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Disaster Management Plan PJPL LPG Pipeli
Disaster Management Plan PJPL LPG Pipeli
1
Panipat –Jalandhar LPG Pipeline (PJPL)
Panipat-Jalandhar pipeline is the first cross-country LPG Pipeline of
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The 273.62 Km long, 10” dia steel pipe,
externally coated (API 5 LX 52) with designed capacity of 0.70 MMTPA
was laid 1.2 mt below the ground level and was commissioned on 8th
November 2008 for evacuation of LPG from Panipat Refinery. The
pipeline is transporting LPG from Kohand pumping station (dist. Karnal)
to Marketing Bottling Plants at Nabha and Jalandhar (Punjab)
respectively. The underground pipeline was laid as per international
code (API 1104) and crosses through various terrains of Haryana and
Punjab through roads, railways, rivers, canals, lands etc.
The pipeline starts from Kohand (0.00 Km) and travels up to Nabha
(136.30 km) and terminates at Jalandhar (273.62 Km). The entire
pipeline is externally coated and cathodically protected against
corrosion. Mainline valves (16 nos) are provided en-route the pipeline
for isolation of mainline for meeting emergency requirements. For
evacuation of LPG during emergency, we are having Mobile hot flare
unit for flaring of LPG. Security guards are manned at our four numbers
of repeater stations en-route pipeline. DGR guards patrolling are being
done day and night for the entire length of pipeline for prevention
against pilferage / sabotage etc. In-house Officers patrolling are also
conducted on regular basis. Villagers awareness program are regularly
conducted covering dos and don’ts during emergency. Line markers
are also installed. Handouts are also distributed to the villagers about
various safety aspects of LPG during leakage covering emergency
contact numbers of IOCL and nearest police station officials.
2
Community development programs at schools, anganbaadi, hospitals
etc at the Right of Way of pipeline are annually conducted and supports
like drinking water, health related items, sewing machines etc are
distributed for the upliftment of needy and awareness is also given
about safety and security of pipeline. Stations (Kohand, Nabha and
Jalandhar) are provided with various safety measures for handling
emergencies. Regular onsite and offsite mock drills are conducted.
In view of the safety of the LPG pipeline in the mainline due to
sabotage, pilferage, damage due to third party during excavation, it
becomes imperative to update the Disaster Management Plan time to
time with a view to serve as a reference and guide for the various DMP
Co-ordinators and the Civil and State Emergency Response Authorities
in the event of any incident. The role and response of the Civil and
District Authorities is very crucial for controlling and minimizing the
damage to the general populace due to any incident of LPG leakage, so
important telephone numbers of PJPL Stations, Mutual Aid Partners,
District Authorities, Police Station and nearest Fire Brigade enroute
Right of Way from Kohand to Jalandhar have been included.
3
LIST OF HOLDERS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
4
S.N DESIGNATION COPY NO.
19 Human Resource Manager, NRPL, Panipat 19
(Welfare Co-ordinator)
20 Sr. Human Resource Officer, NRPL, Panipat 20
(Alt. Welfare Co-ordinator)
21 Station Control Room, Kohand 21
22 Station-in-Charge, Nabha 22
23 Station-in-Charge, Sangrur 23
24 Station-in-Charge, Jalandhar 24
25 Terminal Manager, Karnal Bottling Plant 25
26 Chief Inspector of Factories, Chandigarh 26
27 Deputy Director Factories, Karnal 27
28 Dy. Commissioner, Karnal 28
29 Superintendent of Police, Karnal 29
30 Chief Fire Officer, Karnal Fire Service 30
5
CONTENTS
Page No.
Chapter – 1 INTRODUCTION 11-13
• Introduction
• Scope
• Document Control
• Issuing of DMP
• Definition
• Objectives
• Priority of handling emergency
• Probable Disasters
• Classification of Disaster
• Declaration of Disaster
• Purpose
• Scope
• Responsibilities
• Definition
• Public Emergency Services
• Local Government and Public Services Authorities
• Overview
• System Hydraulic Gradient
• Physical & Chemical Properties of LPG
• Specification of Mainline Pipes
• Mainline Route details
• Mainline ROW details
• Kohand Pump Station
• General Information about Kohand Station
• Properties of LPG
6
• Facilities
• Major Equipments at Kohand Station
• Set Points for Kohand Station
• Communication System
• Fire Fighting facilities
• Fire Protection Accessories
• Personal Protective Equipments
7
Chapter – 7 HANDLING VARIOUS DISASTER SCENARIOS 50-71
8
• Treatment of burns
• Artificial Respiration
• Mouth to mouth method
• External Cardiac Compression
• Injuries
• Electrical shocks
• Miscellaneous tips for First Aid
• Head injuries
• Snake bite
• Frost bite
Annexures
Annexure A- Information to the Public 83-83
Annexure B- Public Relations –Do’s & Don’ts 84-84
Annexure C- Format for information to Outside Agencies 85-85
Annexure D- Telephone Nos. of IOC Coordinators 86-87
Annexure E- Important Telephone nos. of Outside Agencies –Kohand 88-89
Annexure F- NRPL Kohand - Important Telephone numbers 90-90
Annexure G- NRPL Nabha - Important Telephone numbers 91-92
Annexure H- NRPL Jalandhar - Important Telephone numbers 93-94
Annexure I- Telephone Nos. of Police Stations/Fire Brigade along PJPL ROW 95-107
Annexure J- List of Crossings in PJPL 108-119
Annexure K- Emergency Response Plan for PJPL LPG Pipeline 120-121
Annexure L- Bomb Threat Contingency Plan 122-126
Annexure M- Types of LPG Fire due to LPG Leakage 127-132
Annexure N- LPG Material Safety Data Sheet 133-140
Annexure O- List of Non-Sparking Tools at Kohand Station 141-141
Annexure P- List of Tools & Tackles available at Kohand Station 142-145
Annexure Q- Mainline Emergency Tools at Kohand Station 146-147
Annexure R- List of Emergency Tools/PPEs at Nabha & Jalandhar 148-155
Annexure S- Glossary & References
9
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY POLICY
Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Northern Region Pipelines is dedicated and
committed to conduct business with strong focus on safety, health & environment
by ensuring environment friendly development, safe workplaces and enrichment
of quality of life of Employees, Customers and the Community.
• Establish and maintain good standards for safety of the people, processes
and the assets.
• Comply with all applicable Legislations, Statutory Rules and Regulations.
• Plan, design, operate and maintain all facilities, processes and procedures
for a sustained Safe, Healthy and Environment friendly system.
• Create awareness among our Employees & all key Stakeholders about Safe,
Healthy & Environment friendly best practices to prevent workplace injury &
ill-health.
• Welcome audit of our Occupational Health, Safety & Environment
Protection & Management Systems by external bodies as per universal
standards, so that stakeholder confidence is safeguarded.
• Adopt and promote industry best practices to avert accidents and to
preserve ecological balance and heritage.
• Remain committed to be a leader in Occupational Health, Safety &
Environment Protection & Management System through continual
improvement, assimilation of latest technology and by adequate training of
Employees.
10
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DOCUMENT CONTROL
Upon receipt of the Disaster Management Plan / revised pages of the plan, the recipient shall
replace the old pages of the plan with revised pages in the DMP and send the old copy
alongwith acknowledgement to the issuer. The copies of the Disaster Management Plan shall
not be prepared for any third party. Any amendments/revisions in the original plan as
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circulated by issuing authority shall be replaced at relevant paragraph and old plan shall be sent
back to issuing authority.
ISSUE OF DMP
This Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is issued by the Chief Operations Manager (COM), NRPL,
Kohand to assist all NRPL, Kohand personnel engaged in the operations and maintenance of the
pipeline network to deal with emergencies, if any.
The COM, NRPL, Kohand shall maintain a record of all personnel to whom this DMP is issued.
The personnel, to whom this DMP is issued, shall be responsible for keeping it in good condition
and in a safe place, when not in use. It shall be handed over to the successor in case the person
holding the same is transferred to another post/place and notification regarding change of
custody of DMP shall be communicated to issuing authority. In this way, full control of the
contents of DMP shall be maintained.
INTRODUCTION
An exhaustive crisis management on ‘Disaster Control Plan’ to combat LPG leakage / pipe burst,
fire and disaster has been prepared in order to effectively make use of available resources. It
has been prepared to identify the organizational & operational aspects to effectively combat
disaster of any type. It has been prepared to delineate functions of various concerned
departments and agencies for the operational responsibilities.
Many Government / Private agencies like various Government Departments, Fire Brigade,
Police, Hospital, Mutual Aid Partners etc. have been identified for prevention and control of
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disaster. The DMP herein gives an insight into the organizations to counter the disaster with the
help of pooled resources, thereby streamlining the inter-connected activities.
SCOPE
The scope of this Disaster Management Plan extends to various types of crisis and prospective
emergency scenarios that may be experienced at the pump station / mainline, factors affecting
them, Emergency Procedures, Typical Organizational structure, Responsibilities of various
Coordinators and Mobilization of emergency resources. It includes the following: -
• Working Plan during crisis: - It covers the Organogram of personnel at Headquarter,
Base and Station control centre. The responsibilities of the Coordinators at Headquarter,
Base and Station are defined and the assistance required from outside agencies is also
included.
• Emergency Control Plan for Emergencies in the Station and Mainline: -It covers the
Causes, Control Measures, Checklist for Mobilization of Manpower & Equipment and
the responsibilities of all the Coordinators at Station.
The following key elements have been considered in the preparation of the plan:
• Assessment of the size and nature of the events foreseen along with probability of their
occurrence.
• Liaison with outside agencies, including the emergency services.
• Procedures – Raising the alarm and communication (both within and outside pump
station/ installation).
• Appointment of key personnel and defining their roles and responsibilities.
• Setting up of Emergency Control Centres.
• Identification of alternate Control Room.
• Action on-site & off–site
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DEFINITION OF DISASTER
In LPG pipeline network, a disaster is an occurrence of such magnitude that may damage
pipeline or its components & equipments resulting in uncontrolled release of LPG, which may
or may not be associated with fire. Such occurrence disrupts the normal pattern of operation
14
and may cause injury or loss of life / damage to property. In general, a situation that goes
beyond the control of the available resources of the plant may be called a disaster.
PROBABLE DISASTER
A disaster in a Pipeline and associated facilities may occur due to any of the following reasons.
FIRE
• At Station.
• At cross country locations.
OPERATIONAL
• Fire at Station: Leakage of LPG, Short Circuit etc.
• Fire at Mainline: Leakage, Sabotage, Burst of Pipeline etc.
• Leakage of LPG: Leakage at Stations due to line breakage , leakage from valves, drains and
flanges.
NATURAL CALAMITIES
• Floods resulting in washout or breaches.
• Earthquakes
• Cyclonic Winds
15
• Lightning
• Land slides
MAN MADE
• Sabotage
• Pilferage
• War
• Riots
• Civil commotion
CLASSIFICATION OF DISASTER
The factors causing a disaster are different. However, the control measures required to combat
some incidents are similar. They can be classified into various groups as given in the table
below.
Note
• The horizontal rows give the locations on the pipeline where emergency can occur.
• The vertical column gives the type of emergencies.
• The letters L, F & B etc. are the abbreviations for the emergencies like L for Leakage of LPG,
F for Fire & B for Burst and so on.
• The suffix numbers 1, 2 etc. represent the categories for which separate control plan is
required. Common suffix no. indicates a common control plan. The details are as given in
Chapter 6.
16
DECLARATION OF THE DISASTER
The disaster shall be declared by the Chief Co-ordinator (Station) in case of Onsite emergency
and Chief Co-ordinator (Mainline) in case of off-site emergency.
DISASTER SIGNALS
Major Fire - A wailing siren for two minutes. Siren will be sounded three times for 30 seconds
with an interval of fifteen seconds in between.
TERMINATION OF DISASTER
All clear Signals shall be given by Shift in Charge on the direction of the Crisis Co-ordinator
(Base).
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PURPOSE
This procedure states the requirements and allocates responsibilities for emergency planning at
NRPL, Kohand Pump station.
SCOPE
This procedure applies to all NRPL, Kohand Pump Station employees and contractors working at
Station.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Station-In-Charge (COM) shall be responsible for implementing these emergency controls
and for ensuring that all personnel are adequately briefed, tasked and trained to respond to an
emergency situation.
DEFINITION
An emergency or disaster is usually caused by an incident situation. An incident can be defined
as any occurrence, which creates a hazard or potential hazard to secure and safe operation of
the pipeline facilities. An immediate and positive response to any incident is essential to
prevent the situation escalating to a major emergency or disaster.
19
PRODUCT LOSS INCIDENT - A Product loss incident consequence is:
• Any unplanned or uncontrolled escape of LPG from the Pipeline facilities.
• Any actual or suspected pollution of environment by LPG
Copies of the agreed emergency plans should be passed to the relevant local authorities, along
with route maps, location maps and other appropriate details.
Discussion with the Local Police and Fire Service should determine the appropriate method of
communication in case of emergency. Direct communication to a specific telephone number is
preferable rather than a national emergency telephone number.
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OVERVIEW
Panipat-Jalandhar cross-country LPG pipeline (10” dia, 273.620 Km long) was commissioned in
Nov 2008 for transportation of LPG in safest and environment friendly manner.
CHOTAGARHI
JALANDHAR 214.699 (198.88KM)
(273.62 KM) 242.157 201.382
MJPL ROW
258.704 219.3
DEHERU RCP
URAPAR
182.116
RCP 171.285
225.785 COMMON ROW (PBPL) - 90KM
SV+HOV (12 Nos.) INDEPENDENT ROW - 109KM
154.664
COMMON ROW (MJPL) -74KM
RCP+MOV (04 Nos.)
NABHA
(136.3KM) 87.755
47.575 KOHAND
TARANWALI JATEHRI (0.00KM)
RCP RCP
108.405
91.98 81.293 68.906 23.614
PBPL ROW
MUNAK
BADSHAHPUR 7.08 KM
(96.43KM)
22
The details of the stations are mentioned below:
APPROX.
SL.
STATION LOCATION CHAINAGE
NO.
(KM)
CONFIGURATION
SL. CHAINAGE ALTITUDE SDH RH
STATION STATUS OF
NO (KM) (M) (MCL) (MCL)
PUMPING UNITS
23
Note:
• PS- Pump Station
• DS- Delivery Station
• TS- Terminal Station
SDH 1501
RH 222
RH 863
NABHA DS JALANDHAR TS
KOHAND PS
As we can see from the hydraulic gradient profile above, pumping of LPG to requisite Station
Discharge Head is taken care entirely by mainline pumps at Kohand Pump Station. It is to be
noted that Residual Head at Jalandhar is such that pressure of LPG doesn’t fall below vapor
pressure.
The requirement of hydraulics at various Stations is as follows:
Kohand
Design Flow rate 243 KL/HR
Inlet pressure 222 MCL
Booster differential head 1X200=200MCL
(Only one in operation)
24
a)Mainline diff. head (2 in operation) 2X539=1078MCL (At low speed)
Total Head 1500 MCL
a)Mainline diff. head (2 in operation) 2X700=1400MCL (At rated speed)
Total Head 1822MCL
Nabha:
Inlet pressure as per hydraulic gradient 863+222 MCL
Delivery pressure 222 MCL
Jalandhar:
Inlet pressure as per hydraulic gradient 222+222 MCL
Delivery pressure 222 MCL
c) Half as heavy as water when in liquid form, it float on water before vaporising
Hazards :
a) LPG is approximately twice as heavy as air when in gas form and will tend to sink to
the lowest possible level and may accumulate in pits, drains etc.
25
b) LPG in liquid form can cause severe cold burns to the skin owing to its rapid
vapourisation.
c) LPG forms flammable mixture with air in concentration between 1.8% and 9.2%
e) Vapour/air mixture arising from leakages may be ignited some distance from the
point of escape and the flame can travel back to the source of the leak.
• Density:
LPG in gaseous state is 1.5 to 2.0 times heavier than air. However in liquid state its
density is approximately half that of water and ranges from 0.525 to 0.580 @15 oC.
• Vapor Pressure:
Vapor pressure of LPG is about 8 Kg/Cm2 @ 38 oC. For a pipeline full of LPG, any
exposure to heat will result in rise of pressure by 14 to 15 kg/cm2 for a unit degree rise in
temperature. This clearly explains the hazardous situation that could arise due to rise in
temperature.
• Flammability:
LPG has an explosive range of 1.8% to 9.2% volume of gas in air. This is considerably
narrower than other common gaseous fuel. However auto ignition temperature of LPG is
around 410-580 oC and it does not ignite on its own at normal temperature.
• Combustion:
The combustion reaction of LPG increases the volume of product in addition to the
generation of heat. LPG require up to 50 times its own volume of air for complete
combustion. Upon Combustion it yields 3 to 4 times its own volume of carbon di-oxide,
along with 10900 Kcal heat per Kg.
• Evaporation:
When pressure is released LPG vaporizes rapidly, lowering its surrounding temperature
considerably. This may lead to frost burn when come in contact of LPG. Hence special
care shall be taken to wear Skin Protection clothing such as gloves and goggles, when
there is a possibility of coming in contact with LPG.
26
• Auto refrigeration effect of Vaporization of LPG:
When LPG escapes from an opening, it lowers the surrounding temperature thereby
freezing the water vapor in the atmosphere and making the escaping LPG vapor appear
as a whitish cloud. Even if this cloud disappears, it is not a sign that the inflammable
gas/air mixture is dispersed. Leaking liquid phase LPG will rapidly expand to around 250
times its own volume, thereby creating a greater risk than would occur with a similar size
vapor leakage.
• Flame propagation:
LPG liquid released forms vapor, which can travel long distance. The LPG vapor can
give violent concussion upon explosion due to faster flame propagation than in case of
hydrogen.
• Odor:
LPG has only very faint smell and consequently it is necessary to add come odorant so
that any escaping gas can be easily detected. Ethyl mercaptan is normally used as
stanching agent for the same. The amount to be added shall be sufficient to allow
detection in atmosphere 1/5 of lower limit of flammability / odor level 2 as per IS: 4576.
• Color:
LPG is colorless both in liquid and vapor phase.
27
• Viscosity:
LPG has low viscosity of around 0.3 CS @ 45 oC and can leak when other petroleum
products cannot. This demands a very high integrity of pressurize system to avoid leakage.
It is also a poor lubricant too.
28
S.NO PROPERTY RANGE
18 Hazardous Polymerization No
19 Combustible Liquid No
20 Explosive material May be explosive with air
21 Corrosive material No
22 Oxidizer May react with oxidizing agents
• Panipat- Jalandhar LPG pipeline originates from IOCL’s Bottling Plant at Kohand (Panipat),
passes through the LPG Bottling Plant at Nabha en route and terminates at the LPG Bottling
Plant at Jalandhar.
• PJPL is laid in new as well as existing ROW. Around 109 Km. of ROW is new, 90 Km is
common with existing Panipat-Bhatinda (PBPL) ROW and 74 Km. is common with existing
Panipat-Ambala-Jalandhar Pipeline (PAJL) ROW.
• Panipat-Jalandhar LPG pipeline takes off from the LPG Bottling Plant at Kohand and runs in
the north-west direction up to Munak village (Ch.7.077 Km). This stretch of around 7 Km. is
in new and independent ROW.
• At village Munak (Ch.7.077 Km) the pipeline enters the existing ROW of PBPL and runs
parallel to it up to Ch 96.426 Km in village Badshahpur (District Kaithal). In this section of
around 90 Km. length, pipeline crosses two rivers viz. Para and Ghaggar. The pipeline route
also crosses three major Canals i.e. Delhi Parallel branch / Western Yamuna Canal, Hansi
29
Branch Canal & Western Yamuna Canal (Sirsa Branch). The pipeline across the above Canals
was laid using HDD methodology. There are other minor Canals / drains too in this section,
which are crossed by open cut method. There is one national highway, one railway and
three state highway crossings in this section. There are two existing RCP Stations at Ch.
47.575 Km in village Jatheri and at Ch. 87.755 in village Taranwali and four new SV Stations
in this stretch.
• At Ch 96.426 Km, the pipeline separates from PBPL ROW and runs in new and Independent
ROW up to Nabha (Ch.136.300 Km) and from Nabha to Ch.198.880 Km in Chotagarhi village
(District Ludhiana). In this section of around 102 Km length of new ROW, the pipeline
crosses four major Canals i.e. Bhakra Main Canal, Sirhind Canal (Ghaggar Branch), Sirhind
Canal (Patiala Branch) and Sirhind Main Canal. The pipeline is laid below these Canals by
HDD method. There are other minor Canals and drains also in this section, which are
crossed by open cut method. There are two railway crossings, three National highways and
two state highway crossings in this section. There is one new RCP Station at Ch.182.316 Km
in village Deheru and three new SV Stations in this stretch.
• The pipeline enters PAJL ROW at Ch. 198.880 Km and runs parallel to it upto terminal point
inside IOCL LPG Bottling Plant in Jalandhar at Ch. 273.62 Km. In this section the pipeline
crosses Sutluj river by HDD method. The pipeline crosses three national highways and three
Railway lines in this section. There are several drains crossing in this section. There is one
existing RCP of PAJPL at Ch. 225.785 Km in village Urapar and five new SV Stations in this
stretch.
• One river (Sutluj) and seven major Canal crossings (including Bhakra Main Canal, Sirhind
Main Canal etc.) along the pipeline route are crossed by HDD method.
• Apart from above, there are six railway and twenty road crossings, where bore cased
crossing technique is adopted.
• As detailed above, there are sixteen Sectionalizing Valve Stations including four RCP Stations
in the 273 Km. stretch of Panipat-Jalandhar LPG pipeline.
30
• The terrain from Panipat to Jalandhar is generally flat. There are two major rivers (Ghaggar
& Sutluj) and one minor river (Para) crossing the pipeline route. The land from Panipat to
Jalandhar is cultivated land having vegetation cover.
31
13 Delivery Station Two at Nabha & Jalandhar
Kohand 0.00
14 Chainage in KM Nabha 136.300
Jalandhar 273.620
Kohand 238
15 Altitude in M Nabha 238
Jalandhar 237
SDH at Kohand 1501
16 Hydraulics in MCL RH at Nabha 863
RH at Jalandhar 222
32
13. Rahon (Chainage : 219.300 ) HOV
14. Urapar (Chainage : 225.785) MOV
15. Ladian (Chainage : 242.157) HOV
16. Nangal Majha (Chainage : 258.704) HOV
Number of mainline
21 300 (Total)
crossings
National Highway
21b 7 Nos.
crossing
33
Address : Kohand-Assandh Road, Vill. Gudha,
District-Karnal, Haryana-132114
FACILITIES
Equipments: List of equipments installed at the Pipeline Installation at Kohand
S. No. Description Details
Booster Pumping Units
1 Number of pumping units 02 nos
2 Mode of operation Parallel (1+1)
3 Service LPG
4 Design density of fluid 0.540
5 Viscosity cst 0.29
6 Flow in KL/hr 245
7 Differential head 200MCL
8 Make Flow Serve
9 Model 4HPX17A
34
10 Type Horizontal, Centrifugal
Mainline Pumping Units
1 Mainline pumping units 03 nos
2 Mode of operation Series (2+1)
3 Service LPG
4 Design density of fluid 0.540
5 Viscosity cst 0.29
6 Flow in Kl/hr 245
7 Differential head 700MCL
8 Make Sulzer India
9 Model CSG 100-300/7 STG
10 Type Horizontal, radial split, Segmental ring type
Single Basket strainers
1 Number of units 02 Nos
2 Flow in KL/hr 245
3 Inlet and outlet size 8” NB
4 Pressure class ANSI 300#
5 Make Rakdin Industries
Scrapper Barrel
1 Number of units 01 No
2 Size 10”x14” NB
3 Pressure class ANSI 600#
4 Vendor Vee Kay Vikram & Co Ahmedabad
5 QOC Bandlock2 of GD Engg. UK make
6 Pig signaler MiT of GD Engg UK
ROV
1 Number of units 02 Nos.
2 Size 8”
3 Pressure class ANSI 300#
4 Vendor Microfinish valves
5 Actuator make EL-O-Matic
6 Actuator type Pneumatic
7 Type of valve Ball valve
Power Transformer at 33 KV Sub-Station
35
1 Number of units 02 (One standby)
2 Make Andrew Yule & Co, Chennai
3 Capacity 2.5MVA
4 Voltage ratio 33/6.6KV
5 Current ratio 43.74/218.70 Amp
6 Connection DDO
7 Phase 3
8 Cycles 50Hz
9 Weight 8670Kg
Distribution Transformer at Marketing
1 Number of units 01
2 Make Areva T&D India Ltd, Naini Works
3 Capacity 1250KVA
4 Voltage ratio 6.6 KV/433V
5 Current ratio 109.3/1666.7 Amp
6 Connection DYn11
7 Phase 3
8 Cycles 50
9 ISO 2026
10 Volume of oil 850 ltrs.
11 Core & Coil 1620 Kg
12 Mass of oil 740Kg
12 Total mass 4380Kg
Distribution Transformer at Control Building
1 Number of units 01
2 Capacity 500 KVA
3 Voltage ratio 6.6 KV/415 V
36
5. Mass Flow Meter (Enerson Process) 02 Nos.
6. Scrapper Barrels (M/S Vee Kay Vikram & Co.) SLB/SRB 01 No.
7. Basket Strainer (RakDin Engineers) 02 Nos.
8. Mobile Flare System (M/s Combustion Research) 01 No.
9. Generator (M/S Sudhir Gensets) 01 No.
10. Check Valve (M/S Shalimar ) 08 Nos.
11. ROV (M/S Micro Finish Valves) 01 No.
12. TRV (M/s Makaster Valves) 13 Nos.
13. Butterfly Valve (M/S Surya Valves) 22 Nos.
14. Ball Valve (M/S Star Engineers) 85 Nos.
15. Gate Valve (M/S L&T) 03 Nos.
16. Globe Valve (M/S Steel) 85 Nos.
17. Pressure Transmitter (M/S Yokogawa) 04 Nos.
18. Temperature Transmitter (M/S Yokogawa) 02 Nos.
19. Pressure Switch (M/S Yokogawa) 13 Nos.
20. MOV (M/S Virgo Engineers) 15 No.
21. A C (M/S VOLTAS) 06 Nos.
22. SCADA Panel (M/S Yokogawa) 01 No.
23. UPS (M/S D B Electronics) 20 KVA 02 Nos.
24. Battery Bank (M/S Rocket) 02 Nos.
25. OFC Telecom System (M/S spanco) 02 Nos.
Set points for NRPL Kohand Station
Sl. No. Service Set Point Range Tag No.
(Kg/cm2) (Kg/cm2)
1 BP 1 Suction pressure LO 8.0 3-30 PS-101
2 BP 2 Suction pressure LO 8.0 3-30 PS-102
3 BP 1 Discharge Pressure HI 25.0 3-30 PS-103
4 BP 2 Discharge pressure HI 25.0 3-30 PS-104
5 MLPU Suction pressure LOLO 15.0 3-30 PS-105
6 MP 1 Suction Pressure LO 16.0 3-30 PS-106
7 MP 1 Discharge Pressure HI 97.0 22-70 PS-107
8 MP 2 Suction Pressure LO 16.0 3-30 PS-108
37
9 MP 2 Discharge pressure HI 97 65-160 PS-109
10 MP 3 suction pressure LO 16.0 3-30 PS-110
11 MP 3 Discharge pressure HI 97.0 65-160 PS-111
12 MLPU Discharge header pressure 98.0 65-160 PS-112
HIHI
13 Mainline pressure HIHI 99.0 65-160 PS-113
14 Station Inlet pressure LO 8.5 3-30 PS-114
38
• Entire Station is surrounded by fire water hydrant line and water monitors are provided
after regular intervals to blast a jet of water in case of fire. The water line is hooked to
existing fire fighting water network of Kohand Bottling Plant of Marketing Division.
• Sand buckets are also provided at appropriate places in the piping area.
Throughout the building Manual Call Points (MCP) are provide to trigger an alarm manually.
Fire Protection Accessories:
S. No. Items Quantity
1. 4.5 Kg CO2 extinguishers 32
2. 10 Kg DCP extinguishers 31
3. 75 Kg DCP extinguishers 1
4. Fire Hose, Type A 18
5. Jet Nozzle 1 per box +1 10
6. Fog Nozzle 1
7. Universal Nozzle 1
8. Water curtain Nozzle 1
39
12. Explosive meter/ Portable gas detector 3
13. Safety Belt 2
14. Nose mask 4
15. Half face mask with organic vapour 4
cartridge
16. Ear muffs, 4
17. Cotton hand gloves 50
18. Dangri / Boiler suit 38
1) PJPL Ch. 0.0 Km. to 73 Km. => NRPL, Panipat (Ind. & Common ROW)
2) PJPL Ch. 73 Km. to 96.5 Km => NRPL, Sangrur (Common ROW)
3) PJPL Ch. 96.5 Km. to 198.8 Km. => NRPL, Nabha (Independent ROW)
4) PJPL Ch. 198.8 to 273 Km. => NRPL, Jalandhar (Common ROW)
40
", .
&" &
'
"
41
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE DURING DISASTER:
The organisational structure is shown in Annexure S/T/U.
42
7. Maintain a speculative continuous review of possible development and assess these to
determine most probable course of events.
8. Ensure that casualties are receiving adequate attention.
9. Arrange for additional help, if required and ensure that relatives of casualties are informed.
10. Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of the emergency.
43
Role of Chief Co-ordinator (Mainline)
1. On getting the message of the Off-site Emergency, Chief Coordinator shall rush to the
station and start functioning from Control Room and establish Emergency Control Center.
2. To ensure functioning of DMP organogram.
3. Be in constant touch with Chief Co-ordinator (Station) and other Co-ordinators and direct
the entire process.
4. Be fully responsible to mobilize all the coordinators and shall declare the Danger Zones.
5. To ensure that appropriate staffs are dispatched to the incident site.
6. To ensure that appropriate equipment has been dispatched to the incident site.
7. To inform the Crisis co-ordinator (Base) about the incident, magnitude of disaster, combing
operations and no. of casualties, if any.
8. To release the approved information to press and Governmental agencies through Welfare
Co-ordinator.
44
Role of F&S Co-ordinator:
1. On getting the information he shall immediately rush to the site to take charge of entire fire
fighting operation.
2. Immediately mobilise his trained fire fighting personnel with all necessary fire fighting
equipments and extinguishing agents.
3. To immediately contact fire brigade station and mobilise the necessary help.
4. To ensure passing on information to all mutual aid agencies for turnouts immediately.
5. After involvement of all the fire services, he shall direct and assist them with necessary
information to achieve the target.
6. To mobilise all the activities related with fire and safety equipments, materials and
personnel.
7. Contain spread of LPG & clean the area, if required.
45
In case of Off-site emergencies, he shall:
1. Proceed to the site with adequate manpower and equipment after getting feedback from
search party co-ordinator.
2. Install generator, compressor, pneumatic pumps etc. as required.
3. Arrange temporary lightings.
4. Carry out repair and clean the area.
5. Arrange for pressure test and give clearance for resuming pumping operation
46
Role of Communication Co-ordinator:
1. To arrange entire communication system and to keep the system alive.
2. To install the portable radio set and establishes communication with Station Co-ordinator.
3. To arrange & install PA system and make public aware of the danger involved.
4. To identify availability of local P&T telephone line nearby.
5. To maintain liaison with other Co-ordinators for their communication needs.
Combat Team:
The team shall be lead by F&S Co-ordinator. The team shall:
1. Rush to the fire site.
2. Start fire fighting and control the fire.
3. Contain spread of LPG & clean the area, if required.
4. After fire fighting, arrange to keep the fire fighting material at identified places.
47
Auxiliary Team:
The team shall be headed by Maintenance Co-ordinator. The team shall:
1. Rush to fire site.
2. Isolate the live electrical lines.
3. Arrange to protect costly equipments in the area.
4. Arrange to supply fire fighting material at site.
5. Monitor the LPG LEL levels and contain spread of LPG & clean the area, if required.
6. Join the fire fighting team.
7. Arrange to clean the site after fire fighting operation.
Rescue Team:
The team will be lead by Welfare Co-ordinator. The team shall:
1. Activate the first aid centre.
2. Cordon off the area.
3. Access control.
4. Arrange drinking water.
5. Join fire fighting team.
48
BOMB THREATS
Upon receiving information about a bomb threat, the Station-in-charge/Shift in charge shall
1) Immediately evacuate the suspected area.
2) Initiate the evacuation procedure.
3) Inform the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee of Mkting. Bottling Plant, Police and Fire
Services and act on their advice.
4) Alert IOC Management.
5) NEVER open, touch or move the suspected package.
ASSEMBLY POINT
In case of emergency, personnel of Station as well as Mutual Aid Partners shall assemble at
assembly point marked near the Control Room entrance. The manpower required for
firefighting / rescue or any other job, as directed by Co-ordinators, shall be made available from
the assembly point. No one shall go to the control room.
49
"# $ /
" (
& "
50
ROLE OF OUTSIDE AGENCIES IN CASE OF MAINLINE (OFFSITE EMERGENCIES)
51
Role of Water and Irrigation Authorities:
1. Control water flow in canals in the event of LPG pollution.
2. Provide assistance and equipment to control the flow of polluted water and minimize
pollution.
3. Assist with the reclamation of the polluted area.
Role of Railways:
1. Control the movement of trains in the incident area and prevent diesel and steam
locomotives from entering the area.
2. To advise IOC, if they are informed by a member of their staff about a leak or incident
associated with the pipeline or its facilities.
52
"# $ 0
, &
"
53
1. LEAK IN PUMP STATION (L1)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Equipment failure
3) Operational failure
4) Third party activity
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people, if required
2) Prevent ignition
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
4) Safeguard personnel
5) Stop LPG leakage
6) Contain the spread of LPG
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Firefighting equipment viz. Extinguishers, PPEs & Explosimeter/LEL meter etc.
2) Tools & tackles.
54
2. PIPELINE LEAK IN AN OPEN AREA (L2)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure.
3) Third Party Activity.
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) Damage due to Natural Calamities
a. Breaches due to flood.
b. Earthquake.
c. Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people, if required
2) Prevent ignition
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
4) Safeguard personnel
5) Stop LPG leakage
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators.
2) Police/Home Guard.
3) Labour
55
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a. Extinguishers
b. PPEs and Explosimeters / LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep.
3) Communication Equipment.
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Water pollution
4) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people, if required
2) Prevent ignition
3) Safeguard personnel
4) Stop LPG leakage
5) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
8) Divert Traffic
56
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators.
2) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
3) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep and Boats
3) Communication Equipment.
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure.
3) Third Party Activity.
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) Damage due to Natural Calamities
a) Breaches due to flood.
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Cordon the area
57
2) Evacuation of people
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
4) Prevent ignition
5) Stop LPG leakage
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators.
2) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
3) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
CAUSES
1) Ignition due to Short Circuit, Static Electricity Generation, Spark from Engine exhaust, etc.
2) Equipment failure
3) External source of Ignition, Hot work
4) Damage due to natural calamity
5) Lightning
CONSEQUENCES
1) Damage to Equipment and/or structure
2) Injury to personnel
58
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Extinguish fire
2) Cool neighboring equipment
3) Safeguard personnel
4) Evacuation of people, if required
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
Fire Fighting equipment
a) Extinguishers
b) Water source
1) Fire tender
2) Ambulance
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Operational Failure
4) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
5) Ignition due to Short Circuit, Static Electricity Generation, Spark from Engine exhaust, etc.
6) External source of Ignition, Hot work
7) Damage due to natural calamity
8) Lightning
59
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Damage to Equipment and/or structure
4) Injuries
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Extinguish fire
2) Stop LPG leakage
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
4) Contain spread of LPG
5) Safeguard personnel
6) Evacuation of people, if required
7) Cool neighboring Equipment
8) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police/Home guards
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
Fire Fighting equipment
c) Extinguishers
d) Water source
1) Fire tender
2) Ambulance
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
60
c) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
d) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Damage due to natural calamity
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people
2) Extinguish fire
3) Stop LPG leakage
4) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
5) Contain spread of LPG
6) Safeguard personnel
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Police/Home Guard
3) Fire fighting crew
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a. Extinguishers
b. PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
5) Fire tender
6) Ambulance
61
8. LEAK AND FIRE AT CANAL/RIVER CROSSINGS, AERIAL CROSSINGS AND
RAIL/ROAD BRIDGES (LF3)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Damage due to natural calamity
a) Breaches due to flood.
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Damage to civilian property
4) Water pollution
5) Land pollution
6) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people
2) Extinguish fire
3) Stop LPG leakage
4) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
5) Contain spread of LPG
6) Safeguard personnel
7) Divert traffic
8) Clean the area
62
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep and Boats
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
5) Fire tender
6) Ambulance
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Lightning
6) Damage due to natural calamity
a) Breaches due to flood.
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
63
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Damage to civilian property
4) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people
2) Extinguish fire
3) Stop LPG leakage
4) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
5) Cordon off the area
6) Contain spread of LPG
7) Safeguard personnel
8) Divert traffic
9) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment
c) Extinguishers
d) PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep and Boats
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
5) Fire tender
6) Ambulance
64
10. PIPELINE RUPTURE IN PUMP STATION (B1)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Equipment failure
3) Operational failure
4) Third party activity
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Prevent ignition
2) Evacuation of people, if required
3) Safeguard personnel
4) Stop LPG leakage
5) Contain the spread of LPG
6) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire fighting equipment viz.
a) Fire Tenders
b) Extinguishers
c) Water Sources
2) Emergency repair equipments
65
11. PIPELINE RUPTURE IN OPEN FIELD (B2)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Damage due to natural calamity
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people
2) Stop LPG leakage
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
4) Contain spread of LPG
5) Safeguard personnel
6) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Police/Home Guard
3) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other station
4) Fire fighting crew
5) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a. Extinguishers
66
b. PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep.
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
6) Fire tender
7) Ambulance
8) Portable Generators, cables, bulbs, etc.
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Damage due to natural calamity
a) Breaches due to flood.
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) Evacuation of people
2) LPG leakage
3) Fire hazard
4) Damage to civilian property
5) Water pollution
6) Land pollution
7) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Evacuation of people
2) Stop LPG leakage
3) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
67
4) Contain spread of LPG
5) Safeguard personnel
6) Divert traffic
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
4) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other stations
5) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters
2) Car, Jeep and Boats
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
5) Fire tender
6) Ambulance
7) Portable Generators, cables, bulbs, etc
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure.
3) Third Party Activity.
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) Damage due to Natural Calamities
a) Breaches due to flood.
68
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Cordon the area
2) Evacuation of people
3) Prevent ignition
4) Stop LPG leakage
5) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators.
2) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
3) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other stations
4) Labourers
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
69
2) Equipment failure
3) Operational failure
4) Third party activity
a. Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b. Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Prevent ignition
2) Evacuation of people
3) Safeguard personnel
4) Stop LPG leakage
5) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Firefighting equipment viz.
a) Fire Tenders
b) Extinguishers
c) Water Sources
2) Emergency repair equipments
3) Ambulance
70
15. PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE IN OPEN FIELD (BF2)
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure
3) Third Party Activity
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) External source of Ignition
5) Damage due to natural calamity
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire
3) Damage to civilian property
4) Land Pollution
5) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Prevent ignition
2) Evacuation of people
3) Stop LPG leakage
4) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
5) Contain spread of LPG
6) Safeguard personnel
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Police/Home Guard
3) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other stations
4) Fire fighting crew
5) Labour
71
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a. Extinguishers
b. PPEs and Explosimeters/LEL Meters
2) Car, Jeep.
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
6) Fire tender
7) Ambulance
8) Portable Generators, cables, bulbs, etc.
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Damage to civilian property
4) Water pollution
5) Land pollution
6) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Prevent ignition
72
2) Evacuation of people
3) Stop LPG leakage
4) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
5) Contain spread of LPG
6) Safeguard personnel
7) Divert traffic
8) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators
2) Fire fighting crew
3) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
4) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other stations
5) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters
2) Car, Jeep and Boats
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
5) Fire tender
6) Ambulance
7) Portable Generators, cables, bulbs, etc
CAUSES
1) Corrosion- internal/external
2) Mechanical Failure.
3) Third Party Activity.
a) Damage to the pipeline due to the construction activity in the vicinity of the pipeline.
b) Damage to the pipeline with malicious intention of third party (Attempt for
pilferage, riots, sabotage etc.)
4) Damage due to Natural Calamities
73
a) Breaches due to flood.
b) Earthquake.
c) Cyclone
CONSEQUENCES
1) LPG leakage
2) Fire hazard
3) Damage to civilian property
4) Water pollution
5) Land pollution
6) Casualties
CONTROL MEASURES
1) Cordon off the area
2) Evacuation of people
3) Prevent ignition
4) Stop LPG leakage
5) Constant monitoring of LEL levels with the help of LEL meters
6) Contain the spread of LPG
7) Clean the area
MOBILISATION REQUIREMENTS
MANPOWER
1) Co-ordinators.
2) Police/Home Guard/ District/PWD/Irrigation/Railway authorities
3) Supervisory and non supervisory Personnel from base and other stations
4) Labour
EQUIPMENT
1) Fire Fighting Equipment.
a) Extinguishers
b) PPEs and Explosimeters/ LEL meters
2) Car, Jeep
3) Communication Equipment - Mobile Public Address System
4) Mainline Emergency Equipments
74
"# $ 1
( 2
( % &
75
FIRE PREVENTION
PURPOSE
This procedure states the requirements and allocates responsibilities for the prevention of fire
at NRPL, Kohand Pump station.
SCOPE
This procedure applies to Kohand Pump Station employees and contractors / their personnel
working at the station.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Station-in-Charge is responsible for implementing these fire prevention controls and for
ensuring that
• Personnel are adequately trained in fire response procedures and in use of first aid, fire
extinguishers and Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs).
• Good liaison is maintained with the local fire station, Police, Hospital and other associated
authorities.
• A site fire plan is available and is regularly updated.
• That the fire fighting equipments are available and are regularly maintained.
CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE
Fire is classified into four categories depending upon the type of combustible material involved.
This classification establishes the type of extinguisher and the appropriate fire fighting
technique to be used.
76
Class B Fires involving flammable and Dry chemical or carbon dioxide
combustible liquids. (CO2) extinguishers. Never use
water to extinguish a
flammable liquid fire.
Class C Fire involving gas, which is very difficult The best defense is to shut off
to extinguish. the gas. Failing this, dry
chemical or (CO2) is to be used.
Class D Fires in combustible metals e.g. These fires are extinguished
magnesium, aluminum or sodium are with Special dry powder like
the least common types of fire TEC (Ternary Eutectic
Chloride)
Electrical Fires Fire involving electrical equipment. e.g. Dry Chemical or (CO2). Due to
cables, transformers etc. the electrical shock hazard,
non-conducting fire
extinguishing agents must be
used. Never use water on an
electrical fire.
EXTINGUISHING A FIRE
Fuel, oxygen and a source of heat are essential to support a fire. A fire continues, unless one of
these three elements is removed. Fires extinguishing methods are based on removing one or
more of these elements.
WATER
Water absorbs heat and reduces the temperature of the burning material. In addition, steam is
generated which smothers the fire by excluding oxygen. Water should be used for Class A fires,
cooling plant and equipment or as a fine spray to protect fire fighting personnel.
77
used on electrical fires. Dry Chemical can cause considerable damage to delicate electronic
equipment due to its abrasive nature; therefore it should not be used on computers.
FOAM
Foam creates a homogenous smothering blanket that floats on the surface of a burning liquid.
It prevents the production of flammable vapour, excludes oxygen from the fire and reduces the
temperature of the fuel. Injecting foam compound into water using foam – making branch or
similar equipment, produces foam.
78
Annexure A
INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC
The following notice shall be displayed for public information on the outer fence or gates of
every PJPL site under the concerned Station jurisdiction.
79
Annexure B
Don’ts
• Speculate on resumption of normal operations.
• Speculate on causes of the emergency.
• Speculate on the outside effects of emergency.
• Interfere with the legitimate duties of media representatives like Air / TV / Press.
• Place blame for emergencies.
80
Annexure C
TO POLICE
1) Location
2) Type and nature of accident
3) No. of dead /injured
4) Situation
5) Security arrangements required for cordoning off the area
6) Help of the police wireless for communication
TO HOSPITAL
1. Location
2. Type and nature of accidents.
3. No. of injured
4. Type of treatment required for burns/ injuries etc.
5. Assistance required: ambulance, services of doctors etc.
81
Annexure D
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF IOC CO- ORDINATORS
Designation Name & Telephone Numbers
as per DMP Designation of
P &T Off. P&T Resi. OFC I/C I/C Mobile No.
Incumbent
Off. Off. Resi.
Crisis Co – Sh. Ravindra 0120- 0120- - - - 09818854446
ordinator Prasad, 2448706 4203446
(PLHO) GM(HSE)
Alternate Sh. D.P. 0120- 0120- - - - 09958166600
Crisis Co – Semwal, 2448903 2400305
ordinator GM(O)
(PLHO)
Crisis Co – Sh. R. Thakur, 0180- 0180- 27081 4861 5861 09416004585
ordinator DGM(T) 2578737 2595007
(Base)
Alternate Sh. K.K.Lal, 0180 - - 27069 4862 - 09466200702
Crisis Co – CTSM 2578679
ordinator
(Base)
Chief Co – Sh. K.D. 01748- - 81-215 - - 09416201711
ordinator Banerjee, COM 259500
(Station)
Alternate Sh. Mayank 01748- - 81-203 - - 09813310952
Chief Co – Khare, SO&ME 259555
ordinator
(Station)
Chief Co – Sh. J.K. Jha, 0180- 0180- 27045 - 5831 09416201612
ordinator CMNM 2578911 2525831
(Mainline)
Alternate Sh. Ranu Ram, 0180- - 27115 - - 09466130585
Chief Co – 2578869
SCM
ordinator
(Mainline)
Maintenance Sh. Mayank 01748- - 81-203 - - 09813310952
82
Designation Name & Telephone Numbers
as per DMP Designation of
P &T Off. P&T Resi. OFC I/C I/C Mobile No.
Incumbent
Off. Off. Resi.
Co-ordinator Khare, SO&ME 259555
Alternate Sh. Deepak 01748- - 81-202 - - 09671132123
Maintenance Chahal, 259555
Co-ordinator SO&ME
Fire & Safety Sh. Sagar 01748- - 81-202 - - 09896407966
Co-ordinator Saigal, SO&ME 259555
Alternate Sh. Deepak 01748- - 81-202 - - 09671132123
Fire & Safety Chahal, 259555
Co-ordinator SO&ME
Communicati Sh. Ranjit 0180- - 27126 4852 5835 09416208508
on Co- Kumar, 2578697
ordinator CM(T&I)
Alt. Sh. K. Khan, 01748- - 81-202 - - 09729855890
Communicati ST&IE 259555
on Co-
ordinator
Search Party Sh. Kavish, - - 27136 - - 09996792438
Co – SO&ME
ordinator
Alternate Sh. M.K. - - 27023 - - 09034164729
Search Party Meena, O&ME
Co ordinator
Material Co- Sh. Raghunandan 0180- - 27079 4808 5808 09416017005
ordinator Prasad, CMTM 2578709
Alternate Sh. O.P. 0180- - 27041 - - 09355434087
Material Co- Pandey, O&ME 2578706
ordinator
Welfare Co – Sh. Nitin K. 0180- 0180- 27072 - - 09729089121
ordinator Garg, HRM 2578734 2525883
Alt. Welfare Sh. B.L. 0180- - 27146 - - 09996383645
Co ordinator Ratwaya, SHRO 2578734
83
Annexure E
84
10 Environment Engg.,Panipat 0180-2661954
11 Asst. Director (IS&H), Karnal 94167-85578
12 District Magistrate, Panipat 0180-2651801(O) & 2650701(R)
13 SDO,UHBVNL, Gharaunda 9354726241
14 SDO, HVPN, Munak 01748-256630
15 Chief Inspector of Factory 0172-2601256, 2701373
16 Red Cross Society, Karnal 0184-2267903
17 Labour Enforcement Officer, Karnal 0184-2267220
18 SHO, Gharaunda 01748-250029,100
19 Police Control Room, Panipat 0180-2633455,100
20 Police City, Panipat 0180-2632053
21 NRPL Control Room 0180-2578733
22 Panipat Marketing Complex 0180-2578859
IMPORTANT HOSPITAL NUMBERS
1 Refinery Hospital 0180-2585050 (I/C 3222,3093,3094)
2 AMBULANCE, Panipat 102
Civil Hospital Emergency General,
3 Panipat 0180-2644102,2639953,2630275
Chief Medical Officer, Civil Hospital
4 Karnal 0184-2267903
Chief Medical Officer, Civil Hospital
5 Panipat 0180-2630275(O) & 0180-2630601( R)
6 Prem Hospital, Panipat 0180-2632121/2645191
7 Civil Hospital, Karnal 0184-2267796,/2271702
85
Annexure F
NRPL KOHAND
KD BANERJEE COM 9416201711 01748 259500
MAYANK KHARE SO & ME 9813310952 01748 259555
K KHAN ST & IE 9729855890 01748 259555
SAGAR SAIGAL SO & ME 9896407966 01748 259555
DEEPAK CHAHAL SO & ME 9671132123 01748 259555
SUBODH SHARMA Foreman (Elect.) 9466348821 01748 259555
NAIB SINGH EA-IV (Mech.) 9466484847 01748 259555
RAKESH KUMAR EA- IV (T&I) 9812897227 01748 259555
SATYAPAL TA III 9896453927 01748 259555
RAJ KUMAR TA III 9466750565 01748 259555
CHHAJU RAM TA I 7404935205 01748 259555
KOHAND MARKETING
PS BHATTI SPM 8901000789 01748 259252
SAMRESH KUMAR DM 9416340271 01748 259255
SANJAY KHANNA Sr. LPG MGR. (NRO,ND) 9899973825 011-26518080 ext-2623
ASEEM KASHYAP Ch. LPG MGR.(NRO,ND) 9873936007 -
NRPL PANIPAT
CENTRAL DISPATCH 0180 2578704
Toll free No. 18001801340
86
Annexure G
NRPL NABHA - IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS
NRPL NABHA
Name TEL NO. / Resi. No.
SUNIL DAS 9417239994, 0175 2300994
VIKAS JINDAL 9878917550, 01765 227655
ADITYA.V.VATS 9041370325, 01765 227655
TUSHAR K.TIWARI 9878414677, 01765 227655
HARDEEP C.KAUSHIK 9872537962, 01765 227655
RAJEEV KUMAR 7696731929, 01765 227655
GURPREET SINGH 9872625287, 01676 220387
SURESH KUMAR 9417750815, 01672 223303
NAND RAM 9779516838, 01672 220123
PRAVEEN KUMAR 9855633447, 01765 227655
MARKETING NABHA
SHER SINGH 9417217957
SATNAM SINGH 8427588996
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Fire Service & Mutual Aid Partners
FIRE BRIGADE,PATIALA 0175-2215956
FIRE BRIGADE,SANGRUR 01672-234333
FIRE BRIGADE,RAJPURA 01762-224161
FIRE BRIGADE,GOBINDGARH 01765-255111
IOCL SANGRUR (MRKTG) 01672-234530, 232312
HPCL SANGRUR 01672-234528, 235605
IBP SANGRUR 01672-234351, 221092
District Authorities & Police
DC,PATIALA 0175-2212121
SSP,PATIALA 0175-2216747,2214411
SDM,NABHA 01765-220645
DSP,NABHA 01765-220642
SHO,SADAR,NABHA 01765-220648
BOMB DISPOSAL SQUAD 0175-5000126
ELECTRICITY COMPLAINT CENTER 9872518935
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER PATIALA 0175-2215802
87
Important Hospital Numbers
88
Annexure H
89
District Authorities & Police
S.S.P, JALANDHAR 0181 2240431
D.C. JALANDHAR 0181 2224549,2455661,2000000
POLICE 100, 0181 5080151,2221041
P.A.P BOMB SQUAD 0181 2225009,2456274
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FACTORIES 0181 2270202
P.S.E.B SUB STATION 9872516785, 0181 2292719
Important Hospital Numbers
CIVIL HOSPITAL 0181 2227006
RED CROSS 0181 2224366
JALANDHAR CANTT. HOSPITAL 0181 2262406
90
Annexure I
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF POLICE STATIONS/FIRE BRIGADE ALONG
PJPL ROW
91
Telephone Nos. of Police Station (Common ROW with PBPL)
(PJPL Ch. 7.08 Km. to Ch. 96.430 Km. / PBPL Ch. 1115.75 Km to 1205.10 Km.)
92
Tehsil Pundri District Kaithal
(PJPL Ch. 36.161 Km. to 52.161 Km. / PBPL Ch. 1144.75 Km. to 1160.75 Km.)
93
Tehsil Guhla District Kaithal
(PJPL Ch. 86.161 Km. to Ch.93.161 Km./ PBPL Ch. 1194.75 Km. to 1201.75 Km.)
94
Telephone Nos. of Police Stations (Independent ROW)
(PJPL Ch.96.43 Km. to Ch.136. 265 Km.)
95
Tehsil Bhawanigarh District Sangrur
(PJPL Ch. 120.373 Km. to 132.504 Km.)
96
Telephone Nos. of Police Stations (Independent ROW)
PJPL Ch.136.265 Km Tehsil Nabha. to Ch.198.880 Km. Tehsil Machiwara
97
Tehsil Amloh District Fatehpur Sahib
(PJPL Ch. 156.706 Km. to 166.355 Km.)
98
Tehsil Khanna District Ludhiana
(PJPL Ch. 166.727 Km. to 182.783 Km.)
SL.NO Name of Village Police Station Telephone No. Fire
Brigade
01 Rohna Khurd Police Sadar (O) 01628-505160 01628-
02 Rohna Kalan Station Mukh Head 221343,
03 Rajewal G.T.Road, Khanna Constable 220111
04 Fatehpur Dhak 9780001071 Khanna
05 Kotla Dak SHO 9780001031 01765-
06 Chakohi Control Room 255111
07 Bhumadi 9780001145 255501
08 Mohanpur 01628-227901, Mandi
09 Gaggar Mazra 225024 Gobindgarh
10 Deheru
99
Tehsil Machiwara District Ludhiana
(PJPL Ch. 195.044 Km. to 198.880 Km.)
100
Tehsil Ludhiana District Ludhiana
(PJPL Ch. 201.550 Km. to 216.550 Km. / MJPL Ch. 95.00 Km. to Ch. 110.00 Km.)
SL.NO Name of Village Police Station Telephone No. Fire
Brigade
01 Hadian Police Sadar Station, 0161- 2447777 0161-
02 Bhama Kalan Ludhiana SHO Police 2750764
03 Bhama Khurd Control Room 2710501
04 Ghelewal 9780001145 2710502
05 Boothgarh 01628-227901, Ludhiana
06 Baliwal 225024
07 Miani
08 Chaunta
09 Dholanwal
10 Kalewal
11 Salempur
12 Garcha
13 Haidar Nagar
101
Tehsil Phillaur District Jalandhar
(PJPL Ch. 236.550 Km. to 245.550 Km. / MJPL Ch. 128.00 Km. to Ch. 138.00 Km.)
102
Tehsil Phagwara District Kapurthala
(PJPL Ch. 251.550 Km. to 263.550 Km. / MJPL Ch. 146.00 Km. to Ch. 156.00 Km.)
103
Annexure J
LIST OF MAINLINE CROSSINGS IN PJPL
LIST OF HORIZONTAL DIRECTIONAL DRILLING (HDD) CROSSINGS
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
Minor Canals to Refinery 08+726.63
Delhi Parallel Branch Canal 08+863.64
Western Yamuna Canal (CLC) 08+921.39
Gohana Distributory Canal 09+013.48
Hansi Branch Canal 10+244.74
Western Yamuna Canal (Sirsa Branch) 53+860.35
Bhakhara Main Canal (Lined) 101+343.95
Sirhind Canal (Ghaggar Branch) 129+360.03
Sirhind Canal (Patiala 2nd Feeder Branch) 154.057.11
Sirhind Canal (MAIN) 197+769.97
Sutluj River 217+125.61
104
LIST OF RIVER CROSSINGS
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
Para River 82+436.50
Ghaggar River 90+800.13
105
LIST OF STATE HIGHWAY (SH) CROSSINGS
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
Aasandh to Karnal Road (SH-12) 23+851.74
Kaithal to Karnal Road (SH-08) 56+709.65
Kaithal to Patiala Road (SH-11) 70+414.23
Ghaggar to Samana Road (SH-10) (Samana - Patran Road) 107+895.25
Bhawanigarh to Nabha Road (SH-12/a) (Near Nabha Bottling
135+223.51
Plant)
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
106
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
107
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
Kath to Siona Road (LR from Retgarh Chatrana Road to Kanth) 91+980.06
Kath to Siona Road (LR from Retgarh Chatrana Road to Kanth) 92+348.00
Kath to Siona Road (LR from Retgarh Chatrana Road to Kanth) 92+664.69
108
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
109
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
110
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
111
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
112
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
113
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
114
LOCATION CHAINAGE
NAME OF CROSSING
(Km + m)
115
Annexure K
Emergency Response Plan for PJPL LPG Pipeline
In case of any emergency situation, Emergency Response Plan has been prepared that shall act
as a guideline to channelize personnel & resources for optimum management of critical
situation. Various preventive & post-incident actions taken shall be as follows:
116
• Immediate arrangement for prima facie loss evaluation of third party damage (if any)
due to leak.
• Preliminary notification of insurance claim.
• Approach plan for emergency response vehicle like fire tenders, ambulance etc. for
reaching the site.
• Planning for transportation, personnel required for leak rectification, resources, water,
nitrogen, non-sparking tools & tackles, LEL detectors etc. required at site.
• Evacuation of LPG from affected section by controlled cold /hot flaring at the nearest
SV/RCP location, flushing/purging of LPG vapours using water plug and nitrogen purging
etc. as per requirement.
• Rectification of leak using Composite & Mechanical outer wrap (Clock Spring),
conventional leak clamp etc. depending upon type of leak.
• Pressure testing of the rectified section for leaks etc. by resuming pumping.
• Site cleanup and restoration.
• Assessment of final damage and insurance claim.
• Learning and report preparation for information sharing.
117
Annexure L
BOMB THREAT CONTIGENCY PLAN
Once the bomb threat message or any information regarding unidentified object or suspected
bomb is being received by the Shift-in-charge, whether the message is in the form of verbal or
written, immediate information will be sent to Station Coordinator, Central Dispatch (NR), Co-
ordinator of Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC) of Mkting. Bottling Plant viz. Terminal
Manager and to other Coordinators as per DMP.
1. To inform IOC management as per DMP, Police Control Room, Medical Officer, Fire
Station, Bomb Detection & Disposal Squad, Civil Authorities and Corporate Security.
2. Co-ordinate & liaison with the Co-ordinator of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
about the actions to be taken.
3. Close down the facility/pumping operation to avoid damage due to blast if it takes
place.
4. To instruct Security at Gate No. 1 to restrict movement of vehicles other than Police/
Emergency Services.
5. Arrange evacuation of premises as per evacuation plan in consultation with BTAC.
6. Collect intelligence and surveillance through local contact.
7. To keep required number of sand bags ready at site, which are available inside the plant
at various points.
8. Assist search team in search of area and later on explosive experts.
The Shift-In-charge will act as under:-
1. He will immediately assist coordinator to evacuate the area.
2. Close down the facility/pumping operation to avoid damage.
3. Cordoning off the affected area.
4. Ensure minimum movement of personal vehicles/support vehicles near the threatened
site.
5. Assist search team in search of area and later on explosive experts.
6. Assist local Police.
118
7. Control movement of the personnel near the threatened area.
8. Ensure cutting off supply (Power as well as LPG supply) to threatened unit/section.
9. Ensure that the Station Firefighting equipment is ready and available for operation.
EVACUATION
The Station Coordinator after considering all pros and cons may take decision for evacuate and
search. Once the Station Coordinator recommends for evacuation, the designated member
should communicate with the employees accordingly through public addressing system or any
other convenient mode of addressing system.
During evacuation the employees will follow the instructions stated below:
a) Walk out of the building quietly and in orderly manner
b) Do not use lifts, elevators or conveyers.
c) Follow the evacuation route only.
d) Follow instructions from Security staff/ guides on any confusion about the route and
assembly area.
e) Do not leave any personal belongings.
f) Switch off the plant machinery and power supply before leaving area.
g) Open all doors, windows and cupboards before leaving the area.
h) Remain in the assembly area until further instructions.
i) Follow the rule “DO NOT TAKE BOMB AWAY FROM PUBLIC. TAKE THE PEOPLE
AWAY FROM THE BOMB”.
1. The first important action to be taken in case any suspicious object is noticed during
search is to mark the area “DANGER – BOMB”.
2. The next immediate action is to inform the Co-ordinator of the Bomb Threat Assessment
Committee about the finding of the suspected object.
119
3. The Co-ordinator of the committee in turn will communicate the matter to other
members of the committee, bomb squad, police, fire brigade, medical authorities, civil
authorities etc.
4. The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee, considering all the ground situations, shall
decide the extent of the evacuation. The designated officer shall order for evacuation of
area. The safe distance of evacuation shall also depend on the size of the explosive
device. The location and the nature of the bomb shall also be considered during the
determination of the safe distance. However it is safe to evacuate the employees to an
assembly, which is at least 300 m away from the suspected object. Typical minimum
safe evacuation distances are given in the appended table at the end.
5. Place sand bags around the suspected object leaving sufficient clearance. Bomb
blankets, mattresses and cushions of this kind may be used for the impact reduction
purpose. The sand bags should be to sufficient height from the object. Normally, three
to four times height the suspected object is sufficient to reduce the impact. A minimum
of 200 sand bags may be kept at each location for this purpose.
6. If the suspected object is found in an office building or in any room, the windows and
doors shall be opened to minimize the extent of the blast damage, if sufficient time is
available.
7. The evacuated employees should not be permitted to re-enter the building or the
affected area until the bomb squad clears the bomb, declared that the area is safe and
All Clear/Completion Certificate is issued by the Bomb Threat Committee i.e., no re-
entry should be permitted until the Bomb Threat Committee advises to do so.
Following are some more points to remember and practice once the bomb is detected.
a) Suspected object not to be touched / moved unless you are duty bound to do so.
b) Package not to be opened with hand or other materials.
c) Package, object or device not to be punctured.
d) Suspected object not to be submerged in water, as some bombs get activated in
water.
e) Strings or wire attached to the object not to be cut. Some bombs are designed to
get activated once the string or wire is cut.
120
f) Metallic object not to be passed over the package, as some bombs are designed
metal sensitive.
g) Opening of baggage by hand or any other unapproved methods not to be
attempted. Only remote entry technique to be used by trained experts.
h) Flashlight not to be focused directly over the suspected object as some bombs
explodes on exposure to light source.
i) Re-entry to the affected area not to be allowed until the danger is cleared.
121
Typical TNT equivalents and minimum safe evacuation distances are given in the following table
as a general guideline. However, the safe evacuation distances may be fixed based on the site
conditions and threat perception.
Building Outdoor
Explosives Mass
Threat Description Evacuation Evacuation
(TNT equivalent)
Distance Distance
5 lbs 70 ft 850 ft
Pipe Bomb
2.3 kg 21 m 259 m
10 lbs 90 ft 1,080 ft
Suicide Belt
4.5 kg 27 m 330 m
20 lbs 110 ft 1,360 ft
Suicide Vest
9 kg 34 m 415 m
Briefcase/Suitcase 50 lbs 150 ft 1,850 ft
Bomb 23 kg 46 m 564 m
500 lbs 320 ft 1,500 ft
Compact Sedan
227 kg 98 m 457 m
1,000 lbs 400 ft 1,750 ft
Sedan
454 kg 122 m 534 m
4,000 lbs 640 ft 2,750 ft
Passenger/Cargo Van
1,814 kg 195 m 838 m
Small Moving Van/ 10,000 lbs 860 ft 3,750 ft
Delivery Truck 4,536 kg 263 m 1,143 m
Moving Van/Water 30,000 lbs 1,240 ft 6,500 ft
Truck 13,608 kg 375 m 1,982 m
60,000 lbs 1,570 ft 7,000 ft
Semitrailer
27,216 kg 475 m 2,134 m
122
Annexure M
TYPES OF LPG FIRE DUE TO LPG LEAKAGE
1. Pool Fire
Accidental release of flammable liquids such as LPG can collect in drains, low lying areas leading
to severe consequences. Immediate ignition of this pool of leaked LPG results in Pool Fire. It
burns with a stationary diffusion flame. The radiation from the flames can be very intense near
the fires but falls rapidly beyond 3-5 pool diameters.
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion which can be initiated by
the depressurization of a pressure-liquefied gas through a break. This depressurization causes
the fluid near the break to be in a superheated state. BLEVE is among the most fearsome of
accidents that can occur wherever a pressure liquefied gas (PLG) exists.
If a container with a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) suffers structural failure—be it due to
creep, fatigue, or fire-induced or other forms of accidental jeopardy—it may lead to a sudden
depressurization of the container. As a result, the LPG will suddenly be transformed into a liquid
which is ‘superheated’ in respect of the precipitously lowered pressure. Depending on the
123
nature, quantity and the mechanism of the container failure, such a situation can lead to
instantaneous and violent vaporization of the contents, causing a ‘boiling liquid expanding
vapour explosion’—a BLEVE.
Fire impingement on vessels containing pressure liquefied gases can result in catastrophic
failure of the vessel leading to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) e.g.
overheating & rupture of LPG Horton Spheres due to increase of temperature due to adjacent
fire. As LPG is flammable, this can result in the formation of very large fireballs.
In safety assessments where catastrophic vessel failure is identified as a real possibility, the risk
of death from a fireball tends to be higher than that from missiles or blast.
124
0.325
The Fire Ball diameter in mtrs. can be calculated using the equation Dmax = 6.48 M , the
0.26
Fire Ball duration in secs= 0.825 M and the Fire Ball centre height in mtrs. Hmax= 0.75
Dmax where M= initial mass of flammable liquid in Kgs.
3. Torch/Jet fire
Leakage of LPG can be in the form of jet and its immediate ignition results in Torch or Jet Fire
e.g. release of LPG from a Safety Release Valve (SRV) on a Vessel and the LPG jet catching fire.
The direction of the flame depends on the direction of the jet and also on the wind speed which
may bend the jet. It also has localized consequences and such fires can be controlled or
contained.
4. Flash Fire
Immediate ignition of dispersed LPG vapours would result in Flash Fires, which have localized
consequences. Combustion products are generated at a rate low enough for expansion to take
place easily without significant overpressure ahead or behind the flame front. The hazard is
therefore only due to thermal effects. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are
few mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets released.
When a large quantity of LPG is released into the atmosphere, clouds of LPG vapours mixed
with air are formed and may sustain propagating flames when ignited. Delayed ignition of
dispersed LPG vapours can result in blast overpressures covering large areas and can cause
damage at considerable distances from the release point. This may lead to extensive loss of life
and property. Blast overpressures depend upon the reactivity and the amount of dispersed LPG
vapours between two explosive limits. These flammable vapours, on delayed ignition may
result in an explosion known as ‘Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)’.
It causes intensive heat radiation and explosion overpressure due to an expanding fireball and
fragments of the ruptured tank are propelled away with high energy. LPG tank ruptures &
subsequent vapour cloud explosions caused many of the most catastrophic losses in industry.
LPG is gas at normal atmospheric pressure & temperature. Hence, in case of leak in Pipeline
between two SV/RCP stations, the LPG may escape into the atmosphere and may form ‘Vapour
Cloud (VC)’ and if this VC catches fire then it shall lead to huge fireball/Vapour Cloud Explosion.
125
The typical minimum building distances from LPG storage locations as per OISD -144, thermal
radiation intensities at various distances due to fire ball, damage to infrastructure & personnel
at different thermal radiation intensities, tolerable intensities and minimum safe evacuation
distances are given in the following tables as a general guideline.
Table-II
(As per OISD Standard 144)
Distance between LPG storage vessels and plant boundary/Group of buildings not associated
with LPG installation
LPG Flash Fire due to Fireball for LPG popping up from SRV on Storage Vessel
126
Damage due to Incident Radiation Intensity
127
Typical minimum Safe Evacuation Distance from LPG Fire Ball
Minimum
LPG Mass/ Fireball
Storage Description Safe
Volume Diameter
Distance
9 kg /
Small LPG Tank 12 m 48 m
19 ltrs.
45 kg /
Large LPG Tank 21 m 84 m
95 ltrs.
Commercial/Resid 907 kg/ 736 ft
56 m
ential LPG Tank 1,893 ltrs. 224 m
3,630 kg /
Small LPG Truck 89 m 356 m
7,570 ltrs.
Semi tanker LPG 18,144 kg /
152 m 608 m
37,850 ltrs.
Depends on 4 R (Fire
Pipeline Section 450000 Kg /
rate/qty. of ball radii)
between SV/RCP 848000 L
leak and size subject to
Stations. (Av. 16 ( Line fill @ 53
of puncture a minimum
Kms.) KL/Km)
in pipeline of 90 mtrs.
Note:
For any LPG fire scenario, the minimum safe working distance is generally taken as 4
times the fire ball radii or flame height of fire ball (4R) and evacuation distance as
minimum 15 times the fire ball radii (15 R), 30 R if possible. However in any case, the
distances depend on the quantity of LPG leakage, site conditions, weather conditions
and threat perception to the safety of personnel & infrastructure.
128
Annexure N
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
Annexure O
1 Ring Spanner 21
Brass Hammer- 01 lb 1
6
Brass Hammer- 02 lb 1
7
Hammer, Sledge 1
8
Screw Driver- 200*10mm 1
9
Screw Driver- 300*10mm 1
10
11 Chisel, Flat (150*22 mm 0.24 KG) 1
136
Annexure P
Ring Spanner
1 6-32 1
2 32-36 1
3 36-40 1
4 41-46 1
5 46-50 1
6 55-60 1
7 6-32 1
8 32-36 1
9 36-40 1
10 41-46 1
11 46-50 1
12 55-60 1
137
Sl.No. Item Quantity
Screw Driver
18 813 1
19 827 1
20 831 1
21 902 1
22 911 1
23 923 1
24 925 1
25 927 1
26 929 1
27 931 1
28 42/10 mm 1
29 42/14 mm 1
30 42/17 mm 1
31 42/19 mm 1
32 1/2 inch 1
138
Sl.No. Item Quantity
34 Hammer (1 lb) 1
35 Hammer (2 lb) 1
41 Inside caliper 4” 1
43 outside caliper 4” 1
46 Micrometer std.(0-25mm) 1
139
Sl.No. Item Quantity
54 Pliers 8” 1
56 Magnet U 1.5” 1
140
Annexure Q
7 Red Flag 01 No
17 Grease 01KG
18 Axe 01 No.
141
Sl.No. Item description Available
24 Chalk 1Box
25 Dusters 10 Nos.
29 Tasla 04 Nos.
142
Annexure R
At Nabha:
143
10 Boiler Suit(Dangri), made fire retardant cloth ***
12 Safety Helmets 10
17 Resuscitator 2
144
At Jalandhar
A) Electrical:-
8. Digital multi-meter 01
9. Fuse puller 2
B) Mechanical
145
S.No. Description Specifications Qty.
146
S.No. Description Specifications Qty.
147
S.No. Description Specifications Qty.
57. Chisel 6” x 8” 1
148
S.No. Description Specifications Qty.
70. Hammer 01 lb 1
C) PPEs:-
149
S.No. Description Specifications Qty.
150
Annexure S
CH CHAINAGE
CP CATHODIC PROTECTION
ED EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
151
FCV FLOW CONTROL VALVE
GM GENERAL MANAGER
KM KILOMETRE
152
PS PUMP STATION
RH RESIDUAL HEAD
SP SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
153
SSP SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
SV SECTIONALIZING VALVE
TS TERMINAL STATION
VC VAPOUR CLOUD
PRODUCT CODES
LPG LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
LOCATION CODES
KOH KOHAND
NAB NABHA
JAL JALANDHAR
-- xx --
154