General VO N G U Y E N GIAP

DIEN
BIEN
PHU
Third Edifion (revised and enlarged)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

H A N O I ~ 1964
/
 G E N E R A L

VO NGUYEN GIAP

DIEN BIEN PHU

(Revised and Enlarged Edition)

FOREIGN L A N G U A G E S P U B L I S H I N G H O U S E

H A N O I — 1964
 CONTENT

Foreword 7
Notice 9
President Ho Chi Mink's letters 11

DIEN BIEN P H U

I. T h e military situation i n Summer 1953 17

I I . T h ee n e m y ' s n e wscheme: the Navarre military plan 34
III. O u r strategic direction o f the Winter 1953 — S p r i n g
1954 campaign. O u rmajor attacks o n t h e co-ordinated
fronts prior t o t h e Dien Bien P h uc a m p a i g n 49
IV. T h ehistoric Dien Bien P h ucampaign. T h esituation
of t h e e n e m y a n d o u r s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n '77
V. T h e h i s t o r i c D i e n B i e n P h uc a m p a i g n . E v o l u t i o n o f t h e
military situation . 9 8
VI. Paramount significance o f t h e great Dien Bien P h u
victory a n d the Winter-Spring victories 137

A P P E N D I X 175
 1

[
r

i
 FOREWORD

Ten years have elapsed since the memorable Dien

Bien Phu victory and the repercussions of this battle
still make themselves felt, as witness the passionate
discussions still going on about it. How is it that the
Vietnam People's Army born of an essentially peasant
people at the outset equipped with primitive weapons
had the better of a modern and seasoned army, not in
small ambushes or minor engagements but in modern
battles, in the course of a long campaign, requiring
the co-ordination of various arms ?
Has there been any "mistake" of the French High
Command, or in other words, what has been the share
of the protagonists' personal responsibilities and that
of historical necessities which were to bring the French
Expeditionary Corps to defeat ?
For all these questions, no answer, no commentary
could match the account of events made by the
leading actor of the drama. General Vo Nguyen Giap,
Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People's Army,
especially when this account clearly and thoroughly

7
analyses the strategy which was worked out, and
throws a most vivid light on all the military and
political factors which contributed to the victory.
In two editions which were most successful, we
introduced a series of articles written by General Vo
Nguyen Giap on the occasion of the fourth anniver-
sary of the Dien Bien Phu victory. However the reader
would like to have fuller information: these texts
acquainted him with the strategy of the victorious
People's Army in its outlines but concise as they were,
they could not answer all questions.
Since then, the author has had the time to complete
and enrich his text with new details and considera-
tions, and the present edition will help the reader
understand more thoroughly the unfolding of this
historic campaign.
The main orders of the day and messages of the
High Command of the People's Army during this
campaign are published in an appendix-

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

Hanoi — 1964

8
 NOTICE

We advise tlie reader p r o p e r l y to locate o n the map of Indo-

China, and that of V i e t n a m i n particular, the f o l l o w i n g regions
in order to be able easily to follow the unfolding of the
operations :
Vietnam's territory includes three parts : the N o r t h or Bac Bo
(formerly T o n k i n g ) , the Centre or T r u n g B o (formerly Annam)
and the S o u t h or Nam Bo (formerly Cochin-China).
In Bac Bo, the region between the Red river and the Laotian
border is t h e T a y B a c (North-West), a mountainous region where
D i e n B i e n P h u is s i t u a t e d . B e t w e e n the Red river and the Chinese
border t o t h e w e s t of the H a n o i - L a n g S o n l i n e is a n o t h e r moun-
tainous region, the Viet Bac which served as the m a i n base of
the Vietnamese Resistance.
In T r u n g Bo, the region of H i g h l a n d s is called Tay Nguyen
in Vietnamese, B i n h T r i T h i e n is a s h o r t f o r t h e t h r e e provinces
of Q u a n g Binh, Quang Tri and Thua Thien (region of Hue).
F r o m the m i l i t a r y viewpoint, the country w a s divided into nine
z o n e s . Z o n e V w h e r e O p e r a t i o n A t l a n t e t o o k p l a c e is s i t u a t e d in
the south of T r u n g Bo.
Herebelow are the names given by the French High Com-
mand to the positions of Dien Bien Phu :
Him L a m : Beatrice ; Doc Lap ; Gabrielle; Ban Keo : Anne
Marie ; H o n g C u m : Isabelle ; Eastern hills A l , C I , 0 2 ; Eliane ;
another Eastern hill n o r t h of E l i a n e : D o m i n i q u e .
The positions to the w e s t of the C e n t r a l sector are respectively
called : H u g u e t t e (positions E, D , to the north-west of the main
airfield) and Claudine (which comprises the CP.)
r
 P R E S I D E N T HO C H I M I N H ' S LETTER

TO T H E F I G H T E R S O N T H E D I E N BIEN PHU
BATTLEFRONT

Dear officers a n d m e n o nt h e D i e n B i e n P h u b a t t l e f r o n t .
T h i s A u t u m n - W i n t e r , y o u a r e a s s i g n e d t h e taslc o f m a r c h i n g t o
Dien B i e n P h u t o w i p e o u tm o r e e n e m y effectives, extend o u r
resistance bases, a n d liberate m o r e c o m p a t r i o t s still u n d e r t h e
enemy's oppression.
Last year, y o u v a l i a n t l y fought, destroyed m a n y enemies, a n d
scored great victories. I a m v e r y g l a d o f i t .
This year, after several ideological r e m o u l d i n g s a n d m i l i t a r y
c o u r s e s y o u h a v e m a d e m o r e p r o g r e s s e s . Y o u m u s t fight m o r e
v a l i a n t l y , b e m o r e r e a d y t o e n d u r e h a r d s h i p s , a n d k e e p firm y o u r
determination i nevery circumstance :
Resolute to kill the enemy,
Resolute to abide by the policy,
Resolute to win more successes.
The G o v e r n m e n t a n d I a r e w a i t i n g f o r y o u r successes t o con-
gratulate a n dreward you.
W i t h affection a n d determination t o w i n

December 1 2 , 1 9 5 3
HO CHI M I N H

II
PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH
r

L
 PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S
CONGRATULATORY LETTER

T O O F F I C E R S , S O L D I E R S , DAN CONG*, SHOCK

YOUTH ON THE DIEN BIEN P H U BATTLEFRONT
AND LOCAL PEOPLE

O u r a r m y has liberated D i e n Bien P h u . T h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e ,

the G o v e r n m e n t and I convey our cordial greetings to y o u , offi-
c e r s , s o l d i e r s , dan cong, s h o c k y o u t h a n d l o c a l p e o p l e , w h o h a v e
g l o r i o u s l y f u l f i l l e d y o u r ta'kks.
This victory i s big, but i ti s only the beginning. W e must not
be s e l f - c o m p l a c e n t a n d subjective into underestimating t h e
enemy. W e are determined t o fight for independence, n a t i o n a l
u n i t y , democracy a n d peace. A s t r u g g l e , w h e t h e r m i l i t a r y o r
diplomatic, must be long and hard, before complete victory can
be a c h i e v e d .
T h e G o v e r n m e n t a n d I w i l l r e w a r d t h e o f f i c e r s , m e n , dan cong,
shock y o u t h and local people w h o have p e r f o r m e d b r i l l i a n t deeds.
W i t h affection and determination t o w i n

M a y 8, 1954
HO CHI MINH

* People who o u t of patriotism help t h e troops i n operation b y

discharging such tasks as building roads, transporting food and ammu-
nition, carrying the wounded.

13
DIEN BIEN PHU
 1
THE M I L I T A R Y S I T U A T I O N IN S U M M E R 1953

I n s u m m e r 1953 o u r people's W a r o f N a t i o n a l S a l -
vation entered its eighth year. Those eight years were
3'ears o f e x t r e m e l y h a r d a n d h e r o i c s t r u g g l e i n w h i c h
our a r m y a n d people f o u g h t against t h e F r e n c h impe-
rialists' a r m y of aggression w h i c h enjoyed t h e assis-
tance o f t h e U . S . interventionists a n d — i n t h e
beginning — an overwhelming superiority i n arms
and equipment.
Nevertheless, through eight years of protracted
resistance, t h e s t r e n g t h of o u r a r m y a n d people w a s
not annihilated as t h e enemy h a d hoped for. O n t h e
contrary, i t grew as t h e fight developed a n d brought
m o r e a n d more victories; t h e balance o f force w a s
g r a d u a l l y tipped i n o u r f a v o u r . O n t h e e n e m y side,
they w e r e cornered little b y little i n t o a passive state.
As the w a r w e n t o n they encountered n e w difficulties
and m e tw i t h failure upon failure.
A brief review of w h a t happened d u r i n g those eight
years o f resistance is indispensable f o r t h e study o f

2 DliV 17
the enemy's s i t u a t i o n and ours, and of the m i l i t a r y
s i t u a t i o n p r i o r to N a v a r r e ' s m i l i t a r y plan, t h a t is also
p r i o r t o o u r W i n t e r 1953 c a m p a i g n — S p r i n g 1954
campaign and to our preparations for the great D i e n
Bien P h u campaign.

O u r s is a people deeply a t t a c h e d t o f r e e d o m a n d
peace, w i t h a l o n g - s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n of u n b e n d i n g
fighting spirit against foreign aggression and for
national independence. I m m e d i a t e l y after the t r i u m p h
of the A u g u s t R e v o l u t i o n , P r e s i d e n t H o C h i M i n h , i n
t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e o f S e p t e m b e r 2, 1945
stated before the w h o l e n a t i o n and the w h o l e w o r l d
t h a t " V i e t n a m h a s the r i g h t t o be a free a n d i n d e p e n -
d e n t c o u n t r y — a n d i n fact i t is s o a l r e a d y . T h e e n t i r e
V i e t n a m e s e people are determined to m o b i l i z e a l l their
physical and m e n t a l strength, t o sacrifice their lives
and property in order to safeguard their independence
and freedom."
It is public k n o w l e d g e that, h a r d l y a m o n t h h a d
passed since the b i r t h of the D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of
V i e t n a m w h e n the French colonialists, w i t h the help
of B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s m , c o m m i t t e d acts of p r o v o c a t i o n
in Saigon in an attempt to reconquer our country.
Meanwhile, they also hatched the scheme to reconquer
C a m b o d i a and La o s. T h e y sent i n a n a r m o u r e d divi-
s i o n , a n d a p p l i e d t h e i r "lightning war" s t r a t e g y w i t h
the belief that they w o u l d succeed i n " p a c i f y i n g " N a m
B o w i t h i n 10 w e e k s a n d u s i n g i t a s a s p r i n g b o a r d t o
attack the n o r t h e r n part of our country.

18
 B u t t h i s w a s a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n . Our people in Nam
Bo stood up and fought. W h a t t h e y h a d i n h a n d s w e r e
only primitive weapons, yet they were unyielding i n
face o f t h e e n e m y . G u e r i l l a w a r f a r e s o o n d e v e l o p e d
over the w h o l e o fthe M e k o n g delta.
O u r P a r t y o n the one h a n d led the s t r u g g l e o f t h e
N a m B o people and called o n the w h o l e n a t i o n t o sup-
port them, a n do n the other hand exploited t h e con-
tradictions existing within t h e enemy's camp by
coming t oa compromise w i t h France w i t h the signing
of the M a r c h 6, 1946 P r e l i m i n a r y A g r e e m e n t w h i c h
brought about the w i t h d r a w a l of 200,000 C h i a n g K a i -
shek's m e n f r o m our country, b y a d o p t i n g the policy
. o f "making peace in order to advance", a n d b y w o r k -
ing against time to consolidate the people's power and
the r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces, a n d t o p r e p a r e ourselves
against the enemy's n e w aggressive plots.
T h o u g h they h a d recognized our c o u n t r y a s a free
and sovereign state, t h e F r e n c h colonialists d i d n o t
give up their intention o f re-establishing their domi-
nation. T h e more concessions w e m a d e the m o r e they
stepped o n our toes. T h e y tore t o pieces the P r e l i m i -
nary Agreement, went o n with t h ewar i n N a m B o
and carried o n their plan o f peacemeal aggression,
occupying a number o fregions i nBac B o and T r u n g
Bo. T h e chances of p r e s e r v i n g peace became m o r e and
more remote. T h e French colonialists occupied H o n -
g a y a n d H a i p h o n g , a n d i n D e c e m b e r , 1946, s t e p p e d
up their provocative actions. T h e y w a n t e d our m i l i t i a
to l a y d o w n a r m s a n d surrender, and c o m m i t t e d acts
of aggression i n the v e r y h e a r t of H a n o i , o u r c o u n t r y ' s
capital.

19
 As a n answer t o the enemy, the entire Vietnamese
people — responding t o President H o C h i M i n h ' s
a p p e a l : " W e ' d r a t h e r sacrifice e v e r y t h i n g t h a n lose
our country o r return t o slavery" — rose u p t o stop
the enemy's aggressive manoeuvres a n d save t h e
c o u n t r y . The nation-wide war of resistance broke out.

F r o m t h e first d a y s o f t h e R e s i s t a n c e , o u r P a r t y h a d
p o i n t e d o u t : Resistance was the only way to defend
the country and the fruit of the Revolution.
O u r P a r t y a l s o p o i n t e d o u t t h a t : Our people's War
of Resistance was an all-out one waged by the whole
nation. It would be a protracted war full of hardship,
but would certainly be victorious.
Our a r m y and people placed their unquestioned con-
fidence in our P a r t y ' s lines. O u rtroops f o u g h t w i t h
utmost heroism to wear out and destroy the enemy o n
all fronts. I nH a n o i p a r t i c u l a r l y , they f o u g h t a n d kept
their positions for 2 m o n t h s i nthe very heart o f the
city. T h o s e battles h a d a n i m m e n s e e n c o u r a g i n g effect
on our entire people, and a tthe s a m e t i m e helped w e a r
a w a y and pin d o w n the e n e m y forces, thus a l l o w i n g
our g o v e r n m e n t organs and a r m e d forces t o m o v e t o
the countryside, and enabling our people t ocarry out
all necessary organizational and mobilizational acti-
vities. W e could actually preserve o u r m a i n forces,
arouse the whole nation and m a i n t a i n and consolidate
our bases i n t h e countryside, m a k i n g t h e m o u r
footholds a n d supporting bases f o r t h e prolonged
resistance.

20
 I n t h e w i n t e r o f 1947, t h e e n e m y t h r e w o v e r 10,000
seasoned m e n i n a great offensive against V i e t Bac*
w i t h the purpose o fs m a s h i n g our organs of direction
and r e g u l a r forces, s o that t h e y could secure a decisive
victory a n d speed u p t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a puppet
g o v e r n m e n t f o r t h e w h o l e country. O u r people a n d
a r m e d forces i n V i e t Bac f o u g h t back g a l l a n t l y a n d
scored a m a j o r victory. T h e enemy's " l i g h t n i n g w a r ' '
s t r a t e g y once a g a i n m e t w i t h a fiasco. T h e V i e t B a c
v i c t o r y t h u s e n g e n d e r e d a s t a l e m a t e . The war entered
a new stage.
After t h e failure o f t h e "lightning war'' strategy,
the F r e n c h colonialists w e r e compelled t o p r o l o n g
their w a r o faggression. T h e y intensified their attacks
in a n attempt t o "pacify" t h eoccupied areas, t o rob
our resources and m a n p o w e r , a n dt o carry out their
vicious scheme of " m a k i n g w a r t o feed w a r a n d u s i n g
Vietnamese t o fight Vietnamese".
I n 1949, w h i l e the C h i n e s e P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n A r m y
was w i n n i n g major victories i ntheir march towards
South China a n dwhile the guerilla movement w a s
developing w i d e l y a n d p o w e r f u l l y , t h e F r e n c h colo-
nalists post-haste despatched Gen. Revers t o Indo-
c h i n a to w o r k out a n e w p l a n i n the hope of s a v i n g the
situation. Revers' policy w a s t o increase the number
of troops o n t h e B a c B o f r o n t , e x p a n d t h e occupied
areas i n the delta and the m i d l a n d s t o strengthen the
defence o f the q u a d r a n g l e L a n g S o n — T i e n Y e n —
H a i p h o n g — H a n o i and t o close the S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e
border. O t h e r aspects o f Revers' p l a n c o m p r i s e d the-

* The northernmost of Vietnam.

21
development o f the puppet army, the latter t obe used
as o c c u p a t i o n forces, t h e r e g r o u p m e n t of E u r o p e a n a n d
African troops into mobile units, and the intensifica-
tion of mopping-up operations w i t h a v i e w t o sup-
pressing o u rguerilla movement. T o carry out this
p l a n , t h e e n e m y l a u n c h e d m a n y fierce a t t a c k s a n d
s a v a g e m o p p i n g - u p operations, a n db r o a d e n e d t h e i r
zone o f occupation i n t h e delta a n d midlands o f
Bac Bo.
A s f o r u s , w e a d v o c a t e d t h e launching of guerilla
warfare o n a l a r g e s c a l e i n a l l o c c u p i e d areas. The
t a c t i c s o f "independent companies and concentrated
battalions" w a sb r o u g h t i n t o practice a n d crowned
w i t h successes.
P a r t o f our regular forces w a s split into indepen-
dent companies w h i c h w e n t deep i n t o the enemy's
rear, and there combined fighting with political work
a m o n g the population, co-ordinated armed struggle
with political struggle, destroyed t h eenemy while
setting u p and consolidating bases a m o n g the popu-
lation, a n d led the local a r m e d a n d p a r a - m i l i t a r y forces
t o fight t h e e n e m y i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e p o p u l a t i o n -
Propaganda w o r k a m o n g the enemy troops, especially
a m o n g the puppet soldiers, was considered as a stra-
tegical task and received a particular attention. A n t i -
mopping-up operations were successfully conducted.
Guerilla w a r f a r e developed everywhere, and guerilla
bases a n d g u e r i l l a zones w e r e established i nt h e ene-
'my's rear which was gradually turned into our fronts.
While independent platoons and companies were in
action i nB a cBo, T r u n g B o and N a m B o and helped

22
develop t h e g u e r i l l a m o v e m e n t , concentrated bat-
talions were formed and trained for bigger raids and
ambushes. Those battalions laid t h e bases f o r t h e
c o m i n g m o b i l e w a r f a r e . I n 1948, 1949 a n d e a r l y i n
1950, o u r t r o o p s b e g a n o p e n i n g a n u m b e r o f s m a l l size
campaigns which retained certain characteristics o f
guerilla warfare, fielding from three o r four t o nine
battalions. I n such occasions, w e directed o u r blow;s
at the enemy's exposed points s o as t o w e a r out their
effectives a n d t o e x p a n d o u r bases. T h e g e n e r a l m i l i -
t a r y s i t u a t i o n w a s o n e o f fierce t u g - o f - w a r , a n d a t t h i s
j u n c t u r e o u r P a r t y set o u t t h e p o l i c y o f active defence
and preparation for the general counter-offensive.
T h e 1 9 5 0 w i n t e r m a r k e d a great change i n t h e w a r
situation. O u r a r m y h a d g r o w n t o a considerable
extent. After t h e r e s o u n d i n g victory o f t h eF r o n t i e r
campaign, w e started m a n y other major campaigns
s u c h a s t h e M i d l a n d s c a m p a i g n , t h e H i g h w a y 18 c a m -
p a i g n , t h e 1951 H a - N a m - N i n h * c a m p a i g n , t h e H o a
B i n h c a m p a i g n i n t h e w i n t e r o f 1951 a n d t h e s p r i n g
of 1952, a n d the N o r t h - W e s t c a m p a i g n i n t h e w i n t e r
o f 1 9 5 2 . A pattern of counter-offensive on a local
plane could already be seen.
I n those victorious campaigns, w e succeeded i n
wiping out whole mobile units of the enemy, putting
out o f action tens o f thousands o f enemy's effectives
and liberating vast areas i n Bac Bo. M a n y provinces
of s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e s u c h a s C a o B a n g , L a n g S o n ,

* Ha Nam — Nam Dinh — Ninh Binh provinces.

23
Lao Cai on the C h i n a - V i e t n a m frontier, H o a B i n h on
the road j o i n i n g V i e t Bac and the F o u r t h Zone, and
the greater part of the N o r t h - W e s t stretching f r o m
the Red River to the L a o s - V i e t n a m frontier w e r e libe-
rated successively. O u r V i e t Bac base — the m a i n base
of the Resistance W a r — w a s g r e a t l y e x p a n d e d and
consQlidated. I n the m o u n t a i n r e g i o n s of B a c Bo, the
enemy only kept H a i Ninh — a province in the North-
E a s t — the t o w n s h i p of L a i C h a u , a n d the N a S a n
g r o u p of fortified positions i n the N o r t h - W e s t .

W h i l e o u r r e g u l a r forces w e r e w i n n i n g v i c t o r y u p o n
victory on the m a i n fronts, guerilla warfare developed
powerfully everywhere in Bac Bo, behind the enemy's
line. I n the H o a B i n h c o m p a i g n i n particular, o u r
regular u n i t s drove deep i n t o the enemy's r e a r - i n the
Red River delta, fought in co-ordination w i t h the
local a r m e d and p a r a - m i l i t a r y forces, blotted out a
series of e n e m y strongholds, w i d e n e d the g u e r i l l a bases
and guerilla zones and liberated m i l l i o n s of people.
T h e occupied areas w e r e considerably reduced and
covered o n l y about o n e - t h i r d of the t e r r i t o r i e s adja-
cent to the m a i n h i g h w a y s and u r b a n centres.
O n the B i n h - T r i - T h i e n f r o n t despite the u n f a v o u r -
able t o p o g r a p h y of the area the g u e r i l l a m o v e m e n t
held w e l l . I n the s o u t h e r n m o s t p a r t of T r u n g Bo, o u r
troops also w e n t deep i n t o the enemy's rear, expanded
t h e i r b a s e s a m o n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n a n d set u p n e w gue-
rilla bases i n the strategic W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s . I n
N a m Bo, the liberated area in the N o r t h zone w a s
firmly m a i n t a i n e d , and the g u e r i l l a m o v e m e n t else-
where developed widely.

24
 I n t h e s u m m e r o f 1953, t h e P a t h e t L a o L i b e r a t i o n
troops and the V i e t n a m e s e V o l u n t e e r s i n a j o i n t effort
made a surprise attack against the township of S a m
Neua and the m a j o r part of the enemy's troops. T h e
whole province of S a m Neua and vast areas i n
N o r t h e r n Laos w e r e liberated. T h i s created a n e w
pressure on the enemy.
A general assessment of the m i l i t a r y situation i n
B a c B o s h o w s t h a t f r o m t h e w i n t e r o f 1950, o u r forces
constantly kept the initiative of action w h i l e the
e n e m y , as days passed, f o u n d itself m o r e a n d m o r e
in a passive state. I t desperately called on U . S . impe-
r i a l i s m to come to its rescue and the latter did i n t e n -
sify its i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w a r of aggression i n
Indo-Ghina. M e a n w h i l e , m a n y h i g h - r a n k i n g officers i n
the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps had been recalled and
replaced b y o t h e r s . D e L a t t r e de T a s s i g n y , o n e t h e
best F r e n c h generals, w a s sent t o I n d o - C h i n a . I t is
c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e that D e L a t t r e h a d done his best
to broaden the puppet a r m y , concentrate m i l i t a r y
forces, b u i l d up m a n y defence l i n e s , a n d l a u n c h a n
offensive against H o a B i n h w i t h the a i m of r e g a i n i n g
the initiative, but i n the end he too w a s defeated. G e n .
Salan, D e Lattre's successsor, w a s also another
powerless w i t n e s s of bitter defeats o f the' E x p e d i t i o n -
ary Corps on the battlefields of N o r t h - W e s t V i e t n a m
and Upper Laos.
H a v i n g t o concentrate his efforts o n the defence of
the B a c B o delta, the e n e m y left m a n y o f his p o s i t i o n s
on other fronts insufficiently guarded, thus g i v i n g
our forces the o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o step up t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s
and w i n still greater victories.

25
 A b o v e are the m a i n features of the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n
from the b e g i n n i n g of the Resistance t o the middle of
1953.
*
* *

T h e s i t u a t i o n o f the t w o sides i n s u m m e r 1953 c a n

be s u m m a r i z e d a s f o l l o w s :
ON OUR S I D E :
Through eight years o f fighting a n dt r a i n i n g , our
people's armed forces, t h e c o r e o f t h e R e s i s t a n c e , h a d
grown u p from their infancy t o full maturity. T h e
People's A r m y then comprised m a n y regular divisions
and r e g i m e n t s besides a great n u m b e r o f local regi-
ments and battalions. M i l i t i a and g u e r i l l a forces also
developed quickly.
The c o m i n g into being and speedy g r o w t h o f these
three forces w a s t h e r e s u l t o f o u r P a r t y ' s c o r r e c t
p o l i c y o f mobilizing and arming the whole people and
waging a people's war.
It w a s also the result o f t h e correct tactics f o r a
p r o t r a c t e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r : To wage guerilla war-
fare, to advance from guerilla warfare to regular
warfare, to closely combine these two forms of war,
and to develop from guerilla to mobile and siege
warfare.
A s m e n t i o n e d above, the s i t u a t i o n f r o m 1950 t o 1953
w a s characterized by the fact that together w i t h local
offensives, m o b i l e w a r f a r e h a d become the m a i n f o r m
of w a r o n the m a i n battlefield — N o r t h V i e t n a m —

26
where guerilla warfare still played a very i m p o r t a n t
role. M e a n w h i l e , o n other fronts, t h e m a i n role w a s
still played b y guerilla warfare.
Militia and guerilla forces h a d b y t h e n r e a c h e d t h e i r
m a t u r i t y . Their f i g h t i n g spirit h a d been heightened
t h r o u g h thfe s t r u g g l e i n d e f e n c e o f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e .
T h e y had accumulated a w e a l t h o fexperiences and had
equipped themselves w i t h a lot o f weapons a n d equip-
ment captured from t h e enemy, thus constituting a
big reserve for o u r regular a r m y .
Local forces w h i c h c a m e i n t o b e i n g i n 1 9 4 8 b y
merging independent companies w i t h part of t h e mili-
tia a n d g u e r i l l a forces, w e r e n o w able t o s h o u l d e r t h e
combat missions i n their o w n localities, w i p e o u t
enemy troops, oppose e n e m y raids, defend their loca-
lities a n d fight i n good co-ordination w i t h o u r regular
forces, m i l i t i a a n d g u e r i l l a s .
The most outstanding feature w a s t h e tremendous
g r o w t h a n d h i g h d e g r e e o f m o b i l i t y o f o u r regular
troops. A l l o u r r e g u l a r d i v i s i o n s a n d r e g i m e n t s h a d
been o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y strengthened a n d re-equipped
with n e wweapons partly taken from the enemy a n d
partly manufactured b y ourselves i n spite o f great
difficulties a n d t h e scarcity o f necessary means. T h e
technical a n d tactical level a n d fighting capacity o f
our m e n h a d visibly risen t h r o u g h successive drives
of t r a i n i n g a n d t h r o u g h m a j o r c a m p a i g n s . T h e y w e r e
n o w quite f a m i l i a r w i t h mobile a n d siege w a r f a r e a n d
concentrated operations i n v o l v i n g sizeable forces a n d
a vast scope o f action, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n m o u n t a i n r e -

27
gions, and could carry out a n n i h i l a t i n g attacks, m a k e
d e e p t h r u s t s , w i t h d r a w q u i c k l y a n d fight w i t h i n i t i a -
tive, m o b i l i t y and flexibility.
O u r people's armed forces, especially our regular
forces, o w e d their visible and rapid progress t o the
f a c t t h a t o u r Party h a d p a i d d u e a t t e n t i o n t o s t r e n g -
t h e n i n g i t s leadership a s r e g a r d s t h e a r m y , p r o m o t i n g
political education and ideological g u i d a n c e , a n d h a d
continuously heightened the revolutionary and class
character o f our armymen. A sa result o f political
r e m o u l d i n g classes, our a r m y m e n h a d a clearer v i e w
o f t h e g o a l o f t h e i r fight, t h e i r h a t r e d f o r t h e e n e m y
and their fighting spirit had heightened. The ideolo-
gical r e m o u l d i n g c a m p a i g n i n s u m m e r 1953 e s p e c i a l l y
reserved for the arrr.y w a s carried o n w h i l e our P a r t y
w a s i m p l e m e n t i n g the policy of T h o r o u g h R e d u c t i o n of
L a n d Rent and A g r a r i a n Reform. The class conscious-
ness and r e v o l u t i o n a r y strength o four a r m y m e n w a s
thus further enhanced. Internal unity, unity between
the a r m y and people, i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i t y t o disinte-
grate the enemy, internal democracy combined with
strict discipline, d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d c o u r a g e i n fight-
ing, and d y n a m i s m and diligence in duty and produc-
tion, had become good habits and good tradition i n
our a r m y ' s life.
O u r people w e r e u n s w e r v i n g l y u n i t e d a s o n e m a n
around the Party, G o v e r n m e n t and President H o C h i
M i n h . They were resolved to carry through the Resis-
t a n c e , a n d h a d a n i r o n c o n v i c t i o n i n final v i c t o r y .
T h e P a r t y ' s S e c o n d C o n g r e s s i n 1950 t a b l e d t h e l i n e
of N a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c Revolution, re-affirmed the
c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e policy of P r o t r a c t e d R e s i s t a n c e , a n d

28
l a i d d o w n t h e i m m e d i a t e t a s k s f o r t h e w i n n i n g o f final
victory. The highly inspiring resolutions adopted b y
the Congress highlighted t h ew a y t o be f o l l o w e d b y
the w h o l e P a r t y , n a t i o n a n d a r m y t o w i n n e w
successes.
I n 1952-1953, o u r P a r t y p u t i n t o practice the policy
of s y s t e m a t i c R e d u c t i o n o f L a n d R e n t a n d A g r a r i a n
Reform and the slogan " L a n d t o the Tillers'', thereby
succeeded i n b r i n g i n g i n t o full play the a n t i - c o l o n i a l -
ist a n d anti-feudal spirit, a n d i n f o s t e r i n g the m i g h t
of tens o f m i l l i o n s o f p e a s a n t s w h o c o n s t i t u t e d t h e
m a i n forces o f the r e v o l u t i o n .
T h a n k s t o t h e correct policies o f o u r P a rt y, t h e
worker-peasant alliance was ceaselessly consolidated,
the N a t i o n a l U n i t e d F r o n t w a s broadened and became
m o r e solid w i t h every passing day, the people's demo-
cratic power w a s improved a n d strengthened, t h e
consolidation o f t h e bases i n t h e countryside gained
n e w successes, a n d t h e Resistance m a d e h e a d w a y i n
other aspects.
Internationally, t h e j u s t a n d h e r o i c R e s i s t a n c e o f
our people against t h e F r e n c h colonialists a n d U . S .
interventionists enjoyed ever increasing s y m p a t h y and
support f r o m the peoples of the socialist countries and
the French colonies, and f r o m the peace-loving people
of the w h o l e w o r l d .
The great t r i u m p h o f the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n had a
t r e m e n d o u s effect o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . I t
tipped the balance of forces o n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena
in favour o f t h e socialist c a m p a n d o f t h e forces o f

29
democracy, n a t i o n a l independence a n d peace. C o n -
cerning o u r people's W a r o f Resistance, i t h a d a still
greater significance. After the b i r t h of t h e People's
Republic of China, w e were n o longer i n a n extremely
d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n , n a m e l y , fighting w i t h i n t h e e n e m y
encirclement. W e then h a d a c o m m o n border w i t h the
great socialist brother countries, a n d o u r resistance
bases w e r e l i n k e d t o t h e socialist camp.
In 1950, t h e socialist countries recognized t h e
D.R.V. This event further enhanced o u r international
prestige a n d position, a n d strengthened o u r people's
c o n v i c t i o n i n final v i c t o r y .
*
* *

ON T H E ENEMY'S S I D E :

W h i l e i n s u m m e r 1953 o u r people's R e s i s t a n c e w a s
full of b r i g h t prospects, t h e aggressors w e r e facing
great difficulties.
T h e enemy t h e n h a d a b o u t 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n f o r t h e "
w h o l e o f I n d o - C h i n a , c o m p r i s i n g 120,000 E u r o p e a n s ,
Africans a n d legionaries, t h e rest w e r e puppet troops.
A l t h o u g h those effectives s h o w e d a b i g i n c r e a s e - i n
c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e e n e m y forces a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f
the w a r t h e balance of forces between t h e t w o sides
already tipped visibly i n o u r favour.
R i g h t f r o m t h e first d a y s o f t h e w a r o f a g g r e s s i o n
i n V i e t n a m t h e lack in manpower w a s c o n s t a n t l y a
grave danger for the enemy. T h a t w a s because French
i m p e r i a l i s m h a d been w e a k e n e d after W o r l d W a r I I ,

30
its m a n p o w e r and m a t e r i a l resources w e r e limited, and
the colonial w a r w a s opposed b y t h e F r e n c h people
at home. H e n c e t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f m o b i l i z i n g a
colossal m a t e r i a l strength against u s . B u t t h e m a i n
cause lay in the v e r y nature of the u n j u s t and aggres-
sive w a r . T h e u l t i m a t e goal o fthe F r e n c h colonialists
was to grab our land. Faced w i t h our opposition, they
h a d t o scatter their forces a n d s e t u p t h o u s a n d s o f
m i l i t a r y posts, b i g and s m a l l t o protect w h a t t h e y h a d
seized.
Thus, t h e w a r o f aggression undertaken b y t h e
F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps w a s a process o f cons-
t a n t scattering of that army. A n d t h e m o r e i t w a s
scattered the better conditions w e h a d t o destroy i t .
part b y part.
A s w a s s a i d a b o v e , t h e e n e m y ' s "lightning war"
strategy met w i t h complete failure. W h e n compelled
to carry out a protracted war, the F r e n c h tried b y all
m e a n s t o m a k e full use of the puppet a r m y a n d a d m i -
n i s t r a t i o n , p u r s u i n g t h e i r p o l i c y o f "using war to feed
war, Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese" w h i c h t h e y
regarded as important i nhelping t h e m overcome the
shortage o f m a n p o w e r . H o w e v e r , their efforts t o e x -
pand the puppet a r m y did not b r i n g about the expected
results because of our e v e r - g r o w i n g strength ; and the
bigger the p r o p o r t i o n o f puppet troops, the l o w e r the
morale o fthe enemy.
1950 w a s the y e a r the e n e m y e x t e n d e d t o t h e m a x i -
m u m the areas under their occupation. Y e t it w a s also
the t i m e w h e n the e n e m y forces w e r e m o s t d a n g e r o u s l y

31
scattered. T h e y h a d g r a d u a l l y m o v e d i n t o a passive
d e f e n c e , a n d could not muster a strategic mobile force
strong enough t o counter o u r attacks.
This weakness o f the enemy w a s clearly revealed as
soon as w e had started local offensive campaigns. N o t
o n l y w e r e t h e e n e m y m a i n forces w i p e d o u t p a r t b y
part, b u t they h a d also t o w i t h d r a w f r o m part o f t h e
land they h a d previously occupied. T h e enemy, w h o
t o o k t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n e v e r y a t t a c k d u r i n g t h e first
period o f the w a r , were n o w obviously i n a defensive
position i n N o r t h V i e t n a m .
T h e e n e m y left n o stone u n t u r n e d t o seek a w a y o u t
from such a n unfavourable situation a n d t o p u m p
m o r e life i n t o t h e puppet a r m y , h o p i n g t o be able t o
have a massive concentration o f mobile units. Unfor-
tunately enough, t h e inherent contradictions of t h e
w a r o f aggression o n l y led t h e m deeper into the m i r e
of defeat.
Politically, t h e u n j u s t n a t u r e o f t h e w a r o f a g g r e s -
sion aroused m o u n t i n g opposition f r o m t h e F r e n c h
people as w e l l as f r o m progressive o p i n i o n o ft h e
w o r l d ' s people. F r e n c h a n d A f r i c a n mercenaries
became more a n d m o r e fed up w i t h war. A s a result
of t h e successive defeats b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e F r o n t i e r
campaign, the morale o f the French a r m y sank lower.
The split a m o n g t h e French colonialists themselves
became ever wider.
In order t osave the w o r s e n i n g situation, the French
colonialists depended more and m o r e o n U . S . aid and
thus were bound more tightly t o t h e U.S.. U . S . a i d
accounted for 12 p e r cent o f F r a n c e ' s I n d o - C h i n a w a r
b u d g e t i n 1 9 5 1 , a n d f o r 11 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 5 3 . T h e m o r e

32
 the U.S. increased their elTorts i n p o u r i n g aid t o the
French colonialists a n di n plotting t o supplant t h e
latter, t h e m o r e acute t h e contradictions b e t w e e n
them.
At this very stage, w h e n t h eFrench colonialists
were being bogged d o w n i nIndo-China and w h e n the
Korean Armistice w a s realized, U . S . imperialism
availed itself of the o p p o r t u n i t y t ospeed u pi n t e rve n -
tion i n Indo-China, p l a n n i n g t o establish direct con-
tacts w i t h the puppet a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d t o p u l l the
rug from under France. Navarre's plan was a new
plot jointly elaborated b y the F r e n c h and U.S. impe-
r i a l i s t s , w h o s e o b j e c t i v e w a s to carry on and extend
the war of aggression in our country.

3 DBP 33
 THE ENEMY'S NEW SCHEME: "
THE NAVARRE MILITARY PLAN

Early i n 1953 the critical position of t h e French

aggressive troops o n t h e Indo-China theatre o f opera-
tions posed t o t h e F r e n c h imperialists a m o s t u r g e n t
problem w h i c h w a s t o devise n e w measures t o save
the situation a n d avoid heavier defeats.
A t that time, i nFrance,the news o f successive defeats
in Indo-China aroused a n ever broader a n d stronger
popular movement for a n end of the dirty war. I nthe
French N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y the circle standing for a
peaceful settlement oft h eV i e t n a m issue w o n ever m o r e
votes. E v e n t h e L a n i e l - B i d a u l t reactionary g o v e r n m e n t
had t o recognize that i t h a d n o m o r e possibility t o pro-
tract this w a r of aggression a n y longer a n d n o m o r e
hopes o fd e s t r o y i n g o u rforces,and that it w a s h i g h t i m e
to seek a w a y o u t . B u t w h a t w a y o u t ? Insoluble
problem ! T h eFrench g o v e r n m e n t held that a l l efforts
h a d t o b e c o n c e n t r a t e d t o find o u t a n " h o n o u r a b l e w a y

34
o u t " , t h a t is a " v i c t o r i o u s o n e " . A n d t o r e a c h t h i s
goal it had to do its u t m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y to intensify
the war, and w i n relatively great successes.
In face of the F r e n c h a g g r e s s i v e forces bogging
d o w n in Indo-China, U . S . i m p e r i a l i s m u n m a s k e d itself
as a n e x t r e m e l y b e l l i c o s e a n d w i c k e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l
g e n d a r m e . If the cease-fire i n K o r e a had m a d e the
French political circles t h i n k that a s i m i l a r s o l u t i o n
of t h e I n d o - C h i n e s e p r o b l e m w o u l d be p o s s i b l e , i t
impelled Ihe A m e r i c a n s to intensify their intervention
w i t h a v i e w to protracting and e x p a n d i n g the Indo-
China war. Eisenhower himself had many a time
i n s i s t e d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s m c o u l d n o t be
allowed to make further progress in South-East Asia,
especially i n Indo-China, t e r r i t o r y w h i c h the i m p e r i a l -
ists c o n s i d e r e d as a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n o f p r i m e i m p o r -
tance. T h e y ceaselessly brought pressure to bear upon
the French colonialists, requiring the latter to m a k e
n e w w a r efforts w h i l e they actively p r e p a r e d to
supplant France. W h i l e intensifying their aid in every
field, they obliged France to grant "independence" to
the puppet governments, thus creating political con-
ditions for t h e m to have these g o v e r n m e n t s under
their direct c o n t r o l . I n 1953 t h e i r m i l i t a r y aid a m o u n t -
ed to 2 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s m o n t h l y , s o m e t i m e s 4 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e y
sent to I n d o - C h i n a h u n d r e d s of m i l i t a r y personnel
and a m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n to control the F r e n c h colonial-
ists and the puppet a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d ever m o r e
directly participate in the c o m m a n d of the w a r in
Indo-China.
In mid-1953, w i t h the consent of W a s h i n g t o n , the
French government appointed Gen. Navarre in the

35
place of G e n . S a i a n as C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f of t h e
French Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China. Without
h a v i n g D e L a t t r e de T a s s i g n y ' s fame and rank
N a v a r r e w a s a m o n g the y o u n g generals of the F r e n c h
a r m y a c u l t u r e d m a n h a v i n g a sense of strategy. A f t e r
a v e r y short period of i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d research o n
various fronts he w o r k e d out a relatively perfect
strategic plan hoping to reverse the situation, turn
defeat i n t o v i c t o r y and w i n i n a short period of t i m e ,
a decisive strategic success.
N a v a r r e held t h a t one of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s
f u n d a m e n t a l s h o r t c o m i n g i n t h e leading of the war
w a s t h e lack of a set g o a l , w h i c h he c o n s i d e r e d as
the m a i n factor of the flagging m o r a l e of the Expe-
ditionary Corps and puppet troops. Therefore, in
Navarre's opinion, on the one hand, the French
g o v e r n m e n t had to define its o w n policy, w h i c h w a s
to carry on the w a r to defend the French privileges
in Indo-China ; o n the other, boldly to recognize the
"independence" of the allied states w i t h i n the f r a m e -
w o r k of the F r e n c h U n i o n . I t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o m a k e
these "states" realize that they could w i n genuine
"sovereignty" and "independence" only w h e n they had
defeated the V i e t n a m People's A r m y ; and to this end
they h a d to m o b i l i z e all their forces for the cause of
"sovereignty" and "independence", and endeavour to
consolidate a n d enlarge the " n a t i o n a l i s t " a r m e d forces.
A s regards the U.S.A., France w a s badly i n need of
her aid t o continue the w a r ; France and the U . S . A .
had a c o m m o n objective w h i c h w a s to reel back inter-
n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s m , b u t F r a n c e c o u l d n o t fight f o r
t h i s g o a l o n l y t o see h e r s e l f o u s t e d at l a s t f r o m I n d o -

36
 C h i n a . S h e h a d t o fight f o r h e r o w n i n t e r e s t s - L o y a l
to the interests of F r e n c h i m p e r i a l i s m a n d c o n s i d e r i n g
the p r o b l e m according t o t h e c o l o n i a l i s t s ' v i e w p o i n t
only, Navarre held that i f t h e objective o f t h e w a r
could be defined as above, n o t o n l y the F r e n c h E x p e -
ditionary Corps w o u l d k n o w t h e reasons f o r their
sacrifice o n the I n d o - C h i n a w a r theatre, b u t also t h e
"nationalist armies" w o u l d be ready t o partici-
pate i n t h e w a r i n order t o w i n "independence"
and "sovereignty" for their country.
C o n c e r n i n g t h e organization of the command and
the direction of the war, N a v a r r e a s s e s s e d t h a t d u e
to t h e successive cabinet crises i n France a n d t h e
reshuffles o f t o p c o m m a n d e r s i n I n d o - C h i n a , t h e
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t lacked a close direction, a n d a
concrete a n d continuous operational plan. H e also
r e a l i z e d t h a t o n o u r side, o u r a r m y a n d people h a d a
c l e a r g o a l : t o fight f o r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e
F a t h e r l a n d , t o h a v e a v e r y h i g h fighting s p i r i t , t o
f o l l o w a clearly defined policy o f resistance, a n d t o
march forward resolutely under the leadership o f the
government of t h e Democratic Republic o f Vietnam
headed b y President H o C h i M i n h . N a v a r r e held that
only b y urgently obtaining t h e aforesaid political
prerequisites — w a r objective, policy towards t h e
a l l i e d states, o r g a n i z a t i o n o f d i r e c t i o n , etc. — c o u l d
France w i n victory i n the Indo-China w a r .
I n t h e military field, N a v a r r e a n d t h e F r e n c h a n d
American generals estimated that t h ew a r situation
became ever m o r e u n f a v o u r a b l e t o the E x p e d i t i o n a r y
Corps. T h i s w a s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t t h e V i e t n a m
People's A r m y h a s g r o w n very rapidly ; our regular

37
troops w e r e w e l l seasoned, t h elocal forces g o t v e r y
accustomed t othe f r o n t ; our a r m y had a n extremely
heroic fighting spirit, a n da s t r o n g mobile force i n -
cluding m a n y divisions, capable of launching relati-
vely big offensive campaigns. In the m e a n t i m e guerilla
warfare w h i c h had developed everywhere pinned d o w n
and w o r e out a great part o f the e n e m y forces. T h e
Expeditionary Corps w a s ever m o r e d r i v e n into a
scattered a n d passive s i t u a t i o n . T h e b u l k o f t h i s f o r c e
was confined t o defensive assignments i n thousands
of posts a n d g a r r i s o n s s c a t t e r e d o n a l l f r o n t s , t h e r e -
by t h e local reserve force w a s w e a k , t h e general
r e s e r v e f o r c e w e a k e r s t i l l , lacking a s t r o n g strategic
mobile mass t o c o p e w i t h t h e a t t a c k s o f o u r r e g u l a r
forces o r l a u n c h counter-attacks i norder t ow i n back
the initiative. N a v a r r e then concluded that this state
of t h i n g s h a d t ob e c h a n g e d : o n t h e o n e h a n d t o b u i l d
u p a strong puppet army t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m ' o f
e f f e c t i v e s , o n t h e o t h e r u r g e n t l y t o s e t u p a strong
strategic mobile force t o w r i g g l e o u t o f t h e d e f e n s i v e
and passive situation a t that time and eventually w i n
back the initiative.

A n a l y s i n g t h e strategic directions liable t o be

threatened, Navarre pointed out the following remarks:
a ) T h e first direction t h a t m i g h t b e t h r e a t e n e d b y
our a r m y w a s t h eB a c B o delta. H e r e o u r guerilla
bases a n dguerilla zones developed extensively a n d
our local a r m e d forces w e r e fairly strong, hence w e
could u s e our regular forces t o destroy part o f t h e
enemy's effectives a n d disrupt h i s lines i n given
sectors.

38
 Navarre estimated that the above-mentioned danger
had t o be prevented, but i t was not the greatest one.
B y fiercely h a r r a s s i n g our rears and constantly keep-
ing a force o fi n t e r v e n t i o n ready h ecould surely check
our attacks t h a n k s t o the m o b i l i t y a n dm i g h t o f h i s
various arms. A n y successes w e m a n a g e d t o w i n
would be only tactical. However, the delta, a densely
populated and w e a l t h y region w i t h m a n y facilities i n
transport a n d supply, offered m a n y possibilities f o r
our troops t olaunch a big offensive, hence its defence
had t obe most carefully organized.

b ) T h e second direction t h a t m i g h t b e t h r e a t e n e d b y
our a r m y w a s N o r t h - W e s t V i e t n a m and U p p e r Laos.
In these m o u n t a i n regions, the e n e m y defence system
had m a n y vulnerable points. A s the enemy had paid
attention only t othe delta, w h i c h h econsidered as the
"key position'' of South-East Asia, h i s organization
of t h e f r o n t i n m o u n t a i n r e g i o n s h a d m a n y s h o r t -
comings : h i s forces w e r e scattered, h i s supply m e t
with m a n y difficulties, and the topographic c o n d i t i o n —
favourable t o u s— w a s u n f a v o u r a b l e t o h i m . These
shortcomings and unfavourable conditions accounted
for his severe defeats, especially i n the F r o n t i e ra n d
North-West campaigns. Therefore, he had t o prevent
the danger of a n offensive b y o u r troops i n this
direction. T h i s attack w o u l d score successes n o t o n l y
in the N o r t h - W e s t , but also i n Upper Laos, and t h e
important ensuing political repercussion w o u l d be
notably felt both i n L a o s a n d T h a i l a n d .
However, after carefully considering our possibili-
ties t o u s e a b i g force i n this direction, N a v a r r e
seemed m o r e reassured, because t h e c o m m a n d e r s

39
a c c u s t o m e d t o t h i s b a t t l e f i e l d h a d asserte:d t h a t i n
this sector o u r troops could n o t ensure their supply
and send reinforcements o n a large scale f o r a rela-
tively l o n g period, b u t could o n l y u s e a l i m i t e d force
for r e l a t i v e l y short offensives.
c ) T h e third direction t h a t m i g h t b e t h r e a t e n e d b y
our a r m y w a s South Indo-China. Here, w e h a d t h e
strategic zone o f W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s bordering o n
Lower Laos, then t h e N a m B o combat zone w i t h
Important h u m a n a n d material resources a n d where
the e n e m y forces, w e a k e r t h a n those i n the N o r t h , w e r e
scattered i n v a r i o u s localities t o defend t h e occupied
territory.
Navarre estimated that if o u r regular forces
launched a n offensive i n this direction they could
create a great c o n f u s i o n a n d w i n m a n y successes-
T h o u g h there w a s n o sign as yet o f such a n offensive,
this danger h a d t o be prevented, since t h e liberation
of the N o r t h - W e s t b y o u r troops a n d t h a t of S a m N e u a
and m a n y other localities b y t h e Vietnamese V o l u n -
teers a n d t h e P a t h e t L a o L i b e r a t i o n troops i n U p p e r
Laos. Therefore, N a v a r r e posed t h e problem o f reso-
lutely p r e v e n t i n g o u r r e g u l a r forces f r o m e x p a n d i n g
beyond t h e N o r t h e r n battlefield, a "prohibited line",
from Thakhek to D o n g Hoi.
A s regards t h e Southern battlefield, N a v a r r e held
that t o let o u r troops control f o r years t h e thickly
populated a n d wealthy provinces i n t h e Fifth Zone
and a fairly large area i n t h e N i n t h Zone i n N a m
Bo, w a s a grave mistake, for w e could rely upon
these zones t o strengthen o u r forces a n d create new
threats f o r t h e w h o l e sector, . , ,= •
 Proceeding f r o m these considerations, N a v a r r e and
the French and A m e r i c a n generals m a p p e d out a
large-scale operational plan, hoping t o regain t h e
initiative and t o w i n a decisive success i n a short
period of time.
T h i s operational plan e n v i s a g e d two phases:
a) I n a u t u m n - w i n t e r 1953 a n d s p r i n g 1954 : t o keep
t h e strategic defensive i n t h eNorth, carry out a
strategic offensive i n the South, a t the same time
develop the puppet a r m y , muster troops, and build
up big mobile force.
Concretely speaking, the enemy decided t o gather
a strong mobile force i n the Bac B odelta i n a u t u m n
a n d w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 t o o p e n fierce m o p p i n g - u p o p e r a t i o n s
to destroy our guerilla bases and guerilla zones; a t
the same time h e planned t o launch attacks o n our
free zones i nordjer t o p i n d o w n a n d w e a r o u t o u r
regular troops, d r i v i n g u st othe defensive before w e
c o u l d p a s s to' t h e o f f e n s i v e . M e a n w h i l e , h e w o r k e d
against t i m e t o develop the puppet forces a n d con-
centrate his troops a s r a p i d l y a s possible.

After winter, that i s after the season o f big opera-

t i o n s i n t h e N o r t h , e a r l y i n 1954, t h e e n e m y w o u l d
avail himself o f t h e forced rest o f our troops t o
transfer the greater part o f his mobile force t o the
South. A t this period, the climatic conditions i n the
S o u t h w e r e f a v o u r a b l e t o the o p e r a t i o n s o fthe e n e m y .
His intention was t o open big operations t o occupy
all our r e m a i n i n g free zones, p a r t i c u l a r l y the F i f t h
Zone and the N i n t h Zone i nN a m B o t o remove all
gerious t h r e a t s ; the e n e m y w o u l d take a d v a n t a g e o f

41
his victories to develop n e w puppet forces and regroup
n e w m o b i l e forces, thus p r e p a r i n g a big offensive o n
the front of the N o r t h .
b) I f t h e p l a n w e r e w o r k i n g w e l l , i n a u t u m n -
w i n t e r 1954, h e w o u l d t r a n s f e r t o N o r t h V i e t n a m h i s
mobile forces g r e a t l y increased and h i g h l y heartened,
t h e n s h i f t t o a strategic offensive o n t h e f r o n t o f t h e
N o r t h and w i n great m i l i t a r y successes, t h u s f o r c i n g
us t o negotiate i n c o n d i t i o n s f a v o u r a b l e t o t h e m . A n d
if w e did n o t accept his c o n d i t i o n s h e w o u l d d e s t r o y
our r e g u l a r forces.
T o have the required forces t o carry out this plan,
N a v a r r e advocated the f o l l o w i n g measures : t o devel-
op t h e puppet a r m y o n a l a r g e s c a l e ; t o r e g r o u p
part o f t h e occupation forces ; t o a s k f o r reinforce-
ments from France.
Navarre h a d n o other w a y than t o resort t o t h e
perfidious policy f o r m e r l y applied b y Gen. Revers and
G e n . D e L a t t r e d e T a s s i g n y : "to feed war by war,
to use the Vietnamese to fight the Vietnamese", t o
use puppet t r o o p s a s o c c u p a t i o n forces i n place o f
European a n d African troops transferred t o t h e
r e g r o u p i n g points. T h e o n l y difference w a s that
N a v a r r e insisted that i t be applied o n a larger scale
and w i t h more resolution.
With U.S. weapons a n d dollars Navarre a n d the
F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n generals decided t o b u i l d u p
i n 1953 a n e w puppet a r m y c o m p r i s i n g 5 4 b a t t a l i o n s
named mobile battalions a n dt o double this strength
i n 1954. T h u s t h e effectives o f t h e puppet t r o o p s
a m o u n t e d f r o m about 200,000 t o 290,000, n o t includ-
i n g t h e puppet soldiers i n t h e E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps.

V2
T h e y used every barbarous a n d cruel manoeuvre t o
impoverish o u r people i n t h e t e m p o r a r i l y occupied
zones, m o p p e d u p , arrested, duped, coaxed, a n d
c o r r u p t e d t h e y o u t h . F r o m M a y 1953 t o M a r c h 1954,
the e n e m y succeeded i n s e t t i n g u p 107 n e w puppet
battalions 95,000 m e n s t r o n g — t h e highest figure
since t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e w a r . H o w e v e r t h e F r e n c h
and A m e r i c a n generals h a d t o acknowledge that i n
practice this expedient d i d n o t help, because i t w a s
only a quantitative increase at t h e expense o ft h e
q u a l i t y o f t h e u n i t s a n d t h e fighting s p i r i t w h i c h
flagged despite their psychological w a r f a r e schemes
— signboard o f s h a m independence, a n t i - c o m m u n i s t
ideology, full liberty given t o t h e troops t o destroy,
rape a n dpillage during the operations.
Simultaneously w i t h the development o f the puppet
forces, N a v a r r e envisaged t h e r a p i d e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
a f a i r l y s t r o n g strategic mobile force c a p a b l e o f
breaking a l l o u r offensives a n d destroying t h e m a i n
part o f o u r forces later o n . T h u s i n 1953 a n d 1954,
he i n t e n d e d t o b u i l d u p a m o b i l e m a s s o f 7 d i v i s i o n s
(6 divisions o f i n f a n t r y a n d 1 d i v i s i o n o f p a r a t r o o p s ) ,
comprising 2 7 mobile brigades i n all. F o rthis pur-
pose, N a v a r r e o r d e r e d t h e r e g r o u p m e n t o f h i s picked
European a n dAfrican units, w h i c h were t o be with-
d r a w n f r o m a n u m b e r o f posts. A t t h e same t i m e h e
proposed t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t t o send h i m t w o
d i v i s i o n s , b u t received o n l y 12 b a t t a l i o n s c o m i n g
from France, North Africa a n d Korea. I n autumn-
w i n t e r 1953, t h e e n e m y succeeded i n r e g r o u p i n g a
mobile force o f 8 4 battalions o n the I n d o - C h i n a front,
a n d t o c a r r y o u t t h e first p h a s e o f t h e N a v a r r e p l a n .

43
he c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e B a c B o d e l t a a f a i r l y s t r o n g
mobile force c o m p r i s i n g 4 4 battalions, that i s over 5 0
per cent o f h i s m o b i l e forces t h e n e x i s t i n g i n I n d o -
China.

I m m e d i a t e l y after h i s appointment, Gen. N a v a r r e

had m a n y a t i m e declared that h e had t o a c t accord-
i n g t o t h e s l o g a n "always keep the initiative'",
"always on the offensive'*.
I n s u m m e r a n d d u r i n g t h e a u t u m n o f 1953, t h e
e n e m y successively l a u n c h e d scores o f fierce m o p -
ping-up operations i n t h eoccupied zones i n B a c B o ,
B i n h - T r i - T h i e n a n d N a m B o . I n these raids h e
m o b i l i z e d fairly s t r o n g forces, s o m e t i m e s scores o f
i n f a n t r y battalions covered b y a r t i l l e r y and air force,
such as i n t h e large-scale mopping-up operations i n
Binh-Tri-Thien, the H a i H a u region ( N a m Dinh
province), the Luoc River region (Thai B i n h prov-
ince). H e mopped these regions m a n y times, massa-
cred t h e people, arrested t h e y o u t h , a n d h e r d e d t h e
population into concentration c a m p s f o r a closer
control. H e endeavoured t o break our g u e r i l l a bases,
sabotage our economy, destroy our reserve force, and
use e v e r y p e r f i d i o u s s c h e m e t o develop h i s puppet
troops.

I n J u l y 1953, h e d r o p p e d h i s p a r a t r o o p s deep i n t o
our rear, attacked L a n g S o n , a n d boasted that w e
had suffered h e a v y losses, t h o u g h i n fact o u r losses
were insignificant.
 The enemy had his m y r m i d o n s intensify their
c o m m a n d o activities, e x t e n d i n g the fields of action
of the b a n d i t s i n t h e a r e a s n e a r L a o C a i , L a i C h a u ,
chiefly S o n L a .
I n A u g u s t 1953, the e n e m y w i t h d r e w t h e w h o l e of
his a r m e d forces f r o m N a S a n to the delta, a n d
clamoured that this w i t h d r a w a l w a s a great success.
F o r m e r l y , N a S a n h a d been c o n s i d e r e d b y h i m as
"the Second V e r d u n " , blocking the road to the
S o u t h w a r d advance of c o m m u n i s m , but w h e n they
had to evacuate it i n order to escape destruction, they
declared that N a S a n had lost a l l m i l i t a r y interest.
I n October 1953, N a v a r r e l a u n c h e d t h e H a i A u
(Gull) operation in the region bordering N i n h B i n h
and T h a n h H o a provinces, declared that he had
regained the initiative, paralysed our regular forces
and boasted of his readiness to occupy T h a n h H o a
or attack i n the direction of P h u T h o . T a k i n g a d v a n -
tage of the m a r c h of the e n e m y o n the free zone, one
of o u r m a i n u n i t s w a s ordered t o choose positions
w i t h vantage g r o u n d to destroy his forces, u n i t by
unit. O u r troops had caused the enemy heavy losses
o n the N i n h B i n h m a i n f r o n t as w e l l as i n his rear.
His troops had to w i t h d r a w f r o m N h o Q u a n .

Since the arrival of N a v a r r e in Indo-China to the

first h a l f o f N o v e m b e r e v e r y t h i n g s e e m e d t o r u n f o r
the best: he could intensify "the pacification''' of his
rear, threaten our liberated zones, f e v e r i s h l y " m o b i l -
ize" the y o u t h to develop the puppet a r m y , keep the
initiative i n the w i t h d r a w a l of troops i n some sectors.

45
or. l a u n c h offensives o n others, a n d b o l d l y r e g r o u p
his strategic m o b i l e forces. A t t h a t t i m e t h e e n e m y
thought that o u r A u t u m n - W i n t e r plan began t o fizzle
out, because a part o f o u r regular forces h a d been
w o r n out, o u r other m a i n units w o u l d certainly be
used f o rt h e defence o f t h e free zones. A l l t h e orders
of t h e d a y a n d " w e e k l y letters"' o f G e n . N a v a r r e t o
his officers a n d m e n as w e l l as t h e F r e n c h a n d
A m e r i c a n press, revealed a n u t m o s t o p t i m i s m .
Suddenly, t h eenemy H i g h C o m m a n d received n e w
pieces o f i n t e l l i g e n c e ; there w e r e signs a b o u t t h e
transfer o fone u n i t o four regular forces t othe N o r t h -
West. T h e enemy w a s i n a quandary: should w e
attack i n this a u t u m n - w i n t e r i n t h e direction o f t h e
delta o r t h e N o r t h - W e s t , a n d i f w e attacked i n t h e
direction o f t h e North-West, h o w t o ensure t h e
protection of h i s troops stationed i n L a i Chau, a n d
particularly h o w t o protect Upper Laos ?
After h a v i n g w e i g h e d t h e pros a n d cons, G e n .
N a v a r r e decided t o l a u n c h a n e w operation n o t
mentioned i n h i s former strategic plan.
O n N o v e m b e r 20, 1953, six picked m o b i l e b a t t a l i o n s
were parachuted o n t h e M u o n g T h a n h plain a n d
o c c u p i e d Dien Bien Phu. T h e e n e m y ' s f i r s t i n t e n t i o n
was t o reinforce t h eposition of D i e n Bien Phu, then
get i n t o l i a i s o n w i t h L a i C h a u t o occupy T u a n G i a o
and even Son L a a n dN a San. Thus t h eradius o f h i s
action i nthe N o r t h - W e s t w o u l d extend a n dthe defence
of Upper Laos be ensured.
But, i nm i d - a n d late i n N o v e m b e r , t h ee n e m y found
out n e wsigns; i t seemed that m a n y o f o u r regular
units including t h e most seasoned ones were march-
ing in the direction of the N o r t h - W e s t . These
n e w s at first v a g u e , b e c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e precise.
T h e e n e m y detected the transfer of our troops for
t h e first t i m e i n w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 , r a t h e r r a p i d l y c o m -
pared w i t h the previous years w h e n he realized the
m a i n d i r e c t i o n o f o u r a t t a c k o n l y a t t h e first s h o t , a s
it w a s t h e case i n t h e F r o n t i e r a n d N o r t h - W e s t
campaigns.
An e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t n e w p r o b l e m c l a i m e d t h e
attention of the H i g h C o m m a n d of the F r e n c h Expe-
d i t i o n a r y C o r p s : i n face of o u r a r m y ' s i n t e n t i o n t o
launch a big offensive, had it to w i t h d r a w from
D i e n B i e n P h u or reinforce its garrison and accept
t h e c o m b a t o n t h e s p o t ? O n D e c e m b e r 3, 1 9 5 3 , G e n .
N a v a r r e chose the second solution and ordered to
keep D i e n B i e n P h u at a l l costs, a n d create e v e r y
favourable condition to destroy an i m p o r t a n t part of
our regular forces i n case of attack ; w h e n necessary,
t r o o p s c o u l d be w i t h d r a w n f r o m L a i C h a u t o r e i n f o r c e
Dien B i e n P h u . B a s i n g o n the N a S a n experience he
felt quite confident t h a t w i t h a s t r o n g force a n d a n
up-to-date s y s t e m of defence, D i e n B i e n P h u w o u l d
certainly become an unassailable fortress. A s our
troops marched on the N o r t h - W e s t the enemy had to
find s t r a t a g e m s f u r t h e r t o a t t r a c t o u r r e g u l a r f o r c e s ,
at last if w e persisted i n our offensive, our r e g u l a r
forces w o u l d c e r t a i n l y suffer h e a v y losses. O n l y i n
this w a y could the enemy's strong-points i n the N o r t h -
W e s t be kept, U p p e r L a o s i n s e c u r i t y a n d t h e B a c
B o delta n o t be a t t a c k e d . W i n t e r w o u l d b r i n g n e w
successes. A n d once our r e g u l a r forces w e r e w o r n
out and weary, w h e n the enemy's m o b i l e forces w o u l d

47
be r e g r o u p e d a n d r e i n f o r c e d , G e n . N a v a r r e w o u l d
freely s h i f t to the S p r i n g p l a n , t h a t is t o l a u n c h h i s
strategic offensive o n the S o u t h e r n battlefield as
envisaged in his plan.
T h i s decision of N a v a r r e w a s of a n e x t r e m e l y g r e a t
strategic importance. After h a v i n g taken it, the enemy
axed his propaganda about this success, stressing
t h a t t h e o c c u p a t i o n a n d r e i n f o r c e m e n t of D i e n B i e n
P h u w e r e a n i r r e f u t a b l e p r o o f of t h e r e n e w e d s t r e n g t h
acquired by the E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps and of its h i g h
mobile strategic possibilities. After the days of
anxiety, o p t i m i s m w i t h i n the official circles and i n
the French and A m e r i c a n o p i n i o n increased m o r e
than previously.
In the m e a n t i m e our regular forces were actively
preparing for the A u t u m n - W i n t e r offensives and
g r a d u a l l y t i g h t e n i n g its e n c i r c l e m e n t of D i e n B i e n
Phu.
A new page began i n the h i s t o r y of t h e w a r * i n
Indo-China.

48
 Ill

OUR STRATEGIC DIRECTION

O F T H E W I N T E R 1 9 5 3 - S P R I N G 1954 CAMPAIGN
OUR MAJOR A T T A C K S ON T H E CO O R D I N A T E D
FRONTS PRIOR TO THE DIEN BIEN PHU
CAMPAIGN

A s h a s been said i n previous chapters, V i e t n a m ' s

military situation i n summer 1953underwent impor-
t a n t changes. O n o u r side, f r o m t h e F r o n t i e r c a m -
paign onward, o u r troops grew powerfully, w o n
successive victories i n m a n y offensive campaigns
and firmly maintained the initiative o n the B a c B o
front. O n t h e e n e m y side, h e suffered successive
defeats, h i s effectives w e r e destroyed, t h e area u n d e r
his control n a r r o w e d d o w n : h e couldn't help u s i n g
new measures such as developing h i s puppet troops,
reinforcing h i s m o b i l e forces i n a n a t t e m p t t o save
the situation. A s o u r forces o n t h e N o r t h e r n battle-
field w e r e m a r k e d l y s t r o n g e r t h a n o n o t h e r s , a n d t h e
Bac B o delta w a s important politically as well as

4 DBP 49
strategically, the enemy w a s ever m 6 r e prone to
concentrate his forces to defend the Bac B o delta,
r e g a r d i n g it as "a key p o s i t i o n i n S o u t h - E a s t A s i a " .

A s e a r l y as 1953, o u r P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e h a d
analysed profoundly and scientifically the military
situation on various fronts in V i e t n a m in particular,
and throughout Indo-China in general.

The Central C o m m i t t e e assessed that due to

the u n e v e n d e v e l o p m e n t of o u r forces o n v a r i o u s
fronts in Bac Bo, T r u n g B o and N a m Bo, the bulk
of the e n e m y m a i n forces w a s g r a d u a l l y concentrated
in Bac Bo, w h i l e o n other fronts he w a s exposed o n
m a n y sectors. I n Bac Bo, his forces w e r e regrouped
in the delta w h e r e a s o n m o u n t a i n fronts, he w a s
relatively weaker, and the topographic conditions
there w e r e favourable to us and u n f a v o u r a b l e to the
enemy.

Seasoned i n great campaigns, our regular forces

whose combativeness h a d been raised, acquired n e w
a b i l i t i e s i n m o b i l e w a r f a r e as w e l l as i n siege w a r f a r e .
H o w e v e r , as h a s been p r o v e d by t h e e x p e r i e n c e s
d r a w n i n t h e M i d l a n d s c a m p a i g n . R o a d JVb 1 8 c a m -
paign and H a - N a m - N i n h c a m p a i g n i n 1951, o n the
delta front, w i t h our a r m e d forces mustered to a
certain degree, w e could g a i n the absolute s u p e r i o r i t y
o n l y i n a s h o r t p e r i o d of t i m e . A s s o o n as t h e e n e m y ,
t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of his possibilities i n r a p i d r e i n f o r -
cement, b r o u g h t i n m o r e m o b i l e forces, w e t h e n m e t
w i t h m a n y dilTiculties i n c o n t i n u i n g the development
of o u r offensive. O n m o u n t a i n f r o n t s , it w a s clear

50
that our troops had more favourable conditions t o
destroy the enemy, w h o w a s relatively scattered, and
w a s handicapped i nthe use a n d development o f the
effectiveness o f his a r t i l l e r y a n d a i r force, etc. H i s
supply and reinforcement, o n l y carried b y air, w e r e
greatly limited. O u r troops had m a n y possibilities t o
secure and m a i n t a i n a m i l i t a r y superiority t h r o u g h o u t
the offensive c a m p a i g n o r i ngiven directions d u r i n g
the campaign, hence w e could score great successes.

Proceeding f r o m the foregoing analysis and con-

sidering the destruction o f e n e m y effectives a s t h e
m a i n task, our P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e put forth
a most correct strategic direction w h i c h consisted in
concentrating our forces to launch offensives in
strategically important directions where the enemy
was relatively weak in order to wipe out part of his
effectives, liberate territory, at the same time com-
pelling him to scatter his forces to cope with us on
the vital points which they could not abandon ;
moreover the scattering of his forces created new
favourable conditions for us to put out of action more
of his effectives. T o speak m e r e concretely, o n the
front o f t h e B a c B o delta, besides t h em a i n and
immediate task w h i c h was t o continue speeding u p
guerilla w a r f a r e i n the e n e m y rear, w e could also use
part o f our regular forces i n m i n o r battles. A s for
major campaigns, they should be launched i n other
directions. B y s o doing w ew o u l d gradually create
conditions t oproceed to the liberation o f the delta.

Once m o r e the P a r t y Central C o m m i t t e e re-affirmed

the strategic direction o f t h e resistance war i n

51
general a n dt h edirection o f operations o f our a r m y
in particular as follows, " T h e general g u i d i n g prin-
c i p l e o f o u r l i b e r a t i o n w a r i s t o c o n d u c t a long resis-
tance war by our own means, t h e r e f o r e w e m u s t n o t
be s u b j e c t i v e , u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e e n e m y , t a k e h a s t y
steps and i n d u l g e ourselves i n recklessness. T o s t r i k e
surely a n d advance cautiously, strike t o w i n , strike
o n l y w h e n success is certain : i f i t i s not, t h e n d o n ' t
strike". Only fighting with victory w a s allowed.
Fighting without victory was n o tallowed.
O u r r e g u l a r forces had t o take m o b i l e w a r f a r e as
the m a i n tactics. W e used rapid m o b i l e w a r f a r e t o
destroy the e n e m y effectives part b y part. W e a v a i l e d
ourselves o f o u r s u p e r i o r i t y i n a r m e d forces t o
destroy t h e enemy wholesale i n i n d i v i d u a l battles,
not t o w e a r out, n o t t o r o u t h i m . A g a i n i t w a s neces-
sary for our troops t o co-ordinate siege w a r f a r e w i t h
mobile warfare. This w a s a necessity t o b r i n g our
offensive c a m p a i g n s t o great victories.
W e h a d predicted t h a t after t h e cease-fire o n t h e
Korean front the French a n d A m e r i c a n imperialists'
new plot w o u l d be their endeavour t o increase their
forces and extend their a g g r e s s i v e w a r i n I n d o - C h i n a .
The military situation i n summer 1953 became
m a r k e d l y tense especially after t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f
Gen. N a v a r r e as Commander-in-Chief o f t h e French
Expeditionary Corps i n Indo-China.
O u r people a n d a r m y s t o o d u n d a u n t e d i n face o f
the enemy's n e w plots and manoeuvres. O u r task w a s
resolutely t o fight i n order t o smash t h e N a v a r r e
plan, t o defeat i t . B u t w h a t s h o u l d be o u r strategic
d i r e c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n ? I n face of t h e e n e m y ' s

52
new plot, h o w should *we analyse t h esituation a n d
define t h e principles o f a c t i o n i n a precise w a y s o
that victory might be guaranteed ?
The concrete problem w a s :
The enemy was m u s t e r i n g a huge force i n the B a c
B o delta, concentrating a n unprecedentedly great
m o b i l e f o r c e , fiercely r a i d i n g h i s r e a r , a n d l a u n c h i n g
big a n d small offensives against o u r free zones,
should w e either concentrate our forces t o cope w i t h
the enemy o r despatch t h e m t o launch offensives i n
other directions ?
T h e first s o l u t i o n w a s : t h e e n e m y w a s c o n c e n t r a -
t i n g his forces i n t h eB a c B o delta t h r e a t e n i n g our
free zones, then w eshould m u s t e r all o u r r e g u l a r for-
ces o r t h e b u l k o f t h e m i n t h e p l a i n t o d e s t r o y p a r t
of the e n e m y t r o o p s a n d t o c o - o r d i n a t e w i t h g u e r i l l a
w a r f a r e in order t odefend our free zones for a certain
time. A f t e r the e n e m y h a d suffered c e r t a i n losses, and
our free zones had been consolidated, w e s h o u l d either
leave o u r regular forces operate i n t h e delta o r
transfer them i n other directions, according t o t h e
situation.
The second solution w a s : the e n e m y w a s concen-
t r a t i n g h i s forces i n t h e B a c B o delta w h e r e t h e
conditions of combat were more favourable t o h i m
t h a n t o o u rregular forces, t o u s e o u rforces there
w o u l d b r i n g u s l i m i t e d successes and w e m i g h t suffer
losses. T h e r e f o r e , i t w a s necessary for u s t o t r a n s f e r
our regular forces i n other directions w h e r e the e n e m y
w a s relatively exposed, t o destroy bis effectives .more

53
 advantageously a n dcompel h f m t o scatter h i s forces
to cope w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n ; m e a n w h i l e w e should
speed u p guerilla w a r f a r e i n t h e e n e m y ' s rear
throughout t h e country. I f t h e enemy attacked o u r
free zones, h i s forces w o u l d be ever m o r e scattered ;
and o u rvictories i n t h e directions w h e r e t h e e n e m y
was exposed, w o u l d automatically compel h i m t o
w i t h d r a w f r o m o u r free zones.
A t that time, w e could already see t h e m a i n lines
of t h e N a v a r r e plan, b u t t h e e n e m y ' s p l o t d i d n o t
concretely come t o light yet. O u r P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m - '
mittee studied a n d analysed t h e situation, firmly
grasped t h e spirit a n d f u n d a m e n t a l strategic direc-
tion p u t forth previously t o proceed t o t h e adoption
of t h e d i r e c t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e W i n t e r 1953 —
S p r i n g 1 9 5 4 c a m p a i g n . T h i s s t r a t e g y w a s : to use
part of our regular forces to launch offensives upon
the directions where the enemy was exposed, at the
same time to seek for opportunities to destroy the
enemy in mobile warfare in the direction where he
could attack deep into our free zones. Meanwhile we
would speed up guerilla warfare on all fronts of the
enemy rear, and actively carry out all necessary
preparations among the people, the local troops, the
people's militiamen and the guerillas • in the free
zones, so that our regular forces had a free hand to
fulfil their tasks.
T h e operational plan w a s i n i t s b r o a d l i n e s :
a) T ou s e part o f o u rr e g u l a r forces t o l a u n c h a n
offensive i n t h e north-western direction, destroy t h e
e n e m y w h o w a s still occupying L a i C h a u , thus libe-
rating thewhole North-West.

54
 b) T o propose the P a t h e t L a o L i b e r a t i o n t r o o p s to
co-ordinate with the Vietnamese volunteers units in
order to launch an offensive in the direction of
M i d d l e Laos, destroy the e n e m y effectives, and en-
large the liberated zone.
c) A s t h e e n e m y ' s a c t i o n w a s n o t y e t c l e a r l y seen
our immediate tactics w a s to post an i m p o r t a n t part
of o u r r e g u l a r forces at a c e r t a i n p o i n t , c o m p l e t e l y
conceal t h e m , and keep ourselves ready for action.
I n face of our troops' offensive i n the n o r t h - w e s t e r n
direction, it w a s possible that the e n e m y w o u l d send
his reinforcements t h e r e ; in this circumstance, we
w o u l d dispatch m o r e regular forces i n that direction
to w i p e out his effectives. T h e e n e m y m i g h t also
attack deep i n s o m e d i r e c t i o n of the V i e t B a c base
to cut our lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d supply, destroy
the lines of reinforcements of o u r forefronts, a n d
cause losses to our free zones, at the s a m e t i m e
compel our regular forces to w i t h d r a w f r o m the
N o r t h - W e s t . I n this case, w e w o u l d seek w a y s a n d
means to attract the e n e m y deep i n t o our rear and
then use p a r t of our r e g u l a r forces t o put h i m o u t
of a c t i o n .
d) I n the delta, w e w o u l d speed up guerilla w a r -
fare in the enemy's rear, consolidate and develop our
guerilla bases and guerilla zones, undertake effective
co-ordinated operations w i t h the aforesaid offensives.
If the e n e m y attacked our free zones, w e w o u l d w e a r
h i m out and tried to destroy p a r t of his effectives.
Above was the operational plan worked out
for our a r m y on the m a i n battlefield — the N o r t h e r n
battlefield.

55
 The P a r t y Central C o m m i t t e e again based itself on
the enemy situation and ours, and o n the aforesaid
strategic direction, t o define the W i n t e r - S p r i n g ope-
rational plan for the Southern battlefield whose broad
lines w e r e as f o l l o w s :
a) I n the S o u t h , w e had a large free area w h i c h
w a s the Fifth Zone w h e r e our a r m e d forces w e r e
relatively strong. A t that time, w e had received
reliable i n f o r m a t i o n about the enemy preparations
for an attack to occupy o u r free zones. I n the F i f t h
Zone, w e faced a p r o b l e m w h i c h w a s also as difficult
t o be s o l v e d as t h a t i n t h e N o r t h : t h e e n e m y w a s p r e -
p a r i n g to launch an offensive u p o n our free zones;
should w e use the b u l k of o u r r e g u l a r forces to cope
w i t h the enemy's scheme and defend our free zones or
rush them to another direction in which w e had m a n y
m o r e f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s t o d e s t r o y t h e e n e m y effec-
tives.

W e reached a bold and precise resolution w h i c h

w a s to concentrate the b u l k of o u r r e g u l a r forces i n
the Fifth Zone to launch an offensive upon the front
of the W e s t e r n H i g h P l a t e a u x i n order to d e s t r o y
p a r t O'f t h e e n e m y e f f e c t i v e s a n d l i b e r a t e p a r t o f t h e
territory. The people, the local a r m e d forces, the
people's m i l i t i a m e n a n d guerillas, together w i t h a
s m a l l part of our regular forces, had the task of
m a k i n g active preparations to cope w i t h the enemy's
scheme of encroaching u p o n o u r free zones- We
assessed that the e n e m y m i g h t attack and t e m p o r a r i l y
occupy p a r t of o u r free zones, b u t if o u r offensive
developed favourably on the W e s t e r n H i g h Plateaux

56
The V.P.A. H i g h Coiiini.inci w o r k i n g out the plan of operations
front, he would finally be compelled t o w i t h d r a w
his troops f r o m t h earea h e h a d just occupied a n d
perhaps .even f r o m m a n y o t h e r localities.
b) W i t h r e g a r d t o the N a m B o f r o n t a n d t h a t o f
the southernmost part o f T r u n g Bo, our task w a s t o
speed u p guerilla w a r f a r e , take advantage o f the n e w
favourable conditions created b y the transfer o f t h e
bulk o f t h e enemy's forces t o other directions, t o
multiply small attacks i n which w e were certain o f
victory, w e a r o u ta n d destroy t h ee n e m y effectives
part b y part, intensify the political w o r k a m o n g the
puppet soldiers, a n denlarge o u r g u e r i l l a bases a n d
zones. O u r people and a r m y i n the free N i n t h Z o n e
also made active preparations t o cope w i t h a n
eventual enemy offensive.
The aforesaid operational plan proceeded f r o m the
following fundamental principles o n t h e strategic
directions and direction of operations :
First, i n t h e l i b e r a t i o n w a r w a g e d b y o u r p e o p l e ,
the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l strategic p r i n c i p l e w a st o
d e s t r o y t h e enemy effectives and increase our forces ;
o n l y b y d e s t r o y i n g t h e e n e m y effectives could w e
change the balance o f forces between the e n e m y and
us a n d liberate territory. I f d u e t o t h e defence o r
liberation o f territory w e d i dnot steadily abide b y
the principle o f d e s t r o y i n g t h ee n e m y effectives, i n
the end our forces w o u l d be easily w o r n out and w e
w o u l d be unable t o defend territory, l e t alone t o
liberate it. T h e r e f o r e i tw a s necessary f i r m l y t o g r a s p
this m a i n principle.
Second, w e h a d t o s t r i k e t o w i n , s t r i k e o n l y w h e n
success is certain, strike t o w i p e out the e n e m y . A t

57
the s t a r t o f t h ew a r . o u rm i l i t a r y forces w e r e m u c h
weaker than those o f the enemy, i f w e did not firmly
grasp the principle of striking t o w i n a n dt o destroy
the enemy, our forces could n o tincrease, a n d g r o w
stronger. W i t h regard t o o u ra r m y which w a s that
of a n o p p r e s s e d n a t i o n , o f t h e p o o r t o i l i n g p e o p l e ,
it w a s necessary f o r u s f i r m l y t o g r a s p t h i s p r i n c i p l e :
to strike only w h e n success is certain ; if i tis not, then
don't strike; t o wipe out the enemy but not t o wear
h i m out. W e h a d t o d o i n such a w a y that after a
combat, after a campaign, our troops g r e w stronger,
and t h ee n e m y t r o o p s w e a k e r .
Third, b e c a u s e w e w a n t e d t o d e s t r o y t h e e n e m y
effectives a n d t o s t r i k e o n l y t o w i n a n d n o tt o b e
defeated, because w e h a d t o realize these goals i n
conditions of t h eenemy being strong, a n dw e mili-
t a r i l y w e a k , o u r strategic direction could n o t allow
us t o choose other directions t h a n those w h e r e t h e
enemy w a s exposed, a n d relatively w e a k a n d w h e r e
w e h a dm a n y favourable conditions i n a l laspects i n
order t o concentrate o u r absolute superiority i n
matters of troops a n d firepower, f o r combats of
wholesale destruction. D r a w i n g experiences f r o m the
successes a n dfailures i n t h efirst y e a r s o f t h e resis-
tance w a r , w e realized a l lthe clearer this i m p o r t a n t
principle : t o attack the sectors w h e r e the e n e m y w a s
exposed o r r e l a t i v e l y w e a k - A t t h eb e g i n n i n g o f t h i s
chapter i t h a s been recalled that o u rP a r t y C e n t r a l
Committee h a d correctly reaffirmed t h e strategic
direction of o u r regular forces: t o spearhead o u r
offensives upon t h e fronts w h e r e t h e e n e m y w a s
exposed, i n the i m p o r t a n t directions w h e r e the e n e m y

58
was relatively weak, i n order t o destroy h i m . W h e n
w o r k i n g o u t t h e A u t u m n - W i n t e r 1 9 5 3 — 1954 p l a n ,
w e based ourselves o n the direction set b y the P a r t y
Central Committee.
Fourth, b e c a u s e o u r a i m w a s t o d e s t r o y t h e e n e m y
effectives, attack t h e e n e m y w h e r e h e w a s r e l a t i v e l y
weak, a n d create favourable conditions t o destroy
him, i nthe practical m i l i t a r y conditions o b t a i n i n g at
that time, whose major feature w a s the concentration
by the enemy o f a fairly p o w e r f u l m o b i l e force i n t h e
Bac B o delta, w e s h o u l d not launch large-scale offen-
sives u p o n that p o w e r f u l m o b i l e m a s s but seek w a y s
and means t o compel h i m t o scatter h i sforces, first
of a l l i n m a n y directions, i n this w a y h e w o u l d be
weaker i n every direction, and w ew o u l d have m a n y
m o r e conditions t o w i p e h i m out ; the best t h i n g w a s
to scatter h i m i n t h e directions u n f a v o u r a b l e t o h i m
in topographical conditions, i n t h e use o f weapons
a n d t e c h n i q u e , i n t r a n s p o r t s a n d s u p p l y , etc., a n d
thus we w o u l d have m a n y more conditions t o destroy
a greater part o f his effectives. I f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t
point i n t h e Navarre plan w a s t o overcome a l l
difficulties, u s e a l l measures, resolutely concentrate
forces, b u i l d a t a l l costs a strongest strategic m o b i l e
m a s s t o cope v i c t o r i o u s l y w i t h o u r offensives, a n d
moreover, t o launch large-scale offensives t o destroy
our r e g u l a r forces, t h e v e r y i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i n o u r
Winter-Spring operational plan was t o overcome all
d i f f i c u l t i e s , u s e a l l m e a s u r e s , keep firm the initiative,
determinedly compel the enemy to scatter, s m a s h h i s
concentrated mobile mass, compel h i m t o split h i s
r e g u l a r forces i n v a r i o u s directions, t h e n choose t h e

59
directions most favourable t o u s t o destroy h i m . W e
strongly believed that w e could d o that because w e
had grasped o n eof t h ei m p o r t a n t contradictions o f
the enemy's aggressive w a r : t h e contradiction
between t h econcentration o f forces a n d occupation
of t e r r i t o r y , t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e b u i l d - u p
of a l a r g e - s c a l e m o b i l e force a n d t h e s c a t t e r i n g o f h i s
forces t o v a r i o u s regions, b e t w e e n t h e strategic
offensive a n d strategic defensive.
Our Winter-Spring operational plan also crystal-
lized a n d emphasized t h e principle of dynamism,
initiative, mobility and rapidity of decision in face
of new situations.
Dynamism and initiative m e a n t t o seize t h e good
opportunities, choose t h e front favourable t o u s a n d
unfavourable t o t h e e n e m y t o attack h i m , a n d des-
troy h i s effectives; i t m e a n t determinedly t o avoid
the situation i nw h i c h w ehad t ocope passively w i t h
the enemy, but o n the c o n t r a r y w ehad t o compel the
enemy t o despatch h i s troops wherever w e l i k e d ;
again i tmeant that i f the opportunities did not exist
w e w o u l d create t h e m t o destroy the enemy.
A g a i n w h y d i d w e n e e d mobility and rapidity of
decision in face of new situations ? F o r t h e e n e m y ' s
situation could change rapidly, partly because h e
had a concentrated force and m a n y means o f trans-
port, and partly because our activities compelled h i m
to react. O n a l l f r o n t s i n g e n e r a l a n d o n each direc-
tion i n particular, t h e enemy could w i t h d r a w h i s
troops f r o m one sector t o reinforce the other, a n d this
reinforcement could be great o r small, h e m i g h t
attack our free zones o r m i g h t not, and if h e attacked

60
our free zones, he m i g h t choose one sector or the
other. O u r t r o o p s h a d t o be m o s t m o b i l e a n d r a p i d
in order n o t to let slip a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o destroy
the enemy.
H o w s h o u l d be m o b i l i t y a n d r a p i d i t y of d e c i s i o n
in face of n e w s i t u a t i o n s ? T h i s m e a n t the r e a d i n e s s
t o fight t h e e n e m y i n a n y c o n d i t i o n w h e n h e w a s n o t
yet reinforced, w h e n he had been reinforced or w a s
w i t h d r a w i n g : w e w e r e r e a d y t o fight e i t h e r i n t h e
d e l t a , or i n t h e m o u n t a i n r e g i o n s ; if c o n d i t i o n s c h a n g e d
unfavourably to us w h i l e w e were c a r r y i n g out our
operational plan, we immediately transferred our
t r o o p s to o t h e r d i r e c t i o n s or w i t h d r e w t h e m ; if the
situation changed suddenly the forces transferred
t o one d i r e c t i o n w o u l d be i m m e d i a t e l y d e s p a t c h e d t o
another. W i t h regard to the army, m o b i l i t y and
r a p i d i t y of decision i n face of n e w s i t u a t i o n s m e a n t
constant readiness to fight on whatever battlefront,
at any time, i n any f o r m , w i t h a n e n e m y i n his
position or on the march, to engage i n mobile w a r -
fare, siege w a r f a r e or guerilla w a r f a r e provided w e
could w i p e o u t the e n e m y effectives. I n short, m o b i l i t y
a n d r a p i d i t y of d e c i s i o n i n face of n e w s i t u a t i o n s w a s
a n expression of d y n a m i s m a n d initiative, d r a w i n g
its source f r o m the d e t e r m i n a t i o n to w i p e o u t the
e n e m y effectives. A l l ideas a n d actions w e r e a i m e d
at reaching the basic goal w h i c h w a s the destruction
of e n e m y effectives.
A g e n e r a l s u r v e y of a l l f r o n t s t h r o u g h o u t the
country showed that our Winter-Spring operational
plan a i m e d at f r u s t r a t i n g the N a v a r r e plan, w a s the
e x p r e s s i o n of a c o - o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s

61
i n B a c B o , T r u n g B o a n d N a m B o , etc., t h e e x p r e s -
sion of a close c o - o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n r e g u l a r w a r f a r e
on the m a i n fronts and guerilla w a r f a r e i n the
enemy's rear, a close c o - o r d i n a t i o n between the task
of d e s t r o y i n g t h e e n e m y efTectives a n d t h a t o f l i b e r a t -
i n g territory, w i t h the d e s t r u c t i o n of e n e m y efTectives
as t h e m a i n t a s k .
The realization of the aforesaid tactics m e a n t that
w e could take advantage of the enemy's w e a k points
and contradictions to destroy h i m ; contradiction
between the consolidation of his defence system i n
the t e m p o r a r i l y occupied zones and the ofTensive
u p o n our free zones, c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n o c c u p a t i o n
and pacification of the S o u t h e r n battlefield o n the one
hand and the transfer of his troops to Bac B o o n the
other, contradiction between territorial occupation
and military concentration.
T h e realization of the aforesaid tactics m e a n t that
w e could destroy part of the e n e m y efTectives, disperse
his m o b i l e forces, liberate part of the territory, build
n e w bases, create n e w fronts, thus creating conditions
to d e s t r o y m a n y m o r e e n e m y efTectives.
T h e realization of the aforesaid tactics m e a n t that
w e could constantly keep our initiative, and drive
the e n e m y into a m o r e and m o r e passive situation.
The realization of the aforesaid tactics m e a n t that
w e c o u l d f r u s t r a t e t h e n e w e n e m y p l o t , sma«sh t h e
N a v a r r e plan like w e had done w i t h D e Tassigny's.

Such were our strategic direction and operational

p l a n i n W i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - S p r i n g 1954.
 T o carry out these direction and plan, i n the
regions threatened by the enemy, w e had scattered
our stores, t r a n s f e r r e d o u r offices and schools deeper
in o u r territory, m a d e p r e p a r a t i o n s t o cope w i t h
every enemy offensive by our o w n means. I n the
enemy's rear, the people together w i t h the a r m e d
forces a n d p a r a - m i l i t a r y t r o o p s w e r e f e v e r i s h l y
preparing to parry the enemy raids.
I n O c t o b e r h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s o f dan cong h a d
been mobilized to prepare for v a r i o u s fronts ; the
c o m m u n i c a t i o n lines w h i c h had been w i d e n e d , w e r e
repaired.
In m i d - N o v e m b e r , a part of our r e g u l a r forces
marched to the front-line, i n the direction of L a i
Chau. The Vietnamese volunteers, together with the
Pathet L a o Liberation troops, also got themselves
prepared to operate i n M i d d l e Laos. O u r W i n t e r -
S p r i n g offensives w e r e about to begin.
A t t h i s v e r y p e r i o d O'f t i m e , t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n
underwent a n e w change.
T h e e n e m y detected the t r a n s f e r of part of our
regular forces i n the N o r t h - W e s t e r n direction. On
N o v e m b e r 20, 1953, p a r t o f h i s m o b i l e forces was
parachuted o n Dien Bien P h u to occupy it. A new
situation w a s thus created.
W e t i m e l y assessed t h i s n e w s i t u a t i o n as f o l l o w s :
About the enemy's l a n d i n g of his troops o n D i e n
B i e n P h u , t h o u g h w e could n o t foresee its exact t i m e
a n d place, i t h a p p e n e d w i t h i n t h e l i m i t of o u r p r e v i -
sion that if the N o r t h - W e s t was threatened the enemy
w o u l d send reinforcements i n t h a t direction. T h u s ,

63
 in face o f the threat o f our attack, the e n e m y losing
his initiative, had t o despatch part o f his mobile
forces to D i e n Bien P h u i n order to protect the N o r t h -
West, cover Upper Laos, and smash our offensive plan.
H o w w o u l d the enemy situation change in the near
future? The enemy m i g h t defend Dien Bien P h u and
Lai C h a u a t the s a m e time, w i t h the protection o f
Dien Bien P h u a s the m a i n task.
If threatened h e could r e g r o u p his forces t o one
single position w h i c h h e w o u l d reinforce t o some
extent; w e did not yet k n o w exactly the position h e
w o u l d choose, but it w o u l d b eprobably D i e n B i e n P h u .
If being m o r e h e a v i l y threatened he m i g h t reinforce
that position t o some extent and transform i t into
a fortified entrenched c a m p (in this case h e m i g h t
choose D i e n Bien P h u a s a premise t o build h i s
position) but h em i g h t also w i t h d r a w .
A t that time w e could not yet affirm that the enemy
would stay o rw i t h d r a w , that h ew o u l d stay a t one
point o r a t t w o , for a long o r short time, that h e
would send i n reinforcements i n great o r small
n u m b e r s first, b e c a u s e w e d i d n o t y e t h a v e r e l i a b l e
information t o foresee the enemy scheme ; second,
because the enemy also faced m a n y difficulties : i f h e
w i t h d r e w h em i g h t lose t e r r i t o r y , i f h e sent i n great
reinforcements h e w o u l d scatter his mobile forces
and m i g h t be destroyed, therefore h em i g h t not have
a well-defined plan, o r h e might have i t which h e
might change w h e n h e met w i t h difficulties arising
from our action.
H o w e v e r changeable the enemy situation m i g h t b e
the landing by the enemy of his air-borne troops on

64
Dien Bien Phu was advantageous to us. I t l a i d b a r e
the contradiction o f t h e enemy between occupation
of t e r r i t o r y a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f forces, b e t w e e n t h e
occupation o ft h em o u n t a i n positions a n dthat o f t h e
delta positions.
In consideration o f t h e aforesaid assessment, t h e
units o f o u r r e g u l a r forces w h i c h w e r e m a r c h i n g t o
the Nor t h- W es t , w e r e ordered i m m e d i a t e l y t o attack
and destroy the enemy at L a i C h a u ; a t the same time,
a w i n g o f o u r forces advanced r a p i d l y t o w a r d s t h e
North o fDien Bien P h u , cutthe retreat of the enemy
from L a i Chau t oDien Bien Phu, prevented h i m from
m a r c h i n g f r o m D i e n B i e n P h u t o meet h i s forces
c o m i n g f r o m L a i C h a u , a t t h e s a m e time w e closed
on t h eenemy a t D i e n Bien P h u , encircled h i m a n d
prepared for t h ebattle t o come.

LIBERATION OF L A I CHAU,
ENCIRCLEMENT O F DIEN BIEN PHU

O n D e c e m b e r 10, 1953, w e opened fire o n t h e L a i

Chau front. F o r m e r l y w eh a dw i p e d o u to r forced t o
surrender thousands of bandits i n t h e regions of
Muong L a andChau Thuan.
The enemy at L a i Chau h a d withdrawn part of
his forces t o D i e n B i e n P h u b y a i r f r o m D e c e m b e r 7,
1953. T h e r e m a i n d e r c o m p r i s i n g t w o b a t t a l i o n s o f
puppet soldiers a n d 23 companies, w a s prepared t o
withdraw b y t h e m o u n t a i n tracks t o rally Dien
Bien P h u .

5DBF 65
 H a v i n g been i n f o r m e d o f the w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e
enemy from L a i Chau, our troops immediately march-
e d f o r w a r d a l o n g R o a d W e 4 1 , n o w R o a d JMb 6 , t o
pursue him. O n December 10, w e d e s t r o y e d the
outpost of P a - H a m , about 30 k m from L a i Chau. O n
D e c e m b e r 12, 1 9 5 3 o u r t r o o p s l i b e r a t e d L a i C h a u t o w n .
O n D e c e m b e r 13, o u r t r o o p s w i p e d o u t t h e e n e m y
in r e t r e a t at M u o n g P o n a n d P u S a n peak. T w o d a y s
before, w e had destroyed part of the e n e m y forces
c o m i n g f r o m D i e n B i e n P h u a t T a u v i l l a g e . 10 k m
north of D i e n B i e n P h u .
After more than ten days and ten nights of fighting,
pursuit, encirclement and destruction in this m o u n -
tain region, our troops liberated the r e m a i n i n g part
of the e n e m y - o c c u p i e d z o n e i n L a i C h a u p r o v i n c e ,
w i p i n g o u t 24 companies.
After our victory in the south-western part of N i n h
Binh province, the L a i C h a u campaign w a s a great
success of our troops i n w i n t e r 1953-spring 1954.
This victory gave m o r e confidence to our a r m y and
people.
Another consequence of the L a i C h a u battle w a s
that the enemy had to reinforce Dien Bien P h u hastily
t o a v o i d t h e d a n g e r of b e i n g d e s t r o y e d . T h e N a v a r r e ' s
r e g r o u p i n g p l a n b e g a n to be f r u s t r a t e d .
Besides the Bac Bo delta, Dien Bien Phu became
a second point where the enemy concentrated his
forces.
Our troops hurriedly encircled the Dien Bien Phu
fortified entrenched camp.

66
 LIBERATION OF THAKHEK
AND SEVERAL REGIONS IN M I D D L E LAOS

Parallel with the preparations to attack L a i Chau,

orders were given to the Vietnamese volunteers t o
co-operate w i t h t h e P a t h e t L a o L i b e r a t i o n troops t o
launch a n offensive o n the M i d d l e L a o s front, where
the e n e m y w a s relatively exposed. E a r l y i n December,
detecting our activity, the enemy hastily rushed
reinforcements t o this sector.
O n December 21 and 22 the Pathct L a o a n d Viet-
namese units launched t w o successive attacks upon
K h a m H e and Banaphao near the V i e t n a m - L a o s
frontier, destroying completely t w o enemy- mobile
battalions, the greater part of another mobile batta-
lion a n d a battalion o f artillery. After a series o f
victories the Pathet L a o a n d Vietnamese units rushed
towards Thakhek while pursuing the enemy i n his
flight a l o n g R o a d JSfs 9 .
The enemy bewildered withdrew from Thakhek to
Seno, a m i l i t a r y base near Savannakhet. O n Decem-
ber 2 5 , t h e P a t h e t L a o L i b e r a t i o n u n i t s entered libe-
rated Thakhek, a t o w n o n the bank of the M e k o n g .
T h e l i b e r a t e d z o n e s w e r e e x t e n d e d t o R o a d N° 9 . A
number o f enemy posts stationed there w e r e also
destroyed.
This w a s another great victory of o u r troops i nthe
w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - s p r i n g 1954 c a m p a i g n . T o face o u r acti-
vity i n time the enemy h a d t o transfer hastily his
mobile forces f r o m t h e B a c B o delta a n d other f r o n t s
to reinforce S e n o a n d t u r n i t i n t o a b i g fortified
entrenched camp i n order t o impede the Pathet L a o

67
and Vietnamese units in tlieir advance into Lower
Laos. Navarre was compelled to scatter his forces
over several points.
Besides the Bac Bo delta and Dien Bien Phu, Seno
became the third point where the enemy concen-
trated his forces.

LIBERATION O F T H E B O L O V E N S H I G H L A N D
AND T H E TOWN OF A T T O P E U

Simultaneously with the attack on Middle Laos,

one unit of the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces
crossed dangerous mountain regions and advanced
deep into Lower Laos where it effected adjunction with
the local armed forces.
Taking advantage of the exposure of the enemy,
on December 30 and 31, the Pathet Lao and Viet-
namese forces defeated an enemy battalion in the
region of Attopeu and liberated this town. Following
up their victory, they advanced toward Saravane and
liberated the whole Bolovens Highland in Lower Laos.
The enemy had to despatch reinforcements to Pakse
town.

LIBERATION O F K O N T U M
AND THE NORTH OF T H E W E S T E R N H I G H L A N D S

Though defeated in many sectors, the enemy still

remained subjective in appraising the situation. Due
to the easy occupation of Dien Bien Phu he thought

G8
we were not strong enough to attack it, not only
because it w a s a v e r y s t r o n g fortified entrenched
camp, but the distance w h i c h separated i t f r o m our
rear created insuperable obstacles for us i n the
supply of food if w e w a n t e d to attack it. H e t h o u g h t
that our many-sided attacks were due to our hesitancy
in tackling with Dien Bien P h u and that w e w o u l d
s o o n be o b l i g e d t o e v a c u a t e t h e N o r t h - W e s t b e c a u s e
o f s u p p l y d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e n h e w o u l d find t h e m e a n s
to destroy part of o u r r e g u l a r forces and c a r r y on
h i s p l a n t o o c c u p y T u a n G i a o , S o n La-, a n d e v e n t u a l l y
to return to N a San.
It w a s this same subjective appraisal w h i c h made
h i m m o b i l i z e o n J a n u a r y 2 0 , 15 b a t t a l i o n s t o l a u n c h
an offensive upon the southern part of P h u Y e n i n
the Fifth Zone. This was the A t l a n t e operation, a
strategic ofi'ensive e n v i s a g e d by the N a v a r r e p l a n ,
a i m e d at o c c u p y i n g our w h o l e free zone i n S o u t h
Trung Bo.
Despite the e n e m y ' s a t t a c k u p o n o u r free zone, o u r
troops in the Fifth Zone carried o n their plan most
resolutely, l e a v i n g behind o n l y a s m a l l part of their
forces t o cope w i t h the e n e m y a n d cover o u r rear,
while the bulk attacked the W e s t e r n H i g l a n d s , a
strategically i m p o r t a n t sector w h e r e the e n e m y w a s
relatively exposed.
T h e offensive began o n J a n u a r y 26. T h e next day,
w e destroyed the M a n d e l sub-sector, the s t r o n g e s t
one, then w e w i p e d o u t the post of D a k t o and liberat-
ed the w h o l e n o r t h o f K o n t u m p r o v i n c e . O n F e b r u a r y
17, w e l i b e r a t e d K o n t u m t o w n , s w e p t t h e e n e m y f r o m

69
t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of t h e W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s a n d
a d v a n c e d a s f a r a s R o a d JVe 1 9 . M e a n w h i l e , w e a t t a c k -
ed P l e i k u t o w n - T h e e n e m y b e w i l d e r e d h a d t o stop
his offensive i n the plains of the F i f t h Zone, w i t h d r a w
m a n y units f r o m there and even a n u m b e r of u n i t s
from Middle Laos and Binh-Tri-Thien to reinforce
P l e i k u t o w n a n d a n u m b e r of s t r o n g h o l d s i n t h e
southern part of the W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s i n order t o
parry our blows.
T h e K o n t u m v i c t o r y w a s a n o t h e r great success of
our a r m y and people i n the W i n t e r - S p r i n g campaign.
I n the F i f t h Zone, w e foiled the t h r e a t of the e n e m y
u p o n the rear of Q u a n g N a m a n d Q u a n g N g a i p r o v -
inces, liberated the w h o l e of a n i m p o r t a n t strate-
gical base i n the n o r t h of the W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s .
O u r free zone r a n f r o m Q u a n g N a m a n d Q u a n g N g a i
sea-coast to the V i e t n a m - L a o s frontier, linked w i t h
the liberated s o u t h - w e s t e r n part of the Bolovens
H i g h l a n d of f r i e n d l y L a o s .
T h i s v i c t o r y p r o v e d a l l t h e clearer the a c c u r a c y of
the P a r t y C e n t r a l Committee's g u i d i n g principle.
The enemy was more and more obviously driven on
to the defensive. H e had to transfer troops f r o m the
Bac B o delta to reinforce M i d d l e Laos, a n d after-
wards from M i d d l e Laos and Binh-Tri-Thien to rein-
force the W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s .
The enemy concentrated forces i n an attempt
rapidly to attack and occupy the Fifth Zone, but had
to stop this m o v e to react t o our offensive.
The enemy w a n t e d t o concentrate his forces but
was compelled to continue scattering t h e m . Pleiku

70
and a number of strongholds i n the south of the
Western H i g h l a n d s became the f o u r t h point where
he concentrated his forces-
Our offensive o n the W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s w a s
v i c t o r i o u s l y c a r r i e d o n t i l l J u n e 1954' a n d s c o r e d m a n y
m o r e successes, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e r e s o u n d i n g v i c t o r y
at A n K h e , w h e r e w e c u t t o pieces t h e m o b i l e r e g i m e n t
No 1 0 0 w h i c h h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e K o r e a n f r o n t ,
thus liberating A n K h ea n d seizing a large booty i n
vehicles, weapons a n d m u n i t i o n s .

LIBERATION OF PHONG S A L Y AND T H E NAM HU

RIVER BASIN, THE PUSH FORWARD TOWARDS
LUANG PRABANG

After t h e defeat o f L a i C h a u , D i e n B i e n P h u b e c a m e
t o o i s o l a t e d . T h e e n e m y t r i e d t o effect j u n c t i o n
between D i e n B i e n P h ua n d U p p e r L a o s b y increasing
his occupation forces a l o n g t h e N a mH u R i v e r basin
as f a r a s M u o n g K h o a , h o p i n g t o e s t a b l i s h l i a i s o n
with Dien Bien Phu.

To put the enemy o n the w r o n g track, destroy more

of h i s effectives a n d o b l i g e h i m t o c o n t i n u e s c a t t e r i n g
his forces i n order t o create f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r
our preparations f o r t h e offensive upon t h e fortified
entrejiched camp orders were given t o t h e Vietnamese
volunteers t o co-ordinate their action w i t h the Pathet
L a o L i b e r a t i o n troops f o r a n offensive i n t h eN a m
H u River basin.

71
 On January 26, the Pathet L a o a n d Vietnamese
forces attacked M u o n g K h o a w h e r e t h e y destroyed
one E u r o p e a n b a t t a l i o n ; t h e n e x p l o i t i n g t h i s success,
they*wiped out t h e enemy i nthe N a m H u River basin,
and came w i t h i n striking distance of L u a n g Prabang.
The N a mH u front-line considered by t h e enemy
as h i s s t r a t e g i c l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w a s s m a s h e d ,
17 e n e m y c o m p a n i e s b e i n g d e s t r o y e d , i n c l u d i n g o n e
European battalion. L u a n g Prabang w a s threatened.
O n the other hand, t h e Pathet L a o a n d Vietnamese
forces advanced t o t h e n o r t h a n d l i b e r a t e d P h o n g
Saly. T h eresistance base o f t h e L a o t i a n people w a s
expanded, linked w i t h t h e S a m N e u a liberated zone
and o u rNorth-West.
I n face o f t h e p o w e r f u l o f f e n s i v e o f t h e P a t h e t L a o
and Vietnamese troops, t h e enemy h a d t o reinforce
L u a n g P r a b a n g w i t h h i s m o b i l e forces w i t h d r a w n
from t h e B a c B o delta.
' Once more, N a v a r r e was compelled to continue
scattering his forces. Luang Prabang became the
fifth point where the enemy concentrated his forces.

am SUCCESSES ON THE FRONTS IN THE ENEMYS

REAR IN T H E BAC BO DELTA, T H E T H R E E PROVINCES
OF QUANG BINH, QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN,
THE SOUTHERNMOST PART O F T R U N G BO,
AND NAM BO

W h e n t h e e n e m y w a s i n difficulties t o cope w i t h
the successive attacks o f o u r r e g u l a r forces i n m a n y
sectors, e v e r y w h e r e o n t h e f r o n t s i n t h e e n e m y ' s rear,

72
 our r e g u l a r forces, local forces, people's m i l i t i a a n d
guerillas effectively ejcploited t h e s i t u a t i o n t o speed
up their co-ordinated activities.
I n the B a c B o delta, g u e r i l l a w a r f a r e developed
v e r y p o w e r f u l l y . O u r r e g u l a r a n d l o c a l forces des-
troyed m a n y important enemy positions, including
l a r g e ones s u c h as H o a n g D a n i n H a N a m p r o v i n c e ,
La Tien in Thai Binh province, T u S o n i n Bac N i n h
province; compelled the enemy to w i t h d r a w f r o m a
series of other positions, i n c l u d i n g i m p o r t a n t ones
s u c h as B o s u b - s e c t o r i n B a c G i a n g p r o v i n c e . D i e m
Dien and Cao M a i in Thai B i n h province, K i n h M o n
in H a i D u o n g province, P h u L u u T e i n H a D o n g
province, A o K h o a n g and S u o i M e i n S o n T a y p r o v i n -
ce. V a r i o u s f o r m s o f a t t a c k s , a m b u s h e s , c o m m u n i c a -
tion warfare developed powerfully,, destroying w h o l e
c o m p a n i e s , s o m e t i m e s w h o l e b a t t a l i o n s ; R o a d JSfo 5,
an enemy vital strategic line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w a s
threatened seriously, being sometimes cut for weeks
on end. E s p e c i a l l y i n t w o great attacks o n C a t B i
and G i a L a m airfields, our a r m y m e n destroyed scores
of e n e m y planes. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g m o n t h s , g u e r i l l a
warfare i n the Bac B o delta developed still m o r e
powerfully. The propaganda w o r k directed t o the
e n e m y also scored v e r y great achievements. T h e
guerilla bases and g u e r i l l a zones w e r e g r e a t l y
expanded, t o t a l l i n g three-quarters of the t e r r i t o r y
controlled by the enemy-
Binh-Tri-Thien, and i n the southernmost part of
T r u n g Bo, our troops' activity w a s also intense, strik-
i n g p o w e r f u l l y on the communication lines, derailed
many enemy trains, smashed m a n y enemy raids.

73
expanded the guerilla bases and g u e r i l l a zones,
increased the propaganda w o r k a m o n g the enemy
r a n k s and w o n m a n y successes.
In N a m Bo, throughout the w h o l e W i n t e r - S p r i n g
c a m p a i g n , o u r t r o o p s e n d e a v o u r e d t o speed up co-
ordinated activities. D u e to the transfer by the e n e m y
of his m o b i l e forces to o t h e r f r o n t s , the influence of
our successive victories o n m a n y fronts, the precise-
ness of our principles of action, a n d the d o i n g a w a y
w i t h a number of former shortcomings, guerilla
warfare which was being developed' powerfully,
s c o r e d v e r y g r e a t s u c c e s s e s . T h e e n e m y i n o v e r 1,000
posts and w a t c h t o w e r s w a s either destroyed or com-
pelled to w i t h d r a w . T h e free N i n t h Z o n e w a s f i r m l y
maintained and expanded. The large and small
guerilla bases and g u e r i l l a zones w e r e restored and
greatly expanded. M a n y localities were liberated,
and the n u m b e r of soldiers crossing t o our side
amounted to thousands, and afterwards to tens of
thousands.

E a r l y i n M a r c h 1954, w h e n r e v i e w i n g t h e g e n e r a l
military situation on various fronts, we saw t w o
noteworthy characteristics :
First, o u r t r o o p s , t a k i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e o f l a u n c h i n g
a series of offensive c a m p a i g n s i n m a n y directions.
were victorious everywhere, destroying part of the
e n e m y effectives a n d l i b e r a t i n g m a n y l o c a l i t i e s i n c l u d -
i n g important strategic areas.
Second, t h e e n e m y s t r a t e g i c m o h i l e m a s s w a s n o
m o r e concentrated i n the B a c B o delta but scatter-
ed o v e r s e v e r a l d i r e c t i o n s : L u a n g P r a b a n g and
M u o n g Sai in Upper Laos, Seno in Middle Laos,
Pleiku, the south of the W e s t e r n H i g h l a n d s i n the
Fifth Zone, and part of his picked forces w a s pinned
d o w n at D i e n B i e n P h u . N a v a r r e ' s f a m o u s m o b i l e
mass concentrated i n the Bac B o delta w a s by
t h e n reduced f r o m 44 b a t t a l i o n s t o 2 0 b a t t a l i o n s , a
great part of these battalions w a s n o longer mobile
a n d h a d t o be s c a t t e r e d i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e i m p o r -
tant communication lines, particularly Road 5.
The Navarre plan was going bankrupt.
N a v a r r e ' s scheme w a s t o build up a n ever stronger
mobile strategic mass to w i n back the initiative, but
w e obliged h i m t o scatter his forces i n m a n y direc-
tions, and subjected t h e m t o gradual destruction and
passive reaction.
Navarre's scheme was to wear out and destroy part
of our r e g u l a r forces, f r u s t r a t e o u r W i n t e r - S p r i n g
p l a n ; however, o u r r e g u l a r forces, instead of b e i n g
destroyed, w o n successive victories, w h i l e his m a i n
forces suffered h e a v y losses.
N a v a r r e ' s scheme w a s t o "pacify"' his rear, but there
guerilla w a r f a r e developed ever m o r e p o w e r f u l l y .
Navarre's scheme was to launch offensive cam-
paigns t o t h r e a t o u r free zones, p i n d o w n a n d w e a r
out o u r r e g u l a r forces, b u t o u r free zones w e r e n o t

75
threatened and our regular forces kept on their mobi-
lity at a high degree, whereas the enemy rear was
fiercely attacked and more threatened than ever before.
However, the French and American generals did not
want to admit this disastrous truth.
They even reckoned that our activity in winter 1953-
spring 1954 had reached its peak, that our withdrawal
was beginning, and that we lacked the strength to
continue our offensive.
They even reckoned that despite their casualties
they had been able to cope with and check our Autumn-
Winter offensives and now it was their turn to get
back the initiative. Proceeding from this assessment.
Gen. Navarre ordered to continue the strategic offen-
sive on the Southern battlefield, concentrate relatively
great forces to continue occupying the Fifth Zone and
resume the Atlante plan which had been interrupted-
On March 12, to win back the initiative, he started
an attack on Qui Nhon.
Not for a moment did he believe that on the follow-
ing day, March 13, 1954, we would launch a large-
scale offensive on the Dien Bien Phu fortified
entrenched camp. Thus began the historic Dien Bien
Phu campaign.

76
 IV

THE HISTORIC DIEN BIEN PHU CAMPAIGN

THE SITUATION OF THE ENEMY AND OUR
STRATEGIC DIRECTION

D i e n B i e n P h u is a large v a l l e y situated w e s t of
the mountainous zone of the North-West.
I t i s a p l a i n 18 k i l o m e t r e s l o n g b y s i x t o e i g h t
kilometres wide. I t is the biggest, a n d most densely
populated of the four large plains i n the N o r t h - W e s t
close t o t h e V i e t n a m - L a o s f r o n t i e r , situated a t t h e
junction of important roads linking w i t h L a i Chau i n
the north-east; T u a n Giao, S o n L a , N a S a n i n the
east a n d south-east; L u a n g P r a b a n g i n t h e west
and S a mNeua i n the south. The French a n d American
imperialists considered D i e n B i e n P h u as a strategic
position of utmost importance, a strategic position
between N o r t h V i e t n a m , Upper Laos a n d the South-
w e s t of China, capable of becoming a n i n f a n t r y a n d
air base o f e x t r e m e efficiency i n their scheme o f
aggression i n South-East Asia.

77
 T h e effectives o f the e n e m y a t D i e n B i e n P h u w h i c h
w e r e i n t h eb e g i n n i n g about six battalions w e r e gra-
dually reinforced t o cope w i t h our offensive. W h e n w e
launched t h e attack, t h e garrison h a d 12 battalions
and seven companies o f infantry; during t h e cam-
paign t h ee n e m y continued t o send a s reinforcements
four battalions a n d t w o companies o fparatroops, thus
totalling 17 battalions o f infantry, m a d e chiefly o f
Europeans a n dAfricans a n d crack paratroops units.
M o r e o v e r there were tliree battalions o fa r t i l l e r y m e n ,
one battalion o f sappers, o n e armoured company, a
transport unit o f 2 0 0lorries a n d a p e r m a n e n t squa-
dron o f 14 aircraft. A l t o g e t h e r 16,200 m e n .
These forces occupied a fortified entrenched camp
h a v i n g three sub-sectors w h i c h supported one another
and comprised 4 9 strong-points. Each strong-point,
w i t h its o w n disposition o f defence, f o r m e d w i t h others
a "complex resistance centre" defended b y mobile
forces a n d a r t i l l e r y , a n d s u r r o u n d e d b y c o m m u n i c a -
tion trenches a n dbarbed wire, h a v i n g i m p o r t a n t a n d
a u t o n o m o u s possibilities o f defence. E a c h sub-sector
c o m p r i s e d several s t r o n g l y fortified resistance centres-
Each resistance centre as w e l l as t h ew h o l e fortified
entrenched camp were defended b y a system o f under-
ground works, a n d a system o f auxiliary works
(fences o r fields o f barbed w i r e , m i n e - f i e l d s ) a n d a n
extremely powerful firing network.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t w a s t h e central sub-sector
situated i n t h e middle o f t h e M u o n g T h a n h village,
the chief t o w n o f D i e n B i e n P h u . N e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s
of t h e forces o f t h e g a r r i s o n w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d here
(eight battalions c o m p r i s i n g five stationary and three

78
mobile battalions). I t h a d m a n y resistance centres
supporting each other and s u r r o u n d i n g the c o m m a n d
post, the a r t i l l e r y a n d c o m m i s s a r i a t bases, a n d protect-
ing t h e airlield. T o the east, there w a s a s y s t e m o f
v e r y efficacious fortified heights, especially hills A - 1 ,
C-1, D - 1 , E - 1 w h i c h w e r e the m o s t i m p o r t a n t defence
w o r k s o f t h e sub-sector. D i e n B i e n P h u w a s consi-
dered b y t h e e n e m y as a n unassailable a n d i m p r e g -
nable fortress. I n fact, t h e c e n t r a l sub-sector w a s
defended b y quite a s t r o n g force, a n d t h e eastern
heights could n o t be attacked easily. Besides, t h e
artillery and a r m o u r e d forces of the e n e m y could inter-
cept a n y o f our approaches, across t h e flat p l a i n ; a
system o f fortifications, barbed w i r e a n d trenches
w o u l d permit t h e enemy t o wear out a n drepel a n y
assault, a mobile force of battalions of paratroops w a s
ready t o co-ordinate i t s action w i t h t h e resistance
centres i n order t o counter-attack a n d break a n y
offensive, a n d t h e m o t o r i z e d a r t i l l e r y a n d a i r force
could check a n y attack a n d a n n i h i l a t e o u r a r t i l l e r y
positions considered b y the e n e m y as easily detected
because they w e r e set u p o n t h e slopes f a c i n g t h e
valley w i t h i n his firing-range (the distance from t h e
heights d o m i n a t i n g D i e n B i e n P h u t o the airfield w a s
f r o m 10 t o 12 k i l o m e t r e s ) .
T h e Northern sub-sector c o m p r i s e d t h e r e s i s t a n c e
centres o n D o c L a p hill and B a n Keo. T h e p o s i t i o n o n
D o c L a p h i l l h a d the task t o defend t h e N o r t h e r n side,
a n d check a l l attacks c o m i n g f r o m L a i C h a u .
Him L a m , although belonging t o t h e central sub-
sector w a s h o w e v e r like D o c L a p a n d B a n K e o t h e

79
most advanced peripheric position ; i t defended t h e
north-east a n d checked a l l attacks c o m i n g f r o m T u a n
Giao.
T h e Southern sub-sector, a l s o n a m e d H o n g C u m ,
had t o check a l l offensives c o m i n g f r o m t h e s o u t h
while protecting the liaison w i t h Upper Laos.
T h e e n e m y artillery w a s i n s t a l l e d i n t w o b a s e s : o n e
at M u o n g T h a n h , the o t h e r a t H o n g C u m , c a p a b l e of
s u p p o r t i n g each other and p r o t e c t i n g the s u r r o u n d i n g
strong-points. Besides t h e a r t i l l e r y o f t h e fortified
entrenched camp, each resistance centre h a d i t s o w n
a r t i l l e r y c o m p r i s i n g m o r t a r s o f a l l sizes, flame-throw-
e r s , a n d d i r e c t - f i r i n g g u n s , d i s p o s e d i n a c l o s e fire
system which ensures i t s o w n protection as well as
that of other strong-points.
D i e n B i e n P h u h a d t w o airfields — t h e m a i n field a t
M u o n g T h a n h , a n d a r e s e r v e field a t H o n g C u m ; t h e y
linked w i t h H a n o i a n dH a i p h o n g i n a n airlift w h i c h
d a i l y m a d e n e a r l y 100 t r i p s s u p p l y i n g f r o m a b o u t 2 0 0
to 3 0 0 t o n s o f g o o d s a n d a i r d r o p p e d f r o m a b o u t 100 t o
150 t o n s .
T h e s c o u t i n g planes a n d fighters o f t h e p e r m a n e n t
s q u a d r o n c o n s t a n t l y flew o v e r D i e n B i e n P h u . T h e
m i s s i o n of b o m b i n g and strafing our troops, t o protect
this entrenched camp w a s taken u p b y aircraft t a k i n g
off f r o m G i a L a m o r C a t B i a i r f i e l d s a n d l a t e r b y t h e
planes o f U . S . aircraft carriers anchored i n t h e H a
Long Bay.
N a v a r r e asserted that w i t h such p o w e r f u l forces
and s t r o n g defence s y s t e m , D i e n B i e n P h u w a s t h e
strongest fortified entrenched camp never seen i n
I n d o - C h i n a , " a n i m p r e g n a b l e fortress^'. F r o m t h i s

80
subjective viewpoint t h e e n e m y considered that a n
attaci< f r o m o u r p a r t w o u l d b e v e r y i m p r o b a b l e , esti-
m a t i n g that if our troops ventured t o launch a n offen-
sive, h e w o u l d h a v e the g o o d o p p o r t u n i t y t o inflict a n
inevitable defeat o n u s . D i e n B i e n P h u w o u l d be for
the enemy a battlefront prepared t o cause our regular
forces h e a v y losses. T h e e n e m y w e n t s o f a r a s a r r o -
g a n t l y t o challenge u s for a n attack.
*
* *

O n o u rside, i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e p a r a c h u t i n g o f
enemy troops into D i e n B i e n P h u , w ehad the assump-
tion that under t h e threat o f o u r forces, t h e e n e m y
could either w i t h d r a w , o r strengthen his defence there,
and t u r n D i e n B i e n P h u into a fortified entrenched
camp w h i c h offered u s a good o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u t out
of action his picked troops. P r o c e e d i n g f r o m these con-
siderations, w h i l e attacking L a i C h a u w e urgently
sent part o f our forces i n the w e s t e r n direction t o c u t
off a l l l i a i s o n b e t w e e n L a i C h a u a n d D i e n B i e n P h u ,
encircle this base, c l i n g t o t h e e n e m y lines a n d pre-
pare for t h ebattle. '
Dien B i e n P h u w a s a s t r o n g fortified entrenched
c a m p . T h e fortified entrenched camp w a s a f o r m o f
defence n e w l y devised b ythe e n e m y o n the I n d o - C h i n a
w a r theatre; i t had already m a d e i t sappearance, b u t
on a lower level a t H o a B i n h late i n 1951, i n the P l a i n
of J a r s ( L a o s ) , a n d a t N a S a n i n 1952-1953. B e f o r e
this newest a n dstrongest f o r m o f defence a p r o b l e m
which arose w a s : should w e attack t h e fortified
entrenched camp o r not ?

6 DBP 81
 F o r m e r l y , wherj o u r forces w e r e still w e a k , t h e
enemy setup small positions and fought with small
combat units. W h e n our troops w e r e able t o destroy
his s m a l l reinforcements a n d s m a l l positions, t h e
enemy system o f disposition w a s developed and con-
solidated a step f u r t h e r , r e l y i n g u p o n b i g fortified
positions w i t h ever more solid w o r k s , powerful armed
forces and fire-power, a n drelatively b i g shock-units.
Later o n , i nface o f the g r o w t h o f our a r m y , w h e n the
fortified positions w e r e i n danger o f being w i p e d out.
the e n e m y either w i t h d r e w his forces t opreserve t h e m ,
or reinforced t h e m and organized the defence accord-
ing t o the f o r m o f fortified entrenched camp.
This formula o f fortified camp was not a ninitiative
of the F r e n c h colonialists' a g g r e s s i v e a r m y . I n W o r l d
W a r I I the G e r m a n fascists h a d utilized this defensive
form, setting u p "hedgehogs", hoping t o check t h e
powerful offensives o f the Red A r m y against B e r l i n .
The French and American generals only applied t h e
G e r m a n fascists' experience t o t h e I n d o - C h i n a w a r
theatre, hoping t o check the progress o f our a r m y .
F a c i n g t h e enemy's n e w defensive tactics, w h a t
should be our tactics t o record the m a x i m u m o f suc-
cesses i n t h ec o n d i t i o n w h e r e t h e b a l a n c e o f forces
between u s and the enemy was k n o w n . I t should be
stressed again t h a t w h e n w o r k i n g out o p e r a t i o n a l o r
tactical solutions, w ealways proceeded f r o m the fun-
damental principles o f strategic direction w h i c h con-
s i s t e d i n destroying the enemy effectives and striking
only when success is certain. P r o c e e d i n g f r o m t h e
aforesaid fundamental principles, w h e n t h ef o r m o f
f o r t i f i e d e n t r e n c h e d c a m p m a d e i t s first a p p e a r a n c e ,

82
the possibilities of our troops to w a g e a l o n g c a m -
paign and our tactics w e r e still limited, w e advocated
not to -directly attack these centres, but t o t r y to
immobilize the e n e m y regular forces there, w h i l e our
regular troops w o u l d operate i n the sector w h e r e the
enemy was relatively weak and more exposed and
where we had more favourable conditions to destroy
his effectives. W e had applied this tactics i n the H o a
Binh campaign : while the enemy concentrated his
forces in this t o w n and b u i l t it i n t o a n entrenched
camp, w e launched our m a i n attacks not on H o a B i n h
but i n other sectors and a n n i h i l a t e d the e n e m y rein-
forcements and his positions along the Da River, and
launched victorious attacks on his rear in the Bac
Bo delta. Later on, w h e n the enemy concentrated
his troops in the N a San fortified camp, after some
e n g a g e m e n t s d u r i n g w h i c h w e destroyed p a r t of his
forces but also suffered losses w e decided n o t t o attack
Na San immediately. Then the Vietnamese Volunteers,
in co-ordination w i t h the Pathet Lao Liberation
troops, launched a n offensive i n the direction of U p p e r
Laos towards the south-west oi Na San, and score
great victories. «.

However this formula was not the only one w o r k -

able. W e j u d g e d t h a t the p r o b l e m of direct attaclc o n
a n d of a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e f o r t i f i e d c a m p s h a d t o be
solved at a n y cost, and t h a t it w a s a n a t u r a l o u t c o m e
in the e v o l u t i o n of the w a r , i n the process of develop-
m e n t of o u r a r m y . I n fact, o n l y by w i p i n g o u t the for-
tified entrenched c a m p , could w e defeat the enemy's
newest and highest f o r m of defence, t h w a r t his great-
est efforts i n o r g a n i z i n g h i s defence s y s t e m , p r o v o k e

83
in his r a n k s a n e w crisis, create a n e w m i l i t a r y situa-
tion, pave the w a y for our a r m y to progress, and i m p e l
the development of our a r m e d struggle.
I n fact, since the a p p e a r a n c e of fortified c a m p s w e
w o r k e d v e r y h a r d to s t u d y this n e w f o r m of defence,
assess and analyse its s t r o n g and w e a k points, point
o u t a d e q u a t e t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s as w e l l as t h e r e q u i r e -
ments i n technique and equipment, and the difficul-
ties to o v e r c o m e i n order to t r a i n o u r troops, and
make t h e m capable of a n n i h i l a t i n g the fortified camps.
A n d i t c o u l d be said t h a t at t h e b e g i n n i n g of a u t u m n -
w i n t e r 1953 o u r troops w e r e p r e p a r e d for t h i s task.
Thus w h e n realizing that the enemy could strengthen
his forces at D i e n B i e n P h u and t u r n it into a fortified
entrenched camp, our P a r t y Central Committee rapid-
l y t o o k t h e firm d e c i s i o n t o s e i z e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y i n
order to wipe out this base.

W h e n deciding to annihilate the D i e n B i c n P h u for-

tified entrenched camp, w e based ourselves o n our
army's n e w possibilities, on the characteristics of this
battlefield, and the large-scaie operations o n our side
and the e n e m y side at this front.
In the evolution of the m i l i t a r y situation i n w i n t e r
1953, D i e n B i e n P h u g r a d u a l l y b e c a m e t h e c e n t r a l
point of the N a v a r r e plan. O n l y by annihilating this
base could w e smash the F r a n c o - A m e r i c a n plot of
protracting and expanding the war. H o w e v e r , the
necessity to w i p e out D i e n B i e n P h u and its impor-
tance c o u l d n o t be r e g a r d e d as the essential factor t o
justify the decision of the offensive. T h e crucial prob-

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leni w a s w h e t h e r c o n s i d e r i n g the b a l a n c e of forces
at that time, a n d the n e w possibilities of o u r t r o o p s
and those of the e n e m y , w e could i n i t i a t e a n e w m e -
thod which consisted in attacking directly a fortified
entrenched camp, in this case D i e n B i e n P h u ; i n
other w o r d s , c o u l d w e be s u r e of v i c t o r y i n a t t a c k i n g
Dien Bien P h u , a very powerful fortified entrenched
camp ? : I
Compared with Na San, Dien Bien Phu was much
superior i n effectives and fire-power ; its disposition of
defence w a s also m u c h m o r e m o d e r n . W h i l e N a S a n
w a s a fortified c a m p s m a l l e r i n size a n d h a v i n g s i m p l e
resistance centres, D i e n Bien P h u had a w h o l e system
of complex resistance centres. N a v a r r e a n d the F r e n c h
and American generals spoke highly ol Dien Bien P h u ,
a n d considered i t as a c o m p l e x fortified e n t r e n c h e d
camp provided with highly organized defence system.
They concluded that our troops, w h o had been unable
to wipe out Hoa B i n h and N a S a n w e r e n a t u r a l l y
incapable of attacking D i e n Bien P h u , an impregnable
fortress.
Navarre and the French and A m e r i c a n generals
also held that their s u p e r i o r i t y at D i e n B i e n P h u w a s
due to the l o n g distance between the fortified en-
trenched c a m p s e t u p i n the m i d d l e of the m o u n t a i n o u s
regions of the N o r t h - W e s t , and our bases i n the rear.
A n attack on Dicn Bien P h u w o u l d necessitate fairly
b i g forces, v e r y l o n g lines of s u p p l y d u r i n g a r a t h e r
long period. They learnt by experience that w e had no
large-scale reinforcement and supply possibilities in
such a l o n g period, not to m e n t i o n that his air force
w o u l d inflict heavy losses o n our lines of supply. A s to

85
say t h a t D i e n B i e n P h u lay i n the m i d d l e of a valley
surrounded by m o u n t a i n s , one did not forget that this
valley was very large and that the roads from T u a n
Giao to it were only tracks inaccessible to the trans-
port of a r t i l l e r y ; n o t t o s p e a k of t h e a p p r o a c h of o u r
troops across the flat p l a i n w h i c h w o u l d go beyond
o u r m e a n s . T h i s is t o a s c e r t a i n a l l t h e m o r e c l e a r l y
that Dien Bien P h u was unassailable.
Basing himself on the aforesaid reasons, N a v a r r e
t o o k t h e firm strategic decision t o r e i n f o r c e D i e n B i e n
P h u , accept the combat w i t h our regular forces, and
considered D i e n B i e n P h u as the ideal battlefield t o
inflict h e a v y losses on our troops, if w e dared to
attack it.
T h e reasons given by N a v a r r e o n the excellence of
this position were not w i t h o u t foundation. His error
w a s t o see o n l y t h e s t r o n g p o i n t s o f D i e n B i e n P h u
and n o t its v u l n e r a b l e points. H i s greater m i s t a k e w a s
that w i t h the conception of a bourgeois strategist he
could n o t visualize the i m m e n s e possibilities of a
people's a r m y a n d the e n t i r e people w h o w e r e fighting
for independence and peace; it was still m o r e difficult
for h i m to realize the evolution and remarkable pro-
gresses of o u r people a n d o u r a r m y , u n d e r s t a n d a n d
appreciate the great possibilities of an i n d o m i t a b l e
fighting spirit of a people's a r m y w h i c h w a s deter-
m i n e d t o fight a n d t o w i n .
O n o u r side, w h e n deciding to a t t a c k a n d w i p e o u t
the Dien Bien P h u fortified entrenched camp, did w e
realize all the a d v a n t a g e s of the e n e m y a n d foresee
all the difficulties that w e could encounter ? W e w e r e
a w a r e of all this, but w e also s a w the e n e m y ' s w e a k

86
points that we could take advantage of; moreover, w e
were conscious of the i m m e n s e possibilities of our
a r m y and people to overcome all the difTiculties, and
to neutralize the s t r o n g points of the e n e m y i n order
to w i n victory.
D i e n B i e n P h u had all the s t r o n g points of a n y for-
tified entrenched c a m p , but also its p a r t i c u l a r s t r e n g t h .
Its isolated position i n the m i d d l e of a n i m m e n s e and
hiily region i n v o l v i n g the N o r t h - W e s t and Upper Laos,
far a w a y f r o m the rears, chiefly f r o m the enemy's big
airfields made its supply and r e i n f o r c e m e n t e n t i r e l y
dependent o n a i r - w a y . If t h i s w a y w a s cut off o r block-
ed, t h i s p o w e r f u l f o r t i f i e d e n t r e n c h e d c a m p w o u l d
expose all its w e a k points, g r a d u a l l y lose its fighting
ability and initiative, land in a defensive position and
face m o r e and m o r e intricate conditions ; i n case of
danger, a w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d be v e r y difficult. T h i s is
not to m e n t i o n that the already l o w fighting spirit of
the enemy troops could sink m o r e deeply in case of
diflficulties or defeat.
O n o u r side, w e h a d picked u n i t s w i t h a h i g h fight-
ing spirit, having made important technical progresses
and w e l l equipped, enthusiastic and determined to
destroy the e n e m y . W e could m a k e use of o u r supe-
r i o r i t y i n efi'ectives a n d fire-power ; our troops had
already a certain experience in siege warfare, they
were trained to attack fortified entrenched camps, they
were able to overcome difficulties, and m a k e the
necessary preparations to annihilate these camps. T h e
supply of food and a m m u n i t i o n for a h u g e force, far
a w a y f r o m our bases and d u r i n g a l o n g period w a s
in fact v e r y difficult, but w e h a d a n i m m e n s e rear, the

87
support o f o u r entire people a n d P a r t y w h o concen-
trated their forces t o serve the front a n d t o secure food
and ammunition for o u r army, thus allowing i t t o
fulfil its task. -
W e also considered the possibilities o f reinforcement
on t h e side o f t h e e n e m y w h e n N a v a r r e disposed o f
big m o b i l e forces. H o w e v e r o w i n g t o our w i n t e r offen-
sives this mobile m a s s w a s greatly scattered, and, as
w e foresaw it, w o u l d be further i n t h e days t o come.
W e t h u s h i g h l y v a l u e d t h e effect o f t h e c o - o r d i n a t e d
fronts w h i c h created good conditions f o ro u r regular
forces t o a n n i h i l a t e D i e n B i e n P h u a n d curb t h e r e i n -
forcements o f t h e enemy f o rthis entrenched camp.
O n t h e b a s i s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , a n d firmly s t i c k i n g t o
the principle o f d e s t r o y i n g t h e e n e m y effectives a n d
striking surely, t h eP a r t y Central C o m m i t t e e took t h e
firm d e c i s i o n t o w i p e o u t a l l t h e e n e m y f o r c e s a t D i e n
Bien P h u . W h i l e N a v a r r e chose this base t o give a
decisive battle t o our regular troops, w e also chose i t
t o d o a strategical decisive battle a g a i n s t t h e e n e m y .
W e were resolved t o concentrate t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g
majority o f o u r picked units t o destroy t h e most
seasoned e n e m y forces i n t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l fortified
e n t r e n c h e d c-amp i n f n d o - C h i n a .
This important resolution w a s based o n t h e prin-
-ciple o f d y n a m i s m ; i n i t i a t i v e , m o b i l i t y a n d r a p i d i t y o f
decision i n face o f n e w s i t u a t i o n s t h a t t h e P a r t y C e n -
tral Committee pointed out for our strategic direction
in w i n t e r 1953-spring 1954.
' • ' I n ihd first phase o f t h e W i n t e r - S p r i n g c a m p a i g n ,
on the basis o fthis principle, w elaunched m a n y offen-
sives o n t h e points w h e r e t h e e n e m y w a s r e l a t i v e l y

88
At the V.P.A. command post,
on the Dien Bien Phu Front
exposed, w h i l e w e pinned d o w n h i sm a i n forces a t
Dien Bien Phu, t o allow ours t o crush h i m o n other
fronts, a t the same time made necessary preparations
to attack the fortified entrenched camp.
I n t h e second phase, w h e n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s a t t h e
D i e n B i e n P h u front h a dbeen completed, a n d t h e
repeated successes o four troops on v a r i o u s operational
theatres h a dcreated n e w favourable conditions, w e
attacked the fortified entrenched camp.
Formerly, we had tried t oavoid the positions where
the enemy w a s strong, a n d chosen t h e i m p o r t a n t
strategic points w h e r e h e w a s relatively w e a k t o
destroy h i m ; i n t h eD i e n B i e n P h uc a m p a i g n w e
concentrated the greatest part o f our regular forces
to attack this most powerful fortified entrenched camp.
W h i l e i n t h e b e g i n n i n g w e h a d us'ed m a i n l y t h e f o r m
of m o b i l e w a r f a r e a n d s m a l l siege w a r f a r e , i n the D i e n
Bien P h u campaign, t h e form of operation w a sa
large-scale 'siege w a r f a r e h a v i n g t h e character o f a
positional w a r f a r e . I nthe plane o f the decisive battle
of strategic i m p o r t a n c e a s w e l l a s the scale a n d the
form o f campaign, the offensive upon the D i e n Bien
P h u f o r t i f i e d e n t r e n c h e d c a m p m a r k e d a new stage i n
our Party's leadership of the armed struggle as well
as i nt h e g r o w t h o f o u r a r m y . T h e v i c t o r y i nt h i s b i g
campaign w o u l d certainly create a n e w situation for
our people's resistance w a r .
Since the launching o fthe offensive, the task of oir
regular forces at the D i e n B i e n P h u front, thus becom-
ing the m a i n front o f the w h o l e country, w a s not t o
encircle and pin d o w n the enemy, but t o pass on to
the offensive to w i p e out this camp.

89
 A t other fronts our troops had the task t ooperate i n
close co-ordination w i t h D i e n B i e n P h u i n order t o
wear out and put the enemy out o f action, scatter and
pin d o w n his forces, and reduce t o the m a x i m u m h i s
possibilities t oreinforce Dicn Bicn P h u .

After i t h a dbeen decided t o take Dien Bien P h u ,

the problem o f p a r a m o u n t importance w a st o k n o w
h o w t o a n n i h i l a t e i t ; t h i s w o u l d b e t h e guiding prin-
ciple of this campaign.
In t h eearly stage, w h e n w e encircled t h ee n e m y -
w h o had just been parachuted — h e was still i n small
number and h i sdisposition o f defence and organiza-
t i o n w a s still l o o s e — w e d i dw a n t t o w o r k against
time a n dt o profit b y t h edeficiency o f a n adversary
w h o h a d j u s t o c c u p i e d t h e t e r r a i n to do a rapid battle
^in order to win a rapid victory.
If w e f o l l o w e d this principle w e w o u l d h a v e t o
ensure a n absolute superiority i n effectives a n d
fire-power, we w o u l d attack t h eenemy f r o m m a n y
directions, with o n e m a i n thrust a n d other prongs
penetrating deep i n t o t h e enemy's line a n d c u t t i n g
the entrenched c a m p i n t o several sectors ; concentrate
our effectives and fire-power, strike a tthe weakest and
m o s t i m p o r t a n t points, a n dt a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f t h e
enemy's deficiencies, w i p e o u t the b u l k o f his forces ;
then w e would continue t o p u t o u t of action h i s
r e m a i n i n g forces, a n d fulfil t h e task t o completely
annihilate this entrenched camp.
A swift attack with a swift victory w o u l d have m a n y
advantages : o u rtroops w e r e i n good fettle, fatigue

90
and w e a r i n g out w e r e not to bew o r r i e d and the supply
of food a n da m m u n i t i o n could b e c e r t a i n l y ensured
without great difficulty as the campaign did n o t last
long.
However, these tactics h a d a very great impediment:
despite their ideological and tactical p r e p a r a t i o n our
troops lacked concrete experience in attacking fortified
entrenched c a m p s because this w a s the first t i m e t h a t
they attacked a fortified entrenched camp, a n d a
powerful one.
That is w h y while making preparations, w e
continued t o study t h es i t u a t i o n o f t h ee n e m y a n d
make sure o f our possibilities once more. W e found
t h a t the e n e m y h a d reinforced his effectives, built his
lines o fdefence, and organized a f a i r l y s t r o n g defence
system. Grasping the principle of striking surely w e
estimated that w h i l e this entrenched c a m p h a d been
strengthened a n d t h e enemy w a s n o longer tem-
porarily occupying the terrain, a rapid attack t o w i n
a rapid victory w o u l d not vouch for complete success.
In consequence, w e resolutely affirmed that the guiding
p r i n c i p l e o f t h e c a m p a i g n w a s to strike surely and
advance cautiously.
According t othis principle, w e n o longer conceived
t h e D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n a s a l a r g e - s c a l e siege
battle, w h i c h t o o k p l a c e u n r e m i t t i n g l y i n a s h o r t
p e r i o d o f t i m e , b u t a campaign in which a series of
siege battles having the character of positional
warfare, w e r e f o u g h t i n a r a t h e r l o n g t i m e , i n t h i s
campaign w e w o u l d have absolute superiority i n
n u m b e r t odestroy the enemy, sector b y sector, till the
fall o f the entrenched camp. A c a m p a i g n w a g e d b y

91
striking surely and advancing cautiously would bring
n e w difficulties a n dobstacles. T h e longer t h e cam-
paign dragged on, the m o r e the enemy could consol-
idate his defence w o r k s and b r i n g i nreinforcements ;
on o u r side, o u r t r o o p s could b e w o r n o u t a n d
exhausted, and could meet the greatest difficulties i n
supply.
But striking surely and advancing cautiously was
t h e sure guarantee of victory. A g e n e r a l s u r v e y s h o w e d
that the balance o f m i l i t a r y forces between the e n e m y
a n d u s tipped i no u r f a v o u r , b u t i t w a s o n l y a r e l a t i v e
superiority; b y fighting step b y step, w e could
c o n c e n t r a t e a n a b s o l u t e s u p e r i o r i t y i n eff'ectives a n d
fire-power on each battle and w o u l d ensure victory.
Such tactics corresponded t o the technical level o f o u r
troops w h i c h h a db y that time o n l y experiences i n
siege w a r f a r e a n d i n d e s t r o y i n g a t a t i m e o n l y -a
stronghold defended b y t w o o r three companies o r a
battalion ; n o w it w a s necessary t o m a k e a step further
in destroying a t a time one o rseveral s t r o n g h o l d s , —
each defended b y a b a t t a l i o n — l y i n g i n a fortified
entrenched camp ; w ecould raise our technical level
t h r o u g h fighting b y m e a n s o f w a g i n g a s e r i e s o f s i e g e
battles w h i c h w e r e hard a n dcomplex b u tnot very
great before proceeding to the destruction o fthe w h o l e
of t h e e n e m y forces.
In striking surely a n d advancing cautiously, w e
could keep complete initiative, attack the e n e m y a t
any time a n d a t a n yfront as w e l i k e d ; w e w o u l d
attack h i m only w h e n w e were sufficiently prepared
and sure of victory, otherwise w e w o u l d not attack
or w o u l d delay the attack ; w ew o u l d defend o n l y the

92
positions which h a d t o be defended a n d could h e
defended, o t h e r w i s e w e w o u l d n o tdefend ; after a
battle, w e w o u l d w a g e another o n eimme'diately i f
possible, o t h e r w i s e w e could take a rest t o reor-
ganize our forces a n dm a k e better p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r
the next battle.
In striking surely a n d advancing cautiously w e
could aggravate the enemy's greatest difficulty w h i c h
w a s the problem o f supply and transport. T h e longer
the campaign, the heavier the losses suffered b y the
e n e m y i n effectives, w e a p o n s a n d m u n i t i o n s , a n d the
greater the difficulties h e w o u l d meet i n supply a n d
transport. H e w o u l d be i n greater difficulties i f w e
could keep under our control his airfields and his o n l y
supply line, a n d d i d o u r utmost t o tighten o u r
encirclement.
A general survey of t h e fronts throughout t h e
country showed that i f the D i e n Bien P h u c a m p a i g n
lasted long, o n other fronts w'ew o u l d have m o r e
f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s t o d e s t r o y m o r e e n e m y effec-
tives, liberate m o r e territory, a t the same time satis-
factorily co-ordinate our action w i t h the m a i n front.
Due to the foregoing reasons, w e resolutely affirmed
t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a m p a i g n w a s to
strike surely and to advance cautiously. This resolu-
tion required a very great determination, that o f
firmly keeping the principle o f striking surely w h i l e
conducting t h e operations, a n d of exerting all-out
efforts t o overcome thousands u p o n thousands o f
difficulties a n d obstacles t o secure victory f o r t h e
campaign.

93
 T h e e n e m y m i g h t be r e i n f o r c e d , a n d i n t h i s case, w e
w o u l d h a v e t o fight m a n y m o r e b a t t l e s a n d o n l y w i t h
harder fighting could w e destroy the w h o l e of the
e n e m y forces. B e t w e e n the necessity of f i g h t i n g m a n y
hard but surely victorious battles, and fighting fewer
battles i n w h i c h w e w e r e n o t certain of victory, w e
c h o s e t h e first s o l u t i o n . T h e e n e m y m i g h t r e c e i v e m o r e
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s b u t n o t as h e l i k e d , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n
w e could already restrict his supply and transport and
were operating actively on all fronts throughout the
c o u n t r y . I f h e w a s r e i n f o r c e d , he w o u l d be s t r o n g e r t o
cope w i t h us, b u t m e a n w h i l e he w o u l d m e e t w i t h
greater difficulties.
O u r t r o o p s m i g h t be w o r r i e d o n a c c o u n t o f t h e l o s s e s
and fatigue, but it was not that w e had no more means
to a v o i d or lessen these losses a n d fatigue. W e s h o u l d
pay the greatest a t t e n t i o n to the h e a l t h of the troops,
see t o i t t h a t t h e y h a d b e t t e r f o o d a n d b e t t e r r e s t s ,
intensify the prophylactic measures on the fronts. W e
should actively dig trenches, build strong shelters,
make careful preparations for the replenishment of
our units and the rapid r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of our forces
after e a c h c o m b a t so as t o e n s u r e u n r e m i t t i n g fighting.
A long-term operation w o u l d easily entail losses and
fatigue, but compared w i t h the enemy, w e were in a
better p o s i t i o n as w e w e r e e n c i r c l i n g h i m , a n d w e
could advance or w i t h d r a w at our free will. A s for the
enemy, he w a s encircled and could not have initiative
a t a n y t i m e ; w e c o u l d fight h i m o r n o t t o fight h i m ,
while the enemy w a s constantly forced to live in the
trenches, w i t h i n our encirclement, his m o r a l e w a s
tense, a n d he w a s a f r a i d of b e i n g a t t a c k e d at a n y t i m e .

94
 Tiicrefore w e w e r e dctcrniiiicd not to fear losses and
fatigue, and to do everyttiing in our power to overcome
them and secure complete victory.for the campaign.
As the campaign dragged out, the supply became
our most difficult problem. I n former campaigns such
as t h a t of the N o r t h - W e s t , t h o u g h s m a l l e r i n size a n d
effectives, and the front w a s nearer o u r rear, there
were days w h e n our troops had to live on rice gruel
and at times due to the difficulties i n supply, w e struck
u p o n the idea of g i v i n g up o u r o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s . T h e
Dien Bien Phu front was over four hundred kilometres
from our rear, and the supply line w a s very dangerous
at m a n y sections, i n case of e n e m y air raids or
unfavourable climatic conditions and obstacles our
supply and reinforcements to the front w o u l d meet
w i t h very great difficulties. B u t w e w e r e determined
n o t t o flinch f r o m t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d a d o p t a n o t h e r
strategic direction which w o u l d not ensure victory. O n
the contrary, to w i n complete victory for the campaign,
w e m u s t raise the spirit of e n d u r i n g hardships of all
our officers and m e n , and the heightened conscious-
ness of s e r v i n g the front of the c o m m i s s a r i a t , the
t r a n s p o r t a n d s u p p l y s e r v i c e , a n d o f t h e dan cong.
W i t h the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e
and G o v e r n m e n t , and the sacrifice a n d efforts of the
people in the rear, w e w e r e confident that w e could
ensure the supply and reinforcements to the Dien Bien
P h u front. I n this connection, o n the e n e m y side, it
w a s n o t t h a t e v e r y t h i n g r a n s m o o t h l y for h i m ; if w e
could restrict or cut off his air line, he w o u l d meet
with insuperable difficulties beyond prediction, due to
his v e r y great r e q u i r e m e n t s i n suppHes and m u n i t i o n s ,
to the increasing casualties h e had t osuffer and the
flagging morale o f his mercenaries.
Another worry of ours w a sthat if t h e campaign
dragged out, the rainy season w o u l d be coming. O n
the m o u n t a i n fronts, t h e rains m i g h t cause great
damages, the roads might be destroyed, the fortifica-
tions m i g h t became wet, the health o f our troops and
dan cong m i g h t b e b a d l y i n f l u e n c e d . B u t c o m p a r e d
with the enemy w e were i nhigher positions whereas
his fortifications built i nthe valley m i g h t fall i no r b e
flooded, while he could not concentrate his troops o n
higher level a n d open g r o u n d s f o r fear o f o u r fire-
power. Therefore the unfavourable climatic conditions
m i g h t create difficulties f o r u s , b u t also cause great
difficulties for the enemy.
I n fact the D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n has testified t o
t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f o u r p r i n c i p l e o f striking surely and
advancing cautiously. This guiding principle brought
the campaign t o complete victory.
T o materialize the principle o f striking surely a n d
a d v a n c i n g c a u t i o u s l y , w e g a v e o u r operational plan a t
D i e n B i e n P h u a c o n t e n t w h i c h c o n s i s t e d o f a series
of siege battles aimed at destroying at a time one or
several enemy resistance centres, setting up and
tightening our encirclement, limiting and afterwards
completely cutting the enemy line of supply and rein-
forcements and in the end, wiping out the whole of
the enemy forces.
The campaign was conceived i n t w o phases :
a ) I n t h e first p h a s e , w e w o u l d destroy the enemy
outer resistance centres, s e t u p a n d t i g h t e n o u r o f f e n -

96
sive a n d encirclement positions, n a r r o w d o w n t h e
enemy occupied area, limit and afterwards c u t off h i s
line of supply and reinforcements.
b) W h e n w e c o u l d create s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , w e
w o u l d s h i f t t o t h e p h a s e o f general attack t o d e s t r o y
the w h o l e o f the e n e m y forces.
Generally speaking the military situation developed
in line w i t h t h eforegoing direction, b u ti n practice
this development w a s m o r e complicated i n detail.
 V
THE HISTORIC DIEN BIEN PHU CAMPAIGN
EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION

Four months had elapsed from the time the enemy's

paratroops occupied Dien Bien Phu to the time we
attacked and annihilated it.
During this period the enemy did his best to inten-
sify his military power, dig more combat trenches and
communication trenches, build more fortifications and
consolidate his defence system. Early in December
1953, after Navarre had been resolved to transform
Dien Bien Phu into a powerful fortified entrenched
camp, the enemy worked out a four-step plan for
defence :
Step 1 : To slow down the advance of our troops by
using air force to bomb and strafe our main communi-
cation lines from Yen Bai and Thanh Hoa to the
North-West;
Step 2: To kick our troops out of Lai Chau by
violent bombardments ;

98
 Step 3: T o c h e c k o u r a t t a c k s o n D i c n B i e n P h u b y
causing h e a v y d a m a g e s t o u s;
Step 4 : A f t e r t h e s e v i c t o r i e s , t o e x p a n d h i s z o n e s
of o c c u p a t i o n .
Towards the e n d of November 1953, t h e enemy
attempted t o launch a n attack o n Thai Nguyen-Cho
C h u t o destroy o u r stores a n d attract o u r r e g u l a r for-
ces. A f t e r w e i g h i n g t h e p r o s a n d c o n s , h e r e a l i z e d t h a t
he w a s n o t able t o c a r r y t h r o u g h h i s p l a n because o n
the o n e h a n d h e lacked efTectives a n do n t h eother h e
w a s afraid o fm e e t i n g t h e s a m e failure a s i nt h e offen-
sive operation against P h u Tho-Doan Hung the
previous year.
T h e e n e m y thus stepped u p t h eb o m b i n g a n d straf-
ing of o u r communication lines d a ya n dnight i n t h e
hope o f dealing a b l o w a t o n e o f o u r i m p o r t a n t w e a k
points which w a s t h esupply t o t h efront, i n order t o
foil o u r offensive plan.

ACCELERATION OF PREPARATORY WORK: OPENING OF

THE ROAD TO HAUL GUNS; BUILDING OF POSTIONS
FOR OUR ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY; SUPPLY WORK;
THOROUGH PREPARATION O F T H E ATTACKING F O R C E S ;
OBSERVATION O F T H E SITUATION O F T H E ENEMY

It w a s precisely w h e n t h eenemy h a d prepared t o

face a l l e v e n t u a l i t y a n d used e v e r y m e a n s t o cope w i t h
t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h a t w e c a r r i e d o u t a gigantic prepara-
tory work t o r e a l i z e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e P a r t y
Central C o m m i t t e e t o launch a b i goffensive f o r t h e
a n n i h i l a t i o n o ft h e D i e n B i e n P h u fortified entrenched
camp.

99
 C a r r y i n g cut the instructions of the P a r t y Central
C o m m i t t e e and the G o v e r n m e n t , our P a r t y and people
mustered their forces and did their best to w i n v i c t o r y
in this W i n t e r - S p r i n g c a m p a i g n , the central target of
which was Dien Bien Phu.
A s has been said in P a r t I I I , w e had launched m a n y
successful ofTensives o n v a r i o u s fronts, a n n i h i l a t i n g
an i m p o r t a n t part of the enemy's force, c o m p e l l i n g the
enemy to spread his mobile force everywhere, liberat-
ing i m p o r t a n t regions i n c l u d i n g the s u r r o u n d i n g s of
Dien Bien Phu, thus isolating completely this
entrenched camp and reducing to a certain extent the
possibility for the enemy to send reinforcements to
the D i e n B i e n P h u front.

At Dien Bien Phu, a thorough preparation was

actively made for the big c a m p a i g n to come.
a) W h e n the e n e m y paratroopers began occupying
Dien Bien Phu, this far-away entrenched camp was
linked w i t h R o a d 41 by a m u l e - t r a c k n e a r l y 100 kilo-
metres long — the Dien B i e n P h u - T u a n G i a o track —
w h i c h had been rarely used by the e n e m y and by us
since a l o n g t i m e . T h i s track crossed a n u n i n t e r r u p t e d
series of hills a n d v a l l e y s w i t h steep g r a d i e n t s a n d
w a s cut by n e a r l y one h u n d r e d b i g and s m a l l streams.
To a l l o w our regular army, especially our artillery,
to a t t a c k D i e n B i e n P h u , the first p r o b l e m to be s o l v e d
was immediately to build the D i e n B i e n P h u - T u a n
Giao track into a motor road. W i t h great difficulties,
our troops m a n a g e d to open this road and to build a
dozen bridges in a relatively short time. U n t i l the end

100
of tfie c a m p a i g n , o u r e n g i n e e r i n g u n i t s k e p t t h i s r o a d
in good repair despite increasing sabotage activities
of the e n e m y a n d t o r r e n t i a l r a i n s a n d floods.
b ) O u r t r o o p s s u c c e e d e d i n opening the roads and
hauling the guns into position. A t f i r s t , w h e n , t a k i n g
advantage o f the enemy's w e a k points, w ew a n t e d t o
strike s w i f t l y , o u r ordnance pieces w e r e h a u l e d b y
trucks t o t h e surroundings of Dien Bien Phu, a n d
from there t o the eventual line ; they were dragged
into position d u r i n g seven days and nights o nend b y
the efforts of our a r m y m e n . W h e n i t w a s decided t o
follow the principle of s t r i k i n g surely and advancing
cautiously, our troops were resolute t ohaul the guns
out o f their positions t o complete t h e preparatory
work.
T h e n five roads w e r e opened t om o v e our g u n s in b y
trucks i n order to use our a r t i l l e r y w i t h m o r e m o b i l i t y .
These roads r a n a l o n g the m o u n t a i n slopes, crossed
the passes around Dien B i e n P h u w i t h i n the range o f
the enemy guns and traversed the regions w h e r e n o
track h a d ever been seen. O u r a r m y m e n h a d
hacked a w a y t h e jungle a n d fulfilled their task i n
scheduled time. These roads could be kept i n repair
and i n secrecy till the end o f the campaign o w i n g t o
a skilful camouflage.
T o prepare for the offensive against Dien Bien P h u ,
our artillery w a s again m o v e d i n along these n e w l y
built roads, and a t the sections inaccessible and dan-
gerous t o our trucks, the guns w e r e hauled into posi-
tion b y men's strength. T h e building of these roads
and the hauling o f our guns w a s a n uphill and heroic
struggle of o u r artillerymen a n d infantrymen, a n d

101
reflected t h e combativeness a n d l o v e o f l a b o u r o f a
revolutionary a r m y . I n these w o r k s , o u r officers a n d
men displayed a great courage a n d i n d u s t r y ; they
were n o t daunted b y enemy artillery a n d aircraft:
unsparing i n w o r k , they d i d their best t o introduce
i n n o v a t i o n s , increase l a b o u r efficiency,' w o r k a g a i n s t
t i m e t o fulfil their task ; i n difficult a n d perilous cir-
cumstances there w e r e soldiers w h osacrificed their
lives t o save guns.
Contrary to the assumption of the enemy w h o
believed that our artillery could never be carried near
his fortified e n t r e n c h e d c a m p , w e m a n a g e d t o m o v e
hundreds o f tons o f ordnance pieces a n d m u n i t i o n s t o
the battlefield a l o n g steep slopes a n d across deep
ravines.
c ) W e b u i l t v e r y s o l i d artillery positions. T o secure
a p o w e r f u l fire a n d t h e s a f e t y f o r o u r g u n s i n a r a t h e r
long time, w e built very solid artillery casemates
capable o f b e a r i n g t h e b r u n t o f t h e e n e m y 105 m m .
and 1 5 5 m m . cannons; these positions were built at
places completely unsuspected b y t h e e n e m y ; they
w e r e carved deep i n t o t h e m o u n t a i n a n d hill slopes
and so skilfully camouflaged that they could hardly
be d e t e c t e d b y s c o u t p l a n e s a n d c o u l d s t a n d a n y
b o m b i n g and shelling. Besides these real positions, w e
installed sham positions t o sidetrack t h e attention o f
the enemy, disperse h i s fire-power i n order f o waste
his b o m b s a n d s h e l l s .
The enemy underestimated o u r artillery, believing
that n o t only w a s i t w e a k i n fire-power b u t i t could
not b e h a u l e d near h i s p o s i t i o n s . H e w a s c e r t a i n t h a t
if e v e r w e m a n a g e d t o h a u l o u r g u n s i n t o t h e po.si-

i02
tions which w o u l d be likely t o threaten h i m , i t w a s
completely possible for h i m t o detect o u r firing-nests
at once b y h i s m o d e r n o b s e r v a t i o n devices a n d t o
riposte b y artillery and aircraft. H o w e v e r , c o n t r a r y t o
his calculations, t h a n k s t o a -careful preparation,,
throughout the offensive campaign not only w a s our
small artillery not destroyed but i tdid a very efficient
job and w a s the terror o f the enemy.
d ) W e built solid entrenched positions f o r o u r c o m -
m a n d organs a n d t h e necessary positions f o r o u r
infantry t olaunch the attack and approach the enemy.
As i t w a sa protracted campaign against a quite
powerful enemy, w e considered i t a n important duty
to guarantee security and continuity i nc o m m a n d and
w o r k for the c o m m a n d organs a n dcombat units. T o
this end, our a r m y m e n built very solid casemates for
the division command, most of t h e m were carved
deep i nthe m o u n t a i n slopes a n d c o u l d bear the b r u n t
of the b o m b a r d m e n t s b y e n e m y a r t i l l e r y a n d a i r force.
In the first phase o f attacks, the task o f o u r a r m y
was t oannihilate a n u m b e r o f outer posts w h i c h w e r e
strong resistance nests protected b y a v e r y complex
network of auxiliary positions a n dfortifications, by
d i r e c t fire a n d c r o s s - f i r e s w e e p i n g t h e m o u n t a i n s l o p e s
a n d b y a p l u n g i n g fire t o i n t e r c e p t a l l the j u n c t i o n s
likely t obe used b y our troops t or u s h for the attack;
moreover these positions w e r e protected b y the firing-
nests o f the central sub-sector and s o u t h e r n sub-sector
according to a plan elaborated beforehand. This is not
to m e n t i o n the a c t i v i t y o f e n e m y planes. I nthese con-
ditions, t ovouch for the success o f the c o m i n g opera-
tions, our troops buckled d o w n t o digging trenches.

103
building starting points for the attacks ; they d u g a
system ofcommunication trenches o fnearly one hun-
dred kilometres long for our troops t o approach the
enemy line and carefully prepared the bases o f attack.
T h i s elaborate p r e p a r a t i o n curbed t h e effect o f t h e
e n e m y fire a n d s e c u r e d v i c t o r y f o r o u r t r o o p s .
e ) O u r supplies were well prepared. The require-
ments o fthe campaign in food, a m m u n i t i o n and medi-
cines w e r e v e r y great. R e s p o n d i n g t othe appeal " A l l
for the front, all for v i c t o r y " launched b y the P a r t y
Central C o m m i t t e e and the G o v e r n m e n t , our people
devoted their m a n p o w e r a n dw e a l t h t o t h e Dien
Bien P h u front ; the inhabitants o f the free zones, o f
newly-liberated regions i nthe N o r t h - W e s t as well as
the regions i n the rear o f the e n e m y , served the f r o n t
with enthusiasm. W e organized supply lines hundreds
of k i l o m e t r e s l o n g f r o m T h a n h H o a o r P h u T h o t o t h e
North-West, passing through dangerous sections
pounded and destroyed day and night b y a n enemy
w h o did his best to check our transport and m o v e m e n t .

Sappers and shock-youths from the lowlands and

the highlands courageously built o r repaired the roads
and neutralized time-bombs. The enemy destroyed the
roads, w e mended them ; beating the enemy in courage
our fighters highlighted their determination t o open
t h e road of victory. E v e n a t t h e e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t
sections bombed and strafed day and night b y enemy
aircraft, our transportation w a s only a little disturbed
and, generally speaking, w a s secure. H u n d r e d s o f
m e n a n d w o m e n dan cong n o t f l i n c h i n g f r o m a n y d i f f i -
culty and danger, enthusiastically served t h e front
and contributed over 3 million work-days.

104
 The government committee for supply to the front
and the organs of the commissariat mobilized all pos-
sible modern and rudimentary means to transport food
and ammunition to the front. Truck convoys worked
to the limit of their capacity ; they ran lightless for
nights on end, took advantage of foggy weather to
run in the daytime, climbed high passes and ran along
difficult roads and even along the sections where
time-bombs had been dropped by the enemy. Tens of
thousands of pack-bicycles and wheelbarrows, thou-
sands of craft, convoys of donkeys and horses were
employed to transport supplies to the front, using
roads and tracks, deep rivers and swift streams.
Our people performed a wonderful deed unimagina-
ble by the enemy : To cater for great effectives operat-
ing on a battlefront very far from our rear in a long
period.
While doing this preparatory work, we h a d j o watch
the situation of the enemy at Dien Bien Phu and on
other fronts throughout the country. At Dien Bien
Phu the enemy strengthened his defence positions
to a high degree ; it was thus necessary for us to make
a profound study as to the concrete characteristics of
the enem.y and his strong points and weak points, par-
ticularly at Him Lam and the positions in the northern
sub-sector, which were the targets of our first phase
of attacks.
During the length of this preparation, our troops
had to do heavy work, such as building the Tuan
Giao-Dien Bien road, opening the roads and build-
ing the positions for.our artillery and infantry, hauling

105
artillery into position. W i t h i n the range of the e n e m y
artillery, under the constant observation of scout-
planes, a gigantic b u i l d i n g y a r d w a s f u n c t i o n i n g i n
the vicinity of D i e n B i e n P h u . T o a v o i d unnecessary
d a m a g e s , o u r t r o o p s w o r k e d at n i g h t i n the o p e n
c o u n t r y , t h e n to g a i n t i m e , t h e y w o r k e d at d a y i n the
fog and under the camouflage of lattis w o r k s m a n y
k i l o m e t r e s l o n g . I t s h o u l d be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t t h e
enemy artillery and aircraft were very active through-
out December 1953 and J a n u a r y 1954. I n F e b r u a r y
1954, w h i l e o u r p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k w a s i n f u l l s w i n g ,
the enemy, t h i n k i n g that perhaps w e had given up our
plan to attack D i e n B i e n P h u , sent his bombers to
other fronts, especially to the N a m H u basin and
L u a n g P r a b a n g where the Pathet L a o Liberation
troops and the Vietnamese volunteers were launching
successful attacks.

M a n y a t i m e the e n e m y m o b i l e force at D i e n B i e n
Phu, propped up by artillery and tanks, made
reconnaissance incursions into the surroundings of
Dien Bien Phu. B u t they were repulsed by small
units of our a r m y which, t a k i n g advantage of the
ground and solid positions, w e r e able to protect our
preparatory w o r k and keep it i n secret. T h o u g h
fighting separately against an enemy m a n y times more
powerful, these units fulfilled their task very heroically.
O n J a n u a r y 30, 1954, a p l a t o o n d e f e n d i n g a p o s i t i o n
north of D i e n B i e n Phu, repelled 7 assaults of 5 enemy
b a t t a l i o n s . O n F e b r u a r y 12, 1954 a g r o u p o f 5 s c o u t s
b e a t b a c k a n e n e m y b a t t a l i o n . O n F e b r u a r y 15, 1954,
o n e o f o u r p l a t o o n s r e p u l s e d 12 a s s a u l t s l a u n c h e d b y
3 battalions. M o v i n g w i t h i n 3 kilometres f r o m the

106
enemy's line, our m o u n t a i n artillery began threatening
M u o n g Thanh airfield, creating impediments t o h i s
supply.

While doing such a huge work, our troops had t o

keep themselves i n good fettle for the c o m i n g battle.
The responsible cadres o f combat units did their best
to improve the health condition of their men, keep
their number i nfull, improve the supply, secure for
t h e m good food and good rest, create c o n d i t i o n for t h e m
to eat their fill, t o h a v e h o t f o o d a n d h o t d r i n k a n d t o
sleep s o u n d l y i n the w a r m . P r e v e n t i v e h y g i e n e w a s
the object o f great care b ythe a r m y m e d i c a l services
at a l l levels. O n the o t h er h a n d , w e s p a r e d p a r t o f o u r
t i m e t o give officers and m e n m o r e t r a i n i n g i n tactics
and technique, specially i n t h e installation of
positions, i n t h e co-ordination o f action between
infantry and artillery and i n the attack o f entrenched
camp.

W h e n the P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e had decided t o

wipe out all the enemy a t D i e n Bien P h u , w h e n the
principle of advancing cautiously and striking surely
had been adopted and the p l a n o fconcrete operations,
especially the plan o f preparation, mapped out, t h e
political work p l a y e d a g r e a t r o l e . T a k i n g t h e P a r t y
cells a s cores, this w o r k g a v e officers a n d m e n a
thorough political education and ideological leader-
ship and imbued t h e m w i t h the great significance o f
the D i e n Bien P h u campaign ; i t m a d e everyone
realize that t h e success o f t h ecampaign, like t h e
success o fall r e v o l u t i o n a r y w o r k s , w a s achieved o n l y
through valiant struggles, sacrifices and hardships ;

107
it m a d e e v e r y o n e r e a l i z e t i i a t , t ow i n b r i l l i a n t success,
great efforts should b e made, thereby i t instilled a
g r e a t determination to fight and to win i n t o t h e
troops. W i t h regard t o t h e principle of advancing
c a u t i o u s l y a n d s t r i k i n g s u r e l y , a t first n o t a l l o f f i c e r s
and m e n agreed. Political w o r k did its best t o m a k e
our troops realize this principle a n d overcome; their
tendency t ofear fatigue and losses ; i t gave t h e m and
m a i n t a i n e d f o r t h e m t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight u n r e -
m i t t i n g l y a n d as long as possible. I n t h e stage o f
preparation, political w o r k inculcated o n t h e troops
the importance o f p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k vis-a-vis the suc-
cess o f t h e c a m p a i g n , h e n c e i t r a i s e d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
and the courage o f the officers and m e n i n struggle,
urging them t o w o r k more enthusiastically i n order
to spare bloodshed for their mates later on, t o over-
come difficulties and obstacles a n dt o carry out t h e
preparatory w o r k successfully. Political w o r k k n e w
h o w t oco-ordinate the education o f the task o f ideolo-
gical leadership _with the concrete requirement o f this
task i n order t o rouse the officers and m e n and s h o w
them the direction t om a r c h f o r w a r d . M a n y practical
slogans were put up, such as "Zealously to build roads
for a r t i l l e r y i s zealously to work f o r victory",
"Zealously to build solid positions iszealously to w o r k
for victory", " T o m a i n t a i n the roads i n good repair is
zealously t o w o r k f o rv i c t o r y " , o r " T o h a v e a r o a d
builder m o r e i s t o create m o r e favourable conditions
for v i c t o r y " , " T o build fortifications a n inch thicker
is t o c r e a t e m o r e f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s t o d e f e a t t h e
enemy".

108
 T o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e first t e n d a y s o f M a r c h 1 9 5 4 ,
the preparatory w o r k w a s t h o r o u g h l y completed a n d
carefully supervised.
O n M a r c h 13, 1954, o u r t r o o p s r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o
launch t h egreat offensive a g a i n s t the D i e n B i e n P h u
fortified entrenched camp.
A s h a s been said i n P a r t I V , t h e c a m p a i g n w a s
planned t oinclude a stage for our troops t o annihilate
the outer posts, t o t i g h t e n t h e encirclement, t o curb
and eventually t o c u t offt h e road o f r e i n f o r c e m e n t
and supply o f t h e e n e m y ; then followed t h e second
stage i nw h i c h a general attack w o u l d be launched t o
annihilate t h e w h o l e o f t h e D i e n Bien P h u fortified
entrenched camp.
In reality, the c a m p a i g n developed i nthree phases :
a ) First phase: o u r t r o o p s t o o k t h e n o r t h e r n a n d
north-eastern outer posts, i.e.H i m L a m a n d a l l t h e
n o r t h e r n sub-sector.
b ) Second phase: it w a s t h e longest phase i n
which the most m u r d e r o u s battles w e r e fought- I n this
phase o u rtroops a n n i h i l a t e d t h e key defence s y s t e m
of t h e central sub-sector, occupied t h e eastern hills
a n d t h e a i r f i e l d , t o o k t h e e n e m y i n a r i n g o f fire, g r a d u -
ally tightened t h e encirclement, narrowed d o w n t h e
t e r r a i n occupied b y t h ee n e m y a n dh i sa i r space a n d
prepared t o c u tdefinitely his source o f reinforcement
and supply.
c ) Third phase: t h i s w a s a s h o r t p h a s e a s a l l t h e
favourable conditions h a dbeen prepared, o u r troops
took the last height i n the east and shifted to a general
attack t o annihilate the w h o l e Dien Bien P h u fortified
entrenched camp.

109
THE FIRST PHASE OF ATTACKS : ANNIHILATION OF THE
HIM LAM RESISTANCE CENTRE AND THE WHOLE
NORTHERN SUB-SECTOR

The H i m L a m resistance centre w a s the strongest

defence centre o f t h e e n e m y . I t belonged t o t h e c e n t r a l
sub-sector, 2 k m . f r o m M u o n g T h a n h . I t s m i s s i o n w a s
to protect t h e central sub-sector, c o m m a n d t h e T u a n
G i a o - D i e n B i e n road, check t h e direction f r o m w h i c h
came o u r major attacks o n the outskirts o f D i e n B i e n
Phu. H i m L a m w a s defended by a reinforced battalion
of l e g i o n a r i e s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e 1 3 t h r e g i m e n t o f
legionaries considered b y t h e e n e m y as o n e o f h i s
most seasoned combat units. I t w a s composed of three
strongholds supporting each other a n d provided w i t h
s t r o n g positions o f defence, efficient firing-nests a n d a
w h o l e s y s t e m o f a u x i l i a r y w o r k s m a d e o f fields o f
mines a n d barbed w i r e f r o m 100 t o 2 0 0 metres w i d e
in some places.
The outermost post i n t h e north-western direction,
the H i m L a m resistance centre, h a d close r e l a t i o n s
w i t h t h e n o r t h e r n sub-sector o f the fortified entrenched
camp. T h i s sub-sector included t h e resistance centres
on D o c L a p H i l l a n d B a n K e o . These three resistance
centres made u p a n outer zone a d v a n c i n g i n t h e
northern, north-eastern a n d north-western directions.
Doc L a p Hill w a s 7 0 0metres l o n g by 150metres w i d e
and 4 k m . off M u o n g T h a n h ; it w a s defended b y a
reinforced battalion of N o r t h Africans, protected by
s t r o n g positions o f defence a n d a solid s y s t e m o f
auxiliary works a n d reinforced by a plunging fire.
This strong position h a d the task t o block up the road

110
and check o u rattacks f r o m t h e n o r t h . T h e B a n K e o
resistance centre lay o n a hill north-west o f t h e air-
field, 2 k m . f r o m t h e c e n t r a l sub-sector, a n d w a s
defended b y a battalion o f T h a i puppet troops. A l l
these three resistance centres w e r e c o v e r e d b y 105 m m .
a n d 155 m m . g u n s f r o m M u o n g T h a n h a n d H o n g C u m ,
according t oa careful a n dsecret firing plan.

T h e task set t o o u ra r m y i n t h efirst phase w a s

to wipe out these three outermost resistance centres,
destroy part of the enemy force, narrow down the
enemy occupied zone, create conditions for our troops
to tighten the encirclement and attack the central
sub-sector. T h i s w a s t h e first siege battles g i v e n
against t h e resistance centres o f a very powerful
fortified entrenched camp, a n dt h efirst battles o f t h e
Dien Bien P h u campaign. I f throughout the campaign,
the direction o foperations should firmly abide b y t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l principles o fs t r i k i n g s u r e l y and w i n n i n g
surely, i n these first battles these p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d b e
grasped m o r e tightly. I t w a s precisely t o secure
complete victory for these first battles t h a t o u r t r o o p s
had made long a n delaborate preparation a n d train-
i n g , a b i d i n g b y t h e p r i n c i p l e o f giving battle only after
it had been well prepared; i n siege warfare, t h e
preparatory w o r k s h o u l d b e co m p l et e d i n ev er y respect;
in a siege battle w h i c h h a d t h e character o fa pitched
battle done against a strong position located i n a
powerful entrenched camp, preparation i nall respect
for t h e combat s h o u l d b e a l lt h e m o r e t h o r o u g h .
W i t h o u t such a preparation, siege w a r f a r e could n o t
be v i c t o r i o u s .

ill
 W i t h regard to the use of force, to v o u c h for the
success of the first battles, w e possessed a n a r m e d
force and a fire-power absolutely superior to those
of the enemy. O u r i n f a n t r y w a s three t i m e s or over
three times stronger t h a n the enemy's, our m o r t a r s
a n d l i g h t a r t i l l e r y h a d a fire m a n y t i m e s more
powerful. The mission of our heavy artillery units was
directly to protect our infantry o n the one hand and
t o t a k e t h e e n e m y h e a v y g u n s u n d e r i t s fire o n t h e
other.
O n M a r c h 13, 1 9 5 4 a t 5 p . m . w e s t a r t e d a t t a c k i n g
t h e Him Lam r e s i s t a n c e c e n t r e b y a s h e l l i n g .
O u r artillery w a s scheduled t o go into action at
4 p.m. B u t at n o o n , it h a p p e n e d that the e n e m y h a d
discovered that our starting points were o n l y 200
metres f r o m his positions ; he sent a u n i t to attack us.
One of our heavy artillery units received orders to
shell H i m L a m i n order to repel the e n e m y and protect
our positions a n d at the s a m e t i m e to shell the airfield
and M u o n g T h a n h to supervise the accuracy of our
fire. T h e s h e l l i n g d e s t r o y e d s o m e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n c l u d -
i n g the H i m L a m c o m m a n d post and a n u m b e r of
stationary planes. T h e m a j o r c o m m a n d i n g H i m L a m
post and the colonel c o m m a n d i n g the central sub-
s e c t o r w e r e k i l l e d w i t h i n t h e first m i n u t e s .
T h e attack o n H i m L a m began at 5 p.m. sharp. O u r
infantry and artillery co-ordinated their action quite
c l o s e l y . T h e first p o s i t i o n w a s c o m p l e t e l y a n n i h i l a t e d
after orie hour's e n g a g e m e n t , t h e second after t w o
hours. The attack on the third position in the north-
west w a s arduous. T h e e n e m y a r t i l l e r y , paralysed at
first, began to riposte more and more vigorously. A t

112
 10.30 p.m. we annihilated completely the Him Lam
resistance centre, put 300 soldiers out of action and
captured 200 others. The Him Lam victory was the
Arst won at Dien Bien Phu. This battle of annihilation
exerted a very great influence on the evolution of the
campaign.
On March 14, 1954, the attack on the resistance
centre on Doc Lap Hill started.
At 5 p.m. our artillery began to shell the enemy
command post at Muong Thanh, his artillery positions
and the airfield, and destroyed his fortifications on
Doc Lap Hill. This artillery duel was very murderous.
According to the documents taken from the enemy, to
cover his positions on Him Lam and Doc Lap Hills
and destroy our artillery positions, during three days,
from March 13 to March 15, 1954, the enemy fired over
30,000 shells. On March 14, 1954 his aircraft coming
from Hanoi bombed and strafed our positions all night
long.
Owing to a heavy rain which delayed the hauling
of our mountain-artillery into position, the attack on
the Doc Lap resistance centre was started only at
2 a.m. of March 15 and ended at 6.30 a.m. with the
complete annihilation of this stronghold.
At 6 a.m. an enemy infantry unit, propped by tanks,
came from Muong Thanh and attacked us, but was
forced to withdraw after suffering some casualties
from our artillery.
The third resistance centre. Ban Keo, in the north-
west, was isolated and heavily threatened by our
troops. At the time when a unit of our main force was
making preparation to annihilate this position, the

8 DBP 1L3
e n e m y t h e r e i n w a s i n u t t e r c o n f u s i o n . O n M a r c h 17,
1954 a t 3 p . m . B a n K e o r e c e i v e d 2 0 s h e l l s f r o m o u r
artillery. T h o u g h threatened by their French com-
manders, the T h a i puppet troops availed themselves
of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y w h e n t h e F r e n c h t o o k r e f u g e i n t h e
trenches, t o surrender w i t h their weapons. T h e e n e m y
tanks w h i c h pursued t h e m w e r e halted by our a r t i l l e r y
and w e r e c o m p e l l e d to fall back.
T h u s t h e first t w o b a t t l e s o f t h e c a m p a i g n e n d e d i n
t w o resounding victories. T h e H i m L a m resistance
centre and the w h o l e n o r t h e r n sub-sector w e r e a n n i h i -
lated. T h e e n e m y ' s outer defence l i n e o n the n o r t h -
east, t h e n o r t h a n d the n o r t h - w e s t w a s b r o k e n , l a n d i n g
the c e n t r a l sub-sector i n a m o r e complicated s i t u a t i o n
because it w a s c o m p l e t e l y exposed o n these sides.
T h e s e s i e g e b a t t l e s w h i c h w e r e f o r u s t h e first t o
have a p o s i t i o n a l character, destroyed the s o l i d resis-
tance centres of a v e r y p o w e r f u l fortified entrenched
camp. O u r troops made a big stride i n siege w a r f a r e
in the classical sense of the w o r d , i n co-ordination
with heavy guns and anti-aircraft guns. These victories
w e r e o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e i n s o f a r as t h e y p a v e d
the w a y for the v i c t o r y of the w h o l e c a m p a i g n and l a i d
the f o u n d a t i o n for the great victories to come.
I n t h e s e t w o b a t t l e s o f t h e first p h a s e , o u r p o s i t i o n s
of a t t a c k p r o v e d t o be v e r y e f f i c a c i o u s . O u r a n t i - a i r -
craft defence a n d a n t i - a r t i l l e r y defence w e r e so w e l l
o r g a n i z e d t h a t t h e effects o f e n e m y a i r c r a f t a n d a r t i l -
lery were greatly restricted. Furthermore, our artillery
was very accurate ; operating i n good co-ordination
w i t h our infantry, it caused great damages t o the
enemy, destroying m a n y of his a r t i l l e r y positions.

114
threatening his central airfield, and hitting h o m e
m a n y stationary planes. O u r anti-aircraft batteries
came into action and shot d o w n m a n y planes i n sup-
port of o u r troops.
O n his side, the e n e m y suffered h e a v y losses, h a v i n g
t w o picked battalions put out of action, one b a t t a l i o n
disbanded, and losing all the n o r t h e r n sub-sector and
the key outerposts i n the north-east. The greatest
anxiety of the e n e m y w a s t h a t his c o m p a r a t i v e l y
s t r o n g fire p o s i t i o n s w e r e n o t o n l y p a r t i a l l y d e s t r o y e d
but p r o v e d of little effect; h e w a s n o t able t o use t h e
anti-artillery tactics to annihilate our artillery posi-
tions. M o r e o v e r , the central airfield w h o s e safety w a s
badly needed to land reinforcements, food and a m m u -
n i t i o n a t D i e n B i e n P h u , w a s t a k e n u n d e r t h e fire o f
our artillery.
But, the greatest f a i l u r e of the e n e m y w a s t h a t he
had underestimated the situation, t h i n k i n g that w e
were able to a n n i h i l a t e o n l y isolated posts defended
by about one b a t t a l i o n and n o t to w i p e out the resis-
tance centres m a d e u p of m a n y posts l y i n g i n such
a s t r o n g f o r t i f i e d e n t r e n c h e d c a m p as D i e n B i e n P h u ,
the m o r e so since these resistance centres w e r e defend-
ed by t h e m o s t s e a s o n e d u n i t s . H e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d o u r
s m a l l a n d w e a k a r t i l l e r y ; b u t a f t e r t h e first c o m b a t s ,
he w a s a w e - s t r i c k e n by the p o w e r of o u r h e a v y g u n s
and anti-aircraft guns. A few days later, the colonel
c o m m a n d i n g the e n e m y h e a v y a r t i l l e r yunits at M u o n g
T h a n h c o m m i t t e d suicide.
F r o m the strategic conception for the w h o l e Indo-
Chinese theatre of operations, the e n e m y c o m m i t t e d

115
a very serious mistake : T h i n k i n g that we did not dare
attack Dien Bien P h u and had given up our offensive
p l a n , o n M a r c h 12, 1954, G e n . N a v a r r e p u r s u e d h i s
scheme of l a u n c h i n g , w i t h an i m p o r t a n t m o b i l e force,
a strategic offensive on the Southern battlefield, by
landing at and occupying Q u y N h o n , thus m a k i n g his
force m o r e scattered. T h i s u n t i m e l y o p e r a t i o n created
greater difficulties and caused h i m a further loss of
initiative.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e s p i t e o u r first v i c t o r i e s , d e s p i t e t h e
great reverses he h a d suffered, despite the great diffi-
culties he had encountered the e n e m y still h a d a v e r y
powerful force and w a s d o i n g his best to cope w i t h
t h e s i t u a t i o n . O n M a r c h 14 a n d 16, 1 9 5 4 , h e r e i n f o r c e d
his troops w i t h t w o battalions of paratroopers from
Hanoi. H e airdropped parts of heavy guns and a m m u -
nition, consolidated his defence line t o bear the b r u n t
of o u r a r t i l l e r y . H e r e a d j u s t e d , organized and
strengthened the protection of his airfield and replaced
the puppet troops of the outer posts by E u r o p e a n a n d
African troops. H e still believed i n the strength of the
central sub-sector and of his artillery and aircraft and
t h a t w e w o u l d n o t be able t o d e s t r o y t h e m .
Redoubling their activity, his aircraft bombed and
strafed our front and supply lines. T h e e n e m y hoped
that by suffering h e a v y losses our troops w o u l d not be
in a position to continue the attack, and w o u l d fall
back, especially w h e n the c a m p a i g n p r o t r a c t e d a n d
our supply lines w e r e violently taken to task, causing
great difficulties to our supply of food, a m m u n i t i o n
and medicines.

116
Gen. \'() Xi^uyen Gi;ip iiispceting
till' anti-aircraft guns
SECOND PHASE OF ATTACKS : OCCUPATION OF THE
EASTERN HILLS AND THE A I R F I E L D ; CUTTING THE
ROADS OF SUPPLY AND R E I N F O R C E M E N T ; TIGHTENING
ENCIRCLEMENT, AND GRADUAL SHRINKING OF THE
SECTOR OF OCCUPATION AND T H E AIR S P A C E OF T H E
CENTRAL SUB-SECTOR

The second phase w a s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t , the long-

est a n d the m o s t m u r d e r o u s p h a s e o f t h e c a m p a i g n ,
because the central sub-sector w a s the m o s t p o w e r f u l
sector, l y i n g i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e plain o f M u o n g
T h a n h , and w a s defended b ya system o fv e r y powerful
strongholds built on the eastern heights.
A f t e r t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e first p h a s e , w e a s s e s s e d t h a t
though t h e enemy's force w a s partially p u t o u t o f
action, i t w a s still v e r y s t r o n g a n d t h ep r i n c i p l e o f
o u r o p e r a t i o n s w a s s t i l l t o strike surely and advance
cautiously.
The task set for the second phase of attacks was to
occupy the fortified heights defending the eastern side
of the central sub-sector, rapidly to approach and
encircle the enemy, to close in the positions of attack
and encirclement, to neutralize then to occupy the
airfield, to check then to cut off the road of supply and
reinforcement of the enemy, to wear out and destroy his
forces, to shrink his sector of occupation and air space
and to prepare for a general attack in order to wipe
out all the enemy.
The central sub-sector w a s c o m p o s e d o f five r e s i s -
tance centres t o t a l l i n g over 3 0 positions defended b y
7 battalions o f European and African soldiers and one
battalion o f puppet troops, including some mobile

117
battalions o fparatroopers. I n i tlay the c o m m a n d post
of the e n t r e n c h e d c a m p , t h em a i n fire-positions, the
armoured units, the commissariat and the central air-
field. The w h o l e sub-sector l a yi n the middle o f the
Dien Bien P h u plain. F r o m the sub-sector t o the sur-
r o u n d i n g hills, 3 t o 5 k m . long, the t e r r a i n w a s flat.
T o attack the eastern heights and tighten the encircle-
m e n t , a t a c t i c a l p r o b l e m o f u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e was to
approach the entrenched camp on a flat ground a n d
to fight unremittingly day and night when the
artillery, motorized units a n daircraft of t h e enemy
were very active.
Since the t i m e our m a i n force b e g a n t o m a k e siege
warfare the problem which harassed u s was h o w t o
approach the enemy. Already i n the previous impor-
tant campaigns, w e had solved this problem b y taking
advantage o f t h ehilly terrain a n d o f t h en i g h t t o
approach the e n e m y secretly. Later on, w h e n w e w e r e
strong enough t o attack more important strongholds,
our troops began t o build a few w o r k s t o parry the
e f f e c t s o f t h e e n e m y ' s fire b u t t h e s e w o r k s w e r e s t i l l
very rudimentary. That isw h y , except a few occasions,
it could b e said t h a t p r e v i o u s l y a l l siege b a t t l e s h a d
been fought a t n i g h t : sorties, combats, w i t h d r a w a l s .
O w i n g t o such restriction i n time our possibility t o
annihilate the enemy in siege w ar f ar e w a s also limited.
A t Dien Bien P h u this important tactical problem
came up again as a nurgent requirement. It w a s solved
b y t h e p o l i c y o f building positions of attack and encir-
clement a n d t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r e d
as t h e c e n t r a l t a s k o f t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d
phase o f attacks.

118
 The system of positions of attack and encirclement
included the communication axes r u n n i n g around the
M u o n g T h a n h sub-sector a n d c u t t i n g the c e n t r a l sub-
sector f r o m t h e s o u t h e r n sub-sector ; m a n y l i n e s o f
c o m m u n i c a t i o n trenches p r o v i d e d w i t h field w o r k s
r u n n i n g f r o m the s u r r o u n d i n g hills t o the p r o x i m i t y of
the enemy's f r o n t - l i n e ; m a n y cross c o m m u n i c a t i o n
trenches to increase liaison possibilities ; i n fixed posi-
tions it was necessary to build fire-positions, ammuni-
t i o n d u m p s , s l e e p i n g t r e n c h e s , first-aid t r e n c h e s , e t c .
I n about t w e l v e days, our troops w e r e able t o d i g
a l e n g t h o f o v e r 100 k m . o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t r e n c h e s
and combat trenches and b u i l d w o r k s o f a l l descrip-
tions. T h e e n e m y left n o s t o n e u n t u r n e d t o w r e c k o u r
c o m m u n i c a t i o n trenches and our positions, but despite
the bombing and strafing by his aircraft and artillery,
our troops advanced unchecked nearer and nearer the
e n e m y b y fighting m a n y g r e a t a n d s m a l l b a t t l e s . T h e
building o f thepositions o f attack a n d encirclement
r e q u i r e d a g r e a t eff'ort o n t h e p a r t o f o u r m e n w h o
proved t o be valiant i nstruggle, painstaking i n w o r k
and persevering i n overcoming difficulties and hard-
ships, v i r t u e s i n h e r e n t i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y a r m y . T h e
success of t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n enabled u s t o close i n u p o n
t h e e n e m y o n flat g r o u n d , s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m o f f o o d
t r a n s p o r t , k e e p firm t h e f r o n t , fight u n r e m i t t i n g l y d a y
a n d n i g h t a n d r e s t r i c t t h e effect o f t h e e n e m y ' s a r t i l -
lery and aircraft as m u c h as possible. O n the closing
days o f M a r c h 1954, the b u i l d i n g o f t h e p o s i t i o n s o f
attack and encirclement w a s virtually completed and
the starting points w e r e prepared t o s t o r m the eastern
hills.

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 O n the n i g h t o f M a r c h 30, 1954, t h e second p h a s e
o f t h e D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n b e g a n w i t h our attack
on the 5 defence heights north of the central sub-sector.
This series o fs t r o n g h o l d s w e r e the key defensive line
of t h e e n e m y , t h e loss o f w h i c h m a d e t h e defence o f
D i e n B i e n P h u i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s e x p l a i n e d t h e fierce-
ness o f the battles o n the eastern hills.
O n M a r c h 3 0 , 1954 a t 5 p . m . t h e a t t a c k o n t h e
eastern hills started. This w a s a large-scale battle
because its a i m w a s not o n l y t o a n n i h i l a t e a b a t t a l i o n
but several battalions a t a t i m e ; i t w a s a complex
struggle because i t included a series o f siege battles
and annihilated m a n y positions. I t w a s started quite
to o u r a d v a n t a g e . A f t e r 4 5 m i n u t e s , w e d e s t r o y e d a l l
the e n e m y troops a n d occupied H i l l C - 1 , near H i l l A - 1 .
After one and a half hours w eput out o f action part
of a b a t t a l i o n o f p a r a t r o o p e r s a n d o c c u p i e d H i l l E , a
stronghold i n the north. After 2 hours w e annihilated
all the b a t t a l i o n defending H i l l D a n d occupied this
height which was the most important stronghold and
the second advanced position i n the n o r t h e r n direction.
T h e n H i l l D-2 w a s occupied. I n the m o r n i n g the e n e m y
launched against these hills a counter-attack f o l l o w e d
the n e x t d a yb y a second, b u t t h e y w e r e a l l f o u g h t
back.
Special m e n t i o n should be made o f H i l l A - 1 , t h e
m o s t i m p o r t a n t of the five h i l l s a n d t h e last s t r o n g h o l d
protecting the central sub-sector. T h e battle f o u g h t o n
H i l l A - 1 f r o m t h e n i g h t o f M a r c h 3 0 t o A p r i l 4 , 1954
w a s t h e m o s t a r d u o u s . I n t h e first n i g h t , w e o c c u p i e d
two-thirds of theposition. I n thesmall hours o f t h e
next m o r n i n g and t h r o u g h o u t the day, the e n e m y force,

120
strengthened and propped by artillery and tanks,
reoccupied t w o - t h i r d s of the position. O n the n i g h t of
M a r c h 31, w e launched a second attack w h i c h dragged
until the m o r n i n g of A p r i l 1 ; the result w a s that w e
reoccupied t w o - t h i r d s of this position, but after m a n y
counter-attacks, the enemy retook part of the lost
g r o u n d . O n t h e n i g h t o f A p r i l 1, w e l a u n c h e d t h e t h i r d
attack which degenerated in an arduous tug-of-war.
O n A p r i l 4, w e s t i l l d i s p u t e d e v e r y i n c h o f t h e g r o u n d
w i t h the e n e m y w h o w a s t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of under-
ground trenches and solid w o r k s t o p a r r y our b l o w s ;
in the end, each side c o n t r o l l e d half the height. W h i l e
this stronghold had not yet fallen, the enemy rein-
f o r c e d b y p a r a t r o o p e r s , l a u n c h e d o n A p r i l 9, 1 9 5 4 a
counter-attack in an attempt t o reoccupy H i l l C-1 ; the
battle raged for 4 days and nights a n d the hill w a s
also divided into t w o parts, each under the occupation
of a n o p p o n e n t .
T h u s the attack o n the h i l l s east o f the central sub-
sector w a s c r o w n e d w i t h a n i m p o r t a n t success b u t a l l
t h e t a r g e t s set f o r t h w e r e n o t r e a c h e d . S i n c e t h e
beginning of the campaign w e had put out of action
5,000 seasoned e n e m y s o l d i e r s t h a t is a force
equal to 6 battalions, of w h i c h 3 battalions w e r e com-
pletely destroyed. T h i s force represented n e a r l y t w o -
fifths of the t o t a l n u m b e r . T h e r e m a i n i n g force, o v e r
ten t h o u s a n d , w a s s t i l l s t r o n g a n d l a t e r o n r e i n f o r c e d
by some battalions, but the m o r a l e of the e n e m y w a s
sagging. W i t h regard to the vantage ground, w e neu-
tralized the n o r t h e r n heights and almost all the impor-
tant heights east of the central sub-sector; our
positions of attack and encirclement advanced to the

121
p r o x i m i t y o f t h e airfield ; w e tightened t h e encircle-
ment, curbed t h e supply a n d reinforcement o f t h e
enemy, c u t off h i s l i a i s o n b e t w e e n t h e c e n t r a l s u b -
sector and the s o u t h e r n sub-sector. H i s sector of occu-
pation s h r a n k and his air space w a s g r e a t l y reduced.
W e a d v o c a t e d to carry on the task s e t f o r t h e s e c o n d
phase of attacks, that is t ocontinue t oconsolidate our
positions o f attack a n dencirclement a n dd r a w them
nearer t h e enemy's line, i m p r o v e the t e r r a i n , occupy
some i m p o r t a n t positions i n order t o tighten the encir-
clement, occupy the airfield t o the p o i n t o f c u t t i n g off
all supply a n d reinforcement o f t h e enemy, a n d
threaten more seriously the interior o f his line.
In application o f this plan, w e drew our positions
n e a r e r a n d n e a r e r t h e e n e m y ( f r o m 10 t o 15 m e t r e s i n
some places). I n our hand, the eastern hills, especially
H i l l D - 1 , were turned into strong defensive positions,
p r o v i d e d w i t h firing w o r k s f o r m o u n t a i n - g u n s a n d
m o r t a r s , and solid fortifications. O u r g u n s o f a l l size
c o n s t a n t l y k e p t t h e e n e m y u n d e r t h e i r fire a n d t h e
battle raged day and night.
T a k i n g advantage o f t h e trenches advancing near
t h e e n e m y , w e a p p l i e d t h e peacemeal occupation
tactics. O n t h e n i g h t o f A p r i l 1, 1954, i n a s u r p r i s e
a t t a c k w e e n t i r e l y a n n i h i l a t e d p o s i t i o n 106 d e f e n d i n g
the w e s t e r n side o fthe airfield. O n the n i g h t of A p r i l
2, p o s i t i o n 311 l y i n g i n t h e w e s t w a s u n d e r o u r fire;
t h e e n e m y e i t h e r s u r r e n d e r e d o r fled a w a y . O n t h e
n i g h t o f A p r i l 18, w e a n n i h i l a t e d p o s i t i o n 105 d e f e n d -
i n g the n o r t h e r n side o f the airfield and o n the n i g h t
of A p r i l 22, w h i l e b u i l d i n g w o r k s f o r t h e a t t a c k , o u r
troops availed themselves of a favourable opportunity

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to launch a surprise attack and occupied p o s i t i o n 206
d e f e n d i n g the w e s t e r n side of the c e n t r a l airfield w h i c h
w a s thus entirely exposed. F r o m the west, east a n d
north, our lines o f attack advanced t o w a r d s the air-
field, m e t t h e r e a n d c u t i t a c r o s s . The central airfield
was occupied by our troops. W e t i g h t e n e d t h e e n c i r -
c l e m e n t f u r t h e r , t h e s t r u g g l e b e c a m e fiercer. T h e
enemy launched m a n y powerful counter-attacks,
propped b y motorized vehicles a n d aircraft, i n a n
a t t e m p t t o r e p u l s e o u r l i n e s . T h e fiercest c o u n t e r - a t t a c k
took place o n A p r i l 2 4 w i t h the a i m o f d r i v i n g o u r
troops o u tof t h e airfield. The result w a s that t h e
enemy was partially annihilated while our positions
w e r e firmly m a i n t a i n e d a n d t h e a i r f i e l d r e m a i n e d
under our control.
T h e sector occupied b y the e n e m y n a r r o w e d d o w n
to a square o f 2 k m . i n side. T h e c e n t r a l sector w a s
w i t h i n r a n g e o f o u r g u n s o f a l l sizes. O u r a n t i - a i r c r a f t
batteries also m o v e d i n . T h e n a r r o w air space left t o
the e n e m y w a s n o m o r e safe. A t t h a t t i m e , t o k i l l a n
enemy more, t ooccupy a n inch of ground more, was
also of i m p o r t a n t significance. O n the one h a n d w e
annihilated t h e enemy's positions o n e b y o n e a n d
repelled his counter-attacks; on the other w e vied w i t h
one another i n sniping t h e enemy. Rifle-shooters,
machine-gunners, mortar-gunners a n d artillerymen
did their best i n t h i s action, c a u s i n g h i m greater a n d
greater losses ; his m o r a l e w a s s i n k i n g ; h e c o n s t a n t l y
lived in fear and tension and did not dare m o v e about
for fear o f being shot as soon as h e w e n t out o f h i s
fortifications. O u r shock u n i t s penetrated deep i n t o
the enemy's line, destroyed his stores and decimated
his force.
123
 Supply and reinforcement became a v e r y difficult
problem for the enemy. L o n g since his airfield w a s n o
more utilizable ; specially from the time w e had cut
it a s u n d e r a n d b r o u g h t it under o u r c o n t r o l , the e n e m y
had no other alternative than to airdrop reinforcement,
food a n d a m m u n i t i o n o n D i e n B i e n P h u . H o w e v e r as
the area occupied by the e n e m y w a s too n a r r o w and
h i s a i r c r a f t d i d n o t d a r e fly l o w f o r f e a r o f o u r a n t i -
aircraft batteries, o n l y part of his supplies fell i n his
sector w h i l e a bigger a n d bigger part fell i n t o o u r
hand. W e prevented h i m from picking up the
parachutes to cut off his source of supplies ; o n the
other hand, w e disputed these supplies w i t h h i m and
appropriated his food and a m m u n i t i o n to partially
replenish our supplies. I n this connection, it should
be m e n t i o n e d t h a t w e h a d u t i l i z e d a l o t o f c a n n o n
s h e l l s d r o p p e d b y t h e e n e m y t o fire b a c k a t h i m . A f t e r
the engagements o n the eastern hills, the e n e m y
airdropped t w o battalions i n r e i n f o r c e m e n t ; later he
dropped by w a v e s u n i t s of w h a t he called v o l u n t e e r s —
t o t a l l i n g seven or eight hundred m e n — t o reinforce
D i e n B i e n P h u ; p a r t of these t r o o p s fell i n t o o u r h a n d s
and were taken prisoner i m m e d i a t e l y after their
landing.
T h r o u g h o u t the second phase of attacks the s i t u a t i o n
was pressing. T h e A m e r i c a n interventionists sent i n
m a n y more bombers and transport planes to help the
French defend D i e n B i e n P h u .
E x c l u d i n g t h e A m e r i c a n C. 119 s q u a d r o n s , t h e
enemy utilized at the D i e n B i e n P h u front t w o - t h i r d s
o f h i s fighters a n d t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s i n I n d o - C h i n a . B y
b o m b i n g h e a v i l y and repeatedly a g i v e n area, the

124
e n e m y h o p e d h e w o u l d be a b l e t o s a v e t h e D i e n B i e n
P h u fortified entrenched camp. H i s bombers w e r e v e r y
a c t i v e i n b o m b i n g a n d s t r a f i n g w h a t he b e l i e v e d t o be
our positions ; they burnt all the hilly r e g i o n surround-
ing Dien Bien P h u w i t h n a p a l m bombs and destroyed
w i t h h e a v y b o m b s w h a t w a s b e l i e v e d t o be t h e p o s i t i o n s
of o u r a r t i l l e r y . O n A p r i l 2, 1954 a l o n e , h i s b o m b e r s
a n d fighters m a d e 2 5 0 s o r t i e s . T h i s h u g e b u t d e s p e r a t e
efi'ort d i d n o t g i v e t h e e n e m y t h e e x p e c t e d r e s u l t . I n
the meantime, we tightened the encirclement ; our
y o u n g anti-aircraft units operated very successfully
and caused substantial d a m a g e s to the enemy.
A t the b e g i n n i n g of A p r i l 1954, t h e F r e n c h a n d
American generals saw that D i e n B i e n P h u was facing
the threat of a n n i h i l a t i o n . A t the s a m e t i m e the F r e n c h
government officially requested the U . S . to send
s q u a d r o n s o f fighters a n d h e a v y b o m b e r s f r o m t h e
Philippines or f r o m aircraft carriers of the U . S . 7th
fleet t o r e i n f o r c e D i e n B i e n P h u . B u t t h e r e w e r e d i s a -
greement i n the A m e r i c a n official circles and sharp
contradictions between the imperialists themselves;
moreover, the e n e m y t h o u g h t t h a t such a n act c o u l d
not save the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps but w o u l d
be s e v e r e l y c o n d e m n e d b y p u b l i c o p i n i o n a t h o m e a n d
abroad and complicate the Indo-Chinese situation,
bringing about unexpected consequences ; i n the end
this plan w a s given up.
In mid-April, the enemy contemplated to launch,
from the N a m H u basin, an operation t o rescue D i e n
B i e n P h u . O w i n g t o lack of effectives, this p l a n w a s
delayed m a n y times and finally abandoned-

125
 T h e e n e m y t h e n intended t o operate deep into our
rear, w i t h attack o n T u y e n Q u a n g a n d Y e n B a i , a n d
Phu Doan by the end of April. This plan w a s also
given u p because the e n e m y r a n short of effectives a n d
aircraft and feared h e could not v o u c h for the success
and w o u l d suffer a bitter defeat.
A t t h ee n d o f A p r i l , he gradually lost t h e hope o f
defending Dien Bien P h u . H e realized little b y little
that t h o u g h active, his air force could n o t " c r u s h " o u r
troops, ease off the e n c i r c l e m e n t a n d cut off o u r s u p p l y
road. A t Dien Bien Phu, w h a t remained o fhis mobile
force w a s 5 companies, his sector of o c c u p a t i o n s h r a n k
t o t h e s i z e o f f r o m 1.3 k m . t o 1.7 k m . T h e s i t u a t i o n o f
his troops became a l a r m i n g .
O n o u r side, w h i l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e second p h a s e w e
fought unremittingly at t h eDien Bien P h u front, t h e
b a t t l e a g a i n s t the e n e m y w a s a l s o v e r y fierce a n d h a r d
o n o u r lines of supply f r o m t h e r e a r t o t h e f r o n t . A s
has been said above, there w a s a great r e q u i r e m e n t i n
supply a n d reinforcement f o r t h e campaign. O u r
combat units amounted t o tens o f thousands o f men,
o u r dan cong s e r v i n g i n t r a n s p o r t r e a c h e d h u n d r e d s
of thousands, our lines of supply w e r e as l o n g as f r o m
300 t o 500 k m . , a n d t h e d u r a t i o n o f service dragged
over 6 months. Compared w i t h the F r o n t i e r campaign,
at D i e n B i e n P h u the v o l u m e o f food needed w a s ten
times over. I f w e take S o n L a as the limit o l the zone
of supply, t h e g o o d s t r a n s p o r t e d w i t h i n t h i s z o n e for
the c a m p a i g n a m o u n t e d t o 4.5 m i l l i o n t o n / k i l o m e t r e s .
However the means of transport w a s only partly
mechanized, t h e r e m a i n i n g w a s rudimentary, using
manpower.

126
 D u r i n g our preparation, the enemy did his utmost
to destroy our lines of s u p p l y . B u t his a i r c r a f t w a s
the most active in A p r i l , the m o n t h i n w h i c h D i e n B i e n
P h u was threatened, the direct supply made by the
enemy for this entrenched camp m e t w i t h greater
i m p e d i m e n t s ; the e n e m y considered the d e s t r u c t i o n of
o u r lines of s u p p l y as o n e of h i s p r i n c i p a l m e a n s t o
save the situation. O u r rbads w e r e single track,
narrow, badly kept and dangerous in some places. T h e
enemy concentrated his air force and airdropped
quintal-load bombs, time-bombs and "butterfly"
bombs; his aircraft operated day and night, b o m b i n g
a n d s t r a f i n g t h e v i t a l p o i n t s s u c h as t h e p a s s e s c a l l e d
K h e , H u t Gio', L u n g L o , P h a D i n ; s o m e of t h e m
received as m a n y as h u n d r e d s of t o n s of b o m b s i n o n e
day. T h i s is n o t t o s p e a k of t h e g r e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s c r e a t e d
by rain and flood. O w i n g to all these impediments, the
stores at the f r o n t fell at t i m e s far b e l o w the n o r m .
T o overcome these difficulties, and guarantee the
supply to the front, the Party Central Committee and
G o v e r n m e n t called on all the P a r t y and people to
m a k e every effort to secure the t r a n s p o r t of f o o d a n d
a m m u n i t i o n to the f r o n t . A t t i m e s h u n d r e d s of cadres
at m e d i u m level a n d h i g h level w e r e m o b i l i z e d t o serve
the supply line ; a great n u m b e r of political cadres at
the front also took part i n supply w o r k . T h a n k s to the
great efforts displayed by the inhabitants, i n c l u d i n g
the North-Westerners, and to the great h e r o i s m and
e n d u r a n c e o f t h e dan cong, e s p e c i a l l y a t t h e fire l i n e ,
w e w e r e able to t h w a r t the perfidious s c h e m e of the
enemy w h o was attempting to sabotage our supply

127
w o r k . O u r task of r e i n f o r c i n g and s u p p l y i n g this
historic c a m p a i g n w a s fulfilled on a large scale. O u r
preparations w e r e w e l l attended to to enable us, i n
c a s e o f n e c e s s i t y , t o fight t h r o u g h o u t M a y a n d l o n g e r .
T h e characteristic of the second p h a s e of attacks
w a s t h a t a t first t h e o p e r a t i o n s w e r e c o n d u c t e d a f t e r
t h e r a p i d a n d r e s o u n d i n g v i c t o r i e s o f t h e first p h a s e ;
t h a t i s w h y , t o b e s u r e o f v i c t o r y , o n t h e field o f
ideological leadership, w e attached importance to
o v e r c o m i n g the m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of s u b j e c t i v i s m and
u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of the e n e m y because this w o u l d
easily lead to the negligence in grasping the concrete
situation of the enemy, and i n b u i l d i n g the positions
which w e r e not up to our r e q u i r e m e n t ; it w o u l d lead
to the carelessness in grasping and controlling our
fighting force as w e l l as o u r p l a n of o p e r a t i o n s .
H o w e v e r , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t features of this second
phase of attacks were the acuteness and fierceness of
the struggle w h i c h required f r o m our m e n a v e r y great
combativeness and heroism ; the long period d u r i n g
w h i c h o u r t r o o p s h a d t o fight u n r e m i t t i n g l y a n d t o
cope w i t h weariness, tiredness and t e n s i o n ; the fight-
ing conditions which were very hard and arduous
b e c a u s e o u r fighters w h o h a d t o s h e l t e r i n t h e i r f o r t i f i -
cations d u r i n g the m o n t h s of p r e p a r a t i o n , h a d n o w
t o fight a n d l i v e f o r a l o n g p e r i o d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
t r e n c h e s a n d d u g - o u t s . T h i s is n o t t o m e n t i o n t h e
difficulties created by heavy rains w h i c h broke a w a y
or inundated our positions. S o m e t i m e s the supply w a s
irregular. As the battle w a s going on w i t h o u t respite,
in the course of pushing f o r w a r d our line of attack

128
and encirclement, the i n e v i t a b l e loss o n our side m a d e
it necessary t o t i m e l y replenish and re-organize our
forces t o c o n t i n u e the fight.
I n t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e political work w h i c h h a d
played a role o f paramount importance, continued t o
expound t h o r o u g h l y the great significance o f the cam-
paign, and t o interpret carefully the determination of
the P a r t y Central Committee which was t o annihilate
completely the e n e m y a t D i e n B i e n P h u ; each success
on our part a n d each reverse of t h e e n e m y encou-
raged o u r officers a n d m e n ; t h e e x a m p l e o f c o m -
bativeness a n d sacrifice o f o u r heroes a n d fighters
served t o develop t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y h e r o i s m a m o n g
o u r t r o o p s a n d t o k e e p firm a n d r a i s e t h e i r d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n t o fight a n d t o w i n . P o l i t i c a l w o r k a l s o s a w t o t h e
interpretation and supervision o f concrete tasks such
as : d i s c i p l i n e a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e l i f e a t t h e f r o n t ,
supply o f hot food and hot drink, arrangement for the
fighters t o h a v e s u f f i c i e n t s l e e p ; w e m u s t see w h e t h e r
our positions had been b u i l t u p t o the r e q u i r e m e n t t o
enable our troops to m o v e a l o n g i n the d a y t i m e w i t h o u t
being discovered by the enemy, w h e t h e r these positions
were not wet, a n d whether t h e rule of preventive
hygiene h a d been observed. P o l i t i c a l w o r k also s a w
t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e fighting f o r c e s i n r e q u i r e d
numbers, the replenishment o f these forces a n d pro-
m o t i o n o f n e w cadres. Great a t t e n t i o n w a s paid t o
recruiting n e w Party members a n d re-organizing
P a r t y ceils. T h e respect o f a strict discipline, correct
and timely punishment and reward were also import-
ant to raise the combativeness o f our troops.

9 DBP 129
 A s the second phase dragged on, w e obtained a m o r e
i m p o r t a n t success a n d a greater s u p e r i o r i t y i n effec-
tives and fire-power. I n the course o f the battles our
plan o f operations proved t o be accurate ; tactical
problems could be solved very concretely. I n the
meantime, t h e enemy met w i t h bitter failures and
encountered great difficulties i neffectives, reinforce-
ment, supply and in the m o r a l field.
H o w e v e r , i t w a s precisely a t that time, that a
rightist and negative tendency a p p e a r e d a m o n g o u r
officers a n d m e n , under various f o r m s : fear o f
casualties, losses, fatigue, difficulties and hardships,
u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f the e n e m y , s u b j e c t i v i s m a n d self-
conceit- F o l l o w i n g closely the s i t u a t i o n o f o u r a r m y -
m e n a t the front, the Political B u r e a u o f the P a r t y
Central Committee assessed that the great victories
w o n lately had created basic conditions for our troops
to annihilate completely the enemy a t D i e n B i e n P h u ,
but our officers c o m m i t t e d mistakes, m a i n l y because
their "rightist tendency curbed somewhat the influen-
ce o f o u r v i c t o r i e s . " T h e P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u i n s t r u c t e d ,
"All levels of the Party, the Party members, and the
cadres must do their best to overcome rightist ten^
dency, consolidate and raise their determination,
heighten their sense of responsibility before the
people, army and Party, resolutely correct the past
mistakes, grasp further the principle of striking surely
and advancing cautiously, at the same time, work
against time, strictly obey orders, overcome all diffi-
culties and hardships, and fulfil their task of securing'
complete victory for the campaign."'

130
 At a conference o f delegates o f the P a r t y c o m m i t t e e
of d i v i s i o n s a n d v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a s e r i o u s a n d
thorough ideological struggle took place. T h e m e e t i n g
assessed objectively t h e s i t u a t i o n o n b o t h sides,
pointed o u t o u r v i c t o r i e s a n dt h ee n e m y ' s reserves,
the conditions m o r e and m o r e m a t u r e d for o u r a r m y
to destroy a l lthe e n e m y , a n d requested o u r troops
to abide b ythe basic principles and w o r k a g a i n s t t i m e
t o w i n final v i c t o r y b e f o r e t h e r a i n y s e a s o n .
W e have bluntly criticized t h e manifestations o f
rightist deviation and passivity, and pointed out that:
"The spirit of our Party and army i s I t h e r e v o l u -
tionary d y n a m i s m o fthe proletariat,its spirit of light-
i n g w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s e a n dcoricession a g a i n s t t h e
enemy. I t is t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y spirit i n i t s fullest
meaning, a spirit w h i c h w a r n s people not t o rest o n
their laurels and not t oflinch from difficulties but t o
fight perseveringly i n a n ycircumstances, until final
v i c t o r y . I n t h e a r m y , t h i s P a r t y s p i r i t in the heroism
in fighting, the determination to destroy the enemy,
the strict execution of orders, t h e r e s o l u t i o n t o o v e r -
come difficulties and hardships ; i t is a spirit w h i c h
makes people fearless o f danger, fatigue, losses and
s a c r i f i c e o f l i v e s . I t c o n s i s t s i n fighting u n r e m i t t i n g l y ,
not being subjective and conceited w h e n achieving a
success a n dnot being s h a k e n i n case o f d e f e a t ; i t
enables y o u t o keep i n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s y o u r self-
control a n d diligence a n d your persistence i n
struggle.'''
After this conference, a campaign o f ideological
education and struggle was launched from the P a r t y
committees t o the cells, f r o m officers t o soldiers and

131
in a l l c o m b a t u n i t s . T h i s c a m p a i g n w a s a great
success o f t h e political w o r k a t t h e D i e n B i e n P h u
f r o n t , a n d o n e o f the greatest achievements ever
scored b y this w o r k i n t h e h i s t o r y o f s t r u g g l e o f o u r
army. T h egreat result obtained w a st h e suppression
of a l l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h e e r r o n e o u s t e n d e n c y . A l l
the P a r t y m e m b e r s , officers a n d m e n h a dm o r e confi-
d e n c e i n t h e final v i c t o r y a n d a n u n s h a k a b l e w i l l t o
destroy the enemy completely. Imbued w i t h a great
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight a n d t o w i n a n d a g r e a t m e t t l e ,
our units w e r e eager t o m a k e preparations f o ra n e w
phase o f attacks a n d d i dtheir best t os w i t c h over t o
the general onslaught.

THIRD PHASE OF ATTACKS : OCCUPATION O F T H E LAST

HEIGHT IN T H E EAST, A N N I H I L A T I O N O F NEW POSTS,
FURTHER SHRINKING OF THE SECTOR OCCUPIED
BY T H E ENEMY AND HIS AIR SPACE, HEAVY THREAT
TO T H E I N T E R I O R OF HIS LINE, SCHEDULE FOR THE
GENERAL ATTACK AND ENTIRE ANNIHILATION
OF T H E ENEMY

A t the end of April, the situation w a s most desperate

for t h ee n e m y . N e v e r t h e l e s s i n t h e E a s t , h e still
controlled two-thirds of Hill A - 1 and a half of Hill C-1.
His a i rspace shrank a great deal but h e continued t o
receive small quantities o f supply dropped b y
transport planes.
The task set far our troops in this phase was to
occupy the eastern heights still partly in the enemy'^s
hand, to wipe out some positions in the West, to

132
a n n i h i l a t e new enemy^is forces, to advance f u r t h e r our
l i n e of attack and encirclement, to concentrate the
fire of a l t our arms on the i n t e r i o r of the enemy's line,
to control what remained of his a i r space and to
prepare for the general attack.
This third phase of attacks began at a t i m e w h e n
the enemy w a s f a c i n g a desperate s i t u a t i o n ; o n o u r
side, t h e m o r a l e o f o u r t r o o p s r a n v e r y h i g h , t h e
difficulties i n s u p p l y h a d j u s t been o v e r c o m e , t h a t is
w h y the battles given i n this phase w e r e strikingly
r a p i d . N e a r l y a l l o u r u n i t s o p e n e d t h e fire a t s c h e d u l e d
time, strictly carried out orders, fought most valiantly
and fulfilled all the tasks entrusted to t h e m .
T h i s p h a s e o f a t t a c k s b e g a n o n t h e n i g h t o f M a y 1-
W e swiftly wiped out the enemy w h o w a s still control-
ling half H i l l C - 1 , and occupied this position. O n the
same night, w e quickly annihilated positions 505 and
5 0 5 - A at t h e feet o f t h e e a s t e r n h i l l s s i t u a t e d o n t h e
left b a n k of the N a m R o m R i v e r . I n the w e s t , p o s i t i o n
311-A w a s s w i f t l y liquidated. I n the s o u t h e r n sub-
sector, w e p u t o u t o f a c t i o n p a r t o f t h e e n e m y t r o o p s
stationed north-east of H o n g C u m . O n the n i g h t of
M a y 3, w e t o o ' k p o s i t i o n 3 1 1 - B i n t h e w e s t . O u r l i n e s
of a t t a c k a n d e n c i r c l e m e n t a d v a n c e d f u r t h e r a n d
further, n e a r i n g the e n e m y ' s c o m m a n d post b y less
than 300 metres i n some places.
There were signs that the enemy w a s contemplating
to force his w a y t h r o u g h o u r l i n e o f e n c i r c l e m e n t ,
after the assessment by N a v a r r e a n d other F r e n c h
and A m e r i c a n generals that Dien Bien P h u w a s
facing the threat of annihilation. H e w a s scheming
to regroup his forces i n three c o l u m n s and, under the

133
cover of night, t o break t h r o u g h o u r encirclement and
flee i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f L a o s : a c o l u m n o f p a r a t r o o p e r s
w o u l d w i t h d r a w t o t h e south-east, t h e second m a d e
up o f l e g i o n a r i e s a n d N o r t h - A f r i c a n s w o u l d h e a d f o r
south and the t h i r d w h i c h included the units defending
H o n g C u m w o u l d take t h e western direction. A n
enemy column w o u l d start from Upper Laos t o meet
these three c o l u m n s . Gen- D e Castries and some u n i t s
were t o r e m a i n a t Dien B i e n P h u w i t h the w o u n d e d .
W e closely watched the i n t e n t i o n and preparations of
the e n e m y a n d set t o our units thus o c c u p y i n g t h e
western positions t h e task t o tightly control all t h e
roads and tracks leading from D i e n Bien P h u t o the
Laotian frontier. After t h e annihilation o f this
entrenched camp, w e laid hand o n a n order issued
by the enemy's c o m m a n d t ocarry out these operations
of r e t r e a t o n t h e n i g h t o f M a y 7 .
O n M a y 6, a t 5 p.m. o u r troops attacked H i l l A - 1 .
In t h e preparatory stage o u r sappers h a d d u g a n
underground trench leading t o t h ecentre o f the hill
and introduced there one ton o f explosives. W i t h the
powerful co-ordination of this explosion, o u r troops
attacked this position from various directions, put out
of a c t i o n t h e d e f e n d i n g u n i t c o m p o s e d o f p a r a t r o o p e r s
of t h e f o r e i g n l e g i o n , a n d occupied this last height.
On the same night, our troops stormed and occupied
H i l l C-2, a secondary p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n H i l l C-1 a n d
the N a m R o m River- P o s i t i o n 506, n o r t h o f M u o n g
T h a n h bridge, a n d position 310 i n the west fell into
our h a n d . T h e e n e m y l o s t a l l t h e e a s t e r n h e i g h t s a s
well as a n i m p o r t a n t contingent o f troops ; h e
o c c u p i e d o n l y a s e c t o r o f f r o m 7 0 0 t o 1,000 m e t r e s
in side; t h e m o r a l e o f his troops s a n k t o the l o w e s t
point.
Everything w a s ready for the general attack. W h i l e
preparations were being made t o vouch fort h e
success o f t h e c o m i n g o p e r a t i o n s , o n M a y 7, w e
detected s o m e u n u s u a l s i g n s o n the side of the e n e m y :
Except for a few planes w h i c h airdropped some food,
all t h e enemy's planes c a r r y i n g m u n i t i o n s r e t u r n e d
to H a n o i w i t h o u t d r o p p i n g their parachutes. H e r e and
there i n t h e sector held b y t h e e n e m y , explosions
were heard, p o i n t i n g o u t that he w a s destroying
weapons. A number o fsoldiers threw their arms and
ammunition into the N a m R o m River.
W e deemed that the enemy w a s i n a turmoil. O u r
troops received orders t o m a k e themselves ready.
O n M a y 7, a t 2 p . m - o n e o f o u r u n i t s a t t a c k e d
position 507, near M u o n g T h a n h bridge. T h e e n e m y
offered a w e a k resistance, a l l the g a r r i s o n s u r r e n d e r -
ed. P r o f i t i n g b y t h i s v i c t o r y w e a n n i h i l a t e d p o s i t i o n s
508 a n d 509 o n the left b a n k o f the N a m R o m R i v e r .
It w a s clear that t h e e n e m y fell i n t o c o n f u s i o n a n d
lost a l l h i s combativeness ; w h i t e flags appeared i n
some places.
A t 3 p.m. o u rtroops received orders t o seize this
o p p o r t u n i t y t o launch a general attack on the fortified
entrenched camp w i t h o u t w a i t i n g f o r t h e n i g h t .
F r o m the east and w e s t our d i v i s i o n s co-ordinated
their actions and struck directly a t the enemy's com-
m a n d post. T h o u g h t h e e n e m y h a d still a b o u t 10,000
m e n left, he w a s c o m p l e t e l y d e m o r a l i z e d - W h e r e v e r
our troops w e n t the e n e m y soldiers raised w h i t e flags
and surrendered.
A t 5.30 p . m . , w e o c c u p i e d t h e c o m m a n d p o s t : G e n .
D e Castries a n d a l l his staff w e r e captured. A l l t h e
enemy troops stationed at Dien B i e n P h u came out
and surrendered. They were taken prisoner and were
kindly treated.
Our flag bearing the slogan "Determined to F i g h t
and to Wir^" w a s raised aloft over the D i e n B i e n P h u
plain.
W e attacked the southern sub-sector the same night-
There the enemy, a force 2,000 s t r o n g , t r i e d t o w i t h -
d r a w i n the direction of Upper Laos. P u r s u e d by our
troops a n d c a u g h t at 8 p . m . a l l the e n e m y troops
w e r e t a k e n prisoner at m i d n i g h t .
After 55 days a n d n i g h t s of u n r e m i t t i n g struggle,
the e n e m y at the D i e n B i e n P h u fortified entrenched
camp was completely annihilated.
The historic Dien Bien P h u campaign was
completely victorious. T h e strategic offensive of w i n t e r
1953 a n d s p r i n g 1954 o f o u r a r m y e n d e d i n a g r e a t
victory.

136
 VI

PARAMOUNT SIGNIFICANCE
OF T H E GREAT DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY
AND OF T H E WINTER-SPRING VICTORIES

The historic Dien Bien P h u campaign a n di n

general the W i n t e r 1953-Spring 1954 campaign were
the greatest victories ever w o n b y o u r a r m y a n d
people u p t o t h e present t i m e . These great v i c t o r i e s
m a r k e d a g i a n t p r o g r e s s , a momentous change in the
evolution of the Resistance War for national salvation
put up by our people against the aggressive French
imperialists propped up by U.S. interventionists.
A n analysis of t h e n e w aspect of this resistance
war brings out the following points :
First, i n t h e s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e o f w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 a n d
s p r i n g 1954, w e l a u n c h e d m a n y a t t a c k s o n t h e v a r i o u s
battlefields o f t h e country.
F r o m t h eFrontier campaign i n 1950 o n w a r d s t h e
f o r m o f local counter-offensive h a d appeared. I n each
season of operations o ri n a certain period, o u r regular
a r m y w a s i n a position t ow a g e a successful offeilsive

137
c a m p a i g n in a g i v e n direction of the m a i n battlefield,
viz. Bac B o I n the f o l l o w i n g years w e constantly kept
the initiative o n this m a i n battlefield; the great
efforts displayed by the e n e m y to w r e s t back i n i t i a t i v e
in Bac B o w e r e t h w a r t e d by our a r m y .
I n a u t u m n 1953 a n d s p r i n g 1954 o u r r e g u l a r a r m y
w a s able t o l a u n c h attacks n o t o n l y o n v a r i o u s fronts
in Bac B o but i n the Fifth zone ; m e a n w h i l e the Viet-
namese volunteers co-ordinated their action w i t h the
Pathet L a o Liberation troops and launched offensive
campaigns in Upper Laos, Central Laos and Lower
Laos. T h e scope of our W i n t e r - S p r i n g strategic offen-
sive w e n t beyond the m a i n battlefield, and began t o
spread to S o u t h V i e t n a m and Indo-China.
Second, i n t h e s e c o n d s t a g e o f t h e W i n t e r - S p r i n g
strategic offensive, w e mustered the greatest part of
crack units of our r e g u l a r a r m y o n the m a i n front,
Dien Bien Phu, and launched a big offensive against
this most powerful fortified entrenched camp defended
by a n i m p Q r t a n t c o n t i n g e n t of e n e m y picked soldiers.
Previously, and even i n the early stage of the
W i n t e r - S p r i n g offensive, the trend of our operations
w a s t o find a g a p i n t h e i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g i c d i r e c -
tions of the e n e m y to attack and a n n i h i l a t e part of
his force.
In the D i e n B i e n P h u campaign, w e proceeded to
the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of our m a i n force to a n n i h i l a t e the
enemy's force a n d h a m m e r at t h i s entrenched c a m p
believed by t h e e n e m y t o be i m p r e g n a b l e . T h e D i e n
B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n had fully the character of a
decisive battle in the strategic point of v i e w .

138
 Third, i n t i i e W i n t e r 1 9 5 3 a n d S p r i n g 1 9 5 4 o f f e n s i v e ,
there was a new change i n t h e f o r m o f operation.
Mobile warfare which included the units previously
fighting i n siege w a r f a r e a n d played t h e m a i n role
on the B a c B o battlefield, then developed f a r a n d
wide a n dplayed t h e m a i n role o n t h e battlefields o f
the Fifth zone and the neighbour country.
A greater change w a sthat previously a n d i n t h e
first stage o f the W i n t e r - S p r i n g offensive, t h e opera-
tional f o r m frequently used b y our regular a r m y had
been m o b i l e w a r f a r e b u t i n t h e D i e n B i e n P h u
campaign — the central point o f t h e n a t i o n - w i d e
battlefield — our a r m y used a n e w operational f o r m ,
siege w a r f a r e , w h i c h h a s t h e character o f a large-
scale positional w a r f a r e .
A t that time, guerilla warfare played a role o f
paramount importance at t h e fronts i n the enemy's
rear, and the m a i n r o l e i n B i n h - T r i - T h i e n and N a m B o .
To judge bythe enormous change and development
of t h e scale o f o f f e n s i v e c a m p a i g n s , a n d o f t h e c h a -
racter a n d f o r m o f operations o f t h e D i e n B i e n P h u
campaign, o u r a r m y scored great successes never
k n o w n b e f o r e . With these successes, our Resistance
War shifted from the form of local counter-offensive
to that of large-scale counter-offensive, from the
strategic initiative on the Bac Bo battlefield to the
initiative on other battlefields throughout the country.
There lies the g r e a t strategic significance of the g r e a t
Dien Bien P h u victory a n d o f other W i n t e r - S p r i n g
victories.

139
 I n the D i e n Bien Phu and Winter-Spring campaigns,
we have put out of action a very important contingent
of the enemy's force.
Dien Bien Piiu was the greatest and the most
typical battle of annihilation fought by our a r m y up
to this time, and the greatest v i c t o r y ever w o n by our
people for n e a r l y a c e n t u r y of s t r u g g l e against
foreign aggression. The Dien Bien P h u battle was
also r e g a r d e d as one of t h e g r e a t e s t b a t t l e s o f a n n i h i -
l a t i o n i n the a n n a l s of a r m e d s t r u g g l e of w e a k a n d
small nations against the aggressive armies of the
imperialists and colonialists. A t Dien Bien P h u w e
a n n i h i l a t e d a n d c a p t u r e d m o r e t h a n 16,000 m e n ,
i n c l u d i n g the w h o l e staff c o m m a n d i n g the e n t r e n c h e d
c a m p w i t h a g e n e r a l . 16 c o l o n e l s a n d I . 7 4 q o f f i c e r s
and n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers. I n this amber w e r e
17 c r a c k i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , i n c l u d i n g 7 b a t t a l i o n s
of p a r a t r o o p e r s , 3 a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s a n d n e a r l y one
battalion of sappers, altogether 21 battalions-
A general survey of all the battlefields i n the coun-
try, shows that i n the W i n t e r - S p r i n g offensive, w e
put o u t of a c t i o n 112,000 e n e m y soldiers, or one
quarter of a l l the e n e m y a r m e d forces i n I n d o - C h i n a ;
out of this n u m b e r , 25 b a t t a l i o n s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y
destroyed. T h e n u m b e r of A m e r i c a n bombers, fighters
and transport planes, i n c l u d i n g B 24 bombers, and
C 119 h e a v y t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s s h o t d o w n o r d e s t r o y e d
at D i e n B i e n P h u w a s 62, a n d the n u m b e r of planes
shot d o w n and destroyed o n a l l the other fronts i n
t h e c o u n t r y w a s 177, r e p r e s e n t i n g a v e r y i m p o r t a n t
part of the enemy's air force i n I n d o - C h i n a .

140
 1

Gen. \'o Nguyen Giap inspecting the Dien Bien Phu

battle-field after victory
I
 Since tlie t i m e the F r e n c h i m p e r i a l i s t s r e t u r n e d a n d
unleashed their aggressive war, never, i n a relatively
short time, had they suffered such a h e a v y loss. I t
w a s a l l the m o r e so since t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y of t h e
enemy force annihilated by us included his best units
viz, the battalions of paratroopers, the battalions of
European and A f r i c a n i n f a n t r y m e n considered by the
e n e m y as " s p e a r h e a d s " , " o f f e n s i v e b l o w s " , t h e back-
bone of N a v a r r e ' s strategic m o b i l e mass. These serious
reverses caused a great apprehension in the h i g h
c o m m a n d of the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y C o r p s a n d
m a d e the a l r e a d y s a g g i n g m o r a l e of their generals
and soldiers sink more rapidly.

I n the historic D l e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n a n d i n the

Winter-Spring campaigns, we liberated large areas
of s t r a t e g i c importance.
In Bac Bo, after the liberation of L a i C h a u and
Dien Bien P h u , it w a s the first t i m e that the last
enemy disappeared f r o m the N o r t h - W e s t . T h e resis-
tance bases expanded, c o v e r i n g all the m o u n t a i n
r e g i o n s of B a c B o , f r o m V i e t B a c t o t h e N o r t h - W e s t
and H o a Binh, and linking with the large liberated
areas of the upper part of Laos, o u r n e i g h b o u r . T h e
enemy w a s thus cooped up i n the Red River delta.
T h e F i f t h zone, one of o u r free zones coveted by
the enemy, expanded m u c h m o r e widely- A large area
n o r t h of the strategically i m p o r t a n t H i g h P l a t e a u x ,
w a s liberated. T h e threat caused by the enemy to the
rear of t h e p r o v i n c e s of Q u a n g N a m , Q u a n g N g a i
and B i n h D i n h w a s dispelled. O u r liberated zone
which r a n from the seacoast to the L a o t i a n frontier

141
and linked with t h e liberated zone o f L o w e r Laos
was a new threat t o the enemy i n South Indo-China.
O n t h e fronts i nthe enemy's rear, i nt h eRed R i v e r
delta, i n B i n h - T r i - T h i e n a n d N a m B o ,t h e g u e r i l l a
bases a n d t h e regions w h e r e t h e g u e r i l l a operated
e x p a n d e d w i d e l y . T h ezones occupied b y t h e e n e m y
was so narrow that they were reduced t o mere points
and lines. The enemy-controlled regions i n t h e R e d
River delta shrank ; three-quarters o f t h eterritoryi n
the enemy's rear w e r e liberated.
In Laos, t h ePathet L a o Liberation troops a n d t h e
Vietnamese volunteers liberated P h o n g Saly province
and the N a m H u basin, expanded their bases i n Upper
Laos a n dt h eliberated areas i n Central Laos a n d i n
Lower Laos. Throughout Laos, more than half t h e
territory a n d half t h ep o p u l a t i o n w e r e liberated.
W i t h t h eabove-mentioned great victories a n d w i t h
the W i n t e r - S p r i n g strategic offensive c u l m i n a t e d b y
t h e D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n , the Navarre plan
worked out by French and American imperialists
went bankrupt.
T h e e n e m y suffered h e a v y losses i n men- A great
part o f w h a t w a scalled Navarre's "strategic mobile
mass" w a s annihilated, t h er e m a i n i n g w a s compelled
to scatter t o t h e point o f losing i t s mobility. T h e
enemy's morale was most shaking. Large contingents
of n e w l y r e p l e n i s h e d p u p p e t t r o o p s w e r e d i s b a n d e d .
W h a t w a smore serious f o r t h e enemy w a sthat b y
liquidating t h eD i e n Bien P h u entrenched camp, o u r
troops defeated h i s highest a n d m o s t p o w e r f u l f o r m
of defence a n d p u t h i m before t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t t h e

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other defence systems, m u c h w e a k e r t h a n D i e n B i e n
P h u , w o u l d be t h r e a t e n e d w i t h a n n i h i l a t i o n .
In this dangerous situation, the e n e m y of course,
did not think of l a u n c h i n g the strategic offensives
m a p p e d o u t i n the N a v a r r e p l a n , still less o f the possi-
bility t o w i n decisive v i c t o r i e s as c a l c u l a t e d b y the
French and A m e r i c a n w a r m o n g e r s . A t that time, the
greatest concern of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t w a s to
save the r e m a i n i n g force of the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y
Corps from threat of a n n i h i l a t i o n . I n the m i d d l e of
M a y 1954, G e n . F l y c a m e t o S a i g o n w i t h i n s t r u c -
tions from the French government to Gen. N a v a r r e
t o the effect t h a t t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e R e d R i v e r
d e l t a s h o u l d be r e d u c e d at o n c e to t h e " u s e f u l s p a c e "
a n d p r e p a r a t i o n s h o u l d be m a d e , i n c a s e o f n e c e s s i t y ,
t o w i t h d r a w F r e n c h t r o o p s s o u t h o f t h e 18 t h p a r a l l e l .
I n s u b s t a n c e , these i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d as m a i n
goal and priority task the protection of the r e m a i n i n g
force of the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps. T h e p l a n
for such a w i t h d r a w a l w a s carried out at the end of
J u n e a n d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f J u l y 1954). T h e e n e m y
fled f r o m V i e t T r i t o w n , t h e C h o B e n s u b - s e c t o r , a l l
the zone south of the delta embracing the province
and city of N a m Dinh, T h a i Binh, N i n h Binh, P h a t
D i e m and B u i Chu. I n this retreat, the enemy w a s
pursued and partially destroyed by our troops.
Tens of thousands of puppet soldiers deserted the
enemy's r a n k a n d passed over to the side of the
people.

T h e great victories won at D i e n B i e n P h u and in

W i n t e r - S p r i n g as a whole opened up a new political
situation and made a decisive contribution to the
success of the Geneva Conference in 1954.
143
 T h e n e w s o f trie D i e n B i e n P h u v i c t o r y c a m e r i g h t
at t h e t i m e w h e n t h e 1954 G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e w a s
preparing t o discuss t h e re-establishment o f peace
in Indo-China.
This victory t h w a r t e d t h escheme o f t h e bellicose
French colonialists and the U . S . interventionists w h o
were contemplating to p r o l o n g and expand the aggres-
sive w a r i n I n d o - C h i n a a n d seeking t o torpedo t h e
Geneva Conference. The Laniel-Bidault reactionary
cabinet w h i c h h a d since earlier set forth t h e policy
of " f i g h t i n g t o t h e e n d " a n d " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e
I n d o - C h i n e s e w a r " , fell a n d w a s replaced b y a peace-
seeking cabinet headed b y Mendes-France-
Despite all sabotage attempt of the U . S . imperialists
and the F r e n c h w a r m o n g e r s , after m o r e t h a n seventy
days o f negotiations, the conference obtained a good
result.
The delegation o fthe Democratic Republic of Viet-
n a m p u t forth a t t h e conference t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
standpoints o f o u r people a n d g o v e r n m e n t , v i z :
peace, independence, unity, democracy, and r e g a r d e d
it as their f o n d aspiration" a n d l e g i t i m a t e interests
for t h e m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n o f w h i c h t h e V i e t n a m e s e
people w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o m a k e a l l sacrifice a n d
s t r u g g l e t o t h e e n d . O u r p e o p l e w o n a g r e a t diplo^-
m a t i c success t h a n k s t o the b r o a d u n i t y i n s t r u g g l e
within their rank, t othe W i n t e r - S p r i n g victories and
especially t o the great D i e n B i e n P h u victory, t o the
solidarity o f the peoples o f V i e t n a m , Cambodia a n d
Laos, t o the unstinted support o f t h e Soviet U n i o n ,

144
China a n d other brother socialist countries a n d t h e
approval a n d support o f t h e French people a n d t h e
peace-loving people i n t h e w o r l d .
With t h e Geneva Agreements signed o n July 21,
1954 peace h a s b e e n r e s t o r e d i n I n d o - C h i n a o n t h e
b a s i s o f respect of sovereignty, independence, unity
and territorial integrity of Vietnam and her friendly
neighbours, Cambodia and Laos. After nearly a
century o f struggle f o rnational liberation, a n d over
eight years o f valiant a n d hard resistance b yt h e
entire people, t h e n o r t h o f o u r c o u n t r y h a s been
completely liberated. T h epolitical clauses a i m e d a t
peacefully r e u n i f y i n g V i e t n a m t h r o u g h free general
elections were provided for.
T h e successful conclusion o fthe G e n e v a Conference
was a great victory f o ro u rpeople a n d t h e w o r l d ' s
people w h o a r e s t r u g g l i n g f o r peace, n a t i o n a l inde-
pendence, democracy a n d socialism a n d a severe
defeat f o r t h e U - S . i m p e r i a l i s t s a n d t h e bellicose
French colonialists.
The great Dien Bien Phu victory and the Winter-
Spring victories as a whole had a far-reaching
influence in the world.
W h i l e t h ebellicose imperialists w e r e confused a n d
discouraged, t h e news o f t h e victories w o n b y o u r
a r m y a n d people o n t h e battlefronts t h r o u g h o u t t h e
c o u n t r y especially t h e D i e n B i e n P h uvictory, h a v e
greatly inspired the progressive people the w o r l d over.
The Dien Bien P h u victory w a sn o tonly a great
victory o four people but w a s regarded b ythe socialist
countries as their o w n victory. I t w a s regarded as a
great victory o f t h e w e a k a n d s m a l l nations n o w

0 DBP 145
fighting against imperialism a n d o l d a n d new-
colonialism for freedom and independence. D i e n Bien
P h u has become a pride o f the oppressed peoples, a
great contribution o f our people to the high m o v e m e n t
for n a t i o n a l liberation w h i c h h a s been s u r g i n g u p
powerfully since t h e e n d o f W o r l d W a r I I , a n d
heralded t h e collapse o f t h e colonial system o f
imperialism.
Dien Bien P h u was also a great victory o f t h e
forces o f peace i n t h ew o r l d . W i t h o u t this v i c t o r y ,
certainly the G e n e v a Conference w o u l d not b e suc-
cessful and peace could not b ere-established i n Indo-
China. This substantiates all the more clearly that
the victory w o n a t D i e n B i e n P h u and i n general the
Resistance W a r p u t u p b y o u r people, and the
victorious struggle f o r liberation waged b yt h e
oppressed people against imperialism and colonialism
under all forms, played a role o f paramount impor-
tance in weakening imperialism, t h w a r t i n g the scheme
of a g g r e s s i o n a n d w a r o f the e n e m y a n d c o n t r i b u t i n g
greatly t othe defence o f w o r l d peace.
*
* *

The Dien Bien P h u victory and i n general t h e

Winter-Spring victories were very great ones.
F r o m the preceding chapters w e clearly realized that
the main and fundamental factor for this victory was
the correct political and military line of our Party,
headed by President Ho Chi Minh.
This line w a s the Marxist-Leninist line applied t o
the practice o f our r e v o l u t i o n , the line o f a people's

146
 w a r w a g e d b y t h e e n t i r e p e o p l e i n a l l fields, a p p l i e d
to the concrete c o n d i t i o n s o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r y a r m e d
struggle i n our country. This line, i m b u e d w i t h the
Marxist-Leninist fundamental principles on revolu-
tionary w a r and revolutionary a r m y and combining
the valuable experiences of the Soviet Red A r m y and
the Chinese People's L i b e r a t i o n A r m y w i t h our o w n
experiences, w a s applied creatively to the concrete
conditions of our revolutionary armed struggle.
A s is k n o w n , b y s u m m e r 1953, o u r people w e r e
facing n e w e n o r m o u s difficulties. T h e F r e n c h colo-
nialists benefiting from an intensified aid by the A m e -
rican imperialists, were s t r i v i n g to p r o l o n g and extend
the w a r in Indo-China. W i t h i n a short period, the
enemy increased his forces fairly rapidly, concentrated
a rather b i g strategic m o b i l e force, launched opera-
tion after operation to "pacify" his rear, scrambled
w i t h us for m a n p o w e r a n d w e a l t h , a n d at the s a m e
t i m e threatened our free zone, i n a n a t t e m p t r a p i d l y
to wrest back the strategic initiative-
I n f a c e o f t h e p e r i i d i o u s s c h e r r t e oif a n e x p e r i e n c e d
and wicked enemy and of the threat of the French
and American imperialists, if w e had not been
possessed of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y spirit and a f i r m confi-
d e n c e i n t h e final v i c t o r y , a n d i f w e h a d n o t g r a s p e d
the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t m i l i t a r y science, w e w o u l d h a v e
made mistakes in appraising the situation and
estimating the enemy's strength and w o u l d probably
h a v e become pessimistic i n face o f the enemy's
temporary strength, w h i c h w o u l d have been detri-
m e n t a l to our f i g h t i n g spirit and even m a d e us lose
our bearings.

147
 B a s i n g itself o n tlie experience it had d r a w n ever
since i n leading the r e v o l u t i o n and a r m e d struggle,
on its t h o r o u g h r e v o l u t i o n a r y spirit of a v a n g u a r d
P a r t y , a n d o n i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o wipe o u t t h e e n e m y
and b r i n g the Resistance W a r to victory, our P a r t y
Central C o m m i t t e e m a d e an objective and scientiiic
analysis of the s i t u a t i o n , accurately assessed the
enemy's strength, examined his internal contradic-
t i o n s , h i s s t r o n g p o i n t s as w e l l as h i s w e a k p o i n t s ,
a n d a p p r a i s e d o u r d i f f i c u l t i e s as w e l l as o u r a r m y ' s
and people's great fighting capacities.
Our Party Central Committee then worked out a
correct strategic direction : to concentrate our forces
to shift over to the offensive against the strategic
points where the enemy w a s relatively w e a k i n order
to w i p e out p a r t of his effectives, at the s a m e t i m e to
compel h i m to scatter his forces to cope w i t h us at
the vital points w h i c h he h a d to defend at all costs,
thus creating new conditions to crush m o r e enemy's
effectives. This strategic direction — "dynamism,
initiative, m o b i l i t y and r a p i d i t y of decision i n face of
new situations'' — gradually shattered Navarre's
strategic mobile corps and brought our W i n t e r - S p r i n g
offensive campaigns on all the battlefronts t h r o u g h o u t
the c o u n t r y to great victories.
W h e n the enemy's m a i n forces w e r e scattered i n
m a n y directions, w i t h a part of his c r a c k troops
isolated at D i e n B i e n P h u , our P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m -
mittee m a d e a t h o r o u g h a p p r a i s a l of the s i t u a t i o n of
hostilities t h r o u g h o u t the country, correctly as.sessing
the enemy's v e r y strong points and f u n d a m e n t a l w e a k
p o i n t s a t D i e n B i e n P h u . P r o m p t e d b y t h e firm c o n f i -
d e n c e i n t h e fighting c a p a c i t i e s a n d c r e a t i v e n e s s o f
the people's a r m y a n d our people, i tm a d e a strategic
decision : t o concentrate a l l forces t o w i p e o u t t h e
whole enemy force a tD i e n B i e n P h u . T h i s clearsighted
and valiant strategic decision along w i t h the correct
direction o f operations i nthis historic c a m p a i g n have
brought our a r m y and people t o great victories.
The second decisive factor for the Dien Bien Phu
victory and in general for the Winter-Spring victories
was the determination to fight and to win and the
spirit of unity in struggle of our army and people
under the Party's leadership.
T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight a n d t o w i n o f o u r a r m y
and people i n the historic D i e n Bien P h u c a m p a i g n
and i nthe W i n t e r - S p r i n g campaigns i n general was
the boundless strength o f the masses o f people, espe-
cially t h e labouring masses, w h o , imbued w i t h t h e
Party's correct political line, h a d risen i n a r m s t o
struggle f o r their elementary a n d most cherished
a s p i r a t i o n s , independence for the Fatherland and
land to the tillers, to pave the way toward socialism.
T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight a n d t o w i n o f o u r a r m y
and people w a s t h e continuation o f o u r nation's
indomitable fighting spirit, the heroism o f a small and
weak nation of a young revolutionary army opposing
the strength, of a just cause and o f a n entire people
to t h e p o w e r f u l a r m y o f a n a g g r e s s i v e i m p e r i a l i s t
country. This spirit was also the thoroughly revolu-
tionary spirit of t h eproletariat patiently inculcated
by the P a r t y i n the a r m y , the f i r m d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o
o v e r t h r o w i m p e r i a l i s m a n d i t s s t o o g e s , t h e fine h e r o i c
fighting spirit, the sense of s u r m o u n t i n g a l l difficulties

149
and overcoming ail hardsiiips, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y
h e r o i s m p l a c i n g the interest of the people, of the
nation and of the r e v o l u t i o n above a l l , and the readi-
ness for the s u p r e m e sacrifice for the sake of the
revolution.
This spirit was tempered and enhanced by our
people's l o n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n
w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - s p r i n g 1954 t h e p o l i c y o f m o b i l i z a t i o n o f
the masses for systematic rent reduction and l a n d
reform greatly contributed to the enhancement of our
people's and a r m y ' s p a t r i o t i s m , class consciousness
and revolutionary enthusiasm-
In the a r m y , after m a n y political courses o n the
goal of the national-democratic r e v o l u t i o n and the
t a s k o f t h e peoplei's a r m y , e s p e c i a l l y after t h e p o l i t i c a l
class o n the policy of l a n d r e f o r m , our officers a n d
men — peasants for the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y —
saw their class stand enhanced a n d their w i l l t o w i p e
out the enemy increased ; everyone w a s ready to go
to the front w i t h an ardent r e v o l u t i o n a r y zeal, ready
for the m o s t difficult tasks a n d r e a d y s t r i c t l y t o
i m p l e m e n t the orders to w i p e out the e n e m y and w i n
victory.
W i t h such a mettle our a r m y could s u r m o u n t a n y
difficulty, destroy any e n e m y and discharge a n y task.
As the enemy had planes, tanks and guns he believed
t h a t o u r a r m y w o u l d be u n a b l e t o o p e n u p r o a d s , a n d
h a n d our a r t i l l e r y pieces i n t o p o s i t i o n . C o n t r a r y t o h i s
expectation, our a r m y had done that. A s he had b i g
forces, a p o w e r f u l fire-power, s o l i d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s a n d
flat g r o u n d t o h i s a d v a n t a g e , h e t h o u g h t t h a t o u r
army could not approach D i e n Bien P h u w i t h o u t being

150
smashed, nor s t o r m his centres of resistance, let
alone undertake continuous operations day and n i g h t
to destroy his strongest entrenched camp. C o n t r a r y
to his expectation, our a r m y h a d done a l l that he had
reckoned unfeasible. O u r a r m y had w i p e d out the
w h o l e e n e m y force i n the D i e n B i e n P h u entrenched
camp.
In the great fighting o n the D i e n B i e n P h u battle-
f r o n t as w e l l as o n t h e o t h e r b a t t l e f i e l d s t h r o u g h o u t t h e
c o u n t r y i n w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - s p r i n g 1954, o u r a r m y set
countless examples of admirable h e r o i s m w h i c h consti-
tute perennial tokens of its fine t r a d i t i o n - B e V a n D a n
offered h i s b o d y as a m a c h i n e - g u n s u p p o r t . H o a n g V a n
N o bayoneted the enemy till he breathed his l a s t ; i n
a fighting p o s t u r e T o V i n h D i e n r e a d i l y l a i d d o w n h i s
life t o p r o t e c t a n a r t i l l e r y piece. P h a n D i n h G i o t
blocked an enemy loop-hole w i t h his o w n body. T h e y
were scouts capturing m a n y enemies by tricks, drivers
s t a y i n g at the steering w h e e l t h o u g h w o u n d e d , engi-
neers at grips w i t h time-bombs, medical m e n and sup-
p l i e r s p l u n g i n g i n t o t h e fire o f t h e b a t t l e t o t r a n s p o r t
munitions and carry a w a y the wounded, signal m e n
d e v o t i n g t h e m s e l v e s t o e n s u r e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , etc.,
a n d so m a n y o t h e r s h i n i n g e x a m p l e s . T h e y w e r e u n i t s
o n t h e D i e n B i e n P h u b a t t l e f r o n t as w e l l as o n t h e
co-ordinated battlefields, i n the r e g u l a r forces, the
regional troops, the militia or the guerilla, all of t h e m
surmounted countless difficulties and hardships and
p e r f o r m e d g l o r i o u s deeds, c o n t r i b u t i n g t h e i r p a r t to
the victory of the campaign.
In the D i e n B i e n P h u campaign and i n the W i n t e r -
S p r i n g campaigns i n general our people displayed a

151
g r e a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight a n d t o w i n , d e d i c a t e d
themselves to supplying the frontline and struggled
side by side w i t h o u r a r m y m e n i n a p p l i c a t i o n of the
motto "all for the front, all for victory".
Everywhere throughout the country, on the m a i n
b a t t l e f r o n t as w e l l as o n t h e c o - o r d i n a t e d b a t t l e f i e l d s ,
in the free zone as w e l l as i n t h e e n e m y ' s r e a r , o u r
people put all their strength and material resources
at the disposal of the v a r i o u s battlefronts. O n the
Dien Bien P h u battlefront, to overcome the extreme
difficulties i n supplying a large-scale campaign,
requiring a l o n g time and i n v o l v i n g big forces on a
j u n g l e battlefield h u n d r e d s of k i l o m e t r e s distant f r o m
their rear, our people displayed a very lofty heroism
and spirit of u n i t y i n s t r u g g l e w i t h the a r m y . O u r
people had performed a great deed beyond the enemy's
expectation.
N e i t h e r t h e fire o f t h e e n e m y ' s p l a n e s n o r t h e h a r d -
ships of the expedition could check the a d v a n c e of
t h e c o n v o y s o f dan cong a n d t r a n s p o r t w o r k e r s o n t h e
roads, paths, rivers, streams, day and night carrying
food and a m m u n i t i o n to Dien Bien P h u for the a r m y
t o fight t h e e n e m y . S o m a n y a d m i r a b l e e x a m p l e s o f
h e r o i s m , e n d u r a n c e of h a r d s h i p s a n d o v e r c o m i n g of
difficulties w e r e recorded- T h e people in the n e w l y
liberated North-West though poor, enthusiastically
contributed their little store of food t o the a r m y . T h e
convoys of pack-bicycles raised the freight capacity of
such vehicles to several h u n d r e d s of k i l o g r a m m e s ,
sometimes to three hundred.
D r i v e r s of s a m p a n s a n d r a f t s — w o m e n for t h e
most part — crossed countless rapids and negotiated

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numberless dangerous waterfalls. A t the front-lino,
the people s t r u g g l e d side b yside w i t h the a r m y m e n ,
p l u n g i n g i n t o t h e fire t o t r a n s p o r t m u n i t i o n sa n d
carry away the wounded. Serving in the hospitals o r
as s t r e t c h e r - b e a r e r s , t h e p e o p l e t e n d e d t h e w o u n d e d
as t h e i r k i t h - a n d - k i n - O n t h e r o a d s , t h e p e o p l e d e v o t e d
themselves day and night to opening up and m e n d i n g
roads under the strafing o f enemy planes o r near
time-bombs.
N o t only did our people supply the a r m y w i t h w a r
m a t e r i a l and s t r u g g l e side b yside w i t h the a r m y b u t
they also provided the a r m y m e n w i t h the m o s t trivial
things like needles and thread, sending t h e m food,
gifts and letters of encouragement, c o n v e y i n g to t h e m
the affection o fthe entire people and c o m m u n i c a t i n g
to them t h e enthusiasm o f millions o f peasants
e n g a g e d i nland r e f o r m .
The spirit o f u n i t y i nstruggle, the d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t o fight a n d t o w i n o f o u r a r m y a n d p e o p l e u n d e r t h e
Party's leadership w a s obviously the decisive factor
in the v i c t o r y of the D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n a s w e l l
as o f t h e W i n t e r - S p r i n g c a m p a i g n . T h i s i s a p r o o f
that a solid rear i sfrequently a decisive factor i n the
victory of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r .
The third decisive factor in the victory of the Dien
Bien Phu campaign as well as of the Winter-Spring
campaigns is the close co-ordination of the Pathet
Lao Liberation troops, the Laotian friendly people's
wholehearted assistance for our army volunteers, the
sympathy and support of the fraternal socialist
countries and of the peace-loving peoples in the world.

153
 T h r o u g h o u t the resistance years, especially i n
W i n t e r 1 9 5 1 - S p r i n g 1 9 5 4 ; i n face o f the a g g r e s s i v e
scheme of the c o m m o n enemy, the Pathet Lao
L i b e r a t i o n forces and o u r a r m y v o l u n t e e r s l i v e d a n d
fought shoulder to shoulder, thus w i n n i n g a great
victory for both nations- T h e L a o t i a n people gave
every support to the volunteer units and loved them
as t h e i r k i t h - a n d - k i n .
T h e peoples of the Soviet U n i o n , C h i n a and the
other socialist countries regarded the struggle of our
a r m y a n d people as a f r o n t - l i n e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c a m p
against imperialism, daily followed the development
of the fighting o n the D i e n B i e n P h u battlefield,
vehemently condemned the French and A m e r i c a n
imperialists' scheme and acts a i m e d at p r o l o n g i n g
and extending the war, and wholeheartedly supported
a n d e n c o u r a g e d o u r peoplei's s t r u g g l e .
H e r e o n c e a g a i n m e n t i o n s h o u l d be m a d e o f t h e
very great role played by the experiences of armed
struggle of the Soviet and Chinese peoples i n our
Resistance W a r .
M a o Tse-tung's m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g is the v e r y rich
experience of the l o n g a r m e d struggle of the Chinese
People's L i b e r a t i o n A r m y a n d people s u m m e d up i n t o
theory, the line of armed struggle of a semi-colonial
and semi-feudal country against a multifold powerful
enemy. A s the social situations of our c ount ry and
China and the r e v o l u t i o n a r y struggles of both peoples
have m a n y similar fundamental points, M a o Tse-
tung's m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g has made very great contri-
butions to our Party's leadership of the Resistance
W a r . S i n c e 1950 after the v i c t o r y o f the C h i n e s e

154
revolution, our a r m y and people had even m o r e
facilities t o learn the v a l u a b l e experiences of the
Chinese People's L i b e r a t i o n A r m y and M a o Tse-tung's
military thinking, and applied them creatively and
successfully to the practice of our r e v o l u t i o n a r y a r m e d
struggle. T h i s w a s also an i m p o r t a n t factor account-
i n g for our army's rapid g r o w t h , for its successive
victories, especially i n the W i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - S p r i n g 1954
campaigns and the great historic D i e n B i e n P h u
campaign.
W h i l e the struggle against the c o m m o n enemy
reached a decisive phase, w i t h lofty p r o l e t a r i a n inter-
nationalism, the French people and C o m m u n i s t P a r t y
gave every support to our people's j u s t Resistance
W a r , stepped up the heroic struggle for the e n d i n g of
the dirty w a r i n Indo-China, against the French war-
like colonialists' policy of aggression.
T h e peoples of oppressed countries a n d the peace-
l o v i n g peoples the w o r l d over also f o l l o w e d our
people's struggle, especially the f i g h t i n g o n the D i e n
Bien P h u battlefield, w i t h a profound s y m p a t h y and
a wholehearted support.
W e h i g h l y appreciate the s y m p a t h y and support of
the forces of peace, n a t i o n a l independence, d e m o c r a c y
and socialism to o u r people's j u s t s t r u g g l e a n d con-
sider it a m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor of o u r v i c t o r y .
*
* *

These w e r e the factors w h i c h decided the v i c t o r y

of the great D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n a n d g e n e r a l l y
speaking of other W i n t e r - S p r i n g victories.

155
 As f a r as t h eaggressive French colonialists were
concerned, after the fall o f D i e n B i e n P h u , t h e great
reserve o f t h e F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps a n d t h e
complete failure of Navarre's m i l i t a r y plan, well k n o w n
militarymen, statesmen, writers and journalists wrote
a great deal about D i e n B i e n P h u and held different
views r e g a r d i n g t h e cause o f this reverse, t h e ones
pinning the responsibility o n the F r e n c h government,
t h e o t h e r s o n G e n . N a v a r r e . T h i s h e a t e d controversy
is s t i l l g o i n g o n .
W e are a l l aware that, w h e n Gen. Navarre w a s
resolved t o attack D i e n B i e n P h u t o save L a i C h a u
and defend Upper Laos, h ew a s m u c h appreciated and
lauded b y strategists a n d politicians o f a l l sorts,
including the Americans. E v e n Gen- C o g n y considered
the attack o n D i e n B i e n P h u as a n operation carried
out a t t h e r i g h t t i m e a n d i n t h e r i g h t place, a d d i n g
that i f ever he w e r e entitled t o m a k e a decision a n d
had enough competence, h e w o u l d have transferred
the w h o l e entrenched camp f r o m N a S a n t o D i e n B i e n
Phu. Gen. Salan, o nhis part, said that the "attack o n
D i e n B i e n P h u is a necessity." E v e n F r e n c h P r e m i e r
Laniel w h o was not directly deciding this matter, o n
hearing the report, n o t only fully approved this
scheme b u t said t h a t " G e n . N a v a r r e ' s creative deci-
sion h a s never been t a k e n t o task b y a n y m i l i t a r y
experts i nFrance and abroad."
After Gen. N a v a r r e h a d taken, on-December 3,
1953, t h e s t r a t e g i c r e s o l u t i o n t o " d e f e n d D i e n B i e n
P h u a t any cost" and "accept battle" w i t h our regular
force i n order t o inflict a severe defeat u p o n u s , once
again t h eFrench and A m e r i c a n generals and politi-

156
cians unaniiriGUsly held that "the Dien Bien Phu forti-
fied entrenched camp is an inviolable fortress." Gen.
Navarre and his subordinates, such as Cogny and De
Castries, agreed that Dien Bien Phu was the most
powerful fortified entrenched camp in Indo-Chin^.
Pleven, French minister for National Defence, Mac
Jacquet, minister of Associated States and Gen. Ely,
general chief-of-staf! of the French army, came in
person to Dicn Bien Phu to make on-the-spot investiga-
tion into the solid system of defence of the entrench-
ed camp, and were all convinced that it was .an
ideal battlefield carefully prepared to annihilate our
main force. Gen. O'Daniel commander-in-chief of U.S.
armed forces in the Pacific was of the same opinion.
It was not until the second half of December, when
reports were heard that the bulk of our regular army
continued marching in the direction of Dien Bien Phu,
that the French High Command began to be anxious,
thinking that if ever a battle was to take place,
"victory would not be one hundred per cent guaran-
teed". Nevertheless, the French and American gene-
rals did not fully realize the great danger which was
looming over Dien Bien Phu. At that time there was
opinion to withdraw from that entrenched camp, but
Gen. Navarre and Gen- Cogny maintained that "Dien
Bien Phu must be defended at any cost!", that to with-
draw from it would "impair the morale of the defend-
ing troops who were jubilant over the prospect of a
victorious defensive battle"'. On his part, Col. De
Castries who at first was "determined to lure the
opponent to this valley" to destroy him, did not have
much confidence, thinking that the "battle would be

157
a r d u o u s , b u t h e w o u l d b e a b l e t o k e e p firm t h e f r o n t
if h e r e c e i v e d i n r e i n f o r c e m e n t t w o o r t h r e e r e s e r v e
battalions". H o w e v e r as t i m e w o r e a w a y n o attack
on the entrenched camp, but large-scale operations i n
Upper Laos o n o u r part w e r e detected by t h e enemy.
Gen. N a v a r r e t h o u g h t that " t h e w a v e of attacks of
the opponent"' w a s ended. W i t h such a n appreciation,
he sent part of his regular a r m y t o S o u t h V i e t n a m t o
pursue the Atlante operation.
D u r i n g the attack on D i e n Bien P h u by o u r army,
the H i g h C o m m a n d of the F r e n c h Expeditionary
Corps w o r k e d o u t m a n y p l a n s ; as they w e r e never
put into practice, t h e e n e m y h a s n o t been able u p t o
the present time, t o assess the outcome of these plans,
whether they w o u l d e n d i n success or i n failure.
The enemy w a s contemplating to attack Thai
Nguyen, T u y e n Q u a n g or Y e n B a i t o cut off o u r lines
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d s u p p l y . W e c a n n o w a f f i r m
that if such a n operation w a s undertaken, n o t only
was the enemy unable to destroy o u r supply lines,
but surely o u r m a i n force, secretly h i d d e n there, w o u l d
have the opportunity to inflict heavy losses upon h i m -
The enemy w a s also p l a n n i n g t o w i t h d r a w f r o m
Dien Bien P h u by air. If such plan w a s carried o u t
earlier, possibly o n l y a part of his m a i n force w o u l d
be a n n i h i l a t e d . H o w e v e r s i n c e t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f
December, as w e concentrated o u r m a i n force a r o u n d
Dien Bien P h u and constantly followed hard o n the
enemy's heels h e w o u l d suffer h e a v y losses if such
a withdrawal was undertaken.
W h e n at Dien Bien P h u the enemy w a s p u t i n a
dangerous spot, he c o n t e m p l a t e d t o m a k e a sally

158
 t o w a r d U p p e r L a o s . S h o u l d s u c h a n a t t e m p t be m a d e ,
surely, a l l h i s f o r c e s w o u l d be d e s t r o y e d i n fierce
battles because w e h a d c o n t r o l l e d a l l t h e r o a d s a n d
tracks leading to the L a o t i a n frontier ; even t h o u g h
in the b e g i n n i n g s o m e of h i s forces m a n a g e d t o r u n
a w a y t h e e n e m y w o u l d s u r e l y be d e s t r o y e d o n t h e
b a t t l e f i e l d oJ t h e h i l l y r e g i o n s o f U p p e r L a o s , n e a r
Dicn Bien Phu.
There w a s a t i m e w h e n y i e l d i n g to the proposal of
the L a n i e l - B i d a u l t g o v e r n m e n t , the A m e r i c a n w a r -
m o n g e r s such as S t a t e S e c r e t a r y D u l l e s , a n d chief-
of-staff of U.S. g r o u n d forces R a d f o r d w a n t e d t o a v a i l
themselves of t h i s r a r e occasion t o send heavy
bombers to Indo-China to save Dien Bien P h u . It
could be said t h a t if these A m e r i c a n w a r m o n g e r s
w o u l d c a r r y t h r o u g h their scheme of stepping up their
intervention, o u r difficulties w o u l d be greater b u t i n
the end the s i t u a t i o n of the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y
C o r p s c o u l d n o t be r e t r i e v e d a n d D i e n B i e n P h u c o u l d
n o t ' be s a v e d , e t c . A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y
circles w e r e a w a r e of this ; n o t o n l y w e r e t h e y a f r a i d
of t h e d i s a p p r o v a l of p r o g r e s s i v e p e o p l e o f t h e w o r l d ,
including the A m e r i c a n people, they did n o t dare
i n v o l v e I n d o - C h i n a i n a s e c o n d K o r e a n w a r . T h a t is
w h y even E i s e n h o w e r did n o t agree to this increased
intervention, a r g u i n g t h a t such a step w o u l d end n o t
only in a "tragedy" for the U S . but w o u l d "lead to
w a r in Indo-China and South-East Asia.i' Churchill
w h o was then Britain's prime minister said straight
away that "intervention was not commendable"
because " i t w o u l d be a s t r a t e g i c m i s t a k e ! " , a n d t h a t
"only G e n e v a offered the best o p p o r t u n i t y " .

159
 W h e n the w a r w a s ended, c o m m e n t i n g o n N a v a r r e ' s
"skilful strategy" the bourgeois Chuke L i a n g s w h o
had quite accurate opinions on military matters said
that Gen.- N a v a r r e ' s p l a n to attack D i e n B i e n P h u b y
paratroopers was understandable, but his resolution
to choose D i e n Bien P h u for a do-or-die strategic
battle w i t h our m a i n force w a s erroneous i n that he
over-estimated too m u c h his forces a n d u n d e r - r a t e d the
opponent's. O r they held the v i e w that Navarre's
resolution to concentrate his picked troops at D i e n
B i e n P h u t o g i v e a fierce battle to o u r forces, a n d at
the s a m e t i m e to send part of his m a i n force to carry
out the Atlante operation w a s a strategic mistake,
because by so d o i n g he dispersed his m a i n force, a
t h i n g t o be a v o i d e d , as h e h a d d e c l a r e d . T h e s e o p i n i o n s
w e r e c o r r e c t ; n e v e r t h e l e s s after the f a l l of t h e D i e n
B i e n P h u fortified entrenched c a m p , they w e r e n o t so
h i g h l y qualifiied as t h e n a k e d t r u t h w a s conspicuous
to everyone. T h e question w a s w h e t h e r these C h u k e
Liangs, i n Gen. Navarre,'s place, w o u l d escape f r o m
v i e w i n g the p r o b l e m according to the conception of
classical w a r and according to the bourgeois strategic
s t a n d p o i n t a n d w h e t h e r t h e y c o u l d see a l l t h e g r e a t
possibilities offered by a people's a r m y i n a revolu-
tionary w a r and by an entire people w h o w e r e r i s i n g
up to liberate themselves.

The aggressive w a r unleashed by the French impe-

rialists in Indo-China dragged o n for eight or nine
years. T h o u g h they did their best to increase their
force to n e a r l y half a m i l l i o n m e n , sacrificed h u n d r e d s
of t h o u s a n d s of soldiers, s p e n t i n t h i s d i r t y w a r 2,688
billion French francs, squandered a great a m o u n t of

160
resources, shed a great deal of blood of the F r e n c h
people, c h a n g e d 20 cabinets i n F r a n c e , 7 h i g h c o m -
missars and 8 commanders-in-chief in Indo-China,
their aggressive w a r g r e w f r o m bad to worse, m e t
defeat after defeat, w e n t f r o m o n e strategic m i s t a k e
to another, to end i n the great D i e n B i e n P h u disaster.
T h i s is because t h e w a r m a d e b y the F r e n c h c o l o n i a l -
ists w a s a n u n j u s t war- I n this w a r the e n e m y m e t
w i t h the i n d o m i t a b l e spirit of a n entire people a n d
t h e r e f o r e , n o s k i l f u l g e n e r a l — be h e L e c l e r c , D e
Tassigny, Navarre or any other general — could save
the F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y C o r p s f r o m defeat. N e i t h e r
there w o u l d be a m i g h t y w e a p o n — c a n n o n , t a n k o r
heavy bomber and even U.S. atomic bomb — which
could retrieve the situation. O n the upshot, if i n
a u t u m n 1953 and w i n t e r 1954, the e n e m y d i d n o t
occupy D i e n B i e n P h u by paratroopers or if he occu-
pied it a n d w i t h d r e w l a t e r w i t h o u t c h o o s i n g it as t h e
sil;e o f a d o - o r - d i e b a t t l e , s o o n e r o r l a t e r a D i e n B i e n
P h u w o u l d come up, t h o u g h the t i m e and place m i g h t
change ; and i n the end the F r e n c h and U.S- i m p e r i a l -
ists w o u l d c e r t a i n l y m e e t w i t h a bitter f a i l u r e .

* *

In the D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n and other W i n t e r -

Spring campaigns, the sacred resistance w a r waged
by our people against the F r e n c h imperialists and
U.S. interventionists w o n a great victory. The great
successes scored by our people at D i e n B i e n P h u and
at the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e testified e l o q u e n t l y t o the
correct political line of our P a r t y i n this l o n g a n d

IGt
hard Resistance W a r . Therefore i n speaking ofthe
factors contributing t o t h e victory o f t h e D i e n Bien
P h u campaign a n d other W i n t e r - S p r i n g campaigns,
w e could n o t fail t o speak o f t h e principal factors
w h i c h decided the success o fthe resistance w a r w a g e d
by o u r people-
The success of the Resistance War, of Dien Bien
Phu, was first due to the fact that our Party's policy
of resolutely making the Resistance War was entirely
correct.
O u r n a t i o n cherished peace ; our P a r t y and G o v e r n -
m e n t perseveringly pursued a policy o f peace. B u t
the F r e n c h colonialists w e r e determined t o invade our
c o u n t r y and k i n d l e the aggressive w a r . I nface o f this
aggression, o u r people h a d o n l y a v i t a l w a y left w h i c h
was to wage a just w a r forliberation, t o oppose t h e
counter-revolutionary violence o f t h e enemy b yt h e
revolutionary violence o f o u r people.
O u r P a r t y ' s policy o f resolutely m a k i n g t h e resis-
tance w a rwas, t h e o n l y w a y t o defend t h e fruit o f
the A u g u s t revolution, a n d t h e independence o f t h e
F a t h e r l a n d . O n l y w h e n o u r people's resistance force
w a s . s t r o n g enough t o deal t h ee n e m y a telling b l o w
at D i e n B i e n P h u , w a s h e c o m p e l l e d t o r e l i n q u i s hh i s
privileges a n dinterests a n drecognize t h e legitimate
interests o four people and n a t i o n and w a s the Geneva
Conference i n 1954 successful. A n undeniable t r u t h
was that the imperialists w o u l d never w i t h d r a w o f
their free will unless t h epeople u s ev a r i o u s methods
of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e t o o p p o s e t h e m e n e r g e t i c a l -
ly a n d p e r s e v e r i n g l y , a n d t o t h w a r t t h e i r s c h e m e o f
war a n d aggression.

162
 The success of the Resistance War. of Dien Bien
Phu, was due to the fact that our Party has firmly
grasped the revolutionary national democratic line
of Marxism-Leninism. T h e Resistance W a r o f o u r
people w a s precisely t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e r e v o l u -
tionary national-democratic task under t h e form o f
armed struggle.
• The French imperialists invaded o u rcountry once
more. I n this situation, the n a t i o n a l factor w a s o f p r i m e
importance. O u r P a r t y also assessed that, t h e all-out
revolution for n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n should have a n a t i o n -
al p e o p l e ' s d e m o c r a t i c c o n t e n t . T h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t
task a n d t h e anti-feudal task should co-ordinate
closely w i t h each other, because i m p e r i a l i s m w o r k e d
hand i n glove w i t h feudal landlordism against o u r
people ; because ours w a s a b a c k w a r d a g r a r i a n coun-
try a n d our peasantry was, n u m e r i c a l l y speaking, t h e
greatest force. O u r P a r t y attached i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e
peasant question, not only because the peasantry w a s
the m a i n force o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n l e d b y t h e w o r k i n g
class, b u t i t w a s also a basis o n w h i c h a series o f
problems could be solved : w e w o u l d rely o n t h e
countryside t o setu p the revolutionary a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
and t h ebases o f t h e revolution, t o start t h e people's
war, to wage a protracted guerilla warfare, t o build
up a p e o p l e ' s a r m y , e t c .

U n d e r t h e s l o g a n , "For independence of the Father-

land, for land to the peasants", ourParty mobilized
t h e e n t i r e p e o p l e , first t h e b a s i c w o r k e r a n d p e a s a n t
masses, united a l l t h e revolutionary classes a n d
patriotic elements, united t h e nationalities w i t h i n t h e
country, consolidated a n d broadened t h e National
United Front e n t h e basis of t h e worker-peasant
alliance.
This correct political line has encouraged the entire
people t ocontribute their h u g e force t othe liberation
war. I t w a s precisely along this line that our P a r t y
was successful in the task o fconsolidating and expan-
ding the rear o f the resistance w a r , o f b u i l d i n g and
strengthening the people's a r m e d force, o f m o b i l i z i n g
the m a n p o w e r and w e a l t h o f the patriotic people, o f
carrying o u tt h e slogan "All f o rt h e front, a l l f o r
victoryf. The entire people worked devotedly for the
f r o n t ; t h ed e t e r m i n a t i o n t o fight a n dt o w i n o f o u r
a r m y m e n a n d people o n t h evarious fronts o f t h e
country especially a t Dien Bien Phu, demonstrated
all t h e m o r e clearly t h e correct a n d clearsighted
political line o f our Party.
The success of the Resistance War, of Dien Bien
Phu, was due to the correct military line of our Party.
As has been said above, this w a s the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t
military line applied t o the concrete condition o f the
revolutionary war waged against a powerful enemy
by a colonial a n d semi-feudal c o u n t r y besieged b y
imperialism.
Our Party h a sskilfully and creatively applied the
line o f people's w a r , w a g e d a n all-out r e v o l u t i o n a r y
people's w a r , roused a n darmed the entire people.
Our P a r t y w h i c h had a correct strategic line, assess-
e d t h a t o u r Resistance War should be long and
arduous, and fend for itself but would certainly be
victorious- O u r p e o p l e ' s a r m e d f o r c e s h o u l d b e c o m -
p o s e d o f three kinds of armed forces: the regular
 force, the local force and the militia ; t h e p r i n c i p l e
o f o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d s t a r t f r o m guerilla warfare to
regular warfare, from guerilla warfare to mobile
warfare and siege warfare, with a constant close and
flexible co-ordination between these forms of operation.
In practice, t h e Resistance W a r h a s testified t o t h e
brilliant success o f t h e correct m i l i t a r y line o f o u r
Party. O u r people's a r m e d force h a s constantly
g r o w n i n s t r e n g t h i n t h e fire o f t h e battle, w i n n i n g
victory after victory, and p a s s i n g f r o m initial success-
es t o g r e a t e r s u c c e s s e s .
The victories w o n i n t h e W i n t e r 1953-Spring
1954 c a m p a i g n a n d e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e D i e n B i e n P h u
great c a m p a i g n w e r e a m o d e l o f leadership o ft h e
war a n ddirection o f strategy a n dmilitary operation
along t h eM a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t military line, a n dwere a
great success o f this line.
The success of the Resistance War and of Dien Bien
Phu, could not be taken apart from the favourable
conditions prevailing in the evolution of the interna-
tional situation.
Our P a r t y constantly regards the Vietnamese revo-
lution as part and parcel o fthe w o r l d revolution. T h e
evolution o f t h e international situation h a s always
influenced t h er e v o l u t i o n i n our country.
After W o r l d W a r I I , t h e balance o f force i n t h e
world between t h e revolution a n d counter-revolution
has unceasingly tipped i n f a v o u r o f t h er e v o l u t i o n a r y
people, t o the d e t r i m e n t o fthe c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .
Following t h e great victory o f t h e Soviet Red A r m y
over t h e G e r m a n a n d Japanese fascists, t h e great
triumph o f t h e Chinese revolution h a s basically
changed the above relation of forces, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y
force is definitely s u p e r i o r t o the c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n -
ary force.
A high revolutionary m o v e m e n t has emerged, i n
w h i c h the socialist system has played its m a i n role
vis-a-vis the trend of development of h u m a n society,
the national-liberation m o v e m e n t has become a m i g h t y
revolutionary current, causing the disintegration of
big parts of the colonial system of imperialism-
W h e n the relation of forces i n the w o r l d has
changed i n f a v o u r of the r e v o l u t i o n , it is o b v i o u s t h a t
time has come for the r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces to carry
out an offensive strategy and spearhead the struggle
at the aggressive and bellicose i m p e r i a l i s t s , headed
by the U . S . T h i s offensive s t r a t e g y is n o w a i m i n g at
the regions w h i c h are the weakest fronts of imperi-
a l i s m , i.e. A s i a , A f r i c a a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a , t o r e p u l s e
i m p e r i a l i s m step by step, defeat i t p a r t by p a r t a n d
secure success for peace, n a t i o n a l independence,
democracy and socialism.
T h e sacred Resistance W a r w a s put up by our people
in the above-mentioned i n t e r n a t i o n a l situation. O u r
P a r t y and people based themselves o n the concrete
historical condition of our c o u n t r y to carry out the
offensive strategy against i m p e r i a l i s m in the f o r m of
armed struggle and we have w o n a brilliant victory.
The great Resistance W a r of our people topped by
Dien Bien Phu, has eloquently substantiated a truth
of o u r time, v i z :
I n the present world condition, if a people — what-
ever weak they may be — r i s e up i n unity, pursue a
correct p o l i t i c a l l i n e , and f i g h t resolutely for inde-

166
pendence and peace, they have all possibilities lo
defeat the most cruel aggressive army of the impe-
rialists and colonialists. The aggressive war unleash-
ed by the imperialists and colonialists will certainly
be defeated and the revolution for liberation of
nations will certainly be victorious.

* *

Ten years have elapsed since the great Dien Bien

P h u v i c t o r y and the r e s t o r a t i o n o f peace- S i n c e t h e n
m a n y momentous changes have taken place i n o u r
beloved country.
I n t h e c o m p l e t e l y l i b e r a t e d North, u n d e r t h e l e a d e r -
ship o f our P a r t y , o u r people h a v e e n g a g e d i n t h e
period o f socialist r e v o l u t i o n a n dsocialist construc-
tion. W e have correctly followed the path outlined b y
our P a r t y a s early a s 1930, a n da d v a n c e d f r o m t h e
n a t i o n a l people's d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n t othe socialist
revolution, w i t h o u t going t h r o u g h the period o f capi-
talist development. This great change is t h e result
o f t h e l o n g a n d fierce a r m e d s t r u g g l e w a g e d a g a i n s t
imperialism and i t s lackeys, a struggle t o overthrow
the d o m i n a t i o n o f i m p e r i a l i s m a n dc o l o n i a l i s m a n d
feudal landlordism. I n a p e r m a n e n t r e v o l u t i o n , t h e
people's democratic power,- w h i c h w a s formerly
a worker-peasant dictatorial power i n essence, h a s
addressed itself t othe task o f p r o l e t a r i a n dictatorship.
It is precisely after the establishment o f the prole-
tarian dictatorial state that w e have rapidly achieved
economic restoration, completed land reform and then

J67
carried t h r o u g h socialist t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h e t o i l i n g
peasants, the real masters of the countryside, have
of t h e i r free w i l l e m b a r k e d o n t h e p a t h of collective
w o r k , the path of co-operativization. A l l the capitalist
industry and trade have been peacefully transformed.
The socialist state economy has g r o w n day by day.
T h e r e g i m e of e x p l o i t a t i o n of m a n by m a n has been
basically abolished. The socialist production relation
has been established- O u r people are enthusiastically
carrying out the first five-year plan, m a k i n g the first
step i n socialist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n a n d b u i l d i n g the
first m a t e r i a l and technical basis of socialism. O u r
e c o n o m y is a d v a n c i n g s t e a d i l y t o w a r d s a n i n d e p e n -
dent e c o n o m y . T h e c u l t u r a l life of the m a s s e s i m p r o v e s
d a y b y d a y . T h e p e o p l e ' s p o w e r is c o n s o l i d a t e d a n d
national defence strengthened.
D u r i n g ten years, a very short span in the history
of a n a t i o n , the N o r t h of o u r c o u n t r y has m a d e b i g
strides never seen before. These great achievements
s u b s t a n t i a t e t h a t the socialist s y s t e m is v e r y b e a u t i f u l .
H a v i n g a great love for labour and a high vigilance,
which testify to a thorough revolutionary spirit, our
people are m a k i n g all efforts to build and defend the
North and turn it into a more and m o r e steady basis
for the struggle for n a t i o n a l reunification. O u r people
are enthusiastically v y i n g w i t h one another i n patriotic
emulation to show their gratitude towards their
southern compatriots and constantly unite them in
their heroic struggle against the e n e m y of the n a t i o n .
According to the strict stipulations of the G e n e v a
Agreement, our people w g u l d have built a free and
happy life in a peaceful, independent, unified, demo-

.I(i8
cratic, r i c h a n dp o w e r f u l V i e t n a m ; b u tn o sooner h a d
the signatures o f t h e a g r e e m e n t d r i e d t h a n t h e U . S .
imperialists a n d their henchmen brazenly violated i t
and plotted t o partition o u r country p e r m a n e n t l y i n
order t o t r a n s f o r m S o u t h V i e t n a m i n t o a n e w - t y p e
c o l o n y a n d a m i l i t a r y base-
It can be said that since the s i g n i n g of the a r m i s t i c e
agreement, t h e g u n report o f t h e w a runleashed by
the aggressors a n d t r a i t o r s t o t h ec o u n t r y h a s never
ended i n t h e S o u t h . T h e N g o D i n h D i e m a d m i n i s t r a -
tion, agent o fthe U.S., pursued a policy o fterror a n d
massacre, set u p a fascist dictatorial regime, launched
hundreds of mopping-ups with i t s regular forces,
perpetrated unheard-of crimes, arrested and killed our
southern compatriots w h o did not have even then a n
iron piece t o defend t h e m s e l v e s a n dw h o w e r e u s i n g
political struggles t o oppose the enemy, a n d c l a i m i n g
independence, democracy, n a t i o n a l reunification a n d
the guarantee for m a n t o have the r i g h t t o live. O v e r
these past f e w years, t h e U . S . i m p e r i a l i s t s o v e r t l y
intervened i n S o u t h V i e t n a m b y force o f arms, intro-
duced there m i l i t a r y personnel a n d c o m b a t u n i t s ,
shipped there tens o f thousands o f tons o f w e a p o n s
of a l l d e s c r i p t i o n s a n d s q u a n d e r e d b i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s ,
or over o n e m i l l i o n d o l l a r s daily. T h e y k i n d l e d t h e
undeclared war, u t i l i z e d S o u t h V i e t n a m a s a b a t t l e f i e l d
t o t e s t w h a t t h e y c a l l e d t h e "special war" w i t h a v i e w
to repressing t h e movement o f liberation o f various
nations.

Like our people t h r o u g h o u t the counry, o u r southern

compatriots cherish peace. B u t once again, their revo-
l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e h a s s h o w n i n f a c t t h a t : in face of

101)
the violence and war of the enemy, their only vital
road is energetically IQ oppose him by the political
and armed struggle of the broad masses and by the
just war of the entire people. O u r s o u t h e r n c o m p a -
triots have risen u pand waged a patriotic struggle
to liberate themselves.
Under the banner o fthe S o u t h V i e t n a m L i b e r a t i o n
N a t i o n a l F r o n t , 14 m i l l i o n people i nthe S o u t h h a v e
united as one m a n t o save their homes and their
country and t ooppose the enemy o f the people and
nation. The manifesto and programme o f action of
the S o u t h V i e t n a m L i b e r a t i o n N a t i o n a l F r o n t h a v e
clearly s h o w n the line of struggle w h i c h consists i n
achieving the people's democratic revolution, over-
throwing the neo-colonialism of the U.S. imperialists
and their stooges, gaining independence, democracy,
peace, and neutrality, and advancing toward the
peaceful reunification of the Fatherland. These mani-
festo a n d p r o g r a m m e h a v e reflected t h e fondest
primary aspirations of o u rSouthern compatriots,
thereby r a l l y i n g a l lt h erevolutionary classes a n d
patriotic personalities, regardless of nationality,
creed and political affiliation. T h e prestige o f t h e
Front is greater and greater. I n the world, the heroic
struggle w a g e d b y o u rsouthern compatriots h a s
received a widespread a n d s t r o n g approval a n d
support unprecedented i n the history o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y
struggle o f our people.
F o l l o w i n g the correct path outlined b y the Front,
our compatriots have made a v e r y v a l i a n t a n d fierce
people's war, u n d e r v e r y r i c h and creative forms o f
revolutionary struggle. F r o m country t o town, from

170
t h e h i g h l a n d s t o t h e l o w l a n d s , political struggle is
very closely co-ordinated with armed struggle. Organ-
ized into a n u n f l i n c h i n g political a r m y , the b r o a d mas-
ses o f p e o p l e h a v e w a g e d a d i r e c t s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e
enemy, c l a i m i n g for m a n the right t o live a n d elemen-
tary freedoms, a n d demanding independence a n d
democracy- I n t h e meantime, guerilla w a r f a r e w a s
organized everywhere and expanded very swiftly. The
valiant South Vietnam Liberation army, w h i c h i s s t i l l
v e r y y o u n g a n d h a s t o fight i n v e r y d i f f i c u l t a n d h a r d
conditions, h a s inflicted upon t h e e n e m y defeat after
defeat a n d p e r f o r m e d b r i l l i a n t feats-of-arms w h i c h
are t h eterror o f t h e enemy.
The patriotic w a r p u t up by o u rsouthern compa-
t r i o t s h a s t a k e n a new turn, t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f
w h i c h is that the balance o f forces is c h a n g i n g i n our
favour, not i nfavour o fthe enemy. T h e Staley-Taylor
plan a i m e d a t e n d i n g t h ew a r w i t h i n 18 m o n t h s h a s
collapsed. T h e n e t w o r k o f strategic hamlets boasted
by the e n e m y as a product o f the m o s t up-to-date a n d
most effective experiences o fthe c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y
w a r s i nGreece, M a l a y a , and the P h i l i p p i n e s h a s been
shattered i n great parts b y t h e rising m o v e m e n t o f
political a n da r m e d struggles o f our people. T h e U . S .
imperialists a n dtheir h e n c h m e n have suffered defeat
a f t e r d e f e a t w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o find a n y r e m e d y ,
though they have increased their effectives t o half a
million, raised t h enumber o f A m e r i c a n advisers a n d
combat troops t otens o f thousands, applied t h o r o u g h l y
w h a t they claim t o be t h e newest tactics, employed
the most up-to-date w e a p o n s i n t h e w a ragainst t h e
guerilla a n d resorted t o t h e cruellest means o f
destruction such as toxic chemicals. It is crystal clear
that they have engaged in a "tunnel with no end in
view". Contradictions within their ranks are more
and more acute. Within a short period of time, the
U S . imperialists were compelled to change horses in
mid-stream twice, each time provoking a coup d'etat.
However after each putsch their force dwindled
instead of being strengthened, and the morale of their
troops sank more deeply. At present the die-hard and
cruel U.S.imperialists are striving to step up their
armed intervention in South Vietnam in order to find
a way out. But even in their political and military
circles, nobody believed that their aggressive war in
the South could end in a short time, and more and
more people have foreseen that this war is drawing
close to its bitter failure.
The valiant southern people who have struggled
for twenty years on end are now making the sacred
resistance war for the second time. With a firm com-
bativeness and an incomparable heroism they are
eloquently demonstrating the great truth of our
time, viz :
In the present condition of the world, if a people —
whatever weak and small they may be — rise up in
unity, pursue a correct political line and fight stub-
bornly for independence and peace, they have all
possibilities to defeat a powerful army of the predatory
imperialists and their lackeys and to thwart all the
plans of aggression of the imperialists and colonial-
ists, old and new.
The world's people are doing their best to encou-
rage the just struggle of our southern compatriots

172
and regard it as the front-line o fprogressive m a n k i n d
against t h e cruellest enemy o f t h e world's people :
U.S. imperialism. O u r southern compatriots will
certainly show themselves w o r t h y o f this valuable
approval a n d support.
The long and momentous Dien Bien Phu battle of
our compatriots in the South will certainly w i n f i n a l
victory. V i e t n a m , o u r Fatherland, will certainly be
reunified. The U . S . imperialists a n dtheir stooges w i l l
certainly be doomed t o a bitter failure.

*
* *

As centuries have passed, in the unbending struggle

against foreign invasion to safeguard the indepen-
dence of their country, the heroic Vietnamese people
have written the most glorious pages in their history :

BACH DANG
CHI LANG
DONG D A
DIEN BIEN P H U

We are now living in a grand era.

• Future belongs to us.
Under the glorious banner of our Party, headed by
President H o Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people will
always advance to a brighter and brighter future
Socialist construction in Vietnam w i l l certainly be
crowned with success. National reunification will
certainly be successful.

173
 Iti (he world, under the invincible banner of
Marxism-Leninism, progressive mankind shall always
march forward. The cruel imperialists and colonialists
shall be swept out of the earth. All the oppressed
oeoples who are now rising up in struggle shall be
completely liberated and shall be masters of their
destiny and their country. Socialism and communism
shall triumph completely. Mankind shall always
march forward in peace and happiness.
Wc are proud that in the history of revolutionary
struggle of the peoples and nations which stand up
to smash their shackles and fight oppression and
exploitation, Dien Bien Phu will remain for ever as
a glorious feat-of-arms and a great event heralding
the triumph of the oppressed peoples and nations and
the collapse of imperialism and colonialism in the
world.
The great Dien Bien Phu victory will for ever urge
our people and nation as well as the oppressed nations
in the world resolutely to march toward greater
victories.
Dien Bien Phu will live for ever in the heart of
future generations.

Hanoi 1964
IN C O M M E M O R A T I O N
O F T H E 10th A N N I V E R S A R Y
OF T H E DIEN BIEN P H U VICTORY
 APPENDIX
ORDERS OF T H E DAY, LETTERS A N D
NOTES OF E N C O U R A G E M E N T D U R I N G
T H E DIEN B I E N P H U C A M P A I G N A N D
T H E CO-ORDINATED C A M P A I G N S IN
W I N T E R 1953 - SPRING 1954
 CONGRATULATORY LETTER

TO UNIT X X O N T H E VICTORY W O N
AT THE FRONT SOUTH-WEST O F NINH BINH

Officers and m e n ,

A t tfie b e g i n n i n g o f A u t u m n A V i n t e r , t h e e n e m y h a s
concentrated h i sm o b i l e forces t o attack our free zone
in t h e south-west of N i n h B i n h h o p i n g t o destroy o u r
rear a n dw i n back t h e i n i t i a t i v e .
Although t h eenemy h a s concentrated a large con-
tingent of picked troops, mobilized a great number of
artillery pieces, a r m o u r e d cars a n d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e
front, y o u have fought heroically, overcome difficulties,
seized t h e best o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o w i p e o u t a great
number of enemy troops a n d obliged t h e enemy to
w i t h d r a w f r o m o u r free zone-
This w a so u r first great v i c t o r y w o n o n t h e B a c B o
battlefield at t h e b e g i n n i n g of operations i n a u t u m n
and winter. I t has also s h o w n that y o uhave made
further progresses after t h e recent political r e m o u l d -
ing in the army.

12 DI3I' 177
 'the H i g h C o m m a n d h a s decided t o confer a third-
class M i l i t a r y M e d a l o nthe w h o l e unit.
I send m yc o n g r a t u l a t i o n s t o all o f y o u , a n d w i s h
you good health and high spirits. I recommend you
not t obe subjective, not t o underestimate the enemy
after y o u r victory, t o be ready t o destroy the e n e m y
and p e r f o r m n e w feats o f a r m s .
W i t h affection and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t ow i n .

November 7, 1953
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S A R M Y
General V O NGUYEN GIAP

178
 ORDER OF ENCOURAGEMENT

TO OFFICERS A N D M E N A T
THE DIEN BIEN P H U FRONT

Comrades,

On orders from the P a r t y Central Committee,

Government a n dPresident H o Chi M i n h , this winter
you will go to the North-West t o :
— Destroy the enemy's effectives,
— W i n over t h e population,
— Liberate t h e regions still held b y t h e enemy.
The enemy is occupying a region of o u r beloved
North-West, scheming t o s o w division among o u r
compatriots a n dtrample them underfoot, a n d disturb
our rear.
We must repair roads, overcome difficulties a n d
hardships, fight valiantly, endure hunger a n d cold,
go u p hill a n d d o w n dale, cover l o n g distances a n d
carry heavy loads t o find t h e e n e m y i n h i s refuge t o
destroy h i m a n d liberate o u r compatriots.

179
 This winter, with the hatred for the imperialists
and feudalists w e have learnt i nt h e political remould-
ing i n t h e a r m y , w i t h t h e technical a n d tactical
progresses w e have acquired i n t h e recent military
remoulding, w e will certainly strengthen a n d develop
the v i c t o r y o f t h e N o r t h - W e s t c a m p a i g n i n w i n t e r
1952, a n d w i l l c e r t a i n l y d e f e a t t h e e n e m y .
March forward valiantly-

December 6, 1953
General V O NGUYEN GIAP

180
 O R D E R OF THE DAY

ON T H E OCCASION OF T H E S E V E N T H
ANNIVERSARY OF T H E NATION-WIDE
RESISTANCE W A R A N D T H E NINTH
ANNIVERSARY OF T H E SETTING UP
OF T H E PEOPLE'S A R M Y

Officers and m e n o f the regular a r m y , local

forces, people's m i l i t i a and g u e r i l l a s t h r o u g h -
out the country,

On December 19, 1 9 5 3 , t h e n a t i o n - w i d e Resistance

War of our people has entered its eighth year.
O n D e c e m b e r 22, 1953, since the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
the P r o p a g a n d a U n i t of the V i e t n a m L i b e r a t i o n A r m y ,
o u r h e r o i c p e o p l e ' s a r m y h a s b e e n set up for n i n e y e a r s .
O n the occasion o f the a n n i v e r s a r y of these t w o
historic days I sincerely send m y congratulations to
all our officers a n d m e n w h o are f i g h t i n g o n a l l
fronts in the country. I affectionately ask after the
w o u n d e d servicemen. O n behalf of the a r m y I respect-

18i
fully b o w to the souls of those w h o h a v e h e r o i c a l l y
sacrificed their lives for the F a t h e r l a n d .
I s e n d m y c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s t o t h e dan cong w h o a r e
serving at the front-line to ensure the supply of food
and a m m u n i t i o n for the troops to kill the enemy.
I affectionately ask after the health of the fan)ilies
of officers and m e n , especially those of the w o u n d e d
and martyrs.
T h r o u g h eight years of resistance w a r against the
aggressive imperialists our people's a r m y has unre-
mittingly struggled against the aggressors.
I n t h e fire o f t h e b a t t l e , o u r a r m y h a s s t a r t e d f r o m
small guerilla units to rapidly become a p o w e r f u l
a r m y w i t h h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of soldiers of the
regular a r m y and local a r m y and m i l l i o n s of m i l i t i a -
men and guerillas.
O u r a r m y has w o n glorious victories, put o u t of
action 320,000 enemies, liberated over 78,000 square
kilometres of land, extended the Viet Bac resistance
base f r o m the Chinese frontier to the L a o t i a n frontier,
m a i n t a i n e d and developed g u e r i l l a w a r f a r e a n d set up
m a n y large guerilla bases in the enem>f's rear. P a r t i -
cularly since the Frontier campaign, our a r m y has
w o n seven big campaigns, and kept the initiative in
the N o r t h e r n battlefield-
A t present, after h a v i n g been heavily defeated by
our a r m y in the North-West, by the Laotian Liberation
troops in Upper Laos, especially after the U.S. impe-
rialists' defeat in Korea w h i c h obliged t h e m to sign
the armistice, the U.S. interventionists and the French
colonialists are e n d e a v o u r i n g to extend the w a r in
Vietnam, Cainbodia, and Laos, carry out the N a v a r r e

182
plan, recruit m o r e puppet troops, concentrate their
armed forces, l a u n c h m o p p i n g - u p o p e r a t i o n s i n .the
enemy's rear and attack the free zones, h o p i n g t o w i n
back the i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s is a v e r y p e r f i d i o u s s c h e m e .
But we have the clear-sighted leadership and the
correct political a n d m i l i t a r y line of the P a r t y , G o v e r n -
ment and President H o C h i M i n h , and the whole-
hearted support of the N a t i o n a l U n i t e d Front, of the
entire people. W e also h a v e the f o l l o w i n g new
favourable conditions to smash the enemy's scheme:
First, after the political and m i l i t a r y r e m o u l d i n g s ,
especially after the recent political r e m o u l d i n g , our
people's a r m y has m a d e great progress i n politics as
w e l l as i n t a c t i c s a n d t e c h n i q u e . T h e officers' a n d
men's fighting spirit raises further.
Second, our P a r t y and G o v e r n m e n t have agitated
the peasants to s t r u g g l e for the successful c a r r y i n g
out of the r e d u c t i o n of l a n d rent a n d interest rate.
E a r l y i n D e c e m b e r 1953, the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y
u n a n i m o u s l y passed the l a w of l a n d r e f o r m w h i c h
gave back l a n d t o the tillers- T h i s is an e x t r e m e l y
i m p o r t a n t political success w h i c h filled o u r a r m y m e n
with enthusiasm, increased the resistance of the entire
people and enhanced the fighting spirit of our troops.
Third, the u n a n i m o u s support of the W o r l d M o v e -
m e n t for peace a n d d e m o c r a c y headed by the S o v i e t
Union, of the F r e n c h people and the F r e n c h colonial
peoples for our Resistance W a r has become stronger
and stronger. T h e bloc of alliance between V i e t n a m ,
C a m b o d i a a n d L a o s is closer a n d closer. T h e I n t e r n a -
tional D a y of S o l i d a r i t y w i t h the V i e t n a m people

183
decided by the W o r l d Federation of Trade U n i o n s w i l l
strengthen our confidence and e n h a n c e the f i g h t i n g
spirit of our army.
To celebrate the anniversary of the nation-wide
Resistance W a r and the setting up of our A r m y ;
To answer President H o Chi M i n h ' s appeal for
the fulfilment of the t w o central tasks : to intensify
the struggle against the e n e m y and carry out land
reform ;
In the name of the H i g h C o m m a n d of the V i e t n a m
People's A r m y I give orders to a l l officers and m e n
of t h e r e g u l a r a r m e d forces, l o c a l forces, p e o p l e ' s
militia and guerilla :
1. T o d e v e l o p t h e t r a d i t i o n o f h e r o i s m a n d e n d u -
rance of our L i b e r a t i o n A r m y , to do y o u r best to kill
the e n e m y , d e s t r o y as m a n y e n e m i e s as possible, step
up g u e r i l l a w a r f a r e , defend the free zones, a n d s m a s h
the N a v a r r e plan.
2. T o s t r i c t l y i m p l e m e n t t h e l a w o f l a n d r e f o r m , t h e
land policy of the P a r t y and Government, and to
resolutely support the peasants i n their great struggle
to c a r r y out the s l o g a n " L a n d to the t i l l e r s " .

Officers and men.

Under the leadership of the Party, G o v e r n m e n t and

President H o Chi M i n h , our people's a r m y will
certainly defeat the enemy, smash the N a v a r r e plan
as w e l l as t h e s c h e m e s t o e x t e n d t h e w a r o f t h e F r e n c h
colonialists and U.S. interventionists-

484
 O u r p e o p l e ' s a r m y w i l l c e r t a i n l y w i n t h e final
victory i n t h eheroic a n d g l o r i o u s s t r u g g l e f o r t h e
complete independence o f the Fatherland, the return
of l a n d t o t h e p e a s a n t s , a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d e f e n c e
of peace a n d d e m o c r a c y i n A s i a a n d i n t h e w o r l d .
W i t h affection and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w i n .

December 19, 1953

THE MINISTER O F NATIONAL DEFENCE.
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

185
 LETTER

TO THE TRAINING COURSE FOR CADRES

I N C H A R G E O F DAN CONG

O n the occasion o f the anniversary o f the nation-

wide Resistance W a r and the setting-up of the people's
army, I have received y o u r letter in w h i c h y o u resolu-
tely promise t o study hard s o that y o u w i l l actively
l e a d t h e dan cong i n t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e i r t a s k .
The scale o f military operations g r o w s w i t h every
passing day. S o a r e t h eneeds o f t h efront. T h e
g u i d a n c e o f t h e dan cong i s a v e r y g r e a t p r o b l e m , i n
w h i c h the leadership of t h e c a d r e s has a d e c i s i v e role.
That isw h y w h e n carrying on their task all the cadres
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e dan cong m u s t :
— Raise their spirit t oendure hardships and over-
come difficulties, and their determination t o fulfil
their task.
— P a y g r e a t a t t e n t i o n t o t h e dan cong's l i f e , p e r s i s -
tently educate and e n c o u r a g e t h e m t oovercome diffi-
culties, ensure supplies for t h e a r m y , a n d r e f r a i n
from bureaucracy and commandism.

186
 ^ s t r i c t l y abide b y the policy o f nationalities and
discipline t o w a r d s the masses-
Your task is very heavy a n d very glorious. D o
your utmost t o fulfil your promises i n the letter o f
engagement.
.Affectionately yours,

December 26, 1953

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E V I E T N A M P E O P L E ' S AR.MY
General VO NGUYEN GtAP

187
 MESSAGE

TO UNIT X X E N T R U S T E D W I T H T H E MISSION
TO GO DEEP INTO T H E ENEMY'S REAR FOR
CO-ORDINATED ACTION I N SUPPORT
OF T H E DIEN BIEN P H U CAMPAIGN

The H i g h C o m m a n d has been i n f o r m e d that y o u

have overcome great hardships and privations to
fulfil y o u r task.
I affectionately send y o u m y greetings.
Y o u r task is v e r y h e a v y . T o fulfil, i t is t o m a k e a
worthy contribution to the c o m m o n success, and
create good conditions to w i n n e w successes in time
to come.
You must raise your determination t o carry out
your task, endure hardships a n d sufferings, a n d
overcome all difficulties.

You m u s t firmly keep discipline a n d secrecy, defend

against air raids, and watch-spies.
You must protect your arms a n d a m m u n i t i o n .

188
 You must show that a revolutionary army is
invincible-
I wish you high spirits and good health t o fulill
your task.
W i t h affection and determination t owin.

January 1954
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

189
 LETTER ON THE OCCASION
OF THE LUNAR NEW YEAR

( S P R I N G O F G I A P N G O — 1954)

Ofl'icers a n d m e n of the regular army, local

forces, people's m i l i t i a a n dguerillas throughout
the country,

Today is t h e first d a y o f t h e L u n a r N e w Year Giap

Ngo. While w e are merrily reading the messages of
the Party Central Committee, the Government, the
Fatherland Front a n d President H o C h i Minh, I
affectionately send m y wishes for a happy N e w Year
to t h e officers a n d m e n of the regular army, local
forces, people's militia a n d guerillas throughout the
country.

I wish the wounded a prompt recovery to return

to their units as soon as possible ;

I w i s h t h efactory a n doffice w o r k e r s of t h e n a t i o n a l
defence great successes i n the emulation t o increase
labour ciTiciency t o serve the army;

1<K)
 I w i s h t h e dan cong on all fronts good health and
strong ardour to overcome hardships and difficulties
in order to ensure the s u p p l y of food a n d ammunition
for the a r m y to kill the enemy;
1 also send m y N e w Year greetings to the families
of the wounded and martyrs, and to those of the
officers and men on duty.

This N e w Year has come when our army is defeat-

ing the enemy on all the fronts in the country. O n
the North-West front Lai Chau has been liberated ;
during their w i t h d r a w a l , the enemy effectives have
been destroyed. The enemy's regular forces at Dien
Bien Phu are isolated and driven to the defensive.
O n the battlefield in the Red River delta, our army
hammers continuously at the enemy's positions,
annihilates his reinforcements, harasses his commu-
nication lines (roads and waterways), extends the
guerilla zones and guerilla bases, deals heavy blows
at the local forces and l i g h t i n f a n t r y of the puppet
army.
In Binh-Tri-Thien our troops are intensifying their
activities.
In the Fifth Zone w h i l e the enemy attacks the south
of our free zone our army has launched successful
attacks on the north of Kontum, destroying many
important enemy positions and liberating large
territories-
I n N a m B o , g u e r i l l a w a r f a r e is i n f u l l s w i n g : many
enemy posts have been wiped out or forced to surren-
der, m a n y guerilla zones and bases extended.
Recently the resistance war in the neighbouring
countries — Laos and Cambodia — has also scored

191
great victories. T h e L a o t i a n Liberation A r m y has
d e s t r o y e d t h e e n e m y o n R o a d N? 1 2 , l i b e r a t e d t h e
g r e a t e s t p a r t o f T h a k h e k p r o v i n c e , c u t o f f R o a d We 9 ,
and liberated the north of Savannakhet province.
I n C a m b o d i a , g u e r i l l a w a r f a r e is d e v e l o p i n g , p a r t i -
cularly in South-West.
The e n e m y has suffered defeat after defeat i n his
new military scheme. H e has thought of concentrating
his a r m e d forces i n the highest degree to "pacify" his
rear, strike at the free zone, and w i n back the initia-
tive. B u t at p r e s e n t h i s r e g u l a r a r m y is forced t o
scatter on m a n y fronts : at D i e n B i e n P h u , Seno, and
in the u n t i m e l y attack o n the south of T r u n g B o .
T o be o b l i g e d t o s c a t t e r his a r m e d forces is t h e
greatest failure of the enemy, w h i c h will account for
m a n y other setbacks.
In the past year the enemy lost over 90,000 men.
It w i l l lose m o r e . C o n f r o n t e d w i t h these defeats, the
French and U S . imperialists will certainly strive to
save the situation. W e are not subjective and do not
underestimate the enemy, but w e are sure that i n the
n e w year w e will certainly score greater successes.
The L u n a r N e w Year festival has come w h e n in
our rear the people are elated at the n e w s of victories,
and are actively participating i n the mass agitation
for l a n d r e f o r m ; w h e n o u r p e o p l e a n d a r m y a r e
w a r m l y observing the V i e t n a m - C h i n a - S o v i e t U n i o n
Month of Friendship ; w h e n the m o v e m e n t cf
struggle of the F r e n c h people against the w a r of
aggression i n V i e t n a m is r i s i n g , a n d w h e n the w o r l d
m o v e m e n t for peace and democracy is g i v i n g us
increasing support.

192
 Enjoying the festive hours of a T e t o f victory, w e
are a l l t h e m o r e c o n f i d e n t i n t h e c l e a r - s i g h t e d
leadership of t h e P a r t y C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , G o v e r n -
ment and President H oC h i M i n h , w e a r e all t h e m o r e
grateful t o o u r people w h o have devotedly helped
the a r m y , a n d t o t h e p e a c e - l o v i n g peoples a l l o v e r
the w o r l d , h e a d e d b y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , w h o h a v e
whole-heartedly supported us.
The T e th a s come j u s t w h e n m o s t o f u s a r e f i g h t i n g
the e n e m y o n t h e f r o n t - l i n e . T o c e l e b r a t e t h e T e t o f
victory a l l officers a n d m e n , a l l units, a l l a r m s , a l l
fronts m u s t :
— Energetically w i p e o u t t h e enemy, a n d closely
combine their action.
— Emulate with o n e another t o p e r f o r m feats o f
arms, a n dfight u n r e m i t t i n g l y ,
— D o y o u r best t o w i n t h e banner " D e t e r m i n e d t o
fight a n d t o w i a " o f P r e s i d e n t H o C h i M i n h ,
— M a k e this spring a spring of glorious victory.

T h e F i r s t D a y of t h e L u n a r
New Year Giap N g o
T H E C O M M A N D E R - I N - C H I E F
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S A R M Y
General V O N G U Y E N G I A P

13 DBF 193
 CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM

TO A L L OFFICERS, SOLDIERS A N D DAN CONG

IN T H E F I F T H ZONE

In the name of the H i g h C o m m a n d , I

— C o n g r a t u l a t e the officers and m e n o n the K o n t u m
front w h o have overcome hardships a n d difficulties,
fought heroically, destroyed a great number of enemy
troops, a n d liberated t h e t o w n a n d t h e province of
Kontum.
— C o n g r a t u l a t e t h e officers a n d m e n i n T u y H o a
and t h e enemy's rear i n t h e Fifth Zone w h o have
fought, harassed a n d wiped o u t a great contingent
of e n e m y t r o o p s , a n dp r o t e c t e d t h e l i v e s a n d p r o p e r t y
of t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
— C o n g r a t u l a t e t h e officers a n d m e n o f t h e free
zone w h o have studied hard, made active preparations
to defend o u r rear a n d foil a l l t h e enemy's schemes.
In the name of the army, I thank all our compatriots
of t h e n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s w h o h a v e d e v o t e d l y s u p -
ported t h ea r m y t o defeat t h e enemy.

194
 The K o n t u m v i c t o r y is o u r iirst great success o n
the S o u t h e r n b a t t l e f i e l d . I t i s o n e o f o u r i m p o r t a n t
successes o n a l l t h e f r o n t s t h i s s p r i n g . I t i s a h e a v y
blow dealt a t t h e enemy's scheme o n t h e S o u t h e r n
front, p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n h e i s b o g g e d d o w n i n T u y
Hoa. Victorious, y o u m u s t n o t be subjective a n d
underestimate t h e enemy, b u t endeavour t o consoli-
date t h e liberated zone, s t r e n g t h e n a n d develop y o u r
successes, e m u l a t e w i t h t h e b r o t h e r u n i t s o n o t h e r
fronts t o destroy m o r e enemies, a n d w i n t h e r e w a r d -
promised b y President H o C h i M i n h .
W i t h afTection a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w i n .

December 2. 1954
T H E COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E VIETNAM P E O P L E ' S ARMY

General V O NGUYEN GIAP

195
 TALK

W I T H T H E ARTILLERY A N D ANTI-AIRCRAFT
UNITS

O n t h e occasion of t h e N e w Year's D a y , I come t o

see y o u , a n d w i s h y o u a l l g o o d h e a l t h a n d m a n y
successes-
Please convey m y affectionate greetings for a
Happy N e w Year t o all other comrades.
Of late, o n the instructions f r o m above, y o u fulfilled
the tasks of m a r c h i n g t o t h e f r o n t a n d h a u l i n g t h e
artillery to positions a n d at r e g r o u p m e n t places.
These tasks are regarded as c o m b a t tasks as t h e y
had t o be carried o u t i n h a r d conditions.
T h e f u l f i l m e n t of these tasks is a success. I convey
my congratulations to y o uall.
In carrying out our tasks, w e have learned some
great lessons.
First, w e firmly kept our determination, fought
valiantly and overcame all hardships and difficulties.
The tasks y o u just fulfilled were very heavy a n d
difficult. T h o u g h living far f r o m the battlefields for a
l o n g t i m e a n d l a c k i n g fighting e x p e r i e n c e s , y o u firmly

196
maintained your determination, brought into play the
v a l i a n t combativeness of r e v o l u t i o n a r y soldiers to
overcome all difficulties and hardships in order to
fulfil y o u r tasks. O n l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y soldiers as w e
are could fulfil such tasks. T h i s has s h o w n the h u g e
forces and inexhaustible possibilities of o u r a r m y .
You should clearly realize this to raise y o u r confidence.
Second, the infantry, sappers, and artillery units
closely co-ordinated w i t h one another i n a spirit of
solidarity. T h o u g h h a v i n g not yet m a n y experiences in
co-ordinating their actions, of late v a r i o u s a r m s united
and co-operated w i t h one another v e r y closely, hence
they could fulfil their tasks.
The close co-operation between v a r i o u s a r m s i n the
past as i n t h e f u t u r e w i l l h e l p o u r a r m y w i n m a n y
successes-
Third, y o u strictly carried out the instructions f r o m
the upper levels.
Of late, w h i l e c a r r y i n g out the instructions f r o m
the upper levels, y o u m e t w i t h difficulties a n d h a r d -
ships. But, confident in y o u r upper levels, y o u strictly
carried out those instructions, hence your successes.
T o help y o u build up v a r i o u s a r m s , and acquire a
good combative style in order to fulfil the glorious
tasks to come, I r e m i n d you the f o l l o w i n g points :
First, you should fight valiantly, and actively
destroy the enemy.
Y o u s h o u l d n o t get w o r r i e d o n a c c o u n t of the e n e m y
air force and artillery and should n o t flinch i n face
of difficulties a n d h a r d s h i p s .

197
 V a l i a n t l y t o fight, a n d a c t i v e l y t o d e s t r o y t h e e n e m y
is t h e c o n c r e t e e x p r e s s i o n of o u r thorough-going
r e v o l u t i o n a r y spirit and of our s t a n d p o i n t of fighting
for our nation and class.
In the time to come, you should develop in the
highest degree y o u r combativeness, put o u t of action
as m a n y e n e m y effectives as p o s s i b l e , a n d m a k e t h e m
fear our artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
Second, you should strictly carry out the instruct-
ions f r o m the upper levels.
Y o u should carry out the instructions f r o m the upper
levels thoroughly, urgently, unhesitatingly, and
u n w a v e r i n g l y . O n l y by so d o i n g c a n w e u n i f y o u r w i l l
and action, and not let slip the o p p o r t u n i t i e s of
destroying the enemy-
V a l i a n t l y t o fight a n d t h o r o u g h l y t o c a r r y o u t t h e
instructions f r o m the upper levels are t w o f u n d a m e n t a l
points i n the combative style of o u r troops.
Of late, y o u strictly carried out the instructions
f r o m t h e u p p e r levels a n d as a r e s u l t y o u scored
successes, t h a t w a s good. H o w e v e r , a n u m b e r of
comrades hesitated before difficulties, did not yet carry
out the instructions thoroughly, seriously, promptly,
these c o m r a d e s m u s t get r i d of their s h o r t c o m i n g s
and must make progress.
Third, you should closely co-ordinate with the
infantry.
The task of artillery and a n t i - a i r c r a f t u n i t s is to
co-ordinate with infantry to achieve the task of
destroying the enemy.

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 Therefore, in all circumstances, you should endea-
vour to overcome difficulties, and very closely
co-ordinate w i t h infantry.
Fourth, you should do your utmost in studying
technique, i n l e a r n i n g t o be g o o d s h o t s .
You should raise your technical level, actively
compete w i t h y o u r brother units i n good shooting,
bringing down m a n y enemy aircraft and destroying
artillery, stores, and solid fortifications.
In previous campaigns like in the last few days,
t h e e n e m y d a i l y fired a i m l e s s l y t h o u s a n d s o f c a n n o n
s h e l l s , b u t i n v a i n . S u c h a firing i s a w a s t e o f m u n i -
tions and a disclosure of one's position. W e are quite
d i f f e r e n t . E v e r y t i m e w e fire, o u r firing must touch
our targets in such a w a y that the next time, the
enemy w i l l fear our artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
Fifth, you should protect your weapons, and save
m u n i t i o n s . Y o u r w e a p o n s m u s t be used t o d e s t r o y o u r
enemy.
Y o u should protect these weapons like y o u do y o u r
o w n lives.
Of late, y o u highlighted the slogan "Better to
sacrifice ourselves t h a n t o let o u r c a n n o n s be
destroyed," and m a n y comrades acted up t o the
slogan. F r o m n o w on, y o u should develop this good
point.
Sixth, the officers m u s t a l w a y s identify themselves
with the fighters, s h a r i n g t h e i r h a p p i n e s s as w e l l as
their hardships and setting good examples for t h e m .
Recently, in c a r r y i n g out y o u r tasks, m a n y officers
were close to their m e n , g i v i n g t h e m help, and w o r k e d

199
w i t h t h e m in the h a u l i n g of cannons. T h i s w a s good-
H o w e v e r s o m e of t h e m d i d n o t y e t l o v e t h e i r m e n as
they s h o u l d do, a b a n d o n i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n face of
difficulties, or if t h e y w e n t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r m e n ,
they yelled reproaches and show themselves irritated.
These c o m r a d e s did n o t fulfil t h e i r tasks as officers.
They must make good their shortcomings and must
make progress.

T o continue our preparations for the campaign, you

should carry out the f o l l o w i n g tasks :
First, you should build very strong artillery
positions.
O u r f o r t i f i c a t i o n s m u s t be t h i c k a n d firm enough
to stand the e n e m y shelling. Besides fighting you
should w o r k against time in reinforcing our fortifica-
tions. T o m a k e t h e m o n e c e n t i m e t r e t h i c k e r is t o
create m o r e favourable conditions to defeat the
enemy.
You should build m a n y sham positions to sidetrack
the enemy, disperse his fire-power and make him
waste weapons and munitions-
Second, you should review the recent artillery
hauling.
T h e r e c e n t a r t i l l e r y h a u l i n g w a s t h e first b i g t e s t
experienced by our units. T h r o u g h this test, all of y o u
have m a d e progress, at the s a m e t i m e y o u also s h o w e d
your weak points and shortcomings. You should
develop the spirit of criticism and self-criticism i n
the review i n order to learn f r o m experiences and
make further progress.

20{)
 c) T h i r d , i t is a b o u t t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e u n i t s .
You should firmly m a i n t a i n the combative forces of
the troops.
T h e officers s h o u l d be m o r e concerned with the
problems of food and rest of their m e n .
Y o u s h o u l d i m p r o v e c o o k i n g so t h a t food a n d d r i n k
be s u f f i c i e n t a n d s e r v e d h o t .
Y o u should w o r k out a rational time-table for
i n n e r l i f e a n d f o r w o r k s o t h a t t h e fighters m a y h a v e
e n o u g h t i m e to sleep.
Y o u should have the huts built carefully, avoiding
d a m p n e s s a n d c o l d w i n d s o t h a t t h e fighters m a y be
warm.
You should intensify the prophylactic measures, the
discipline of k e e p i n g secrets, t h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t defence,
and the vigilance w i t h regard to spies and t r a i t o r s
in order to i m p r o v e the h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n s of the t r o o p s
and not to suffer casualties w h e n n o t fighting.
Today, I come t o see you and remind you these
things.
I wish you all high spirits, good health and great
successes.

February 7, 1954

201
 CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

TO T H E UNITS WHICH HAVE DESTROYED

THE ENEMY AIRCRAFT O N GIA L A M
AND CAT B I AIRFIELDS

The H i g h C o m m a n d s o l e m n l y m e n t i o n s i n despat-
ches y o u r feats o f a r m s f o r t h e w h o l e o f t h e V i e t n a m
People's A r m y t o k n o w , a n d sends i t sw a r m congratu-
lations t o a l l t h e officers a n d m e n w h o h a v e been
brilliantly victorious i n the t w o valiant attacks upon
Gia L a m a n d C a t B i airfields o n the nights of M a r c h
4 a n d 6 , 1954',! d e s t r o y i n g e n e m y a i r c r a f t a n d m a n y
of h i s m u n i t i o n stores, t h u s c a u s i n g h i m v e r y h e a v y
losses.
T h i s is a great m i l i t a r y feat, o n e o f t h e m o s t heroic
a n d g l o r i o u s c'ombats, t h e b i g g e s t d e s t r u c t i o n r a i d
ever scored i n t h e a n n a l s o f o u r a r m y , d i r e c t l y attack-
i n g t h e enemy's m i l i t a r y centres l y i n g close t o H a n o i
and H a i p h o n g . These t w o attacks destroyed a n
i m p o r t a n t part o f t h e e n e m y a i r force, i n c l u d i n g
essentially bombers a n d transport.planes supplied t o
French imperialism by American imperialism, thus

202
exerting a great influence o n the activities and supply
of the e n e m y a i rforce, a n dc r e a t i n g f a v o u r a b l e con-
ditions for our m a n y victories t o come o n the fronts
throughout t h e country. These t w oattacks have
t h r o w n the e n e m y into a panic, a n dgreatly inspired
our a r m y a n d people.
Your unparalleled heroism isw o r t h y to be highlight-
ed for a l l officers a n d m e n i nt h e w h o l e a r m y t o l e a r n
from.
I w i s h that y o uwill m a k e further efforts, n o t
indulge yourselves i nsubjectivism, not underestimate
the enemy, make a review t o d r a w experiences, fight
u n r e m i t t i n g l y a n dscore f u r t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g feats o f
arms.
W i t h affection a n dd e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w i n .

March 8. 1954
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

203
 ORDER OF ENCOURAGEMENT
TO A L L OFFICERS A N D M E N ,
ALL UNITS,
ALL ARMS,

TO START A GREAT OFFENSIVE

UPON T H E DIEN BIEN PHU FORTIFIED
ENTRENCHED CAMP

Officers a n d m e n .

The D i e n Bien P h u campaign shall begin.

This is t h e biggest siege campaign ever k n o w n i n
the annals of o u r army-
For these last three m o n t h s since t h e e n e m y para-
chuted h i s forces o n D i e n B i e n P h u , o u rtroops h a v e
encircled a n dpinned t h e m d o w n there, thus creating
conditions f o r u s t o defeat h i m u n r e m i t t i n g l y o n a l l
fronts throughout t h e country.
Lai C h a u h a s been liberated, a t t h e N a m H u River
front-line t h e e n e m y h a s been smashed, a t P h o n g S a
L y h e h a s been also swept a w a y . T h e D i e n B i e n P h u

204
 fortified entrenched camp has become completely
isolated, standing all alone i n the m i d s t of our
i m m e n s e rear.
The time has struck for our regular forces to launch
an offensive upon D i e n Bien P h u .
O u r victory at D i e n B i e n P h u shall m e a n the
destruction of the b u l k of the e n e m y effectives, the
liberation of the w h o l e N o r t h - W e s t , the e x p a n s i o n a n d
consolidation of the i m m e n s e rear of the r e s i s t a n c e
w a r , a n d a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the successes of l a n d
reform.
O u r victory at D i e n B i e n P h u shall m e a n the
stride f o r w a r d of o u r heroic people's a r m y , a n d a v e r y
i m p o r t a n t victory of our resistance w a r .
O u r victory at D i e n B i e n P h u shall m e a n the
s m a s h i n g of N a v a r r e ' s p l a n w h i c h is s u f f e r i n g h e a v y
failures, a t e l l i n g b l o w dealt at the F r e n c h and A m e r i -
can imperialists' plot of e x p a n d i n g w a r . O u r victory
at D i e n B i e n P h u s h a l l exert a r e s o u n d i n g influence
t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y a n d a b r o a d , a n d s h a l l be a
w o r t h y contribution to the w o r l d peace movement
w h i c h is d e m a n d i n g a n e n d t o t h e w a r i n V i e t n a m ,
Cambodia and Laos, especially at this time w h e n the
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t i n face of its c o n t i n u o u s failures,
has b e g u n to s p e a k of n e g o t i a t i o n s i n o r d e r peace-
f u l l y t o s o l v e "the p r o b l e m of w a r i n I n d o - C h i n a .
In accordance w i t h the order f r o m the P a r t y Central
Committee, the G o v e r n m e n t and President H o C h i
Minh,
W h i l e our troops, in co-ordination w i t h your action,
are e n d e a v o u r i n g to k i l l the e n e m y on all f r o n t s
throughout the country,

205
 I call o n all the officers and m e n , a l l units, a n d a l l
arms o n the Dien Bien P h u front.
To realize t h e honour o f participating i n this
historic campaign,
To have a lofty determination t okill the enemy.
To firmly keep the principle o f " s t r i k i n g surely and
advancing cautiously".
To brave all hardships.
To overcome a l l difficulties.
T o co-ordinate closely your actions.
To fight unremittingly.
To destroy the whole ofthe enemy a tDien Bien Phu
and w i n a great victory for the campaign.
The combat hour h a s struck!
A l l officers a n dm e n , a l l u n i t s , a l l a r m s , v a l i a n t l y
advance forward, compete with one another i n scoring
brillant feats o f a r m s to w i n the " D e t e r m i n e d t o F i g h t
and t o w i n " banner awarded b y President H o
Chi M i n h .

March, 1954
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

206
 F I V E R U L E S OF T H E DISCIPLINE

I N F O R C E O N T H EF R O N T DURING
THE DIEN BIEN P H U CAMPAIGN

To crystallize the determination of President H o

Chi Minh, the Party Central Committee and the
Government,
To guarantee the thorough implementation of the
combat instructions of the H i g h C o m m a n d .
To help a l l a r m s — infantry, artillery, sappers
develop i n the highest degree their v a l i a n t combati-
veness a n d the effectiveness o f their technique,
T o help a l l officers a n d m e n clearly realize their
responsibility before the w h o l e a r m y i n t h e great
combat t o come,
To w i ncomplete victory for the campaign.
The H i g h C o m m a n d takes t h e decision t o issue the
f o l l o w i n g five r u l e s t o b e s t r i c t l y o b s e r v e d b y a l l
officers a n d m e n o n t h e f r o n t :
1) A n y o f f i c e r , a n y m a n , a n y u n i t w h o f i r m l y
maintains his determination i n a l l circumstances,
especially i n urgent and hard circumstances,

207
thoroughly implements the instructions f r o m above,
fights valiantly, destroys many enemy soldiers,
captures m a n y P.O.W's, seizes m a n y weapons, brings
d o w n m a n y a i r c r a f t , etc. s h a l l be r e w a r d e d .
A n y m a n , any unit w h o w a v e r s , does not t h o r o u g h -
ly i m p l e m e n t the i n s t r u c t i o n s , flinches before the
enemy, hesitates before difficulties, finds pretexts to
s h u n his t a s k s , s h a l l be p u n i s h e d .
2) A n y officer, a n y m a n , a n y u n i t w h o correctly
abides by the discipline concerning the keeping of
secrets, the a n t i - a i r c r a f t defence, the vigilance against
spies and traitors, especially d u r i n g the m a r c h or the
c a m p i n g near the e n e m y , w h o does not let o u t the
secrets of the o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n a n d of the a c t i o n of
our t r o o p s , s h a l l be r e w a r d e d .
A n y m a n , a n y unit w h o s h o w s a lack of vigilance,
w h o does not strictly abide by the discipline concern-
i n g the keeping of secrets, the a n t i - a i r c r a f t defence,
th€ vigilance against spies and traitors, w h o let
out the secrets of the o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n a n d of the
action of o u r t r o o p s , w h o let o u t t h e secrets con-
cerning the direction of the m a r c h and the c a m p i n g
position of o u r troops, t h u s c a u s i n g losses to o u r
troops and e x e r t i n g a bad influence o n the v i c t o r y of
the c a m p a i g n , s h a l l be p u n i s h e d .
3) A n y officer, a n y m a n , a n y u n i t w h o correctly
abides by the discipline concerning the t i m e and the
close c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h other u n i t s , b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y
a n d a r t i l l e r y , b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y a n d i n f a n t r y , etc., w h o
fulfils the c o m b a t tasks, s h a l l be r e w a r d e d .
A n y m a n , any unit w h o does not correctly abide by
discipline concerning the time and the close co-ordi-

208
nation with friendly units, tiius impeding himself f r o m
fulfilling his tasks and causing losses a n d difficulties
to f r i e n d l y u n i t s , s h a l l be p u n i s h e d .
4) A n y officer, a n y m a n w h o , i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f
hard fighting w i t h heavy casualties, remains actively
diligent, rapidly reorganizes his unit t ofight u n r e m i t -
tingly, firmly grasps t h eopportunity t o p u to u t of
action m a n y enemies, shall b e rewarded-
Any man, any unit w h o is not diligent, w h o shows
indolence and weariness, w h o does not p a y attention
to the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f his unit, thus l e t t i n g slip t h e
g o o d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , w h o d o e s n o t fight u n r e m i t t i n g l y
and does not fulfil his task, shall be punished.
5) A n y officer, a n ym a n , a n yu n i t w h o correctly
implements t h epolicy concerning t h ew o u n d e d a n d
the dead, t h epolicy c o n c e r n i n g w a r booties, a n d t h e
policy concerning the P . O . W ' s a n dt h e surrenderers,
shall be rewarded.
A n y m a n , a n yu n i t w h o does n o tcorrectly i m p l e -
ment the policy concerning the w o u n d e d and the dead,
w h o destroys o rwastefully utilizes w a r booties, kills
or t o r t u r e s t h eP . O . W ' s a n d t h es u r r e n d e r e r s , shall
be p u n i s h e d .

March, 1954
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

l', D B P
 ORDER OF ENCOURAGEMENT

TO A L L OFFICERS A N D M E N O N VARIOUS
FRONTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY T O
CO-ORDINATE THEIR ACTION WITH
THE DIEN BIEN P H U CAMPAIGN

Officers a n d m e n o n v a r i o u s fronts t h r o u g h o u t t h e
country !
O v e r the past three m o n t h s o u r troops have encir-
cled t h e e n e m y m a i n forces i n D i e n B i e n P h u , like
we have encircled t h e m i n H o a B i n h . A t the same time,
on a l l fronts throughout t h e country w e took advan-
tage o f t h e exposure o f t h e e n e m y t o speed u p g u e r i l l a
w a r f a r e , a n d w e w o n m a n y successes.
O n M a r c h 13, o u r t r o o p s a t t a c k e d t h e o u t s k i r t s o f
Dien Bien Phu. They continue encircling a n d pinning
d o w n t h e e n e m y there- A t present h e is c o n c e n t r a t i n g
his a i r force a n d m a k e s p r e p a r a t i o n s t o t r a n s f e r m o r e
reinforcements t o Dien BienP h u .
Our units o n a l l fronts have the same task of i n -
tensifying their activities, destroying the enemy's
effectives, a t t a c k i n g h i s i m p o r t a n t roads a n d w a t e r -

210
ways, a n dexposed central points, thus p a v i n g t h e
w a y t o the s m a s h i n g o f t h em i l i t a r y p l a n o f F r e n c h
and American i m p e r i a l i s m s .

Our guiding principles are :

Actively t okeep the initiative,
To launch small combats w i t h certain successes,
T o fight u n r e m i t t i n g l y .
To co-ordinate with a l l fronts throughout t h e
country.

March 13, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

211
 CONGRATULATORY LETTER

TO T H E UNITS VICTORIOUS
IN T H E T W O C O M B A T S A T H I M L A M
A N D D O CL A P H I L L S

I s o l e m n l y send m yc o n g r a t u l a t i o n s t o a l l t h e officers
and m e n of various units a n d arms w h o highlighted
their v a l i a n t combativeness a n d close co-ordination
d u r i n g t h e n i g h t s o f 13 a n d 14 o f M a r c h 1 9 5 4 i n t h e
annihilation of H i m L a m a n d D o cL a phills which had
been t h e m o s t fortified outposts o f t h e enemy, destroy-
ing two-thirds o f the N o r t h e r n sub-sector o f t h e Dien
Bien P h u fortified entrenched camp, completely p u t
out of action t w o enemy picked European-African
battalions, bringing d o w n a n d destroying m a n y enemy
aircraft, thus c a u s i n g h i m h e a v y losses.
The t w o attacks annihilating H i m L a m a n d D o c
Lap positions w e r e t w o biggest siege attacks ever
k n o w n i n t h e a n n a l s o f o u r a r m y . T h e s e w e r e t h e first
offensive attacks u p o n t h e e n e m y fortified entrenched
c a m p . T h e s e w e r e t h e first o f f e n s i v e a t t a c k s w i t h t h e
co-orcjination o f artillery a n d anti-aircraft units. These

212
victories liave m a r k e d the obvious g r o w t h o f our a r m y
and laid good bases for the f o r t h c o m i n g victories. Y o u
should learn f r o m t h eexperiences d r a w n f r o m t h e
recent c o m b a t s a n d s h o u l d n o t b e subjective a n d
should n o tunderestimate t h eenemy. T h eenemy is
doing h i s utmost t o reinforce Dien Bien Phu, y o u
should actively consolidate and develop your victories,
continue encircling t h e enemy i n Dien Bien Phu,
create favourable conditions f o r o u rtroops o n a l l
fronts throughout t h ecountry t o destroy as m a n y
e n e m y effectives a s possible, t h u s s m a s h i n g t h e
military scheme o f French and American imperialisms.
W i t h affection a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t ow i n -

March 15. 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
Genera! VO NGUYEN GIAP

213
 MESSAGE

CALLING ON T H E TROOPS TO BUILD

OFFENSIVE AND ENCIRCLEMENT POSITIONS
ON T H E DIEN BIEN P H U FRONT

Officers and m e n , fighters on the Dien Bien Phu

front! "
I n t h e first fighting p h a s e o f t h i s h i s t o r i c c a m p a i g n ,
we have gained great victories and the enemy has
suffered great losses. A l l of y o u h a v e k n o w n this.
The P a r t y Central C o m m i t t e e has sent a letter to
c o n g r a t u l a t e y o u , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h i s is a h i s t o r i c
c a m p a i g n , a n d r e m i n d e d t h a t y o u s h a l l fight p e r s i s -
t e n t l y a n d p e r s e v e r i n g l y a n d s h a l l n o t be s u b j e c t i v e
and shall not underestimate the enemy.
The A r m y P a r t y Committee has also praised you.
A t first t h e e n e m y t r i e d t o h u s h u p t h e p u b l i c
o p i n i o n o n the reality, but n o w he c a n do i t n o longer.
H e h a s s a i d , " I f t h e flag o f t h e D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c

214
of V i e t n a m f l y o v e r tlie D i e n B i e n P h u f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ,
t h e s i t u a t i o n of I n d o - C h i n a w i l l u n d e r g o g r e a t c h a n g e s
influencing the whole o f South-East Asia".
He fears that i f France loses t h e battle, s h e w i l l
be i n a d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s position a t t h e Geneva
Conference.
T h e day before last, t h e r e a c t i o n a r y r u l i n g circles
i n F r a n c e o b s e r v e d five m i n u t e s ' s i l e n c e t o e n c o u r a g e
their troops a t D i e n B i e n P h u - W h a t w r e t c h e d n e s s !
All the big F r e n c h papers h a v e f r o n t p a g e d the n e w s
o f t h e D i e n B i e n P h u b a t t l e . L'Humanite, organ of
the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , has w a r m l y a c c l a i m e d
the victory o f o u r a r m y .
I have told y o u these news s o that y o u m a y better
value t h e honour o f participating i n this historic
campaign, not be subjective and not underestimate
the e n e m y , a n dh a v e greater confidence a n d m a k e
g r e a t e r e f f o r t s , a n d b e i m b u e d w i t h t h e principle of
striking surely, advancing cautiously and fighting
unremittingly.
Today, I w a n t to talk w i t h y o u about some problems
of i d e o l o g y a n d t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . I w i l l s p e a k i n
simple t e r m s ; t r y t olisten t om e a n d y o u w i l l under-
stand w h a t I say. I w i l l s a y n o t h i n g difficult.
At present w e have w o n great victories, the enemy
has suffered h e a v y defeats, but h e i s still p o w e r f u l .
Our superiority i n effectives a n d fire-power has
increased, but i t i s not y e ta n absolute superiority.
Therefore, w e have t o strike surely a n d advance
cautiously.

315
 In w h a t respects i s t h e enemy still strong !

H e i s s t i l l s t r o n g b e c a u s e his effectives are still

nearly ten thousand strong. T h o u g h h i s m o r a l e h a s
flagged, and the difficulties h ehas m e t w i t h are incal-
culable, w e m u s t not underestimate h i m . I fw e under-
estimate the enemy w e shall b e defeated.
The enemy is still strong o n t h e three f o l l o w i n g
points :
F i r s t , h e c a n s t i l l parachute supplies. W e have
c o n t r o l l e d h i s airfields b u th a v e n o ty e t c o m p l e t e l y
cuts his supply line.
S e c o n d , h e c a n s t i l l parachute reinforcements. W e
have controlled his airfields but cannot yet completely
cut his reinforcement line.
T h i r d , his artillery has been still very active, his
air force will be even more active. O u r a r t i l l e r y a n d
anti-aircraft guns can curb the activities o fthe e n e m y
artillery and a i rforce only t osome extent.
In this situation, are y o u w i l l i n g t oovercome those
three strong points o fthe enemy ? I a mreported that
you a r eb u r n i n g w i t h the hatred for the e n e m y artil-
lery and aircrafts, and a r every angry w h e n seeing
that h e could still parachute supplies a n d troops.
T h u s a l l o fy o u w a n t t od e p r i v e t h e e n e m y o fh i s t h r e e
aforesaid assets.
W h a t shall w ed ot oattain that i m p o r t a n t goal ?
After completing the positions of attack and encir-
clement a n d r e a l i z i n g t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e a i m o f
|[radually depriving the enemy o fthe three aforesaid
assets, w h a t shall w e do ? N o w y o u shall pool y o u r

216
efforts to complete the b u i l d i n g of positions. Next
time, I shall tell y o u w h a t y o u m u s t do afterwards.
I a m reported that you have spent m a n y days on
end building positions between c o m b a t s a n d some of
you are wearied-
B u t if w e are w e a r i e d , w e m u s t r e m e m b e r t h a t the
enemy within the Dien Bien P h u fortified entrenched
c a m p is i n greater t e n s i o n a n d m o r e w e a r i e d t h a n w e
are, his w o u n d e d have n o shelters a n d n o medicine,
his fortifications have fallen i n or shaken, his supplies
are r u n n i n g short, and his casualties are increasing
under our shelling.
T h u s , s h a l l w e t a k e r e s t s so t h a t t h e e n e m y m a y
take rests too and reorganize his ranks, call for
reinforcements, receive the supplies dropped by his
air force, and b r i n g into full play his a r t i l l e r y and
air force, or shall w e , being m e m b e r s of a People's
A r m y a n d of the V i e t n a m W o r k e r s ' P a r t y , h i g h l i g h t
the courage of e n d u r i n g hardships, and overcome
difficulties, getting ourselves a bit m o r e wearied in
order to make the enemy ten times m o r e wearied and
cause h i m ten times m o r e difficulties? W h i c h shall
w e choose between these t w o roads ? I a m sure that
you unanimously answer that w e shall develop our
army's t r a d i t i o n of e n d u r i n g hardships, overcoming
difficulties, and fighting heroically in order conti-
nuously to build positions, and unremittingly to
fight t h e e n e m y .
T o s a y so d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t w e do n o t a t t a c h
i m p o r t a n c e to the h e a l t h conditions of o u r fighters.
O n the contrary, officers shall attach the greatest
importance to the health conditions of their m e n , and

217
soldiers shall take care of their o w n h e a l t h a n d to t h a t
of t h e i r comrades-in-anins- E s p e c i a l l y the c o o k s s h a l l
m a k e efforts. Shelters o n t h e f r o n t shall b e good,
they shall not b e u n t i d y . Rice and tea shall b e served
hot. The health service shall intensify the prophy-
lactic measures. Officers a t all levels shall control
this w o r k because i t i s the material basis for conti-
nuous fighting. This is a very important work.
I r e m i n d the officers a n d political c o m m i s s a r s a n d
i n s t r u c t o r s o n e m o r e t h i n g : t o w o r k o u t a v e r y detailed
plan f o r t h e b u i l d i n g o f p o s i t i o n s a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
forces i n order to spare t i m e and efforts o ftheir m e n .
Especially they shall g e t themselves close t o t h e
fighters to encourage them, and supervise the building
of p o s i t i o n s . R e c e n t l y , d u e t o y o u r s u p e r f i c i a l super-
vision, i n m a n y places they were built carelessly and
as a r e s u l t o u r c a s u a l t i e s h a v e i n c r e a s e d .
1 e m p h a s i z e o n c e m o r e t h a t t h e officers at all levels
shall in person supervise the building of positions.
This i s a duty. Officers a t any level w h o do not fulfil
it s h a l l b e s u b j e c t t o d i s c i p l i n a r y sanctions.
In s h o r t , the immediate central task at the present
time is to build positions of attack and encirclement
at a rapid rate and according to norms ; at the same
time we shall fight the enemy to wear him out and
fulfil our task of building positions.

T o b u i l d p o s i t i o n s i s firmly t o g r a s p t h e p r i n c i p l e
of " s t r i k i n g s u r e l y a n d a d v a n c i n g c a u t i o u s l y " . W e
s h a l l n o t fight, o r w e s h a l l fight v i c t o r i o u s l y . T o s a y
"striking surely and advancing cautiously" does not
mean that we shall not w o r k against time. W e must

218
a c t i v e l y viork against time, b e c a u s e i f w e c o m p l e t e
our positions one d a ysooner, w e w i l l increase diffi-
culties for the e n e m y one day sooner, and create m o r e
conditions f o r o u rcertain victory o n e d a y sooner.
To dig one more cubic metre of earth at this hour
means actively to work for the victory of the campaign.
As our present central task is t o build positions,
the General Political D e p a r t m e n t decided that t h e
first c r i t e r i o n t o w i n Uncle's " D e t e r m i n e d t o F i g h t
and t oW i n " banner is the building o f positions.
The building of positions is a combat task n o l e s s
glorious t h a n t h eattack u p o n t h ee n e m y t o d e s t r o y
him.
Have you understood clearly what I have said ?
I a m certain that you have.
If t h e r e are s o m e w h o d o n o t yet u n d e r s t a n d c l e a r l y ,
the officers shall give t h e m f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d
their comrades shall help them-
Only b y clearly understanding our tasks c a n w e
develop a l l our forces, and once w e c a ndevelop our
forces, w e shall c e r t a i n l y fulfil o u r tasks.
Our troops are strong enough t ohaul our artillery
over tens of kilometres along hilly roads, hack the
jungle t o build tens of kilometres o f road, establish
over one hundred kilometres o f positions and destroy
the enemy most fortified strongholds. I t is certain
t h a t o u r f o r c e s s h a l l fulfil the task of building the
offensive positions and encircling the enemy, thus
creating conditions t o w i n complete victory f o r t h e
campaign.

219
 You a l lhave your share of responsibility i n this
important task.
I shake hands with y o ua n dwish that you shall
make further efforts.
W i t h affection and determination to win

March 20. 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S A R M Y
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

220
 CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

• T O T H E UNITS O F T H E REGULAR FORCES,

LOCAL FORCES, MILITIAMEN A N D GUERILLAS
W H O W O NV I C T O R I E S O N R O A D 5

The H i g h C o m m a n d sends w a r m congratulations

to y o u w h o , after h a v i n g successfully attacked m a n y
enemy trains last J a n u a r y a n d February, launched a
powerful offensive i n M a r c h o n t h e e n e m y system of
d e f e n c e w o r k s o n R o a d JSfe 5 , r a z i n g m a n y enemy
positions a n d watchtowers, destroying m a n y enemy
reinforcements, especially t h e destruction of several
bridges a n d sections o f r a i l w a y s , thus f o r m a n y times
cutting off t h e enemy m o s t i m p o r t a n t strategic road
on the B a c B o front.
I n your victorious attack u p o n R o a d ^ 2 5, a n e n e m y
vital c o m m u n i c a t i o n line, y o u destroyed a n i m p o r t a n t
part o f t h e e n e m y effectives, attracted h i s m o b i l e
troops, especially interrupted t h e transport of A m e -
rican munitions from Haiphong t o H a n o i a n d to
various fronts. Y o u r action is a close co-ordination
with that of o u r a r m y o n Dien Bien P h u a n d other
fronts.

221
 Together w i t h t h esuccessful attacks o n G i a - L a m
a n d C a t B i a i r f i e l d s , y o u r v i c t o r i e s o n R o a d JYs 5 h a v e
highlighted t h e indomitable spirit o f o u ra r m y a n d
people i nthe enemy's rear, a t the s a m e t i m e brouglit
out the failure o f the enemy i nhis scheme o f "pacify-
ing'' h i s rear i n t h eR e d River delta. Despite t h e
unevenness i n size, tactics a n dtechnique, y o u r com-
bativeness is n o less v a l i a n t t h a n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t o fight a n d t o w i n o f o u r o f f i c e r s a n d m e n o n t h e D i e n
Bien P h u front.
You should d o your utmost t o consolidate a n d
develop your victories, speed u p guerilla w a r f a r e ,
actively help t h e people fight t h eenemy, prevent
yourselves from subjectivism a n dunderestimation o f
the enemy, a n d continue t o co-ordinate closely w i t h
our army's encirclement of Dien Bien Phu.
I wish you further victories.
W i t h affection a n dd e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w i n .

March 23, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP

222
 LETTER

TO OFFICERS A N D M E N BEFORE T H E W A V E
OF ATTACK ON T H E EAST SECTOR
OF T H E DIEN BIEN P H U FORTIFIED
ENTRENCHED CAMP

Comrades,
1. L a s t d a y I w r o t e t o y o u a b o u t t h e b u i l d i n g o f
positions for attack and encirclement, and promised
t o y o u t h a t w h e n the w o r k is n e a r i n g c o m p l e t i o n , I
would tell y o u w h a t to do next to w i n a n e w victory
for the c a m p a i g n .
Today our positions are on the m a i n ready. T h a t
is a h u g e w o r k i n d e e d . I t h a s e n a b l e d us t o t i g h t e n
our encirclement and limit the enemy's reinforce-
ments and supply. M o r e o v e r , they have brought the
central sector of the e n e m y under the r a n g e of our
mortars, and covered the m o v e m e n t of our troops i n
their assault against h i m . T h e y have almost annulled
t h e effect o f t h e e n e m y ' s a i r r a i d s . T h e y w i l l h e l p us
score n e w successes.
 2- T o d a y I i n f o r m y o u a b o u t a m o s t i m p o r t a n t
news ; our H i g h C o m m a n d has decided to launch a
big attack on the e n e m y at D i e n B i e n P h u .
This operation has three aims :
F i r s t , t o w i p e o u t as m a n y e n e m y effectives as
possible i n several successive engagements. T o this
end w e m u s t n o t o n l y strike at m a n y places at a t i m e
but also rush m o s t v a l i a n t units deep into the enemy's
p o s i t i o n s t o s o w c o n f u s i o n a n d w i p e o u t as m a n y
e n e m y effectives as possible a l o n g w i t h a c e r t a i n
n u m b e r of his C P .
Second, to destroy a n d occupy p a r t of the a r t i l l e r y
positions of t h e e n e m y t o d e p r i v e h i m of t h i s s u p p o r t ,
then use it to shell h i m .
T h i r d , t o occupy such places as a d v a n t a g e o u s to
us, h o l d a n d use t h e m e v e n t u a l l y t o t h r e a t e n t h e
r e m a i n i n g enemies most efficiently.
I believe y o u are eager to take part i n so i m p o r t a n t
a fighting.
Does this attack m e a n a general assault ? N o t yet,
because the e n e m y still has a great force. H o w e v e r ,
this o p e r a t i o n w i l l e x e r t a decisive effect i n c r e a t i n g
favourable conditions for a general assault.
3. W h y h a s o u r H i g h C o m m a n d d e c i d e d t o s t a r t s o
important an onslaught?
Because it reckoned that our troops had four
conditions to w i n :
a) T h i s t i m e w e h a v e a b s o l u t e s u p e r i o r i t y i n effec-
t i v e s as w e l l as i n fire-power, especially as o u r
m o r t a r s of all sizes can directly and i m m e d i a t e l y shell
the central sector of the e n e m y .
 b) W e have f a i r l y solid p o s i t i o n s of a t t a c k a n d
encirclement; therefore in this lighting our a r m y
keeps on f o l l o w i n g the principle to "strike surely and
advance cautiously".
c) O u r a r m y w h i c h h a s s c o r e d s u c c e s s e s i n r e c e n t
f i g h t i n g s a n d n o w i n field w o r k , is m o r e e x p e r i e n c e d
in dealing w i t h a fortified entrenched camp t h a n
before, confident in the certain victory and determined
to w i n it.
d) T h e m o r a l e of the besieged e n e m y is s i n k i n g
d a i l y as t h e n u m b e r of w o u n d e d i n c r e a s e s a n d t h e
supply becomes difficult; after hoping i n v a i n that
his planes could b o m b a r d our artillery positions and
strafe our troops he is n o w i n a state of a n x i e t y a n d
confusion.
Those arc the conditions for us to defeat the e n e m y .
4. I T o w e \ c r , u n d e r t a k i n g a b i g o f f e n s i v e w e a r e
bound to encounter difficulties.
a) T h e first o n e is t h a t s o m e of y o u , h a v i n g n o t
clearly realized the situation of the e n e m y and ours,
become subjective, underestimate the enemy, and pay
undue attention to organizing the fighting, w h i c h can
lead to failure. O t h e r s , h a v i n g n o t yet grasped the
importance of the c o m i n g assault, do n o t m a k e all-out
efforts a n d pay s m a l l heed t o their task.
By overcoming those erroneous views you can w i n
certainly.
b) T h e s e c o n d d i f f i c u l t y is t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e
fighting. W h e n striking a position y o u m u s t prepare
for rapidly m a k i n g a breach, k e e p i n g clear of y o u r
former mistakes. W h e n pushing a thrust you must
have well equipped and tidy troops w i t h sufficient

15 DBF 225
explosive, s m a l l w e a p o n s a n d s h o c k force- B e s i d e s ,
t h e r e are o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e
fighting concerning the operations in day-time, the
m e a n s of p r e v e n t i n g block, the w a y to e n s u r e good
transmissions, etc. T h o s e arc concrete difficulties
w h i c h officers and m e n have to o v e r c o m e to w i n
victory.

5. I n b r i e f , t h e c o m i n g a t t a c k is f a r g r e a t e r t h a n
t h e p r e v i o u s o n e s . W h a t is t o be d o n e t o s e c u r e
success ?

Answer:
T h e o n l y r e q u i r e m e n t is t h a t a l l officers a n d m e n
m u s t be i m b u e d w i t h t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e H i g h
Command, behave resolutely and valiantly, strike
r a p i d l y , s e t t l e r a p i d l y , a t t a c k fiercely a n d n o t l e t s l i p
any opportunity to w i p e out the enemy. Should one
fall, another w i l l take his place, officers and P a r t y
m e m b e r s m u s t set g o o d e x a m p l e s t o t h e e n t i r e a r m y ,
each m a n m u s t set a g o o d e x a m p l e w h e n a s s a u l t i n g
the enemy, everyone m u s t s h o w a s t r o n g mettle, not
be a f r a i d of d i f f i c u l t i e s o r c a s u a l t i e s , s t r i k e t e r r o r
into the e n e m y ' s heart at the sight of o u r troops. A l l
of y o u m u s t h a v e s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d e m u l a t e
to raise a l o f t P r e s i d e n t Ho Chi Minh's banner
" D e t e r m i n e d t o fight a n d t o v . i u " .

Comrades,
Once this attack w o n , w e shall inflict most heavy
losses upon the enemy, creating the required condi-
tions to w i p e o u t the w h o l e e n e m y force at D i e n B i e n
Phu.

226
 Once this attacii w o n , o u ra r m y will make a step
forward from destroying a n enemy battalion i n a
siege battle t o p u t t i n g out o f action several battalions
in a battle.
T h i s i s a g r e a t t r i a l f o rb o t h officers a n d men.
Our entire army o n a l l fronts, o u r compatriots
throughout t h ecountry are longing f o rt h e news of
this victory.
O u r P a r t y Central Committee a n dPresident H o Chi
Minh a r ew a i t i n g f o rt h e n e w s of this victory-
All m e n ,a l l u n i t s , a l l arms must enhance their
determination, a n d fulfil a t a n y cost this glorious
coming task.

I w i s h y o um a n y shining deeds !
Shaking hands with y o uw a r m l y before y o u g o t o
the battle.
With affection a n dd e t e r m i n a t i o n t o win,

March 29, 1954

T H E C O M M A N D E R - I N - C H I E F
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S AR.MY

General V O N G U Y E N GIAP

227
 LETTER

CALLING ON T H E DIEN BIEN P H U FIGHTERS

TO P U S H A H E A D T H E E M U L A T I O N DRIVE
TO SNIPE T H E E N E M Y

Rifle-shooters,
Machine-gunners,
Mortar-gunners,
Artillerymen,
A f t e r o u r g r e a t v i c t o r i e s at D i e n B i e n P h u , o u r
p o s i t i o n s of e n c i r c l e m e n t h a v e reached t h e e n e m y ' s
central sector.
T h i s sector is n o w w i t h i n t h e r a n g e of a l l o u r pieces
of a r t i l l e r y .
T o w e a r o u t , e x h a u s t a n d k i l l t h e e n e m y as m u c h
as p o s s i b l e ,
T o keep h i m i n constant fear a n d strain, spoil his
appetite and trouble his sleep and subject h i m to a n
imminent death.
T o create conditions for our troops to w i n greater
successes, e v e n t u a l l y to w i p e out the w h o l e e n e m y
force at D i e n B i e n P h u ,

228
 1 call o n ,
All rifle-shooters,
. Machine-gunners,
Mortar-gunners,
Artillerymen,
Highly t o promote their ardour to kill t h e enemy,
actively to emulate i n sniping h i m at D i e n Bien P h u .
To kill one enemy w i t h o n e bullet,
To display patience allied t o zeal, accurately l o
aim at t h e enemy, a n d t o h i tt h e m a r k f o r every shot.
W h o w i l l be t h e best rifle-shot o n t h e D i e n B i e n
Phu front ?
W h o w i l l l)c t h e best m a c h i n e - g u n n e r , t h e best
m.ortar-gunncr, t h e best a r t i l l e r y m a n o n t h e D i e n
Bien P h u front ?
The H i g h C o m m a n d is w a i t i n g f o r y o u r exploits
to c o n g r a t u l a t e a n d r e w a r d y o u a n d y o u r u n i t s .
W i t h aflection a n d determination t o w i n .

April 22, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY

General V O NGUYEN GIAP

 LETTER
TO A L L DAN CONG ROAD-MENDERS

Our historic campaign h a s scored great victory.

The enemy is facing countless difficulties, but h e still
offers a stiff resistance.
His scheme is actively t o destroy our communica-
tion lines w i t h a v i e w t o causing u s difficulties o f
supply, especially i n t h ecoming rainy season-
Therefore your task is most heavy a n d important.
It requires a v a l i a n t sacrificing spirit, a p e r s e v e r i n g
abnegation like the fighters' ardour t okill the enemy
at the f r o n t .
I hope that you will strive t oemulate i n ensuring
safe roads, thus providing sufficient food, w e a p o n s
and a m m u n i t i o n for our troops t okill the enemy and
contributing t o t h e great victory o f this historic
campaign.
W i t h affection a n d determination t o w i n .

April 1954
T H E CO.M.MANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General V O NGUYEN GIAP

m
 L E T T E R

T O T H E W O U N D E D A N D T H E S I C K

O N T H E D I E N B I E N P H U B A T T L E F R O N T

I am glad tc i n f o r m y o u t h a t o n M a y 7, o u r heroic
people's army destroyed the whole enemy force at
D i e n B i e n P h u , i n c l u d i n g 21 b a t t a l i o n s of crack troops
totalling 16,200 officers and men, thus liberating the
entire North-West.
With the complete victory at Dien Bien Phu, we
have materialized the determination of the Party
Central Committee, the Government and President
Ho Chi Minh, and created favourable conditions for
our army and people to w i n greater victories. By
wiping out the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, we have
backed in a realistic and efficient w a y , the peasants'
struggle for land and the diplomatic struggle of our
Government delegation at the G e n e v a Conference.
This glorious victory is due to the clearsighted
leadership of the Party Central Committee, the
Government and President H o Chi Minh, to our
people's support to the front, a n d for a n i m p o r t a n t
part to the spirit of v a l i a n t fighting and the endurance
of h a r d s h i p s o f o u r p e o p l e ' s a r m y . T h r o u g h o u t t h e
c a m p a i g n , y o u h a v e set m a n y e x a m p l e s o f a r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y people's a r m y , s h o w n yourselves m o s t w o r t h y
of b e i n g t h e best s o n s i n defence o f t h e F a t h e r l a n d ,
the fighters of w o r l d peace and democracy.
Uncle Ho sends you his greetings and con-
gratulations.

Comrades,

The F r a n c o - A m e r i c a n imperialists heavily defeated

were forced to discuss about a peaceful settlement for
the I n d o - C h i n a issue at the G e n e v a Conference, but
they most perfidiously schemed to sabotage the Con-
ference and continue e x t e n d i n g their aggressive w a r
against our country- W e must enhance our vigilance
to the utmost, constantly bearing in m i n d Uncle's
t e a c h i n g : " T h i s v i c t o r y is b i g , b u t i t is o n l y t h e
beginning... A struggle, whether military or diploma-
tic, m u s t be l o n g a n d h a r d , before c o m p l e t e v i c t o r y
c a n be a c h i e v e d " . W e m u s t be r e a d y t o foil t h e e n e m y ' s
new plots and deal h i m heavier blows.

Comrades,

W h i l e our a r m y celebrates its v i c t o r y and enthusias-

tically prepares itself to promote it, y o u have to stay
in hospital for treatment. Y o u rejoice at the v i c t o r y
and at y o u r o w n feats, but y o u cannot r e s t r a i n y o u r
impatience for a prompt recovery to return to your
units a n dcarry o n y o u r assignments. T h i s spirit is
worthy o fmerit. I hope you will show patience in your
treatment and wish you prompt recovery t ocarry o n
the f i g h t i n g a n d score n e w feats.
W i t h affection and determination t o w i n .

May 11, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF T H E V I E T N A M PEOPLE'S ARMY
General V O N G U Y E N GIAP

233
 LETTER

TO T H E COMPATRIOTS IN T H E NORTH-WEST

The Dien Bien P h u campaign has ended in a great

victory. The valiant V i e t n a m People's A r m y has put
out of action over 16,000 enemies, the North-West
has been completely liberated-

O n behalf of all officers a n d m e n of the V i e t n a m

People's Army I convey my congratulations to the
entire N o r t h - W e s t people and m y t h a n k s to all of y o u
w h o have done your utmost in supplying food to our
t r o o p s , s e r v i n g a s dan cong, s e n d i n g l e t t e r s a n d gifts
to our army and l o o k i n g after our wounded and
patients.

I w i s h all of y o u good health and good courage to

put into practice our President Ho Chi Minh's
t e a c h i n g : let a l l n a t i o n a l i t i e s u n i t e w i t h o n e another
a n d help m u t u a l l y as b r o t h e r s of a f a m i l y , maintain
order and strive to increase production for every one
to enjoy security and welfare, v o l u n t a r i l y enlist i n the

2:v>
a r m y and guerilla organization to liquidate the
pirates and traitors, protect their villages and oppose
the enemy's new schemes.
I w i s h the entire North-West people many new
successes.

May 15, 1954

THE .MINISTER OF N.ATIONAL D E F E N C E
.\ND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
O F T H E V I E T N A M P E O P L E ' S AR.fWY
General VO NGUYEN GIAP
 COMAIUNIQUE
OF T H E VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY HIGH
C O M M A N D

T h e great c a m p a i g n launched by our a r m y at D i c n

B i e n P h u o f f i c i a l l y b e g a n o n M a r c h 13, 1 9 5 4 w i t h
the first assault o n the outposts of the entrenched
camp. The enemy's ellectives then included 12
battalions of i n f a n t r y and paratroops, three b a t t a l i o n s
of a r t i l l e r y a n d h e a v y m o r t a r s . O u r s u c c e s s i v e a n d
victorious attacks have compelled the e n e m y to send
as r e i n f o r c e m e n t s five b a t t a l i o n s o f c r a c k p a r a t r o o p s
along with other specialized units, which has brouglit
h i s e f f e c t i v e s t o 2 1 b a t t a l i o n s a n d 10 c o m p a n i e s . T h e
e n e m y has built a vast fortified entrenched camp,
m o r e solid t h a n that at N a S a n , c o m p r i s i n g m a n y
clusters of s m a l l posts, i n all 49 posts o n a n area
1 2 k m s long by 6 k m s wide with t w o big airfields
for h e a v y planes.
 F r o m M a r c h 13, 1954 w l i e n o u r a t t a c k b e g a n u n t i l
M a y 6 when our final assault was launched, our
ciTensive against D i e n B i e n P h u w a s undertaken
u n r e m i t t i n g l y a n d fiercely d u r i n g 5 5 d a y s ^ a n d n i g h t s .
O n M a y 7, a t 10 p . m . o u r a r m y d e s t r o y e d t h e e n t i r e
e n e m y force at D i e n B i e n P h u . T h e h i s t o r i c c a m p a i g n
of D i e n B i e n P h u has scored complete v i c t o r y .
7\ccording to p r e l i m i n a r y estimates, our a r m y has
p u t o u t of a c t i o n 17 b a t t a l i o n s o f i n f a n t r y a n d p a r a -
troops, three b a t t a l i o n s of a r t i l l e r y a n d h e a v y m o r t a r s ,
a n d a n n i h i l a t e d a i l tlic u n i t s of m o t o r i z e d vehicles,
air force, s a p p e r s a n d t r a n s p o r t , etc. T h e list of e n e m y
casualties included over 2 1 b a t t a l i o n s of i n f a n t r y a n d
p a r a t r o o p s , 10 p u p p e t c o m p a n i e s , i n a l l 1 6 , 2 0 0 m e n
completely put out of action.
a) B e l o w are the names of the enemy units
destroyed :
1. A i r b o r n e brigade JNe 2 comprising seven
battalions :
— B a t t a l i o n o f c o l o n i a l p a r a t r o o p e r s Nb 1 , b a t t a l i o n
o f l e g i o n p a r a t r o o p e r s N° 1 , b a t t a l i o n o f c o l o n i a l p a r a -
t r o o p e r s No 2 , b a t t a l i o n o f l e g i o n p a r a t r o o p e r s N° 2 ,
battalion of colonial paratroopers 6, b a t t a l i o n of
c o l o n i a l p a r a t r o o p e r s N" 8 , b a t t a l i o n o f p u p p e t p a r a -
t r o o p e r s N° 5 .
2. M o b i l e brigade NQ 9 comprising six infantry
battalions :
— B a t t a l i o n N° 1 o f t h e s e m i - b r i g a d e o f l e g i o n a r i e s
M l 1 2 , b a t t a l i o n NQ 3 o f t h e s e m i - b r i g a d e o f l e g i o n a r i e s
JMb 1 3 , b a t t a l i o n N° 1 o f t h e r e g i m e n t o f l e g i o n a r i e s
j \ 2 , b a t t a l i o n No 3 o f t h e r e g i m e n t o f N o r t h A f r i c a n s
( A l g e r i a n s ) JVb 3 , b a t t a l i o n JNe 1 o f t h e r e g i m e n t o f
N o r t h A f r i c a n s ( M o r o c c a n s ) N° 4, b a t t a l i o n of p u p p e t
T h a i s No 2 .
3- M o b i l e brigade 6 comprising four infantry
battalions :
— B a t t a l i o n K° 3 of the r e g i m e n t of l e g i o n a r i e s
Ni 3 , b a t t a l i o n N ° 2 c f t h e r e g i m e n t o f N o r t h A f r i c a n s
( A l g e r i a n s ) N° 1 , b a t t a l i o n J\'2 5 o f t h e r e g i m e n t o f
N o r t h A f r i c a n s ( A l g e r i a n s ) jNb 7 , b a t t a l i o n o f p u p p e t
T h a i s J\ 3 .
4. T w o b a t t a l i o n s a n d a company of 155mm. and
105 m m . guns and one b a t t a l i o n of 120 m m . heavy
m o r t a r s t o t a l l i n g 48 pieces b e l o n g i n g to the regiment
o f c o l o n i a l a r t i l l e r y NQ 4 .
5. T w o sections of anti-aircraft defence with
12.7 m m . b a t t e r i e s .
6- O n e b a t t a l i o n o f e n g i n e e r s , o n e c o m p a n y o f m o t o r -
ized u n i t s w i t h ten 18-ton t a n k s , one t r a n s p o r t c o m -
p a n y w i t h 120 v e h i c l e s .
7. T h e D i c n B i e n P h u a i r b a s e i n c l u d i n g a p e r m a -
n e n t a i r f o r c e f o r m a l i o n o f five r e c o n n a i s s a n c e planes,
seven fighter planes, four transport planes and one
helicopter, and a body i n charge of the air force.
8. T h e staff a n d bodies a t t a c h e d t o it i n c h a r g e of
information, liaison, logistics, medical service, mili-
t a r y police, r e p a i r of vehicles, etc.
9. 10 c o m p a n i e s of p u p p e t T h a i ( f o r r e p l e n i s h m e n t ) .
Moreover there were infantry units belonging to
mobile brigades in the Red River delta mustered by
the e n e m y a n d d r o p p e d o n D i e n B i e n P h u to. r e p l e n i s h
the decimated units. T h e y w e r e called "volunteer para-
troops for reinforcement" of Dien Bien P h u .
b) T h e list of enemies killed or taken prisoner
included :
— T h e w h o l e high c o m m a n d of the e n e m y at Dien
Bien Phu.
— T h e w h o l e staffs of the subsectors S o u t h , N o r t h
and Central.
— T h e staffs of the three m o b i l e brigades a n d a l l
the c o m m a n d s of b a t t a l i o n s of i n f a n t r y a n d other
arms.
T h e h i g h officers k n o w n so far c o m p r i s e d :
— Brigadier General De Castries, commander of
the N o r t h - W e s t m i l i t a r y zorje and c o m m a n d e r of D i e n
Bien P h u , captured alive.
— 16 c o l o n e l s k i l l e d o r t a k e n p r i s o n e r a m o n g t h e m :
C o l o n e l T r a n c a r t , first assistant commander in
charge of the N o r t h - W e s t affairs,
Colonel Gaucher, second assistant commander,
o f m o b i l e b r i g a d e No 9 ,
Colonel Langlais, third assistant commander and
c o m m a n d e r of mobile brigade of paratroops
2,
Colonel Piroth, fourth assistant commander and
commander of the artillery.
Colonel Allieu, c o m m a n d e r of the S o u t h subsector
a n d c o m m a n d e r o f m o b i l e b r i g a d e N« 6 ,
C o l o n e l G u t h , chief of staff-at D i e n B i e n P h u ,
Colonel Ducruix replacing Guth (killed),
 Colonel Guerin, commander of the air force at
Dien Bien Phu,
Colonel Vaillant, commander of the artillery
replacing Allieu,
Colonel Lemeunier, assistant commander of the
central subsector,
C o l o n e l S e g u i n Parzies, chief of staff replacing
D u c r u i x , etc.
T h e officers killed or captured from second lieute-
nant up to m a j o r totalled 353, w h i l e the n o n - c o m m i s -
sioned officers killed or captured numbered 1,396, i n
all 1,749.
T h e r e w e r e 57 planes shot d o w n and destroyed at
the front and 5 others brought d o w n on the w a y to
' the front, i n all 62, inclilding h e a v y bombers B . 24,
b o m b e r s B . 26, t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s C . 119 a n d fighters
Handiver, all of them supplied by the U.S. to France.
Our a r m y captured all the weapons and munitions,
equipment and material in the D i e n Bien P h u fortified
entrenched camp (statistics are not yet available but
the n u m b e r of parachutes alone exceeds 30,000).
If the D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n has ended i n so
great a v i c t o r y , it is t h a n k s to the clearsighted leader-
ship of President H o C h i M i n h , the P a r t y C e n t r a l
Committee and the G o v e r n m e n t , to the u n y i e l d i n g
a n d v a l i a n t fighting s p i r i t , t h e e n d u r a n c e t o h a r d s h i p s
and the e x t r a o r d i n a r y m a t u r i t y of a l l officers and m e n
on the D i e n B i e n P h u battlefront, to the devotion of
t h e p e o p l e i n t h e r e a r a n d t h e dan cong i n s e r v i n g

240
the f r o n t , and to the m o s t effective co-ordination
between the a r m y and the people on all the battle-
fronts t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y . D i e n B i e n P h u is a
very great victory, unprecedented i n the annals of
the s t r u g g l e of t h e V i e t n a m P e o p l e ' s A r m y .

May 8, 1954
(Excerpt from the Communique of tlic H i g l i Command)

IG DBl'
 O R D E R OF THE DAY

O N T H E O C C A S I O N
O F T H E D I E N B I E N P H U V I C T O R Y

(Read at the review on May 13,1954

in liberated Dicn Bien Plni)

Officers and men of the infantry, artillery, anti-

aircraft defence and engineers victorious on the Dien
Bien Phu front,

Officers a n d m e n of the r e g u l a r army, local troops,

people's militiamen and guerillas on the battlefields
throughout the country,
Today, in liberated Dien Bien Phu, I solemnly
congratulate all officers and men on the battlefields
throughout the country.
By order of the G o v e r n m e n t and President H o Chi
Minh, I solemnly mention in dispatches among the
Vietnam People's A r m y the great exploit of the
officers a n d m e n of the i n f a n t r y , a r t i l l e r y , a n t i - a i r c r a f t
defence and engineers w h o have won this brilliant
victory of D i e n B i e n Phu.

2^,2
 I respectfully b o w before the m e m o r y of the heroes
w h o have sacrificed their lives for t h i s h i s t o r i c v i c t o r y
of D i e n B i e n P h u .
D i e n B i e n P h u is a v e r y great victory, unpreced-
ented i n the annals of the struggle of o u r a r m y . W e
have destroyed over 16,000 picked t r o o p s of t h e e n e m y
in his strongest fortified entrenched camp. W e have
liberated the w h o l e N o r t h - W e s t , extended a n d con-
solidated the vast rear of the resistance, a n d contri-
buted to ensure the success of the l a n d reform.
Together with the regular army, the local troops,
the people's m i l i t i a m e n a n d the guerillas t h r o u g h o u t
the country, together with the Pathet L a o L i b e r a t i o n
troops... w e have foiled the N a v a r r e plan, dealt a m o s t
heavy b l o w at the scheme of extending the w a r
by the bellicose F r e n c h colonialists and A m e r i c a n
interventionists-
With the Dien Bien P h u campaign our a r m y has
m a d e a leap f o r w a r d , f r o m small-scale p o s i t i o n a l
warfare destroying an enemy battalion to large-scale
positional warfare w i p i n g out over 21 enemy batta-
lions. This m a t u r i t y constitutes a solid base for our
a r m y to put o u t of action m o r e e n e m y effectives a n d
bring the resistance to m o r e brilliant victories.
O u r a r m y has w o n a g l o r i o u s victory at D i e n B i e n
Phu thanks to the clearsighted leadership of the
Party Central Committee, the Government and
President H o C h i Minh.
Our a r m y has w o n a glorious victory at D i e n B i e n
Phu thanks to the valiant and tenacious fighting
s p i r i t , t o t h e e n d u r a n c e of- h a r d s h i p a n d o v e r c o m i n g

2/. ,3
of difficulties o f all officers and men at Dien Bien
Phu. This spirit must be further consolidated a n d
strengthened.
Our a r m y has w o n a glorious victory a t Dien Bien
P h u t h a n k s t o t h e d e v o t i o n o f t h e dan cong in serving
the front, the compatriots i nthe North-West and i n
the rear. O n behalf o fthe a r m y I express m y gratitude
t o t h e dan cong and compatriots as a whole.
Our a r m y has w o n a glorious victory a t Dien Bien
Phu thanks t oa most effective co-ordination between
the regular army, t h e local troops, t h e people's
militiamen a n d tlie guerilla, o n t h e battlefields
throughout t h ecountry. I n tlic R e dRiver delta,
guerilla w a r f a r e has developed most powerfully, our
army has many a time cut off r o a d N e5 , c o n d u c t e d
s u c c e s s f u l r a i d s o nG i a L a m and Cat B i airfields. I n
Binh T r i T h i e n w ehave been very active.
In the Fifth Zone, w e have liberated K o n t u m , stroke
deep i nt h e enemy's rear, shattering his scheme of
attacking our free zones- I n N a m B o guerilla warfare
developed powerfully and scored many successes. I
warmly congratulate all officers and men o n various
battlefields t h r o u g h o u t the country.
Our a r m y has recorded a glorious victory a t Dien
Bien Phu tiianks t o t h eclose co-ordination of t h e
Pathet L a oLiberation troops... O n behalf of t h e
Vietnam People's A r m y I wholeheartedly hail t h e
spirit of solidarity i n struggle of t h ePathet L a o
Liberation troops.
 Today, celebrating this victory, on behalf of the
V i e t n a m People's A r m y H i g h C o m m a n d , I order all
officers a n d m e n o n the D i e n B i e n P h u b a t t l e f r o n t
and all various battlefields t h r o u g h o u t the country :
1. T o r e a l i z e t h e g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e D i e n B i e n
P h u victory, at the s a m e t i m e to g r a s p the perfidious
scheme of the bellicose F r e n c h and A m e r i c a n inter-
v e n t i o n i s t s , a b s o l u t e l y t o a v o i d s u b j e c t i v i s m , self-
complacency and underestimation of the enemy, to
be v i g i l a n t a n d r e a d y t o s m a s h e v e r y s c h e m e o f t h e
enemy.
2. T o s t r i v e a n d s t u d y t l i c v a l u a b l e e x p e r i e n c e s o f
the historic D i e n B i e n P h u victory, to develop to the
utmost the fighting spirit full of d y n a m i s m , valiance,
tenaciousness of the " D i e n B i e n P h u lighter" i n order
to raise the combativeness of our a r m y and m a k e it
invincible.
3. T o a c t i v e l y f i g h t t o c o n s o l i d a t e a n d d e v e l o p t h e
victory of the D i e n B i e n P h u campaign, to consolidate
and develop the achievements of the W i n t e r - S p r i n g
victories, to w i n more brilliant victories.
I solemnly hand to all the victorious units the
banner "Determined to fight and to w i n " that
P r e s i d e n t llo C h i M i n h a w a r d s ( h e o f f i c e r s a n d m e n
at the D i c n B i e n P h u battlefront.
Under the banner "Determined to fight and to w i n "
of P r e s i d e n t H o C h i M i n h ,
For the sake of the independence of the Fatherland,
F o r t h e l a n d t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e t i l l e r s .
F o r the sake of peace in A s i a and the w o r l d .

245
 Let a l l officers a n d m e n courageously march
forward !
W i t h affection and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t ow i n ,

Dic'.i B i e n Phu battlefront

May 13, 1954

FOR THE HIGH COAtMAND

OF THE \-lETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY

General VO NGUYEN GIAP

246
 ANSWER

TO A NI N T E R V I E W O FT H E W E E K L Y
REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
ON T H EO C C A S I O N O F T H E ANNIVERSARY
OF T H E DIEN BIEN P H UV I C T O R Y ( M a y 1963)

Q U E S T I O N ~ Could you, please. General, make

known, what are the decisive factors of the Dien Bien
Phu victory.

ANSWER — T h e D i e n B i e n P h u b a t t l e i s t h e
greatest victory o f o u rpeople a n da r m y d u r i n g t h e
war o fliberation against t h eFrench imperialists a n d
the A m e r i c a n interventionists.
A m o n g t h e decisive factors o f this historic victory
one m u s t speak n a t u r a l l y o f t h e factors b e l o n g i n g t o
m i l i t a r y strategy a n d tactics.
Here I w o u l d like t ostress that t h e most important,
the m o s t decisive factor o ft h eh i s t o r i c D i e n B i e n P h u
victory is t h ei r o n will, t h e v e r y h i g h fighting spirit
of o u r people a n da r m y w h o , r e s p o n d i n g t ot h e a p p e a l

247
of t h e P a r t y a n d P r e s i d e n t H oC h i M i n h , w e r e r e s o l u t e
to m u s t e r a l l forces t o w i p e o u t a t a n y cost t h e
enemy's picked troops i nt h eD i e n B i e n P h u entrench-
ed c a m p .
D e l v i n g deeply into t h e matter w e c a n s a y that
the f u n d a m e n t a l factor o f t h e D i e n B i e n P h u v i c t o r y
is t h e s a m e w h i c h l e d o u r l o n g a n d a r d u o u s w a r o f
liberation t o final victory.
This factor is t h e correct political a n d m i l i t a r y line
of t h e V i e t n a m W o r k e r s ' P a r t y . T h e p a r t y h a s r a l l i e d
our entire people i n a broad n a t i o n a l united front,
built u p a n d educated t h e People's A r m y , correctly
and skilfully l e d t h e people's w a r against aggressive
imperialism, with thefundamental slogan ; "National
independence", "Land to t h e tillers", "Progress
t o w a r d s o c i a l i s m " . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t factor o fo u r
victory is thewholehearted sj^mpathy a n d support o f
the peace a n d f r e e d o m - l o v i n g people t h r o u g h o u t t h e
w o r l d , first o f a l l t h epeople o f t h e socialist countries,
•those o f France a n d t h e F r e n c h colonies.
This sympathy a n dsupport have greatly encourag-
ed u s .

Q U E S T I O N — Could you, please let us know the

role of the population of the rear in the preparation
and carrying out of the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

ANSWER — T h e m a r v e l l o u s r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e V i e t -
namese people against t h e F r e n c h colonialists a n d
American interventionists with the Dien Bien P h u
c a m p a i g n as i t s apex, h a s t a k e n t h e character o f a
just w a r , a people's w a r w a g e d b y t h e entire people
in all fields.

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 Throughout the nine years of resistance never did
the V i e t n a m e s e people c o n t r i b u t e so m u c h l a b o u r
a n d effort t o serve t h e f r o n t as i n w i n t e r 1 9 5 3 - s p r i n g
1954, t h a t is i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n a n d c a r r y i n g o u t o f
the Dien Bien P h u campaign.
A c t i n g up to the m o t t o " A l l for the front, a l l for
victory" and inspired by the achievements of land
reform, hundreds of thousands of people — peasants
for the o v e r w h e l m i n g p a r t — h a v e e n l i s t e d as dan
cong, f o o t i n g t h o u s a n d s o f k i l o m e t r e s , e n s u r i n g t h e
supply of food a n d m u n i t i o n s , m e n d i n g roads, l o o k i n g
after the w o u n d e d . . . o f their o w n free w i l l , the people
have sent tens of thousands of tons o l paddy and
thousands of tons of foodstuffs to the army, mobilized
vehicles, s a m p a n s a n d rafts t o serve the front. T h e
people i n the e n e m y ' s rear a n d e v e n those i n the
provisional occupied t o w n s have also eagerly con-
t r i b u t e d p a d d y t o t h e a r m y , as w e l l as e v e r y t h i n g
needed by the front.
I t is p r e c i s e l y t h e d e v o t i o n a n d b o u n d l e s s courage
of the p o p u l a t i o n i n the rear, r e s o l u t e to serve the
front, w h i c h have enabled us to solve a tricky p r o b l e m
considered by t h e e n e m y as i n s o l u b l e : t o s u p p l y the
Dien Bien P h u battlefront and the other to-ordinated
battlefields with foodstuffs and munitions, through
l o n g distances, o n a v e r y l a r g e scale, a n d u n d e r the
fierce and continuous strafings and bombings of
Franco-American aircraft. T h e contribution of the
population in the rear to the Dien Bien P h u victory
has i e e n v e r y great indeed-
 Q U E S T I O N — Could you, please, tell whether there
was an important American aid to the French Expedi-
tionary Corps during the Dien Bien Phu campaign ?

A N S W E R — S i n c e t i i e first y e a r s o f o u r p a t r i o t i c
resistance, t h e A m e r i c a n imperialists h a d closely
colluded with t h e French colonialists, supplied them
with weapons, munitions, planes, gunboats t o mas-
sacre t h eV i e t n a m e s e people.
After their rout from t h e Chinese mainland a n d
their s h a m e f u l defeat i n K o r e a , t h e A m e r i c a n impe-
rialists stepped u p their intervention i n V i e t n a m ,
taking advantage o f t h edifficulties facing t h e French
to kick t h e latter o u t o f I n d o - C h i n a . I n fact they
had taken t h e command of the w a r i n Indo-China
since 1953, w i t n e s s t h e N a v a r r e P l a n .
S i n c e 1951 A m e r i c a n a i d a n d w e a p o n s p o u r e d i n t o
Indo-China h a d increased w i t h every passing d a y .
From 119 million dollars i n 1951, i t rose t o8 0 0
m i l l i o n i n 1954.
A m e r i c a n weapons introduced i n Indo-China ave-
raged 6,000 tons m o n t h l y i n 1952, rose t o o v e r 20,000
tons i n 1953, a n d a t t i m e s t o n e a r l y 100,000 t o n s i n
1954, e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g t h e D i e n B i e n P h u c a m p a i g n .
E v e r since t h e d a y w h e n t h e F r e n c h colonialists
dropped paratroops o n Dien Bien P h u a n d began
building t h eD i e n B i e n P h u fortified entrenched c a m p
(11-1953) t h e A m e r i c a n imperialists h a d established
a number o f airlifts t o supply weapons a n d foodstuffs
to t h e French, then sent aircraft carriers o f t h e

250
Seventh Fleet t o B a c B o Gulf a n ddespatched A m e -
rican pilots directly t o m a n A m e r i c a n planes flying
French colours t omassacre the V i e t n a m e s e people.

The realities o f t h eaggressive w a r i n V i e t n a m a s

well as i n theDien Bien P h u campaign have shown
that f o rt h eFrench imperialists a n dcolonialists this
is a d i r t y w a r w a g e d b y t h e F r e n c h s o l d i e r s a n d a
contingent of other mercenaries with dollars a n d
weaponry ofthe American imperialists.

Q U E S T I O N — W h a t are the main conclusions to

be drawn from the results of the Dien Bien Phu battle?

ANSWER — F r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e V i e t n a m e s e
people's w a r f o r n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n i ng e n e r a l , espe-
cially o f t h eD i e n Bien P h u victory, I think w e c a n
draw t h efollowing conclusions :
a) D i e n B i e n P h u i s n o t o n l y a g r e a t v i c t o r y o f the
V i e t n a m e s e people but also a great v i c t o r y o f progres-
sive m a n k i n d , o f all s m a l l and w e a k nations fighting
against colonialism under every f o r m and for indepen-
dence and freedom, o f t h eforces o f socialism, demo-
cracy and peace the w o r l d over.
The Dien Bien P h u victory has proved that i n the
present w o r l d conjuncture a s m a l l a n dw e a k n a t i o n
w h i c h h a s a correct line, rises u p a s o n e m a n , i s
resolved t o fight f o r independence a n d democracy,
against imperialism a n dcolonialism under every
form, a n d enjoys t h e sympathy a n d support o f t h e
w o r l d p e o p l e , w i l l s u r e l y w i n final v i c t o r y .

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 b) I n their e m a n c i p a t i o n s t r u g g l e , i n face of the acts
of v i o l e n c e a n d w a r by the a g g r e s s i v e i m p e r i a l i s t s
and colonialists the oppressed nations have no other
way than a resolute political and m i l i t a r y struggle by
the people, a political and m i l i t a r y violence of the
entire people. T h e political and m i l i t a r y struggle of
the entire people, the people's w a r , the people's a r m y ,
the N a t i o n a l U n i t e d F r o n t of the entire people, such
is o u r w a y t o s u b s i s t e n c e a n d v i c t o r y -
c) W e a l l k n o w t h a t D i e n B i e n P h u has p a v e d t h e
w a y for the conclusion of the G e n e v a A g r e e m e n t s i n
1954 r e s t o r i n g peace i n I n d o - C h i n a a n d r e c o g n i z i n g
the sovereignty, independence, u n i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l
integrity of V i e t n a m and I w o other countries : Laos
and Cambodia.
Therefore w e can conclude that every negotiation
w i t h t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s m u s t be b a c k e d b y a n d g o a l o n g
w i t h a resolute struggle under every form against all
t h e i r p e r f i d i o u s s c h e m e s ; it is o n l y w h e n t h e people's
forces h a v e g r o w n i n the s t r u g g l e t h a t the i m p e r i a l i s t s
resign themselves to r e l i n q u i s h their privileges a n d
interests and recognize our legitimate rights.
W e can also conclude that by their heroic, l o n g and
hard resistance, by their great D i e n B i e n P h u victory,
the V i e t n a m e s e people have struggled not o n l y for
the independence of their fatherland but also for the
safeguard of peace in V i e t n a m and in South-East
A s i a , w h i c h is b e i n g s e r i o u s l y s a b o t a g e d b y the A m e -
rican imperialists in the South of our country and
in Laos.
d) F o r us, t h e V i e t n a m e s e people, w e c a n d r a w a n
i m p o r t a n t a n d specific c o n c l u s i o n : i f f o r m e r l y the

252
Vietnamese people have defeated t h e French a n d
American imperialists, particularly o n the Dien Bien
Phu battlefront, today in the just emancipation strug-
gle o f o u r c o m p a t r i o t s i n t h e S o u t h a g a i n s t t h e
extremely barbarous undeclared w a r o f the y\merican
imperialists a n d their stooges, t h e heroic S o u t h e r n
people w i l l surely w i n final v i c t o r y . T h e l i b e r a t i o n
of t h e S o u t h a n d t h e n a t i o n a l r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e
Vietnamese people w i l l surely w i n victory.
e) Through their schemes of intervention a n d
outright aggression, t h e American imperialists a l l
the m o r e u n s m a s k themselves as the cruel aggressors
of t h e V i e t n a m e s e p e o p l e , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l g e n d a r -
mes, the most ferocious and dangerous enemies o f the
w o r l d people a n dthe n a t i o n a l liberation m o v e m e n t .
W e a r e confident that, everywhere i n t h e w o r l d ,
in Asia, Africa a n d L a t i n America, t h e ,U.S.-led
imperialists, however perfidious a n d machiavellian
they m a y be i ntheir scheme o f enslaving the peoples,
w i l l surely fail s h a m e f u l l y i n the end. T h e emancipa-
tion struggle o fthe Asian-African and L a t i n A m e r i c a n
peoples w i l l s u r e l y score b r i l l i a n t victories.

Q U E S T I O N — We propose you. General, to convey

some words to the readers of R e v o l u t i o n A f r i c a i n e ,
a weelily which unreservedly support the national
liberation struggle of the African peoples.

ANSWER— I a m glad t o convey t othe readers o f

"Revolution Africaine", t o a l lour friends i n Africa,
our m o s t heartfelt greetings, our greetings o f f r a t e r n a l
union and unshakable resolution in our great struggle

253
against colonialism under every f o r m , for the indepen-
dence a n d f r e e d o m of t h e A f r i c a n p e o p l e s as w e l l as
of the A s i a n a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a n peoples, f o r g e n u i n e
peace i n the w o r l d , peace i n n a t i o n a l independence,
freedom and happiness.
The African peoples always regard our victories,
specially t h e D i e n B i e n P h u o n e as t h e i r o w n - I w o u l d
like to express here our heartfelt t h a n k s for y o u r
thorough support, formerly during our patriotic
resistance as t o d a y i n t h e peaceful s o c i a l i s t b u i l d i n g
in the N o r t h and the e m a n c i p a t i o n struggle of o u r
compatriots in the South.
W e w i s h y o u brilliant success in the struggle for a
free A f r i c a , free of a n y i m p e r i a l i s m and c o l o n i a l i s m
under every f o r m — o l d and new.
nted in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam