1.

Go vs CA

G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992

Facts:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,

nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot
Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt
ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identi ed petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor led the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.

Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant

because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime
had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police of cers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
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“personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to
the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner. It was shown that media had depicted the accused as guilty
even though the proceedings were still on-going. This situation led to
widespread public belief in the suspect’s guilt, despite the fact that he
had not yet even been subjected to preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether the judge in the instant case manifested impartiality

due to media's in uence.

Ruling: Yes. Justice Isagani Cruz observed that the trial court has
(apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has
its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and
persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational
publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and
impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its
handling of the case.

The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial,
and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases
but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he
is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind
bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case who enjoys the
assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide
and unfavorable media coverage may be presumed guilty before trial
and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the importance of
the court always following the Rules.

2. Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, 202 SCRA 445

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Facts:Respondent designated Judge Pitao as Acting Judge of the
MCTC of Biliran Cabucgayon, Leyte, which was vacant, to allocate 2
session days a week in his additional sala. Judge Pitao in his
residence received a note from a woman, who was the wife of the
accused in the criminal case pending trial for a long time. The note
requested that the case be heard and decided, and if the court had no
jurisdiction, to remand it to RTC. It also spoke of Big Man Egane.
Respondent asked Pitao whether he received the note, and warned
Pitao about Big Man Egane, who was backing the complainant in the
case and that Pitao should acquit the accused. Pitao, however,
convicted the accused of theft because the evidence was strong.
Irked, respondent Villamor directed Pitao to forward the records to his
court, elevated the records of the case to RTC over which respondent
presides, and designated Judge de la Pena as Acting Judge of the
MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte replacing Pitao; and acquitted the
accused in the criminal case. It was found in the investigation that
respondent had sent the handwritten note through the wife of the
accused to Pitao.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Villamor was guilty of giving

undue interest in a pending criminal case.

Ruling: Yes, for doing such, respondent violated Canon 1 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, speci cally, Sec. 3 thereof: Judges shall
refrain from in uencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
This act of sending his note to Pitao showed failure to exercise due
care, and had an appearance of impropriety. His remark to Pitao of
acquitting the accused was also improper and created an impression
that he was for the exoneration of the accused. It tended to in uence
the trial judge who was going to decide the case, running afoul of the
principle that judges are to promote justice by administering it
impartially.

3. Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil 322

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 Facts: Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District, He duly quali ed and took possession
of the of ce . Later on he was appointed Judge of the Twenty- rst
Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has consistently
refused to accept appointment to the Twenty- rst Judicial District.

Issue: Whether or not Borromeo may refuse his appointment to the

21st Judicial District.

Ruling: Yes, he may. There is no power in these Islands which can

compel a man to accept the of ce. Therefore, anyone could refuse
appointment as a judge of rst instance to a particular district, when
once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same
right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other
personcould be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance
since another rule of public of cers is, that an appointment may not be
made to an of ce which is not vacant. Judges are permitted to perform
the duties of the of ce undeterred by outside in uence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system
equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government. For
the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the
language used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative
Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the
accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of
public of cers, leave from for no other construction than that a Judge
of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his
consent.

4. Arban vs. Borja, 143 SCRA 634

Facts: Complainant Ponciano A. Arban, the then District Engineer for

Camarines Sur, Ministry of Public Works and Highways, led the
instant administrative case for  grave misconduct against Judge
Melecio B. Borja, Presiding Judge of Branch XX, Regional Trial Court,
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Region of Naga City. Arban alleged that said respondent hit him with
the pistol he was carrying the petitioner on the left side of his head,
sending him sprawling to the oor and rendering him momentarily
unconscious. The respondent also threatened with his said gun the
companions of the complainant. The respondent also red his gun in
the balcony of the apartment he is lodging in, from where he followed
the complainant to the said restaurant.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of violating the

Canon of Judicial Ethics

Held: Whatever the motive may have been, the violent action of the
respondent in a public place constitutes serious misconduct and the
resultant outrage of the community in Naga City is a blow to the image
of the entire judiciary. Judge Borja violated the established norm for
judicial behavior that "a judge's of cial conduct should be free from
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach." (Sec. 3, Canon of Judicial
Ethics).

"The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more

importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice
between two con icting interests, specially in the station of municipal
judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact
with the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the
judge to return that regard, he must be the rst to abide by the law and
weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously
careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law."

5. Abad vs. Bleza

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 Facts: After a cock ght, complainant Abad and one Potenciano Ponce
had a verbal tussle which culminated in Abad's being shot in the chest
by Francisco Sabater, Jr., an alleged bodyguard of Ponce. Sabater,
was charged with frustrated homicide and Potenciano Ponce with
attempted homicide before the RTC where the respondent presides.
Respondent, however, was in error in appreciating as a mitigating
circumstance "lack of intention to kill the victim" in xing the penalty
imposed on Sabater. Therefore, the fact alone that respondent found
Sabater guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide would prove that he
had no doubt in his mind that Sabater had the intent to kill Abad.
Respondent's appreciation as mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to kill in favor of Sabater is palpably out of place. Presumably, what
respondent had in mind was to consider the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed under
Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is different from lack of
intention to kill.

Issue: Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.

Ruling: No. the same was done without malice or deliberate intent to
perpetrate justice. But in any case, there was negligence for which he
should be reprimanded. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous. However, while judges should not be disciplined for
inef ciency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors
of judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they should be conversant
with basic legal principles. They are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes (and to keep themselves
abreast of the latest laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting their
jurisdiction. In present case, The records fail to show malice, ill-will or
even bias on the part of respondent judge. His decision pointed out,
one by one, the glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence
which led to the exculpation of defendant Ponce. Therefore, the
administrative cases are hereby, DISMISSED. The recommendation is
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 well taken although the reprimand may be dispensed with
considering the respondent's poor health and his impending
retirement.

6. Jacinto vs. Vallarta

Facts: This case originated from a Complaint1 led by Spouses Jesus

V. Jacinto and Nenita C. Jacinto on March 22, 2002. Judge Placido B.
Vallarta was charged therein with gross negligence, gross ignorance
of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and
unbecoming conduct. Complainants were dismayed by the attitude
shown by Judge Vallarta and the words from him [were] so surprising
that they [did] not expect to hear from a public servant and from a
Judge for that matter. Instead of giving sound advice to their case,
Judge Vallarta acted otherwise and was totally rude towards them.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Vallarta should be held administratively

liable?

Ruling: Yes. Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law

and justice, from whom the people draw the will and inclination to
obey the law. Thus, the of cial conduct of judges should be free from
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. Their personal
behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond reproach.
Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public con dence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." In this case, respondent
displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a
magistrate of the law. His unguarded utterances, impatience, and
undisguised lack of concern bordering on contempt for the plight of
complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help,
constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public
con dence in the judiciary.
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 From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members
of the bench, a resort to intemperate language only detracts from the
respect due them and becomes self-destructive. The judicial of ce
circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a
number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for
accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration
of justice.Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public
con dence in the judiciary. Thus, it is their duty to avoid any
impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and integrity of
the judiciary. "Maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty
of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the
administration of justice."

Respondent must be reminded that government service is people-

oriented. "Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and
courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding."Impatience and
rudeness have no place in government service, in which personnel
are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.

7. Masangcay vs. Aggabon

Facts: Complainant Dominga P. Masangcay, Clerk IV of the Of ce of

the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis,
Province of Quirino, charged respondents Judge Carlos T. Aggabao,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32 and other court employees with
gambling, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Law,
discourtesy in the course of of cial duties, dishonesty, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, nepotism and improper solicitation of contributions
from subordinate employees, party litigants or Private Practitioners.
Respondent judge, Atty. Betguen, Clerk of Court VI of Branch 31 and
other court employees gamble with cards namely "Tong-It" or "Pepito"
together with outsiders inside the Courtroom and any vacant place at
the Justice Hall during Of ce Hours. The Judge plays with the group
when [there are] no scheduled cases during of ce hours. Atty.
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Betguen could not act on the needs of the people who need his
service immediately for he is gambling.

Issue: Whether respondent judge violated the Canon of Judicial

Ethics,

Ruling: Yes. While there is insuf cient proof of gambling, the playing
of cards during of ce hours in a courtroom by respondents Judge
Aggabao and Atty. Betguen is convincingly established. A courtroom is
hardly the place for playing cards. A courtroom is generally looked
upon by the people with high respect and not a few consider it as a
sacred place where witnesses testify under oath, where con icts are
resolved, rights adjudicated, and justice solemnly dispensed. Making it
a game room diminishes its sanctity and dignity. The playing of cards
in the courtroom and the occasional fraternization with lawyers in
drinking sessions, established by the testimony of Provincial
Prosecutor Anthony Foz, made the respondent Judge liable, at the
very least, for impropriety in violation of Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which requires that a judge's of cial conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but
also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

8. Cabrera vs. Pajares

Facts: The complainant Enrico Cabrera gave a sworn statement to

NBI denouncing respondent Judge James B. Pajares for asking
money from him in connection with his civil case led by his father
against him for the annulment of the sale made to him of about 28 ha.
of land. Judge Pajares intimated him that he needed money. Cabrera
gave P1,000.00 to Pajares because the latter had been unduly strict,
preventing him from making statements during the trial of his case.
After two months, Judge Pajares again asked him of money. At this
point, Cabrera asked the assistance of the NBI in entrapping Judge
Pajares. After the entrapment, Cabrera came to Court and charged
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 the Judge Pajares with indirect bribery. Respondent claimed that he
took the marked money enclosed in an envelope because he thought
that it was for the surveyor who had been appointed to prepare a
survey plan of the land in dispute under a Civil Case. Nevertheless,
the claim of the respondent was countered by the prior ling by the
complainant of a motion for reconsideration of the judge’s order
appointing a surveyor, which the latter informed the judge during the
entrapment, but prior to the arrival of the NBI.

Issue: Whether Judge Pajares committed acts unbecoming of a

member of the judiciary.

Ruling: No. While there is evidence of indirect bribery, however, there

is none to support the other charge of acts unbecoming of a judge.
Respondent Judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being
given to him by reason of his of ce. The Court has time and again
stressed that members of the judiciary should display not only the
highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such
manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion. The Court had
likewise stressed that the judge is the visible representation of the law
and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of
justice between two con icting interests. Thus, for the judge to return
that regard, he must be the rst to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. Respondent Judge was
hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
bene ts and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of
the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

9. OCA vs. Judge Hermoso

Facts: Respondent judge, in connivance with his co-respondent

sheriff, demanded and received from the complainants, litigants in
Civil Case No. 50328, the sum of P5,000.00 as consideration for the
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 approval by the said judge of the release by the respondent sheriff of
the payloader that the defendant had agreed to cede to the plaintiff in
full satisfaction of the judgment. Their acts constitute a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as charged in the information
led against them in the Sandiganbayan, and also the crime of
extortion, one of the modes of committing robbery.

Issue: Whether respondent judge and sheriff should be held

administratively liable.

Ruling: Yes. It is no over-statement to say that, in a very real sense,

the success of our democracy will depend on the faith of the people in
the judiciary as the impartial dispenser of justice. That faith will grow
or dwindle according as the judges are honest or corrupt. Realizing
this, we have endeavored to purify the bench as much as we are able,
that the misdeeds of a relatively few may not taint the name of all. This
endeavor will continue until the judiciary is washed clean and white. A
similar effort should be made and maintained in the legal profession
so that every lawyer, as an of cer of the court, may pursue only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling. Respondent judge and
Sheriff Flores are both declared guilty of gross misconduct and
considered DISMISSED from their respective of ces as of the date of
their preventive suspension on March 27, 1984, with forfeiture of
whatever retirement and other bene ts they would otherwise have
been entitled to.

10. Martinez vs. Pahimulin

Facts: On September 30, 1972 complainant appeared as counsel for

the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2001. He was cross-examining Pilar
Harada, a witness for the defendant, when opposing counsel objected
in such a way that he was suggesting to the witness the answer to the
question. Whereupon, complainant asked respondent Judge to stop
him from coaching the witness and to limit his objection on legal
grounds. Judge Pahimulin told complainant that opposing counsel was
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'still talking.' Atty. Martinez insisted that respondent stop opposing
counsel from talking because he was putting into the mouth of the
witness the answer to his question. This remark of complainant
angered the judge who, in a loud voice told him: "You are a
disrespectful lawyer." Complainant remarked: 'Then, Your Honor, I
have to quit as a lawyer.' At this juncture, respondent banged his gavel
telling complainant: 'You are a disrespectful lawyer. You talk too much.
Complainant was about to make an explanation but respondent told
him: 'Get out. I do not want to hear you. You have already quitted.

Issue: Whether respondent judge should be held administratively

liable.

Ruling: No, respondent was exonerated with an admonition that he

behave as a judge is expected to behave calm, cool, and collected, so
that he can act with utmost sobriety in the solutions of problems
before him. Respondent should not have lost his temper when he was
continuedly interrupted by the complainant. Instead of shouting at the
complainant, he should have maintained his composure. While the
respect and dignity of the court had to be upheld, respondent should
not have acted with anger and shouted at the lawyer who must have
suffered embarrassment in front of many people. He should have
acted with utmost sobriety and for this he should be censured.
Respondent Judge was hereby reprimanded for his uncontrolled
passion and lack of proper decorum in the conduct of the proceedings
in his court and warned that a repetition of the same or other
misconduct in of ce will be dealt with more severely.

11. Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo

FACTS: Petitioners in this case seek the annulment of respondent

Judge’s orders in criminal cases denying petitioners’ motion for
respondent judge to disqualify or inhibit himself from hearing and
acting upon their Motion for New Trial. The SC issued a Resolution
asking the respondent Judge to le his answer. Said Resolution also
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issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent from
further proceeding with the criminal cases. The Solicitor General
informed the SC that they are "persuaded that there are bases for
stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his
resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of
bias and prejudice. The OSG further submits that the case should he
remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with
instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused
with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may
be warranted.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be disquali ed from

hearing the cases.

Ruling: It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to

enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or
their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to
Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at
all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. Thus, it has always
been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a
state of mind" and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality. It must be obvious, therefore, that
while judges should possess pro ciency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before
them should have con dence in their impartiality. It appears, however,
that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the
question as to whether or not he should be disquali ed from further
proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already
become moot.
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 12. Felongco vs. Dictado

Facts: Complainant Adelaida P. Felongco charges respondent with:

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment adverse to plaintiff;
Facilitating the issuance of a writ of execution, thus unduly favoring
defendants; Refusing to abide by a restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals against the enforcement of the unjust decision; and
Citing the plaintiffs for contempt on the ground of alleged
disobedience of the unjust decision. Complainant Felongco led a
complaint for forcible entry against Celso Tapangan, et al., in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga and Sta. Elena, Camarines
Norte. The lower court rendered judgment ejecting therein defendants
from the premises. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, respondent,
as the presiding judge, reversed the inferior court's decision. Upon
petition by complainant (CA-G.R. SP No. 10730), the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of respondent holding that the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court's " ndings are supported by the evidence adduced" and
that "the Regional Trial Court was in error when, motu propio, even in
the dispositive part of the decision, it directed the immediate issuance
of the writ of execution and possession. On appeal by certiorari, the
SC in its resolution sustained the decision of the CA.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge in the instant case should be

inhibited for partiality.

Ruling: Yes. A judge must learn to suppress his personal emotion,

must show a willingness to suspend judgment until a comprehensive
survey of the ground, and an appreciation and understanding of the
different attitudes and viewpoints of those involved in the controversy
has been made and must learn to transcend his own narrow
prejudices or prejudgment." We nd these worthy traits of a judge
wanting in the author of the decision now on appeal, and nd his
honor lacking in that degree of impartiality expected of him. The court
found that the decision of the respondent was not supported by the
evidence, and furthermore, was contrary to law and jurisprudence,
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 thus prompting said court to question respondent's impartiality. The
Court nd that respondent's actuations in the instant case display his
partiality. The infractions of respondent, especially when viewed
together instead of as separate and isolate facts, show that he is un t
to discharge the duties and functions of a judge so as to warrant the
imposition of the extreme penalty of DISMISSAL from the service.

13. Datuin, Jr. vs. Soriano

FACTS: The case arose from a complaint for a sum of money led by
Olivia Natividad against Teresita Lopez before the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan (RTC) which was raf ed to Judge Andres B.
Soriano (Judge Soriano). Atty. Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. (Atty. Datuin)
appeared as counsel of the defendant in the said case. Subsequently,
Atty. Datuin led a Motion for Disquali cation against Judge Soriano
for being partial and bias by shouting at Complainant Datuin without
just cause, for ordering that the buyer of the parcel of land in dispute
must rst appear before him and for issuing an order without reciting
the details thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Judge Soriano warrants

punitive action from the Supreme Court.

RULING: Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the

performance of a judge’s functions, hence, bias, prejudice and even
undue interest cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a
judge’s sacred allegation under oath of of ce to administer justice
without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and the
rich. It is settled that in administrative proceedings the complainant
has the burden of proving, in general by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. This complainant failed to discharge that
Judge Soriano yelled at him, absent evidence as to its content as well
as the circumstances under which it was made, its import cannot be
appreciated. The argument that Judge Soriano will not be asking that
the buyer be presented to him if he had no hidden agenda is
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 unadulterated speculation, hence, deserves no weight. In respondent
Judge Soriano’s case, he has explained that his Order was not the
pre-trial order as he was wont to issue one only after the transcription
of the stenographic notes taken during the pre-trial was completed to
make sure that all the matters therein taken up are re ected in the
order. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous. For a judge may not be
held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or
decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
of ce untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.

14. Palang vs. Zosa

FACTS: After respondent Judge had acquitted Julieto P. Herrera of

the crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion that the charge
was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies being"
rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciously presented by the
offended party, now petitioner, causing great damage and prejudice to
Herrera's moral and social standing and a destruction of his image as
well as his character, the aforesaid Herrera, thus acquitted, now
private respondent here, led an action for damages against the
complainant, now petitioner. It is his submission here that considering
the language used by respondent Judge, he would not be able to
decide such civil case justly and impartially. The respondent Judge
respectfully manifests that he voluntarily inhibits himself from
conducting the trial of the said case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is allowed to inhibit.

RULING: This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be

commended. He has lived up to what is expected of occupants of the
bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of justice is thus
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 reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without bias and
favoritism. It does not suf ce that they in fact rid themselves of
prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is an
instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like
Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. At
least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is
deference to the due process mandate.

15. Pimentel vs. Salanga

Facts: Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is

complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court
on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of
"serious misconduct, inef ciency in of ce, partiality, ignorance of the
law and incompetence." Petitioner seeks in the complaint therein to
have respondent judge immediately suspended from of ce and, after
due notice and hearing, removed therefrom.  The judge's return
traversed the factual averments.  Whereupon, this Court, on July 13,
1967, referred the administrative case to Mr. Justice Eulogio Serrano
of the Court of Appeals "for investigation, report and
recommendation." On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court
below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil
Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470
aforesaid. On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing
motion. He stood his ground with the statement that the administrative
complaint against him is no cause for disquali cation under the Rules
of Court; that Civil Case 21-6 and Electoral Case 2470 "are now on
the nal stages of termination" and transfer thereof to another sala
"would only delay their nal disposition, make the parties suffer [from]
further efforts and expenses", and "would be violative" of
Administrative Order 371 of the Department of Justice de ning the
court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer justice
in accordance with the law and the merits of the cases to be heard
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 and decided by him." A move to reconsider the foregoing resolution
failed of its purpose.  Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Is a judge disquali ed from acting in litigations in which counsel

of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative
case said counsel lodged against him?

Ruling: The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule

137, Rules of Court,[2] which reads in full:

"SECTION 1. Disquali cation of judges.  - No judge or judicial of cer

shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
af nity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed accor ing to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of
his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above." Thus, the genesis
of the provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say the
letter thereof, clearly illumines the course of construction we should
take.  The exercise of sound discretion - mentioned in the rule - has
reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disquali es himself,
not when he goes forward with the case. For, the permissive authority
given a judge in the second paragraph Section 1, Rule 137, is only in
the matter of disquali cation, not otherwise.  Better stated yet, when a
judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disquali ed by the
rst paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been
- he has to continue with the case. Since respondent judge is not
legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari
or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment
in the cases herein mentioned.
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 16. Geotina vs. Gonzales

Facts: Rosario R. Calderon led with the municipal court of

Surigao, Surigao del Norte, presided by Judge Jose L. Gonzalez
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent judge), a criminal complaint
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Dr.
Jose G. Geotina (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) and
Remedios Kierulf. After conducting the preliminary examination, the
respondent judge dismissed the criminal action as to Kierulf. He then
ordered the arrest of the petitioner and xing the bond for his
provisional liberty. The petitioner led a motion to disqualify the
respondent judge from hearing the criminal case, alleging as
ground therefor the relationship of the latter to the
complainant Calderon within the sixth civil degree by af nity. The
respondent judge makes no denial whatsoever of his relationship
within the sixth degree of af nity to the complainant Calderon but
instead ruled on the inapplicability of section 1 on the ground that he
bears no relationship to either the People of the Philippines, the
plaintiff, or Dr. Jose G. Geotina, the accused (petitioner and appellant
herein) - the only parties he considers as litigants in the criminal
action.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge has authority to preside

over the case at bar.

Held: No. Section 1 and 2 Rule 137 of the Rules of Court prohibits
him from trying the case. His refusal to inhibit himself to hear
the criminal case in the face of the express prohibition
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Judges must faithfully comply with the rules on
disquali cation on account of relationship as this serves not only to
protect the rights of the parties but to assure an impartial
administration of justice and prevent erosion of the people's
con dence in the judiciary.
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 The Court therefore held that respondent judge is without authority to
preside over the criminal case in question. Section 1, in commanding
him to withdraw from the case herein involved, necessarily divests him
of all authority to actin any judicial capacity in connection therewith.
The Court further held that where the disqualifying fact is indubitable
and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disquali cation, as
in the case at bar, sec. 1 forthwith completely strips the judge of
authority to proceed. All his acts in the premises are without authority
of law.

17. Oktubre vs. Valano

Facts: Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise D'Arcy

vda. De Paler, a non-resident American.   D'Arcy is the widow of
Abraham Paler, a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. 
Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew. During his lifetime, Abraham
built a four-storey commercial and residential building in Maasin City
on a lot he owned in common with his siblings. After Abraham died,
none of his heirs petitioned for the settlement of his estate. D'Arcy,
through complainant, administered the Paler building. Shortly after his
appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998, respondent Judge,
with D'Arcy's permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days.
He sought an extension of his stay but D'Arcy turned down his request
since during her next visit to the country she would use the room
respondent Judge then occupied.  Nevertheless, respondent Judge
was able to continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a
room reserved for a sister of Abraham. On 28 September 2000,
complainant led a complaint against respondent Judge for changing
the lock of his room and of the door leading to the third oor of the
Paler building and for taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler
building.   On 2 October 2000, complainant and respondent Judge met
at the Of ce of Punong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there
was no settlement as respondent Judge questioned complainant's
residency in Abgao. After the meeting, respondent judge charged
complainant with Robbery in relation to the wheel she removed from
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the jeep and a warrant was issued by Judge Velasco, malicious
mischief and Falsi cation by Private Individuals and Use of Falsi ed
Documents was led against Dr. [D'Arcy], her principal.

Issue: Whether respondent judge should be disciplined for his failure

to inhibit himself from his own criminal complaints,

Ruling: Yes. the rule on disquali cation of judges under Rule 3.12 and
Rule 137, Section 1 stems from the principle that no judge should
preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might
be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is
intended to preserve the people's faith and con dence in the courts of
justice. True, a judge should possess pro ciency in law so that he can
competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him have con dence in his impartiality. Indeed, even
conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is
proscribed. Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal
complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the
cases.  Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case
No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By
doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication
Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal
prosecution. Respondent Judge's subsequent inhibition from the three
cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have
taken cognizance of the cases in the rst place. The evil that the rule
on disquali cation seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right
to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent Judge
refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging was the effect of
respondent Judge's conduct on the image of the judiciary, which
without a doubt, immeasurably suffered from it. 

18. Dayuno vs. Barillo

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Facts: On March 2, 2000, an overseer of the Sumogod estate over
which respondent Tangeres served as the administratrix, led a
criminal complaint for quali ed theft against herein complainant, who
was allegedly caught unlawfully gathering coconuts worth P800.00
within the Sumogod estate. Upon review of the resolution on
preliminary investigation, the Of ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Negros Oriental, on the nding that complainant has adequately
shown proof of ownership over the land on which the coconuts were
harvested, dismissed the criminal complaint for want of probable
cause. Complainant apparently could not shake off the belief that the
initiated criminal case by the overseer was an instance of malicious
prosecution instigated by respondent Tangeres who used her position
as clerk of court and the court as instruments in perpetrating her evil
designs and fabricating offenses. Turning his sight against the other
respondent, complainant alleges that, on May 29, 2002, respondent
Judge Barillo issued, purportedly in relation with the case between
complainant and respondent clerk of court, a notice for conference,
requiring him to appear before his sala on June 5, 2002 when no case
has been led against him. To complainant, respondent judge's
actuation was "designed to protect and defend the interest of
respondent Clerk of Court", a clear manifestation of partiality and bad
faith, with the end in view of harassing him.

Issue: Whether respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Ruling: Yes. The time-honored rule is that a judge, as dispenser of

justice in the light of applicable statutes and jurisprudence, should not
only act fairly, independently and honestly, but should also be
perceived to be fair, independent and honest. In the case at bench,
respondent judge, in a gesture irresistibly suggesting manifest bias for
respondent clerk of court, but bias against complainant, of cially
issued a notice of conference, complete with a case title, i.e., "Ms.
Lucia L. Tangeres, Plaintiff, versus Eduardo Dayuno, Defendant",
requiring, to stress, complainant to appear before his sala for a
conference concerning what turned out to be a non-existing case.
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Understandably, the notice led complainant to believe that the notice
partakes of a subpoena and that the intended meeting with
respondent judge's clerk of court was court-related. At bottom then,
respondent judge lent the authority of his of ce just to accommodate
his clerk of court in a manner less than judicious. As the OCA would
put it, "Judge Barillo's act of af xing his signature in the notice of
conference . . . gave it a semblance of legality, which, in effect
provided [a] shield or protective mantle to his Clerk of Court."
Respondent judge thus created the impression that his clerk of court
held undue sway in the affairs of his court. To be sure, the Code of
Judicial Conduct frowns upon this demeaning practice, tending as it
does to compromise the integrity and moral authority of the presiding
judge. In the language of Rule 2.03 of Canon 2 of the Code:

A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to in uence

judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial of ce shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to in uence the judge. Respondent Judge Hector B. Barillo of
the MTC of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental is adjudged GUILTY of
violation of Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

19. Padilla vs. Zantua Jr.

Facts: Mayor Roger Padilla of the Municipality of Jose Panganiban,

Camarines Norte charged MTC Judge Roberto Zantua with serious
irregularities and grave misconduct in the performance of his of cial
duties for: 1. Failure to decide cases within the prescribed period; 2.
Unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases; 3. Manifest partiality in
favor of a litigant; and 4. Fraternizing with lawyers who have pending
cases in his sala Padilla complains that some of the cases pending in
the judge's sala have not even been tried. He also alleges that Zantua
is always seen eating and drinking in public establishments with Atty.
Augusto Schneider, the opposing counsel in several criminal cases
pending in Zantua's sala.
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 Issue: Whether respondent judge is guilty of manifest partiality in
favor of a litigant and fraternizing with a lawyer, speci cally Atty.
Schneider, who has pending cases in his sala.

Ruling: Yes. The actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking

in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may
well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the
trust of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge. This eventuality
may undermine the people's faith in the administration of justice. It is
of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in the
locality. A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public
con dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.5 The
prestige of judicial of ce shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to in uence the judge.
Public con dence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. Respondent
Judge is hereby ADMONISHED with a warning that a repetition of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Judge is reminded to be prompt in the disposition of cases pending in
his sala.
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