METAPHYSICS LECTURE NOTES

Course description.
Because of its foundational status in the philosophic community it is usual to regard
metaphysics as the queen of the philosophic sciences it is not surprising therefore for
metaphysics to always be the center of attraction in the philosophic sciences, however
metaphysics evokes a diverse and sometimes conflicting responses from philosophers not
everyone sympathizes with the claims of metaphysics some are for metaphysics while some are
against metaphysics, some applaud metaphysics while others condemn it, indeed rarely did
philosophers engage metaphysics with cool detachment, they approach it with a certain
ambivalent and this ambivalent reception underscores the controversial status of metaphysics,
indeed since the intervention of Kant in the philosophical conversation the problematic nature of
metaphysics has remained a prominent feature of philosophy, in the 21 st century for instance,
logical positivism under the leadership of A.J Ayer is noted for its attack on metaphysics, indeed
the relative disrepute with which metaphysics has fallen in the present day is largely due to the
influence of logical positivism, but logical positivism is not alone in its substitution of
metaphysics, other currents in contemporary philosophy such as existentialism, pragmatism, and
deconstructionism, they all contribute in different ways to the anti-metaphysical bias of
contemporary philosophy.
Outline
 The meaning, object and relevance of metaphysics: the etymological definition of
metaphysics and the problem of defining metaphysics.
 The question of the object of metaphysics
 The relationship between metaphysics and other disciplines
 The relevance of metaphysics
 The criticisms and Justification of metaphysics: A.J Ayer, Carner, wigestin
 The problems and Dynamics of metaphysics
 Metaphysics and formation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Exams will come from lectures
Test one is in class, one is take home both in May.

1
 THE NATURE MEANING AND OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
PROBLEM OF DEFINING METAPHYSICS
To define metaphysics is not an easy task, the difficulty comes from its equivocal nature,
i.e from the fact that it can assume many and somethings conflicting connotation in such a way
that sometimes the term mean different things to different people depending on one’s
philosophical persuasion. So, that the term admits diverse shades of meaning is perhaps one of
the most difficult challenges facing metaphysics as an academic discipline, this of course mean
that those who employ the term can often operate across different levels even when from all
intent they are supposed to be discussing the same subject, the reality of the problems is evident
in the history of philosophy and the history of metaphysics which is repute with controversies
among metaphysicians regarding its nature and meaning.
Paradoxically the situation of metaphysics in all its epochs of the history of philosophy
has largely been defined by these controversies so that in other to understand the claims of
metaphysics and the various receptions metaphysics has enjoyed and continue to enjoy, it is
important to be familiar with the nature of these controversies. In the 18th century for instance,
to settle the controversy surrounding metaphysics once and for all, metaphysics
transforms itself into a science and this was one of the chief considerations behind Kant’s
critic of pure reason i.e. a need to overcome the controversy surrounding the status of
metaphysics is one of the consideration behind Kant’s critic of pure reason and in the 19 th
century, controversies were defined by the efforts of logical positivism to checkmate what it
considers the hegemony of metaphysics. In contemporary philosophy assaults of logical
positivism on metaphysics is carried on by existentialism, pragmatism and
deconstructionism, all of which maintained an anti-metaphysical posture and called into
question the traditional understanding of metaphysics as a science of Being Qua Being.
The pectoral of the reception of metaphysics and the images of metaphysics they confront
us with do not make it an easy task at all in defining metaphysics, but we shall try to clarify the
meaning of metaphysics by looking at the various ways the term has been understood hoping that
from this exercise a consensus should be met regarding the meaning of metaphysics or at least
with respect to how the concept is used. It means our approach is not merely prescriptive, on the
contrary by taking into account how philosophers have understood the term down to the ages,
one can come to the understanding of the meaning and nature of metaphysics.
ETYMOLOGICAL DEFINITION
The best way to flag off this investigation is to interrogate the etymology of metaphysics.
The term is a derivative of two Greek words “meta” which means “after or beyond” and
“physika” which means nature or physical so that etymologically speaking metaphysics can be
understood as a science that preoccupies itself with the things “after nature or beyond the
physical”. It may offer very little as per the nature of metaphysics but this light is very
important.

2
 We need to however make a further determination of the sense in which metaphysics is
after nature or beyond physical. The prefix “meta” is a crucial emphasis, the meaning of
metaphysics in the final analysis will depend on the sense annexed to that prefix “meta” since
invariably the meaning of the concept “physical” seems to be clearly defined so far as what is
negated in that etymological definition is physical to the effect that the concern of metaphysics is
not with nature but beyond nature. The manner in which the meta is understood therefore plays a
key role in defining our overall sense of metaphysics. Interestingly, much of the controversies in
the history of philosophy surrounding the nature of metaphysics has centered on the
hermeneutics of the meta in that etymological definition of the term.
*His Explanation in brief:
The etymological definition of Metaphysics presents it as being beyond nature, it is after
nature, the emphasis is on the interpretation of the meta.
EDITORIAL DEFINITION
Historically the term metaphysics is associated with Andronicus of Rhodes, one of the
editors of Aristotle’s works. Andronicus is supposed to have been the first person to deploy the
concept of metaphysics, although the concept is used with reference to Aristotle’s works,
Aristotle himself never used the term in any of his writings. According to popular account, in the
course of editing Aristotle’s treaties, Andronicus used the term to designate one of Aristotle’s
works which bore no title, the treaties in question which bore no tittle in which Aristotle
discusses matters he regards as “First Philosophy” occurs after another treaty within Aristotle’s
Couples with the title “Physics” and “physics” deals with the subject of nature.
*His Explanation
In Aristotle body of work, there is a particular treaty which had no title, and there is
another of his treaties that bears the tittle “physics”, so the one without the tittle then derives its
name from its position in relation to the body of work that has a title and the one that has the
tittle “Physics” is dealing with the subject of nature and the one without the tittle is now baptized
“metaphysics.” So we try to explain the editorial meaning which has to do with the position of
these untitled work in Aristotle’s body of work. So the treaties editorially is after the work
“Physics” and it was named metaphysics so editorially it was just an innocent indication in
Aristotle’s body of work. But there is clue there that is more than editorial, in saying that the one
that is untitled deals with subject matter that Aristotle considers as “first Philosophy”, so if one
goes by the content and not just merely the editorial position, it is already very suggestive of
what metaphysics is about, metaphysics deals with matters of “first Philosophy”.
*Note continues.
So, sensing that the untitled treaties occurred after the one titled “physics”, Andronicus
designated the untitled treaties “metaphysics” which translating the Greek “De Meta De Physika
Libia” which means “the book which comes after the Physics”, so the editorial meaning of
metaphysics is “the book that comes after the physics or the book that comes after the
physics that treats the subject of first philosophy”. So going by this explanation, it means that

3
the term metaphysics has come about “as a result of the position of Aristotle’s untitled
treaties within his couples and to this extent the term has no coherency beyond the editorial
meaning imposed upon it by Andronicus.”
On this view therefore we are entirely indebted to the editorial view of Andronicus as far
as the origination of the term metaphysics is concerned, in fact one may accept the cogency of
the editorial explication of the term, however the question is DOES IT DO JUSTICE TO THE
MEANING OF METAPHYSICS? No it doesn’t because it hardly explains why a whole
discipline has come to be designated by this term, so there should be a more fundamental reason
beyond the editorial meaning. There is something more and when that is explored, one begins to
discover a more fundamental sense of metaphysics, and the way to explore this “something
more” is to focus on the content of the treaties and the sort of issues it discusses.
*His explanation
Labels can be misleading but they are important, but it is also important that a label
correctly captures what is inside a thing, so that strictly speaking the label derives from the
content, so that beyond the label if one really wants to understand a thing, one needs to focus on
the content. So in this case focusing on the content will give you a deeper meaning of
metaphysics beyond the fact that metaphysics according to the etymological definition is beyond
physical or after nature. Yes, it is a definition but it is not enough, furthermore, to say that
metaphysics is a book after physics, is also a definition, an editorial one, but it is not sufficient,
so already it is clear that the “meta” is “equivocal” one can take it etymologically as “something
beyond nature”, and editorially as “something after the treaties called Physics”. But remember
there is clue as I earlier said, Aristotle did not tittle it, but if you look at the content, it is dealing
with matters of first philosophy, so once you look at that it gives you the different meaning of the
term. So this brings us to the chronological meaning of the term.
CHRONOLOGICAL MEANING OF METAPHYSICS
Chrono means “time”, so, it is not accidental that Aristotle says that the treaties discusses
first philosophy, and of course metaphysics has come to be known as first philosophy, that is
another name designated to it, but Aristotle already said that what he is dealing with is first
philosophy. So understandably first philosophy refers to “issues of fundamental
importance, i.e. matters relating to first principles of being” and to this extent such matters
do not let themselves to easy comprehension, in short they are not matters that are
understood immediately, on the contrary such matters test one’s perseverance and it is only
when one has thought them through and dwelt with them patiently do one begin to
understand them at all, in short the more we dwell on such matters, the more we think
them through, the greater and further comprehension one achieves.
So that if we are to consider them all “the order in which such matters are learnt (*his
words: that is where the Chronology is coming from; the order of learning), it will be
comparable to moving from simple matters to complex matters.” (matters of first philosophy
are not matters you unravel immediately they are matters you ruminate upon again and again and
the more you do so the greater the possibility of comprehension). We do not usually begin with

4
complex matters we reserve it for later. N:B It furthermore implies that the object of metaphysics
cannot be grasped immediately, it takes perseverance and patience.

10th march 2023 10:06am

(Recap)
The recalling factor in each of this definition is an attempt to determine the proper
hermeneutics of the prefix “meta” because that is what eventually determine the meaning of
metaphysics, so the meta has different interpretations and that is what gives it variety of
interpretations, if you interpret it etymologically you get “after nature or beyond the physical”,
but there is always a need to supplement because the information that each of those efforts
provide is not adequate so that each one completes the other, why is it still incomplete, that is
what we have seen with regards the etymological definition that is why the definition led us to
consider the editorial, educational and chronological definition, each of them has something to
contribute to our understanding of metaphysics as far as clarifying the sense in which the meta
should be understood. The next one we should pay attention is the Populist meaning.
POPULIST DEFINTION OF METAPHYSICS
From our consideration of the chronological and educational, you will agree with me that
it provides a fuller meaning, but be that as it may, the fuller meaning it provides is not sufficient,
and that means that beyond the chronological and editorial interpretations, the meta can yield to
other interpretations as well, and one of those interpretations as we will see represents a moment
of deflation in an attempt achieve a full view of the meaning of metaphysics.
From time immemorial metaphysics has been associated with occultism, witchcraft,
magic and superstition although the association is problematic and conveys a wrong
impression of the nature of metaphysics, nonetheless it thrives on the equivocation inherent
in the prefix meta in the etymological definition. (so it means the prefix is ambiguous,
equivocal and because of that it is problematic.)
In the present context the populist understanding of metaphysics in terms of occultism,
plays on the provision the meta makes for a distinction between the physical world and the world
underlying the physical world i.e. the world of the spirit, of principalities. The assumption is that
while the physical world is visible, the world of the spirit which underlies it is invisible,
nonetheless it enjoys a causal relationship with the world of the physical so far as anything that
happens in the physical is taken as a manifestation of some causal activity in the world of the
spirit. So there is a causal relationship between the physical and the spiritual and the assumption
is so pervasive and it is fundamental feature of popular synthesis. Because of the causal link that
supposedly binds both worlds, the man on the streets again and again results to native doctors,
magicians and fortune tellers in attempt to account for observed phenomena in the physical
world, believing that each phenomena is grounded in the spirit. Against this back drop,
metaphysics is then seen as the science of the occult, with the metaphysician understood to

5
possess some privileged knowledge into the secret causes of events observed in the physical
world.
However, take note, as seductive and as popular this image of metaphysics is, (and that is
the conception of the ordinary man, the man on the street), we have to say however that the
populist meaning associated with the meta is pejorative and as such it is misleading. But we can
understand how such association between metaphysics and the occult can arise but it is
nonetheless a falsification of the nature of metaphysics, it simply shows as we have noted
that we cannot achieve a proper understanding of the nature and meaning of metaphysics
unless our hermeneutics of the prefix meta in the etymological definition of the term is
adequate.
The contention is that the hermeneutics of the meta that the populist meaning
presupposes is inadequate and to this extent it falsifies the meaning of metaphysics,
steering us as it were in a negative direction as far as our search for the meaning of
metaphysics is concerned.
We have also seen that the meta can be interpreted editorially and chronologically, so that
unlike the populist meaning of the term which misinterprets the meta by associating it with
witchcraft because of the causal link that supposedly exist between the visible and the
invisible so that then the invisible is assumed to be the cause of whatever happens in the
visible, which is misleading , the editorial and the chronological are not necessarily misleading
but they are nonetheless incomplete with respect to the portrait of metaphysics they possess.
HIS EXPLANTION
You may be going in the right direction, but when you do not have the full grasp of what
is happening, there is a possibility that as time goes on you will get lost, so the other two
definitions i.e. the chronological and editorial definitions are on the right direction as far as the
authentic meaning of the prefix meta is concerned which is what then gives you the
interpretation of metaphysics, they are on the right track, but they are not complete, so there is
still something that needs to be added. However, the populist definition is in the wrong direction,
whether it is complete or not is not the issue it can never be complete if you want to understand
what metaphysics is, that is why I said it represents a moment of deflation in your search, but
remember we are not following the axiomatic process rather we are following the descriptive
approach in trying to gather all the relevant information to enable us achieve the whole view of
metaphysics. So if you take any element that is in the wrong direction, it is a moment of deflation
it is not going to advance your search for what you are looking for ,and that is the case with the
populist meaning, so that a further determination is required in other to achieve a good
conception of metaphysics even if the chronological and editorial are on the right path and it
simply means that for the populist it is inadequate, apart from the fact that they serve as a
contrast to tell you what metaphysics is not, and why that falsification arises, which is because of
the misinterpretation of the prefix meta.
So it is important to be clear about that because it means we can actually contrast both of
them, in previous years, I have asked them to discuss the populist definition of metaphysics

6
and contrast it with the rest. The first point is that one is in the right direction as far as the
search for the meaning of the prefix meta is concerned, and then you can see the positive
qualities of the editorial and chronological and what needs to be further supplemented.
(maybe I will repeat that question for you this time).

NOTE CONTINUES…
So we cannot underestimate the contrast between the hermeneutic of the meta
presupposed by the populist meaning and the hermeneutics of the meta respectively presupposed
by the editorial and chronological meanings, for while one points in the right direction (i.e.
editorial and chronological), the other (populist) forecloses the possibility of arriving at a
realistic understanding of the nature of metaphysics.
So while we certainly cannot rest on the populist meaning given its pejorative nature,
we still have more work to do even if we appropriate the basic points of the chronological
meaning in an attempt to achieve a full determination of the concept of metaphysics.
Philosophy is a typical discipline with special responsibility to make a rational
assessment of available possibilities and possibly work them into a synthesis in the event of
conflict of interpretation, so that in the light of the hermeneutic confusion unleashed at the
equivocation inherent in the prefix meta in the etymology of the term metaphysics, it falls on the
philosopher to reconcile the difference in the hermeneutics of the prefix meta and come up
with the synthesis that gives as adequate as possible, a conception of metaphysics. (So a
philosopher is a reconciler and the reconciliation is done on the platform of pure reason). These
means that there is a philosophical definition of metaphysics by various philosophers and so
now we are going to discuss how philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, Bradly and whitehead
defines metaphysics.
Here we will be able to see how the chronological and editorial definition is inadequate
even if they are on the right track for the philosophic definition gives you a clearer meaning, but
be careful for in philosophy no position is sacrosanct, so that even when they give you a full
view, the further challenge is whether that definition itself is acceptable, that is why we have
different philosophers giving different definitions.

7
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS (10th march 2023)
Aristotle and Plato are like philosophical twins, their views are very similar, Aristotle
was once a student of Plato, Plato founded an academy. Aristotle knows Plato’s view thoroughly.
What is true of Plato is also true for Aristotle, the waters of philosophy flow from them. We are
considering Aristotle first because metaphysics is more associated with Aristotle as seen from
the editorial definition, even though he didn’t use the term metaphysics, but he is responsible for
presenting metaphysics as first philosophy.
For the sake of anticipation, for a good introduction captures the conclusion, it is
noteworthy to say that Aristotle has TWO definitions of metaphysics, first as a science of being
qua being, and second, as a science of the highest substance. These two definitions constitute a
full understanding of Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics.
METAPHYSICS AS THE SCIENCE OF BEING QUA BEING.
In conceptualizing the subject matter that has come to be known as metaphysics today,
Aristotle calls it First Philosophy, so one can also say metaphysics is first philosophy. This
designation gives us a clue about Aristotle’s concept of metaphysics. Metaphysics is not first
philosophy in the sense that it’s subject matter has to be studied first, but rather it is first
in the sense that it deals with the fundamental principles of being i.e. first principles of
being.
The concern of metaphysics is to understand the primary causes and not the
secondary causes of being, so that in approaching reality metaphysics seeks ultimate
explanation for the nature of things and not proximate explanation.
*His Explanation
There is difference between first principles and secondary or tertiary principles, there is a
difference between ultimate and proximate explanation in the sense of metaphysics as first
philosophy, it is limited, it concerns itself with the primary causes of being and not secondary
causes of being. It is dealing with ultimate explanation and not proximate explanation.
*note continues…
So being that it’s concern is with fundamental causes of being and ultimate explanation,
metaphysics takes precedence over disciplines that occupy themselves with secondary
causes of being or with proximate explanation of the nature of things.
*His explanation

8
 Now we can see what we said in the abstract mainly that metaphysics is foundational for
disciplines, it is evident in Aristotle’s definition which defines it as first principles with deals
with ultimate explanation and not proximate explanation, it is foundational in respect to the
entire gamut of sciences. Since it is first principle it means that tertiary and secondary principles
are exemplification of first principles, so it means the principles of metaphysics with relating
with primary causes of being are exemplified by other disciplines and for these reason
metaphysics is foundational. (possible exam question as he said).
Note continues…
Aristotle did not use the term metaphysics, but Andronicus baptized his work as
metaphysics and that is what is known as metaphysics today, and that work deals with maters of
first philosophy but first philosophy in the sense of first principle of being.
Aristotle in his metaphysics says:
there is a branch of knowledge that studies being qua being and the attribute
that belong to it in virtue of its own nature, now this is not the same as any of
the so called special sciences since none of these inquires universally about
being qua being, they cut off some parts of it and study the attributes of the
part, that is what the mathematical sciences do for instance, but since we are
seeking the first principles, the highest causes, it is of being qua being that we
must grasp the first causes. (possible exam or test question)
*His Explanation
What he is trying to say is that metaphysics is dealing with being qua being, and being
qua being refers to the highest causes of being. It is the science of being qua being in the sense
that it investigates what makes a thing what it is, it investigates the essence of a thing, the “is-
ness” of a thing so far as it is. It means for anything that is, the cause of its “is-ness” is the
interest of metaphysics.
This definition of metaphysics as science of being qua being immediately presupposes
that there is a distinction between universal and particular, because everything that is, is a
particular being, but what makes it what it is, what defines its “is-ness” is not the particular,
rather it is the universal, for it is the universal in the particular that makes the particular what it
is. So if metaphysics is dealing with the is-ness, that is what makes a thing what it is, it is that
universal in the particular that is its primary concern in attempt to explain the cause of that
particular thing, or if you prefer in attempt to explain particular things or nature of things, what
metaphysics is investigating is the universal that makes things what they are, so that the
presupposition is that, the particular is not it’s own cause but the particular has the universal that
allows it to be what it is.
Once you introduce that distinction between particular and universal it means that
metaphysics as science of being qua being is studying the universal in the particular. This does
not mean that metaphysics is not interested in the particular but it is interested in the particular
with regard to its universality because it is the universal in the particular that makes the particular

9
what it is, so it means it is not interested in the particular in the particularity but it is
interested in the particular in its universality, it means every particular thing has a universal.
Being qua being tells you that there is universal and the [articular that makes it what it is,
metaphysics wants to explain every particular thing but given that no particular thing can account
for itself, every particular thing is accounted for in terms of the universal, so to interrogate any
particular, one is interrogating the universal in the particular and the interrogation of universal in
the particular then helps you to understand that thing in it’s essential nature, that is what Aristotle
is calling the fundamental cause or first principle, the universal that makes that thing what it is.
However, the question is…what is that universal? This explanation of metaphysics as science of
being qua being is applicable to anything, books etc. for philosophy studies everything.
Note continues…
METAPHYISCS AS SCIENCE OF HIGHEST SUBSTANCE
Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics as being qua being apart from presupposing the
distinction between particular and universal, it also presupposes something else for it says that,
that every particular thing is a substance. So one cannot present his definition without
mentioning that, for him metaphysics is dealing with the particular in its universality
because it is the universal in the particular that makes the thing what it is, and the point of
metaphysics is to understand the nature of being.
In addition to these, he further says that, every particular thing which you are trying to
understand and which is the object of metaphysics is a substance, meaning that the
universe is a conglomeration of particular substances and they have casual relations, it
means one particular thing can influence another thing, the implication of this is that, if you then
want to say what is that universal?, it means that you cannot explain any particular thing in terms
of itself, but in terms of universal in the particular, but that then sets up a kind of casual
relationship.
*His explanation
Take for instance if you were to account for paper, you may ask who made the paper, this
same with a carpenter in terms of wood, so no particular thing can account for itself because a
particular thing is always wanting for another particular thing, for that particular thing is a
universal, and every particular thing is a universal so it sets up a causal relationship. For
example, who is a father of David, am looking at him now, is this really him, he is particular
being, from the standpoint of Aristotle we want to understand his nature as he is in himself.
David has eyes and large ears, they are all essential definitions of him, but if one asks WHO
MADE DAVID? so to explain his real nature, one has to go beyond his particular attributes
to uncover his essential character and his “is-ness”. One cannot talk of his “is-ness” without
talking about his grandparents, in interrogating his universal nature they are involved, they are
particulars and also universal for being universal they gave birth to David, so one still needs to
interrogate who is the father of his grandparents and these goes on and on to various generations.

10
 The point is you cannot interrogate any particular thing without an infinite regress
of causes and each one is a universal but it means that there is no pure universal, every
particular thing is a universal but it is not a pure universal e.g David is a universal, a
particular thing, a substance, his grandparents too are particulars and universals but more
universal than David, but can one get to a point where there is pure universal?
Note continues…
So the essence of these illustration is that for Aristotle, every particular thing is a
substance so for him to say that metaphysics is a science of being qua being, he is more or less
saying that metaphysics is the science of substance. So he is only talking of particular things as
substances and if metaphysics is dealing with universality in particularity it means you that you
can as well say it is the science of universal, science of substance, since it is the universal that
explains the particular in its universality.
We are still explaining metaphysics as the science of being qua being, so if Aristotle is
saying that metaphysics is the science of substance it means that there are different hierarchy
of substances and what he is looking at is the causes and he has four causes. The material cause,
formal cause, efficient cause and final cause, and metaphysics is dealing with the final cause, the
end to which things tend, however it also has concern for the material cause because it points to
the particular, and the formal cause for it points to universal and the efficient cause.
So Aristotle everything points to the highest cause, for he is saying there is highest
substance, recall he is talking about the primary cause of first principle of being, and the first
principle of being cannot be any particular thing, the ultimate cause of being cannot be any
particular being, it’s the universal in the particular, however recall that every universal in a
particular itself is a particular thing, so that in the end Aristotle is talking about pure
universal, it is only pure universal that is genuinely regarded as the ultimate cause of
everything and without presupposing that pure universal that is not contaminated with
particularity it means one cannot explain anything. It means we are talking of the universal
of universals.
Recall how we traced David generation to Ad infinitum, and this did not actually give the
explanation we need about the is-ness of David, so Aristotle then postulates that there must be a
cause that is itself uncaused, the unmoved mover, when he is talking of the unmoved
mover, that is “the highest cause”. The highest cause is a universal, but it is not a universal
that has any particular, it is not a universal in the particular, but it the universal of
universals, it is a pure universal.
This explains Aristotle’s emphasis on the first principle of being, it means the first
principle of being cannot be anything particular, it cannot be anything that is
contaminated with particularity, that is why he says that look! metaphysics is science of
being qua being in the sense that it is the science of universals, because even if every
universal is a particular, but the universal that is free of particularity that is “first cause, the
highest substance” and in this sense he derives the second definition of metaphysics as “science
of the highest substance” and the highest substance according to him is “the unmoved mover,

11
the uncaused cause o” or you can call him God but his own God is not a personal God he is
“pure act”.
So in these sense he gives two definition of metaphysics “science of Being qua being”
and “science of highest substance” which is the uncaused cause responsible for everything.
The two definitions are not the same but they are complimentary, because once it is
clear that everything is substance, then metaphysics is the science of substance, which is right,
which means it is the science of universals, so the distinction between universal and particular is
important to understand what is meant by Being qua Being, and no particular thing accounts for
itself and every particular thing has substance.
The distinction between matter and form allows you to explain the concept of substance
in Aristotle. This brings about actuality and potentiality, for every particular thing has a form and
matter the fact that it has form means it is a particular thing, and the fact that it has matter means
it is open to become something else.
14th march 2023
ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS CONTINUES…
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO DEFINITIONS
We have seen that he has two conceptions of metaphysics, which are, metaphysics as the
science of being qua being, and as the science of the highest of substance or of God. So the point
we will interrogate now is what is the relationship between these two conceptions? For when
he says that it is the science of being qua being, it needs to be explained extensively, what does it
mean? and also the science of the highest substance, what does it mean? what is the relationship
between the two conceptions, are they mutually exclusive? are they complimentary? How do
we reconcile them? The relationship between these two conceptions of metaphysics is one of
the core challenge in the history of metaphysics after Aristotle and it has been said, the
history of philosophy is like a footnote of Aristotle and Plato, and his conception of metaphysics,
must have a considerable difference on the history of metaphysics and by extension of
philosophy itself.
The way you look at the relationship between these two conceptions does matter,
obviously for Aristotle the two conceptions are not exclusive of each other they are
complimentary, but even in that relationship of complementarity which do you think takes
precedence? if you look at it the way we have explained it and the way Aristotle has
presented it is the second definition of “metaphysics as the highest substance” that takes
precedence. So the definition of metaphysics as the science of highest substance already
encapsulates the definition of metaphysics as the science of being qua being. Being Qua being
is telling us that metaphysics is a science of universals, the universal in the particular, but
from our discussions it is just the universal in the particular, the universal in the particular
itself has to be accounted for, so that you are then talking of then talking of the universal of
universal that is not in need of any explanation, hence you assume that there is a highest

12
substance which is the cause of every other substance, and it means there are multiplicity of
substances and each of those substance is a universal since there is no mere particularity.
It means that the conception of metaphysics as the highest substance is an attempt to
answer the question regarding the most fundamental cause of being, or the most
fundamental principle of being without you cannot account for being. So if you want to
account for the “is-ness” of anything you may start with the conception of metaphysics as
being qua being, but there is no possibility of understanding of metaphysics as the highest
substance, for once you have excavated the highest substance you do not need any other
excavation because the first principle is its own explanation and that is why it is regarded
as the first cause or the highest substance.
So it means that there is substance but there are hierarchies of substances, everything
is a substance and everything is casually related with other things, but even with that, you
cannot explain anything unless you have that which in itself is an explanation, so in terms
of the highest substance you can explain everything.
He furthermore posits that the highest substance is God and there can be no other
cause higher than God, so it means that God is the foundation of everything, however you
have to be careful for he holds that God is not a personal god, this first course he is talking
about is a metaphysical necessity arising from the fact that if you do not *force it that there
is a first cause then it means that you would not be able to explain anything, so the
necessity of explaining everything is what gives rise to his postulation of First cause.
The relationship between the two definition as conceived by Aristotle is not necessarily
the way it has been understood and that is understandable because he is a philosopher, and you
are not bound to follow him and people have not followed him entirely with regards to his notion
metaphysics although his conception of metaphysics, the twofold understanding of metaphysics
are influential, but you need to be aware that for Aristotle there is no opposition, there is no
misconceptions, but more importantly you need to be aware that without prejudice to the
complementarity between the two conceptions the emphasis is on the highest substance and
that encapsulates the rest, so that you can’t talk of universal without talking of the
universal, and in these case universal is also a particular thing and that is why Aristotle’s
concept of substance is not complete without “matter and form” so that which is the highest
substance can is pure act, and every other thing is “act and potency, it is matter and form”
and if it is matter and form it means that thing cannot account for itself ultimately, it has to
be accounted for in terms of another and then in terms of the highest substance.
MEDIEVAL RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
People have received his view especially in medieval philosophy where the highest
substance was baptized as God, and they spoke of God and his creatures and God is the
foundation of everything there is. So ethics and metaphysics are interrelated, Axiology, value,
reality, God is the foundation of everything. So that in medieval philosophy what they did is just
to appropriate Aristotle and apply it. Like Aristotle the two conceptions are complimentary for

13
them and are not mutually exclusive and like Aristotle the emphasis is on the highest substance
and in that case metaphysics remains the queen of all things.
So there is a recognition that there is a plurality of principles and the unity of principles is
accounted for in terms of metaphysics and the principles of metaphysics are exemplified and you
cannot have that without the conception of metaphysics as the highest substance.

MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF

METAPHYSICS
From the advent of modern philosophy especially as a result of the rise and the
acceptance of science Aristotle’s metaphysics is rejected. The four causes, which tried to
explain the reality of things and which cannot be presented without talking about his
concept of substance were questioned and beginning from the modern period “final
causality is rejected” and by final causality we are talking about God, and they centered on
efficient causality which is man, so in modern philosophy the shift is from “ Deo-centrism to
Anthropocentrism” man becomes the center and God is sidelined.
So the modern reception of the relationship between Aristotle’s conception of
metaphysics was such that modern philosophers favored and laid emphasis on “being qua
being”. This is at the start of modern philosophy, however they will still try to talk about the
highest substance, but the point is that the ambiguity becomes very obvious, because in the
ancient period highest substance is God, and the medieval made it very clear that these
God is the Christian God as Aquinas cosmological argument of the five proofs of the
existence of God posits, and each of the proofs is moving from the domain of “Physics to
metaphysics” moving from what you can observe to the cause of what you can observe and
the cause of what can observe cannot be part of what you observe. So he is talking of the
apriori.
So in the modern context Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as the highest substance
then undergoes transformation that is not talking of God but in every context there is a god
if you look at God as a highest substance in every context there is god, e.g the god of bodija
is Fr. Igbekele, and of our class is Falade. The point is once you come into the modern
context it allows you to equivocate a “surrogate god” and in these case many of the
metaphysical theories in modern philosophy are looking for the “highest god” but “it is not
the traditional god” they may look for something that can serve as final cause outside of
which you can’t acquaint anything.
So it means that Aristotle is rejected and in that case there is tension between his
conceptions and that tension becomes even more heavy in the contemporary context. In the
contemporary context they hold that there is no need for god for everything is its own god,

14
that is the “cult of autonomy” I decide what I want to do and you decide what you want to
do so that there “are plurality of substance and each of them and each of them is self-
explanatory” you do not need reference to any other person to explain anything, so that if
that happens it means that the conception of metaphysics as the science of highest
substance is nothing because everything is on the same level, there is no hierarchy.
So what is now in play for them is the science of being qua being, they do not deny
that there is universal but universal for them is interpreted “Nominalistically”. There is
metaphysical realism, there is conceptualism and there is nominalism when one is
interrogating the reality of universals, so is not that they did not agree that a particular
thing does not point to a universal but the question is WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE
UNIVERSAL? “Universal in the contemporary context then becomes nothing but mere
names and labels for identifying particular reality”. However, it is not as if the universal has
an ontological reality, so in that one can see what has become of Aristotle’s conception of
metaphysics, the other side that he took so seriously (highest substance) is completely kept
and the one that is accepted (being qua being) is then re-conceptualized to fit into the
modern understanding of things.
However, metaphysics is like a cockroach you cannot completely kill it.

15
PLATO’S CONCEPT OF METAPHYISCS 17TH MARCH 2023
There is a basic continuity between Plato and Aristotle, we started with the latter because
he is more famous for metaphysics especially as the discipline as come to be named after him
according to the editorial work of Andronicus.
So we shall look at the main thrust of Plato’s conception of metaphysics, however bear in
mind that all the time the basic challenge is to have a proper hermeneutics and understanding of
that meta in the prefix that is what gives you the sense of metaphysics and as we have seen there
are different senses of metaphysics as we explore that hermeneutics of the meta, but for the
philosophers they are trying to bring everything together, you can see that in Aristotle and
Plato continues in the same vain.
According to Plato metaphysics is a science of the supra-sensible reality.
*His explanation
If you explore that definition, the emphasis definitely is on the supra and it means above
or beyond, paying attention to the meaning of supra it is very similar to what we have in the
etymology metaphyics, so there is certainly a transgression of the sensible, it is not denying
the claim of the sensible, but it is saying that metaphysics is not associated with the sensible
but it associated with the supra sensible. So the sensible has to be transcended to be able to
derive the metaphysical.
THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO’S DEFINITION
The emphasis of the supra reminds of Aristotle, because he holds that metaphysics is the
science of being qua being which presupposes the distinction between the particular and the
universal, and the universal is supposed to be in the particular so that there is certain
transgression of the particular in other to realize the universal even though the universal is
supposed to be in the particular, there is no separation between the universal and the
particular, but for you to focus mainly on the particularity in the particular that is not
metaphysics, rather it entails considering the particular in its universality but that cannot
happen unless you transcend the particular and focus on the universal in the particular,

16
that is when you are able to realize the universal which the object of metaphysics. In these
case Plato is doing something similar with his definition, so far as the emphasis is on the
need to go beyond the sensible.
Take note, the sensible is always particular, so strictly speaking, Plato is talking
about the sensible particular, and metaphysics is not associated with the sensible particular
but with the supra-sensible, so there is something that is universal beyond the sensible
particular and it is only when you focus on that that you are genuinely involved with
metaphysics.
Taking the two definitions into account they are more or less saying the same thing
with regard to what metaphysics is, the physical, the sensible, the particular has to be
transcended in other to have what you call metaphysics.
The particular and the universal are both reality, so talking about them is also
talking about reality, so if you collapse the double emphasis on being qua being and supra-
sensible, they are more or less saying that metaphysics is a discourse on the nature of
ultimate realities, not particular reality but universal reality so in that case there is no
difference between Plato and Aristotle definition of metaphysics.

SPECIFICS OF METAPHYSICS AS SCIENCE OF THE SUPRA-SENSIBLE

Here we will focus on Plato’s theory of forms/ideas, which is a response to the question
as to the nature of ultimate reality, the core problem of metaphysics
For Plato there are two tiers of reality, one he calls the world of forms and the second
the world of appearance. The world of form is the world of Universals, and the world of
appearance is the world of particulars. The world of the sensible particular is not the real
world, the really real world is the world of forms, the world of universals. The world of
forms/universals is inhabited by universal forms which are ideal prototypes that are
instantiated by sensible particulars in the world of appearance.
*His explanation
The point is that there are two levels of reality, one is according to Plato is not a real
world it is just an appearance of the real and the other is the really real world and everything in
the world of particulars is a reflection of what you have in the world of forms, so that properly
speaking, reality that you attribute to sensible particulars is a derivative reality in the sense that
in themselves they do not possess any reality, if they possess any reality it is by virtue of their
affiliation with the world of universals.
So the point we have made is that there are two worlds one of them is not the real world,
it is a world of appearance it is a shadow of the real world and according to Plato the world of
sensible particular participate in the world of forms. The sensible particulars by virtue of
participating in their corresponding ideal forms in the world of forms, it means that they not have
fullness of reality, they only enjoy partial reality, it is only the forms that enjoy fullness of

17
reality, that is another way of putting the point that the forms are ideal prototype that embody
fullness of reality, whereas the sensible particulars that enjoys a relationship of participation with
the forms has only partial reality.
So can we relate this back to this definition of metaphysics? Is he saying that the world of
sensible particulars is not reality? no, rather he says there is world of forms and world of
appearance, the world of forms is the ideal world, the world of appearance is the world of
particulars, but every particular is a sensible being, but the world of form, is the world of
universals and the ideal world in the sense that he says, it is the really real world, another way of
saying it is the ultimate and ultimate is the opposite of proximate.
In another way what am trying to say is for Plato, that definition of metaphysics as
science of the supra-sensible presupposes that there are two worlds, and that is the main thrust of
theory of forms, it divides reality into two levels and I am just trying to explain the two levels,
because his theory of forms illustrates his concept of metaphysics, for he is saying that
metaphysics has to do with the ideal world which strictly speaking is the supra-sensible, so the
clause is the supra-sensible, and in the world of forms there are universals, so every particular
thing in the world of appearance/particular e.g. table or chair has an ideal form in the world of
forms. So everything is a particular thing and that particular thing has an ideal form, and that
particular thing is just a resemblance it is a participation in the ideal form, so it means that
without the ideal “table” there is no particular thing, that is why he is saying that whatever reality
you find in the world of the sensible is partial and it is just a reflection of the ideal form.
However, metaphysics is not dealing with the sensible particular, the object of
metaphysics is in supra-sensible, but for that to happen it means that the world of the sensible
particular has to be transcended so that strictly speaking metaphysics is dealing with ideal forms,
but you cannot deal with the ideal form without dealing with the particulars, it means for you to
explain the particular presupposes the ideal form, if you have the ideal form, means you have the
particular because the ideal form encapsulates the particular, since the particular participates in
the ideal form.
Is it different from Aristotle? No. why? Because the ideal form is the form is universal so
it is more or less saying hey Look! You are dealing with the relationship between universals and
particulars, and metaphysics is about universals and the universals supposedly contains
particulars, the particular cannot be explained on its own because anything the particular has is
contained in the universal, so if you want to explain the particular, you must first explain the
universal.
So it is not saying that there are no particulars, but particulars live by shadows of
universal, and metaphysics is dealing with universal hence he is saying it is science of the supra-
sensible and not the sensible, he is not denying that there is sensible, so we are talking about
ultimate and proximate and only the universal is ultimate. That is about the reality that
metaphysics is preoccupied with, it is the supra-sensible reality, ultimate reality not particular or
proximate reality.
Note continues…

18
HOW THE PARTICULAR IS TRANSCENDED TO REALIZE THE UNIVERSAL WHY
IT IS A “SCIENCE”
The universal is in the particular like Aristotle says and unless you go beyond the
particular you can’t get the universal, so the question is how do you transcend the particular in
other to get to the universal? What is the logic of that transcendence? The logic of that
transcendence is Pure reason, so Plato and Aristotle are saying the same thing, because it
means that without the exercise of pure reason we cannot go beyond the sensible particular
and without the exercise of pure reason we cannot grasp the universal in the particular, it
is not something for your eye, it is not something you get from observation, it is something
you get by applying pure reason and Plato calls his own reason dialectical reason. He calls it
such because reason has the capacity to go beyond mere particularity and realize the
universal, so it means that with reasoning you can understand the universality in the
particular since reason operates by way of Abstraction.
So pure reason relates with form and observation relates with appearance,
metaphysics is not observation, it does not deal with appearance, but it doesn’t mean it
cannot start with appearance, it starts with it and goes beyond it to the supra-sensible.
Plato is not just saying that metaphysics is science of the supra-sensible but it is a science
that relies on pure reason in transcending appearance in other to determine the nature of
ultimate reality.
The emphasis is on the supra-sensible, for what he said is that metaphysics is a science
of the supra-sensible, and what we have been explaining is the supra-sensible, but why it is a
science is what we have explained by referring to pure reason as the instrument metaphysics
relies on in transcending and in grasping the nature of the supra-sensible. So if you want to
put it differently it means the material and formal object of metaphysics, it means for Plato
that distinction is presupposed just the distinction between material and formal object is
presupposed by Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics as science of being qua being.
So for Plato, the supra-sensible reality is the material object and another name for the
supra-sensible reality is ultimate reality and sensible appearance is another name for
proximate reality, so metaphysics deals with ultimate reality the totality of all there is.
The first point is that “supra-sensible is the ultimate reality, the second point is that
to get ultimate reality you need to use reason to transcend sensible particular, the further
point is that in the world of ideal forms there is hierarchy of forms. So Plato’s concept of the
supra-sensible presupposes hierarchy of forms, because recall the form of table cannot be in
the same level as the form of human being, and the form of human being cannot be in the
same level as the form of God, so it means that those forms that make up the world of forms,
you can arrange them in terms of hierarchy and the hierarchy depends on the level of the
entity that each one embodies, because each of the forms have instances in the sensible world,
be it chair, table ,dogs humans, stones etc. they are all particulars and they have ideal forms,
but those ideal forms, they cannot all enjoy the same level of reality.

19
 So what he is saying simply is that in the world of forms there are so many forms, there
is many forms and there are particular things for there is no particular thing that doesn’t have
a corresponding form, but the forms are not on the same level, there is hierarchical
organizations of the forms, and the highest of them is what he called “the form of the good”
all the other forms are flowing from the form of the good, so if metaphysics is dealing with
supra-sensible, in the most fundamental sense it is dealing with the form of the good and the
form of the good encapsulates every other forms because it means reality is ultimate goods,
that is where some of the Christian philosophers took the ideas of Aristotle and Plato, God is
good is the most fundamental characterization of God, and talking about the goodness of God
means talking about the love of God, for God created all things out of his love, so everything
flows out of divine goodness, and divine goodness is the evidence of divine love, so there is
correlation between love and goodness, and God is defined as love, so it means everything flows
out of the love of God, so it means you can explain the whole of creation as coming from the
emanation of the love of God, that is very close to what Plato is saying, but he is not a Christian,
that is what medieval philosophers like Plotinus and Augustine hold.
So note that there is hierarchy, and the fact that there is hierarchy in his conception of the
form reminds us of the closeness between Plato and Aristotle, for in Aristotle’s concept of
metaphysics there is hierarchy of substances because particular things are categorized
according to their levels of universals and the one that is universal of universals, that is why
there is act and potency, for everything contains matter and form, but as you ascend the
hierarchy the particularity decreases just as the potency decreases, so that in God that is
the highest is pure act. So it is almost the same point that Plato and Aristotle ae making.
The purer the form the higher the hierarchy in the hierarchy of being, so there is hierarchy
of truth and reality in both Aristotle and Plato.
SIMILARITIES AND DISIMILARITIES BETWEEN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE’S
DEFINITION OF METAPHYSICS
However, the question remains is there any difference between Aristotle and Plato’s
definition?
The main similarities between them has to with their understanding that there is no
particular without universal, the particular has to be accounted for in terms of the
universal. The universal is indispensable if you are going to explain anything.
Metaphysics is not science of particular it is science of universal, they called it different
names, one called his own being qua being and highest substance, and the other calls his own
supra-sensible, but if you want to put it very well you can say form of the good.
However, recall that Aristotle was a student of Plato, maybe Plato didn’t look at that
aspect, so by the time Aristotle is appropriating Plato, he is now able to say it is the science of
being qua being, but already presupposes Plato, the hierarchy of forms with the form of the good
on top and without the form of the good the other form cannot be explained. It is just like the
sun, we see things in the light of the sun, and that will explain the importance of the highest form
that everything flows out from, and analogously Aristotle says the same thing, you cannot

20
explain any particular thing unless you presuppose that the highest one is uncaused and is the
cause of every other thing.
So Aristotle conception of metaphysics are complementary, for you can’t have science of
being qua being without having science of the highest substance, just like you cannot have the
table without the form of the table and then the form of forms which is the form of the good, for
the form activates the different forms and the different forms can then explain the particular
instantiations.
However, the difference between both of them is still on that issue of the relationship
between universal and particular, the similarity is on universal and particular, at this point
if you understand it, this is the main problem of philosophy and it is coming all the time in
different segments of philosophy, the problem of the relationship between particular and
universal is very evident in philosophy and it is also evident in Aristotle and Plato’s conceptions,
so it is one thing to affirm the reality of the particular and the reality of the universal, the
issue is the relationship, How are they related?, for it is not sufficient to say that the
particular is explained by the universal, the question is how can the universal explain the
particular? The particular is an instantiation of the universal but how can it be that?
Plato presupposes that, for if he doesn’t presuppose that, he will not say that
particular is partial reality and the world of forms is the reality, he will not also say that
the particular is participating in the universal, if he doesn’t recognize the affiliation
between both of them, he will not say that the particular is a reflection of the universal, that
it is a shadow of the universal, that it is imitating the universal, so if he is saying all of that
the presupposition is the universal accounts for the particular given that one is the instance
of the other, so that if you have the universal, the universal already contains the particular
and not just one particular but other instances of the universal. So that’s not a problem.
So the question is how is that possible? For Plato the relationship is the relationship
of participation, and if it is relationship of participation it means the universal is more than
the particular without universal there is no particular, and that is precisely what he is
saying by contending that the universal is the really real world and the particular is partial
reality, so the issue is how?, Here comes the answer, For Plato the world of universal is not
the world of particular, so it means for him both of them are separate worlds, that is why in
his conceptions there are two levels, the first is the world of forms and the second is the world
of appearance, and they are separate, and that is his theory of forms and the theory of forms is
meant to explain the reality of change but what he is saying is that the world of forms is
metaphysically the opposite of the world of appearance and that means ontologically, the
universal is separated from the particular and that is the problem, so if they are separate, that is
if the universal is separate from the particular , how then can what is separate from the other
explain it? if universal is separate from the particular and the particular participates in the
universal, How? They are separate one is in the world of forms and the other is in the world of
particular, there is no relationship between them, since there is no relationship between both of
them how can the universal explain the particular? We call this Plato’s Metaphysical Dualism, it
means his metaphysical dualism throws his theory into confusion and that is the starting point of

21
Aristotle’s concept of metaphysics because Aristotle is saying that Yes! Universal explains
particular but if universal is separate from particular you cannot have that explanation. So
what he does is to dismantle the separation and to argue that there is only one world, and that
world contains the universal and the particular, so it is not the case that you have two worlds
that are separate from each other as Plato says, and everything Aristotle then does is
dependent on that understanding of the relationship between universal and particular, so it
means universal and particular are not separate, and that is why in his own conception he is
talking about the universal in the particular both the universal and the particular they inhabit
the same world, but in the case of Plato the universal is in a separate world, and Aristotle’s
question is if they are separate how can they account for each other? And on the basis of that
his theory is punctured.
However, for Aristotle’s conception there is a problem with that position, for there is
always a problem for every philosophical position, the question is if the universal is in the
particular, what is the difference between both of them? If the universal is not different
from the particular, then the universal cannot account for the particular, for the universal
to account for the particular it must be different from it, but if the universal is in the
particular and it has no transcendental aspect, if the universal completely collapse in the
particular then there is a problem as whether the universal can account for the particular.
But, certainly Aristotle is right by saying that if you put both of them separate as Plato did
then there is a problem.
So metaphysics is still the science of the supra-sensible, and the science of being qua
being, the only quarrel between the two is the relationship between universal and particular
whether they are separate or whether they inhabit the same world, and from that
standpoint, Aristotle theory is certainly an advance over the one of Plato.

22
BRADLEY’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS 24TH MARCH 2022
Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Bradley whose full name is Francis Hilbert Bradley. He is
much closer to our time, born in 1846 in England, he is one of the most important philosophers
in the 20th century, he contributed to virtually every area of the philosophical discipline, however
he is mostly known for his work in metaphysics, and this finds a systematic exposition in his
magnum opus, appearance and reality, an essay in metaphysics which was published in 1883.
There is also to his credit such writings as:
(i) Ethical studies (1876)
(ii) Principles of Logic (1883)
(iii) Essays in truth and reality (1914)
(iv) Appearance and reality: An essay in metaphysics (1893)

The concept of metaphysics is implicit in all of his writings especially in his account of
morality as self-realization in ethical studies, and then his, theory of Judgement and
inference in the principles of logic, same is true of his essay in truth and reality, but where
you find his view of metaphysics explicitly articulated is in his appearance and reality. From
the tittle of the work one can see that it is a metaphysical essay.
He holds metaphysics in high esteem seeing a close affinity between religion,
mysticism and metaphysics.
*His explanation
This recalls some of our discussions in our introduction to philosophy, where we saw the
rubrics of the concept and definitions of philosophy as a program of change, and various
conceptions of philosophy as a program of change, such as Marxism, existentialism, and
pragmatism. The eastern mysticism, recall we said that philosophy can be understood as a

23
process in thinking, yet it is not just thinking, because when you are thinking you become one
with the absolute, and in that change one is talking of contemplative transformation, which is
close to Christianity. Christianity is religious philosophy in the sense that the contemplatives by
contemplating God as the object, you become what you contemplate. However, that is not
Philosophy if can recall what we discussed on the relationship between Philosophy and religion,
they both have something in common, which is their material object been reality as a whole, but
the point of philosophy is to interrogate reality to know it not to become it, but in Christianity,
the point is you are not just contemplating God you want to become like God in everything both
you attitude and dispositions, and that cannot happen without interior transformation in which
you surrender everything to God, so thinking and contemplation are not the same, meditation and
contemplation are not the same, in meditation you use reason to think and analyze but in
contemplation you get to a point where you are no longer in control, that is mystical experience,
here you are not just thinking for thinking about God transport one into God to a point where you
experience interior transformation

Note continues…
so if he is saying that there is a close affinity between these three (mysticism, religion and
metaphysics) and metaphysics itself is a primary instantiation of philosophy, then one can as
well say that there is a close affinity between religion, mysticism and philosophy. For Bradley
metaphysics is not just more than thinking it is close to mysticism and religion, it is quite
different from what we find in the modern or post-modern concept of philosophy where
everything depends on pre reason.
So if you go back to the etymological definition of philosophy the distinction between
human wisdom and divine wisdom you see that Bradley is at the intersection between both,
because he will say philosophy is human wisdom but it has important affinity with divine
wisdom, so far as it is open to divine transcendence. Augustine and most Christian philosophers
will say the same.
He regards metaphysics as one of the highest vocation to which a human being is
called and no human being can realize his full potentials unless he learns how to think and
more importantly to think properly and to think properly is to think metaphysically. So
you see the value of why we discussed the problem of defining metaphysics because if your
conception of metaphysics is occult-tic you will be in confusion here, because you will think that
to think metaphysically means to think occultticaly, but that is not the case because metaphysics
is using pure reason and to think metaphysically means the issue has to be considered in all
its ramifications, as a whole, so when you are thinking as a whole you are thinking
metaphysically, and Bradley thinks that that is the vocation of every human being, so it
means every human being is a metaphysical animal.
As a form of thinking, which presupposes a hierarchy of thinking of which
metaphysics is the highest, so as a form of thinking it (metaphysics) provides an important

24
avenue for understanding the nature of things as they are in themselves rather than merely in
terms of their accidentals or as appearances.
*His explanation
if we discuss the problem of appearance and reality, we see that by its very configuration
what is said to be appearance is ontologically dependent on the subject, so appearance is relative
to the subject, so if there is no subject there is no appearance because appearance is as you see it,
so once you say “it seems” it is the perspective of the subject, it means “if it seems” one is more
or less saying it may not be what it actually is, so it means reality and “seeming” are not the
same. Seeming is from the perspective of the subject and the perspective of the subject may not
correspond with reality and in that case there is a disparity between appearance and reality, but
that is from the epistemic side.
What then is the relationship between appearance and reality? And there you see Plato
saying that the sensible particular is not the really real, but it cannot be divorced of the really
real, because appearance is real so far as it is the appearance of reality, that is why the life of the
appearance is a reflection of the life of reality, well in that case Yes! There is a difference
between appearance and reality, but the distinction between both of them in the final analysis
occurs within the context of reality, because if there is no universal form there is no
particular form, so for you to make a distinction between universal and particular, the
distinction must fall within reality, so the appearance cannot be outside reality it is always
part of reality and that is an essential point of Bradley. Let us now look at how he defines
metaphysics because that will elaborate some of the points that we have touched upon.
Note continues…
Bradley says in his Appearance and Reality that “we may agree perhaps to
understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance or the
study of first principles or ultimate truths or again the effort to comprehend the universe
not as piece meal but as a whole”.
*His explanation
The fact that he says it is the study of the highest substance reminds us of Aristotle’s
definition, and also his notion of metaphysics as an attempt to know reality as against mere
appearance reminds us of Plato. The emphasis on mere is important because mere is pejorative, it
is more or less saying that something is not complete. However, that reminds us of Plato because
he defines metaphysics as the science of the supra-sensible and these presupposes appearance
and reality.
Furthermore, when he says to comprehend the universe as a whole and not as piece it
reminds us of Aristotle and his conception of metaphysics as the highest substance, because the
highest substance is the ultimate, the totality and the whole as against the particular.
Any definition gives you a point of entry into somebody’s view, once you enter then you
can elaborate and this definition gives us a point of entry into Bradley’s conception of

25
metaphysics, and from there we can then begin to consider the different ramification of his
concepts of metaphysics. We have mentioned some of the point that needs to be remarked
already.
POINTS TO BE NOTED ABOUT BRADLEY’S DEFINITON
These points give a holistic understanding of Bradley’s view. The first is that:
Bradley says metaphysics is an “attempt to know”: - an “attempt” suggests a trial, when you
are not sure of the object of the journey, you are tying. When you are attempting, there is a
possibility of success and failure. However, metaphysics is about knowing reality as against
mere appearance, this still captures Bradley’s conception, all he is saying is that, it is an attempt
he is qualifying the whole effort as an attempt, meaning that knowing reality as against
appearance can either be successful or not.
Furthermore, this reminds us about the nature of metaphysics whether or not it is
absolute, so it means that metaphysics cannot claim to everything, even when it claims to
know everything, even when it claims to know everything we can take at as attempting to
know and there it means there is possibility of success or failure and with that it means
metaphysics is not almighty, it means it is limited.
This is very significant, because it the first time we find such kind of emphasis, the other
conceptions are very much optimistic that look! if you use the resources of pure reason there is
no way you cannot determine the nature of reality successfully, but Bradley is not saying one
cannot use pure reason, for the instrument of metaphysics remains pure reason but he is
saying that he has his doubt as whether one can use pure reason to grasp the nature of
ultimate reality, that is why he is saying “attempt”, it means Yes! You can use it to grasp it
but it is another thing whether you can grasp it in its totality, so that is why he is saying
that it is an effort to comprehend the universe not as piece meal but as a whole, so he is not
denying that one wants to get everything and the vocation of metaphysics is to get
everything that is why we said holistic, but because one’s intention is to get everything does
not mean one can get it.
So it means that metaphysics is science of being qua being or supra-sensible as Aristotle
and Plato has said respectively, it means that it uses the instrumentality of pure reason, but
where issues begin to arise is whether through the instrumentality of pure reason can
metaphysics determine the nature of everything? So metaphysics claims to be able to do
that but Bradley is protesting that that is a bit too ambitious and it is completely beyond it,
for all metaphysics is trying to do is an attempt and in that attempt there is a possibility of
success and failure.
N:B (The question may come up in the exams “what is the significance of Bradley’s
definition of metaphysics as an attempt to know reality rather than mere appearance?” and
the whole emphasis should fall on the significance of “ an attempt”).
However, there are two possible extremes that we must guard against when Bradley
presents his metaphysics as an attempt to know, these extremes are: -

26
 (a) The extreme of absolute failure
(b) The extreme of absolute success
So because he says it is an attempt does not mean it is going to fail woefully and it
doesn’t mean it is going to succeed perfectly, both are imbedded, he is saying that look!
Metaphysics can know reality, so if you say because of the “attempt” metaphysics cannot know
reality which is the extreme of absolute failure then you are getting it wrong, and similarly one
cannot say that he is saying that metaphysics can know everything which is Absolute success,
rather he is actually saying that you cannot know everything, but you cannot know everything
does not mean that you cannot know anything, so there are two points, the first is an affirmation
that metaphysics can know something, it can know some aspect and it can know as much as
possible but it cannot know everything.
So these two extremes should be avoided, and when these two extremes become
effective it means philosophy and skepticism will come across as enemies, but the truth is
that there is a common ground between philosophy and skepticism so that one is not
necessarily exclusive of the other.

BRADLEY’S CONCEPTION CONTINUES…. 27TH MARCH 2023

Significance of “attempt” continues…
We presented Bradley’s definition generally and we analyzed it, however there is
analysis and there is synthesis, so if you want to study anything you analyze it into its component
and you will be to assemble and see everything it fully.
With metaphysics from the standpoint of Bradley we can see the definition of various
elements, and by focusing on each of those elements it gives you some insights about what
metaphysics is all about.
The second point to be noted about Bradley’s definition is: -
The correlation/ combination between Bradley’s concept of metaphysics and that of Plato
and Aristotle:
It is seems as though Bradley is combining Plato and Aristotle’s conceptions and one can
see that from the analysis of the definition. His definition of metaphysics combines the
definitions of Aristotle and Plato. But it must be noted that Bradley is neither Plato nor Aristotle,
which means that there is something unique about Bradley’s definition. So in one sense he is
repeating Plato and Aristotle but there is something very unique about his own conception of
metaphysics.
So if you put everything together, Bradley’s concern is to understand the relationship
between appearance and reality, because from his standpoint, appearance cannot but
belong to reality, but how does it belong to reality, (Plato and Aristotle are saying the same

27
thing, if the particular cannot be divorced from the universal because without the universal you
cannot understand the particular), so for Bradley reality meaning the whole of all there is
cannot be divorced of appearance and appearance for Bradley is just what is not the whole,
so it means the whole is the all-inclusive reality, it is a totality, and the all-inclusive reality
is also called ultimate reality or universal reality. So strictly speaking appearance is not
reality if you imply that appearance is totality, but if you imply that appearance is part of
reality then one can say that appearance is reality, just like Plato, the sensible particular one
cannot say it is a nonentity, as long as you recognize that that the sensible particular is real by
virtue of it’s participation in reality or the world of forms.
So for Bradley then, his definition of metaphysics as we have seen is an attempt to
know reality and not mere appearance, for him “there is a certain logic of part and whole”.
*His explanation
For instance, David is a part of this class and the entire class is the whole of the class,
one can talk about the class as a whole but the whole is different from the collection of the
particulars which is David and others, you can talk of the whole as the whole, but you can also
talk of the whole as parts a collection of the constituent elements. When we do this are we
talking of the same thing? the answer is YES and NO, look! when you add up all the individuals
in the class is that really the whole? or what you refer to the whole is different from just a mere
collection of particulars?
The whole is not just the collection of particulars, because we are talking of the harmony
that exist between the particulars, so it means the whole is immanent of the particulars, but the
whole cannot be reduced to any of the particulars, or to any of the sets of the particulars, so it
means that the whole is a reality that transcends the particulars that make it up even though the
particulars are part of the whole.
Note continues…
So that is the logic of the part of whole, because it means that every particular thing
for Bradley is appearance, but an appearance of reality understood as totality of all there
is. So that is the logic of part and whole, and that is why if you go back to that definition you will
then say that metaphysics is not studying reality in fragments or piece meal but as a whole, so it
wants to capture everything about what there is.
These brings us to the next (third) point which is:
The question of the possibility and limits of metaphysics:
This point should remind us of the distinction we made between the material object of
metaphysics and the formal object, that distinction is effective for all the other philosophers we
have studied, whether Aristotle or Plato, for we know that the material object of metaphysics is
ultimate reality and the formal object is pure reason, and that is effective on any branch of
philosophy if it is philosophy, if it is really philosophy no matter how minute that branch of
philosophy is it must exemplify this structure that the material object is ultimate reality and the

28
instrument it uses is pure reason, and if metaphysics is the primary instantiation of philosophy it
means that that is true of metaphysics pragmatically.
So Bradley is trying to capture that metaphysics is interested in the whole and in
trying to address the nature of the whole, it relies on pure reason and not adulterated
reason, you find it in other branches of philosophy but in metaphysics that is the main
expression of what philosophy is so that you can expect the highest level of abstraction and
universality, as far as both the material object and formal object is concerned.
So one can then see that they are all saying the same thing, one cannot define any
discipline without demarcating the material object from the formal object, Aristotle will say that
Look! For you to be able to grasp the universal in the particular it is not through
observation it is through pure reason and Plato is saying the same point that to know the
sensible particular which is derivation of the forms, and over and above all which is
derivation from the form of the good unless you use dialectical reason you cannot ascend
the domain of the sensible to attain the supra-sensible.
So it is still the material and the formal object which is also seen in Bradley.
Remember we that Bradley is different from Aristotle and Plato, but the question is how is he
different from them? first you can use that in his conception of metaphysics, because everything
their saying is metaphysics has to do with an attempt to use the instrument of pure reason, to
know ultimate realties. But the point is to determine the possibilities and limitations of
metaphysics, for everything has possibilities and also limitations.
When you look at that you will see the difference between Aristotle, Plato and Bradley,
and it has to do with the nature of the relationship between appearance and reality, but from
what Bradley is saying everything particular thing is appearance but it is appearance of the
whole, and if the problem of metaphysics is between reason and reality, it means reason is
appearance for reason is a particular thing, it as an aspect of the whole, but because reason is
part of the whole, there is no way reason cannot understand reality, reason can understand
reality, because the study of the whole is the same as the study of reality.
However, whether or not reason can take the whole of reality is another issue,
whether there is a difference between reason and reality.
*his explanation very important!
Going back to your first year the problem of philosophy is the relationship between
reason and reality, and there are three possibilities, the skeptical position says there is no
connection at all, and this means that even if you use reason you cannot understand
anything and that is the presupposition for the conception of philosophy as conceptual
analysis, because the presupposition is that philosophy is all about determining the
meaning of the concepts, so the concept themselves are not concepts of reality, and that
presupposes a skeptical understanding of the relationship between reason and reality.
There is another position which holds that both reality and reason are intimate,
since reason is the instrument of metaphysics, the relationship is so intimate such that there

29
is nothing of reality that reason cannot unravel. If that is the case it means that philosophy
is “almighty, it has no limit, but the possibility is not yet in question”
Plato and Aristotle did not quite say so but they implied that reason can know
everything about the nature of reality, but for Bradley that is not the case. Does reason
have the capacity to know everything Yes it does, but will it know everything in the end
NO! it won’t that is why Bradley says it is an attempt to know. So while he will not deny the
possibility of metaphysics, or the relationship of reason and reality like the skeptics did by
saying that there is no relationship, however he is not also saying that there is absolute
relationship between both of them such that there is no difference between reality and
reason, and once there is a difference between appearance and reality which he
presupposes it means that “there is a limit to what reason can do, reason can know as much
as, but there is a limit to what reason can know about reality, and in that sense it means
reality is more than reason, and it means reason is part of reality but reason cannot be
identified with the totality of reality”.
Note continues…
So looking at what we have done so far it means that for Bradley metaphysics has a limit,
just like philosophy, but philosophy is very important, for one to know to reality as much as
reality can be known, one cannot but rely on the instrument of reason, but in doing that, one
should not be oblivious of the limits of reason, and reason is limited because of the nature of
reality, that reality is more than any of it’s particulars, that it is why he is saying it is immanent,
and there is no way any of the particulars cannot belong to reality, but belonging to the reality
( this is the emphasis of the limits) a part is always a part it is not a whole, and reason is just a
part of reality, and because of this there is no way reason can know the whole of reality
otherwise reason will become God itself.
Important!!!
So what Bradley is trying to do is to tone down metaphysics without denying it’s
possibility, so toning down the possibility of metaphysics is not the same as negating its
existence, we have seen cases of outright negation in the positivist, but Bradley is not a
positivist, but at the same time he is not affirming that metaphysics is absolute. Metaphysics is
very important but it is not everything. So if that is the case it means that for Bradley
metaphysics has to be humble. He wants a notion of metaphysics that is not too ambitious but
humble, that is conscious of its limits. Bradley is criticizing what we will later call traditional
metaphysics which is familiar to the conception of philosophy as a systematic enterprise which is
in contrast with the conception of philosophy as a conceptual analysis.

30
WHITEHEAD’S CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS 31ST MARCH 2023
BIOGRAPHY
His full name is Alfred whitehead, he was an English philosopher of the early 20 th
century like Bradley, and like him he contributed to virtually every area of philosophy and even
beyond, but he is mostly known for his metaphysics, and that means that from his metaphysics
one can derive the rest of his views in regard to different areas.
He was a scientist, a mathematician, he came to philosophy through mathematics, he is
one of the fathers of modern symbolic logic, with Russell he authored the famous principi
mathmatica which is the locus classical of modern symbolic logic.
Before we move to consider his metaphysics it is noteworthy to mention some of his
writings, he was a prolific writer, and some of his most important works includes:
i) Science and the modern world (1925)
ii) Religion in the making (1926)
iii) Process and reality (1929)
iv) Adventures of ideas (1923)
v) Modes of thoughts (1935)
Of all of his books where one finds his concept of metaphysics explicitly articulated is in
“process and reality” and it has a sub title “an essay in cosmology”.

31
WHITEHEAD’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
It is noteworthy to say that “he uses metaphysics interchangeably with speculative
philosophy and this hardly reflects his conception of metaphysics because he thinks that the
concept of metaphysics that has prevailed so far is too ambitious in the sense that it gives the
impression that metaphysics is almighty, that it can know everything, and he thinks that is too
lofty a conception of metaphysics” so there is a desire in him like Bradley to move away from a
concept of metaphysics that is too full of itself.
So one can see the convergence between Bradley and Whitehead as far as their
conception of metaphysics is concerned, they want a humbler understanding of metaphysics, it is
evident in the very title of their respective books, Bradley’s own is “Appearance and reality:
An essay in metaphysics” and whitehead’s own is “Process and reality: An essay in
cosmology”, so they are both inclined to tone down the concept of metaphysics and whitehead’s
preponderance of the concept of speculative philosophy in speaking about metaphysics is part of
the strategy of toning down the concept of metaphysics, in other words he is saying that the
concept of metaphysics that is traditionally understood already is overloaded so that at the
mention of the world metaphysics one is already thinking of a discipline that is without limit and
he is interested in focusing on the limits of metaphysics such as to delegate that metaphysics is
not almighty, that is why he is using the concept of speculative philosophy.
So, to determine Whitehead’s conception of metaphysics one needs to ask what does he
mean by speculative philosophy? According to him, “speculative philosophy is the endeavor
to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every
element of our experience can be interpreted”

Looking at the definition there are some important elements that helps one to understand
his conception of metaphysics these elements are:
Speculative philosophy:
it tells us already something about his concept of metaphysics.
Emphasis of Speculative philosophy as an endeavor:
here we ask what is an endeavor? it is synonymous to an attempt, which reminds us of
Bradley, and probably he was influenced by him, for if he says that speculative philosophy
which he means by metaphysics, is an endeavor, it is analogous to saying that it is an attempt to
know reality as against mere appearance as Bradley holds, but whitehead converted metaphysics
to speculative philosophy in other to underscore the limits of metaphysics without prejudices to
the possibilities of metaphysics, and his emphasis on it being an “endeavor” connotes his effort
to tone down the conception of metaphysics, because if you are making an effort, that itself
carries the possibility that the endeavor can either succeed or not, so if speculative
philosophy/metaphysics is an endeavor, it reinforces the point that “metaphysics is not almighty,

32
that it is dealing with absolute reality but it may not be able to comprehend the totality of all
there is.
An endeavor to frame:
Another element is that he says it “is an endeavor to frame” but Bradley says “it is an
endeavor to know” there is a shift of emphasis, for it means that speculative philosophy is about
framing, but what are you framing? It is the “framing of general ideas.”, which constitute a
system that is logical, coherent and necessary, the essence of the “framing” is “framing of
general ideas” and the accidents are “the system that is logical, coherent and necessary” they
qualify general ideas, they are important but they are not the essence.
Interpretation of experiences:
Furthermore, it is about “Framing general ideas in terms of which every element of
our experience can be interpreted” from this we can deduce that metaphysics is about
interpreting the element of our various experience. In a system everything is interrelated, so if
the general ideals constitute a system then it has to be logical, coherent and necessary, it means
one thing follows another. So he is saying that “metaphysics is about framing general ideas
and we use those general ideas to interpret experiences”

So in all of this elements, the most important is the “interpretation of experiences”, so

it means that “metaphysics can be said to be the interpretation of experiences with the aid of
general ideas which is constructed”. Take for instance, the carpenter frames the door, and
constructs it to be used, in like manner, he is saying that, the metaphysician as a speculative
philosopher frames general ideas and uses them to interpret experience, so the emphasis falls
on the interpretation of experience.

However, there is a “qualifier” and that qualifier is “our experience,” an interpretation

of every element of ‘our experience’”, it is both comprehensive and delimited because the
emphasis is on “every” and “our experience” respectively.
Generally this definition is related to Bradley because whitehead said it is an “endeavor”,
but one may not see how it is related to other definitions, because the other definitions hold that
metaphysics is about the relationship between particular and universals, reason and reality, and
the goal of reason is to penetrate reality and make it known, this is seen in Plato and Aristotle,
but the presupposition is that reason can know everything about reality but Bradley said no, that
it is an attempt, yes it can know as much as possible, but if it wants to know everything one can
start from the standpoint of reason and then complete it with faith, in that case there is a
continuity between philosophy, religion and mysticism. if that were to happen it means
metaphysics is not almighty and that is the point Bradley is trying to drive home, and it is the
same emphasis that whitehead takes on.

33
 Whitehead did not use the concept of reality he used the concept of experience, he
did not use the concept of reason rather he used the concept of ideas, because those ideas
are always ideas of reason, so his definition is divided into “two parts, experience and ideas,
the goal of metaphysics is to interpret experiences using ideas, but from the previous
definitions, the goal of metaphysics is to know reality using reason, so that we are talking of
reason and reality, but this definition is talking about experience and ideas, but they are all
saying the same thing.
Once the two definitions are correlated one sees that they are saying the same thing, and
also one can see the reason why he prefers speculative philosophy but the message is still the
same that metaphysics is limited.
METAPHYSICS IN CONTRADISTINCTION WITH COSMOLOGY AND THE
RECONCILIATION OF METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE IN WHITEHEAD’S
CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
Looking at the qualification of the experience as “our experience” this also portrays that
he doesn’t want a conception of metaphysics that is too ambitious, he is not saying that
metaphysics is about everything, rather he is saying that it is “our experiences” there could be
other experiences but he is just interested in our experience, and when he is talking of “our” he is
talking of human experience because beyond human beings, there are other experiences but he is
not interested in that and that is why he said that “it is an essay in cosmology, and not an essay
in metaphysics because he is converting metaphysics to speculative philosophy”
So what he is saying about “our experience and not experience in all ramifications
also points to his efforts to delimit metaphysics”
Metaphysics right from the time of Plato and Aristotle is about everything, anything short
of everything is not okay for metaphysics, but Bradley and whitehead tries to delimit the
ambitions of metaphysics.
Whitehead tries to delimit metaphysics because he thinks that there is tension between
science and metaphysics, that is between scientific rationality and metaphysical rationality,
and in the last 300 years’ science has the most momentum, so things that are not scientific are
looked down upon so that metaphysics immediately comes into disrepute.
Positivism, “the positivist prejudice is the believe that science is everything,” and if one
is to use the measure of science to judge metaphysics it means metaphysics is nothing, this is
why Bradley and whitehead tries to tone down metaphysics so that it can be acceptable in a
world where scientific rationality has taken over everything, because if metaphysics
maintains that it is everything and it is in conflict with science, people will go for science
and metaphysics goes into extinction. So both of them believed that the only way to save
metaphysics is to reduce it a bit so that it is not in conflict with science and then one can
achieve a relationship between metaphysics and science.
Science is so influential as whitehead knows, and he doesn’t want to ignore that fact but
at the same time he believes that metaphysics is more important than science, so he is looking for

34
a way to bring the two together, and he did this by “toning down metaphysics and re-
conceptualizing it as speculative philosophy with emphasis that it is an exercise in
cosmology and cosmology simply refers to universe, and one can talk of this universe and
other universe like mars Pluto etc., so he limits metaphysics to the human realms without
prejudice to the fact that the universe is more than the planet earth inhabited by humans,
so in doing that he limits the notion of metaphysics as being about everything, and that is
why he said that it is the interpretation of every element of our experience in terms of
general ideas, but this goes with the connotation that metaphysics and science can still
cooperate and in that case he has succeeded in reconciling metaphysics and science.
CRITICISM OF WHITEHEAD’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
However, the question arises his conception of metaphysics, is it acceptable? because it
means he is criticizing traditional metaphysics and traditional metaphysics is not ready to
relent in its notion that it is studying everything and anything that is not everything is
appearance. So for Bradley what whitehead is doing is far too low for metaphysics “ because
metaphysics is about the study of the whole of the whole using pure reason, but whitehead
is of the opinion that one does not need to study the whole of the whole, just study one
limited whole which is our own universe of experience and so long as one can interpret it in
terms of general ideas that are logical, coherent and necessary one has satisfied the
demands of speculative philosophy, and that kind of speculative philosophy is not in
tension with scientific rationality because that is what science is also doing”.
So his attempt to tone down metaphysics is acceptable, but on the long run he is doing a
disservice to metaphysics, because metaphysics is brought down too low and it is as though
it has become a particular science, it is no longer the universal science that Aristotle and
Plato says it is because now it is dealing with the particular, even though it is our own
universe of experience, so long as it is not dealing with experience qua experience that
encompasses all universes of discourse then it means that his conception of metaphysics is
low.

3rd April 2023

CONCLUSION OF WHITEHEAD, AND THE MEANING, OBJECT AND RELEVANCE
OF METAPHYSICS.
QUESTION OF THE OBEJECT OF MATEPHYSICS
Every discipline has an object, the material and the formal object, and so does
metaphysics, it the two most fundamental considerations we have been examining in the various
definitions we have seen and in all of the definitions we have seen be it Plato, etymological,
populist, Aristotle etc. there has been a focus on the question of the nature of reality whether
it is particular or universal reality and what we have seen consistently is that the meta
indicates that there is always a transgression of the particular, the physical, the sensible,
appearance and without this transgression there is no metaphysics, for metaphysics is going

35
beyond, so the presupposition is that there is a beyond from the particular, and without
implying that metaphysics is not interested in the sensible or particular the overall emphasis is
that metaphysics is dealing with that which is beyond the particular or sensible, hence
metaphysics is a science of being qua being or supra-sensible without any indication that it is
not interested in appearance.
Within this context there arose the relationship between the particular and universal or
appearance and reality which is still within the material object, the question about this
relationship also attempts to clarify the nature of reality that metaphysics deals with, and the
emphasis is on ultimate, for metaphysics is dealing with everything.
However, the conflict between Plato and Aristotle has to do with how the beyond is
related to that which is beyond, how the supra-sensible relates with sensible, and whether it
can relate with the sensible if the supra-sensible is separated from the sensible.
So they all agree that the material object of metaphysics is ultimate reality clarifying
the nature of ultimate reality. Furthermore, they all agreed on the question of how does
metaphysics study its subject matter, which is the question of the formal object of
metaphysics, and they agreed that metaphysics studies its subject matter through the
instrumentality of pure reason so the formal object of metaphysics is pure reason. One starts
with observation to attain a level of pure abstraction.
So, metaphysics investigates the nature of ultimate reality, the totality of all there is
and it does that through the instrumentality of pure reason. So one will not be presenting
metaphysics accurately if one says or implies that metaphysics studies ultimate reality through
the means of observation or magic or incantation.
So the material object of metaphysics is ultimate reality or reality as opposed to mere
appearance and the formal object is pure reason as opposed to adulterated reason.
REALTIONSHIP BETWEEN REASON AND REALITY
It is then expedient to investigate the relationship between reason and reality, with the
presupposition that there is a correlation between the structure of reality and the structure of
reason, and it is only because of this correlation that one can use reason and reason then
gives access into the nature of reality, because they are together. However, the question may
arise about how together they are, nevertheless the opposite of this is that they are not aliens,
because if they were alien then they would have nothing to do with each other, because there will
be no way one will use pure reason to interrogate and still be able decipher the nature of ultimate
reality.
So if they were alien it means that metaphysics is not possible because no matter how
much one uses pure reason to try to study and unravel the nature of ultimate reality one will not
succeed. These are two positions already on the question of whether metaphysics is possible
or not, once one formulates the problem in terms of the relationship between reason and
reality.

36
 There is a third position, the first position says that there is no connection between
reason and reality, the second position says that there is a connection and they are so intimate
that there is nothing that reason cannot know about reality, the third position says that, they
are together but there is a difference, they are not so intimate that reason can take possession
of everything, it means there is a difference between them amidst their identity, and because of
their identity there is no way reason cannot know, for the vocation of reason is to know, but
given then that there is a difference between the structure of reality and the structure of
reason, there is a limit to which reason can know. And this is evident in Bradley and whitehead
conception of metaphysics, but it becomes more obvious in the conception of metaphysics from
the perspective of whitehead especially with his attempt to bring metaphysics and science
together, scientific rationality and metaphysical rationality.
However, the issue is that, metaphysics cannot be defined outside of the relationship
between reason and reality, and the question of how and to what extent metaphysics is
possible also has to be decided in terms of the framework of this relationship, so that one sees
that the emphasis of ultimate reality and pure reason are very important for all the definitions.
RELEVANCE OF METAPHYSICS
With the emphasis that real philosophy is metaphysical philosophy and not pragmatic
philosophy will help us to address the question of relevance of metaphysics. If one uses the
standard of science, then one cannot see any relevance of metaphysics, because it is the most
abstract of all philosophical disciplines.
Metaphysics deals with pure concepts that have instantiations in other philosophical
disciplines, this is why metaphysics is the foundation of every other disciplines. Metaphysics is
about using the intellectual capacity to try to unravel the nature of things by interrogate in them
in themselves and as comprehensible as possible. To this takes a lot of patience and this is what
the editorial meaning is talking about when it sees metaphysics as first philosophy.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
We began with the problem of defining metaphysics, the etymology gives a point of entry
into the meaning but it is not adequate because the meta is equivocal, and the editorial gives a
specific interpretation of the meta but it is only editorial, we saw the educational interpretation as
first philosophy, and then the populist deficient definition brings about a deflation because it is
moving in the wrong direction, a complete misrepresentation, because it missed the point about
the formal object of metaphysics, but it seems to understand that it deals with invisible reality
and that the invisible influences the visible, so it still talks about appearance and reality, but the
definition missed it by not allowing that the instrument metaphysics uses in investigating this
reality is pure reason. Then came the philosophical meaning which corrected the misconceptions,
as evident in all the philosophers we examined they all had that correlation between reality and
reason and they all tried in examining the question on how far pure reason can go in unraveling
the nature of reality.

37
 In the final analysis the question of the meaning of metaphysics itself is problematic,
because one cannot find all the philosophers posing the same answer regarding the nature of the
connectivity between reason and reality, that is why beginning with Bradley and whitehead there
is a movement in the direction of toning down metaphysics, but before then there is an optimism
that reason can unravel the whole of reality, and these two emphasis will give a different
understanding of the nature of metaphysics. One a metaphysics that is humble and has a foot on
the ground according to Bradley and Whitehead, and a metaphysics that is proud and assumes to
know everything according to Plato and Aristotle but not entirely their stance.
However, Bradley gives the balance, he combines Plato and Aristotle, but also making a
unique contributions which influenced whitehead, but what misled whitehead is his
overemphasis on science, so he ends up with a conception of metaphysics that is scientific but a
caricature of the real thing.

METAPHYSICS CRITICISMS AND JUSTIFICATION 21st April 2023

As we have noted metaphysics has a lot of criticisms, some are for it and others are
against it, however the criticisms and justifications gives one an insight about what metaphysics
really is. So here we are looking at specific criticisms of metaphysics which is aimed at arriving
at a clearer understanding of what metaphysics is. So we will begin with David Hume.
DAVID HUME CRITICISMS OF METAPHYSICS
Hume was a Scottish Philosopher of the 18th century, and he is regarded as a foremost
critic of metaphysics in the western world, this means that all other criticisms has some
bearing in his own criticism of metaphysics, so he is more or less a pioneer in criticizing
metaphysics. So understanding the criticism of Hume will help one to understand other critics

38
like Kant, because if not for him there would not have been any criticism from Kant, Ayer or
Carnap.
To better understand his criticism, one has to understand his attitude towards
metaphysics and his attitude was well spelt out in one of his writings when he said “when we run
over libraries, persuaded by this principles, what havoc must we make if we take in our hands
any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number i.e. analytic truth? No! Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matters of facts and existence i.e. synthetic truth? No!
permit me then to place that it can contain nothing but Sophistry and illusion”
So from his attitude he is more or less saying that metaphysics is useless, that is his
conclusion, however he has a premise/reason for saying this which is contained in the
passage and it is only when one focus on the reason that we will be able to understand
Hume and access whether his criticism is accurate or adequate or not. From his passage one
can see that he is an enemy of metaphysics
HUMES PREMISE FOR REJECTING METAPHYISCS (Account of the nature of
Knowledge)
From the passage his intrinsic premise in rejecting metaphysics is based on the
nature of knowledge. He claims it is epistemic, this means that he has a specific
understanding of the nature of knowledge, and on the basis of his account of knowledge he
then concludes that metaphysics is not possible, so if his premise is correct then his conclusion
must be correct, and also if his epistemic premise for rejecting metaphysics is correct then his
conclusion follows suit and vice versa.
Exam!!! * On the basis of Hume’s account of knowledge access his rejection of
metaphysics? First you will WRITE his account of knowledge on which he basis his
rejection of metaphysics.
Note continues…
By philosophical orientation, Hume is an empiricist, so it means his account of
knowledge is empiricist account of knowledge. So he is an empiricist so the fundamental
question is what is the play of empiricism regarding the nature of knowledge?
The playing of empiricism is that experience is the source and origin of knowledge, so
it means without experience there is no knowledge, but he is talking about sense experience.
This is his premise for rejecting metaphysics, it is based on the nature of knowledge, it is
epistemic and it has to do with the claim that sense experience is the source and origin of
knowledge, and to that extent it means that all our knowledge begins in experience and likewise
consummate in experience, so that unless our knowledge is cashable in terms of sense
experience, we cannot really validate such knowledge claim.

39
 Talking about the senses as the source and origin of knowledge, we have five senses, so
he is saying that for knowledge to be possible it has to derive from the senses, you have to see,
taste, feel, and smell it.
Some implications can be drawn from the claim that the senses are the source and origin
of knowledge and the first implication is that it affects the understanding of the basis of the
intellect, so the issue it throws up is, what is the relationship between the senses and the intellect,
for if the senses are the origin and source of knowledge it means it bears no relationship with the
intellect, it is a further claim of empiricism, they opine that the intellect maybe a source of
knowledge but it is a subordinate source of knowledge it is not original so far as anything in
the intellect must first pass through the senses, so it is as if the intellect builds on what the
senses provide.
So there is a bit of subordination of the intellectual function to sense experience, and this
means that one cannot use the intellect independently of the senses, that is, the intellect on
it’s own cannot attain knowledge of anything, so if the intellect attains knowledge of
anything, it has to be through the instrumentality of the senses, so this claim complements
the claim that the senses are the source and origin of knowledge, so it means that the
intellect is a secondary source of knowledge and the senses is the true source, that is why we
mentioned earlier that according to the empiricist, all knowledge starts and consummates
with sense experience, so much so that unless it is cashable with sense experience it is not
knowledge.
So this is a general explanation of his empiricism as far as the nature of knowledge is
concerned with Hume, so it means any empiricist should subscribe to this two thesis that “ sense
experience is the source and origin of knowledge and by implication that the intellect is not
an original source of knowledge but it is subordinate to the senses, so much so that there is
nothing in the intellect that does not pass through the senses, which is more or less
affirming the priority of the senses as the source and origin of knowledge.”
HUMES RADICAL FORMULATION OF EMPIRICISM
Hume formulates his thesis in a very radical form, he is an austere empiricist, there are
other empiricist like Locke and Bradley who subscribed to the view that all our knowledge
begins with the senses and the intellect is a secondary source of knowledge, however, Hume
formulates this radically in terms of what he calls epistemology of impression, the emphasis is
on impression. So he is saying that the five senses are the source and origin of knowledge
however in addition to this, the fundamental thing is that every knowledge is derived from
impression and by impression, he is talking about sensation, which is something very
immediate.
So he is saying that the basic building block of knowledge is sensation. His conception
of impression is immediate perception. So all he is saying is that for him the senses is the
starting point but within category of the senses there is the fundamental experience of sensation
which should be distinguished from subsequent levels of sense experience.

40
 So, for him if impression is the basis of all knowledge, then unless one has impression of
something one cannot claim to know that thing, and this is empiricism formulated in the most
radical form, because he says that if a knowledge claim cannot be traced to its corresponding
impression, then it means that that knowledge claim is false.
So, from his basis of his account of the nature of knowledge he concludes that
metaphysics is not possible, so all we have said regarding the senses as the source and origin of
knowledge, the subordination of the intellect to the senses, and the formulation of Hume’s
radical empiricism which holds that impression is the starting point of every form of knowledge
is termed “Non- technical explanation of his theory of knowledge”.
Furthermore, he has a “technical explanation of his empiricist account of
knowledge”, and he presents it in what he calls “matters of facts and relations of Ideas”. He
derives this distinction from Leibniz, for Leibniz made a distinction between “analytic truth
and synthetic truth”, Leibniz is a rationalist and for him analytic truth according to him are
truths of reason and synthetic truths are truth of the sense experience. Matters of facts
relate to synthetic truths, relations of ideas relate to Leibniz’s analytic truth, so it means
matters of fact are truths of sense experience, and relations of ideas are truths of reason.
Hume’s distinction of matters of facts and relations of ideas also relates to the distinction
of “Aprior and Aposteriori” apriori are truths of reason and aposteriori are truths of sense
experience, so the fundamental thing to know is that in formulating technically his
empiricist account of knowledge Hume appropriated Leibniz distinction of analytic truth
and synthetic truth in terms of his distinction between matters of facts and relation of
ideas. So analogously as Leibniz, for Hume, “matters of facts are truths of sense experience,
aposteriori” and “relation of ideas is truths of pure reason, apriori.”
He went on to say that, the apriori or analytic truth or truth of reason has always been the
privilege of rationalism over and above empiricism however Hume challenges the sovereignty of
the apriori, because according to rationalism, one can use the apriori independent of experience
to acquire knowledge about everything, so, if rationalism is correct by saying that apriori is truth
transcending experience it means that there is another source of knowledge that is legitimate
apart from sense experience. So in appropriating the distinction of Leibniz and
reformulating it in terms of his matters of facts and relation of ideas, he is trying to
deconstruct the privilege of the apriori as a means of acquiring knowledge of reality that is
not based on sense experience. So for him the battle between rationalism and empiricism has to
be fought on the basis of the measure of the apriori
This brings us back to his notion that the intellect is a subordinate source of knowledge, for there
is nothing in the intellect that doesn’t come through the senses, so the intellect is a derivative
source of knowledge and not original source of knowledge and if that is the case, the question
then arises if the apriori can really tell us anything about the nature of reality?, Hume replies by
saying that “ the determinations of pure reason are not determinations of sense experience,
for if reason has to depend on the senses it means reason is already limited by the senses,
however that is not pure reason it is adulterated reason, so reason has to work in

41
conjunction with sense experience according to him and it cannot know anything apart
from the way sense experience presents things to be, however pure reason can transgress
sense experience and also take both sensible and the trans-sensible, this brings us back to the
meta and that is the claim of metaphysics, that through the instrumentality of pure reason, one
can go beyond the sensible to the supra-sensible, so it means without the apriori i.e. pure reason,
metaphysics cannot establish its claim.”
So for Hume to challenge the claim of metaphysics he needs to destroy the apriori and
that is what he is trying to do by reformulating that distinction between analytic truths and
synthetic truths in terms of matters of facts and relations of ideas. However according to his own
formulation it means that the determination of pure reason is tautological, so if pure reason were
to operate on its own independent of experience as the rationalist claims it means that pure
reason can be making statements that are just tautological but not really about what is in the
world. So the only way to make statements that reflect the way things are in the world is only to
make the statements with the consciousness of the limits of sense experience.
So it means he is repeating the same thing with his reformulation, and the sum of it
all is that the senses are the source and origin of knowledge, and the intellect cannot
operate independently of the senses, for if it operates independently of the senses, then the
truths are tautological. The example he gives for analytic truth is that, relations of ideas are
relations of pure reason without any reference to the way things are in the world, for
example, bachelors are unmarried men, it gives no new knowledge because just by analyzing the
concept of bachelor unmarried men is already contained in it, so all one is doing is making
explicit what is implicit in the concept of bachelor, in that case, analytic truth are truth by
definition but it doesn’t say anything about what is happening in the world.
So Hume’s point is that, pure reason is like saying “A” is “A”, and if that is what
metaphysics has, then it cannot say anything about reality, for it is only saying that reality is
reality, so if one really wants to know anything about reality, the way to gain this knowledge is
through the senses, and even if the intellect is to be used, it has to be combined with the senses,
and if the intellect does this, then it is limited by the senses because there is nothing in the
intellect that does not first appear in the senses. So Hume is saying that any idea one has in the
intellect must be traceable to its original impression, and this original impression must be a
sense impression or must be through sense experience, the object one claims to know must
make an impression through sense experience, however following this claim brings about
confusion, because it means that truth of reason has nothing to do with the way things really
are, it is just tautological and does not provide any knowledge, so much so that, if that is
what metaphysics is claiming then it should not be taken seriously. So this is Hume’s
epistemic basis of his rejection of metaphysics. So Hume is arguing that metaphysics is not
possible insofar as all our knowledge is derived from sense experience.
The material object of metaphysics is ultimate reality which encompasses all universals
and particulars, and the formal object is pure reason, metaphysics uses pure reason and not sense
experience or reason combined with sense experience to study ultimate reality, and it claims that
with pure reason alone it can know not just particular things but everything, so the claim of

42
metaphysics depends solely on pure reason, and if pure reason cannot do what metaphysics
claims then it means metaphysics is non and void.
If Hume’s theory of knowledge is to be accepted then metaphysics is not possible,
because he holds that all knowledge stems from sense experience, and the knowledge of the
material object that metaphysics is investigating is gotten through pure reason, so if sense
experienced is used as the measure as Hume argues it means that metaphysics is not possible
because the only the sense can access is the particular reality that can be seen and felt, the reality
metaphysics is investigating can’t be seen or felt, therefore Hume is trying to say that if
empiricism is correct then it means metaphysics is impossible.
However, in criticizing this argument of Hume, the metaphysician can argue that, they
never posited that one can use sense experience to investigate reality, so the empiricist is right in
saying that the senses cannot gain knowledge of metaphysical reality but that does not mean that
there is no metaphysical reality, for the senses cannot access the supra-sensible which is what
metaphysics is dealing with.
However, there are two sides to the argument of Hume and the major premise of his
attack on metaphysics is the attack on pure reason, that pure reason is tautological in its
determination. The point of his criticism of metaphysics is that, reason is subordinate and
there is nothing in reason that is not first in the senses so that reason is constrained by the
senses and if reason has to be constrained by the senses it means that the idea of pure
reason cannot be attainted, because if one uses reason to try to capture metaphysical reality
the limitation imposed by sense experience will prevent one from attaining it.
So the core of Hume’s criticism of metaphysics is the status of the apriori, what he
calls relation of ideas, for relations of ideas are simply logical truth, tautological truth, so
for him pure reason is tautological in nature and since this is so it means that it cannot
apply to the real world, and it furthermore mean that one cannot use pure reason to grasp
the nature of ultimate reality and in that case it means that the project of metaphysics
which is aimed at understanding the nature of ultimate reality is rendered impossible on
the basis of the instrument it claims to use which is pure reason, for it means that the
determination of pure reason is tautological if one still insists that the instrumentality of
pure reason should be employed in determining the nature of ultimate reality, then it is an
impossible enterprise and that is why he concludes that it is nothing but sophistry and
illusion.
Hume is only correct if pure reason is actually tautological, and if his claim is to be
contested it should not be done on the basis that all our knowledge is derived from sense
experience, for his main claim is that deriving from senses, intellect is subordinate to the
senses and one cannot be talking of pure reason operating independently of the senses, if it
does operate independently as the rationalist claim then it is just building castles in the air,
and if it does this then it cannot be about reality. So the relationship here is between reason
and reality, can reason penetrate reality? if both are alien then it is not possible, and Hume
is claiming that reason and reality are alien so far as the determinations of pure reason

43
according to his empiricism is tautological, so it means that the is very skeptical about the
relationship between reason and reality, and that practically dismisses the possibility of
metaphysics.
So to determine if Hume is right about his rejection of metaphysics, first one needs
to consider if his hermeneutics of the apriori is adequate. Are there forms of reason that
are tautological or not? What is true in the logical system, is it true in the real world? No!
however if it is true in the real world it means that logic can be applied to reality and that is
what Hume is claiming and so if all forms of reason are tautological it therefore means that
Humes is correct, metaphysics is not possible, because metaphysical reality cannot
transcend the domain of mere ideas. That is if all forms of reason or idea, are merely
relations of ideas without any bearing on reality then metaphysics is not possible.
KANT’S JUSTIFICAION
So what one needs to prove is that “there are other forms of reason that are not
tautological” and one needs only one instance of these forms of reason that are not
tautological to deconstruct Hume’s position, for when this instance is found it means that
metaphysics is possible and that is the part that part explores. For if the argument of
Hume’s about the relationship between analytic truth and synthetic, truth is true in the
sense that analytic truth is purely tautological then metaphysics is not possible.
So, “Kant introduced a third division of propositions”, he did not deny that there
are analytic and synthetic truths which are truths of pure logic and sense experience
respectively but both are not exhaustive, there is a “third truth, synthetic apriori truth”
which is the object of metaphysics. So if he is correct that the distinction between synthetic
truth and analytic truth is not exhaustive, then it means that there is a room for the
possibility of metaphysics and in that case, it means that Hume’s assessment of metaphysics
is one-sided, because he thinks that there are only two kinds of truth and he holds that
analytic truth is purely tautological, but there are other forms of truth that are not
tautological and Kant calls it “transcendental reason.”
So Hume did not really understand the nature of metaphysics and he is super-
imposing on the nature of metaphysics and assuming that metaphysics is using purely
analytical reason, and if it is not the case that metaphysics is relying on tautological truths
it therefore means Hume is wrong and what fundamentally is wrong in Hume’s argument
is the concept of empiricism that he operates with, he reduced experienced to sense
experience alone, it is too one sided, and if it is followed it means that there is no room for
transcendental realities however once this reduction is undone, there will be no tension
between reason and reality.
So Kant’s introduction of the third division of proposition broadened the scope to
allow for so many possibilities of experience.
EXAM QUESTION
How does Hume account of knowledge provide a basis for his rejection of metaphysics?

44
AYER’S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS 28TH APRIL 202. 8:15am-10am
BIOGRAPHY
His full name is Alfred Jules Ayer (1910-1989), he was a British philosopher of the 20 th
century with Russell and Morre, he exacted considerable influence on several generation of
British thinkers, in the British context, Ayer was the official spokesman of the movement known
as LOGICAL POSITIVISM, a movement which traces its origin to the “Vienna Circle”, and has
among its members are thinkers such as Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schick, and Wittgenstein. The

45
movement of Logical Positivism is known for its Anti-Metaphysical Bias, so quite naturally
Ayer’s attitude towards metaphysics is negative. Logical positivism is an enemy to metaphysics.
His rejection of metaphysics is very much under the influence of Hume and Kant,
especially the primary appraisals of metaphysics as provided by Hume and Kant., although his
position is similar to those of Kant and Hume, it is not the same, and also to better grasp the
uniqueness of his critic of metaphysics one has to pay attention to his point of divergence what
sets it apart is “the nature of the premise on which he predicates his intention of
metaphysics”, so to understand Ayer’s conclusion that metaphysics is not possible, one has
to pay attention to the premise, if the premise is correct then the conclusion is correct.
Ayer’s criticism of metaphysics is found in his book titled “language, truth and Logic”
and the title of his first chapter already makes clear his negative reception of metaphysics and it
is titled “the elimination of metaphysics” and he says in the opening chapter that: The
traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful.
The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and
method of a philosophical enquiry. And this is by no means so difficult a task as the history of
philosophy would lead one to suppose. For if there are any questions which science leaves it to
philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery. We
may begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a
reality transcending the world of science and common sense. Later on, when we come to define
metaphysics and account for its existence, we shall find that it is possible to be a metaphysician
without believing in a transcendent reality; for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances
are due to the commission of logical errors, rather than to a conscious desire on the part of their
authors to go beyond the limits of experience. But it is convenient for us to take the case of those
who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality as a starting point for
our discussion. The arguments, which we use to refute them will subsequently be found to apply
to the whole of metaphysics.”
His Explanation!!!
This quotation reveals various ramification of Ayer’s criticism of metaphysics; first it
reveals that his attitude towards metaphysics is dismissive and negative, also evident in the
passage is his reasons for rejecting metaphysics, secondly also evident in his passage is his
point of divergence as regards Hume and Kant.
So what is clear from the passage is that he is familiar with the claims of
metaphysics for he is saying that “one cannot a metaphysics that is dealing with
transcendent reality, he is opposed to the notion that metaphysics is dealing with
transcendent reality but not just transcendent reality but knowledge of transcendent
reality, transcendent reality is the material object, while knowledge is the formal object, the
formal object deals with knowledge of transcendent reality, but Hume is saying that not
empirical reality, it is dealing with transcendent reality and not empirical reality, but it is
evident from the passage that the notion of transcendent reality is problematic because it is
beyond experience.

46
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMIC PREMISE AND LINGUISTIC PREMISE
AS A BASIS FOR REJECTING METAPHYSICS
Also those who claim that the knowledge of transcendent reality is possible (…
24:04.73 wasn’t audible), so it means for him that the issue of the limits of possible
experience is in accessing details of metaphysics, this goes in agreement with Hume
position, who posit that there is nothing in the intellect that is not first accessible to the
senses, so that for knowledge of anything to be possible it has to be through the means of
sense experience. However close attention should be applied when he says that the fallacy
of the metaphysicians is due to the condition for pure reason because it can be due to the
violation of the limits of experience which is why Hume holds that one cannot have
knowledge of ultimate reality because the determinations of pure reason are tautological,
but Kant reverses these by affirming that there is a third category for not all forms of
reason are tautological there are forms of reason that are not tautological and for that
reason it is possible for reason (synthetic apriori) to have access to ultimate reality and that
is the difference between Kant and Hume, but for Ayer, this difference fails into
“insignificance” because he thinks that the approach that under-gets both initiatives is
problematic, which means we can have a “a linguistic and also an epistemological
approach” to the rejection of metaphysics, the two approaches are viable, Hume and Kant
took the epistemic approach and based the possibility of metaphysics on whether or not one
can have knowledge of transcendent reality, so the issue is about the nature of knowledge
and that is why the premise of Hume and Kant for rejecting metaphysics is “epistemic”.
However, without denying that one can try to reject metaphysics on the basis of
knowledge, Ayer is saying that, that approach can never result in a successful rejection of
metaphysics, so he is a super enemy of metaphysics because as it is evident the argument of
Kant and Hume is not sufficient to reject metaphysics, so Ayer is saying that if metaphysics
is rejected with the basis of the argument of rejection being on the nature of knowledge it
may turn out to be inconclusive, so he “wants a completely different basis for accessing and
rejecting metaphysics and that new basis is the linguistic approach and not epistemic, it is
based on the nature of language”, so it therefore means that metaphysics can be rejected by
analyzing the nature of knowledge and then drawing the conclusion that one cannot have
knowledge of ultimate or metaphysical reality and that immediately dismisses the
possibility of metaphysics because metaphysics is claiming that it can know ultimate
reality, Hume took this approach when he said that if on the basis of knowledge one
cannot know reality then it means metaphysics is impossible.

AYER’S LINGUISTIC BASIS FOR THE REJECTION OF METAPHYSICS

So for Ayer, if you really want to kill metaphysics, you have to show not just that
you can’t have knowledge of ultimate reality or transcendent reality, but that all statement
about ultimate reality is “meaningless, is nonsense”, so if he can show that metaphysical
statement is meaningless it means that gives you a stronger basis for a rejection of

47
metaphysics, so that he is more or less advocating first and foremost as a point of departure
as that passage makes clear for the “revision of the premise on the basis of Hume’s
metaphysics accessed and rejected” that is his point of divergence from Hume and Kant.
So Ayer argues that “ the new premise has to be philosophy of language and it has to
deal with whether or not it is possible for metaphysical statements to be meaningful
because if metaphysical statements are not meaningful it means that metaphysics is dealing
with what is meaningless and that will seal the death of metaphysics” because the
utterances do not make sense and if the utterance do not make sense one can’t be talking of
knowledge, because for you to know something, the statements in which it was formulated
has to make sense, so he is saying that, this is “a more fundamental argument for rejecting
metaphysics” and that is why he is preparing the so called “commission of logical errors”,
this commission of logical errors explains why metaphysics is not possible.
So far, we have been distinguishing between an epistemic premise and a linguistic
premise for rejecting metaphysics, and Ayer argues without prejudice to the claim of the
epistemic premise that the epistemic premise cannot be the lord, so there is a need for a
new premise and the new premise has to the linguistic premise. So the question is what is
the nature of the linguistic premise? I have already given an indication of that by indicating
that he “wants to interrogate the meaningfulness of metaphysical statement because if he
can show that no metaphysical statement or statement about ultimate reality can be said to
be meaningful, it means he will secure the conclusion that metaphysics is impossible
because the metaphysical statements are meaningless.” Hume opine that metaphysics is
not possible because one cannot know transcendent reality, and he says this because of his
empiricism which implies the senses are limited and reason is tautological, so metaphysics
is not possible because one cannot know ultimate reality whether one uses the senses or
reason and that is the epistemic approach. The whole of the epistemic approach is to say
that one does not have epistemic access to ultimate reality and metaphysics is claiming that
one can have this access, so if they can show that one can’t have access it means they have
rubbished metaphysics, but Ayer is saying that, yes! You can follow that, but if you follow
that route, the argument is not conclusive, so I want to show you a better way of dismissing
metaphysics ( kpatakpata), the basis should be shifted from epistemic to linguistic premise
and show that metaphysical statement are meaningless.
So, the linguistic approach is stronger, and one cannot understand contemporary
philosophy if this approach is not well understood, it is a new revolution from knowledge to
language. At the start of the modern period there was revolution of the emergence of
epistemology as the first philosophy against the backdrop of the challenge of skepticism,
but the revolution lasted for almost 300 years, but at the start of the 20 th century, there is a
new approach, a completely new approach which is “philosophy of language” it is every
important, because it gives new a completely new platform to access philosophical
problems you can see that in that passage he quoted, that is why he can be so confident to
say that the traditional dispute for philosophers are unwarranted as they are unfruitful,
because it is due to commission of logical errors, so just clarify the logical errors and it will

48
be clear that metaphysics is nonsense. So you see why the nature of his linguistic premise
becomes very crucial.
So another passage from language truth and logic that buttresses this point
regarding his rejection of metaphysics from epistemic to linguistic is “one way of attacking
a metaphysician who claimed to have knowledge of a reality which transcend the
phenomenal world will be to enquire from the premises his propositions were deduced,
must he not begin as other men do with the evidence of the senses? And if so what valid
process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendence reality,
surely from empirically premises nothing whatever whatsoever concerning the existence of
anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred, but this objection will be met by a
denial on the part of the metaphysician that his assertions were ultimately based on the
evidence of the senses, he will say that he was endowed with the faculty of intellectual
intuition which enabled him to know fact that could not be known through the sense
experience, and even if it could be shown that he was relying on empirical premises and his
venture into a non- empirical world was therefore logically unjustified it could not follow
that the assertions which made concerning this non-empirical world could not be true, but
the fact that the conclusion does not follow it’s premises is not sufficient to show that it is
false”
So we are still talking about “his relocation of the basis for his rejection of
metaphysics from epistemic premise to linguistic premise, but he is saying that if you are
following an epistemic premise then you can never overthrow metaphysics, the only way to
overthrow metaphysics is to focus on the statement in which the claims of metaphysics are
formulated, and then he says that one cannot overthrow a system of transcendent
metaphysics merely by criticizing the way in which it comes into being, it cannot be done
by criticizing the source and origin of knowledge, whether it is sense or reason, but what is
required rather is a criticism of the nature of the actual statement which comprise it, and
this is the line of argument which we shall in fact pursue for we shall maintain that ( the
following statement is his own linguistic premise for rejecting metaphysics--), no statement
which refers to reality transcending the limits of possible sense experience can possibly
have any literal significance, from which it must follow that the labors of those who have
striven to describe such a reality has all being to devoted to the production of nonsense”.
So he is very bold and that is what language gives you, if your language is meaningless
then you cannot talk because nobody will understand anything that you are saying and he is
saying that the utterances of metaphysicians are nonsense and meaningless, and if your
utterances are nonsense and meaningless and you claim that you can know anything then it is
already rubbish and it means that metaphysics itself it meaningless and it is impossible.
So what we have done now is to show that there is difference between and an epistemic
premise and we have explained the difference and particularly how it relates to Ayer’s criticism
of metaphysics, while he is not disagreeing with them he opines that the approach cannot secure
the final rejection of metaphysics and for that reason he wants to relocate the basis to a linguistic
premise and we have also seen the nature of that linguistic premise, it has to do with the

49
meaningfulness of statements but specifically meaningfulness of metaphysical statements, so he
will try and formulate a criterion that will help you to demarcate statements that are meaningful
and statements that are not meaningful and on the basis of that criterion he will then access
whether or not metaphysical statements can meet up with that requirement, and if metaphysical
statements cannot meet up with the requirement of meaningfulness and stipulated by the criterion
of meaningfulness that he puts in place then it means that metaphysics is not possible.
So if we come back from break what we should be asking is “what is the parameter for
determining whether a statement is meaningful or not, once you understand this, you can
then apply the criterion to all statement, but his target is metaphysical statement. So in this
case of he is going to reject metaphysics on the basis of the meaninglessness of it’s statement, he
also wants to make it look as though that criterion is a universal criterion for meaningfulness in
all possible worlds of discuss, so that it looks as if he is just applying that universal criterion of
meaningfulness in eliminating metaphysics if metaphysics cannot satisfy it, so that is the
strategy but you have to see that the strategy is problematic one you focus on it, but the first
thing is to establish what is the criterion of meaningfulness in a statement, and how it applies to
metaphysics and also determine if the application is warranted.
AYER’S CRITERION FOR DETERMINING MEANINGFUL AND MEANINGLESS
STATEMENTS (VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE)
So since he is predicating the possibility of metaphysics on the meaningfulness of
metaphysical statements and of course he wants to prove that metaphysical statements are
meaningless and if meaningless then it means metaphysics is impossible, and he has a linguistic
basis for dismissing the possibility of metaphysics, but in other to do that he needs a clear
criterion of meaningfulness in other to demarcate meaningful statement from meaningless
statements and that criterion for him is what he calls “ the principle of verification or
verifiability” that is his criterion of meaning and simply put he said that “ for any
statement to be said to be meaningful it means what the statement utters, the claim of the
statement must be verifiable otherwise the statement is meaningless” or as from his passage
he says:
the criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of facts is the
criterion of verifiability, which says that a sentence is factually significant to any given
person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition which he purports to express
that is, if he knows what observations will lead him under certain conditions to accept the
propositions as being true or reject it as being false, if on the other hand that the proposition
is of such a character that the assumption of its truth or falsehood is consistent with any
assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of the spiritual experience then as far as it is
concerned if it is if not a tautology, then a mere pseudo- proposition, the sentence expressing
it may be emotionally significant to him but it is not literally significant, and with regard to
questions the procedure is the same, we can inquire in any case what observations will lead
us to answer the questions one way or the another, and if non can be discovered, you must
conclude that the sentence under consideration does not as far as we are concerned express a
genuine question however strongly it’s grammatical structure may suggest that it does.

50
 So clearly, he is making a subtly distinction between “literal and emotional significance”
the distinction is pivotal in situating the focus of the meaning and purpose of his criterion of
verifiability. So something maybe emotionally significant but it is not factually significant
and if it is not factually significant it means it is meaningless. So, it means clarification is
focused on factual significance and not emotional significance and factual significance has
to do with whether a statement is verifiable in terms of ‘observation’, and then he comes to
state the criterion more exclusively that the criterion of verifiability is defined by the
demands literal significance and not emotional significance so that on these view, (note: you
can take the following statement as the abbreviation of the verification principle), “the
meaning of a statement is it’s method of verification and it’s method of verification
observation”.
So long and short of it is that the meaning of any statement is it’s method of verification
and it’s method of verification is observation, because a statement cannot be said to be factually
significant unless what it asserts can be verified by means of observation so the emphasis is on
observation. So is it still empiricism or not? Yes, it is, but in this case, it is in regard to meaning
of statement or propositions and not knowledge. So, he is asking whether the statements or the
proposition is meaningful and the way to find out is to determine whether what the statement
asserts can be verified in terms of observation.
This is very serious, so let’s consider the statement “it is raining”, is it meaningful or not
if you apply the criterion of verification, yes, it is, for he is saying that the statement is factually
significant only if you can confirm by means of observation that it is actually raining, otherwise
the statement is meaningless, so one can confirm that it is raining by going out to see through the
five senses. What about if one says “it rained yesterday” or “it will rain tomorrow”, and the
criterion says that one must observe it, so is the statement meaningful or meaningless, it is
meaningless.
So, we have explained that he has formulated the criterion of meaningfulness in terms of
the principle of verification that states that the meaning of a statement is its method of
verification and it’s method of verification is observation, and that simply means that for any
statement to be meaningful, what it asserts must be observable, if it is not observable then it is
not clarified and if is not clarified then it is meaningless. So, the statement is very strict and one
can see already that it excludes statements regarding the past and the future, it is dealing only
with the immediate experience.
So, if you are following how things are enfolding, he is talking about criterion of
meaningfulness that will help you to separate statements that are meaningful and statements that
are meaningless and he has already formulated the criterion in terms of the verification principle,
and could that be a tool to attack metaphysics or not under the guise of accessing all statement
that are meaningful or not? From then, he will conclude that, if the criterion is accepted which
will apply to test all statements can metaphysical statements pass it? So what we are anticipating
is the question that, can statement about transcendent reality pass this test of meaningfulness?

51
For it means what that statement is asserting can it be observed, if it cannot be observed it means
that it is not verifiable because the meaning of a statement is it’s method of verification and the
method of verification is observation. So if metaphysical statements cannot be observed with
regards to what he asserts it means that they are then meaningless, nonsense and impossible.
So the core of logical positivism is the principle of verification because that is what
enables it to separate meaningless and meaningful statement, and the argument is predicated on
the meaninglessness of metaphysical statement, so that one need to focus on that verification
principle in asking whether it has been properly formulated, and whether or not it can serve as an
ultimate criterion of meaningfulness or whether it can serve as a criterion of meaningfulness of
certain statements, or whether for different categories of statements there will be different
criterion of verification, or whether the criterion of verification can be formulated differently,
because they way he has formulated strictly in terms of immediate observation is
problematic, and he quickly saw that reformulated it.
AYER’S REFORMULATION OF THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE IN TERMS OF
VERIFICATION IN PRINCIPLE AND ACTUALITY
So the principle of verification in hands went through different formulations once he
noted the difficulties associated with the principle that it cannot apply to past or future but
more troublingly is the fact that it cannot deal with deal with mathematical statements, the
original formulation that the meaning of a statement is it’s method of verification and it’s
method of verification is observation, if you follow it means that statements about past,
future and also mathematical statements are meaningless, because if you say “2+2=4” one
cannot observe what it asserts and for that reason just like statements of past and future,
mathematical statements must be dismissed as meaningless, and it that is the case, everything is
meaningless except what you can see immediately and when that time passes that statement also
becomes meaningless, for instance “Joesph was in class 30mins ago” it is meaningless because it
cannot be immediately observed.
So the original formulation is too narrowly formulated, and he saw that and tried to
modify it by “making a distinction between verification in principle and verification in
actuality” that is an attempt to repair the ridiculous scenario that statements about yesterday and
statement about tomorrow on the principle of verification as formulated by him originally turns
out to be meaningless so that he can then argue that “he is not talking of actual observation
although the principle is saying that the method of verification is observation but he is then
equivocating by saying that he does not mean that one must actually observe it, but if one is
in a position to observe it that is still sufficient, and that is ‘verification in principle’, so he
is not requiring a strict demand of verification in actuality, but if it were the case of
verification in principle, which means that there is possibility of verification but right now
the condition is not possible or right, so if that is the case it means statement about the past
and future are rehabilitated.
Also mathematical statements, because he then makes a further distinction between
“weak and strong verification”, ‘weak verifications relates with verification in principle

52
and strong verification relates with verification in actuality” and he argues that “let us settle
for a weak conception of verification that does not require that you are actually present
and you are actually observing what is happening”, so he is already making a fundamental
distinction between “verification in principle and verification in practice/actuality and then
weak verification and strong verification” .
The long and short of it is that “he is modifying his principle of verification to make
elastic such as to accommodate as many statements as possible because if it is too narrowly
formulated as it is originally such that only statements that can be observed immediately
are meaningful then it’s counter intuitive and anybody should see through it and reject it”
A BRIEF SUMMARY
So we are saying that the principle of verification as originally formulated by Ayer, it’s
method of verification of a statement that determines it’s meaning and it’s method of verification
is observation, once you look at that verification principle one sees that there is problem with
regards to statements about past, future and mathematical statements, of course he is not going to
talk about metaphysical statements because that is what he is trying to eliminate but as the
principle starts, we are just interrogating the principle and it’s credentials and we can see already
that there is a problem at that universal level of putting in place a criterion in terms of
which every statements can be verified, so statements about the past. future and mathematical
statements are throwing up challenges and it is then forcing him to back to the drawing board,
and then to make the principle more elastic and once that is done, the apparent meaninglessness
of statements about past, future and mathematical statements disappear and it has been
rehabilitated into a kingdom of meaningfulness as defined by the principle verification.

53
CARNAP’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS 5th May 2023, 8:15am-10:00am.
He was a German born American philosopher of the 20th century and he was a core
member of the Vienna circle, this circle is made of group of scientist, mathematicians and
philosophers who were opposed to metaphysics and generally they were responsible for the
development of the philosophy of logical positivism one of the key philosophical movements of
the 20th century.
Carnap made a significant contribution to almost all department of the philosophical
discipline such as philosophy of science, philosophy of language, probability theory, deductive
logic, model logic and other aspects. Central to his philosophical project is the question of the
unity of science he was convinced that metaphysics has no say in the matter contrary to the
traditional assumption that the foundation of science was to be sought in metaphysics. (so
he certainly did not agree with Aristotle that metaphysics is first philosophy, the queen of
all the sciences). Indeed, like other members of the Vienna circle he believed that metaphysics
was meaningless and as such should be eliminated, consequently he was determined to
divorce science from metaphysics as a counterpoint to the hegemony of idealism and as such to
ground science in logic rather than on metaphysics, not surprisingly his supposition in
metaphysics finds its ultimate fulfillment in his advocacy of mathematical logic as the ideal
language in terms of which he conducts an inquiry concerning the nature of truth and
reality.
BASIS OF HIS REJECTION OF METAPHSYICS
Against this backdrop, his fundamental conviction was that the sciences can be unified
by applying the method of logical analysis in interrogating and processing their respective
empirical data, consequently he devoted much attention to the question of the foundation
of logic and mathematics, given therefore Carnaps commitment to the verification principle

54
which he shared with the members of the circle in effects that no statement is meaningful
unless it can be empirically verified, the meaning of a statement is it’s method of
verification and its method of verification is observation, so that it is not surprising that he
concluded with the basis of the principle that “metaphysical statements are meaningless on
account of the fact that they fail to measure up to the standard of legislated by the
verification principle.
His explanation!!!
So what we want to do is to look at the various ramifications of Carnaps critic of
metaphysics with particular focus on how his version of rejection of metaphysics is elevated on
the verification principle and now from the standpoint of logical analysis, he then declares that
metaphysical problems are pseudo problems, and he it then raises the question on whether his
criticism of metaphysics is correct. So from this brief abstract one can see that, while he asserts
the verification principle as put forward by the members of the Vienna circle, but he has an issue
with the way the verification principle was formulated, so that he feels that the way it has been
formulated will not be effective, and truly it was not effective as Ayer presented it, but Carnaps
wants to reformulate it in reference to the efforts to grant science the logic, should give you a
clue already as to how he proceeds in trying to save the verification principle after the
unfortunate experience of that principle in the hands of Aye such that the principle cannot pass
its own test.
So Carnap still has confidence in the verification principle but he believes that it has to be
reformulated and that is fundamental to his criticism of metaphysics, that reformulation is in
terms of logical analysis and with the reformulation of the verification principle in terms of
logical analysis he then resume the task of eliminating metaphysics in term of that reformed
principle of verification. Before we delve into how he reformulated the verification principle
and then on the basis of this reformation resumed his elimination of metaphysics let us look at
his life and works.

CARNAP’S LIFE AND WORKS

His parents were deeply religious and as a young man he shared same convictions, he
was born in 1891, but as he grew older he abandoned his convictions on account of its
irreconcilable conflict with modern science which parcimated the young Carnap tremendously.
After his initial studies at the local school, he e was further educated at the universities of
Fibrock and Gina where he studies, physics, mathematics and philosophy at Fibrock he was
taught by Hegel the famous German logician widely regarded as the father of analytic
philosophy on account of his ground breaking contributions to mathematical logic. He also spent
time in Berlin where he studied the theory of relativity at a time when Albert Einstein the chief
proponent of quantum physics was a professor of physics at the university of berlin. His
education was briefly interrupted by the outbreak of the first world war during which he served
briefly in the army, at the end of the war he returned to Gina to complete his doctorate in

55
Philosophy and in Philosophy of science on the topic of comparative study on the concept of
Space used in Physics, mathematics and Philosophy.
On invitation from Moritz Schick who was a Professor at the university of Vienna in
1926, Carnap worked at the university of Vienna as an instructor, an appointment which offered
him the opportunity to join and meet other members of the Vienna circle, with whom he
collaborated to write the manifesto “the circle”, as well with whom he founded a journal
devoted to scientific philosophy. He later relocated to the united states of America and also
naturalized and became an American citizen, he taught at the university of Chicago until 1953
and then he later taught at the institute of Advanced in and from there he was appointed
the chair of philosophy at the university of California until he retired in 1961 and then he died in
1971.
He was also a prolific writer he wrote various books like:
1. The logical construction of the world (1929)
2. The scientific conception of the world. in collaboration with some members of the
Vienna circle (1929)
3. The logical syntax of language (1931)
4. Edited International encyclopedia of unified science with Charles Morris

His explanation
He is committed to the unity of science as evident in his works and the unity of
science is not to be grounded in metaphysics, rather it is grounded in logic, so he is going to
use logic as a basis to reject metaphysics, but in pushing metaphysics away, he is more or
less showing his preference for science, so science is very important to him, because for the
sake of science he doesn’t want anything to do with metaphysics, so is he close to
whitehead?, whitehead was not a logical positivist but he was a logician and a mathematician he
defended metaphysics but however he toned it down.
So we are trying to see how the three elements of science, logic and metaphysics
correlate, Carnap is not interested in metaphysics but he is very much interested in logic and the
foundation of science has to be grounded in logic. He wants to eliminate metaphysics for
traditionally metaphysics is at the center everything, as a foundation and his interest is in science
and traditionally science is grounded in metaphysics, but he doesn’t want that procedure so he is
going to put something else in place, for him logic should play the role of grounding science, so
now we will look at his logically basis for his rejection of metaphysics.
LOGICAL BASIS FOR CARNAP REJECTION OF MEATPHYSICS

56
 We cannot overemphasize that there are two approaches we can follow in rejecting
metaphysics and these are the epistemic and the linguistic, the epistemic is exemplified by
Hume and Kant but there are others that we did not treat and Ayer exemplified the
linguistic approach. The linguistic approach has several versions, the one of Ayer is
predicated on the verification principle.
Carnap who is thoroughly conversant with the various ramification of the verification
principle, but the issue he has with it is that “it does not provide a credible basis for the
rejection of metaphysics” so that if really he wants to eliminate metaphysics he cannot
continue to use the principle as originally formulated by the members, so he formulated it and
made it more resourceful and impregnable to those criticisms that were directed against the
verification principle.
So he reformulated the verification principle because he thinks that the original
formulation is problematic, because it cannot pass its own test, and more fundamentally, the
reason why it cannot pass its own test is because it states that the method of verification is
observation, so following it strictly from the start it is problematic, Ayer saw the problem and
tried to make it elastic but that effort did not save the principle, that is why we said that the main
problem of the principle is the rigid empiricism that it comes with such that the concept of
experience is reductionist in such a way that it is sense experience which is just one form of
experience but it takes it as the whole and for that reason it becomes one-sided, this is a
more fatal criticism of the verification principle which is stronger that the criticism of the
principle not being able to pass its own test, it cannot pass its own test because the concept of
experience that guides it is too narrow.

CARNAP’S REFORMULATION OF THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE

In his attempt to eliminate metaphysics (kpatata) Carnap reformulated the verification
principle in terms of the idea of logical analysis, he does not abandon the empirical basis of the
formulation of the verification principle, rather he transforms and rethinks it in terms of logical
analysis against the backdrop of its well-known deficiencies. So he will rely on the tool of
logical analysis and not just empirical verification in an effort to eliminate metaphysics, so
one may be talking about logical verification as a successor to verification original
conceived as empirical verification.
In his book titled Elimination of metaphysics, he says that “there have been many
opponents of metaphysics from the Greek sceptics to the empiricist of the 19 th century i.e. Hume,
criticisms of very diverse kinds has been set forth, many has declared that the doctrines of
metaphysics is false since it contradicts our empirical knowledge, others believe that it is
uncertain on the grounds that its problems transcends the limit of human language or the limit of
human knowledge, many anti-metaphysicians has declared that preoccupation with metaphysical
question is sterile, whether or not this questions can be answered it is at any rate unnecessary to
worry about them, let us devote ourselves entirely to the practical tasks which confronted active
men everyday of their lives.”

57
 From this it shows that he is familiar with metaphysics and he furthermore says that “the
development of modern logic has made it possible to give a new and sharper answer to the
question of the validity and justification of metaphysics, the researches on applied logic and
theory of knowledge which aimed at clarifying the cognitive content of scientific statement and
meaniings of the terms that occur in the statements by means of logical analysis leads to a
positive and negative results, the positive result is what doubt in the domain of empirical science
the various branches of science has clarified the formal logical epistemological connections are
made explicit. In the domain of metaphysics including philosophy of value and normative
theory, logical analysis yields the negative results that the alleged statement in this domain are
entirely meaningless, therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained which was not
yet possible in several earlier trains of thought, but it is only when the development of logic
during recent decades provided us with a sufficiently sharp tool that the decisive step of radically
eliminating metaphysics can be taken,
So all we are trying to say is that his tool is logical analysis, and logical analysis is a
very important development in 20th century logic (symbolic logic). Symbolic logic is one of
the most important development in 20th century and that is where we have the names of Hegel,
whitehead, Russell and Wittgenstein they are the key movers in that area. So the Vienna circle
took this whole development, and Carnap uses the tool of symbolic logic, and he posits that
in logic that tool I,e symbolic logic has performed a very important function in the sense
that it can help to clarify the meaning of statements, statements in science and statements
in other spheres.
So if the tool of logical analysis can help clarify the meaning of a statement, because
symbolic logic is an artificial statement that translate statement and the unit of statement is
proposition for the unit of language is proposition, so that in talking about the meaning of
proposition which is different from a sentence because proposition is a statement that makes an
assertion, for example it is raining is a proposition because it makes an assertion that is capable
of being true or false, it has a truth value but the meaning of the proposition has to be
determined in terms of its logical proponent and that is what he refers to as logical syntax for
example a proposition has a subject, object and copular that joins it together and the meaning of
the statement depends on these logical structure, which means that every statement has a
logical form as distinguished from its material component, for example Alfred is in the
class listening to a lecture in metaphysics, this statement cannot be said to be meaningful
because it doesn’t have a logical syntax and “the job of logical analysis is to analyze the
statement bringing out its different components and thereby bringing out the meaning of
the statement”, for example Alfred is in class is a statement and Alfred is listening to
metaphysics lecture is another statement so it means that the statement is a complex one and the
statement it is raining is a simple statement.
So symbolic logic is important because it provides the tool of analysis that have proved
very effective in determining whether a statement is meaningful or not, it provides the basis of
breaking down a statement into its component element and without the component element the
meaning of the statement cannot be determined, for each of the word given operates in the

58
context of that statement so that the statement and the different component are related in a certain
logical fashion.
Logical analysis enables one to decompose statements it-not it’s various components,
for example Alfred is in class and Alfred is listening to metaphysics lecture, so without the “is”
one cannot join Alfred and class, and same goes with Alfred is listening to metaphysics lecture, it
is a complex statement, so the point is logical analysis in symbolic logic provides the
opportunity to translate the statement into symbols and with the symbols it creates room
for more effective analysis, for it means that if one takes any statement and it has the same
structure it means they are the same because one can represent that Alfred is in class as
(“A is C”) and then Alfred is listening to metaphysics as ( “ A is D”), so this is the symbolic
representation of the statement. One can also have a statement that has the same structure for
instance, David is in the Chapel (“D is C”).
So Carnap is saying that logical analysis provides the tool which enables one to
analyze and determine the meaning of a statement, so every statement has a logical syntax
or structure and without this logical syntax the statement is meaningless. So he still has
sympathy for verification but due to the influence of Moritz Schick he posits that for any
statement to be meaningful according to the verification principle, the meaning of the statement
is its method of verification and the method is observation, but he transforms observation
because of its problematic nature, for example the statement “ it is raining” the only way to find
out whether the statement is meaningful according to the original formulation is by observation,
Carnap does not negate that however he posits that “ as a further requirement that
observation has to be translated into logical language or syntax and he calls that “protocol
statement”.
So for an observation statement to be meaningful it has to be processed through the
means of logical analysis, if the statement is translated and not the observation, and it
possess logical syntax it means it is meaningful, so it is still the same empiricism but it is
logical empiricism and it is based on the resources of symbolic logic which affords the
opportunity of analyzing a thing in terms of its symbols.
So he is moving always from empiricism but this foundation is still empiricism because
what it means for him is that “for a statement to be meaningful according to the demands of
logical analysis, that statement must be seen to possess logical syntax and a statement
cannot be seen to possess logical syntax if the object that statement is dealing with is not
observable because the translation of the statement into logic is dependent on the
observability” so like the previous empiricism he is not insisting, like the problem of
verification principle is that can you observe it? And one can observe only what is happening
now, what happened an hour ago cannot be observed and if it cannot be observed it is
meaningless, but “ Carnaps is saying that if it is possible for you to observe an event, can one
translate the statement regarding that observed event, if it is possible that the observed event can
be translated into logical terms, then the meaning of the statement is preserved, but if what one
claims to observe cannot be reduced to observation statement it means it is not translatable into
protocol statement and for that reason it cannot have a logical structure, and logical analysis of

59
the statement will reveal that it is lacking logical syntax and if that happens it means that the
statement is meaningless.”
The method of logical analysis is not peculiar to Carnap and that is why we spoke about
symbolic logic, for using it one is no longer dealing with the material condition of the event or
statement for everything is now translated into logical symbols, or logical form, and one is
interested in the logical form which is different from the content, the form is a logical matter it
is not material matter it has to do with how things are related logically and that is what
determined the meaning of the statement, and the task of logical analysis is to decompose
the formal structure of the statement and determine whether it has a logical form.
Summarily, any statement that does not have a logical form is not meaningful, but the
logical form itself is as a result of translating observed reality into logical structure. So the
question arises does metaphysics has a logical form? For a statement is meaningful if and only if
it has a logical form which needs to be exposed by means of logical analysis and if logical syntax
then the statement is meaningless. Scientific statement definitely must be observable and has
logical form and syntax, however metaphysical statement like God is sitting in his throne in
heaven, in those not pass the old verification principle, fundamentally in the reformulated
verification principle, there is nothing to analyze because one does not have contact with the
object, and in addition to these logical analysis demand that he statement regarding that observed
even should be formulated in logical terms and the job of logical analysis is to expose the logical
structure and separate it from the material content. There are multiple logical forms for example
we have modus tollens, modus pollens and others and any statement that exhibit that structure is
a valid form, and any statement that cannot be translated so as to reveal its logical form is not
meaningful and for Carnap metaphysical statement fall into this category and for that reason they
are meaningless.

MEANING OF CARNAP’S REFORMULATED VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE IN

TERMS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS
So according to him there are two kinds of statement; it is either the statement id
representative or it is emotive, if it is representative it has meaning and there falls science, if it
emotive for example if one says I am tired or I am depressed, it cannot be measured it is an
emotional statement so it means the statement does not have literal significance but statements
that have a representative structure are meaningful, so metaphysical statement fall within the
emotive use of language, so it is significant but not literally significant and as long as it is not
literally significant it is devoid of meaning, so only scientific statement are literally significant
and they are translatable into protocol statement and they possess logical syntax, but statements
of religion, morality, aesthetics all belong to the emotive domain, they are significant but they do
not have any factual content, and not to have factual content means the statement is not

60
translatable to protocol statement and one is to use the tool of logical analysis to try to uncover
the logical structure it means one will find nothing according to the logical structure of the
statement since there is no fact. Take for example, God is sitting on his throne in heaven is not a
fact, it is an assumption, it is a projection, so what is factual is what one can observe and that is
the point of departure of his theory of logical analysis for he is saying that what is factual need
not actually be observed but the statement the statement regarding that fact should be translatable
into logical forms and once that is done it means the statement is meaningful, and logical
analysis can then help expose the statement.
So he is more or less saying that only statements of logic are meaningful, and statements
of logic is an advance of statements of science, statement of science are empirical statements, but
logic is the unity of science for the statement can be translated into logical syntax and if that is
possible it means the statement is meaningful. So through the means of logical analysis one can
discover whether a statement has a logical syntax, and that is why he said that “with the
emergence of modern logic it is now possible as it was not before to attempt a radical elimination
of metaphysics”, so metaphysical statement are pseudo statements because any meaningful
statement should have a logical syntax, but metaphysical statements appear to be true statements
but when subjected to logical analysis they do not possess logical syntax and for this reason they
are not true statement for only statements with logical syntax can be said to be meaningful and
for this reason metaphysical statements are meaningless, they are not true statements they are
pseudo statement and the whole of metaphysics which can be reduced to metaphysical
statements about different object for instance in purgatory souls are suffering, it has no factual
basis or logical form, and the meaning of the statement depends on its logical syntax, and its
logical syntax can be exposed when the statement is dismembered and the logical form looked
into, if the statement is found to be lacking logical form it means that the statement is
meaningless, and a statement cannot have logical form unless the factuality can be translated into
protocol statement that then exhibit the logical relationship between the different component of
the statement. For example, A woman is beautiful is a statement of aesthetics and also mother is
evil is a statement of morality, all this are lunched into emotive language.
So the measure is science and no-science and science is held as the ideal and other
domains are judged in terms of the idea of science. The only thing is to be able to translate
scientific statement into logical statement using the tool of logical analysis and not empirical
analysis and that is why the name is logical verification and not empirical verification.
His elimination of metaphysics is based on the idea of logical analysis which is a
reformulation of the verification principle and the summary of this is that only statement of
logic and scientific statements are meaningful, so he is more or less bringing back the
distinction between analytic and synthetic, synthetic is science, and analytic are logical
statements from the way he presented it is a further articulation of scientific statement.
Logic is dealing with facts but it is not dealing with empirical facts, but it is based on
the translation of empirical facts into logical facts, for example, to say “it is raining”,
symbolic language allows one to translate that into symbols, without asking where it is
raining, that is the fact that is represented logically, and symbolic logic gives the symbols to

61
represent those things, so it means every statement can then seem to have a logical form,
any statement that does not have a logical form is not meaningful.
After reformulating logical analysis in terms of the demand of logical syntax, form
or structure, he then applies the principle to metaphysical statement, and he says that they
do not have any logical form because they are not stating an factual event, so he propounds
two divisions of statement which are:
Representational statement: they are facts be they empirical or logical
Emotional statement: they are non-factual either in the empirical sense or logical sense but
it is nonetheless expressible.
Taking a closer look at it her is making a distinction between theoretical and non-
theoretical statements, the only meaningful statement are the ones that are expressible, so
non-theoretical are meaningless. The application is these, his attempt is to eliminate
metaphysics using the basis of logical analysis and his focus is about if the statement of
metaphysics are representative, and this is done only through logical analysis which
exposes the statement in other to discover of it has logical syntax, if it has logical syntax it is
meaningful, if it does not have logical syntax it is meaningless, and now when this is applied
to metaphysical statement, one discovers that it is lacking logical syntax, so Ayer uses the
tool of observation to discover the meaningfulness of a statement but Carnaps moves a step
further by saying that it is not just only observation, one has to translate what is observed
into logical form, so if the observation is not possible then translation into logical form is
also not possible. So he uses logic as a tool of dissolving metaphysics.

CRITICISM OF CARNAPS CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS AND CONCLUSION

So we are trying access the existence of metaphysics based on the premise of logical
analysis and logical analysis is a reformulation of the verification principle, the verification
principle as originally formulated is empirical verification because it requires observation
be it actual observation or possible observation the ideal is still of ideal of empirical
verification that since the bench mark is that it has to be observable, what the statement
asserts needs to be observable that is, that you are in a position to observe it and in that
sense, we talking of empirical verification. But as we noted, this principle itself cannot
satisfy it’s own demands because if one starting asking the question that, the meaning of a
statement is it’s method of verification and its method of verification is observation, so if
one cannot access or observe what the itself asserts it therefore means that the statement
itself cannot satisfy its own demand.

62
 However more importantly, the problem with the verification principle is that the
concept of experience that under-gets it is too narrow, it is one sided, so that after all said
and done the reason why the principle cannot satisfy it’s own demand is that it already got
into a tight corner by assuming that experience is always sense experience and that sense
experience is exhaustive of the totality of experience so that is empirical verification.
However, Carnaps does not reject observation entirely, the only thing he has done
is to step it up higher to say that “for the statement to be meaningful it is not just that it is
observable or it is possible to observe it, but it should be translatable into a logical form
which he called protocol statements, so it means that the empirical basis of that statement
should be delivered from it’s matter or the circumstances surrounding it, then the form of
the statement should be translated into logical form, so logical form” has to do with the
syntax of the statement delivered from it’s material conditioning so that one is not talking
about “the table is in the classroom or the table is in class one” but the form of the table i.e
what makes it a table that the statement captures, “so if that case then the focus is on the
form of a statement and it is the logical form of the statement which he calls the syntax,
that is what determines the meaning of the statement, and in that case, unless the
translation into the logical form occurs, one cannot talk about logical verification, that is
why what he is looking for is the syntax of a statement.” So this means that any statement
that is lacking in logical syntax must be said to be meaningless so that is” logical
verification”
Now the only way to expose the syntax of a statement is to subject it to logical
analysis, and the only way to determine the meaning of a statement on the former
formulation of the verification principle was “physically and that is empirical analysis”,
but this time “you do not need observe what the statement asserts or what you observe is
whether the statement has logical syntax and the way to do that is by subjecting it to logical
analysis so that the method of logical analysis then exposes the syntax.
So it means that we are looking at the logical form, so when we asserts for instance
that “priest are not careful” there is a way to represent that symbolically, that is the form,
but people are used to complaining of generalization, and in logic “all or a statement of all”
(which is why logical analysis is important) when one makes a universal statement, a
universal statement actually in the final analysis is implication, and the same thing with the
statement “some,” a particular judgement and a particular judgement in the final analysis
are universal judgement and universal judgement in the final analysis are hypothetical
judgement, that is the form. So that why we say that, that modus pollens is a universal
form and one can reduce any statement to it because we said that every statement is a
proposition, one can reduce what the statement is asserting to a conditional statement
which is an implication because it is saying “if A then B, and once one has this form that if
A then B, all you need to asserts is “B therefore A” so they are not interested in whether
one is talking about “priest are not careful that’s why they die young.”
Furthermore, I am not just talking about only priest, that is why I am saying it is
the logical form, it is any human being “A, B, C, D”, let’s say “A” is priest, I am not talking

63
of lawyers and Doctors, so you see why it is hypothetical, “Let ‘A’ be Priest IF ‘A’ drives
carelessly ‘B’ is dead”, so be whatever you are, if you are on the steering and doing two
things at the same time carelessly “if ‘A’ drives carelessly then ‘B’ is dead” applies to you.
So in logical verification it is not the empirical matter that one is interested in, that’s
how Carnap went beyond Ayer, so that is why I said that every statement, when you
analyze every statement it becomes a conditional statement, every statement whether it is
particular or universal one can analyze it in such a way that it becomes implication, so it
means that “the form of every statement is implication”, and that is the logical form, the
one we discussed is modus Tollens and it is a valid form, so armed with that resources, it
means that if you are analyzing any statement once you see that it has the form of modus
tollens, you don’t if need to start observing or checking that this one is this one a priest or
lawyer, the point you immediately see by the logical analysis that it must be a valid form
because modus tollens is a valid form and the argument you are analyzing exhibits the
form of modus tollons and the conclusion can’t be wrong so take it anywhere the argument
is valid.
So Carpnap is saying that, “to get beyond the demand of empirical verification the
meaning of a statement depends on it’s logical form and you can always expose the logical
form of a statement by subjecting it to logical analysis, but the point is “ if a statement is
not observable it means it is not translatable into logical form and by virtue of it’s
inaccessibility to logical form it has no meaning” for example ‘God is sitting on his throne
in heaven’, it is not observable, so that if you take the statement to interrogate the meaning,
one is now analyzing it to discover the logical form, one discovers that is has no logical
form, because for it to have a logical form you need to be talking of the subject and the
predicate and in this case the subject is God, but can you observe that subject which is
God?, No!, so if you cannot observe that there is no way you can get the logical form, so it
means the statement is lacking logical syntax and for that reason, that statement is
meaningless.
Moving further, he then jumps, it is not a generalization once one is moving from
universal to particular he then say that, “the statements found in metaphysics are not
observable, and if they are not observable by virtue of what he has said it means that if the
particular statements which are not observable are meaningless then it follows that the
whole of metaphysics is meaningless”
CRITICISM OF CARNAPS CRITIC OF METAPHYSICS
One can access him on two basis first is “if logical form on its on formulation feeds on
the empirical base and he is saying that if a statement is lacking in logical form it does not
have any meaning, but that is not correct, but if you are talking of ‘pure logic’ then it is
correct, but ‘one have to make allowance that life is broader than logic’, so YES!, logical
form can be a test of meaningfulness for logical statements, but for mystical, and
theological statement it cannot be so, so if you use the standard of logic to judge theological
statement you will be making a mistake, for it means you are using something different to

64
judge something else, and in that case, we are only saying that ‘ logical analysis as valid as
it is, is criterion of meaningfulness and it is limited it’s own sphere which is logical
statement’ and of course scientific statement can be translated into logical statement
because they have empirical basis.
So if you stretch very far it means “to use logical analysis squarely to judge
metaphysics it is overstretching is, because it means that meaning is far broader than logic,
and for you to try to use logical analysis in every context, it means that that standard of
meaning is too rigid and to that extent his elimination of metaphysics is questionable.
However, if truly and truly the only to determine whether a statement is meaningful is
through logical analysis then metaphysics is in trouble, but I don’t think so, for it means
that if you make a statement now and that statement is not a statement of logic it means
that the statement is not meaningful, so all what the mad men are saying is meaningless but
God can speak through a man and what is the mad man is saying is actually the solution to
your problem, so that confronts you with “paradox”. For it means “paradoxical statements
are not meaningful” a paradox is something that runs against logic, so it means they are
not clear, and with the parameters of logical analysis we declare them non and void, and is
what he is doing, so it is as if he is taking it that in every situation a statement has to be
amendable to logical analysis and so if that is the case the standard is too narrow.
(Wittgenstein also critiqued him that there are other forms apart from logical form)
So Carnap followed Ayer too closely, and that’s why they are all logical positivist
and the way he is following him is that he has not shed the gap of that empiricism even
though he is claiming that he is translating it into logical form, so that what he has is
“logical empiricism” and the reason why he is now using logic as an exclusive standard to
judge everything is because of the “residue of empiricism” because if truly the statement
must be observable before it can be translated it means that what you are translating is still
infected by empiricism and that is why statement such as God is on his throne in heaven or
other metaphysical statement does not matter, because “ the original requirement that it
must be observable before it is then translated into logical form has not be satisfied”.
So the long and short is that the “criticism leveled against Ayer is also applicable to
Carnap, first: the verification principle originally formulated cannot satisfy its own test,
but the real problem is the empiricism, the empiricism that is refined, so that after all said
and done the effort that Carnap uses to eliminate metaphysics is questionable.
So he is saying that every saying must be representative and all scientific statements
are statements of facts, so it is either it is empirical fact or it logical fact, for Ayer it is
empirical fact and for carnap it is logical fact and unless its empirical fact or logical fact it
is not factually correct and only factually significant statements are meaningful, so
statements of science and statements of logic are meaningful, statement of emotion, that is
emotive statement lack factual significance and for that reason are no meaning even though
they have emotive meaning, and that’s where he consigns metaphysics, aesthetics and
morality.

65
WITTGENSTEIN CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
Biography
Rudrick Wittgenstein was an Austrian born philosopher of the 20 th century and without
any shadow of doubt he is one of the most influential figures in contemporary philosophy,

66
contributing to almost all the various departments of the philosophical discipline such as
epistemology, metaphysics and aesthetics, but his impact is most evident in philosophy of
language where he was preoccupied with the question of the meaning of language, and his
contribution in this context became a point of reference for a reconceptualization of the content
of philosophy.
HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS METAPHSYICS AND HIS CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE WITH THE LOGICAL POSITITVITS ( Ayer and Carnaps)
Like Hume and Kant before him, Wittgenstein was critical of metaphysics in the effect
that he did not believe that the project of transcendent metaphysic was possible as
traditional metaphysics assumed and his point is that language is limited, hence in
reference to the limits of language, he claims that we can only speak what can be said
clearly and regarding what cannot be said clearly, we must keep quiet! He did not mean by
this that what cannot be said clearly does not exist, he meant that such thing belongs to the
other divide of the limits of language and so it is in excess of what can be thought of or
spoken about.
Nonetheless even though he rejected traditional metaphysics believing that it’s
object was beyond the limits of language, his overall attitude to metaphysics was not
dismissive as with the case with logical positivism, it means for him the realm of nonsense
to which metaphysics belongs is not completely bereft of value, but it borders somewhat on
the mystical. “On the contrary his attitude towards metaphysics was equivocal while
arguing that the errors of metaphysics stems from the abuse of language, so that if the
limits of language is clearly established and observed, one could then determine the limits
of what we can say about the nature of reality and what cannot be said.”
In other words, his basis for appraising the question of the possibility of
metaphysics is linguistic considering his preoccupation with the question of language and
the limits of thoughts, it is in this sense that his appraisal of metaphysics is like that of the
logical positivist such as Ayer and Carnap but unlike them he believes that while
metaphysics falls into the category of nonsense, it is nonetheless “high nonsense”, so that
the solution is not the elimination of metaphysics but an understanding of the nature of
metaphysical utterances.
It important to bear in mind this convergence and divergence between Wittgenstein and
the logical positivists in other to grasp fully the import of Wittgenstein’s own criticism of
metaphysics because it means to some extent that he is one with the logical positivist who posits
that metaphysical statements are nonsense, but if he is saying that it is a special grade nonsense it
means that he has a different accommodation of metaphysics, and that is why he says
metaphysics borders on the other divide of mysticism so he is not denying the reality that
metaphysics investigates but rather he argues that it cannot be communicated in terms of
language, so much so that metaphysics therefore becomes very special.
Biography

67
 He was from a wealthy family and he was the youngest of eight children, four brother
and three sisters, and they were all talented in music, his father was an industrialist and his
mother was a concert pianist, the family was not only wealthy but also rich in intellectual and
artistic talent as well. His father was a Jewish convert to Protestantism, but he was brought up in
his mother’s faith which is the Roman catholic church, he was educated at home by tutors and
showed a great deal of progress in mathematics and engineering. When he was 15years he
studied engineering in a college in Germany for two years before transferring to berlin. In 1908,
he started his university education in Manchester university United Kingdom where he studied
engineering and researched aeronautical designs, while in Manchester where he designed a jet
reaction engine and a propeller, his interest shifted from engineering to pure mathematics and
later to the philosophical foundations of mathematics after reading Bertrand Russell’s “the
principle of mathematics”.
He also met the mathematician frege in 1911 and then he suggested to him to study with
Russell who was in Cambridge, he subsequently enrolled at the trinity college at Cambridge in
1912 where he studied for five semesters and was frequently engaged in conversation with
Russell, Moore and others. During this period Russell was able to discover the great genius of
Wittgenstein and told his sister that he will make the next great advance in philosophy. While in
Cambridge, Wittgenstein kept a note book in which he recorded his ideas, he continued this
practice after he graduated from Cambridge and enlisted in the Austrian army when the WW1
started in 1914. Based on his note book he composed a short treaty during his period of service
in the army and as a war prisoner in Italy, he managed to send a copy of the treatise to Russell
who considered it a work of genius and arranged for it’s publication and the book then appeared
as “the tractacus logico philosphicus”.
After he regained his freedom from the prison camp, he returned to Vienna and took a
break from philosophy. While he was taking a break, he took a teacher training course and he got
an appointment and for the next six years he became a school teacher in remote Austrian
villages, unfortunately he did not enjoy his work as a teacher, he was extremely unhappy,
suffered depression and sometimes he was suicidal, two of his brothers committed suicide. So
because he was unhappy he resigned his appointment in 1926 and then he worked briefly as a
monastery Gardner, he also gave away all his inheritance and lived a frugal life. He was so
talented that he designed a house for his sister.
However, while he was in Vienna, he met a professor at the university of Vienna named
Moritz Shilick, in a time when his “tractatus: has begun to make waves, the professor and the
other members of the Vienna circle admired his work and this encounter resulted in a new
philosophical activity of Wittgenstein and eventually inspired him to return to Cambridge as a
research student where he submitted his the Tractatus as a thesis and Russell and Moore were the
examiner of the thesis, he was then given a research fellowship at the Trinity college, and during
his appointment as a fellow of the Trinity college he began his teaching career at Cambridge and
his association with Cambridge continued until his death in 1951.

68
 Wittgenstein is renowned for having inspired and founded two philosophical movement
during his career, the first one is “Logical positivism”, and second is “ordinary language
analysis or linguistic analysis”, as we said before his “tractacus” almost became the handbook
of the logical positivists, they admired the book and they felt that he was one of them, but he
had reservation and the reservation pertained mainly to his disposition towards metaphysics
especially as a result of his own understanding of the limits of language and it’s implication for
philosophy especially metaphysics. So if he is saying that for the logical positivist metaphysics is
nonsense, he doesn’t disprove that, in fact they got the inspiration to categorize metaphysics as
nonsense from his tractatus, but he had an ambivalent attitude towards metaphysics and it is not
entirely correct to view him as a member of logical positivism, but that will not became clear
until he came back to Cambridge and especially after he got the appointment to become a regular
lecture, in fact within ten years he succeeded Moore and he became the Chair of philosophy.
So we are dealing with his two personalities, the Wittgenstein that wrote the tractatus and
provided inspiration for logical positivism, but before this, he had an association with Russell
who was also very famous “for his theory of Logical atomism” Russell was not a positivist, and
it was from him the god of the body and the good of the mind was derived, he was very critical
of the logical positivist prejudice, so he was clearly not a positivist, but Wittgenstein provided a
basis for logical positivist to promote their position.
So when he went back to Cambridge the second time and he started lecturing, he had a
new theory of language which he will then expose in his book that was published posthumously
because he completed the manuscript in 1948, then he died in 1951 and the book was published
in 1953. The name of the book is “Philosophical investigations”, so if you look at his tractatus
and his philosophical investigations one will have two theories concerning the nature of
language.
In the first theory, he appeared to have been siding with the positivist even though
while he returned to Vienna and they wanted to make him a member, he had reservations
because he knew that his position was different from theirs, but that became explicit in his
second theory which we call “second Wittgenstein” because it is clear that he is taking
almost a diametrically opposed position to the position he took in the tractatus.
So he published only one work in his lifetime which is the tractaus, the Philosophical
investigation which he completed was published after his death, so if you really want to get
a good gauge of his position towards metaphysics you will have to pay attention to what he
is saying firstly in his tractatus and second in his philosophical investigations
The most essential point made so far is about his biography and his works, and he
founded two philosophical movements on the question of the nature of language and that will
become a basis for your understanding of his appraisal of metaphysics, because if you look at his
tractus he seems to have different approach to metaphysics, but that is already an indication that
he is not dismissing metaphysics but constructively his attitude towards metaphysics is that
while dismissing metaphsyics, there is an indication that he wants to rehabilitate it in some
form beyond the reconstruction of metaphysics by logical positivism that is why he doesn’t

69
want to be seen as one of the members because they have completely negative attitude
towards metaphysics and he doesn’t subscribe to that even though he thinks like them that
metaphysics is nonsense., he thinks that they are mistaken not to see that metaphysics has
some intrinsic value and there is no point eliminating it, so he is opposed to the elimination
of metaphysics.
WITTGENSTEIN LINGUISTIC APPRISAL OF METAPHYSICS
So he is critical of traditional metaphysics, it means he has a new sense of
metaphysics as” something that is beyond the limits of language” but nonetheless it should
not be eliminated. So metaphysics can be appraised both epistemicaly and linguistically,
but the epistemic approach is limited and it cannot result in the total elimination of
metaphysics which is the object of those who endorse that approach like Hume, and Kant
but Kant is a bit equivocal because he wants metaphysics in some form but not traditional
metaphysics. For the linguistic appraisal of metaphysics those who endorse it say that the
emphasis is on analysis, it can be empirical or logical analysis, it means empirical analysis
and logical analysis aims at the same goal of showing that metaphysics is meaningless. The
first one is talking observation while the second is about logical syntax but whichever way
you look at it both are based on the nature of language, whether it is empirical verification
or logical verification it is based on language and the clarity on the use of language which
can be established by a means of clarification whether it is open to observation or whether
it has logical syntax, and the way to do that is by analyzing the statement.
So it means that the linguistic basis for appraising metaphysic is equivocal, and it means
that it is not all of them that is successful, for example empirical analysis of Ayer and also
logical verification of Carnap, and now Wittgenstein is going back to the nature of language
and his mean contention is that logical positivism attitude towards metaphysics is wrong,
which means that there is something in logical positivism that is genuine and he supports it
and that is what is relevant in his tratactatus and it has to do with the question of the
nature of language “whether the function of language is to represent or whether the
function of language is to express. ” we saw in carnap that language is said to have two
function representation and expression and the only one that is factually significant is the
representative function, the emotive function of language is expressive but it is not
factually significant, so for logical positivism, it is only when language is representative can
language could be said to be meaningful otherwise it is meaningless and with that kind of
understanding of the nature of language it means that metaphysics according to logical
positivist is meaningless even though emotively it may have significance, but that does not
guarantee anything because it means that what it is looking for is what is factually
significant and it means it is only science, mathematics and logic can be admitted into the
category of meaningful statement, in that sense it means metaphysics is eliminated by
excluding it from that domain of language.

For Wittgenstein, he takes it that “the measure of meaning is logical syntax he does
not have any problem with that, in fact he propounded that with Russell, so that in talking
of logical analysis it means that the function of philosophy is logical analysis”, this is the

70
most important part of contemporary philosophy, if you can get it then you et almost
everything, “so in talking of analysis and linguistic analysis, analysis can be logical, or
linguistic analysis, so we are talking about logical analysis as opposed to ordinary language,
Wittgenstein went to study under Russell and he came from mathematics, and he also read
Russell’s principles of mathematics, and fregge directed him to Rusell, these are big names
in logic, logic has exited for more than 2000 years but at the start of this century, these big
names fregge, Russell, witgentein and whitehead are responsible for what is called
‘symbolic logic’ and ‘symbolic language is an artificial it means that there is what is called
‘natural language’ and natural language can be translated into symbolic logic and then it
provides you with a tool of analysis, it means that with symbolic logic one has a tool of
analysis which is called “ logical analysis” and logical analysis is different from ordinary
language, and the big names been logicians they are subscribe to logical analysis, the
passage we quoted from Carnap holds that “with the development of symbolic logic we
now have an instrument that can help us reject metaphysics completely” that is Carnap,
for he means that with logical analysis one can now determine whether a proposition has
logical syntax or not, if it is found to be without logical syntax it means the statement is
meaningless and what he wants to prove is that metaphysical statements when you subject
them to logical analysis they are completely lacking in logical syntax and for that reason
the statement are meaningless, that is carnap.

However, what we are saying is that Carnap himself and the logical positivist that
position concerning the value of logical analysis derives from Wittgenstein in his tractatus
and now we have come to his logical basis for his appraisal of metaphysics.

WITTGENSTEIN LOGICAL BASIS FOR HIS APPRAISAL OF METAPHYSICS

So, it means that your logical basis as logical analysis can be either “empirical
analysis or empirical verification or logical verification” but they are still feeding on logical
analysis, and Russell and Wittgenstein are responsible for logical analysis, Wittgenstein
was a student of Russell so that he got some ideas from Russell, but from what we said now
it was Russell he gave the book to, he was just an undergraduate, so it is like someone
having B.A under a professor even though the professor liked him so much they became
friends, after hi B.A ended, during the sphere time at the war period he wrote the
manuscript, and sent it to Russell who saw it as a good work and published it for him that
is the tractatus. “The major contribution of the tractatus is concerning the meaning of
language, it holds that language is representation, and the name of that theory of the
tractatus concerning the nature of language is “picture theory of language”, so
Wittgenstein and Russell are very close, Russell own was “logical atomism”.

So, “Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is a version of Russell’ s logical

atomism and the theory simply states that ‘the function of language is to picture reality or
to mirror it” so there is a presupposition that there is a relationship between language and
reality so that language is just mirroring reality, and not just that it is mirroring reality,
the indication is that, whatever is in reality is what you have in picture, just like picture,

71
you may see the picture of this class now it is showing everything both the sitting
arrangement but it is a picture, but as we are here now, this is the reality, so the picture is
referring to the reality of this situation in such a way that in the picture one can see each of
the element in the picture, just as you are seating here the picture will show that you are
sitting here, the picture is to show, to reflect what is in the class, so that we are talking of
reality and language “and if the function of language is to mirror, it means it mirrors
everything as it is and in that case the function of language is to represent reality and if the
function of language is to represent reality it means that it represents it in totality, so much
so that there is one to one correspondence between language and reality, so it means
language pictures everything about reality and if language pictures everything about
reality and if there is something about reality that language does not picture it means the
thing is non-existent. ( i.e anything that language cannot picture about reality is no-
existent).

So, that is the “picture theory of language by Wittgenstein which is version of

Russell’s logical atomism” and the logical positivist liked this theory because they believed
that metaphysics is not something that is factual, so with this theory of language “ it means
that language is dealing with facts that are represented by corresponding facts in reality, so
that the elements in language will fit the elements in reality in a representative manner”
and the basic unit of language is “propositional statement” any language can be reduced to
it, and the proposition can reduced to “subject and predicate” we also have others like
conjunction, disjunction, negation, conditional, bi-conditional etc. but the main thing is
once you analyze the proposition for instance “the microphone is on the table” is a
statement, if the statement is saying the microphone is on the table it means that there is a
“table” and in the statement there is “table and microphone” they are combined and the
microphone is on the table that is a proposition and it is true because “ there is
correspondence between what the statement is saying and reality” and that is what the
picture theory of language asserts, “that there is relationship or correspondence, so much
so that a statement is true if in actual fact there is correspondence between the fact of
language and the fact of reality, so much so that if there is no correspondence, the
statement is false”, but in that case it means that “ the function of language is to represent
and for that to happen it means that for instance, “table” itself “must have a definite
meaning” if I assert “ that the microphone is on the table and you are thinking the table is
the chair, you will not get it, “ it means the table is the table and not anything else”, it
means “things have to have a definite or vocal identify and not equivocal identify” and that
is what is called “ the denotative function of language”, denotation!, when you denotate it
means something stands for another, for example, if I say “this is a table” it means that
there is a specific element standing for that table, you cannot ask for table and then go for
chair, chair is not table and table is not chair, “everything has a specific denotation and in
that sense it means that the function of language is representation and this representations
have definite meaning.” This is the theory he is proposing under the picture theory of
language.

72
 So if that is that case, it means that “ it means that it is only scientific statements
that are meaningful because there is no room for equivocation in science, everything is
definite and observable and in this case if it is observable it must also have a logical form, if
you can pick the logical form it means the statement is meaningful, if you cannot pick it
then the statement is meaningless” and the move that Carnap made is to make it a more
stringent condition by asking for logical verification and not just empirical verification, the
statement must have logical syntax and one must be able to expose the logical syntax by
subjecting the statement to logical analysis, all that is coming from Wittgenstein and
Russell, but the thing is that, even though they both subscribe to logical analysis that for
any statement to be meaningful one need to clarify it and expose it’s logical syntax as a
point of departure, but Russell also believes that “ you can use that to generate a
metaphysics, so he tried to use the method of logical analysis to generate a new
metaphysics”, the logical positivist rejects that, because for them the only function of
logical analysis is elimination of metaphysics, but for Russell who was the mentor of
Wittgenstein “one can use logical analysis to go back to traditional metaphysics, that is one
can determine the nature of a thing itself through logical analysis”.

So this is why Wittgenstein is a bit ambivalent, he inspired logical analysis, logical

positivists hijacked it to eliminate metaphysics, Russell will not eliminate metaphysics but
he wants to return to traditional metaphysics, “Wittgenstein does not want to return to
traditional metaphysics but he will not also use logical analysis to eliminate metaphysics as
logical positivist have done, and he will not use logical analysis to go back to traditional
metaphysics, so he is critical of traditional metaphysics and also of logical positivism”, he
wants “a new form of metaphysics and this new form of metaphysics has to do with the
proper understanding of the nature of language especially the meaning of language”.

So, in his tractatus he “gives the impression that every language fits a particular
object in the world,” which is correct, but if you pay attention to what I said earlier “ that
even though he believes that language is representative in its function, he is already talking
about the things you can speak of and the things you can speak of clearly and things you
cannot not speak of regarding which you must be silent!” so there are “two sides” already
even with his tractatus, he said, that if you can say anything and say is clearly then it is
representative but he is also open to the possibility that things you cannot say clearly and
thing regarding which you must keep quiet they fall on the other side, they are not
representative, and because they are not representative, one is not going to eliminate them
like logical positivism, because they are not representative, to representative language they
will emerge as nonsense. However, if one is looking at it from the larger point of something
you are to be quiet about, they are “higher grade of nonsense, and that is where
metaphysical utterances lie, so it means that if one is judging metaphysics with the
standard of representative language it is nonsense, and to do that is to judge metaphysics
with the standard of science because in science everything has to clear and distinct.”

So he is already creating a different category for metaphysics while he is not

denying that science has it’s own domain, but he is saying that “one cannot use that to

73
judge metaphysics, if you judge metaphysics with this side, it is nonsense but if you take
into account the other side it is a high grade of nonsense”. So one can see why he doesn’t
want to belong to the logical positivist even though he subscribes to logical analysis,
because it is through logical analysis that a syntax is exposed and anything that has syntax
obeys the law equivocation, because it is like saying that you are strong when you are sick”,
it is nonsense, but it makes sense only when you know that the person is speaking
metaphorically, so it means “language can be used representatively and expressively, it can
be used denotatively and connotatively”.

WITTGENSTEIN SECOND THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS USE

So the second theory of language is now developing in his writings, it is “language as

use” and it is that “the meaning of language lies in it’s use and you cannot understand any
language unless you consider the context in which it is used”. so the meaning of a language,
a concept, a statement, a word, is the context of the use and each concept has a language
game and that is the context in which it operates, once you are able to understand that
concept, then you will understand the meaning of the language.

So, for example, somebody is sick and he/she says I am strong, if you take it
representatively, you will be confused, but if you take into account the context, the use, of I am
strong, because in saying I am strong he is more or less saying that I am sick but he doesn’t want
to say it literally. How would you rate somebody who can read in between the lines, take for
instance, something is happening now but the guy is just reading it black and white, is he
intelligent, yeh he is, people who study mathematics and logic they do that a lot for they think
life is black and white. The guy says “but you said so!” oh he said so!, but the meaning of what
he said may not be clear, its meaning must have been hidden, but if you read in between the line
you find it, the guy may just be looking at you and asking “should I do it or not” and he
continues looking at you, it maybe that he wants you to do it, but he is just looking at you and
smiling, and when the guy starts pressing him harder he responds after sometime in exclamation
“don’t do it now! Leave it now!”, but what is he actually saying, he is saying “do it”, and that is
language. So, one needs to read the logic of the statement. Another instance is, one meets a
fomator for permission and he says “go na” the tone and the context and that led to that situation
matters in getting the meaning.

So, what we are trying to say is that “language has two different functions, it can
represent, it can denotate, it also has a connotative function,” so you have to be asking
yourself which one is the larger function, it is “connotation”, but is connotation opposed to
denotation? Just a distinction between “literal and metaphoric statement”, so metaphoric
does not negate the literal but it is saying, don’t take it too literally, one need to look in
between the line to discover exactly what it means.

So, “second Wittgenstein is saying, that the meaning of language is not it’s
representation but it’s use,” but tractatus is saying that the meaning of a statement is it’s
denotation because it means that it is representing a particular thing, so if you say you are

74
sick then you are sick, you can’t say you are sick and not sick at the same thing, however if
you look at connotation, you can say you are sick and also you are not sick, but if the
person considers the context of the utterance, one can now say that, even though he is
saying he is not sick, he is sick, so it is the logic one is looking at.

So, with these second theory of language, “ if a statement does not have logical
syntax it is meaningful”. So Wittgenstein is saying that Yes! “one can say something
directly but the most important things in life are not things you can say directly, ( and that
is where he places metaphysics”, “ science can pick things exactly, clear and distinct, and if
you were to use this standard it means many things will be swept away as meaningless
when in actual fact they have meaning but one is using a narrow picture theory of
language”, for the picture theory of language is a bit narrow, it is not wrong but it is
narrow, it is one sided, but the theory of language as use is broader and with that it means
that meaning is not representation all the time. So the sense of a statement is not just it’s
representation

So in conclusion, language is ambiguous, but the point is can one do away with it’s
ambiguities, yes! symbolic language made-away with the ambiguities of language, but the
thing is can one do away with the ambiguity completely and is it even helpful to do away
with the ambiguity? So “every statement has it’s language game” e.g basketball, football
statements etc. has their language game.

So in general he is saying that language does not have a direct meaning, so one must
try to consider the context and then discover the meaning of every statement, every
statement has a meaning and the meaning can be found in the context and how it is used.
“so denotation is a language but it is not the whole of language and it is not even the most
important.

So the greatest revolution in contemporary philosophy is language, when people

became appear that language is and not just representative, if you pay attention to the
representation there are also sheds of meaning so much so that one cannot just take one
meaning as the meaning of a statement, one need to consider the context, that is the
contribution of Wittgenstein.

So this affected everything, because one can question a statement and say, that is not
the meaning, that is just the literal meaning, but the moment one Godden the connotative
meaning, it means they are all meaningful and that is the root of relativism, because every
voice if you listen closely is making a point and the point one is making maybe different
from other point, but for one to say that there is only one voice which is science, and that is
logical positivism, logical analysis, logical syntax, it is one voice logical syntax is important
but not everything must have it.

75
 So his logical basis for appraising metaphysics is equivocal, while he is open to
logical analysis, his new theory of language as use emphasizes on the context, what he is
saying is “every language has meaning if you consider the context.

Wittgenstein’s language as use continues : 15th may 2023

So for Wittgenstein the logical basis for his criticism is equivocal, it is as though
he is for it and also not for it, so it means that there is a form of metaphysics that he is opposed
to, but for you to focus on that you may think that he is same as the logical positivism, but once
you take into account “the sympathetic aspect of his attitude” toward metaphysics, then one
begin to see that his position on metaphysics is not so straight forward it is equivocal.

However, be that as it may, it is all predicated on what he “believes is the nature of

language, specifically, the nature of meaning” which is at the heart of the positivist attack on
metaphysics, so once the matter is located on the focus of language, then the issue is now
whether one can have a meaningful language as far as metaphysics is concerned and the answer
is No! as we met on Ayer in case of empirical verification. Coming from the position of logical
analysis in exposing the logical form or syntax of a statement, that is part of Wittgenstein
contribution even though it does not exhaust the entirety of his contribution, because he is
in the forefront at the introduction of symbolic logic, so much so that, in his first theory i.e
his picture theory of language if one reads it one side-dly, it is insisting on the exclusivity of
logical analysis as a standard of meaning and in that context, meaning emerges as a matter
of representation which means that every particular instance fit/fixed by a name or by a
concept, so it is either everything stands for a specific thing.

So in his Tractatus he is not exactly saying that meaning is representation so far as

there is side that is professing that where you cannot speak clearly, you should be silent, so
it means that to be able to speak clearly, the analysis must end in definite statements, and
“that is the main structure of this picture theory of language”

So he inspired two theories of meaning, and the second one holds that “the meaning
of a concept is not what the concept represent or refer to in reality,” so he is saying that
“the meaning of a concept is the use and then the context in which it is used” one need to
pay attention to how a concept is used and one can determine it’s meaning. So it means that
the meaning of a concept is not just what it refers to but how it is used, so one can say table
and mean something else in that sense that concept is not univocal with regard to it’s
meaning, it is connotation and not denotation.

Sometimes it looks as though that he contradicts himself in the two theories, but the
two theories are not necessarily opposed, if you read in between the line, he attempts to
distance himself from the logical positivist, if you read that in the light of “ the non-
exclusive theory that the meaning of a concept is the use, and the context in which it is
used, then you begin to see that Wittgenstein is actually “trying to combine the two
positions even at the time he wrote the tractatus”, but because the theory of meaning as

76
reference is more in consonance with the agenda of the logical positivist, they then felt that
he was one of them, but in retrospect, once you take into account the later development
whereby his theory of meaning as use emerged exclusively then you will be seeing that he is
saying something very different.

So, looking at his logical basis for his appraisal of metaphysics which is still the
question of the meaningfulness of language, if you put the emphasis on the second theory of
meaning as use, one begin to that “it has a much broader basis for accessing the
meaningfulness of a statement that cannot be reduced to logical analysis and exposure of
logical syntax”, so much so that while his is not underestimating the importance of logical
form, or a statement having logical syntax as a condition of meaningfulness, because of the
second theory it means that “he has a broader understanding of meaning that Yes!, in some
cases there are concepts that refer to specific things, but in the final analysis, for you to
really understand the meaning of every concept, it is has to be considered in terms of it’s
use and the context in which it is used”.

So the latter emphasis is not representative of his position, and once that happens it
means that he has “quite an equivocal disposition towards metaphysics, he certainly did
not absolutize the demands of logical analysis, for it means that if it is science or
mathematics then that condition becomes valid, because in that context, logical analysis can
serve as a criterion of meaning, because there everything is defined clear and distinct, but
beyond the domain of science, mathematics and logic, one cannot use that standard to
judge what is meaningful otherwise the standard becomes very narrow, so it means every
concept has a “language game” and if you do not understand that language game, it means
you cannot participate in that game, for the meaning of a concept is embodied in the
language game, and the language game has to do with how it is used, how a community of
users operate with that concept, so that what he is saying more or less is that “ the meaning
of a concept cannot be determined apriori, one has to study the community in which that
concept is used and how they use it, and it is only when you come from the inside
perspective that you can then understand what that concept means”.

So he is saying that one cannot determine the meaning of a concept “apriori”, it

means he is trying to dissolve and transcend the distinction between apriori and
aposteriroi, because he is saying that “ one cannot determine the meaning of a concept, for
concept is always concept of something, it means one cannot understand anything just by
apriori definition” because once one can define the concept of a thing, it means that one
understands that thing so much so that if you say table, it means nothing but table, but if
one is not going by apriori definition one can say table and mean something else, so that is
what he is trying to allow for, that “concepts derive their meaning from the context of the
use, and for you to understand the context of the use, one have to study the users.” So he
pointing to the importance of anthropology because it is human beings that use the
language in a community, so from what he is saying, one cannot understand a culture
unless one study’s that culture and understand their cultural practices, and that is one of
the innovations of anthropology in the 20 th century, for it is a relatively recent discipline

77
and this emphasis that one cannot understand a people through armchair investigation, so
one need to become one of them and by studying their practices, one begins to understand
their language game, so it means when they use words, one cannot just interpret it apriori.

So it means everything has a language game, but if he is saying that “one cannot
understand it unless one becomes part of it then it means he is tending towards ‘relativism’
becomes it means every culture is irreducible with regards to it’s meaning and unless one
become part of it one cannot understand what is going on”, so that is language, “ the
anthropological basis of language” so that if you accentuate that what one gets is a kind of
incommensurability between languages for it means every concept has a language game,
and for every concept it means that you the language game to be able to understand the
meaning of that concept.

APPLICATION OF HIS THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS USE TO HIS CRITICISM OF

METAPHYSICS

Can we apply that to his criticism of metaphysics? what then happens to

metaphysics? Is metaphysics possible in the traditional configuration? No! because
“metaphysics is the science of being qua being using the instrumentality of pure reason,
and the determinations of pure reason as opposed to the determinations of reality such that
each concept has a definite representation in reality, that is why one can be confident that
with the proper (N:B!!! not audible 22:39.37) of concepts, concepts can help you to grasp
reality”. But” he is saying that reality is too dynamic that one would expect that a concept
can grasp the meaning of that reality because the reality is open to different interpretation
and if one does not exhaust the use and the context one cannot see the different meanings”.
For example, in some community, a table can be a table right, but if you get there when
they say table it is actually chair they are seating on, they are using chair as table, also if
you come to my room some things they call stool, when students come I will say oya! Use it
as chair, that is stool but it is serving the function of a chair, but if you say it is a chair, is it
really a chair? it means one is causing confusion and that is the kind of confusion that
Wittgenstein invites and welcomes, because “he is trying to debunk the idea that everything
has a particular meaning, so if everything does not have a particular meaning then we
cannot have the kind of metaphysics we are talking about because that kind of metaphysics
thrives on the ability of reason to be able to pick out things out there, Apriori!, and
Wittgenstein is saying that look!, no concept refers to one thing exclusively”.

A concept can have a kind of elasticity that allows you to use it differently and
unless you pay attention to how the concept is used, one cannot understand it, in that case
not just concept even designation, for example if stretch out my hands now, it means am
saying this man is sleeping!, but I can even accompany that with some utterances like
ahhhhhh! Or something terrible is going to happen to somebody and am pursuing and
there is no way I can access him and a trailer is coming and he is absent minded and I
shout ahhhhhh! and the man will respond ehhhhhhh!.

78
 So, “if you apply this to his appraisal of metaphysics it means metaphysics in it’s
traditional conception is not possible, and in that sense he is one with the logical positivist,
if that is the kind of metaphysics he is talking about then it is not possible, because the
demand is still the demand of logical analysis which is that meaning is something definite,
but he is opening up the possibility that meaning is not necessarily something definite and
once you allow that, and that is the direction in which he is trying to reform metaphysics,
so that the kind of metaphysics he reforms is that ‘ the first job of a metaphysician is to
clarify the meaning of every concept by paying attention to how it is used, and in that case
he is still talking about analysis’, because if I say table now, the concept of table, one will
want to analyze how it is used in ordinary language, or the concept of seminarian any
concept at all, one cannot determine it aprior, so that the first obligation is to analyze, but
not logical analysis, one is not looking for the syntax, for as I said ahhhhhh!, it has no
syntax but it has a meaning even if it possess no subject or predicate, so the kind of
metaphysics he is saying has to be conscious of the “delicacy of the meaning of concepts,
that is one has to pay attention to the context in which a concept is used, and the context in
which it is used is ordinary language and not symbolic language .

So it is not that there is no form, for meaning depends on form, but he is saying that
it can be logical form but there are other form that are more important, and that is why
they say life is larger than logic, if it is only logic that you are looking for you will miss
many important things in life, for example marriage, the way the husband and wife are
communicating, you will know when there is a problem, they don’t need to say it, there is
no logical form for that, but is there a linguistic form?, Yes!, from the communication, even
the way the wife will look. So the most important things in life is to be able to understand
each situations and if you do not understand it, you will be acting wrongly.

The new sense of metaphysics means that “metaphysics has to pay attention to the
different shades of concepts for it means different people can have different understanding
of that concept so that as a point of departure one is doing “conceptual clarification” but
not in terms of the demands of logical analysis but “ordinary language analysis, common
sense analysis that considers how people generally understands that concept”, so it means
that “this new sense of metaphysics is not apriori rather it is descriptive, because one will
then be able to say that in this context this is what table means or not mean, but how can
we get an overall understanding of how the concept of table is eventually.” So it is like the
approach I gave when you were studying philosophy in your first year, it is not axiomatic,
one looks at different features associated with a concept and then by trying to synthesize
everything one comes up with a Conesus understanding as to what that concept means.

CRITICISM OF HIS APPRAISAL OF METAPHYSICS

So it means in that in that sense, metaphysics is not an apriori science, but it is

“WRONG” because “he is trying to rehabilitate metaphysics in a different form, but in the
process the essence of metaphysics is lost, if you go back to what metaphysics is from time
immemorial and that concept of metaphysics is valid, but it has had issues that is why it is

79
facing a lot of criticism, and we have seen the different criticisms, so the point he is taking
is maybe metaphysics just wants to pay attention to the meaning of how things are used,
but if the thing or concept must be exclusively determined in terms of how it is used in
ordinary language then one cannot have any consensus, for it means there is no way to
reconcile the meaning of a concept because there will be diverse meaning, and all one is
doing is just accessing how different people are using that concept descriptively, so that
cannot serve as metaphysics, so that in the final analysis, his effort to revive metaphysics “
in terms of ordinary language analysis and not logical analysis has failed”.

So, the likes of Russell tries to revive metaphysics on the basis of logical analysis and
the likes of Ayer, Carnap are saying NO! it has no logical form, but Wittgenstein says
YES! It cannot have logical form, but there is a new form of metaphysics that if you
assume that the meaning of a concept lies in the context of it’s usage, if you follow this part
then it brings down metaphysics completely, for it means that metaphysics is just an
anthropological exercise, and I do not think that that is sufficient for what metaphysics
claims to do.

So he is reducing metaphysics to anthropology for it means one needs to check how

people are using the language in ordinary language/form, for you to understand the
meaning of any concept you need to ask first how are they using it, and how it is used will
bring many answers before you can reconcile them, so it means no concept has a definite
meaning and that is why he is talking of relativism, it is dangerous.

However aside from the mysticism, because there is a mystical backdrop from what
he is trying to do, it means that only “science and logic can allow you to speak clearly but
beyond science and logic one has to keep quiet.”

ADDENDUM!!!!!

So philosophy is hard eh!, it is not just easy to condemn somebody you need to know
where he is coming from by entering into his shoes, then reject the shoes and get another
shoe, but your shoe is destined to be criticized and rejected so that after all says and done
all shoe is critiqued and rejected.

80