European Integration and the Cold

War

Post-war Europe was deeply affected by both the Cold War and European
integration. All too often the two processes have been studied entirely sepa-
rately, however. This edited volume therefore brings together contributions from
prominent historians in both of these fields. What emerges is the way in which
the East–West conflict and the emergence of organised cooperation in Europe
did become entangled with one another, despite the attempts of some govern-
ments deliberately to avoid any interplay between the two.
The period covered is one of major change in Western Europe involving both
de Gaulle’s rebellion against the structures of Atlantic and European cooperation
and Brandt’s radical new Ostpolitik. It was also a time when the British debate
about how to define their world role involved calculations about both their
approach to NATO and the EEC. From 1969 onward these changes had also to
be carried out against the backdrop of the American foreign policy of Nixon and
Kissinger.
This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics and
history, and International Relations in general.

N. Piers Ludlow is a senior lecturer in the Department of International History

at the LSE. He is author of Dealing With Britain: the Six and the First UK
Application to the EEC (1997) and The European Community and the Crises of
the 1960s (2006).
Cold War history series
Series editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox
ISSN: 1471-3829

In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of
the established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of
the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt
to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the devel-
opment of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing
expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available
sources.

1 Reviewing the Cold War

Approaches, interpretations, and theory
Edited by Odd Arne Westad

2 Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War

Richard Saull

3 British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War

Marrku Ruotsila

4 Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 1953–1965

Edited by Wilfred Loth

5 The Last Decade of the Cold War

From conflict escalation to conflict transformation
Edited by Olav Njølstad

6 Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War

Issues, interpretations, periodizations
Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero

7 Across the Blocs

Cold War cultural and social history
Edited by Rana Mitter and Patrick Major
 8 US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam
Insurgency, subversion and public order
William Rosenau

9 The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s

Negotiating the Gaullist challenge
N. Piers Ludlow

10 Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64

Changing alliances
Mari Olsen

11 The Third Indochina War

Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79
Edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge

12 Greece and the Cold War

Frontline state, 1952–1967
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

13 Economic Statecraft during the Cold War

European responses to the US trade embargo
Frank Cain

14 Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1960

Kitty Newman

15 The Emergence of Détente in Europe

Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik
Arne Hofmann

16 European Integration and the Cold War

Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973
Edited by N. Piers Ludlow
European Integration
and the Cold War
Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973

Edited by N. Piers Ludlow

First published 2007
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

© 2007 N. Piers Ludlow for selection and editorial matter; individual

chapters, the contributors
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
European integration and the Cold War : Ostpolitik-Westpolitik,
1965–1973/edited by N. Piers Ludlow.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Europe–Military policy. 2. European cooperation–History–20th century.
3. European federation–History–20th century. 4. Detente. 5. Cold War. I.
Ludlow, N. Piers, 1968–
UA646.E92349 2007
327.4009'046–dc22 2006035816

ISBN 0-203-08897-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-42109-8 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-08897-2 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-42109-6 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-08897-5 (ebk)
Contents

Notes on contributors ix
Acknowledgements x
List of abbreviations xi

Introduction 1
PIERS LUDLOW

1 The linkage between European integration and détente:

the contrasting approaches of de Gaulle and Pompidou,
1965 to 1974 11
GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU

2 ‘Grandeur et dépendances’: the dilemmas of Gaullist foreign

policy, September 1967 to April 1968 36
GARRET MARTIN

3 Détente and European integration in the policies of Willy

Brandt and Georges Pompidou 53
WILFRIED LOTH

4 New Ostpolitik and European integration: concepts and

policies in the Brandt era 67
ANDREAS WILKENS

5 Anglo-French relations, détente and Britain’s second

application for membership of the EEC, 1964 to 1967 81
HELEN PARR

6 Stabilising the West and looking to the East: Anglo-American

relations, Europe and détente, 1965 to 1967 105
JAMES ELLISON
viii Contents
7 The Netherlands, the Gaullist challenge and the evolving Cold
War, 1966 to 1973 128
JAN VAN DER HARST

8 An insulated Community? The Community institutions and the

Cold War, 1965 to 1970 137
PIERS LUDLOW

9 Searching for a balance: the American perspective 152

JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI

Conclusions 174
PIERS LUDLOW

Bibliography 180
Index 190
Contributors

James Ellison is a senior lecturer at Queen Mary, University of London. His

expertise centres on British foreign policy since 1945 and especially on
Britain’s relations with both the United States and Western Europe.
Jussi M. Hanhimäki is Professor of International History and Politics at the
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. He has written widely
about Cold War history, including a major new biography of Henry Kissinger.
Jan van de Harst holds the Jean Monnet Chair in the History and Theory of
European Integration at the University of Groningen. He is a member of the
European Union Liaison Committee of Historians and has published widely
on Dutch foreign policy, European integration history and the Cold War.
Wilfried Loth is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the Univer-
sity of Duisberg-Essen. He is the Chair of the European Union Liaison Com-
mittee of Historians and has written extensively about the origins and
development of European integration and about the Cold War.
Piers Ludlow is a senior lecturer in the Department of International History at
the London School of Economics. He is an expert on European integration
history and on Western Europe during the Cold War.
Garret Martin completed his Ph.D. on de Gaulle and the Cold War at the LSE
in 2006. He is currently teaching in the Department of History at the Univer-
sity of Warwick.
Helen Parr is a lecturer at the University of Keele. She has published a book
and several articles on the question of Britain’s membership of the EEC.
Georges-Henri Soutou is Professor of Contemporary History at the University
of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV) and a specialist in the international history of
the twentieth century. He has published widely on the First World War, the
Cold War, Franco-German relations and French foreign policy.
Andreas Wilkens teaches at the University of Metz. He is a specialist on post-
war German foreign policy. Franco-German relations and the history of Euro-
pean integration.
Acknowledgements

This volume is the outcome of a conference held at Pembroke College, Oxford

in September 2004. This event was generously funded by the Arts and Humani-
ties Research Council as part of a larger grant awarded to the Department of
International History at the LSE for the study of Cold War history. I would
therefore like to thank the AHRC for its funding, my fellow award-holders in the
Department for their encouragement and practical assistance, Pembroke College
for the excellence of its hospitality, and each of the paper-givers for their efforts
both during the conference itself and since. I am also grateful to those who
participated in the conference without presenting a paper: Odd Arne Westad,
Nigel Ashton, Steve Casey, Svetozar Rajak, Takeshi Yamamoto and Holger
Nehring all added significantly to the event. I should also like to thank Andrew
Humphrys at Routledge for his help in the preparation of the volume. And
finally, I have as always received much encouragement, support and proof-
reading from Morwenna my wife.
NPL
Oxford, August 2006
Abbreviations

AAPD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

AdsD Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Bonn
AN Archives Nationales, Paris
ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force
AOT Associated Overseas Territory
CAB Cabinet Files
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDF Documents Diplomatiques Français
DEA Department of Economic Affairs
DGI Directorate General I
EC European Community
ECHA European Commission Historical Archives
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defence Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ENF European nuclear force
EPC European political cooperation
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDI Foreign direct investment
FO Foreign Office
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR German Democratic Republic
IMF International Monetary Fund
KVP Katholieke Volkspartij
xii Abbreviations
LBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
MAE Ministère des Affaires etrangères, Paris
MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MLF Multilateral Force
NA National Archive, The Hague
NAC North Atlantic Council
NARA National Archives and Record Administration, Maryland
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
NPMP Nixon Presidential Materials Project
NPT Non-proliferation Treaty
NSAM National Security Action Memorandum
NSC National Security Council
NSF National Security Files
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PNW Prevention of Nuclear War agreement
PRC People’s Republic of China
PREM Prime Minister’s Files
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SF Subject File
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TNA National Archives, London (formerly the PRO)
UN United Nations
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU Western European Union
Introduction
Piers Ludlow

European integration and the Cold War have both played a significant role in
shaping the evolution of Europe since the Second World War. Each, in their
own different ways, did much to divide Europe and to unify it. The integration
process has from the outset drawn a sharp dividing line between those countries
which chose to participate in the ‘building of Europe’ and those which did not. It
also created strong bonds, economic, political and institutional, between the six,
then nine, ten, 12, 15 and now 27 countries which have been involved. Likewise
the Cold War underlined not merely the sharp distinction between Eastern and
Western Europe, between the communist and free worlds, but also a less clear-
cut but still important fracture between those European countries which
belonged to one bloc or the other and those neutrals which remained detached
from the East–West conflict. The Cold War too had a strong unifying effect,
establishing lasting ties between the countries of each Cold War alliance and
making much more solid and enduring the interconnections between Western
Europe and the undisputed leader of the Western world, the United States. Both
processes, moreover, were born, or at least institutionalised, in the same crucial
five years immediately following the end of the Second World War. In addition,
both were profoundly marked by many of the political heavyweights of the post-
war period. Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de
Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles or John F.
Kennedy feature prominently in most accounts of both the integration of Europe
and the development of Western Europe during the Cold War.
Surprisingly, however, the history of each has tended to be studied and told
with next to no reference to the other. Much has thus been written about
Western Europe and the early Cold War,1 and an almost equal amount of ink has
been spilled in attempts to analyse the origins and early development of the
European integration process.2 But these two historiographies have tended to
develop in parallel with few obvious points of intersection. Cold War historians
have thus focused their attention on a narrative which stretches from the estab-
lishment of the blocs in the 1940s, through the high tension and confrontation of
the 1950s and early 1960s, the détente of the later 1960s and 1970s, the ‘second
Cold War’ of the early 1980s and the final collapse of the Cold War system
and of the Soviet bloc in 1989 to 1990. Historians of European integration
2 P. Ludlow
meanwhile have refined a story in which the frustrated hopes of those aspiring to
European unity in the 1940s were partially realised in the early 1950s, hard hit
by the collapse of the putative European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954,
dramatically revived in 1955 with the Messina Conference and the start of the
negotiations which were to lead to the creation of the European Economic
Community (EEC), consolidated by the Community’s early success, depressed
by the stagnation of the process during the 1970s and early 1980s, and revived
once more by the renewed surge forward of the integration process in the mid-
to late 1980s. These twin tales, moreover, have been expounded, debated and
critiqued in different journals and at different conferences.3 And they have been
introduced to students in simplified form in separate textbooks designed for
separate university courses.4
There are admittedly some partial exceptions to this rule. The most obvious,
perhaps, is constituted by some of the writing on the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Analysts of the Marshall Plan, for instance, have been able to point out that the
European Recovery Programme was not simply a Cold War milestone and a
crucial step towards the formation of a solidly Western US-led bloc, but also a
policy initiative intended by its creators to foster European unity and to encour-
age the economic integration of Western Europe.5 Likewise, studies of the EDC
have seldom been able to ignore its Cold War origins – it was born in response
to the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased urgency which this gave to
the issue of whether or not West Germany should be allowed to rearm – or to
overlook the enormous energy with which the United States championed the
project as both a crucial step towards strengthening Western Europe’s defences
against the Soviet threat and as major advance in the direction of that European
unity for which the US had called since 1947.6 Revealingly, however, both of
these examples of Cold War and integration cross-over are normally regarded as
failures. Thus most European historians, at least, would view the Marshall Plan
as a major economic success and as vital in establishing the Western bloc, but as
something of a flop as far as European unity is concerned. US attempts to force
the recipients of Marshall Aid to submit a single pan-European wish-list rather
than multiple national requests or to accept the appointment of a heavyweight
secretary general of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), able to bang heads together and oblige the different countries to coop-
erate, were systematically thwarted by European resistance.7 Over time the Mar-
shall Plan thus did more to cement bilateral links between Washington and each
of the major European capitals than it did to nurture multilateral European coop-
eration. And the institutions that were born out of the Marshall Plan – notably
the OEEC – came to be regarded by many of those responsible for establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the EEC as examples of
how not to integrate and as the archetype of ineffective intergovernmental struc-
tures doomed to paralysis.8 Similarly, the EDC became European integration’s
most celebrated failure – the project that momentarily threatened to bury the
whole endeavour.9 Here too, therefore, enthusiastic American backing seemed to
have been in vain and possibly even counter-productive. Dulles’ celebrated
 Introduction 3
threat that the rejection of the EDC might trigger ‘an agonising reappraisal’ of
the US commitment to Europe proved totally futile, with French parliament-
arians choosing to call his bluff and vote down the ambitious treaty in August
1954. Overall, therefore, even the two main exceptions to the normally separate
narratives of integration and the Cold War in Europe seem only to justify the
normal detachment between the two fields. For on the rare occasions where the
two did interconnect, Cold War-inspired US pressure led the integration process
astray and failed to have a lasting impact. European integration, the implication
seems to be, has worked only when it has been carried out by Europeans for
European reasons rather than when it has been foisted upon Western Europe by
a well-meaning but over-enthusiastic superpower.
The gulf between the two fields has only been increased by recent trends in
the historiography of both European integration history and Cold War history.
The former, for instance, has been deeply marked by the emphasis placed by
Alan Milward and his followers on the economic causes of the integration
process. The notion that ECSC was the product of a particular crisis in the
French steel industry, or that the EEC constituted a Dutch-inspired attempt to
rescue the European nation state by consolidating and making irreversible the
intra-European trade boom of the 1950s, left little space for Cold War considera-
tions.10 The ‘Cold War’ indeed does not register in the index of either of
Milward’s influential two volumes on the origins of European integration.11
Likewise, the proliferation of detailed, archivally based studies of each indi-
vidual country’s path to the EEC has also tended to lessen the emphasis on the
Cold War as a motivation. For the central figures of many of these new studies
have been national civil servants, often based in either economic ministries or
those portions of the foreign ministry most concerned with commercial affairs,
who were much less involved professionally with the parallel evolution of the
Cold War than were the statesmen and parliamentarians who populated earlier,
less detailed accounts of integration’s origins.12 Cold War historians, meanwhile,
have responded in kind. Over the past two decades there has been a fairly sys-
tematic attempt to demonstrate that the Western European powers did matter in
a Cold War context and that events were not entirely determined by the super-
powers.13 But much of this emphasis on the power or even tyranny of the weak
has concentrated on the way individual European states were able to manipulate
and use Washington to their own ends.14 The emphasis has thus been bilateral
and transatlantic rather than multilateral and pan-European. With a few hon-
ourable exceptions, neither ‘new Cold War history’ nor the most recent writings
of integration experts have broken the pattern described above; many of its prod-
ucts have if anything made the separation more acute.15
This volume and the conference at Pembroke College, Oxford out of which it
emerged were designed to examine these parallel histories and to begin to assess
whether or not their lack of interconnection was justified. Those invited to
participate were historians who had shown interest in either Cold War history or
European integration history or occasionally both. Indeed, several of those who
attended belonged to that comparatively rare breed of scholar who had published
4 P. Ludlow
about both fields, although revealingly even they had most often done so in dif-
ferent volumes and in different articles rather than in single works.16 The players
on which they concentrated – France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands,
the United States and the Community institutions – were those deemed most
likely to have played significant roles in both the Cold War and the European
integration process. And the period upon which they were invited to focus – the
second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s – was one of some importance to
both the development of European integration and the Cold War, but equally
one where the interconnections between the two fields had not previously been
explored. It therefore constitutes a good testing ground for the hypothesis that
the separation between Cold War and European integration history described
above was artificial and too extreme.
The 1960s were an important period in the development of Western Europe.
Economically, the period was one during which the Continent’s remarkable
post-war rise seemed to continue.17 There were a few minor interruptions, and
the relatively sluggish British economy went on defying the wider trend.
Overall, however, the period was one of high growth rates, booming exports,
minimal unemployment and controllable inflation – a performance that did much
to cement in the minds of Western European policy-makers and citizens an
equation between European integration and economic success that would be
largely absent from those countries such as Britain that were only to join the
EEC in 1973, the very year when the economic bubble burst. Politically, mean-
while, the gradual rise of the political left after the dominance across Western
Europe of the centre-right during the 1950s seemed to be occurring in a con-
trolled and unthreatening manner – until 1968 at least. And in international
terms, the rapid liquidation in the early 1960s of Western Europe’s remaining
colonial empires meant that Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands no
longer found themselves besieged by world opinion and liable to criticism even
from their superpower ally about their imperial policies in the way that had been
the case throughout the latter half of the 1950s. The speed and dignity with
which each power left its former Asian, African and Caribbean holdings varied
significantly – but in all of the European colonial powers the sense of relief at
the end of empire seemed to outweigh any regret for diminished international
influence. Indeed, Gaullist France was probably not unique in believing that it
could operate more effectively on the world stage after it had lost its empire than
it had been able to when it still ruled directly over significant portions of Africa
and South-East Asia.18
Western Europe’s renewed self-confidence – fuelled by its economic success
and facilitated by colonial disengagement – did not however correspond to
increased centrality to global affairs. From a Cold War history perspective the
1960s are the decade when the centre of gravity of Cold War confrontation
shifted most decisively away from Europe and towards the Third World. This
reflected the fact that, while the European status quo was comparatively stable –
Trachtenberg talks of a European settlement having been reached by 196319 –
the battle over the international alignment of the newly independent states of
 Introduction 5
Asia and Africa had only just been joined.20 The way in which headlines and
news reports about the situation in Vietnam or the state of Sino-Soviet relations
had all but replaced bulletins from Berlin or anxious speculation about the fate
of Trieste as the main daily reminders of the ongoing Cold War accurately sym-
bolised the change. Likewise, the manner in which the one clear Cold War crisis
which did occur in Europe in the latter half of the 1960s – the crushing of the
Prague Spring in August 1968 – was not allowed by either East or West to inter-
rupt more than momentarily the slow progress of détente, demonstrates the
extent to which each bloc had accepted, de facto if not de jure, the presence and
the geographical limits of the other.21
To a large extent this stabilisation of the European Cold War front was good
news for Western Europe. The fading fear of Soviet invasion or subversion cer-
tainly contributed to that sense of growing confidence and well-being noted
above. But it also significantly reduced the pressure on each European country
to march in tight formation behind the United States as far as their international
policy was concerned. By the mid-1960s not only had the countries of Western
Europe long since rid themselves of that financial dependence on the US which
had characterised the early Cold War but they were also self-confident enough to
feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to East–West
relations.22 This allowed the diversity of national approaches which will be
analysed in the chapters that follow. And it also carried with it the potential that
disagreements over Cold War policy could spill over and interconnect with that
other key area of intercourse between European countries, namely the develop-
ment of the EEC. Dissension in NATO might, in other words, contaminate the
successful process of European integration, thereby endangering Western coop-
eration over much more than just military or security matters.
The opening two chapters of the volume focus on France – the first Western
country to break ranks significantly in its approach to the Cold War. Georges-
Henri Soutou thus sets out to contrast the European and Cold War policies of the
two French Presidents to occupy the Elysée during the 1965 to 1973 period,
namely Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Both Presidents were suppos-
edly Gaullist. Pompidou indeed won the 1969 elections partly by presenting
himself as the candidate of continuity after de Gaulle’s surprise resignation
earlier that year.23 But as Soutou demonstrates, each had very different
approaches to the Cold War, to European integration and to the interconnections
between the two. Thus while de Gaulle’s whole strategy centred upon a belief
that the Cold War division of Europe could be overcome and that the Soviet
Union (or Russia as he preferred to call it) could be reintegrated into a pan-Euro-
pean system, Pompidou’s vision was much more cautious as far as East–West
relations were concerned. This underlying strategic gulf meant that each then
turned towards greater Western European cooperation (although neither liked
integration as such) in radically different circumstances. For de Gaulle it was a
fall-back option to be explored most energetically when the prospects for
détente were least encouraging – as they were in the early 1960s. For Pompidou,
by contrast, Western European cooperation became most attractive in the latter
6 P. Ludlow
half of his presidency when détente appeared to be in danger of advancing too
far too fast. Closer European cooperation might give France some degree of
control over Germany’s Eastern policies and somewhat lessen the danger of a
superpower condominium over Europe.
Garret Martin’s chapter, by contrast, adopts a rather different approach. For
instead of looking at how French policy developed over the whole of the period,
he focuses in some detail on one crucial eight-month period, from September
1967 to April 1968. This allows him to prove how tightly entwined were the dif-
ferent strands of French foreign policy. Thus the mounting frustrations of French
Eastern policy – which were ever more apparent during these months despite the
seeming success of de Gaulle’s state visit to Poland – were closely connected to
France’s growing isolation vis-à-vis its Western partners. And this last was in
turn accentuated by the way in which the French struggled to rally Germany and
the other EEC member states to its side in the ongoing debate about how global
monetary cooperation should be organised, while at the very same time seeking
to defy those same Community partners by blocking the widely supported
British bid for EEC membership. While Soutou explores the linkages between
the Cold War and European integration at the level of overall French strategy,
Martin thus reveals the ways in which the two fields could become entangled at
a tactical level.
In Chapters 3 and 4 the focus shifts to West Germany. The Federal Republic
had, for understandable reasons, been the most orthodox and reliable ally
throughout most of the early Cold War years. Both its approach to East–West
relations and its engagement with European integration had been everything that
the United States could have wished for during all but the last few months of the
lengthy period when Konrad Adenuaer remained Chancellor. Indeed, if misun-
derstandings or mistrust did arise between Washington and Bonn in this era, it
was normally because Adenuaer’s government proved itself plus royaliste que le
roi in its steadfastness towards the East and its enthusiasm for cooperation with
the West!24 And even Adenuaer’s brief final flirtation with de Gaulle, which did
ring alarm bells in Washington and cast momentary doubt over West Germany’s
reliability, seemed to have been decisively ended by Adenauer’s successor, the
ultra-loyal Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard.25 Much was to change, however, with the
rise of Willy Brandt, initially as Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition govern-
ment which ruled the FRG from 1966 to 1969 and then, from September 1969,
as Chancellor of a centre-left government. Both chapters on Germany thus
centre their attention on the Brandt years.
The chapter by Wilfried Loth focuses on the crucial relationship between the
new German Chancellor and his French opposite number. Theirs was not a
particularly easy relationship: the Brandt-Pompidou pairing has not been treated
with the same sort of retrospective reverence in the burgeoning literature on le
couple franco-allemand as de Gaulle and Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing or François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.26 As Loth shows,
however, they did make an effort to find areas where the two countries could
cooperate closely and were not totally without their successes. Importantly for
 Introduction 7
this volume their dialogue encompassed both the evolving pattern of East–West
relations and the question of how the early successes of the EEC could be built
upon. Much of their attention was therefore directed towards the possibility of
building a more political Europe, one able to assert itself more clearly from the
United States over foreign policy matters in general and the direction of détente
in particular. Ironically, though, these discussions emphasised the extent to
which Germany and France had swapped positions by the late 1960s and early
1970s. In the Brandt era it was thus Germany that put forward the radical ideas
as much about transatlantic relations as about the approach to Eastern Europe,
while it was France that played the role of conservative brake on a partner prone
to over-ambition. Germany’s radicalism is explored still further in Andreas
Wilkens’ chapter. This traces the development of Ostpolitik back to Brandt’s
formative years as mayor of Berlin during the 1950s and early 1960s, before
explaining how the new approach to Eastern Europe and to the German Demo-
cratic Republic was implemented when the Social Democrats became the
dominant party of government in Germany in 1969. It also explores the extent to
which Brandt’s new Eastern policy was rooted in the earlier success of the
Federal Republic’s Westpolitik. On this Wilkens suggests some interesting
divergences between the ideas of the Chancellor and those of his closest aide
and collaborator, Egon Bahr.
Chapters 5 and 6 on Britain both concentrate on the years when the United
Kingdom found itself outside of the European Community but deeply preoccu-
pied with the question of how to get in. Helen Parr confronts the vexed question
of Community enlargement head-on in her chapter, identifying the reasons
behind Harold Wilson’s belated conversion to the idea of European integration
and elucidating how the Labour government hoped to avoid its bid to enter the
EEC being thwarted by de Gaulle in much the same manner as Harold Macmil-
lan’s 1961 membership application had been. Ultimately, of course, the French
President did bar Britain’s path once more. However, as Parr explains, the
General’s second veto turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory – a short-term success
that actually revealed more about de Gaulle’s weakness than it did about his
strength. En passant, Parr’s chapter also demonstrates that the question of EEC
membership was one of the aspects of early European integration where the
interconnections with the overarching Cold War were strongest and most clear.
James Ellison’s chapter is somewhat more Cold War-centred in its focus, but
again brings out the existence of links between the Cold War and the EEC. A
study in Anglo-American relations, the piece investigates the way in which
London and Washington coordinated their response to de Gaulle’s March 1966
decision to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military command.
Central to British and American strategies was their shared belief that Britain’s
capacity to establish itself as a rival pole of attraction to France and thereby
prevent the General’s actions from having the detrimental effects on Western
unity which both London and Washington feared was tightly wrapped up with
the UK’s attitude towards the EEC. The Wilson government’s realisation that it
needed to revive the issue of British EEC membership and move the country
8 P. Ludlow
closer to, and if possible into, the European Community was thus in part a
response to the crisis in NATO and to the wider challenge posed by de Gaulle.
Other aspects of the same basic strategy involved the resolution of the long-
standing question of how to give Germany some in uence over Western nuclear
strategy without allowing the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear weapons of its
own, the settling of the acrimonious wrangle between the United States, Britain
and Germany over the costs of allied troops stationed in Germany, and the
public demonstration of NATO s commitment to the pursuit of d tente. The
chapter hence underlines both the scale of the challenge which Gaullist France
was deemed to pose to the West and the multifaceted nature of the Anglo-
American response.
Jan van der Harst s contribution on Dutch foreign policy (Chapter 7) acts as a
salutary reminder that in neither NATO nor the EEC did the larger countries
have it entirely their own way. The Netherlands in particular emerged as a
doughty adversary of General de Gaulle and a determined defender of Atlanti-
cist orthodoxy. This re ected its profound belief that while European integration
was economically vital to a small trading nation, Dutch security interests were
much better looked after in a wider grouping including the United States and
Britain than they would be in any rival European entity. The Hague government
was thus strongly opposed to the premature development of a coordinated Euro-
pean foreign policy — in 1962 it had played a central role in blocking the so-
called Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle s most systematic attempt to create such foreign
policy coordination27 — and deeply suspicious of anything that might lessen the
ties between Europe and the US. In an interesting illustration, however, of the
potential in uence of public opinion and domestic political change over foreign
policy, van der Harst explains how several of the certainties of 1960s Dutch
foreign policy were overturned when the veteran foreign minister Joseph Luns
was replaced in 1971 by Norbert Schmelzer. The Netherlands moderated, for
instance, their hard-line stance towards d tente and became more supportive of
the idea that the soon-to-be-enlarged European Community could acquire some
involvement in the eld of foreign policy coordination. The presence of the
British, after all, was believed likely to minimise the chances of any dangerous
drift away from Atlantic alignment.
As Piers Ludlow explains in Chapter 8, the Community institutions them-
selves remained somewhat detached from the Cold War and the question of
East—West relations throughout the 1960s. Contacts were thus minimal between
the European Commission and a Soviet bloc which still regarded the integration
process as a vehicle for German revanchisme; the agenda of ministerial discus-
sions in the EEC Council of Ministers involved little which directly impinged
upon East—West relations; and there were both bureaucratic and tactical reasons
militating against any real linkage between the EEC s development and the
wider Cold War. Despite this, however, Ludlow maintains that there were a
number of more indirect connections between the integration process and the
East—West struggle. In particular, he argues that the whole environment within
which the early Community was able to ourish was profoundly shaped by the
 Introduction 9
Cold War alliance between Europe and the United States. As a result it is
impossible fully to understand what went on in the Brussels institutions without
being aware of parallel developments in the Cold War.
Chapter 9 by Jussi Hanhimäki turns its attention to the United States.
America’s importance in the calculations of all of the European players exam-
ined in the book is obvious, but as Hanhimäki reminds us, Washington was less
centrally concerned with European affairs in the late 1960s and early 1970s than
it had been a decade or so before. The salience of Western European affairs in
American foreign policy had steadily diminished in a period where the key
issues preoccupying US policy-makers were the protracted war in Vietnam,
crises in the Middle East, and the exciting prospects of superpower détente and
triangular diplomacy. By the end of the period reviewed, the Watergate scandal
and the domestic failings of the Nixon administration constituted an additional
distraction. The US did, however, remain involved in Western Europe – its
largest trading partner as well as its main Cold War ally – and was therefore in a
position to react to de Gaulle, to co-opt Brandt’s opening to the East into its own
policy of détente, to support the enlargement of the EEC, and to engage, albeit
belatedly, with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Despite a number of transatlantic contretemps, notably Henry Kissinger’s ill-
fated attempt to designate 1973 as the Year of Europe, the United States con-
tinued to be a key actor in Western Europe, exercising a vital influence over
both the course of East–West relations and the development of the EEC. This
alone added a further layer of interconnection between the Cold War and Euro-
pean integration.
The final chapter will then bring together a number of preliminary conclu-
sions before briefly suggesting some of the issues upon which future research
might focus. Much more remains to be studied in this field. Serious international
history-writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s remains very much in its
infancy, and the long-standing divide between Cold War history and the history
of European integration is too well established and too profound to be entirely
bridged by just one edited volume. Overall, however, there is enough in the
chapters of this book to suggest that there were multiple points where the Cold
War and integration narratives did intersect and that when they did not their sep-
aration was often an act of deliberate policy which deserves to be studied and
explained rather than taken for granted. Even in an era of détente largely free
from the Cold War crises which had punctuated earlier decades, European coun-
tries worked and interacted on an international stage which they were obliged to
share with both of the superpowers and which had been deeply shaped by the
East–West struggle. Ignoring this fact is a step that no one writing a detailed
history of post-war Europe’s efforts to unite can afford to take.

Notes
1 See e.g. Graml (1985), Young (1991), Reynolds (1994), Trachtenberg (1999).
2 See e.g. Milward (1984), Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Deighton (1995).
10 P. Ludlow
3 Among the specialist journals in each field are Journal of Cold War Studies and Cold
War History and Journal of European Integration History and Journal of Common
Market Studies. The most complete series of conferences on European integration
history are those organised by the European Community Liaison Committee of
Historians. These have led, among others, to Poidevin (1986), Schwabe (1988), Serra
(1989), Deighton and Milward (1999), and Loth (2001).
4 On European integration history see e.g. Urwin (1995) and Stirk (2001); on the Cold
War, Crockatt (1994), Reynolds (2000), Soutou (2001).
5 See e.g. Hogan (1987).
6 On the EDC see Dumoulin (2000); on US policy towards German rearmament see
Large (1996).
7 See Milward (1984) and Esposito (1994).
8 See Snoy’s comments cited in Jaumin-Ponsar (1970, pp. 99–100).
9 See Quaroni’s assessment cited in Serra, E. ‘L’Italia e la conferenza di Messina’ in
Serra (1989, pp. 93–4).
10 Milward (1984), esp. pp. 362–420 for the former; Milward (1992) for the latter.
11 Ibid.
12 Bossuat (1996), Lynch (1997), Rhenisch (1999), Mahant (2004).
13 Reynolds (1994) is a good example of the genre.
14 See e.g. Esposito (1994).
15 Probably the clearest exceptions to the rule are Schwabe (2001) and Giauque (2002).
While both are useful, however, they do not go nearly far enough to undermine the
basic contention of this section.
16 Georges-Henri Soutou, Wilfried Loth and Jan van der Harst have all written about
both Cold War history and European integration history, albeit normally on separate
occasions.
17 Boltho (1982).
18 The sense of liberation felt by Gaullist France following the end of the Algerian
imbroglio comes across very clearly in Vaïsse (1998).
19 Trachtenberg (1999, pp. 352–402).
20 In general see Westad (2005).
21 See e.g. Hughes (2004).
22 The altered financial balance between Western Europe and the United States is a
central theme of both Zimmermann (2001) and Gavin (2004).
23 Roussel (1994, p. 282).
24 Adenauer’s nostalgia for the Cold War certainties of Dulles and mistrust of
Kennedy’s greater flexibility is a central theme of Schwarz (1991).
25 See Bange (1999), and Oppell (2002) and Granieri (2003).
26 See e.g. Bitsch (2001).
27 See Vanke (2001).
Bibliography

Alphand, H. (1977) L’étonnement d’être, Paris: Fayard.

Ambassade de France (1967) French Foreign Policy: Official Statements, Speeches and
Communiqués 1966, New York: Service de Presse et d’Information.
Andrianopoulos, G.A. (1991) Kissinger and Brzezinski, London: Macmillan.
Aron, R. (1997) Les articles de politique internationale dans Le Figaro de 1947 à 1977,
vol. 3, Paris: Editions de Fallois.
Association Georges Pompidou (1995) Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, Brussels: Com-
plexe.
Bahr, E. (1996) Zu Meiner Zeit, Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag.
Bange, O. (1999) The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer
in Conflict, London: Macmillan.
Baring, A. (1982) Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt.
Bell, P.M.H. (2001) The World Since 1945: An International History, London: Arnold.
Bender, P. (1995) Die Neue Ostpolitik und ihre Folgen. Vom Mauerbau bis zur Verreini-
gung, Munich: dtv.
Bender, P. (2000) ‘Wandel durch Annäherung. Karriere eines Begriffs’, Deutschland-
Archiv, vol. 33.
Birke, A.M., Brechtken, M. and Searle, A. (2000) An Anglo-German Dialogue. The
Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations, Munich: Saur.
Bitsch, M-T. (2001) Le couple franco-allemand et les institutions communautaires. Une
postérité pour le Plan Schuman?, Brussels: Bruylant.
Bloes, R. (1970) Le ‘Plan Fouchet’ et le problème de l’Europe politique, Bruges: College
of Europe.
Boltho, A. (1982) The European Economy: Growth and Crisis, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Bomert, B. (1990) Nederland en Oost-Europa: meer woorden dan daden. Het Neder-
lands Oost-Europa beleid, geanalyseerd binnen het kader van het CVSE-proces
(1971–1985), Utrecht: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, KU Nijmegen.
Bossuat, G. (1996) L’Europe des Français, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
Bozo, F. (1996) Deux Stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance
Atlantique, 1958–1969, Paris: Plon.
Bozo, F. (2001) Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic
Alliance, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bracher, K.D., Jäger, W. and Link, W. (1986) Republik im Wandel 1969–1974. Die Ära
Brandt, Stuttgart/Mannheim: DVA.
 Bibliography 181
Brands, H.W. (1995) The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of Amer-
ican Power, New York: Oxford University Press.
Brandt, W. (1963) Koexistenz – Zwang zum Wagnis, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
Brandt, W. (1967) ‘Entspannungspolitik mit langem Atem’, Außenpolitik, vol. 18.
Brandt, W. (1969) ‘Plädoyer für die Vernunft. Deutsche Außenpolitik nach dem 21.
August’, Der Monat, vol. 245.
Brandt, W. (1971a) Paix. Discours et publications du lauréat du Prix Nobel de la Paix
1971, Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft.
Brandt, W. (1971b) Der Wille zum Frieden. Perspektiven der Politik, Hamburg: Hoff-
mann & Campe.
Brandt, W. (1976) Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960 bis 1975, Hamburg,
Hoffmann & Campe.
Brandt, W. (1978) People and Politics. The Years 1960–1975, London: Collins.
Brandt, W. (1989) Erinnerungen, Frankfurt: Propyläen Verlag.
Brandt, W. (2005) Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik
1966–1974, Bonn: Dietz Verlag.
Broad, R. and Preston, V. (2001) Moored to the Continent? Britain and European
Integration, London: Institute of Historical Research.
Brouwer, J.W. and van Merriënboer, J. (2001) Van buitengaats naar Binnenhof. P.J.S. de
Jong, een biografie, The Hague: SDU Uitgevers.
Bundy, W. (1998) A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Adminis-
tration, New York: Hill & Wang.
Burk, K. and Stokes, M. (1999) The United States and the European Alliance since 1945,
Oxford: Berg.
Calleo, D. (1987) Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance,
Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Catala, M. (2001) Histoire de la Construction Européene: Cinquante ans après la décla-
ration Schuman, Nantes: Ouest Editions.
Colman, J. (2004) A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and
Anglo-American Relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964–68, Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press.
Coombes, D. (1970) Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community. A Portrait of
the Commission of the EEC, London: PEP.
Coopey, R. (1991) ‘The White Heat of Scientific Revolution’, Contemporary Record,
vol. 5, no. 1.
Costigliola, F. (1992) France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War
II, New York: Twayne’s.
Couve de Murville, M. (1971) Une politique étrangère, 1958–1969, Paris: Plon.
Crockatt, R. (1994) The Fifty Years War: the United States and the Soviet Union in
World Politics, 1941–1991, London: Routledge.
Daddow, O. (2003) Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Applica-
tion to Join the EEC, London: Frank Cass.
Debré, M. (1993) Mémoires, vol. 4, Paris: Albin Michel.
Deighton, A. (1995) Building Postwar Europe: National Decision Makers and European
Institutions, 1948–1963, London: Macmillan.
Deighton, A. and Milward, A. (1999) Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The Euro-
pean Economic Community, 1957–63, Brussels: Bruylant.
Divine, R.A. (1994) The Johnson Years: LBJ at Home and Abroad, Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity of Kansas Press.
182 Bibliography
Dockrill, M. (1995) Europe within the Global System, 1938–1960: Great Britain, France,
Italy and Germany: From Great Powers to Regional Powers, Bochum: Univer-
sitätsverlag Brockmeyer.
Dujardin, V. (2004) Pierre Harmel. Biographie, Brussels: Le Cri edition.
Dumbrell, J. (2001) A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War
and After, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dumoulin, M. (2000) La communauté européenne de défense, leçons pour demain?,
Brussels: Peter Lang.
Durandin, C. (1994) La France contre l’Amérique, Paris: Presses universitaires de
France.
Eckes, A. and Zeiler, T. (2003) Globalization and the American Century, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Edgerton, D. (1996) ‘The “White Heat” Revisited: The British Government and Techno-
logy in the 1960s’, Twentieth Century British History, vol. 7, no. 1.
Ellison, J. (2000) Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European
Community, 1955–58, London: Macmillan.
Ellison, J. (2006) ‘Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the
NATO Crisis of 1966’, Cold War History, vol. 6, no. 1.
Enquete-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in
Deutschland (1995) Materialien der Enquête-Kommission‚ Aufarbeitung von
Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur, vol. 2, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Erofeev, V. (1988) ‘De Gaulle, sa clairvoyance et ses illusions’, Vie internationale.
Esposito, C. (1994) America’s Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France
and Italy, 1948–1950, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
European Commission (1969) Deuxième Rapport Général sur l’activité des Commu-
nautés 1968, Brussels-Luxembourg: Commission.
Ferraris, L.V. (1979) Report on a Negotiation, Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki 1972–1975,
Alphenaanden Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff International Publishers BV.
Fondation Charles de Gaulle (1999) Coudenhove-Kalergi/De Gaulle. Une certaine idée
de l’Europe, Cahier no. 6.
Fondation Charles de Gaulle (2000) L’idée de Nation chez Charles de Gaulle, Cahier no 7.
Froment-Meurice, H. (1998) Vu du Quai. Mémoires 1945–1983, Paris: Fayard.
Garthoff, R. (1994) Détente and Confrontation: Soviet American Relations from Nixon to
Reagan, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994.
Garton Ash, T. (1995) Im Namen Europas. Deutschland und der geteilte Kontinent,
Frankfurt/Main: Fischer.
Gatzke, H.W. (1980) Germany and the United States: A ‘Special Relationship?’, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gaulle, C. de (1959) Mémoires de Guerre. Le Salut, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1970a) Mémoires d’espoir, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1970b) Discours et Messages, vol. 3, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1970c) Discours et Messages, vol. 4, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1970d) Discours et Messages, vol. 5, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1985) Lettres, Notes et Carnets, juin 1958-décembre 1960, Paris: Plon.
Gaulle, C. de (1987) Lettres, Notes et Carnets, janvier 1964-juin 1966, Paris: Plon.
Gavin, F.J. (2004) Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary
Relations, 1958–1971, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Gerbet, P. and Pepy, D. (1969) Le decision dans les Communautés européennes, Brus-
sels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles.
 Bibliography 183
Germond, C. and Türk, H. (2004) ‘Der Staatssekretärsausschuss für Europafragen und
die Gestaltung der deutschen Europapolitik 1963–1969’, Zeitschrift für Staats- und
Europawissenschaften, vol. 2, no. 1.
Geus, P.B.R. de (1996) Staatsbelang en krijgsmacht. De Nederlandse defensie tijdens de
Koude Oorlog, The Hague: SDU Uitgevers.
Geyer, D.C. and Schaefer, B. (2004) ‘American Détente and German Ostpolitik,
1969–1972’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., Supple-
ment 1.
Gilbert, M.J. (2002) Why the North Won the Vietnam War, New York: Palgrave.
Giauque, J.G. (2002) Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the
Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963, Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press.
Goldstein, E. and McKercher, B.J.C. (2003) Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy
1865–1965, London: Frank Cass.
Goscha, C. and Vaïsse, M. (2003) La guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe 1963–1973, Brus-
sels: Bruylant.
Gough, H. and Horne, J. (1994) De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France, London:
Edward Arnold, 1994.
Graml, H. (1985) Die Alliierten und die Teilung Deutschlands: Konflikte und Entschei-
dungen, 1941–1948, Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch.
Granieri, R. (2003) The Ambivalent Alliance. Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the
West, 1949–1966, New York: Berghahn Books.
Haftendorn, H. (1996) NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility,
1966–67, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hahn, W.F. (1972) ‘West Germany’s Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr’,
Orbis.
Hammond, P.Y. (1992) LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations,
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Hanhimäki, J.M. (1996) ‘The First Line of Defense or a Springboard for Disintegration:
European Neutrals in American Foreign and Security Policy, 1945–1961’, Diplomacy
and Statecraft, vol. 7, no. 2.
Hanhimäki, J.M. (2003) ‘ “They Can Write it in Swahili”: Kissinger, the Soviets, and the
Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 1, no. 1.
Hanhimäki, J.M. (2004) The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign
Policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
Hanrieder, W.F. (1989) Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign
Policy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Harrington, J.F. (1984) ‘Romanian-American Relations During the Kennedy Administra-
tion’, East European Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2.
Harrington, J.F. and Courtney, B. (1988) ‘Romanian–American Relations during the
Johnson Administration’, East European Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2.
Harrison, M. (1981) The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security, Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Harryvan, A.G. and van der Harst, J. (2003) ‘Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands
and the Hague Conference of December 1969’, Journal of European Integration
History, vol. 9, no. 2.
Heath, E. (1998) The Course of My Life: An Autobiography, London: Hodder &
Stoughton.
Hellema, D. (1995) De buitenlandse politiek van Nederland, Utrecht: Het Spectrum.
184 Bibliography
Hellema, D., Zeeman, B. and van der Zwan, B. (1999) De Nederlandse ministers van
Buitenlandse Zaken in de twintigste eeuw, The Hague: SDU Uitgevers.
Hiepel, C. (2003) ‘In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator. Germany and the
Hague Summit Conference 1969’, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 9, no. 2.
Hogan, M. (1987) The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of
Western Europe, 1947–1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hollowell, J. (2001) Twentieth-century Anglo-American Relations, Basingstoke: Pal-
grave.
Horne, A. (1989) Macmillan, 1957–1986, Volume Two of the Official Biography,
London: Macmillan.
Hughes, G. (2002) ‘Harold Wilson, the USSR and British Foreign and Defence Policy in
the Context of East–West Détente’, Ph.D., King’s College London.
Hughes, G. (2004) ‘British Policy towards Eastern Europe and the Impact of the “Prague
Spring”, 1964–68’, Cold War History, vol. 4, no. 2.
Institut Charles de Gaulle (1992) De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5, Paris: Plon.
Jaumin-Ponsar, A. (1970) Essai d’interprétation d’une crise, Brussels: Bruylant.
Jobert, M. (1974) Mémoires d’avenir, Paris: Grasset.
Johnson, L.B. (1971) The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency 1963-1969,
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Kaiser, W. (1996) Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integra-
tion, 1945–1963, London: Macmillan.
Kaiser, W. and Elvert, J. (2004) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History,
London: Routledge.
Kilian, W. (2001) Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und
der DDR 1955–1973. Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien, Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot.
Kissinger, H.A. (1969) American Foreign Policy, New York: Norton.
Kissinger, H.A. (1979) White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown.
Kitzinger, U. (1968) The Second Try: Labour and the EEC, London: Pergamon Press.
Kitzinger, U. (1973) Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common
Market, London: Thames & Hudson.
Klotzbach, K. (1996) Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und
Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945–1965, Bonn: Dietz.
Knipping, F. (2004) Aufbruch zum Europa der Zweiten Generation. Die europäische
Einigung, 1969–1984, Trier: WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
Kosthorst, E., Gotto, K. and Soell, H. (1976) Die Deutschlandpolitik der Nachkriegs-
jahre. Zeitgeschichtliche und didaktische Ortsbestimmung, Paderborn: Schoeningh.
Kovrig, B. (1991) Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe, New
York: New York University Press.
Krause, W. and Gröf, W. (1984) Willy Brandt, Auf der Zinne der Partei. Parteitagsreden
1960 bis 1983, Berlin: Verlag Dietz.
Kuisel, R. (1993) Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization, Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press.
Kunz, D. (1994) The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Policy in the
1960s, New York: Columbia University Press.
Kunz, D. (1997) Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, New
York: The Free Press.
Labour Party (1962) Britain and the Common Market: Texts of Speeches made by Rt.
Hon. Hugh Gaitskell MP and Rt. Hon George Brown MP, London: The Labour Party.
 Bibliography 185
Lacouture, J. (1986) De Gaulle, vol. 3, Paris: Le Seuil.
Large, D.C. (1996) Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer
Era, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Lefort, P. (1999) Souvenirs et secrets des années gaulliennes, 1958–1969, Paris: A.
Michel.
Leurdijk, J.H. (1972a) ‘De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek en de nucleaire bewapening
(I)’, Internationale Spectator, vol. 26.
Leurdijk, J.H. (1972b) ‘De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek en de nucleaire bewapening
(II)’, Internationale Spectator, vol. 26.
Little, D. (2002) American Orientalism: United States and the Middle East Since 1945,
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Loth, W. (2001) Crises and Compromises: The European Project, 1963–1969, Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
Loth, W. (2002) Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950–1991, Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave.
Löwenthal, R. and Schwarz, H.-P. (1974) Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik
Deutschland – Eine Bilanz, Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag.
Ludlow, N.P. (1997) Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the
EEC, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ludlow, N.P. (1999) ‘Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–6’, Contemporary
European History, vol. 8, no. 2.
Ludlow, N.P. (2005) ‘The Making of the CAP: Towards a historical analysis of the EU’s
First Major Policy’, Contemporary European History, vol. 24, no. 3.
Ludlow, N.P. (2006) The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating
the Gaullist Challenge, London: Routledge.
Lundestad, G. (1997) Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integra-
tion, 1945–1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lundestad, G. (1998) No End to Alliance: the United States and Western Europe: Past,
Present and Future, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Lundestad, G. (2003) The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From ‘Empire’
by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lynch, F.M.B. (1997) France and The International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty
of Rome, London: Routledge.
Mahant, E. (2004) Birthmarks of Europe: The Origins of the European Community
reconsidered, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Maillard, P. (1990) De Gaulle et l’Allemagne, Paris: Plon.
Mania, A. (1996) Bridge Building: Polityka USA wobec Europy Wschodniej w latach
1961-1968, Krakow: Uniwersytet Jagiellonski.
Marsh, R. (1978) Off the Rails: An Autobiography, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Mastanduno, M. (1992) Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East–West
Trade, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mayall, J. and Navari, C. (1980) The End of the Post-war Era, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Meimeth, M. (1990) Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status
quo und friedlichem Wandel, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Messmer, P. (1992) Après tant de batailles: Mémoires, Paris: Editions Albin Michel.
Milward, A. (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, London: Methuen.
Milward, A. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-state, London: Routledge.
186 Bibliography
Milward, A. (2003) ‘The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Acces-
sion to the European Economic Community’, Journal of European Integration History,
vol. 9, no. 2.
Ministero degli Affari Esteri (1987) Attilio Cattani, Rome: MAE.
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL Press.
Morgan, A. (1992) Harold Wilson, London: Pluto Press.
Newhouse, J. (1967) Collision in Brussels: the Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965,
New York: Norton.
Niedhart, G. (2002) ‘Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wandels
in der neuen Ostpolitik 1967–1974’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 28.
Niedhart, G. (2004) ‘Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-term Objectives, and Grand Design’, Bul-
letin of the German Historical Institute, Supplement 1.
O’Hara, G. (2003) ‘The Limits of US Power: Transatlantic Financial Diplomacy under
the Johnson and Wilson administrations October 1964–November 1968’, Contempor-
ary European History, vol. 12, no. 3.
Oppelland, T. (2002) Gerhard Schröder (1910–1989): Politik zwischen Staat, Partei und
Konfession, Düsseldorf: Droste.
Parr, H. (2006) British Policy Towards the European Communities, 1964–1967: Harold
Wilson and Britain’s World Role, London: Routledge.
Pekelder, J. (1998) Nederland en de DDR, Amsterdam: Boom.
Peyrefitte, A. (1994) C’était de Gaulle, vol. 1, Paris: Editions de Fallois/Fayard.
Peyrefitte, A. (1997) C’était de Gaulle, vol. 2, Paris: Editions de Fallois/Fayard.
Peyrefitte, A. (2000) C’était de Gaulle, vol. 3, Paris: Editions de Fallois/Fayard.
Pfeil, U. (2000) La République Démocratique Allemande et l’Occident 1949–1990, Paris:
Publications de l’Institut d’Allemand d’Asnières.
Pijpers, A. (1991) ‘Dekolonisatie, compensatiedrang en de normalisering van de Neder-
landse buitenlandse politiek’, Internationale Spectator, vol. 45, no. 2.
Pine, M. (2003) ‘Application on the Table: The Second British Application to Join the
European Communities, 1967–70’, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University.
Poidevin, R. (1986) Histoire des débuts de la construction européene (Mars 1948–Mai
1950): actes du colloque de Strasbourg 28–30 novembre 1984, Brussels: Bruylant.
Pompidou, G. (1974) Le Noeud Gordien, Paris: Club Français du Livre.
Potthoff, H. (1999) Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961–1990, Berlin:
Propyläen.
Prate, A. (1978) Les Batailles Economiques du Général de Gaulle, Paris: Plon.
Renaud, I. (1999) ‘Le voyage du général de Gaulle en Pologne en 1967’, unpublished
Masters dissertation, Paris IV.
Rey, M.-P. (1991) La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS à l’heure de la
détente (1964–1974), Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
Reynolds, D. (1994) The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives,
London: Yale University Press.
Reynolds, D. (2000) One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, New York:
Norton.
Rhenisch, T. (1999) Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse. Die deutsche
Industrie und die Gründung der EWG, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Romano, A. (2006) ‘La Conferenza sulla Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa: da pro-
posta sovietica a sfida occidentale. Cooperazione Politica Europea, consultazione
atlantica e distensione (1969–1975)’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Florence.
 Bibliography 187
Roussel, E. (1994) Georges Pompidou, Paris: Lattès.
Roussel, E. (2002) Charles de Gaulle, Paris: Gallimard.
Ruane, K. (2000) The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-
American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55, Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Scheffer, P. (1988) Een tevreden natie. Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de
Europese status-quo, Amsterdam: Bakker.
Schenk, C. (2002) ‘Sterling, International Monetary Reform and Britain’s Applications to
Join the European Economic Community in the 1960s’, Contemporary European
History, vol. 11, no. 3.
Schmidt, W. (2001) Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und Kleine Schritte. Willy Brandt und die
Deutschlandpolitik 1948–1963, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Schmidt, W. (2003) ‘Die Wurzeln der Entspannung. Der konzeptionelle Ursprung der
Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik Willy Brandts in den fünfziger Jahren’, Vierteljahrshefte
für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 51.
Schönhoven, K. (2004) Wendejahre. Die Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit der Großen Koali-
tion 1966–1969, Bonn: Dietz.
Schrafstetter, S. and Twigge, S. (2002) ‘Spinning into Europe: Britain, West Germany
and the Netherlands – Uranium Enrichment and the Development of the Gas Cen-
trifuge, 1964–1970’, Contemporary European History, vol. 11, no. 2.
Schwabe, K. (1988) Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950–51, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Schwabe, K. (2001) ‘The Cold War and European Integration, 1947–63’, Diplomacy and
Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 4.
Schwarz, H.-P. (1991) Adenauer: der Staatsmann, 1952–1967, Stuttgart: DVA.
Schwarz, H.-P. (1999) ‘Die Regierung Kiesinger und die Krise in der ČSSR 1968’,
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 47.
Schwartz, T.A. (2003) Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Seydoux, F. (1977) Dans l’intimité franco-allemande: une mission diplomatique, Paris:
Albatros.
Serra, E. (1989) Il rilancio dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma, Brussels: Bruylant.
Sodaro, M.J. (1990) Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Solomon, R. (1977) The International Monetary System, 1945–1976: An Insider’s View,
New York: Harper & Row.
Soutou, G.-H. (1990) ‘Le général de Gaulle, le Plan Fouchet et l’Europe’, Commentaire,
vol. 52.
Soutou, G.-H. (1994) ‘Le général de Gaulle et l’URSS, 1943–1945: idéologie ou équili-
bre européen’, Revue d’Histoire diplomatique, no. 4.
Soutou, G.-H. (1996) L’Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-
allemands, 1954–1996, Paris: Fayard.
Soutou, G.-H. (2000) ‘Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Eu-
rope’, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 6, no. 2.
Soutou, G.-H. (2001) La guerre de Cinquante Ans. Les relations Est-Ouest 1943–1990,
Paris: Fayard.
Soutou, G.-H. (2004) ‘La menace stratégique sur la France à l’ère nucléaire: les instruc-
tions personnelles et secrètes de 1967 et 1974’, Revue Historique des Armées, no. 236.
Soutou, G.-H. (2004b) ‘La France et l’accord quadripartite sur Berlin du 3 septembre
1971’, Revue d’Histoire diplomatique, no. 1.
188 Bibliography
Speicher, P.C. (2000) ‘The Berlin Origins of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 1957–1966’, Ph.D.,
Cambridge University.
Stebbins, R.P. (1964) Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963, New York:
Harper & Row.
Stirk, P. (2001) A History of European Integration since 1914, London: Continuum.
Sulzberger, C. (1973) An Age of Mediocrity, New York: Macmillan.
Trachtenberg, M. (1999) A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement
1945–1963, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tsoukalis, L. (1977) The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration,
London: Allen & Unwin.
Tucker, N. and Cohen, W.I. (1994) Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American
Foreign Policy, 1963–1968, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Urwin, D. (1995) The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since
1945, London: Longman.
Vaïsse, M. (1993) ‘La France et le traité de Moscou (1957–1963)’, Revue d’Histoire
Diplomatique, no. 1.
Vaïsse, M. (1998) La grandeur: politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle 1958–1969,
Paris: Fayard.
Van Eekelen, W.F. (2000) Sporen trekken door strategische jaren, Meppel: Ten Brink.
Van Staden, A. (1974) Een trouwe bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch
Bondgenootschap, 1960–1971, Baarn: In den Toren.
Vanke, J. (2001) ‘An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959–62’,
Cold War History, vol. 2, no. 1.
Viansson-Ponté, P. (1970) Histoire de la république gaullienne, Paris: Fayard.
Vogtmeier, A. (1996) Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der
sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereini-
gung, Bonn: Dietz.
Volkmann, H.-E. (1996) Ende des Dritten Reiches – Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges,
Munich: Piper.
Voorhoeve, J.C. (1979) Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Wallace, H. (1975) ‘The Domestic Policy Making Implications of the Labour Govern-
ment’s Application for Membership of the EEC, 1964–1970’, Ph.D. thesis, Manchester
University.
Weit, E. (1971) Dans l’ombre de Gomulka, Paris: Laffond.
Wenger, A. (2004) ‘Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilater-
alization of Détente, 1966–1968’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 6, no. 1.
Westad, O.A. (2005) The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of
our Times, New York: Cambridge University Press.
White, B. (1992) Britain, Détente and Changing East–West Relations, London: Routledge.
Wielenga, F. (1999) Van vijand tot bondgenoot. Nederland en Duitsland na 1945, Ams-
terdam: Boom.
Wilkens, A. (1990) Der unstete Nachbar. Frankreich, die deutsche Ostpolitik und die
Berliner Vier-Mächte Verhandlungen 1969–1974, Munich: Oldenbourg.
Wilkens, A. (1999) ‘Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Mone-
tary Union. Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969–1974)’, Journal of
European Integration History, vol. 5, no. 1.
Wolton, T. (1997) La France sous influence. Paris-Moscou 30 ans de relations secrètes,
Paris: Grasset.
 Bibliography 189
Wormser, O. (1978) ‘L’occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie vue de Moscou’, Revue des
Deux Mondes.
Yamamoto, T. (2007) ‘The Road to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1969–1973: Britain, France and West Germany’, Ph.D. thesis, University of
London.
Young, J.W. (1991) Cold War Europe, 1945–89: A Political History, London: Edward
Arnold.
Young, J.W. (1993) Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992, London: Macmillan.
Young, J.W. (2004) The Labour Governments 1964–70, Vol. 2, International Policy,
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Zimmermann, H. (2001) Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West
Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.