Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ICRC Final Defense Draft
ICRC Final Defense Draft
The Prosecutor
Azizi Garba
October 2020
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………….2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………4
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………7
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS…………………………………………………………….9
PLEADINGS……………………………………………………………………………….10
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS………………………………………………….10
DAMAGE.…………………………………………………………………………11
A. Garba is not individually criminally responsible for the war crime due to the
absence...……………………………………………………………….…...11
B. The attack on the Baobab Tree Sanctuary was a result of the acts of the
Kissakan………………………....………………………………………….11
1. Garba does not have effective control over the Kissakan Forces.
………………………………………………………….13
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II. WAR CRIME OF EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR
DAMAGE…………………………………………………………………..….14
crime due………………………………………….....………………...……14
MISSION…………………………………………………………………..…….15
against.……………………………………………………………..……..18
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A. Garba never had the intent to direct an attack to civilians not taking direct
part in hostilities.…….……………………………………………….………19
part in hostilities.……………………………………….….…….19
individual civilians….………………………………….….……..20
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
JURISPRUDENCE
ICC, Bemba Gombo Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
ICTY, Mucić et al. ("Čelebići") Trial Judgment 16 November 1998 (Found in p. 16)
Judgment, P. v. Augustine Gbao et al., Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
(Found in p. 20)
States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27,
Page 5 of 22
(Found in p. 18)
Prosecutor vs. Strugar, Judgment in the Trial Chamber II, IT-01-42-T (2005) (Found in
Page 6 of 22
How does law protect in war? - ICRC Online Casebook, Chapter 9, II. 4. Definition
19)
Humanitarian Law, 2 vols., ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Geneva and
Leslie Green, The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, 29 Canadian
Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Hart, 2007 (Found in p. 17)
(Found in p. 20)
Understanding the International Criminal Court, Is the ICC meant to replace national
Understanding the International Criminal Court, Who can be prosecuted before the ICC?
(Found in p. 10)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Page 8 of 22
At 8:30 am on 5 October 2022, President Garba gave Lt. Col. Diallo the order to return to
Dunanti to secure the oil access point. They were to use any lawful means necessary to secure
the access. On the way to the oil access point, Lt. Col. Diallo encountered some UN personnel on
the way with no intent to harm them. Unfortunately, one UN police officer first discharged a shot
against him which accidentally hit a UN colleague. As a response to the imminent threat, Diallo
shot and killed 3 UN personnel.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
First, the case brought before the Trial Chamber is admissible pursuant to Article 19 of
the ICC Statute.
Second, the conflict between the Kingdom of Momaayo and the Republic of Kissaka was
a non-international armed conflict.
Fifth, Garba is not criminally liable on the basis of command responsibility for the war
crime of intentionally directing an attack against civilians not taking direct part in hostilities,
with respect to the five UN personnel who were killed on 5 October 2022.
Sixth, Garba is not criminally liable on the basis of command responsibility for the war
crime of intentionally directing an attack against civilians not taking direct part in hostilities,
with respect to the 170 Momaayan men and boys who were killed.
Page 10 of 22
PLEADINGS
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Garba faces the Pre-Trial Chamber I for the confirmation of charges. The Prosecution
shall provide sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the Defendant
committed each of the crimes charged.1 The Prosecutor shall offer clear and tangible proof that
would demonstrate a clear line of reasoning which will be the basis of the specific allegations.2
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The facts clearly show that no international armed conflict happened on April 21, 2021
when Garba ordered the Kissakan troops to secure the oil access point. 7 In fact, the orders were
done in stealth to avoid any clash or tension between the Kissakan troops and villagers of
Momaayo.8 An international armed conflict began to exist only on April 25, when the Royal
Momaayo Army intervened.9
A. Garba is not individually criminally responsible for the war crime due to the absence
of direct intent to attack the Baobab Tree Sanctuary.
The Rome Statute provides that a person shall be criminally liable for a crime only if it is
committed with intent and knowledge.12 Specifically, the mens rea for attacks and destruction or
willful damage to cultural property is “direct intent to damage or destroy the property in
question.”13 The charge against Garba cannot be directly attributed to him due to the failure of
establishing direct intent on his part.
The order was only to cross the border by stealth through the Momaayo National Park
and infiltrate the quiet village of Dunanti near the border.14 The objectives were only to secure
the access point to the oil and to peacefully contain the villagers in their houses until the
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Kissakan oil miners were able to begin drilling for oil the next day. 15 It can be logically inferred
that Garba never intended to destroy the Baobab Tree Sanctuary as he was cautious to not inflict
any damage.
Therefore, the direct intent to damage or destroy the property in question is absent 17.
President Garba cannot be held liable for severe damage to the Baobab Tree Sanctuary.
B. The attack on the Baobab Tree Sanctuary was a result of the acts of the Kissakan
Forces in excess of their authority.
An excess of the principal by committing a crime which was not covered by the intent of
the instigator, cannot be attributed to the latter.18 Garba’s orders were only to safely secure an
access point to the oil.
Garba’s instruction was clear, to cross the border by stealth through the Momaayo
National Park and infiltrate the quiet village of Dunanti near the border. 19 What Lt. Col. Diallo
and the 1st Commando Battalion did were acting beyond what they were commanded to do.
Thus, the consequences resulting from stepping beyond the protocols cannot be attributed to
Garba.
1. Garba does not have effective control over the Kissakan Forces.
15 Facts, ¶ 20.
16 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007. ¶1008.
17 Prosecutor vs. Strugar, Judgment, IT-01-42-A, ICL 767 (ICTY 2008)
18 Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, Mental Elements – Mistake of Facts and Mistake of
Law, Oxford University Press. 789 (2002).
19 Facts, ¶ 20.
Page 13 of 22
Garba did not have full control over Lt. Col. Diallo and his forces the moment they went
beyond the orders. “Effective control” is the manner of an accused who “directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and international law as alleged.”20
Garba knew how important the Baobab Tree Sanctuary is, which is why his order was to
peacefully create a path for the access point to the oil. In this case, the damage from the use of
tanks to create the path flattened and killed over 25,000 baobab tree saplings that had been
planted 9 years earlier as part of the Baobab Tree Sanctuary 21 and the 3 improvised explosive
devices made from ammonium nitrate fertilizer were placed near the two remaining 100-year-old
baobab trees22 were never parts of his intent. Lt. Col. Diallo together with the 1st Commando
Battalion directly committed these damages, making Garba incapable of effectively and actively
controlling them.
The extraction of the oil would provide significant benefit to the Kissakan army who had
been unable to afford sufficient oil in the past 10 years.24 Oil, despite its civilian bearing, can be
deemed to constitute the infrastructure of the military industry. It can well be argued that “oil
installations of every kind are in fact legitimate military objectives open to destruction by any
belligerent.”25
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986.
21 Facts, ¶21.
22 Facts, ¶22.
23 Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2020).
24 Facts, ¶10.
25 Leslie Green, The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, 29 Canadian Yearbook
of International Law 222, 233 (1991).
Page 14 of 22
II. WAR CRIME OF EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR DAMAGE
Garba is not individually responsible 26 for ordering the commission of the war crime of
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause widespread, long-
term, and severe damage to the natural environment against the Nadawada River.27
A. Garba is not individually criminally responsible for the war crime due to the absence
of direct intent to attack the Nadawada River.
The Rome Statute specifically provides that an individual is only criminally liable if such
an act is committed with intent and knowledge.28
On April 25, the RMA sent a unit of heavily armed soldiers to Dunanti, armed with high
powered firearms.29 Additionally, the Pictopian military sent large supplies of Mk 17 Mod 0
battle rifles to RMA.30 Two hundred and ten local police from the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Momaayo were stationed in Dunanti and armed with Pictopian military-issue
Berreta 92FS M9 pistols. 31
As a response, Garba gave the order for Kissakan troops to weaken
the Momaayo military by filtering existing stores of crude oil into the Nadawada River.32
What Garba did was only to specifically neutralize or disempower the massive threat of
the RMA which at the moment has military advantage over them. Such intent does not fall under
the specific mens rea required to make a person criminally liable, that is, if the attacks and
destruction or willful damage to cultural property is with “direct intent to damage or destroy the
property in question.”33 Garba’s order stemmed from the overwhelming public pressure to
respond to RMA’s military rising power; it was never to destroy the Nadawada River.
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B. The attack is justified by military necessity.
The principle of military necessity permits measures which are necessary to accomplish a
legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. 34
In the case of an armed conflict, the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military
capacity of the other parties to the conflict. 35
Garba’s order of weakening the Momaayo military by filtering existing stores of crude oil
into the Nadawada River is a legitimate military purpose. Such an order satisfied the only
standard allowed in an armed conflict, which was to weaken the Momaayo military capacity.
C. The conduct did not take place in the context of an international armed conflict.
See the Preliminary Matters of this memorial for the discussion about the nature of the
international armed conflict.
A. Garba is not criminally responsible under the concept of command responsibility of the
Rome Statute.
In order to prove accountability under command responsibility, the suspect either knew
or owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
one or more crimes.36
1. Garba did not direct an attack.
Garba’s order was to secure the oil access point through any lawful means connoting that
Lt. Col. Diallo is absolutely prohibited to incur any extent of damage or harm to any individual
34 How does law protect in war? - ICRC Online Casebook, Chapter 9, II. 4. Definition of
Military Objectives
35 How does law protect in war? - ICRC Online Casebook, Chapter 9, II. 4. Definition of
Military Objectives
36 Rome Statute, Art. 28(a).
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in the discharge of his duties.37 He never executed any order to kill UN personnel that might
block them to secure the oil access point.
Additionally, a duty is placed upon the superior to exercise his power so as to prevent and
repress the crimes committed by his subordinates coupled with the required mental
requirement.38 However, the kind and extent of measures to be taken depend on the degree of
effective control over the conduct of subordinates at the time the superior is expected to act.39
In this case, Garba's extent of effective control ends with the order of securing the oil
access point through lawful means. Actions done beyond such order is out of Garba’s scope of
liability.
2. Garba did not fail to submit the matter to competent authorities because he was not
aware of the commission of the crime.
The duty to submit the matter to the competent authorities, like the duty to punish, arises
after the commission of the crimes. Such a duty requires that the commander takes active steps in
order to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. 40 It remedies a situation where
commanders do not have the ability to sanction their forces. This includes circumstances where
the superior has the ability to take measures, yet those measures do not seem to be adequate. 41
There was no available information or report of the actual shooting incident to Garba to enable
him to conclude that there was a crime committed or to be committed.42
37 Facts, ¶36.
38 ICTY, Mucić et al. ("Čelebići") Trial Judgment 16 November 1998, ¶377.
39 Prosecutor v. Orić, ICTY T Ch, Judgment, 30 June 2006, ¶328.
40 ICC, Bemba Gombo Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 15
June 2009, ¶ 442.
41 ICC, Bemba Gombo Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 15
June
2009, ¶ 442.
42 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC and
Cambridge University Press, Geneva and Cambridge, 2005, I, ¶1013.
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It was only on 20 November 2021, where the ICC Prosecutor informed both King Abdu
and Garba that they found there to be sufficient evidence to open an investigation. 43 Only in this
timeframe, Garba was officially made aware of the crimes committed by Lt. Col. Diallo, which
is why as a response, he ordered his troops to retreat to the border.44
B. Garba did not have effective command and control over Col. Diallo and other
perpetrators.
There is usually more than one commander in a chain of command. The latter may
include, e.g. a section leader, a platoon commander, a company commander, a battalion
commander, a brigade commander, a division of commander and others in ascending seniority.
The significant element, for the purpose of criminal responsibility, is a person’s effective
exercise of command, not the fact he or she holds a particular rank.45
Garba was the commander-in-chief of Lt. Col. Diallo, but his rank does not determine his
liability in the killing of the UN personnel. In the chain of command, Lt. Col. Diallo was the
battalion commander in charge at that time who had effective control over the situation and his
subordinates. This is evident when President Garba’s order was only to secure the access point to
the oil through any lawful means, 46 but later on it was Lt. Col. Diallo who orchestrated the attack
against the UN personnel.47 Garba does not have the material ability to prevent or punish the
material conduct of Lt. Col. Diallo when it killed the UN personnel.48
43 Facts, ¶39.
44 Facts, ¶39.
45 Arnold, “Article 28 Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors”, in Otto Triffterer
(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article, Hart, 2007, ¶ 830.
46 Facts, ¶36.
47 Facts, ¶37.
48 Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgment (TC), 22 January 2004,
¶605.
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Lt. Col. Diallo’s act of firing and killing without any direct orders by Garba is evidence
of insubordination. Diallo’s insubordination was evident in 2010, where he ordered his troops to
cross the border and attack the village despite the direct order of Garba to maintain peace. Thus,
Garba lacks effective control on the ground over Diallo and the Kissakan military forces in
Dunanti.49
C. Garba is not criminally liable for intentionally directing an attack against personnel
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission.
Garba never had the direct intent to attack nor did he have the knowledge that his forces
directed an attack against the UN personnel.50
It was primarily the UN personnel’s fault for causing the armed tension. Clearly, it was
the UN police officer who reached for her weapon first and accidentally shot her colleague
which prompted Diallo to shoot back because there was imminent danger against them. 51 The
UN police officer’s act is invalid because if the intent is self-defense, such concept is only valid
when missions have evolved to include the “right to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent
the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security
Council.52
The UN doctrine on this issue is that peacekeeping operations should only use force
as a measure of last resort, when other means have failed. 53 In this case, other measures
have not been exhausted yet to allow them to resort to force.
A. Garba never had the intent to direct an attack to civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities.
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At 11:25 pm on 24 April 2021, Garba gave Lt. Col. Diallo the order for troops from the
1st Commando Battalion to cross the border by stealth through the Momaayo National Park and
infiltrate the quiet village of Dunanti near the border. There were two objectives: a) to secure the
access point to the oil; and b) to peacefully contain the villagers in their houses until the
Kissakan oil miners were able to begin drilling for oil the next day. 54 From that, Garba never
intended to attack any civilian and gave a clear order to not harm anyone.
1. The object of attack was a civilian population who took direct part in hostilities.
In order to invalidate the attack of the Kissakan troops, the civilians must not take direct
part in hostilities.55 Kissakan troops did not attack a civilian population not taking direct part in
hostilities.
Before the clash happened, half of the few Kissakan troops were peacefully setting up the
makeshift electric fences to block pathways of the village to prevent villagers from getting in and
causing chaos.56 Moreover, the Kissakan troops took stealth measures in order to preserve
peaceful control and to avoid clashes.57 It is clear that they never instigated any threat against the
people of Momaayo.
However, King Abdu’s public statement “that every Momaayo man and boy will be
hostile against Kissakan troops,” implies that every civilian in Momaayo is ready to take a direct
part in such hostilities.58
Such a statement motivated the villagers of Momaayo to fight back worsened the
situation. While creating the physical perimeter peacefully, the few Kissakan troops were
engaged by hostile villagers who brandished their spears, machetes and rolling pins. Three
soldiers were injured in the scuffle, dwindling further the few Kissakan troops.59
54 Facts, ¶20.
55 Elements, Art. 8(2)(b)(i).
56 Facts, ¶23.
57 Facts, ¶23.
58 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.137 (Argentina)
59 Facts, ¶25.
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2. The perpetrator did not intend the civilian population as such or individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
Garba’s order to peacefully contain the villagers shows that he never intended to make
them the object of the attack.60 It was only out of fear of being overpowered by the hostile
civilians that motivated Lt. Col. Diallo to order the execution of the 170 men and boys who were
ready to attack the troops.61 Lt. Col. Diallo’s honest determination for the execution was based
on the hostile behavior of the civilians.62
The Kissakan troops did not engage in the scuffle, rather it was the civilians who directly
attacked them. The loss of protection is only clear when a civilian uses weapons or other means
to commit violence against human or material enemy forces, unless in self-defense.63
Based on the rules and evidence stated above, it is respectfully requested before this
Honorable Chamber to adjudge and declare that the charges against President Azizi Garba be not
confirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
60 Facts, ¶20.
61 Facts, ¶25.
62 United States, Naval Handbook, ¶830.
63 Mbarushimana Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre Trial-Chamber, ¶34.
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Counsel for the Defense
Page 22 of 22