The Current State of Design Craft: Borrowing, Tinkering, and Problem Solving

Author(s): David L. Weimer

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1993), pp. 110-120
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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 Publicadministrators oftendo policyanalysis.Elected
executives and legislators
sometimes calluponadminis-
tratorswho headagenciesto offer adviceaboutpolicies
relatedto theprograms theyadminister. Administrators
at all levels routinely
confront problemswithintheir
agenciesthatbringintoquestionexisting organizational
policiesandsuggestthedesirabilityofconsideringalter-

Tinkering,
Bonrowing,an
d natives. Sometimes
actas consumers
in thesesituations
administrators
ofadviceoffered in pol-
byspecialists

Problem
Solving
icyanalysis;at othertimes,theyproduceanalysisthem-
selves.In eithercase,theycan be moreeffectivewitha
betterunderstanding of the craftof policyanalysis,
especiallythatrelatedto the designof policyalterna-
tives.
David
L.Weimer, ofRochester
University Policyanalysisseems to dividelogicallyintothree
distinct
phases:problemdefinition, policydesign,and
policyevaluation.The division,however,impliesa
Whatcan practitionerslearnfromtherecentresearch sequencingofstepsthatneither fitsactualpracticenor
on policydesign? David L. Weimercontendsthatwhile prescribeshow to do good analysis. For all but the
theliteratureon policydesignhas improvedin recent simplestpolicyissues,thesequenceof problemdefini-
years,therearefew examplesofarticlesexplicitly tion,policydesign,and policyevaluationcan onlybe
addressedtopractitionerswho have a greatdeal togain one iterationof a processthatrepeatedly refinesthe
fromthisbodyofacademic work. Usinga varietyof
problemdefinition in lightof considereddesignsand
theirpredictedconsequences.Although, forpurposes
real and hypotheticalcases, Weimeroffersan introduc-
ofeffectivecommunication, thefinalproductofanalysis
tionto the "craftofpolicydesign,"focusingon various should generallyappear as if it follows the basic
and directions
techniques,strategies, forfuture sequence linearly,an effectiveprocessforproducing
research. theanalysismustalmostalwaysbe configurative, mov-
ing fromone phase in the sequenceto anotheruntil
coherent and reasonedadviceemergesaboutthedesir-
of current
ability policyand itsalternatives.'
Thus,the
studyof designcannotbe completely divorcedfrom
explicitconsiderationof eitherproblemdefinition or
policyevaluation.
In recentyears,policydesignhas begunto receive
considerable attention.
Efforts
havebeenmadetoiden-
tifyand characterizethe generictoolsof government
thatcan be used as thebasicelements forcrafting
poli-
cies (Hood, 1986; Savas, 1987; Weimerand Vining,
1989; Salamon,1989; Brysonand Ring,1990). Even
moreworkseemsto be directedat understanding the
place of policydesignin thebroadercontextof politi-
cal systemsand publicpolicymaking(Dryzek,1983;
Linderand Peters,1984,1987,1988,1989;Woodside,
1986; Bobrow and Dryzek,1987; Ingraham,1987;
Schneiderand Ingram,1988, 1990; deLeon, 1988;
Ingramand Schneider, 1990). Althoughthissteadily
growingstreamof literature certainly
addressesfunda-
mentalissuesin thepolicysciences,itsgenerality and
level of abstraction
makeits immediate usefulness to
practicingpolicyanalystsobscure.

110 PublicAdministmrion
Review* Mrch/Apiil
1993,Vol.53,No.2

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 Theliteraturedirectlyrelevant
to thepractice
ofpolicydesign Narrowly defined,borrowing refersto the searchforpolicy
remainssmall. One lineof inquiry followsAaronWildavsky'salternatives thathavebeenusedin othercircumstances to solve
(1979,pp. 15-16)characterizationof policydesignas theartof similar policyproblems.Tinkering referstothemanipulation of
findingsolutions to policyproblems thatspecifydesirablerela- thedimensions ofa policyalternativeto generateotheralterna-
tionshipsbetween"manipulable meansand obtainableobjec- tives.The techniques listedundertheproblemand evaluation
tives"(Alexander, 1979,1982;May,1981;Dery,1984).Another phasescan be thought of as forms of borrowing (market/gov-
growsoutoftherelatively smallfraction
ofthevoluminous litera- ernmentfailure or tinkering
analysis) (backward mapping, opti-
tureon implementation thatspeaksto analysts(Bardach,1977; mization, and implementation analysis).Second,verylittlehas
Elmore,1979-80, 1985). Evenhere,only"backward mapping" been written aboutthepolicydesignphase.3Third,
explicitly
emerges as a clearly
identifiable
analytical
technique. muchprofessionallyorientedliterature
existsofrelevance tothe
In thisarticle,I providea concretetreatment of policy problemdefinitionand policy evaluation phases,butlittleof it
designthatI hope willbe usefulto practitioners and teachers makesexplicitconnectionsto policydesign.
of policyanalysis. Specifically, I seek to explicatehow the
problemdefinition and policyevaluationphases relateto
designwithsimpleexamplesdrawnmainlyfromthemanage- ProblemDefinition
and PolicyDesign
mentofmunicipal solidwaste. Myfocusin discussing whatI Problemdefinition generally involvesthreeactivities:
inves-
believeto be thecurrent stateof thecraft of designis on the tigating thenature, extent,and probablecausesof thecondi-
roleoftheanalyst, whether playedbya policyspecialist or an tioninitially perceivedas sociallyundesirable;framing the
administrator.I thenexplorehow researchmightcontributeconditionas a policyproblempossiblyamenableto public
to theimprovement ofdesigncraft. intervention; and specifying the relevantgoals forevaluating
candidatepolicysolutions.Consider,forexample,a mayor
concernedabouttherisingcostof thedisposalof municipal
ConceptualOverview solidwastein landfills.An analyst, perhapsthecitymanager
I definepolicydesignas thespecification ofcandidate poli- or budget director, seeking to advise themayormight prepare
cies forimproving somesocialcondition.In theabstract, one an initial
problem definitionwith threemajor components.
can imaginetheset of all possiblepolicyalternatives. Policy theanalyst
First, wouldinvestigate thecondition ofconcern
designwouldthenbe thought to be fullyeffectiveifit speci- as an experientialproblem. Perhapsthe followingstory
fiedas a candidatepolicythealternative in thesetofpolicies wouldemerge.The costsofusinglandfills indeeddo seemto
thattheanalyst, considering all relevantvalues(including per- be rising. One reasonis theincreasing prices(tippingfees)at
haps instrumental valuessuch as politicalfeasibility), would thelandfills used bythecity.The growing of fed-
stringency
preferoverall others.2In practice, of course,forall butthe eraland stateregulations has increased,and willincreasefur-
simplestpolicyproblems, analysts have no hope of knowing ther,the costsof opening,operating, and closinglandfills.
withcertaintywhether theywouldprefer someas yetunspeci- Thesehighercostsare reflected in highertippingfees. Also,
fiedalternativesto thebestof thosethattheyhave specified. regionaldevelopment is reducingthe availability of nearby
Therefore, a less stringent criterion is needed forjudging sites suitableforlandfills,and heightenedpublic concern
designeffortsin practice.Assuming thatsocialconditions can abouttoxicwastesmakesit difficult to getneighboring juris-
alwaysbe improvedin some way,a designeffort is consid- dictions to acceptthosesitesthatmight otherwise be suitable.
eredto be minimally effectiveifitspecifies a candidatepolicy Anotherreasonforrisingdisposalcosts forthe cityis the
thattheanalyst prefers to thestatusquo. growingvolume of solid waste generatedby residents.
Eachofthethreephasesofthepolicyanalysis processoffers Although thepopulation ofthecityhas beenstable,thewaste
techniques minimally
forfacilitating effectivedesign.Thesetech- generated perresident has been rising, following theaverage
niques,whicharelistedinTable1,provide thebasisforthedis- nationalincreasefrom3.22 pounds per residentper day
cussionofthecurrent stateofdesigncraft thatfollows. (lb/capita/d) in 1970 to 3.43 lb/capita/d in 1980 and 3.58
A fewpreliminary comments mayhelpprovideperspective. lb/capita/d in 1986 (FranklinAssociates, 1988).
First,notethatborrowing and tinkering are thespecifictech- Second,the analystwould tryto specifya modelof the
niques thatcan be identified forthe policydesignphase. problemthatincludesvariablessubjectto manipulation bythe
Table 1
Perspectives on Policy Design

PolicyPhase Technique Representative

ReferenceMajorStrengths MajorWeaknesses
Problemdefinition Market/governmentWeimer & Vining(1989) Suggests
broad Difficult
to fitto context
failure
analysis proto-alternatives
Backwardmapping Elmore(1985) Concreteness;
targeting Narrow rangeofproto-alternatives
Policydesign Borrowing Schneider& Ingram(1988) Provides
"working" model Searchcosts;inappropriate analogy
Tinkering May(1981) Systematic
incrementalismNarrow rangeofproto-alternatives
Policyevaluation Optimization Stokey& Zeckhauser(1978) Finetuning Needforsimplification
Implementation Bardach(1977) Focuson essential
elementsOveremphasis on feasibility
analysis andtheiravailability

TheCurrent
State
ofDesign
Craft:
Borrowing,
Tinkering,
andProblem
Solving 111

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 What
city. Because the factorscontributing to the risingpriceof
usinglandfills are largelybeyondthecontrolof thecity,the might becalled themacroeconomicc
pricemustbe treatedas a parameter rather thanas a variable
subjectto manipulation.Consequently, attention wouldturn
to thefactors thatmight affect thequantity ofwastegenerated. approach topolicy analysis"provides a more
Forexample,becauseresidents payforrefusecollection based
on theassessedvalueoftheirproperty rather thanon thevol- stringent standard for problem definition: the
ume of refusethattheygenerate, theyperceivethepricethat
theypay to dispose of an additionalunitof garbage(their achievement ofeconomic efficiency.
marginal private cost)to be virtually zerorather thantheactu-
al costthatthecitymustbearto collectandtakeitto a landfill
Of course,one mayfailto discovertheproblemdefinition
(themarginal socialcost). One can imaginevariouswaysthat
thatleadsto thebestpolicyalternative. Forexample,theana-
the citycould attemptto get residentsto act accordingto
lyst may have prematurely foreclosed attention on ways of
marginal socialcostrather thanmarginal privatecost:inform-
reducingthe priceof usinglandfills.Perhapsan agreement
ing themof the actualsocialcostof theirrefusegeneration,
witha neighboring to provide
changingthe structure of refusefeesto reflect moreclosely could be reached community
less costly landfillcapacity in return forcooperation in devel-
thevolumesgenerated, or limiting thequantities or typesof
oping, say, a regionalsewer district.Effective effortsto
refusethatthecitywillcollect.
reducethevolumeof wastemightactuallyprecludesuchan
Third,theanalyst wouldproposeandjustify thegoalsto be agreement in thefuture iftheneighboring community allows
used in evaluating policyalternatives. So, forexample,one the siteto be developedforotheruses, findsan alternative
goal certainly would be reducingthe rateof increasein the solutionto itssewage problem,or requiresa minimum vol-
costto thecityofrefusedisposal.Othergoalswouldlikelybe ume of waste to make developmentof the site financially
relatedto suchvaluesas thepublicacceptability oftherefuse attractive. Evenifitdidnotdirectly precludetheoptionofthe
collectionsystem, thetimeand inconvenience costsit inflicts cooperativelandfill, the reductionin the volumeof refuse
on residents, and itsenvironmental impacts. mightsufficiently reducecosts so thatinsufficient political
Note thatthisinitialproblemdefinition alreadypoints interestin the issue remains to motivate continued search for
towarda set of proto-alternatives (roughlysketchedrather furthercost reductions.
thanfullydevelopedpolicies)thatrespondto thedivergence Foreclosedsearch,precludedoptions,and thesuppression
betweentheprivateand socialcostsofrefusedisposal.Thus, of fundamental problemsare simplythe undesirableconse-
it satisfiesat leastthe necessarycondition fora good policy quences attributed to incremental decisionmaking. This
definition proposedby David Dery (1984); namely,thatit shouldnotbe surprising; thenecessary condition fora good
offersan opportunityfor improvingsocial conditions. problemdefinition, thatit createopportunities foradvancing
Obviously,otherproblemdefinitions could lead to other socialvalues,is an incremental standard.The riskof solving
opportunities forimproving socialconditions.Forexample,in thewrongproblem, sometimes referred to as "typeIII error,"
documenting theexperiential problem, theanalystmight have is inherent (Dunn,1988). Analysts can reducetheriskoftype
discovered thatresidents ofthecityrecyclemuchlessthanthe III errorthrough a willingness to redefine problemsas new
1986 nationalaverageof .39 lb/capita/d.The modelof the information becomesavailable. Oftenthe new information
problemwould thenprobablyhave includedvariables,such willbe policies,observedin otherjurisdictions or proposedby
as residents'knowledgeof recycling opportunities and the interested parties, thatdo notfollowfromtheinitialproblem
coststheyface in recycling, whichwouldlead to a differentdefinition. Ifthediscovered alternatives have at leastsurface
set of proto-altematives (perhapstheestablishment of collec- merit, thentheanalyst shouldconsiderredefining theproblem
tioncenters,curb-sidecollectionof separatedmaterials, and so thattheunderlying modelframes thesealternatives, andthe
theprovision ofinformation aboutcomposting) and additional positedgoalsprovidea basisforevaluating all theireffects.
goals(reduction in recyclable materialsfrom thewastestream)
forevaluating alternatives. Whatmight be calledthemacroeconomicc approachto pol-
icyanalysis"providesa morestringent standardforproblem
Thesedefinitions oftheproblemsharea commonfocuson definition: the achievement of economicefficiency.Taking
thequantity of municipal wastegenerated by residents.One efficiency as the onlyvalue, and the idealizedcompetitive
can thusimaginea morecomprehensive butstillmanageable economyas the standardof efficiency, the macroeconomic
problem definition thatmodelsbothgrossandnetwastegener- approachequatesproblemdefinition to the identification of
ation.Itwouldprobably leadto a broaderrangeofproto-alter-market failures, situationsin whichviolations of theassump-
natives-theunionof setssuggestedby thenarrower defini- tionsof the competitivemodel lead to inefficiency.The
tions.As fullyspecified alternativesemergeand areevaluated, exclusivefocuson efficiency obviouslybringsintoquestion
theanalyst maydiscover thatthoseoffering thegreatest oppor- thedesirability ofthemacroeconomic approachas a checkon
tunitiesall fallwithin one of thenarrower problemdefinitions.therisksof incrementalism. Nevertheless, becauseefficiency
For expositional purposes,the analystmightverywell recast shouldalmostalwaysbe one of the goals considered,and
the problemdefinition once againto emphasizethe factors because the specification of marketfailureslends itselfto
leadingto the favoredalternatives.Indeed,refocusing the modelingwiththepowerful toolsof positiveeconomicsthat
problemdefinition sometimes playsan important rolein stimu- naturally lead to genericpolicyalternatives, themicroeconom-
latingpoliticalinterest in,and mobilizing politicalsupportfor, ic approachusuallyservesas a usefulstarting pointforprob-
therecommended alternatives (Kingdon, 1984;Weiss,1989). lemdefinition.

112 PublicAdminisraton
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 In additionto thesetraditional market otherlimita-
failures,
ASlongasefficiency
isthe social
only and
goal, tionsofthecompetitive model,whichcannotbe as easilyana-
lyzedin termsof supplyand demand,can serveas rationales
allthe assumptions ofthe competitive economy are for publicpolicy:markets
sumerpreferences
withfewbuyersor fewsellers;con-
thatare endogenous,interdependent, or
unacceptable; incomplete markets forinsurance; biasesin risk
met, then norationale existsforfurther perception;imperfect capitalmarketsand inconsistent time
preferences; and adjustment costsresulting frominflexibilities
government intervention. in prices. (Of course,addingeven the simplestnotionsof
equityand humandignity as valuesto be consideredalong
ProblemDefinitionas theIdentification ofMarketand withefficiency raisea greatvariety of distributional
rationales
Government Failures. At the heartof the macroeconomicforpublicpolicy. The economicapproachtypically treats
approachto policyanalysisis theconceptof theefficiency of theseothervaluesas exogenously imposedconstraints on the
the perfectly competitiveeconomy. Undera numberof searchforefficiency.)
assumptions concerningthenatureof goods,thepreferences
ofconsumers, and theproduction ofgoodsfromfactor Theframework can also be extended to includegovernment
inputs,
themaximization of utility failures,thegenericwaysthatcollective actionfailsto obtain
by consumers and profits by firms
leads to Paretoefficiency:no reallocation Pareto efficiency.Economists have mainly concentratedon the
of factorinputsor
goods could increasethe utilityof one consumerwithout problems encountered in the government supply of goods
decreasing the utility
of some otherconsumer.Government (Wolf, 1979; Viningand Weimer, 1990). Others can be identi-
playsonlyan implicit rolein establishing fied as inherentin theaggregation of individual preferences,the
thesystem of prop-
ertyrightsthatpermits operation of representative government, and the decentraliza-
privategoodsand theframeworks that
allow marketexchangesamongconsumersand producers tionofpolitical authority(Weimer andVining, 1989).
who takepricesas givens. As longas efficiency is theonly To see how the identification of market/government fail-
socialgoal,and all theassumptions ofthecompetitive econo- uresinproblemdefinition leadsto proto-altematives, return to
myare met,thenno rationaleexistsforfurther governmenttheexampleof risingrefusedisposalcosts. The feestructure
intervention. forrefusedisposalservicesprovidedby the city,whichis
Marketfailures representdeparturesfromtheassumptions based on assessedproperty value rather thanrefusegenerat-
of theperfectly ed, creates an externality problem.4 The marginal costofdis-
competitive economythatprevent theecono-
myfromreaching a Paretoefficient posal experienced by a resident is the marginal social cost
equilibrium. Problemdef-
initionthusinvolvesidentifyingmarket divided by thatresident's share of the tax base-effectively
failuresthatmayjustify
government intervention.The market failures zero in a largecity. Thus,theresident disposesof too much
providemodels
thatsuggestpolicyalternatives. Benefit-cost waste fromthe social perspective. Because all the residents
analysisprovides
the analyticalmethodsfordetermining if an alternative is facesimilar incentives,theyall over-dispose so thatrefusefees
potentiallyParetoimproving grow to exceed the value of therefuse servicesprovided.All
(the Kaldor-Hickscriterion).
Does it generatean excess of benefits over costsso thatit could be made betteroff if everyone cut back on disposal.
wouldbe at leastpossibleto makeone or morepersonsbetter The macroeconomic approachwould view the externality
offwithout makinganyoneworseoff? problemas an artifactof therefusefee structure thatdecou-
Economists generallyfocuson four"traditional" marketfail- ples marginal private cost from marginal social cost. An
ures,whichcan be readilyanalyzedusingthe comparative apparentlydirectsolutionwould be to alter the fee structure
staticsof supplyand demand(Weimerand Vining,1989). so thatresidentspaid in proportion to the volume of refuse
Publicgoodsproblemsarisewhenmorethanone personcan thattheygenerated-anapproachbeingtakenby a growing
consumethe same good (nonrivalry) or the ownerof the numberof communities (Watson,1990). The recognition of
good cannotprecludeothersfromconsuming it (nonexclud- an externality
problem leads
naturally to policies that attempt
ability).A purepublicgood,likenationaldefense,is charac- to realignmarginal privateand marginal socialcosts. So, for
terizedby bothnonrivalry and nonexcludability. Externalityexample,economists approaching thedisposalproblemfrom
problemsarisewhen marginalprivatebenefits(costs) from thenationalperspective mightverywell recommend a set of
eitherproduction or consumption differfrommarginal social taxesthatwould internalize
disposalcosts in theprices ofcon-
benefits(costs). Naturalmonopoly problemsarisein indus- sumer goods.
trieswithdecliningaveragecost overthe relevantrangeof Two pointsconcerning thedefinitionofproblems as market
demandso thata singlefirmcan produceat lowestaverage failures deservenote. First,
associatedwitheach market failure
cost. Profitmaximizing pricingresultsin thesinglefirmpro- are one or moregenericpoliciesthatappearto offerdirect
ducingtoo littlefromthesocialperspective.Moregenerally, solutions.Forexample:provision ofpurepublicgoodsthrough
economiesof scale or scope can lead to oligopolywithpro- either government production orcontracting; creation ofprivate
duction levels deviating fromthe competitiveideal. property to makecommonproperty
rights publicgoodsexclud-
Information asymmetry problemsarisewhenone partyto a able; regulation or publicownership to prevent supplyrestric-
transactionhas information that,ifrevealedto theotherparty, tionbynatural monopolies;and regulation ofquality or stricter
wouldchangetheotherparty's behavior.As longas thecosts liability rulesto forcedisclosurein situations of information
of providing the informationare less thanthe benefits from asymmetry. Second,thesesuggested policiesare proto-altema-
the changedbehavior,the persistenceof the informationtivesthatalmostalwaysrequireextensive additionalspecifica-
asymmetry is inefficient. tionbeforetheycan be evaluated.In thecase of a volumetric

TheCurrent
StateofDesignCraft:
Borrowing,
Tinkering,
andProblem
Solving 113

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 Apolicy
feeforrefuse, mustbe determined
designconsiderations before
it can be reasonably
designconsiderations
comparedwithotheralternatives.
formeasuring
Such design
emerges
byworkingdowm
back the
includeprocedures volume
andenforcement systems forcontrolling
illegaldumping
byres-
identsto avoidfees. Thus,thelevelofabstractionofthemar- chain
ofdecisions:
themayor's
office an
prepares
ketfailureapproachis botha strength and weakness;broad
proto-altematives
encouragenonincremental butgen-
thinking, analysis the
showingcost centralized
savingsfrom
erallydo notimmediately suggestall theimportantcontextual
factorsthatmustbe considered. andspecifying
composting the elments
necessary of
ProblemDefinition as BackwardMapping. Whereasthe
macroeconomic approachto problemdefinition leadsto a top- the new leaf-disposalpolicy.
down approachof movingfromgenericproto-alternatives to
morespecificdesigns,the backwardmappingapproachto sortsof tasks,thenthecitymightconsiderdistributing a stan-
problemdefinition leadsto a bottom-up assembly of program dardbag. Sanitation workers couldhandoutbagsalongrefuse
elementsthatyieldsspecificdesigns. It can be thought of as collection routes.Thenumber ofbagsneededbyresidents will
strategicthinking about undesirablesocial conditions: What vary.How canresidents be givenaccessto bagsattimeswhen
behaviors giveriseto theundesirable conditions?Whatinter- theywantthem?Perhapssupermarkets couldbe convinced to
estsandvalueslead to thesebehaviors?In lightoftheseinter- sellthestandard bagsat a nominal fee. How can thecoopera-
ests and values,whatare the opportunities foraltering the tionofthesupermarkets be secured?Theymight be willingto
behaviors?Backwardmappingtakesthe ultimate targetsof sell thebags as a publicservice. Or perhapsthegood will
policyas thestarting point,repeating thesequestionsforeach valueofhavingtheirnamesand addressesprinted on thebags
of theorganizational levelsthatseparatethetargets fromthe wouldbe sufficient to inducetheirparticipation. Assuming that
policydesigner (Elmore,1979-80, 1985). thesupermarkets agreeto participate, whatmustthesanitation
Foran illustrationofbackwardmapping, return once again department do to keep themstockedwithbags duringpeak
to the municipalsolid-waste periods? What additional resources mustthecitycouncilpro-
problem.The first taskforthe
backwardmapperis to identify therelevant vide to the sanitationdepartment for ittobuildthecentral com-
targetbehaviors.
Lookingat the composition of the wasteproducedby resi- posting facilityand carry out the other new responsibilities?
dentssuggestssome appropriate Whatinformation andpolitical skillwillthemayorneedto con-
targets.If the cityfitsthe
nationalprofile,thenabout 35 percentof waste by weight vince the citycouncil to provide theseresources?
consistsof paper and paper board; yardwastes make up The backwardmappingthustakesthe analystfromthe
another20 percent. One targetgroupwould be people as desiredmethodof leaf disposal by residentsback to the
usersof paperand anotherwouldbe people as producers of actionsthatmustbe takenby the citycouncilto set it in
yardwaste-all residents use paper;thosewho livein single- motion.A policydesignemergesbyworking backdownthe
familyhomesproducethemajority ofyardwaste. chainof decisions:the mayor'sofficepreparesan analysis
The secondtaskrequiresan assessment of thevaluesand showingthe cost savingsfromcentralized composting and
interestsrelated to the behaviors of the targetgroups. specifying the necessary elements of the new leaf-disposal
Consider, forinstance, theproducers ofyardwaste. Theyare policy. The citycouncilallocatesfundsto the sanitation
generally homeowners who takepridein the appearanceof department forconstructing and operatingthe composting
theirproperty.Duringthespringand summer, theydispose facility,purchasing stocks of appropriate bags,addingcollec-
of grassclippings, and,duringthefall,theydisposeof large tions solely for leaves, and advertising to inform residentsof
volumesof leaves-activitiesgenerallyperceivedas chores the new policy. The citycouncil also passes ordinances per-
thatdeserveas littletimeand effort as possible. Thosewho mitting theprinting ofthenamesofparticipating supermarkets
are gardeners generateadditional wastethroughout thegrow- on the bags, requiring disposal of leaves in these bags,and
ingseason. Theyare morelikelyto view theiractivity as a directing the sanitation department to distribute information
recreationratherthanas a chore. abouttheordinances to residents.
The thirdtaskinvolvesfinding opportunities forchanging This examplesuggestsseveralgeneralpointsconcerning.
targetedbehaviors.Forexample,residents couldbe informedthedefinition of problems through backwardmapping.First,
thatleavinggrassclippings dispersedon thelawnaftermow- by beginning with consideration of thedisaggregated behav-
ing generallycontributesto healthierlawns (Wisconsin ioraltargets of policy intervention, it naturallyleads to focused
Department of NaturalResources, 1987). Gardeners couldbe rather thanbroadpolicyinterventions. Thus,backwardmap-
encouragedto buildcomposters fortheiryardwastesthrough ping encouragesthe analystto breakbroad problemsinto
a subsidyand technicalassistanceprogram.Residents could moremanageable subproblems.
be requiredto disposeof leaves in biodegradable bags that Second,boththenarrowfocusand theexplicit attentionto
couldbe putdirectly intoa city-runcomposting facility. specificbehaviors tendto yielddetailedpolicydesignsthrough
The tasksare thenrepeatedforthosewho mustacton the thebottom-up assemblyof elements-this contrasts withthe
identifiedopportunities.In the case of leaf disposal,for search for proto-altematives that must then be specified indetail
thesanitation
instance, department mustestablish standards for through forward mapping from the general tothe specific.
acceptablebags and enforce violationsofthestandards.Ifthe Third,morethanone detaileddesignforeach targetcan
sanitationdepartment does not have experiencewiththese emergefrombackward mapping.Justas thepathfromproto-

114 PublicAdminitraion
Review* MarhApril1993,Vol.53,No.2

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alternative
to detaileddesignrequires choicesaboutpro-
explicit
gramelements, thepathfrom
policyalso requires
target
behaviorto fully
assembled
choices. Keepingmorethanone optionat
When aretaken
problem asgiven
rather
anyone decisionpointgenerates morethanone design.
than
asa search
for itis
opportunities,
Finally, forwardand backward mapping each have
strengths and weaknessesrelatedto the tradeoff between
depthand breadth.Backwardmappingleads to a detailed
especially
important status
the
toframe quo
designthatis welltargeted
andthoroughly informed byimple-
mentation considerations.The analyticalcostof such speci- asoneofthe
alternatives.
however,probablyleads to theconsideration
ficity, of fewer so thatpoliciesto addressone can be translated intopropos-
and less variedalternatives.5
By beginning withless detailed als foraddressing the other. The stockpiling of criticalraw
proto-alternatives,
forwardmappingpermits a broadersearch materialsfordefenseindustries as a safeguard againstcutoffs
fordistinctpolicyinstruments. The corresponding disadvan- duringwartime,forexample,suggestedthe possibilityof
tage,of course,is thatimplementationissuesmaynotreceive stockpiling
petroleum to reducethevulnerability oftheecono-
adequateattention as morefully
specified policiesemerge. myto disruptions oftheworldoil market.Generally, howev-
er, the mostappropriate and the mostcommonsourcefor
borrowing,especiallyforlowerlevelsofgovernment in feder-
PolicyDesign:Borrowing
and is thepoliciesadoptedbyotherjurisdictions
al systems, facing
Tinkering similarproblems-lateral
organizationto another.
borrowing of policyideas fromone

In theliteratureon thepolicydesignphaseitself, one finds A logicalapproachto lateralborrowing involvesdrawing

relatively
littleprescription. One mightreasonably arguethat analogies.The first analogyinvolvesidentifying organizations
backwardmappingso completely blendsdesignwithproblem thatare sufficiently similarto one's own to offerat leastthe
definitionthatit shouldbe considereda techniqueof policy prospectforcomparability. An analystworkingfora small
design. Indeed,doingso bringsintoquestionthe utility of cityfacingrisingcostsof solid-waste disposal,forexample,
identifyinga separatedesignphaseat all. Yet,ifforno other mightbeginby lookingforcitiesof similarsize in thesame
reasonthananalystssometimesconfront politicallydefined statethatsharethe
problem.Ifno "new"ideasemerge,then
problems thattheydo nothaveliberty to redefine,considering the searchmightbe expandedto citiesof different size or
policydesignas a distinct activityseemswarranted.
citieslocatedin otherstates-citiesless likelyto be similarin
Whenproblemsare takenas givenrather thanas a search relevantways because of differences in scale, region,and
foropportunities, it is especiallyimportant to framethestatus legalframeworks.
quo as one of thealternatives. Notonlydoes a clearspecifi- Once the
analystfindsanotherorganization thatseemsto
cationofthestatusquo policyprovidea baselineforidentify-be addressing a similar
problem withsomepolicydesign,then
ingandvaluingtheimpacts ofotheralternatives intheevalua-
a carefulcomparison of similarities
and differences between
tionphase,treating thestatusquo as a viablealternative helps the situationsfacingthe organizations should be made to
avertan analyticalbias towardchange. This is especially ifthepolicymightbe transferable.7 For purposes
determine
important becausemostalternatives thrustuponanalysts come return
ofillustration, to theproblemofyardwastes. Aninno-
fromadvocateswho represent specificinterests. How should
vativeapproachto yard-waste reduction, pioneeredby King
analystsgo aboutdesigning alternativesto thestatusquo on County, Washington, is publicpromotion and subsidyofback-
theirown? Whatlittleadvicethereis aboutdesigning policy yardcomposting. The county'ssolid-waste divisionpurchases
alternativesfallsundertwo broadheadings:borrowing and
composting kitsfor$16.50thatitdistributes to residents
fora
tinkering. feeof $8.75. In additionto thissubsidy, thesolidwastedivi-
Borrowing: TheSearcbforAppropriate Analogies.The old sion promotesparticipation throughadvertising and offers
proverb,"thereis nothingnew underthesun,"suggeststhat written and telephoneadviceon usingthecomposters.Over
analystsshouldsearchforpolicyalternatives ratherthancreate 16,000composters have been purchasedby residents so far
themde novo. The proverbcertainly understates theroleof and 70 percent ofsurveyed purchasersestimate thattheyhave
in humanaffairs.
creativity Absenta widelyacceptedbasisfor reducedyardwastesbyapproximately 75 percent(Watersand
prescribing creativity, however,it pointsto an activity that Cox, 1990). Whatfactors shouldanothercountyor citycon-
does havean apparentlogic:searching forpolicydesignsthat siderindecidingwhether theKingCounty program providesa
havebeenproposedorused in analogouscircumstances. usefulprototype?
Ideas fordesigncomefromseveralsources. Occasionally, A numberof possibledifferences of potential
relevanceto
proposalsmade by thosewho have studieda problem(typi- theappropriateness of emulation come to mind. How does
callyacademics)or thosewho have encountered it through averageyard-size
compareto thatin theunincorporated areas
professionalpractice,suggestnovel policydesigns.6 For of KingCountywherethe programis beingimplemented?
example,theidea ofdecoupling aid to farmers
frominefficientHow do differences
in climateaffectthequantityofyardwaste
price-supportsystems,whichhas been advocatedby a num- generated and therelative effectiveness
of composting?How
berofobservers offarmpolicyovertheyears,finallysurfaced do publicattitudes
abouttheenvironment and recycling
com-
as a seriouspolicyalternative
in themid-1980s.Sometimes,pare? Greatdifferences in anyofthesecomparisons couldwell
differentsubstantive
problemssharesufficiently
similarmodels render
theKingCounty program an inappropriate
prototype.

TheCurrent
StateofDesignCraft:
Borrowing, andProblem
Tinkering, Solving 115

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I Limitations
inthe
availability
ofinformation
rialsfurther and preparethemformarket.
pertonintipping feesforuse ofthelandfill;
collectionof nonrecyclable
(The citypayed$32
costsforcurbside
refuseaveragedabout $57 per
complicate
the
logic
ofdrawing
analogies. ton.)Thecityclaimedall therevenuefrom salesofmaterial
the contractor-about$33,000duringthe firstsix months,
by

mostly fromthesale ofaluminum.The cityadvertised to pro-

Limitationsin theavailabilityof information complicate the mote
participation,whicha surveysuggeststo havebeen at a
logicof drawinganalogies. Becauseit is usuallydifficult and rateof
about80 percentofhouseholdssetting outmaterials at
costlyto findoutwhatotherorganizations facingcomparable leastonce permonth, butdid notpenalizethosehouseholds
problemsare doing,searching is unlikely to be comprehen- thatdidnot
participateorrewardthosethatdidparticipate.
sive and may involve heuristicswith predictablebiases
(Schneider and Ingram, 1988). It is likelyto be drivenbyper- TakingtheMilwaukeeprogram as a basicmodel,one can
sonal and professional connections, reportsin professional inductively identifya number ofkeycomponents fora munici-
publications,and thevolunteered accountsof policyinnova- pal recycling program: theresponsibility placedon residents,
tions-usuallyfromthe innovators themselves, people who themethodofcollection, and thearrangements forprocessing
typicallyhave made substantial investments in time,energy, and disposal. The first step in tinkering involvesspecifying
and reputationthat may render them unable to make possiblemodifications of the components as theyappearin
detached assessmentsof theirpolicies (Weimer,1980). thebasicmodel. The responsibilitiesof residentscan be
Consequently, borrowing is likelyto be farfromtheideal of viewedfromseveralperspectives. One concerns whattheres-
fullyinformed choicefromamongthefullsetofutilizedpoli- identsarerequired to do. In theMilwaukee program, theyare
cydesigns. onlyasked to separatethe specifiedrecyclablesfromtheir
refuse.Theycouldinsteadbe askedto makefurther separa-
Tinkering:Incremental Adjustment.Policyanalystsrarely tions,
say,by placingplastics,metals,glass,and paper into
facea clean slate. The contexts, ifnotthecauses,of policy
designatedbins. Thiswould reducecollectioncosts,but it
problemsgenerally includemosaicsof existing policies. The wouldalso inconvenience
residents,
especially thosewithlim-
elementsof thesepoliciesprovidetherawmaterial forpolicy
itedstoragespace, and probablyreducevoluntary participa-
design. So too do prototypes borrowedfromotherjurisdic-
tion. Evenmoreof thecollection and separation costscould
tionsand proto-alternatives arisingout of theproblemdefini-
be shifted to residents by askingthemto bringrecyclables to
tionphase.PeterMay,in one oftheonlyessayson thecraft of
neighborhood collection centersrather thanplace themcurb-
policydesignaddressedto practitioners as well as scholars,
side. Thus,we haveat leastthreeoptionsconcerning resident
advocatesviewingthe creationof policyalternatives as the
responsibilities:
singleseparation, curbside(thebasic model);
"feasible manipulations"of key policy elements.8 His
multiple separation, curbside; andcentralized dropoff.
approachcan be thought ofas one ofincremental adjustment,
or tinkering. In thebasicmodel,residents are motivated by moralsua-
sionthrough advertising thatappealsto thenormsof commu-
I do notuse tinkering pejoratively. Rather, I intendit to
nityand environmental responsibility. Moralsuasionmight be
conveythe idea of seekingbetterpolicydesignswithinthe
supplemented withsanctions againstthose who do not partici-
framework of a basic modelsuch as the statusquo policy.
pate in thecurbsideprograms.Sanctions requirean enforce-
Even whenthe modelrepresents a radicalchangefromthe
mentmechanism, say, refuseworkersspot checkingcollec-
statusquo, tinkering is neededto fititto thespecificcontext
tionsof regulartrashforrecyclables, and a penaltystructure,
andtuneitto thebetter achievement ofrelevant policygoals.
say,a progressively harsherseriesof actionsbeginning with
As an illustration
oftinkering, considerhow analysts might warnings and endingwithlargefines.Suchpunitive measures
go about designingalternative recycling programs fortheir might helpbuilda normforvoluntary recycling or theymight
city.Theycoulddevelopa basicmodelofmunicipal recycling undercutit. Rewardsforparticipation, whileprobablyless
in severaldifferent ways:forward mapping,backwardmap- likelyto affect voluntary participation
negatively, aremoredif-
ping,or borrowing. As previously noted,backwardmapping ficultto incorporate in curbsidecollectionprograms. With
offersgreaterchancesof providing a completeassessment of respectto centralized collection,however,one can imagine
key programelementsthanforwardmapping. Borrowing payingresidents forrecyclables.Pricesbased on salvageval-
generallyoffers evengreater opportunity foridentifying all the ues might be toolow to havea significant impacton participa-
primary program elements whenitis basedon observation of tion;redemption pricesreflecting salvagevaluesand avoided
a working program.In anyevent,tinkering requires thespec- landfill costsmightbe largeenoughto increaseparticipation
ification
ofa basicmodeland itskeyelements. significantly,but thesehigherpricesalso mightserveas a
Imaginethatthe analystshappenedupon the pilotrecy- "refusemagnet," attracting recyclablesfromrefusegenerated
clingprogram beguninJuly1989by Milwaukee, Wisconsin.9 in othercommunities.
The Milwaukeeprogramprovided36,000householdswith Note thatin the basic model collectionis done by city
recycling bins designedto hold approximately one week's employeesand processing by a contractor.Curbsidecollec-
accumulation ofglass(bottlesand jars),plastic(softdrinkbot- tioncouldbe done by a contractor and processing could be
tles and milkjugs), aluminumand othermetalcans, and done bythecity.Fordropoff programs, theoptionsnotonly
newspaper.The binswerecollectedweeklyat curbsideby a includecentersoperatedbycityemployeesor contractors but
sanitationworkerwho separatedthecontents intosegmented also centerssponsoredby community or othernot-for-profit
storageon a taick. The trucks delivered thematerials to a pri- organizations. Withinthesedifferent organizational forms, a
vatecontractor whocharged$25 pertonto separatethemate- numberof additional optionsariseconcerning suchissuesas

116 PublicAdministation
Review* March/April
1993,Vol.53,No.2

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staffinglevels,contractdesign,and the contracting process.
For example,the Milwaukeeprogrampays a contractor
fixedprocessing fee and claimsforitselfall therevenuefrom
a Whether
analysts
amrve
ataninitial
set
of
sales of recyclables.Instead,thecitycouldcreatea stronger
incentive foraggressivemarketingbysharing a fraction
ofthe alternative
policy
designs
bymatching
generic
revenuewiththecontractor.
Havingconsidered variousoptionsforthekeypolicycom-
togeneric
instruments problems,
backward
ponentsof a recycling program, thenexttaskforthetinkerer
is to combineoptionsintofeasibleprogramconfigurations. ortinkering,
borrowing,
mapping, their to
efforts
Not all combinations are viable. For example,establishing
punitive sanctions againstthedisposalofrecyclables inmunic- predict
andvalue
consequencesleadtoideas
often
ipal trashand relyingonlyon dropoff centersoperatedby
community organizations forcollection probably wouldnotbe for
improving
designs.
a politicallyviablecombination-the fines,inconvenience, and
the possiblyunreliable hoursof dropoff centersoperatedby cyproblems haveonlyone goal. Anyonewho expectsclients
volunteers shift too muchoftherecycling burdento residents. or thepolitical system to providesufficient information so that
Nonetheless, thenumberofviablecombinations willoftenbe all goals can be incorporated intoa singleobjectivefunction
largeso thatsomepreliminary screening mustbe done bythe showsconsiderable naivete;analysts bold enoughto provide
tinkererto keeptheanalysismanageable. theirownobjective function risksubmerging tradeoffsthatare
better madeexplicit.Without an objectivefunction thatincor-
poratesall thegoals,formal analysiscan proceedonlyifone
PolicyEvaluationand PolicyDesign goal is takenas theobjectivefunction and theotherstreated
as constraints-this is theapproachof mathematical program-
Whether analysts arriveat an initialsetofalternative policy ming.Theseefforts assumethattheanalyst has a good model
designsbymatching genericinstruments to genericproblems, linking policyvariablesto goals. Unfortunately, theworldis
backwardmapping,borrowing, or tinkering, theirefforts to oftencomplexand difficult to capturein tractablemodels.
predictand value consequences oftenlead to ideas for Further, important uncertaintiesoftencannotbe confidently
improving designs.The mostdirectrouteis through furtherreducedto quantified risksand,therefore, cannotbe incorpo-
tinkering. Yet,ifnoneof thealternatives appearto be better ratedintoformal models.Consequently, evaluation can rarely
thanthestatusquo, thenanalysts shouldreconsider theprob- be reducedto simpleoptimization.
lem definition to see ifother,morepromising, opportunities
can be identified and crafted as policyalternatives. Subject Nevertheless, evaluation forcesspecificity and oftenpoints
onlyto thelimits oftimeand information, theiterativeprocess to opportunities forredesign.Consider, forexample,thepre-
ofevaluation to redesign to evaluation,orevaluation to redefi- viousdiscussion ofyardwastes. In an effort to internalizethe
nitionto designto evaluation, shouldcontinue untilno furthermarginal socialcostsof disposal,residents couldbe required
improvements can be found. to place yardwastesin bags sold at a pricereflecting thedif-
ferencebetweenmarginal privateand marginal social costs.
Two activitiesillustrate the directrelationship between In orderto predictand valuetheconsequencesof thisproto-
evaluationand design:"optimization" and implementationalternative, it is necessary to specify thepriceof thebags. A
analysis.The former showstherelationship betweenevalua- first approximation to marginal socialcostmightbe madeby
tionand designin even highlystylizedanalyses;the latter
simplyestimating thecostto thecityof collecting and taking
showsthe close connection whenthe analysisaimsto pro- each bag to the landfill-ifbags hold about
40 pounds,tip-
duce fully specified alternatives. pingfeesare$30perton,collection costsaverage$50perton,
Redesign as Optimization. Proto-alternatives typicallyleave and bags cost 10 centsto purchaseand distribute, thenthe
thevaluesofcertaindesignparameters unspecified. In highly priceper bag thatwould internalize themarginal socialcost
stylizedeconomicmodels,theproblemfacingtheanalystis to would rangefrom70 cents(if marginal collectioncostsare
maximizesome objectivefunction by choosingthevaluesof assumedto be zero)and $1.70(ifmarginal collectioncostsare
one or morepolicyvariables.In standard benefit-costanaly- assumedto equal averagecollection cost).
sis,forinstance, theobjectivefunction is thepresentvalueof Ideally,evaluationpredictsand values all the conse-
expectednetsocialbenefits.Assumethatthepolicyvariable
quences of policyalternatives.If the pricewere to be set
is thesize ofa flood-control dam. Largerdamscostmorebut
near,say,a dollarperbag,thenanalysts shouldanticipate the
offergreaterprotection againstflooddamage. Findingthe
possibilitythatresidents willnotcooperate.Atthecommunity
optimalsize requiresa searchamongall feasiblesizes forthe
level,vocal residents mayprotestagainstthehighpriceand
one thatmaximizes thepresent valueofexpectednetbenefits.
attempt to have the programeliminated.At the individual
The proto-alternative, builda dam,becomesa fullyspecified
level,someresidents mayattempt to avoidthecostbydispos-
design only aftercompletionof the benefit-cost analysis.
ingofwastein emptylotsthatthecitywilleventually haveto
Thus,in suchstylizedsituations, designcannotbe separated bear a
fromevaluation. Indeed, designis dictatedsolelyby the cost to clear. Some may stealbags by dumping the
modeloftheproblemand itssolution. contents of bagsleftoutovernight byotherresidents.A mar-
ket in counterfeit bags mayeven develop!Afterconsidering
Multiple goals,complexity, anduncertainty limittheuseful- thesepossiblereactions, analystsmaydecide thattrying to
nessof stylized modelsinpolicyanalysis, however.Few poli- pricebagsto internalize directmarginal socialcostfully is not

TheCurrent
StateofDesignCraft:Borrowing,
Tinkering,
andProblem
Solving 117

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 Asimple
desirable. Consideration mightturnnextto moremodest
prices,perhaps25 centsperbag,thatwouldstillcommunicate
to residents theimportanceto thecommunity of reducing
question scenario
underlies Isit
writing:
the
volumeof yardwastes going into landfills,but would be
unlikely to induceeitherpoliticalopposition
or significant
lev- possible
totell
a plausible
story the
ofhow adoption
els ofillegaldisposal.
RedesignBased on Implementation Analysis. Evaluation
a
of policy will
leadtodesired Ifthe
outcomes?
requiresnot onlya fullspecification of the substanceof the
policyalternative but also consideration of its prospectsfor answer isno,then thepolicy must beredesigned.
successfulimplementation. Analysts shouldengagein "for-
ward mapping":identifying all the elementsthatmustbe
assembledforthepolicyto yielditsintendedconsequences, saryprograms.Instead,theymaydecideto makeonlynomi-
assessingthe interests of thosewho controltheseelements, nal efforts to enforcetheban. The resultis likelyto be that
and developingstrategies to inducethemto providetheele- manylocal governments will not substantially contribute to
mentson a timelybasis. The designsof policiesdeveloped newspaper recycling.
through backwardmappingare likelyto have alreadyantici- One can imaginemodifying theban in a numberof ways
pated manyof the elementsrequiredforimplementation;to make local communities more likelyto comply. They
thosethatarisefromborrowing, tinkering, or matching gener- couldbe offered grantsand technical assistanceto lowerthe
ic alternatives to genericproblems arelesslikelyto haveantic- costsofcompliance. The statecouldgivesubsidiesin propor-
ipated the necessaryelements. Skillfulforwardmapping tionto compliance levelsor guarantee to purchasenewspaper
offers theprospectofdiscovering tenuousassumptions under- at somesetpriceto increasethecertainty ofthebenefits from
lyingdesignsand suggestsopportunities forgettingaround complying.Insteadof thesecarrots, the statemightwave a
themthrough redesign. morecrediblestickbysetting a scheduleofcompliance levels
The primary techniqueof forwardmappingis scenario that must be achieved for local communities to be able to
writing (Bardach,1977). A simplequestionunderlies scenario receivecertain grants.
writing: Is itpossibleto tella plausiblestory ofhowtheadop- Modifying thebanto incorporate one or moreofthesepro-
tionofa policywilllead to desiredoutcomes?Iftheansweris visionscan be thought of as redesign.Evaluation, including
no,thenthepolicymustbe redesigned. implementation analysis,mustbe done anewforthemodified
A good scenariois a narrative thatdescribes whatelements designto determine the desirability of itsconsequencesand
mustbe provided,when theymustbe provided,and by thelikelihood thattheywillactually occur. Through thisitera-
whomtheymustbe provided.The writer shouldcritique the tiveprocess,viablenewdesignsemerge.
scenariobyaskingthefollowing threequestionforeach actor
mentioned in thenarrative. First,is providing therequiredele-
mentconsistent withtheinterests oftheactor?Second,ifpro- DesignCraftandthePolicySciences
vidingtheelementis notconsistent withtheactor'sinterests,
whattacticscould the actoruse to avoid providing I hope thatthepreceding synthesis oftheliterature on the
it in an
effective and timely craftof policydesignprovesusefulto practitioners and teach-
manner? Third,whatcounter-tactics could
be used to inducethe actorto providethe element?If the ersofpolicyanalysis.Itshouldmakeclearthat,despitea lack
narrative withstands the critique,it providesa strategy of cleardistinction amongthe phases of the policyanalysis
for
implementation and an inventory process in practice, one can nevertheless identify distincttech-
of theresourcesneededto
executeit. If the answeris no, thenthe narrative niquesfordevelopingpolicyalternatives. Each has strengths
mustbe
rewritten untilit is plausible. If itcannotbe madeplausible, and weaknesses.Thus,it maybe desirableto combinetech-
thenthepolicymustbe redesigned. niquesexplicitly so as to offset theweaknessof one withthe
strength of another.Forexample,market/government failure
As a briefillustration, considera proposedstatelaw that analysisleadsto genericpolicyalternatives thatalmostalways
would ban thedisposalof newspaperin landfills aftersome requirethesortof detailedspecification thatimplementation
future date. The effectiveness of theban willdependon the analysis can provide.
actionsof local governments to removenewspaperfromthe
wastestream, mostlikelythrough separation byresidents prior Policyresearchers wishing to contribute to thecraft ofpoli-
to collection. Whatare the interests of local governments?cy designmightdo so by trying to exploitthestrengths and
Theyshouldbe somewhatsympathetic to theeffort because mitigate theweaknessesof thedesigntechniques.I suggest
diverting newspaperreducestipping feesandoffers hereseveralpromising areasforfuture research.
thepossi-
bilityforrealizingrevenuefromthe sale of the newspaper. First,considermarket/governmentfailure analysis.It con-
To breakeven financially, however,local governments must tributes to designbylinking genericproblems to genericpoli-
achievea highlevelofcooperation fromresidents.Designing cyinstruments. Problems aredefmedinterms ofthefailure of
such a program is difficult
and likelyto requirelargeinvest- statusquo arrangements to achieveeconomicefficiency, so
mentsby local officials, especiallyin communities thathave thatthe instruments operateprimarily to improveefficiency.
no experiencewithrecycling programs.If theydo not per- Efficiencyis rarelythe only appropriate policy goal.
ceivefailureas costly,perhapsbecausetheydo notviewthe Therefore, ourcataloguesof genericpolicyinstruments would
threatof severesanctionsby the stateas credible,thenthey be moreusefulif theyindicateda broaderrangeof likely
maynotbe willingto bearthecostsof developing theneces- effects thatmight be relevant in practicalapplication.

118 PublicAdnitation Review* Marh/April

1993,Vol.53,No.2

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 Attheconceptuallevel,researchers can help inform these uniquecombinations ofpolicyinstruments, to theinstruments
considerations by putting themin moreexplicitinstitutionalthemselves (Bardach,1980;Salamon,1981;and Elmore,1987).
frameworks. The genericinstruments, developedlargely with- It is difficult
forindividualresearchers to conductsuchcom-
in theolderneoclassicalparadigm of perfectcompetition and parative studies,however.Perhapsa morerefined listofpoli-
completeinformation, need to be reexamined fromthe per- cy alternatives wouldprovidea framework fororganizing the
spectivesof the "new institutional economics"-transactionsmorerestricted individualefforts thatcommonlyare made.
coststheory, whichemphasizesboundedrationality, oppor- Absentsomeexplicitefforts to organizecooperative research,
tunism,and asset specificity (Williamson, 1985),and agency I suspectthattenyearsfromnow we willbe facingthesame
theory,whichemphasizesdiscretionary and monitoring costs dearthof systematic empiricalevidenceconcerning whatcon-
(Jensenand Meckling, 1976).Thisreexamination is starting
to textsarelikelyto be mostamenableto specific instruments.
occur,yetit has been neithersystematically appliedacross
Second,considerbackwardmapping.Ironically, thoughit
genericpolicyinstruments norbroughtfromeconomicsinto
is themostclearlyidentified crafttechnique for policy design,
themainstream ofthepolicysciences.10
it is also the mostdifficultto explicate. Manyexperienced
A more explicitinstitutional approach may also help analysts probably use itinstinctively
without recognizingitas
expandthe commonly consideredset of policyinstruments.a technique.It does notcomenaturally to novices.As teach-
For instance,a centralthemeof the new institutional eco- ersof policyanalysis, we wouldbenefit fromcases thatillus-
nomicsconcernsthe problemsthatindividuals and govern- tratehowitcan be applied. Indeed,becauseitis so contextu-
mentshave in makingcrediblecommitments (Rodrikand al in approach,it seems like a topicideallysuitedforcase
Zeckhauser, 1988). Procedural rulesthatmakeit difficult or presentation.
costlyforindividuals or governments to changetheirminds
can be thought of as a genericapproachto solvingthecom- Third,considerborrowing.Anne Schneiderand Helen
mitment problem.An exampleis the provision of the 1988 Ingram(1988)suggesta numberof heuristic biasesthatmight
legislationspecifyingthat the recommendationsof the be expectedto plagueborrowing.Theyalso makea connec-
Commissionon Base Realignment and Closurewould be tionto researchon thediffusion of innovations, a topicthat
acceptedin theirentirety unlessCongressadopteda jointres- receivedmuchattention in the 1970sbuthas been relatively
olutionrejecting themaltogether.Membersof Congresswho dormant in recentyears.A freshlookat innovation processes
faced havingbases in theirdistricts or statesclosed were withan eye towardthe institutional mechanisms thatdo or
unableto undermine the originalcongressional commitmentcould facilitate the diffusion of policyinnovations maybe
to close unneededfacilities so that86 bases are now being desirable. For example,whatmechanisms currently operate
closed. Thus,specifying the agendain advance,beforethe to facilitate thesharingof policyanalyses,ideas,and evalua-
identityofthe"losers"becameapparent, servedas a procedu- tionsamongnational, state,and local publicagencies?How
ralmechanism formakinga morecrediblecommitment.11 effectiveare these mechanisms? How mightthey be
Whether or notitturnsout to be usefulto expandtheset improved?
of genericpolicyinstruments, we would benefitfrommore
empirical investigationsthatattempt to assesstheappropriate-
ness of instruments acrossorganizational, political,and sub- David L Weimeris professor ofpoliticalscienceand pub-
stantivecontexts.Indeed,dissatisfaction withthe failureof lic policy at the Universityof Rochester. He is coauthorof
thevoluminous literature
on implementation to culminate into PolicyAnalysisConceptsand Practice(1989; 1992 Prentice-
generalprinciples prompted a numberof scholarsto urgea Hall),and from1985to 1989,he was theeditoroftheJournal
change in focus away fromprograms,which tend to be ofPolicyAnalysis and Management.

Notes
The authorwouldliketo thankStanley Lee Friedman,
Engerman, William For an attempt to cataloguetheseways,see Wolf(1979). Weimerand
Gormley,
DuncanMacRae,Jr.,andAidanViningforhelpful
comments. Vining(1989) providea broaderframework thatincorporates problems
inherent in democratic, representative,
and decentralized government.
1. For an elaborationof thisview of the processof policyanalysis,see Viningand Weimer(1990) putbureaucratic supplyproblems on a firmer
Weimer andVining(1989,pp. 179-218). conceptualfooting thandoes Wolfby lookingat competition forsupply
2. I purposelyproposean 'analyst-centric" definitionof effectiveness
to and ownership.
keep a focuson designas professional practiceratherthandesignas the 5. Based on a detailed study of 25 decision processes, Mintzberg,
outcomeof politicalprocesses. To the extentthatadvancingthesocial Raisinghani,and Theoret(1976,p. 256) conclude,"Thehypothesis with
good is a professionalnormof policyanalysts, theirpreferenceswillbe thestrongest supportin our studyis thatthe organization designsonly
similarto thoseof an enlightened observer.Policyanalysts who consis- one fully-developed custom-made solution....In contrast,
organizations
tentlyfailto designpolitically
feasiblealternatives,
however, are unlikely thatchose ready-made solutionstypically
selectedthemfromamonga
to remainin positions
ofinfluence. number ofalternatives...."
3. AsidefromMay(1981) and Schneider and Ingram(1988),one might add 6. Often,such ideas are ignoredforlongperiodsbeforereceiving serious
Herbert Simon(1969)and AmitaiEtzioni(1967) as relevant to borrowing, attention(Thomas,1987).
ChristopherAlexander(1967) as relevantto tinkering, and Ernest 7. On the importance of consciouscomparisons of likenessesand differ-
Alexander (1979)as relevantto both. ences in makinganalogiesforpurposesof publicpolicy,see Neustadt
4. Froma slightlydifferent perspective, the disposal problemmightbe and May(1986).
viewedas a failureofgovernment rather thanthemarket. The externality 8. May(1981) also discussessome of thepitfallsof policydesign:ignoring
problemis causedbythefeestructure usedbythecity.One can thinkof relevantvaluesthatlead to misclassification
of problems;givinginsuffi-
thegenericwaysthatcollectivechoicemightlead to suchinefficiencies. cientattentionto implementationbyapplying stocksolutions, prescribing

TheCurrent
State
ofDesign
Craft:
Borrowing,
Tinkering,
andProblem
Solving 119

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 actionstop-down, or formulating'do everything" and dum- 11. Fora discussion
alternatives; of thisand otherdesignconceptsarisingoutof thenew
mying up alternatives
to framefavorably
a desiredpolicy. institutional
economicsand positivepoliticaltheory,
see Weimer(1992).
9. My accountis based on researchconductedby LaurieJohnsonof the It is interesting
to notethatthebase closinglegislation
also allowedthe
RobertM. La Follette ofPublicAffairs,
Institute ofWisconsin.
University selectedbases to be closedwithout of environmental
preparation impact
10. See Brysonand Ring(1990)forone ofthefewattempts at comprehensive statements,a procedural hurdlethatCongressimposedin 1976effectively
treatment. to stoptheadministration fromclosingbases.

References
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