Department of History, National University of Singapore

Review
Reviewed Work(s): British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910, Volume I, The
Southern and Central States by Eunice Thio
Review by: P. L. Burns
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Sep., 1971), pp. 263-264
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National
University of Singapore
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20069947
Accessed: 11-03-2019 10:09 UTC

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Reviews 263

British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910, Volume I, The Southern and Central
States. By EUNICE THIO. University of Malaya Press, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur,
1969. Pp. xxxvii, 288. Preface, Plates, Maps, Abbreviations, Introduction, Bibliography,
Index. Price: M$26-00.

Since World War II Malayan historiography has been concerned largely with the
origins of British political control in the Malay Peninsula. This volume, the first of two
by Professor Eunice Thio, takes up the subject where Professors Cowan and Parkinson
left off in their studies on British intervention into the tin-producing states of Perak,
Selangor and Sungai Ujong in the 1870s. It is divided into two parts, the first on the
revival of the "forward policy" which took Britain into the rest of Negri Sembilan,
Pahang and Johore and the second on the "policy of consolidation" which gave rise to
a "Federation" of all the Malay States under British protection except Johore.
After establishing the circumstances which enabled Sir Frederick Weld to pursue an
expansionist policy, Professor Thio shows how the Governor gradually asserted his control
over the tiny states of Negri Sembilan, first by displacing the Maharaja of Johore as the
arbiter of their disputes, then by making them financially dependent upon the Colony
through loans and grants for road construction and finally by establishing direct control
of their internal affairs through British officers. Outside of Sungai Ujong there was little
tin in Negri Sembilan, but Pahang was different. Everyone believed it was rich in minerals.
Weld did too. All were of course wrong, but the speculators and concession hunters in
the 1880s gave the question of extending British control of Pahang an urgency which
permitted Weld to appoint a British "Agent" there under a treaty in 1887. His successor,
Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, in the following year forced the Sultan to accept a British
Resident with authority to administer Pahang "on a similar system to that existing in the
Malay States under English protection". The model for the Pahang treaty of 1887, whereby
a British Agent would be accepted in return for Britain's recognition of the ruler's claim
to the title of Sultan, was the Johore treaty with Britain in 1885. However, unlike in
Pahang Weld was prevented from getting his Agent into Johore by the Sultan and more
especially by a group of European merchants with financial interests in Johore who
successfully blocked the allocation of funds for the post in the Colony's Legislative Council.
Pahang proved a disaster. There was little alluvial tin; then in 1891 a rebellion broke
out which left the state heavily in debt. However, Pahang's insolvency opened up a
discussion on the larger question of the shortcomings of British administration in Perak
and Selangor, each with a Resident, Sungai Ujong and Jelebu under one Resident and
"old" Negri Sembilan under another. Professor Thio makes this problem the point of
departure for the second part of the volume where it emerges that Malayan officials
argued that 'efficiency" could be achieved through administrative "uniformity" and that
once on this track proposals were soon forthcoming for a "federation" or "union". These
proposals and the men who made them are subjected to a detailed examination by
Professor Thio through two chapters. There are two more chapters on how the "policy
of consolidation" was implemented, one on Swettenham's role successively as Resident
General and Governor in shaping the Federated Malay States as this non-federation became
known, and the other on Sir John Anderson's administrative and constitutional reforms
which led to the creation of a Federal Council and the replacement of the Resident
General by a Chief Secretary to Government. A final chapter sees this policy manifest
in Johore through the appointment of a "General Adviser" in 1910, an arrangement
which was formalized in 1914.
These are complex matters and Professor Thio handles them with great skill and clarity.
The approach is one which sees the making of colonial policy as a matter of political elites,
the Governor and his subordinates in Malaya, the Secretary of State and his departmental
officials in London. But is it an approach which does not make clear what were the limits
of planning? How far, one wonders, did the structure of the colonial system itself or the
institutions which had developed in the Malay States under Resident rule determine the
boundaries of policy making? For example, Weld's failure in Johore might also be explained
by the fact that this state had already become integrated into the colonial system. Unlike
Negri Sembilan which had to be worked on to be made attractive for investment and
Pahang which most good men believed possessed enormous potential and only required

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264 Reviews
British rule to open it up, Johore had already accommodated investment from the Colony
and had "modernized" its political institutions to cope with the social and economic
problems which such development raised. Indeed, it worked sufficiently well in the 1880s
to allow the Colony's merchants to prefer it to direct colonial government. Likewise in
discussing the differences between Lucas and Fairfield on the need for a union of the
Malay states including Pahang, there was an important area of agreement. Both men
accepted that if it could be shown that Pahang possessed substantial mineral resources
Resident rule should be extended to it. As Professor Thio notes (p. 132) Fairfield even
suggested annexing to Selangor Raub, the one productive area in Pahang, thereby bringing
it within what Lucas called "the Chinese zone". Aside from personal rivalries, were they
not both committed to the idea that "modern" government should be used to facilitate
the expanding capitalist sectors of the economy? And once it was agreed that these states
should be brought together, could anything else but the fake federation have been adopted?
Annexation was out of the question as a practical exercise; unitary government was
desirable, but politically dangerous; thus Federation was sold to the rulers in name only
and they were given something else. And on Swettenham's role in shaping Federation
Straits Settlements relations, one must wonder how much the man contributed. Even after
Anderson's reforms in bringing himself more directly into the decision-making process of
the Federation, he and his successors found it very difficult to control the bureaucratic
amalgamation which was engendered by the Treaty of Federation. Professor Thio is wrong
in relying on Swettenham's own opinion of these relations, (pp. 181-2). Treacher though
timid was a better administrator in a regulative sense than Swettenham. His frequent
references to Swettenham was a defensive ploy which with the skilful use of the Conference
of Residents enabled him to overhaul the Federal administration and to give the Federal
officers executive powers despite Swettenham's objections. But these are details.
Professor Thio has given us a major contribution to Malayan historiography. It is
also a very readable book.

University of Adelaide P.L. Burns

The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period. By AKIN RABIBHA
DANA. Cornell Thailand Project, Interim Reports Series, No. 12, Southeast Asia Program,
Dept. of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. July 1969. Pp. xi, 247. Foreword,
Acknowledgements, List of Tables, Apprendices, Abbreviations and Bibliography. Price:
US$300.

'Cornell Thailand Project Interim Reports' often belie their title with no subsequent
version ever appearing. However, the absence of more formal presentation does not
necessarily indicate a lack of substance and the present work is a good example. Akin
Rabibhadana has made a major contribution to Thai studies with what was his M.A.
thesis in Anthropology at Cornell. He systematically makes available a wealth of in
formation about Thai society in the first ninety years of the Chakri dynasty. Furthermore
the approach followed reflects the mutually beneficial exchange of ideas which is in
creasingly found between anthropologists and historians.
The first of the three main parts of the work is an outline of the structural back
ground to the period, mainly through reference to the laws and annals. The second is a
"synchronie analysis" of Thai social organization with particular emphasis on the system
of stratification. Finally, the author focuses on the processes of change within his period
of study and examines the opportunities for social mobility. The appendices contain short
sketches of the lives of various important officials and several genealogies of the major
noble families. The Thai titles in the substantial bibliography are translated and briefly
annotated.
The preliminary material on the Ayutthaya kingdom, while serving to introduce the
Bangkok period, incorporates an analysis of the collapse in 1767. The author suggests
that the principal cause was the monarchy's loss of control over manpower to the princes
thereby engendering intense factionalism and so weakening the central government that

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