“Do We Need a Sex/ Gender Distinction”

Introduction:
We live an embodied life with genital and reproductive organs, hormones and
chromosomes that locate us physiologically as male or female. In a non-gender or non-sexually
organized world, there might be a municipality of sexual organizations, identities, and practices.
As we’re living in a world where our bodies determine whether we are male or female. The
article explores the women’s movement about the escape from biology treated as destiny, from
sex as a cosmic fate, and from the organization of inequality around reproductive difference. One
side stands for it not to be confusing, frankly having different ways to identify ourselves sexually
(biological body) and with gender (how we feel inside). Though critiques arise from some feminists
themselves with regards to the distinction, rising conflict with cultural or personal experiences.
To accurately describe the human experience without eliminating too much, the article
tackles academic feminist perspective arguments interrelated to sexual identity labeling and the
generalized distinction within society at a large. By then, Val Plumwood argues for keeping the
distinction but acknowledges its limitation, presenting both for/against the subject matter in the
fields of sociology and psychology. A clarity on what constitutes gender vrs. just being part one’s
biological sex.

I. The Context of Distinction:

To determine sex, one must assay chromosomes, external & internal genitalia, gonads,
hormonal states, and secondary sex characteristics. Simply sex is biological, and gender relates
to psychological and cultural term (masculinity and femininity) in an individual. Further concept
into the ‘sex-role stereotyping, let idea of gender depend on society’s expectations for what men
and women should be, fitting in with a high level of conformity to a particular society, place & time,
neglects or fails to invite questions about social dynamics, and power. Although the distinction
initially appeared within a behavioral context, it does not need to rely on the extra theoretical
baggage that these contexts impart; whereas to those who don’t conform as much might not fit
into either the category of masculinity or femininity. As this causes confusion for biological
categories at social differences (like love), there stand good reasons for the need of sex and
gender distinctions.

II. The Point of Distinction:

Satisfactory ways that compounds distinctions be executed are:
1. Born biologically, questions the association of sex and gender’s fix relationship. Forming
from a challenge between separation of the biological act of giving birth (sex) and social
role of caregiving (gender). Emphasizing ‘Gender Characteristics’ variability and
changeability, compared to biological ‘Sexual Differences.’ Femininity/ masculinity aren’t
tied onto one specific group.
2. The distinction is necessary to explain the phenomena concepting biased towards men
(androcentric). From Plato’s inclusion of women in the guardian class in “The Republic”
while simultaneously excluding and devaluing femininity as a whole. As men and women
are foreseen distinct because of biology, it isn’t viable to assume individuals to act in a
 certain ability/ trait as we can utilize different characteristics. Understanding that society
treats women and feminine had been treated unfairly in distinct ways. Even though, both
men and women can be smart and capable.
3. The distinction is a tool against biological reductionism. Further, understanding the diverse
characteristics associated upon on sex and gender. Sex do not determine gender.
Challenging the assumptions that these characteristics are solely determined by biology.
4. The distinction has several important political functions. Recognizing societal norm
conforming biological sex associated with their gender. Masculinity and femininity varies
regardless of biological sex. In fact, rejecting aspect of masculinity/ femininity not
necessarily mean rejecting all biological maleness/femaleness. Refuting assumptions
about the individuals of a particular sex sharing identical characteristics, and further
managing generalizations about gendered traits crucial in the fields like psychoanalysis.
One don’t have to behave in a certain way based on your sex and gender.
5. The distinction of sex & gender function at highlighting the possibility of change within the
system. Considering cultural specificity and historical development of gender as a
framework of what aspects are changeable, what aspects are futile to attempt to change,
and to explore different approaches to effecting change.
6. The distinction enables recognition that gender is partly intentional. In Stollerian account,
gender identity is shaped with beliefs, perceptions, and socialization processes—
significant role of social conceptions between sex and gender.

The author argues that sex & gender distinction is necessary and has specific purposes;
knowing oneself better. Without it, we would need to create one as it would be confusing for us.
Sexual difference cannot met certain conditions, thus, abandoning distinction devalues the ability
to differentiate nurturing, aggressions, and genetic differences. “Sexual Difference” obscures
crucial variations and limits discussions as sometimes bodies don’t fit into neat categories of male/
female.

III. Objections to the Distinction:

The objection stands not necessarily abandoning sex & gender distinction rather it
highlights that sex is not solely a biological category. As the rigid division of social and biological
spheres are flawed. Biological criteria for sex do not always align, as variation of industries and
cultural influences manipulates biological facts to fit in the notion of a dichotomy between
classification of characteristics between 2 sexes. Though, it does not commit to the idea that there
are only 2 genders and sexes.
Further, it highlights the need for sensitivity to boundary cases and recognition of
interactions between the biological and social. The exaggeration & rigidification of sexual
differences in certain cultures reveals the feedback of gender structure into sexual ones.
Pluralistic approaches permit flexible comprehension of sexual classifications; freeing distinction
from strict dimorphism, unchangeable (sex) and easily changeable (gender). The distinction
should be based on the types of changes or interventions that are relevant. Crucially, the issues
on distinction lies on how it is constructed and used, creating false polarities, hierarchies, and
reinforce biased assumptions or theories.
The main objections by Moria Gatens are summarized as follows:
 1. The distinction assumes arbitrary connection between the sex (body) and gender (matter
of consciousness).
2. The distinction involves treating the body as neutral or passive in relation of the mind.
3. The assumed consciousness is thought to be neutral or implicitly male.
4. Emphasize the role of sex in shaping one’s identity and experiences.
5. The body is always situated. Body don’t underlie at gender. Argue against treating gender
as something a problem, separable, or eliminable.

Thesis I. The distinction assumes that masculine and feminine behaviors are arbitrary
unpredictable behavior, socially inscribed on a passive, neutral body.
The objection raised against the distinction arguing that gender inscriptions are purely
conventional and easily changeable, disregarding the role of the body or sex in the construction
of masculinity and femininity. While ‘Sex/role stereotype’ detach the body’s significance and
objectively view it for attaching gender roles, neglecting the body’s impact on social meanings.
Further, most accounts recognize the body as the foundation for forming gender, rejecting the
notion of a passive, neutral, and indifferent body. The argument rejects the false choice between
arbitrary connection and indistinguishability and suggests that there can be a logical relationship
between sex and gender where sex acts as a modifier or operator for the construction of gender.
‘Additive’ accounts from R.W. Connell propose that sex is partially determining the
difference, while the rest is attributed to social construction. Gender is a social construction
derived from sex, based on biology and social influence, not standing independent or randomly
added to sexual determination. Rather sex is socially modified or interpreted to give rise to gender:
modifier or operator.
In essence, the arguments reject the notion of all-or-nothing dichotomy between natural
and arbitrary elements; challenging reductionism, highlighting operation on the foundation of sex
involving social construction.

Thesis II. The sex/gender distinction takes the body to be neutral and passive and equates the
distinction with a body/ consciousness distinction, i.e, it is rationalist (Cartesian?)
As sex & gender distinction is often criticized for being debased by mind/body dualism,
the case is not strong as initially presumed. As exemplified by the Stollerian account & ‘Sex-Role
Stereotype,’ that all gender-related aspects are confined to the mind or consciousness. However,
its missing its intended target, raising concerns about certain interpretations of the distinction that
align closely with the Cartesian Dualism. Its proponents need clarity on the role of the body and
address critiques of additive theories that treat the social component as independent from the
body.

IV. What is Gender?

This stands as a clearer explanation of how gender relates to biological sex: elaboration
for further clarification as gender is considered as a social construction or elaboration of sex. The
body plays a crucial role in gender formation rather than an arbitrary unpredictable addition, there
is no pure “sex” or detachable biology without social elaboration.
R.W. Connell’s production model implies gender be developed from the body through
social practices of production. Avoiding dependance on ideas, consciousness, or intention for
gender, emphasizing material production instead. Though this seems to lose the intentional
connection between gender and sex. Moria Gatens propose that gender is the imaginary body to
sex (actual body), a psychical image or phantasy connected to the body-image of others.
However, narrowing gender down to a shared social story about reproductive difference,
neglecting the material aspects of gender production. These accounts infer various perspective
between gender & sex, still has limitations in fully explaining the complexity of the relationship.
Gender incorporates the body and its reproductive aspects, as well as its material
treatment and practices. Gender is seen as a socially elaborated interpretation of sex, rooted in
a shared social fantasy that determines its meaning; though this stands as a mere addition to the
neutral body, and transcends the body-mind distinction. Overall, this account meets the conditions
for a sex/gender distinction by differentiating what is changeable in terms of the body, fantasy,
and practices, and acknowledging the influence of social conceptions on gender.

V. The Subject, Difference, and Degendering

Articles:

• Moria Gatens ‘A Critique of Sex/ Gender Distinction’

• R.W. Connell’s ‘Gender and Power 3.1’
• Robert Stoller ‘The Context of Distiction’
The author, Val Plumwood, examines the functions and uses of the distinction and argues that it
still has a point and is necessary in certain contexts.
Highlighting the importance of recognizing the embodied nature of human beings (actual
body), and the physiological aspects that differentiate them as male or female. However, it
questions whether biological sex differences and gender differences would have significant
importance in a non-sexually and non-gendered organized world. Plumwood suggests that as
bodies still exist and be experienced, specific bodily attributes would not necessarily determine
one’s identity, actions, perceptions, or sexual partners.
Sex & gender distinction stands as a crucial tool in feminist theories, enabling the vision
of gender liberation from biological determinism. However, some cultural feminist or theories of
difference criticized the distinctions. Arguing that it incorporates a rationalist account of mind and
body and an implicitly male account of the subject. Proposing distinction reformation, though
provides vague replacement.
Plumwood acknowledges certain criticisms to be valid and contributed in clarifying the
distinction. As the distinction serves a purpose, it shouldn’t be entirely disregarded. Implying that
it has challenge biological reductionism, explain the androcentric (biased among men) nature of
philosophy and public life, recognize the variability and changeability of gender, enables
discussion about gendered character, and the potential for intentional change in gender identity.
For instance, sex & gender distinction or equivalent concept is necessary to fulfill certain functions
and conditions of adequacy. Abandoning it would result in loss of the capacity to make important
differentiations and hinder discussions about crucial aspects of gender.
As for the distinction equating to the body/ consciousness distinction (a rationalism or
Cartesian dualism), Plumwood argues that gender is not solely determined by the mind or
consciousness, but also involves behaviors and expectations related to the body. Further viewing
gender as a social elaboration or a superstructure built upon the biological foundation of sex, a
production model where gender is produced through social practices, and the idea of gender as
an imaginary body or shared social story about reproductive difference.
Plumwood suggests that gender is the social interpretation and treatment of reproductive
aspects of the body, encompassing both symbolic meanings and material practices. By this,
‘Gender’ involves a story or theory about sex and reproductive difference that is embedded in
social practices.
More to the subject matter is ‘De-gendering’ and its implications. To free from any
association with or dependence on gender. Arguing against the view of subjects be sexed and
that gender is always present. Plumwood criticizes that in societies where sex differences are not
considered to have implication for other aspects of live, individuals may not necessarily be
classified based on their sex. Further, condemning the Philosophical Separatism idea, asserting
men and women be inevitably qualitatively different.
On Gaten’s account that male and female subjectivities (experiences, identities, etc.,) are
different based on the experience of male and female transsexual. Plumwood argues that it
presupposes the social structure where women are responsible for raising children, which may
not always be true. Suggesting that if we challenge the assumption of exclusive female
responsibility for child-rearing, the notion based on transsexualism becomes less valid or
challenged.
Further questioning the notion of ‘De-gendering’ and argues that it doesn’t mean creating
a neutral or genderless subject or denying the differences that arise from the biological
distinctions. Suggesting that every society tends to assign significance to the reproductive roles,
and erasing differences may unintentionally reinforce to male norms. Additionally suggesting to
recognize the importance of diverse bodies and experiences in certain cases, while not assuming
difference in every situation.
Generally, Plumwood critiques the subjects be sexed, challenges the arguments for
Philosophical Separatism, and questions the implications of De-gendering. Advocating for a
nuanced understanding of sex & gender distinction that takes account in various social context
and avoids the establishment of implicitly male norm.