Herbert Spiegelberg and Moritz Geiger, An Introduction To Existential Philosophy

An Introduction to Existential Philosophy
Author(s): Herbert Spiegelberg and Moritz Geiger

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Mar., 1943, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Mar.,
1943), pp. 255-278
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2103176
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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
A Quarterly Journal
VOLUME III, No. 3 MARCH, 1943
AN INTRODUCTION TO EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
EDITOR'S PREFACE
The following text, the editing of which was entrusted to me by Mrs. Geiger, has
been compiled from forty-two handwritten pages of an English manuscript by Pro-
fessor Moritz Geiger. Most of it was found in a folder inscribed "Existential Phil-
osophy," which at the time of his untimely death in 1937 he carried with him on his
last trip to Maine. It was known to his friends that, during the last years of his life,
and particularly during his stay at Vassar College, his deepest concern was this
subject and that, next to the elaboration of an Aesthetics, which he left half com-
pleted, the plan of a book on existential philosophy was foremost in his mind.
The text which is herewith published had not yet reached a final shape. Al-
though there were some six groups of pages containing a connected and fairly co-
herent argument, their relation was not immediately apparent. Their combination
into one continuous text is therefore a reconstruction. There are, however, a num-
ber of almost conclusive indications as to the arrangement planned by the author.
Apart from the intrinsic order of the subject, a certain clue is given by the enumera-
tion of problems on page 259. The historical review seemed to find its most suitable
place at the end.
In addition to that, the arrangement could partly be derived from earlier German
drafts; this applies particularly to section IV (Value). For extensive preparations
had preceded the last English formulation. Among the preparatory materials there
are at least two complete versions of a German essay on "Ontologie und Existenz-
philosophie." The shorter one, entitled "Einleitung," was probably meant to in-
troduce a German book on "Existenzphilosophie." Most of it was found in the
folder mentioned above and its arrangement largely corresponds to that of the
English version published here.
In some instances there were even several English versions of the same passage; in
such cases only the more advanced one has been incorporated. Minor repetitions
could, in the interest of clearness, not always be avoided, Also, the reader will have
to put up with the fact that the meaning of certain technical terms, such as "existen-
tial," becomes fully clear only as the text goes on.
In the interest of smoothing the English wording, which frequently was in a rather
preliminary stage, considerable liberties had to be taken with the text in a good many
places, but care has been taken not to change the author's meaning. For such al-
terations the editor has to bear the full responsibility. In a few sentences, for the
sake of obtaining a coherent text, reconstructions had to be added; the more impor-
tant ones have always been indicated by square brackets.
The whole text has been carefully gone over in collaboration with Professor Rich-
ard B. Brandt of Swarthmore College, to whom the editor is deeply indebted for his
generous assistance. For the earlier sections of this edition I also wish to acknowl-
edge Professor Brand Blanshard's many helpful suggestions.
255

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256 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
II
The justification for publishing this text and for the procedure followed in editing
it lies in the significance of Geiger's conception of existential philosophy. What is
important here is not only his sharp distinction between existential and ontological
philosophy, but also various fruitful suggestions in his analysis of the existential
field, such as the idea of existential depth (pp. 267 if.; cf. also note 12).
As to the development of these ideas, which Professor Geiger had planned for the
book itself, there are only indirect indications. Geiger had treated the subject of
existential philosophy in 1928 and 1933 in two seminars in Goettingen', and the ex-
tensive notes which he had prepared for these show that what he had in mind was
largely a critical examination of cultural phenomena with regard to their existential
significance. The main folder inscribed "Existenzphilosophie," in which the present
text had been found, included detailed studies on "Wissenschaft als Problem," a
topic which had been the subject of another seminar in 1933, where the problem of
the existential significance of science and the humanities had been discussed at
length; and similar investigations were probably planned for the fields of religion and
art. As to the latter, the essay on "Die psychische Bedeutung der Kunst" in "Zu-
gange zur Aesthetik" (1928) gives perhaps the best illustration of critical existential
analysis in Geiger's sense. Here he shows the psychological "depth effects," as
distinguished from the psychological "surface effects," to be the existentially sig-
nificant functions of artistic values in the three forms of those values, namely, formal
or eurythmic, imitative, and "material-positive" ("inhaltlich positiv") or psycho-
vital. Such depth effects are, for instance, the harmonization of our inner life
brought about by that fuller mastery over the world of our experience which an
aesthetic arrangement of our data permits us; the ("Steigerung") of this life through
aesthetic enjoyment; and the intensification of our experiences, particularly of those
experiences which arise from an aesthetic contemplation of the qualitative aspects
of phenomena, once we have "deprived" them of their reality ("Entwirklichung").
The last paragraph of this essay refers in passing to "the" four other spheres
of human existential life: religious relationship to God and destiny, metaphysical
knowledge, the existential bond between person and person, and existential devotion
to impersonal values.
The publication of this fragment was originally planned as part of a more extensive
study of Geiger's conception of existential philosophy and of its relation to other
types of existential philosophy. The loss of the preparatory materials and drafts
on board the S. S. Athenia in September 1939 and the subsequent press of academic
duties have prevented the realization of this larger plan.
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG.
LAWRENCE COLLEGE.
I. KINDS OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY1
"Existential Philosophy" is a collective term for many problems, many

methods of thinking, many points of view, just as is the case with the term
1 It seems noteworthy that his lectures on "Psychologie auf phaenomenologischer

Grundlage," which, at their delivery in the winter of 1930, were taken down and typed
out in detail, are almost completely dominated by the interest in the existential as-
pect of psychological problems.

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INTRODUCTION TO EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 257
"Ontological Philosophy." The distinguishing feature of all existential

philosophy is the fact that its basic category is existential significance.
The [primary] difficulty [lying in the path] of existential philosophy is
that it has to use words, sentences, propositions. Every language has the
function of communication as well as of statement. If I say "Henry IV
of France was married to Katherine of Medici," I want to state a fact and
to communicate this fact. In this sense every such sentence is ontological
[i.e., referring to "ontic" phenomena or facts]. But at the same time it
constitutes an expression, in this [particular] case an expression of my
knowledge. All these three sides of language have to be considered by a
theory of language as well as by a theory of poetry.
Here, the important point is that from the sentence alone you can never
see which function is the one emphasized: the statement of the fact, the
communication of this fact, or the expression of the knowledge of the fact.
This does not involve a danger to ontological philosophy, because what
matters to it in all cases is ontological knowledge. But it is fateful for
existential philosophy.
If somebody says "Life is not worth living," does he mean to assert an
ontological fact? Does he intend to maintain that it is an indisputable
truth, as he does when he says "Gold is a yellow metal"? It may be so,
and in that case we are concerned with a mere ontological statement. In
many cases, however, this sentence is the expression of a person's "Welt-
anschauung" and then it constitutes an existential statement projected
upon the external world. It expresses an attitude toward the world ("Stel-
lungnahme") [to the effect] that life is not worth living, a pessimistic view
of things. And the speaker gives it an objective form by the sentence
"Life is not worth living." Many so-called objective statements are
nothing but such expressions of existential attitudes. For instance, con-
ceptions of God characterizing him as the benevolent and compassionate
ruler, or the powerful creator, or the mysterious governor, or the avenger
are objectivations cf the attitudes man takes toward God. Consequently,
you cannot refute them by the weapons of logic. Whether you can con-
test them at all, we shall have to examine later.2
Existential philosophy might be nothing but such expressions of existen-
tial attitudes ("Stellungnahmen") toward the world. Even the critique
of one existential philosophy by another may be only an existential one
from the critic's standpoint. For example, the controversy between the
Cynic and the Cyrenaic schools in Antiquity was an existential contro-
versy, not an ontological one. When Aristippus the Cyrenaic maintained,
"All happiness is pleasure," and Antisthenes the Cynic replied, "I would
rather be mad than feel pleasure," that was not a controversy which could
have been decided by logical and ontological argument.

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So far as an existential philosophy is only voicing an existential attitude,

it is a proclaiming philosophy, or a prophetic philosophy in Jaspers' terms.'
It may acquiesce in giving expression to its conviction and in communicat-
ing it to others or it may have the desire to instill its own attitude in others.
In all these cases it takes a definite position of its own, and all the argu-
ments and facts produced are nothing but defensive or aggressive persuasion,
no real proof. If a Christian extols the deeds performed by Christians on
account of their Christian faith, such as the testimony of the martyrs, and a
critic of Christianity points out how many cruelties have been committed
by faithful Christians and speaks of the auto-da-fe's and of the Inquisition-
in both cases these arguments are not of the kind [used] in natural science
or in historical research. They do not prove anything that was not proved
before. To the Christian attitude the deeds of the martyrs are the expres-
sion of a Christian existential attitude and those who perpetrated the
cruelties had not really attained the Christian attitude or it had not per-
meated the inner core of their existence; to the critics these deeds are not
distinctive of Christianity, for every religion has its martyrs, whereas the
cruelty of the good Christians proves that the Christian attitude is com-
patible with bad ethics. This factual evidence, however, is only secondary.
[The primary fact is that] both parties see the world from their opposing
standpoints. Has anybody ever ceased to be a good Christian when he
heard about the Inquisition? Was anyone really convinced, rationally
convinced, not only emotionally impressed when he heard of the martyrs?
But there is still a different type of existential philosophy, the inter-
pretative existential philosophy, [i.e., the philosophy which interprets existen-
tial phenomena as to their meaning in the context of human existence.
Consider, for instance, repentance.] Repentance is a problem for existen-
tial philosophy. Now you may proclaim with Spinoza: "There should
be no repentance." Even when based on a system like his, this represents
an existential proclamation. [In contrast to this, ] the Christian existential
attitude proclaims that repentance is a very essential act. And there
might be still other attitudes with regard to it. But you may also inquire
what attitudes are implied in repentance itself, what repentance really
means for human existence. The person who repents may not know this
meaning himself. Or you may ask: What existential significance can
knowledge have for the knowing subject? It may consist, for instance, in
dominating the world or it may have some other contingent function.4
You may interpret it from divergent existential standpoints and it will
always appear different. These different interpretative attitudes can [at
first] only be stated as facts.
There is, [however,] the possibility of a critical existential philosophy.
It can ask: Are all these attitudes really justified to the same degree? And

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can these justifications themselves only be lined up? Or do they possess

different values? Can they be justified only by a proclaiming existential
philosophy? Or do they give evidence in themselves of being better or
worse founded?
Our main interest is in critical existential philosophy. But we shall
have to deal first with the interpretative existential philosophy and shall
then offer a critical interpretation of its phenomena; finally, we shall pro-
ceed, wherever indicated, to a proclaiming existential philosophy.
Thus far, in most cases, existential philosophy has been either openly
proclaiming or, even while wanting to be ontological, has been in fact pro-
claiming. There are only the beginnings of a real interpretative existential
philosophy (Scheler, Jaspers).
It is now necessary to discuss the three following problems:

I. The problem of subjectivity and relativity of existential philosophy.
II. Its relation to ontological problems.
III. Its relation to psychology.
II. SUBJECTIVITY
Every existential attitude is "subjective," if "subjective" means the

same as existential. [For] it is the attitude of the subject.
But in itself this existential subjectivity has nothing to do with the [fol-
lowing] three kinds of ontological subjectivity: (1) There is subjectivity
as an [ontological] answer [to a specific problem]. We ask: What is the
world? And the Kantian answer is: The world is given to us through the
"forms" of the subject; [similar answers are contained in] Berkeley's sub-
jective idealism ("esse est percipi") and Schopenhauer's "The world is our
idea." These are answers to an ontological question. That they make
reference to the subject does not imply any difference. No "significance"
for the subject, not to mention for the human existence, is involved in
[such an] answer. You may draw from it conclusions for personal ex-
istence but they are not essential to it. Kant (as far as his theoretical
system is concerned) and Berkeley are ontological thinkers just as much as
those who give an objective ontological answer like the materialists, Aris-
totle, Leibniz and others. (2) Again, to begin ontological inquiries with a
theory of knowledge, because knowledge [is considered] to be a subjective
fact, does not make a philosophy existential. If you think it necessary
to start with an investigation of knowledge in order to ascertain the limita-
tions and presuppositions of our knowledge of objects, knowledge is re-
garded as a function, as an objective instrument, as a fact for its own sake.
In such a theory knowledge constitutes a fact in which a subject is di-
rected toward an object but it is not considered in its existential signifi-

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cance.-Of course you may also investigate the existential significance of

truth [and knowledge].
[To be sure, whenever] we start from an examination of knowledge, we
investigate from the standpoint of the subject. It is the subjective atti-
tude that we adopt [in that case]; whereas, for instance, in natural science
our starting point is the object.. Whether you look at the world and at
yourselves through the eyes of the subject or whether you do it from the
standpoint of the object constitutes a very important difference within the
ontological attitude but it remains an ontological approach.
It remains true, however, that every existential attitude is at the same
time subjective: It looks at the world from the standpoint of the subject.
But not every subjective attitude is existential. The problems and the
categories [in the epistemological and in the existential attitude] are en-
tirely different.
(3) A third confusion [to be expected] is that between epistemological
relativity and existential [relativity]. As to the question whether we can
obtain objective and absolute truth, from the days of Protagoras' "Man
is the measure of things" down to sensationalism and the so-called human-
ism of to-day, the relativity and subjectivity of truth has always been
maintained. On the opposite side stand the believers in objective truth.
The epistemological standpoint of subjectivity and relativity opposes the
epistemological standpoint of objectivity and absoluteness.-But every
ontological statement contains the claim to objective truth. Relativism
denies [the justification of] this claim, but the claim as such cannot be
denied. We want to know. And what do we want to know? Objectiv-
ity. "But we obtain only subjectivity," replies the relativist.
It is entirely different with existential significance. This subjectivity
means certainly significance for a subject. But if we reserve the terms
subject and object for the ontological interpretation, we had better speak
of personal [significance]; unless we prefer simply to speak of existential
significance. [This significance] is [certainly] at first [sight] personal,
for it means existence for me. If I love somebody and if I make an exis-
tential decision, that is something personal. HIas such a personal decision
also validity for everyone, for every existence? That is the question
which almost never has been explicitly asked.
The order [to be followed in answering this question] is just the opposite
of the one appropriate to ontological problems. In the latter all phenom-
ena are at first sight independent of me in being known; they claim
objectivity. And this claim has to be refuted by argument if we want to
show that they are really dependent upon the subject. In contrast to
this, all existential facts are prima facie personal; it would have to be
demonstrated if we held that they were also "overpersonal" or had validity

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for everyone. "Proof" in this connection means justification. Whether

such a justification can be produced, and in which way, is a problem for
existential philosophy itself. Here we are only pointing out the contrast
with ontological problems.
A fourth question refers to the greater evidence for the existence of
psychical facts. Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" and, before him,
Augustine's "vivo ergo sum" have always served as a starting point for
metaphysics.5 But the "cogito ergo sum," the self-evident existence of
the ego is also the starting point for all existential philosophy. The
existential character of a [particular] decision is a fact which may be mis-
judged, but the ego and the fact that there is the contrast between existen-
tial and non-existential phenomena are [nevertheless] the fundamental
facts for every existential philosophy.
Augustine's doctrine [to be sure] had a stronger existential foundation.
The self-evidence of the ego was according to him not a theoretical fact
but the feeling of an initiating center for every decision. In the system of
Descartes the "cogito" could have been replaced by another fact; if, for
instance, the existence of an external world had been so absolutely certain
to him that it allowed of no doubt, he could have made the external world
the cornerstone of his system. [But] for Augustine's existential stand-
point the ego was his ego: the existential importance of this "existential
ego," is his starting point. Even the impression made by Descartes was
based only in part on the epistemological side of the "cogito." It was
almost [just] as important that he emphasized the certainty of human
existence, its nearness to our own selves. This was the fact by which his
Jansenist friends were attracted, who had, to be sure, nothing in common
with the rationalistic interest in a proposition as certain as mathematical
propositions. And the fact that Malebranche was indignant at Descartes
because he had deduced the certainty of God from the certainty of the
self would be incomprehensible if, to Malebranche, certainty had meant
merely a logical fact. If that had been so, he might as well have been
offended by the fact that Descartes spoke of the absolute certainty of
mathematical propositions. But Malebranche had the feeling that the
"cogito ergo sum" implied an existential decision ("Stellungnahme"),
that to Descartes the ego was the center, not only epistemologically, but
in every respect. It meant the solid ground upon which everything is
based-and therefore Malebranche objected. [His point is]: The exist-
ence of God [is not related to] his significance for man; his dignity is
higher than a merely existential one.
Thus the problems of subjectivity are different in the ontological atti-
tude and in the existential attitude. The . .. [There are no indications
as to the continuation here envisaged.]

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262 PHILOSOPXHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
III. ONTOLOGICAL AND EXISTENTIAL PROBLEMS
[1. Contrast between Ontology and Existential Philosophy.]
Men approach philosophy with entirely different aims. Some want to

obtain knowledge about the ultimate nature of the world; the Absolute,
as the foundation of everything, is the object of their curiosity. They
are like scientists interested in knowing the facts. However the single
facts do not satisfy them. They want to get in touch with the fact of
facts: with the ultimate structure of the world. Or they want to know
how the world derives from the Absolute; they are interested [in] whether
a single principle such as the water of Thales or a mixture of four elements,
was the root [of everything]. They believe either in a materialistic or in a
spiritualistic answer. They [may] seek the solution either by means of
mere imagination, as in the fables of the African negro tribes about the
origin of the world or in the cosmogonies of the Greeks, or they [may] find
an answer by mere rational speculation-but always it is the impulse of
pure disinterested knowledge which inspires them-a curiosity to know
what the fact is. I call the attitude in which these men try to explore
things the ontological attUtude and their problems ontological problems.
But others who turn to philosophy are people of quite a different sort.
To them the origin of the world is of no interest. They want a solution
for the riddles of life. They want to know what happiness is, what is the
course they should follow in life; they are concerned with the problems of
salvation. They are not less interested in knowledge than the ontologists.
But they want to relate everything to their inner personal existence. Their
basic category is not "reality" but "experienced significance for inner
existence." To them the world is important only as something toward
which they must take a stand ["Stellungnahme"], for instance, either to
love it or to hate it. They are existential thinkers and their philosophy is
an existential philosophy. Of course they need to know the facts just- as
much as the ontologists. They need to know that we shall die. But,
whereas for the ontological thinker death is a mere matter of fact, it is
more than that for the existential thinker. He takes an inner attitude to
this fact. To him it is a matter of despair or of resignation to fate. He
may dread it or draw the conclusion that, because he will die, he ought to
enjoy life now: Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall be dead!
[In all these cases] his knowledge is only an instrument of his existential
attitude; it is a means to an end. None of these problems is detached from
the thinker's own existence, as is the question of the first principles; they
have a [disturbing] nearness. One sentence of Nietzsche shows that all his
thoughts turn around human existence, that only problems which have
this nearness to human existence catch his interest: he is not an ontological
but an existential thinker.

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It has often been noticed that there are these two kinds of problems,
but neither have the implications of this distinction been noted nor has a
correct analysis been forthcoming. Every student of philosophy knows,
e.g., that the Milesian period of the Greek philosophy was a period dealing
with problems which I call the ontological problems, that all the questions
and answers concerned the Apx71 of the world, the first principles. The
water of Thales or the Infinite of Anaximander, the atoms of Democritus
or the unchangeable and indestructible being of Parmenides are all onto-
logical theories. And everyone knows that, after the systems of Plato and
Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans raised the great questions of human
attitude toward the world. Everyone realizes that their problem was
that of the correct attitude toward life; their question was that of human
existence, not of the structure of the universe. In the case of these ex-
tremes the classification is easy. But what about Plato, Spinoza, and
Kant? The easy-going answer "both . . . and" means here, as every-
where, only ignoring the problem. The minds of Plato, of Spinoza, and of
Kant were not built like drawers in which these problems rested neatly
side by side, but they formed a unity, perhaps a very complex unity but
not a [mere aggregate].
And so we cannot be satisfied with the simple and obvious examples
considered thus far, but we have to disentangle the ontological and the
existential attitudes from their generally complex embodiments in order to
extricate the existential problem in its pure form.
[2. Ontological Problems.]
There are many ontological problems in philosophy besides those of

ultimate being and of the way in which the world derives from the Abso-
lute. Thus, the connection between soul and body belongs among the
ontological problems; so do the questions of causality and of emergent
evolution.
Of course, all the philosophical questions connected with science are
ontological questions; for scientific problems are ontological problems.
Therefore psychical facts regarded as facts in an objective world are onto-
logical facts too. Psychology as a natural science takes them in this way;
feelings and emotions, acts of will and acts of belief are here facts like stones
and trees. All personal nearness, all existential significance is here elimi-
nated; therefore psychology as a natural science is an ontological discipline.
In the same way a philosophy which gives a subjectivistic answer to
ontological questions is an ontological philosophy. Berkeley's subjectiv-
ism is ontological, not existential. He asks: What is the nature of the
world? His thesis that the world consists of our impressions, that tobe
and to be perceived are [identical, constitutes] an ontological answer to an
ontological question. These impressions, which in his view are the mate-

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rial of the world, [i.e., the actual sense data like] the colors, the sounds,
the tastes, are to be considered not because of their personal nearness but
because they are the building stones of our world. Berkeley's answer is
subjectivistic but not existential.
Within the ontological sphere of problems two different approaches to
the world have to be distinguished, the objective and the subjective one.
Materialism, e.g., is based on an objective approach to the world. It be-
gins with the objects and all the psychical facts are here regarded from the
standpoint of the object. But philosophers such as Locke and Berkeley
and many others begin with the question "What is given to us?" and they
want to decide the philosophical problem of the objective world by an
analysis of these phenomena. That means an attitude entirely different
from the attitude which begins with the problems of objects, takes their
existence for granted, and wants to understand the objective world and
even the subject from the standpoint of the object. Spinoza in the main
parts of his system is an objectivist; his ultimate substance, God, and the
attributes of this substance are taken as objective facts presented by axioms
and definitions. Descartes, at least at the outset of his system, holds the
subjectivistic position. From his universal doubt, from his uncertainty
as a subject of the knowability of the world he is driven to his problems.
And the beginning of his solution, his "cogito ergo sum" is the most sub-
jectivistic starting point he could find; but it is not an existential one. He
does not start from it on account of its nearness to himself but on account
of its absolute certainty. If he [could have] found another proposition,
tof the same degree of certainty] an entirely objective one such as the fact
that matter exists is to the materialist, he might have taken this fact as
the cornerstone of his system.6
For this reason even the problems of knowledge and the related problems
of consciousness are in themselves not yet existential problems. Knowl-
edge can be considered in three ways. First as a [psychological] function
within the subjective attitude: If we know that Phillip of Macedonia was
the father of Alexander the Great, we live in this our knowledge. It con-
stitutes no object for us. It is an instrument for comprehending the world.
We are interested in it [merely] as a function.
Or, second, we may be interested in knowledge as an objective fact. We
may ask: How did knowledge or how did consciousness emerge from an
unconscious matter?-Or, with Hegel and many others, we may believe
that in knowledge the Absolute becomes conscious of itself, so that knowl-
edge is a fact [within the economy of the universe]. In this case we do
not live in the function of knowledge but we take it as a fact which we
may look at from the outside, from an objective point of view. Knowledge
remains a function even in this case, to be sure, but it is transformed into

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an object; it is no longer taken as a living expression of the ego but as an

objective fact like other facts.
Both knowledge taken as a function and knowledge taken as a fact are
considered from the ontological point of view. But knowledge has also [a
third], an existential aspect. The inner relations of men to their knowl-
edge can be very different, the type of its personal nearness [very diversi-
fied]. Knowledge may be a mere instrument for controlling the world or
it may mean the ultimate goal of man's existence, the end he lives for [as
for the pure scientist]. It may be the way to become united with God,
a mystical knowledge (revelation) to be transmitted. Or, according to
Bacon's principle that "Knowledge is power," it may be an expression of
one's will to power.7 By mere inspection of the fact of knowledge you
cannot find out what its existential meaning is. The knowledge of the
Pythagorean proposition had for its discoverer, no doubt, a mystical exis-
tential background, but for the mathematician of to-day this knowledge
corresponds to an existential attitude of purely objective character.
Very rarely has knowledge been explicitly subjected to an analysis of its
existential significance. Nietzsche has to be mentioned as one of the few
who have attempted it; so did Jaspers in his "Psychologie der Weltanschau-
ungen." In this approach all the problems of theory of knowledge change
into existential problems: What does knowledge mean to us? But im-
plicitly few cultural problems are more discussed in our time than the
existential problems of knowledge and intellect. Very few doubt the
ontological value of knowledge; nobody doubts that in science, in history,
in technology, in economics our knowledge has yielded results to which
the knowledge of no [other] time can aspire. It is the existential value
which is in dispute: the problems of action versus intellect, religion versus
intellect, intuition versus intellect, life versus intellect. In all these cases
the deeper existential value of knowledge is questioned. Not the question
of how far human knowledge can advance is the existential one, but the
question of what it means for the subject.
IV. PSYCHOLOGY AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
[1. The Existential Attitude and Psychological Phenomena.]

From this existential standpoint the problem of psychology appears in
an entirely new light. From an ontological point of view psychical facts
are facts like other facts, of no particular importance within the framework
of the universe. As far as we know you can find them only in a negligibly
small part of the world on an insignificant cosmic body, called the earth,
and appearing only in connection with the nervous system of some strangely
built creatures, called animals. From the ontological standpoint psychol-
ogy has no paramount importance; it has it only because, as seen from the

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standpoint of the knowing self, every item of knowledge comes through the
medium of psychical facts.
The existential approach takes quite a different attitude toward the
world. Hence, no problems can be more important, more fascinating,
more relevant than psychical phenomena. Thus, wherever the existential
interest prevails, the study of psychical facts comes to the fore. The dic-
tum of Socrates "Flowers and fields cannot teach me anything, but people
in the city can"8 is the attitude of a man whose interest is directed toward
existential problems. Pope's remark that "The proper study of mankind
is man"9 is the expression of such an attitude. No ontological thinker, no
Newton, no Laplace, no Darwin and no Gauss would have said that.
[Addition in the margin: Furthermore no ontological psychologist, physi-
ological psychologist, or behaviorist would have said it. On the contrary,
their aim has always been to build up psychology as far as possible from
the point of view of a man who thinks that despair and happiness are not
more important than the cells of the body, perhaps even less.] That a
statement like Pope's could be offered without any attempt at proof as a
matter of course, simply as a pronunciamento, was possible only because
for Pope personal nearness was the decisive criterion for what is worth
study.
[Moreover] I believe that the popularity of Descartes' "cogito ergo sum"
and the conclusions drawn from it, according to which psychical states are
more trustworthy than the facts of the external world, is not to be at-
tributed to the greater evidence of these phenomena. Rather, the prefer-
ence given to the "cogito ergo sum" is a consequence in the case of many
people of the comforting feeling that the facts which are nearest our ego
are also the most certain ones. Descartes was far from this interpretation
but it seems to have been in the mental background of his more religious
and mystical followers. In the case of Augustine, it is almost certain that
the selfevidence of the ego had a value to him which did not consist simply
in its ability to overthrow epistemological doubt but in finding in himself
[an ultimate pou sto].
[2. The Meaning of Psychology for Existential Philosophy.]

Existential philosophy is not psychology; more specifically it is not psy-
chology from a subjective point of view [introspective psychology].
It is true that there are two kinds of psychology, one from the objective
standpoint, the other from the standpoint of the subject. Physiological
psychology and behavioristic psychology belong to objective psychology
and so does everything that in Germany is called "geisteswissenschaftliche
Psychologie." The problems of the relation of stimulus and sensation
and of memory properly belong, no doubt, to this objective psychology.

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But when you speak of "empathy" ["Einfihilung" ] or when you say that you
overcompensate your feeling of inferiority with arrogance then you are
working from a subjective point of view.
The relation and the difference between psychology from a "naturalistic"
and psychology from an "immediate" introspective point of view cannot be
discussed here; nor whether they really have to deal with different facts or
whether they merely look at the same facts from a different angle.
The existential attitude i an immediate [introspective] one, and, be-
cause it is interested in personal nearness, it may seem to be identical with
psychology from the subjective standpoint. The difference between the
subjective ontological approach and the existential approach may seem to
be nothing but a difference within psychology [a relation between genus
and species]. If we look at the death of a person in an objective and
disinterested manner, it is taken as an ontological fact; if it moves us and
manifests in so far personal nearness, that would indicate, again, a different
psychical effect and nothing more.
Now, introspective psychology is undoubtedly of great help to existen-
tial philosophy, but it has a different aim and a different starting point.
[In existential philosophy] the fundamental category of personal signifi-
cance, of personal nearness, has to be taken in a much deeper sense than we
have taken it thus far.
For personal nearness to be [considered] an existential fact, it must
come from the innermost core of the personality, i.e., from the "existential"
ego, not from a superficial level of the self in the every day sense ("schlech-
thin"). The object of every decision has personal nearness in a general
way, [otherwise] it would not be an act of decision. But there are also
[specifically] existential decisions which come out of the depth of the ego.
If I decide to take the bus and not the train to New York, that is no existen-
tial decision (even if it arises from a very existential impulse for economiz-
ing.) But it is not a decision with lifetime implications. However, even a
decision for life need not be existential.... If a young boy decides to go
on the stage that may be only a result of having been impressed by a great
actor, or of a desire to perform before other people. But when Plato burns
his tragedies in order to devote his life to philosophy, that is an existential
decision coming from the depth of his existence.
The psychical act is existential not only when it comes from the exis-
tential depth but also when it penetrates to the existential depth. The
death of a relative may fill me with only a superficial grief, disturbing me
but not necessarily coming from existential depth. But [in spite of that]
it may be an existential mourning.'0
[The usual] psychology is much less interested in acknowledging such
differences as basic phenomena than in dissolving them by analysis or by

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explaining them away. However, the real differences [between existen-

tial and psychological facts] should not be indicated merely by abstract
terms. Only an explicit existential philosophy [can make that quite plain.
But such a philosophy] is [certainly] not psychology.
[3. Existential Problems.]

Our examples have shown that it would be wrong to say dogmatically:
Such and such a matter is essentially an existential problem: because for
many people it may not be so at all. For many people the choice of a
profession is a very un-existential matter, and so are marriage and so-
called love. On the other hand, problems may become existential for
some persons, which are not so for others. Is selling a field an existential
problem? Certainly by no means for the real estate agent nor for the
average farmer who, perhaps with some regret, leaves the fields which he
has worked on for some years. But it is such a problem in many cases for
the real son of the soil. A good example occurs at the conclusion of Pearl
Buck's "The Good Earth"; there you will realize what it means [to him].
In spite of that there are typically existential problems and typically
existential facts, such as marriage and death, and typically tin-existential
ones, such as buying a railwN-ay ticket, going to the movies, having break-
fast and the like.
[4; Allegorical Terminology.]
One might expect a strong objection to the preceding analysis: I am

referring to the conception of different layers of "depth" in an ego, and I
shall, later on, speak of other phenomena which usually are not acknowl-
edged by psychology. How often have I heard what every schoolboy
knows, that there is no such thing as an ego and that, if there were such a
thing, it would not have any property like depth? To speak of the surface
of the ego and of its depth is a mere metaphor, and therefore, instead of
using it, it were better to analyze it and to show what are the facts which
are the basis for such a metaphor.
On the basis of my own psychological studies" I would urge with some
confidence that it does not matter into what elements we may "analyze"
psychological data. What is important is how they appear to us. What is
true of such analysis of facts in natural science is also true of psychology:
in certain contexts it is important to forget such "analysis." It isvery
interesting to know that blue has the weave length of four micra; but if I
want to decide whether a garment of a certain shade of blue suits a lady,
I am not at all interested in this fact. It is quite certain that a human
being consists of electrons and protons [which are not] essentially different
from those in a rhinoceros; but identities and differences of this sort are
not [the kind of thing] in which I am interested in life. In this respect

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[even] larger physical and psychical features are often without s

We [have to] take [these facts] just as they are given to us. The impor-
tant question is always what aspect of the object is relevant to a particular
problem. [A fact] may be as complex as it pleases. [Now, in our case,
the real interest attaches to the ego] and to what we call the depth or the
surface of the ego, whatever that may be. Of course, we are using a
metaphor, but the "depth" of a sound is a metaphor too. The decisive
question is whether we mean anything by it, and there can be no doubt
that we do.12
V. VALUE
The problem of value is one of those issues in relation to which the

difference between existential and ontological philosophy can be under-
stood most clearly.
The problem of value, as we see it to-day, came to the fore during the
last generation. Before that time one could speak of the fact that some-
thing had value but not that it was a value. We speak nowadays of
kindness as an ethical value, of symmetry as an aesthetic value, and so
on. Theory of value has become one of the favorite subjects of contem-
porary philosophy. Our grandfathers could only speak of economic values.
You may look up the ethical textbooks of the nineteenth century but you
will not find them speaking of ethical or aesthetic values. As far as I
know, the expression value in the sense in which we use it to-day occurred
first in the writings of Hermann Lotze in the second third of the nineteenth
century. But only through Nietzsche did it become popular, particularly
as a result of his program of "breaking the tables of values," and of a
"revaluation of values." I remember that when about 1900 in a seminar
under one of the foremost German philosophers, I spoke of "kindness"
as an ethical value, he interrupted me and said, "Kindness has value but
you cannot say it is a value." This incident illustrates how recent is the
use of the word value [in the sense to which] we are now accustomed.
But even after that there was for a long time the tendency to reduce
"value" to something else. In the beginning of this century there was a
long discussion about whether value is only another name for pleasure, so
that whatever produces pleasure may be called value. [It is essentially
the same if we define] value as that which is the object of desire.
After a considerable period value was acknowledged as a phenomenon
which cannot be reduced to other phenomena. The so-called Southwest-
German School ([Windelband], Rickert, MiInsterberg, Jonas Cohn) was
the first to acknowledge this, [to be sure] not without [bringing in] certain
Neo-Kantian concepts, and the phenomenological school attempted to
develop a deeper and completer understanding of these phenomena.
[The theory of values developed the idea] that values are independent of
us and demand acknowledgment as such. Thus a new basis of ethics and

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aesthetics was discovered. The results of the work of these new schools
of thought in value theory [may be epitomized] as follows.
(1) A distinction has to be drawn between "value" and "valuation."
"Value" is a property of a fact, or a quality; thus kindness is a value.
"Valuation" is the act of a person. Thus I may "value" kindness, which
is in turn a value. It is the same distinction which is now made in other
branches of philosophy. Thus, e.g., implication is the fact that "if A,
then B." My inference, however, is the act of recognizing this im-
plicative relationship, of drawing a conclusion. This [object character of
values as distinguished from the acts of valuation, J is what is meant b
the [thesis of the] objectivity of values.
(2) Another issue ought not to be confused with the problem of objec-
tivity: the question of the absoluteness or relativity of values. Kant noticed
this distinction although he did not express it in terms of value. Accord-
ing to him, when we call a picture beautiful, we believe that whoever sees
it should acknowledge it as beautiful. The value of the beautiful is here
not regarded as merely subjective but as independent. On the other
hand, if somebody likes Madeira, he does not presume that everybody else
likes it. In this matter his personal taste is decisive. [Only in the former
case] value is [held to be] independent.
There are values which acquire objectivity only . .. through the crea-
tive act of the valuing person [these values being only personal] and there
are others in which the value is independent [of the subject]. The differ-
ence is the same as in the case of other properties of the object.
[Here reference was probably contemplated to qualities such as shape
and volume on the one side and "secondary qualities" or qualities such as
being-perceived, -beloved, -hated, on the other.
In addition to these considerations the German shorter Introduction in
its section on value points out that objective value has to be distinguished
from the existential "value to me." Not only are there value-free objects
without existential significance, but there exist also values without such
significance. For the existential sphere is only a section out of the whole
field of existing objects and values. Now, only things that have existen-
tial significance may acquire "value for us." This is borne out by the
fact that such "values for us" are "felt" ("erfuehlt") in a specific act of
value-feeling, which is rather similar to the way in which existential
significance is apprehended, whereas other values, according to Geiger,
seem to be accessible also to a less emotional type of knowledge. Existen-
tial significance, thus, can be linked up with the axiological category of
"value for us."]
[In a subsequent section of the German Introduction there is a discus-

sion of ontological and existential philosophy in their relations to the tra-

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ditional distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. Re-

lated though these distinctions are, they must not be confused. While
all ontological philosophy is theoretical, not all practical philosophy is
existential. Thus ethics, inasmuch as it consists of theory of values, is
ontological. And even in so far as it deals with practical problems it may
be merely technical, not existential. This is the case with the usual
utilitarianism, which is interested only in discovering the best means for
obtaining the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Technical
ethics exploring the means for such an end is nothing but inverted ontology
(investigating cause and effect) even if it is inspired by an existential
interest. In a similar way the study of history, although ontological in
its form, is permeated by an existential human interest; without it, the
events on some unimportant remote planet like the earth would have no
claim to special investigation.-Besides, not all existential philosophy,
e.g., interpretative existential philosophy, is practical philosophy. Criti-
cal existential philosophy is practical in a broader sense; in this sense, how-
ever, even Nietzsche's criticism of civilization ("Kulturkritik") would
belong to practical philosophy.]
VI. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
[1. The Ontological Misinterpretation of Existential Philosophy.]
It is one of the greatest mistakes of the historians of philosophy that

they do not acknowledge existential problems in their pure form but "ontol-
ogize" them [i.e., misinterpret them ontologically].
The reasons [for this mistake ] are manifold. Two deserve special
notice:
(1) There is, first of all, the desire for systematic unity. All the great
systematizers aspired to a unified view of the world. Setting out as they
did from metaphysics they tried to press existential philosophy into the
framework of their metaphysical systems.
(2) Existential philosophy, no doubt, sees the world from the restricted
standpoint of the existence of the ego. So it seems to lead to a relativism
which dissolves everything. Whether that is true we still have to dis-
cuss. But if one takes existence [as something ontological, as these writers
did] we seem to stand on solid ground.
I shall give some examples of this ontologizing.
(a) The least dangerous manner of connecting ontological philosophy
with existential problems is the way in which the ancient Stoics and
Epicureans did it. Their metaphysics was only the background for their
existential philosophy. You can describe the ethical doctrine of the Stoics
without paying any attention to their materialistic metaphysics. Perhaps
their metaphysics does serve to deepen their ethical standpoint. But their
metaphysics had no existential value in itself, so little [in fact] that you

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cannot even derive the inner stoic attitude from it. Their existential doc-
trine is quite independent of their metaphysics. On the other hand, so
strong was the existential interest of the Epicureans that they altered the
doctrine of Democritus, which they [had] otherwise accepted in its main
parts. As a consequence of their existential indeterminism, they softened
his rigid determinism into an indeterministic atomism. The atoms leave
their courses while falling downward by "free will"; they are little Epi-
cureans, as it has been said. Of course, here the connection is not a very
close one, and existential philosophy as well as ontological metaphysics
retains a certain independence. They suit each other, but they are not
dependent upon each other.
[No other examples follow].
[2. Connections between Ontology and Existential Philosophy in the

Great Classical Systems.]
But these solutions aiming at a kind of truce [between ontological and

existential philosophy] are not the way of the great philosophers. Unlike
his teacher Socrates, Plato was driving at an ontological solution for the
existential problems. And he tried it in a direction which all the great in-
tellectualists took and which gives its typical attraction to his system as
well as to that of Spinoza. If virtue is really knowledge, then to know
the ultimate being is at the same time the highest end of life. In that case,
to understand human existence is at once the most existential and the most
metaphysical concern. If metaphysical knowledge is also at the root of
"existential significance" then the difficulty is solved. I am sure this
way of Plato's and Spinoza's will always be tried by those for whom
metaphysical knowledge is really the center of their existence, [i.e.] by the
philosophers. To Plato, the knowledge of the ideas is at the same time
the highest ontological knowledge and the deepest existential concern,
the ultimate end of man. For "man must know the universal."'3 That
is his existential watchword. When he describes the stages . . . [of
knowledge . . . Here reference to the allegory of the den in the Republic,
Book VII, may have been planned.]
If [cognition of the universal] were only a matter of theoretical knowl-
edge, then it would [have the same significance for Plato's system] as had
for Kant the [introduction of the] things in themselves as ultimate reali-
ties, nothing more. (What it means to take this knowledge existentially
you may see if you hear that the German poet, Kleist, when he became
acquainted with the Kantian system, was driven to despair by the idea
that we cannot know reality. [Incidentally], what does such a knowledge
mean to us others existentially, as distinguished from what it means for us
intellectually?) However, to Plato it was no matter of dispute that this

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highest knowledge is fundamental for the worth of man. Plato's doctrine

of the migration of the soul was dependent upon how much we can know
about [universals]; and his existential consciousness was permeated by the
consciousness of metaphysical dignity.
The same is true of Spinoza and all the mystics; it applies also to Neo-
platonism and all who follow it. Surrender to God presupposes intuition
of him. You attain the zenith of your existence when you are united with
the world-ground, i.e., with God. When Kant, whose thought as a whole
takes quite a different course, speaks of God as the Highest Good or as the
Highest End that constitutes a reflection of this conception. The in-
tuition of God remains here the [existential] fact.
Where this solution is accepted, one of the great difficulties in combining
the ontological and the existential attitude is removed. The existential ac-
tivity receives a metaphysical foundatiwi. [Here in the margin: "epcoS as
the expression of this attitude".] But, apart from the question of whether
Plato's system as a whole is correct, the question why this knowledge is
supposed to be existentially the highest is not [yet] answered. Why is it
our task to strive for intuition of the ideas? It is not a matter of course
that this intuition stands extentially higher than love of another person or
practical action. In all these systems this is simply taken for granted.
[3. The Ontological and Existential Viewpoint in Religion and Scholastic

Philosophy. ]
There is another way of reconciling existential and ontological points

of view. It is a course taken by theology and medieval philosophy.
Religion, as far as it is not mere magic [i.e., a special] technique for earthly
purposes, is existential. It is an inner relation to a being higher than our-
selves. Does this being exist? No religious person seriously asks such a
question. As soon as he asks it, he is on ontological ground. I do not
deny that this question is a necessary one, but it is not an existential one.
In the same way the reality of the external world or the existence of
admirable qualities in a beloved person is not really questioned in the exis-
tential attitude. It has often been remarked that the most deeply religi-
ous persons do not even desire to prove the existence of God. Augustine
had no real proofs [for the existence] of God; he simply brushed all doubts
aside.... But the ontological interest of knowledge will not be satisfied
indefinitely by the existential answer alone. Religion also makes an
ontological claim in connection with the belief in God as the creator of the
world. Religion does answer ontological questions. But religious ques-
tions are by no means merely ontological. They are at the same time
existential. [From this aspect] God becomes the Almighty to whom I
have to submit.

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274 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICA-L RESEARCH
The desire for system and rational foundation reappears continually.

And this impulse transforms into a merely ontological object what was
[originally] an object simply of admiration, veneration, or (in short) of
existential attitudes. As a consequence religious people have always
objected to a philosophical interpretation of religion; of course, very often
they have done so because they have mistrusted the results of philosophical
thought, not merely because such thought was ontological. In early
Christianity this was true of the Christian attitude toward the results of
Greek philosophy, in recent times toward the achievements of ontological
science. It was precisely from this religious point of view that Kierke-
gaard in his attack upon theology contrasted the existential attitude with
the merely ontological attitude.
But the ontological impulse is irrepressible. Religion will always be
more than an existential attitude: it will be a system of truths and dogmas.
Religion may regard them as revealed. But the ontological interest enters
in the form of apologetics. And you have apologetics as soon as proofs are
offered. The historical truth is not enough; religion needs systematic
truth if only such truth as is relevant for religion. It is no accident that
one of St. Thomas' Summae is called "Summa contra gentiles." Does
anyone believe that any "heathen" was ever converted by this "Summa"?
What it really represents is an attempt to give a foundation for the mass
of Christian traditional doctrine and at the same time to systematize it.
This is the substance of scholasticism: not the investigation of what was
unknown but the search for a rational foundation of what was known.
But the object of its investigations was limited to what was both objec-
tive truth and an object of existential interest. All truth had to have an
existential index. God was both the creator of the world and the point of
reference for the existential feeling of dependence and worship.
This connection alone constituted the justification of the system.
Scholasticism introduced itself as an independent system of ontological
truth; in fact it was the background for our religious relation to an exis-
tential object. Therefore its justification disappeared at the first moment
when the connection was lost with that truth which concerned the exis-
tential object.
Why do we laugh, when Medieval Scholasticism raises the question of
how many angels exist in each of the several angelic categories? [Or per-
haps better: how many angels can sit on the point of a pin?] But we do
not laugh when they discuss the virgin-birth (assuming we take medieval
problems seriously at all). What is the difference? Certainly not the fact
that the one is an essential problem whereas the other is a peripheral one.
Not at all! For [even] in science we are not so particular. Of course, the
proofs for the Darwinian theories are more important than the knowledge

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of how many legs a certain species of insect has, but [for all of that] we
do not laugh at specialized investigations. But we do laugh in the case of
the question concerning the number of angels. [The reason is that] the
problem of the virgin-birth is a problem connected with religion itself,
deriving its dignity from it, whereas this is not true of the other problem,
which is only empty ontology.
In the same way we are not satisfied with any [kind of ] deus ex machina.
When God, with Descartes, is introduced as the author of the "influxus
physicus" between soul and body, when his veracity is used as a guarantee
for the existence of the external world, we feel that such a deus ex machina
is an abuse of the prerogatives of existential considerations in connection
with merely ontological problems.
It is the "crux" of all theology that it transforms existential problems
into ontological ones. As long as it is used only for [interpretation and
systematization] it is justified, but in many cases it sets itself quite another
end: it wants to give the certainty of an ontological truth to an existential
truth. [When this is done, when it believes that there are ontological
certainties in theology, an attitude of arrogant intolerance is begotten.]
There is no point in further discussion with somebody who does not under-
stand that three plus three makes six, or who asserts that the Pythagorean
theorem is mistaken. It must be his evil will, if he does not agree. [Like-
wise] religious error is interpreted as ontological error and, accordingly,
ontological disbelief [will be regarded as] immoral disbelief.
[4. Kant's Position. ]
Quite a different combination of existential and ontological points of

view is to be found in Kant. His Critique of Pure Reason is a merely
ontological examination of the possibility of metaphysics. But he him-
self admits the existential background: "I had to deny knowledge in
order to make room for faith." And this faith is a particular kind of pro-
jection of moral, i.e., of existential, postulates into the ontological sphere.
We have the existential conviction that the virtuous man is also worthy
of happiness. We may adopt such a postulate; but the difficulty is how
to prove a truth from such a postulate.
The same thing is true of Fichte's doctrine: The activity by which the
world exists is at the same time ethical....
[5. The Problem in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Jaspers.]
That the existential problems are the decisive ones for religion has been
[clearly] realized by Kierkegaard. In his struggle against Hegelian theol-
ogy, against the theological quibbles of his time he was the first to see the
existential problem. He never explicated it systematically, although he

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used it as a foundation for religious super-naturalism. But the profundity

of his thought was far superior to the level of his time.
During the last fifteen years he has greatly influenced German thought.
Two great systematic works have grown out of this existential movement.
The one is Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit," a work which, in my opinion, in
spite of its great [grandeur of] conception and its clever [ingenious] detail,
is full of confusion of the problems. It has done precisely [the one thing]
which a serious existential philosophy should not do: it has confused exis-
tential and ontological issues, and has derived its knowledge of the world
from existential feelings.
The second work, Jasper's "Philosophie," is of quite a different type.
It is a real philosophy from an existential standpoint, not a confusion of
points of view. Here, all the problems are seen from the point of view of
human existence. [As a consequence] he has achieved deep solutions and
profound insights.
But, setting aside the question of whether I agree with his solutions or
not, I must say that his whole standpoint remains one-sided because, for
him, the ontological questions do not really exist. Metaphysics, e.g., is to
him the interpretation of the world from [the viewpoint of] human exist-
ence, the reading of hieroglyphs ("chiffres") of reality by an existing sub-
ject; this constitutes a merely existential way of raising the question, in
which reality and ontological questions disappear completely.
The following book acknowledges thoroughly the two kinds of problems
[and] the two attitudes. It attempts to clarify the problems, as far as they
can be clarified from [the existential] side, but it does not presume that the
existential standpoint is the only [legitimate] one.
MORITZ GEIGER.
EDITOR'S NOTES
(1) The beginning of the text cannot be clearly identified. Among the various
drafts there is one rather sketchy page headed "Introduction" which probably was
meant to introduce what follows. It starts out by declaring that the most significant
feature of modern civilization is neither technical perfection nor the increase in the
sense of social responsibility nor scientific achievement but a trend toward "method-
ical objectivity." The systematic study of objective phenomena which this term
seems to indicate is contrasted with the casual adjustment to individual occasions as
exemplified by the explanation of natural and historical phenomena with the help of
anthropomorphic personification or by thinking in analogies to other more familiar
patterns like the human organism. With this suggestion the page breaks off. A
plausible supposition is that the continuation meant to show that, as a consequence
of this trend toward "methodical objectivity," the interest in the subjective side of
the phenomena, even in its legitimate sense, was suppressed and that, consequently,
the existential problems connected therewith were lost from sight.
(2) At this place I am leaving out an entire paragraph which seems to me to be a
partial repetition, not yet adequately harmonized with the preceding. Nevertheless,

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since it seems to bring out another side of existential "Stellungnahmen," though one
not clearly distinguished from the antecedent type, I am adding the suppressed
paragraph here:
"But there is still another meaning of the sentence 'Life is not worth living.'
Here the speaker really wants to say 'Life is not worth living for me; I don't
worth living." But in this sentence he has omitted the addition 'for me.' He does
not mean to state a fact about the world; he only wants to give expression to an
attitude. 'I hate this man' may only give expression to my hatred or communicate
the fact that I hate him. Yet the form of saying this would not differ in the two
cases. But in the one case it would be an ontological statement of a psychical fact,
the fact that I am taking an existential attitude; in the other case it would be an
existential outburst."
(3) Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 3rd ed. Berlin, 1925, pp.
2 ff.
(4) Cf. Max Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Leipzig (Neuer
Geist Verlag),1926. Wesen und Sinn von Wissen und Erkenntnis, pp. 243 f.
(5) Not a real quotation; cf. for reference De religion 72 f. and De Civitate Dei,
XI, 26.
(6) This sentence is an almost literal repetition from p. 261. In view of the some-
what different context, I did not think it fit to omit it. The same applies to the
passage on p. 266.
(7) Max Scheler, Wesen und Sinn von Wissen und Erkenntnis; see note 4.
(8) Plato, Phaedrus, 230d.
(9) Essay on Man, Epistle II; an incomplete reference to Goethe which followed
could not be identified. Probably it referred to the related passage in "Wahlver-
wandtschaften" (Jubilaeums Ausgabe, 21, 23) or to the one in Wilhelm Meisters
Lehrjahre (ibid., 17, 113): "Der Mensch ist dem Menschen das Interessanteste und
sollte ihn vielleicht ganz allein interessieren."
(10) This example, in its present form, remains somewhat ambiguous. Does
Geiger mean that even superficial mourning penetrates to existential depth? Or
does he mean that morning, in spite of its remaining on the surface, is by its nature a
deep experience of existential weight? Cf. note 12.
(11) This is an allusion to Geiger's psychological studies, not only under Theodor
Lipps in Munich but with Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, the results of which were
published under the title "Methodische und experimentelle Beitrage zur QuantitAts-
lehre" (in Theodor Lipps, Psychologische Untersuchungen, vol. I.).
(12) In earlier publications Geiger has given a thorough discussion of this concept
of psychological depth, notably in his essay "Beitraege zur Phenomenologie des
aesthetischen Genusses" (Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie und Phaenomenologische For-
schung, vol. I, 1913, pp. 567 ff.). In the course of his penetrating and detailed anal-
yses (pp. 622 ff.) he distinguishes five possible meanings of depth, as applied to vari-
ous psychological phenomena:
(I) being located close to the ego ("Ichzentriertheit" or "Ichnaehe") as implied in
every enjoyment, but lacking, for instance, in a superficial wish, which has been sug-
gested only from the outside (e.g., by an advertisement);
(II) originating from the deepest strata of the ego, such as the inextinguishable desire
for freedom or for love, as distinguished from the superficial and temporary, but pos-
sibly quite intense, desire to be left alone by a certain person;
(III) gripping the deepest strata of the ego ("die tiefsten Schichten des Ich ergrei-
fend"), a characteristic which, for instance, in the case of enjoyment, depends upon

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the attitude of the enjoying person who is either completely in the grip of his enjoy-
ment or only superficially touched;
(IV) absorbing the whole of our inner life ("ausfuellend"); thus a wish or a volition
does not necessarily fill out our whole consciousness, and even in enjoyment our self
may be divided between enjoyment and other experiences;
(V) having a specific existential weight; thus enjoyment from food, drink, or play
has not the same significance or seriousness which has, for instance, the deep enjoy-
ment of a Beethoven symphony.
In his Zugaenge zur Aesthetik, Leipzig, 1928, Geiger contrasts the surface-effect
with the depth-effect of art, illustrating chiefly the third of the above mentioned
meanings of psychological depth ("Oberflaechen- und Tiefenwirkung der Kunst,"
pp. 43 ff.). Here the distinctions of the "Beitrdge" are not further developed. But
the connection of the concept of depth with that of existential significance is clearly
worked out, particularly in the following essay on "Die psychische Bedeutung der
Kunst."
(13) In this form not a literal quotation from Plato.

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An Introduction to Existential Philosophy

Author(s): Herbert Spiegelberg and Moritz Geiger

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2103176

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VOLUME III, No. 3 MARCH, 1943

AN INTRODUCTION TO EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

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I. KINDS OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY1

"Existential Philosophy" is a collective term for many problems, many

1 It seems noteworthy that his lectures on "Psychologie auf phaenomenologischer

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"Ontological Philosophy." The distinguishing feature of all existential

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So far as an existential philosophy is only voicing an existential attitude,

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can these justifications themselves only be lined up? Or do they possess

It is now necessary to discuss the three following problems:

Every existential attitude is "subjective," if "subjective" means the

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cance.-Of course you may also investigate the existential significance of

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for everyone. "Proof" in this connection means justification. Whether

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III. ONTOLOGICAL AND EXISTENTIAL PROBLEMS

[1. Contrast between Ontology and Existential Philosophy.]

Men approach philosophy with entirely different aims. Some want to

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[2. Ontological Problems.]

There are many ontological problems in philosophy besides those of

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an object; it is no longer taken as a living expression of the ego but as an

IV. PSYCHOLOGY AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

[1. The Existential Attitude and Psychological Phenomena.]

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[2. The Meaning of Psychology for Existential Philosophy.]

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explaining them away. However, the real differences [between existen-

[3. Existential Problems.]

[4; Allegorical Terminology.]

One might expect a strong objection to the preceding analysis: I am

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[even] larger physical and psychical features are often without s

The problem of value is one of those issues in relation to which the

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[In a subsequent section of the German Introduction there is a discus-

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ditional distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. Re-

VI. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

[1. The Ontological Misinterpretation of Existential Philosophy.]

It is one of the greatest mistakes of the historians of philosophy that

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[2. Connections between Ontology and Existential Philosophy in the

But these solutions aiming at a kind of truce [between ontological and

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highest knowledge is fundamental for the worth of man. Plato's doctrine

[3. The Ontological and Existential Viewpoint in Religion and Scholastic