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2022-12-09 Watt - Watt's Original Petition and App For Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction
2022-12-09 Watt - Watt's Original Petition and App For Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction
Janie Macias
Combination Clerk
Crane County, Texas
By Andrea Flores
22-052-DCCV-00075
CAUSE NO. _____________________
COMES NOW Ashley W. Watt, Individually, and as Trustee of the Ashley W. Watt 2012
Ranch Trust and Trustee of the Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust (collectively, “Plaintiff”) in
the above-styled cause and file this Original Petition and Application for Declaratory Relief and
Mandatory Injunction against Defendants Chevron U.S.A. (“Chevron”), Walsh and Watts, Inc.
(“Walsh and Watts”), Pitts Energy Co. (“Pitts”), and Williams Oil Company (“Williams”)
(collectively “Defendants”) and in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:
1. The Antina Ranch is an approximately 22,000 acre ranch located in Crane and
Ward Counties, Texas. The ranch was purchased by the Watt family in 1995, and remains under
the control of the Watt family through the Ashley W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust and the Christina W.
Watt 2012 Ranch Trust, which are the current surface estate owners of Antina Ranch. Plaintiff
subject to various mineral leases, including Oil and Gas Lease dated October 11th, 1924 from W.A.
Estes, and wife Dollie A. Estes, as lessor, to J.W. Grant, as lessee, recorded at Volume 10, Page
135 of the Deed Records of Crane County, Texas, covering 20,614 acres of land, more or less,
described therein (the “Estes Lease”); and Oil and Gas Lease dated October 14th, 1924, from
Wristen Brothers et al, as lessor, to J.W. Grant, as lessee, recorded at Volume 10, Page 548 of the
Deed Records of Crane County, Texas, covering 9,088 acres of land, more or less, described
therein (the “Wristen Lease”). Multiple wells exist on the Antina Ranch, including allegedly
plugged and abandoned wells, injection wells, inactive wells, and wells currently in production.
Current ownership, responsibility, and/or current operators of wells on the Antina Ranch include
3. In approximately Spring 2021, apparent leaks at certain wells on the Antina Ranch
were observed. These leaks were previously unknown and undisclosed to Plaintiff. In the same
time period, dying vegetation was observed. These matters were initially raised to Defendant
Chevron, who had responsibility for and/or operated the impacted wells. During these initial
notifications, Chevron failed to provide substantive details as to the causes of the observed leaks
or dying vegetation, and failed to provide material information related to its efforts to address the
issues.
4. On information and belief, Chevron farmed out portions of the original Wristen and
Estes Leases to other operators, including but not limited to the named co-Defendants. In April
2021, Chevron assigned an interest in the Estes Lease—which included the wells with observed
impacts discussed above—to Defendant Pitts Energy. Based on information and belief, Pitts paid
no money for Chevron’s interest in the Estes Lease. Furthermore, based on information and belief,
5. In June 2021, an uncontrolled flow of heavy brine water was discovered at a well
on the Antina Ranch identified as the Estes 24 (API No. 42-103-00781), (the “blowout”). The
Estes 24 well was allegedly plugged and abandoned in 1995. At the time the blowout was
discovered, salt crusting, and dying vegetation were visible in the vicinity of the Estes 24. Chevron
initiated work to address the blowout and encountered numerous problems, ultimately requiring
over twelve weeks to control. Chevron failed to disclose material information related to the leak
to Plaintiff. Based on information and belief, significant amounts of produced water (including
benzene and radioactive signatures) were discharged, including both to the surface and subsurface.
This surface blowout was a violation of Railroad Commission of Texas (“RRC”) Statewide Rule
8.
determine the extent and causes of the various observed events were largely rebuffed, with
Chevron failing to respond to requests for basic information, much less a systematic, scientifically-
and are actively leaking brine, hydrocarbons, and/or other contaminants or exhibit indications of
imminent failure. The impacted wells include those owned and/or operated by each of the
related to the leak at the Estes 24 was not an isolated incident. Chevron’s nondisclosure also
included an intentional failure to notify Plaintiff of plugging occurring at the Estes 27 well (API
application, requesting a significant increase in injection at the Estes 31W (API No. 42-103-
00785). Instead, in its application to the RRC, Chevron misrepresented that it was the surface
owner—which is false—in what appears to be a calculated effort to conceal the application from
a misrepresentation related to a blowout at the Estes 20 (API No. 42-103-00791) that occurred in
December 2020. Not only did Chevron fail to disclose the extent of the blowout, it affirmatively
misrepresented to Plaintiff that only 31.69 bbls of brine were leaked, which is demonstrably false.
Aside from these affirmative misrepresentations, based on information and belief, Chevron has
failed to notify the RRC of certain of these leaks, in violation of RRC Statewide Rule 20.
various wells and sustained casing pressure on Bradenheads have been observed by Plaintiff.
11. Despite notice, Chevron and the other Defendants in this case have failed to conduct
an investigation into these matters to determine if there is a link between the leaks, deteriorating
wells, and their activities conducted pursuant to the Estes Lease and Wristen Lease. With or
without a link, Chevron and the other Defendants remain responsible for these failing wells and
12. These events have had a substantial impact on Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the
Antina Ranch. Further, the toll of the worry and frustration about the future of the Antina Ranch
on Plaintiff is significant and has been exponentially compounded by the failure of Defendants —
principally Chevron—to take these concerns seriously. Defendants have failed to disclose even
Defendants have taken no apparent steps to develop a comprehensive and scientific approach to
investigate the property, and have either ignored or dismissed concerns raised by Plaintiff or
13. Plaintiff Ashley W. Watt is a Marine Corps combat veteran and suffers from post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Her disorder has been aggravated by the injuries to the Antina
14. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Chevron, Walsh and Watts, Pitts, and Williams
for the impacts to the Antina Ranch. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment regarding liability for
the pollution or contamination, monetary damages, and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled
under the law, including site investigation costs and attorneys’ fees.
15. The Plaintiff also seeks a mandatory injunction requiring (1) the immediate
cessation of the flow of pollution and/or contamination from compromised wells onto Plaintiff’s
surface and subsurface, (2) a site investigation resulting in full vertical and horizontal delineation
of impacted groundwater and soils, (3) cleanup and restoration of the property that results, at a
groundwater, and the land returned to the condition prior to any pollution or contamination, (4) re-
entering and properly plugging all allegedly plugged wells on the Antina Ranch for which
Defendants are responsible; and (5) provision of an alternate source of water for the Antina Ranch.
16. Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3 of Rule 190.3 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure and affirmatively pleads that this suit is not governed by the expedited-
excess of $100,000.
17. The extent of the damage to Plaintiff’s properties has not been fully characterized
as of the date of the filing of the petition. Plaintiff seeks non-monetary relief and monetary relief
over $1,000,000. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(c)(5). The damages sought herein are within the
jurisdictional limits of this Court. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this allegation: (1) pre-trial,
should discovery show this number to be too low or too high; (2) during trial, should the evidence
admitted at trial reveal this number to be too low or too high; and/or, (3) post-trial, to conform the
pleadings to the verdict in the event that the jury determines Plaintiffs are entitled to damages in
excess of $1,000,000.00. See, e.g., Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
1990).
IV. Parties
Houston, Texas 77019. Ms. Watt brings this case Individually, as Trustee of the Ashley W. Watt
2012 Ranch Trust, and as Trustee of the Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust. The last three digits
of Ms. Watt’s driver’s license number are 767. The last three digits of her Social Security number
are 677.
business in the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 6001 Bollinger Canyon Rd., San
Ramon, CA 94583-2324. It may be served with process through its registered agent, Prentice Hall
Corp System, Inc., 211 E. 7th Street, Suite 620, Austin, TX 78701-3218.
the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 155 Walsh Drive, Aledo, TX 76008. It may
be served with process through its registered agent, CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan St., Suite
21. Defendant Pitts Energy Co. is a Texas corporation licensed to do business in the
State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 3313 Caldera Blvd., Midland, TX 79707. It may
be served with process through its registered agent, Steven L. Pitts, 3313 Caldera Blvd., Midland,
TX 79707.
the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 3300 N. A Street, Bldg 2-215, Midland, TX
79705. It may be served with process through its registered agent, Tom W. Williams, 3300 N. A
23. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit because the controversy
24. Venue is mandatory in Crane County under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§15.011 because this suit is, in part, for damages to real property, and Crane County is where the
25. The Antina Ranch is owned by the Ashley W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust and the
Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust. Ashley Watt resides on the Antina Ranch. In addition to
homesite, the Antina Ranch is a working ranch. Well water has been the exclusive source of water
in natural resources. These include, but are not limited to, large deposits of sands, which can be
mined and used in the oil and gas industry, and land areas suitable for solar power development.
27. Beginning in approximately the 1940s, Gulf Oil, a predecessor to Chevron, began
developing the Estes Lease. Gulf/Chevron were the sole operator of the Estes Lease until the
transfer of certain of these wells to Pitts. Many wells were productive for decades, and
Gulf/Chevron employed techniques to extend production, including water flooding for late-stage
28. In approximately the 1990s, Chevron began plugging a substantial portion of the
wells under the Estes Lease. This included the Estes 24, which was allegedly plugged and
abandoned in 1995. Based on information and belief, many of the wells originally drilled under
the control of Gulf/Chevron were drilled using the same or similar construction methods and
techniques. Similarly, based on information and belief, many of the wells allegedly plugged under
the control of Chevron were allegedly plugged using similar plugging methods and techniques.
29. As referenced above, in June 2021, a blowout manifested at surface near the Estes
24, a well for which Chevron was responsible—as admitted by both Chevron and the RRC. The
blowout resulted in damages to the Antina Ranch, both on the surface and on the subsurface.
30. On information and belief, there are numerous additional wells that appear to be
compromised and are actively leaking brine, hydrocarbons, and/or other contaminants or exhibit
indications of imminent failure. These include active wells for which named Defendants are the
responsible operators, and allegedly plugged wells for which Defendants are responsible pursuant
to RRC Statewide Rule 14. Importantly, Plaintiff’s investigation efforts continue and at the time
of the filing of this petition, dozens of failing wells have been observed.
information and relief, Chevron knows or should know to be compromised by way of poor cement
bonds, corroded casing, inadequate plugging, active leaking, indications of past discharges or
indications of imminent failure to Pitts, without disclosing such information to Pitts, in violation
of RRC Statewide Rule 15. Based on information and belief, Pitts lacks adequate resources to
32. The transfers of ownership, from Chevron to Pitts, of these wells appears to be an
attempt – either by Chevron or Pitts, or both – to avoid potentially millions of dollars of liabilities
related to asset retirement obligations, including the adequate plugging of wells, or the financial
responsibilities which arise from the failure to do so. This fraudulent scheme, if allowed to stand,
would permit an asset-rich corporation such as Chevron, which presumably has the financial
resources to fulfill the obligations of being a well owner or operator, to transfer those obligations
to an undercapitalized entity, i.e., Pitts, which either may not have the same resources or would
not have entered into these well ownership transactions under the same terms had it known the
facts. Plaintiff, as a creditor, therefore asserts that these transactions are actionable under the Texas
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §24.001, et seq.
33. As set forth below, Plaintiff has been severely damaged by the pollution or
34. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth
below.
35. Defendants Chevron, Walsh and Watts, Pitts, and Williams entered and/or continue
contaminants to subsurface pore space, groundwater, and soil as a result of the leaks from wells
on the Antina Ranch for which these Defendants are responsible. Further, Defendants have and
continue to exceed the scope of the implied easement granted by the Estes and Wristen Leases,
and held by Defendants, to reasonably access the surface of the premises for purposes of mineral
Plaintiff’s property.
36. Defendants’ entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary, and caused injury to
37. Defendants took no action and have taken no action to ensure that the contaminants
would not migrate or continue to migrate, unauthorized, onto Plaintiff’s property. Defendants’
failure to take action to prevent the contaminants from migrating or continuing to migrate on to
Plaintiff’s property was and is grossly negligent or done with malice and deliberate and willful and
Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface from numerous compromised wells and to migrate through
Plaintiff’s property.
39. Defendants’ trespass is temporary because it can be repaired, fixed, or restored, and
any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably
predictable, such that future injury could not be estimated with reasonable certainty.
40. In the alternative, Defendants’ trespass is permanent because either (a) the damage
is not capable of being repaired, fixed, or restored, or (b) even if capable of repair, there is
41. Defendants’ unauthorized entry onto Plaintiffs’ properties resulted in the following
damages:
damages;
g. Expenses;
i. Court costs.
property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring the immediate cessation of the
continuing trespass of pollution and/or contamination, site investigation and cleanup of the site
including re-entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water source, as described
below.
with, Plaintiff’s interests in the use and enjoyment of the property by:
44. Defendants’ substantial interference with Plaintiff’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of the property has caused Plaintiff unreasonable discomfort, annoyance, and
inconvenience.
45. Defendants have caused physical damage to Plaintiff’s property, economic harm to
the property’s market value, and psychological harm to Plaintiff’s “peace of mind” in the use and
legal duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to Plaintiff and the property.
Defendants were aware, or should have been aware of the compromised wells for which they are
responsible and the resulting leaks which have resulted in pollution or contamination to the
installing, monitoring, plugging, repairing the wells, or a combination of these actions. Further,
once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks, Defendants failed
failing to take action once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks.
Plaintiff’s property. To date, Defendants have intentionally failed to take any action to contain or
repaired, fixed, or restored and any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular,
intermittent, and not reasonably predictable, such that future injury could not be estimated with
reasonable certainty.
because either (a) the damage is not capable of being repaired, fixed, or restored, or (b) even if
capable of repair, there is substantial certainty the injury will repeatedly, continually, and regularly
50. Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s interests caused injury to Plaintiff, which
damages;
h. Expenses;
j. Court costs.
in the use and enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring
the immediate abatement of the nuisance, site investigation and cleanup of the site including re-
entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water source, as described below.
52. Defendants owed a legal duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent
53. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the compromised wells for
which they are responsible and the resulting leaks which have resulted in pollution or
installing, monitoring, plugging, repairing the wells or a combination of these actions. Further,
once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks, Defendants failed
to take reasonable affirmative action to control or avoid increasing the danger to Plaintiff. In
through Plaintiff’s property. To date, Defendants have intentionally failed to take any action to
not limited to: (1) the installation of wells, including but not limited to the construction method,
engineering and choice of construction materials; (2) the monitoring of active, inactive and
plugged wells; (3) the plugging of wells; (4) the repair of compromised and leaking wells,
including the repair method; (5) the failure to determine the cause of any leaks including the cause
of any casing failures or the cause of any abnormal pressurization in the wells or both; and (6) the
wells, and (7) the failure to implement an adequate groundwater monitoring plan.
damages;
g. Expenses;
i. Court costs.
56. Defendants’ actions violate RRC Statewide Rule 8, which provides that, “No
person conducting activities subject to regulation by the [RRC] may cause or allow pollution of
surface or subsurface water in the state,” 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(b). It also provides that,
No person may dispose of any oil and gas wastes by any method without obtaining
a permit to dispose of such wastes. The disposal methods prohibited by this
paragraph include, but are not limited to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field
brines, geothermal resource waters, or any other mineralized waters, or drilling
fluids into any watercourse or drainageway, including any drainage ditch, dry
creek, flowing creek, river, or any other body of surface water.
to protect, and the injury to Plaintiff is of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
59. Additionally, Defendant Chevron’s actions violated RRC Statewide Rule 14, which
provides that,
The operator of a well shall serve notice on the surface owner of the well site tract,
or the resident if the owner is absent, before the scheduled date for beginning the
plugging operations. A representative of the surface owner may be present to
witness the plugging of the well. Plugging shall not be delayed because of the lack
of actual notice to the surface owner or resident if the operator has served notice as
required by this paragraph. The district director or the director’s delegate may grant
exceptions to the requirements of this paragraph concerning the timing of notices
when a workover or drilling rig is already at work on location and ready to
commence plugging operations.
60. Plaintiff is included in the class of persons that RRC Statewide Rule 14 is designed
to protect, and the injury to Plaintiff is of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
Statewide Rule 14, and all Defendants’ negligence per se proximately caused injury to Plaintiff,
damages;
g. Expenses;
i. Court costs.
E. Count 5 – Texas Natural Resource Code Section 85.321 (as to All Defendants).
Code or “another law of this state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the [RRC] may sue
for and recover damages and have any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or equity.”
Statewide Rule 8, which provides that, “No person conducting activities subject to regulation by
the [RRC] may cause or allow pollution of surface or subsurface water in the state,” 16 TEX.
No person may dispose of any oil and gas wastes by any method without obtaining
a permit to dispose of such wastes. The disposal methods prohibited by this
paragraph include, but are not limited to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field
brines, geothermal resource waters, or any other mineralized waters, or drilling
fluids into any watercourse or drainageway, including any drainage ditch, dry
creek, flowing creek, river, or any other body of surface water.
The operator of a well shall serve notice on the surface owner of the well site tract,
or the resident if the owner is absent, before the scheduled date for beginning the
plugging operations. A representative of the surface owner may be present to
witness the plugging of the well. Plugging shall not be delayed because of the lack
of actual notice to the surface owner or resident if the operator has served notice as
violation of Statewide Rule 14 caused injury to Plaintiff, which resulted in the following damages:
damages;
g. Expenses;
h. Exemplary damages;
j. Court costs.
property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring immediate cessation of the discharge
of pollution and/or contamination onto Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface, site investigation and
cleanup of the site including re-entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water
including but not limited to the plugging occurring at the Estes 27, the waterflood increase
application related to the Estes 31W, and the extent of the blowout at the Estes 20.
69. Defendant Chevron had a duty to disclose these material facts to Plaintiff who is
the surface owner whose property was impacted by these incidents. Further, Chevron had a duty
to disclose the plugging at Estes 27 pursuant to RRC Statewide Rule 14. Defendant Chevron knew
that Plaintiff was ignorant of these facts, and that Plaintiff did not have an equal opportunity to
discover these facts, yet Chevron was deliberately silent when it had a duty to speak.
70. By failing to disclose these facts, Chevron intended to induce Plaintiff to take some
71. Plaintiff was injured as a result of acting without the knowledge of the undisclosed
a. Actual damages;
d. Expenses;
e. Exemplary damages;
g. Court costs.
misrepresenting the extent of a blowout at the Estes 20 that occurred in December 2020. Not only
that only 31.69 bbls of brine were leaked, which is demonstrably false.
73. At the time Chevron made the representation, it knew it was false, or it made the
74. Chevron intended to induce Plaintiff to take some action or refrain from acting, and
75. Plaintiff was injured as a result of acting without the knowledge of the undisclosed
a. Actual damages;
d. Expenses;
e. Exemplary damages;
g. Court costs.
76. Upon information and belief, Chevron has attempted to transfer ownership of
certain wells that it knows or should have known to be compromised by way of inadequate
plugging, active leaking, indications of past discharges or indications of imminent failure to Pitts,
without adequately disclosing such information to Pitts. Based on information and belief, Pitts
lacks adequate resources to address such issues, nor would it have acquired these liabilities for the
price paid to Chevron had it known the truth. This transfer of ownership – from Chevron to Pitts
of wells, or the financial responsibilities which arise from the failure to do so.
77. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants pursuant to the Texas Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §24.001, et seq.
78. Plaintiff is a “creditor” because she has a valid claim against Defendants, including
the theories of trespass to real property, nuisance, negligence per se, etc., set forth above. TEX.
BUS. & COMM. CODE §§24.002(3),(4). Plaintiff’s claim arose either prior to, or within a reasonable
time after, the transfer was made or Pitts incurred the obligation related to these wells. See id. at
§§24.005 (transfer fraudulent as to present and future creditors), 24.006 (transfer fraudulent as to
present creditors).
79. Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of ownership of the wells at issue in this case, from
Chevron to Pitts, were fraudulent under Texas law. These transfers were made with Defendants’
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, including Plaintiff, whose property was
damaged, is being damaged, and will be damaged in the future by inadequately plugged or leaking
wells, or wells for which failure is likely in the future. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§24.005
(a)(1).
80. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges the transfer was made between Defendants, or
obligation incurred by Pitts, without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, and that Pitts “was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which its remaining assets were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; or intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that it would
incur, debts beyond the its ability to pay as they became due.” Id. at §24.005(a)(2).
between Chevron and Pitts meet the criteria of several of the “badges of fraud,” enumerated in the
82. Plaintiff seeks all relief available to her under TUFTA, including, but not limited
d. Costs and reasonable attorney fees as are equitable and just. [Id. at
§§24.013].
83. Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction requiring the immediate cessation of the flow
of pollution and/or contamination from compromised wells onto Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface,
a site investigation resulting in full horizontal and vertical delineation of chemical constituents
related to the leaks from the compromised wells, cleanup of the pollution or contamination, and
restoration of the property that results, at a minimum, in the complete removal of all chemical
constituents released, no impact to surface or groundwater, and the land returned to the condition
prior to any pollution or contamination. Further, Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction requiring
the Antina Ranch, conduct full cement and casing logs in order to confirm structural integrity and
protection of groundwater resources, and properly plug the wells. Plaintiff also seeks a mandatory
injunction requiring Defendants to provide the Antina Ranch with an alternate source of water as
a result of the pollution or contamination since the groundwater on which the Antina Ranch relies
for all purposes can no longer be used, and Plantiff is without a reliable, clean source of water due
to Defendants’ activities.
84. Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.003, Plaintiff seeks a finding and
determination that Defendants, and not Plaintiff, are liable for all response costs or damages
response costs or damages under certain authorities. The Texas Commission for Environmental
Quality (TCEQ), however, “may not name a person as a responsible party for an enforcement
action or require a person to reimburse remediation costs for a site owned or operated by the
person” if the contaminants that are the subject of the investigation “appear to originate from an
up-gradient, offsite source that is not owned or operated by the person,” reflecting an intention by
the state to protect innocent landowners from liability for pollution or contamination. TEX.
86. Plaintiff also seek costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, as are
equitable and just, pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009.
X. Jury Demand
87. Plaintiff demands a jury trial and herewith tenders the appropriate fee.
89. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194, Defendants are required to provide
the information or materials described in Rule 194.2, 194.3, and 194.4 without awaiting a
90. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to
Defendants that any and all documents produced by Defendants in this matter may be used against
Defendants at any pre-trial proceeding or at trial without the necessity of authenticating the
produced documents.
XIV. Prayer
For these reasons, Plaintiff asks that the Court issue citation for Defendants to appear and
answer, and that Plaintiff be awarded a judgment against Defendants for the following:
b. Mandatory injunction requiring (1) the immediate cessation of the flow of pollution
groundwater, surface water and land returned to the condition prior to any pollution
or contamination; (4) re-entering and properly plugging all allegedly plugged wells
on the Antina Ranch; and (5) the provision of an alternate source of water;
CODE § 37.003, finding and determining that Defendants are liable for all response
e. Exemplary damages;
g. Court costs;
Respectfully submitted,