LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY, MANILA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

PH.D. IN IHM/ Fundamental of Philosophy

PROFESSOR: Carl Mark B. Miniano STUDENT: Zhu Zengyu

ASSIGNMENT: Article 3 DATE: 16th June

Article3:Comments on Smithies

the following questions

2.1 What work is the basis for the commentary? What specific contents of the work is
being refuted and what are those that the author agree?
This article is a comments on Smithies' book "The Epistemic Role of Consciousness" and have
organized them into three themes: zombies, propositional vs. doxastic justification, and Moorean
propositions.
Zombies:
(i) Scientific indispensability: The author raise the point that if we consider zombies seriously, their
behavior would still require notions of rationality and justification for our best theories to make sense
of their actions and interactions. Author argue that if representational mental states are attributed to
zombies based on scientific indispensability, the same reasoning should apply to rationality and
justification. However, you suggest that labeling the rationality and justification of zombies as
different from genuine rationality and justification would be desperate and implausible. This raises
questions about whether the basing relation must be causal and how phenomenal properties play a
role in belief formation.
(ii) Basing phenomenal beliefs vs. Z-beliefs: Another concern this article bring up is that if zombies
were possible, phenomenal properties would seem to be epiphenomenal, lacking any
causal-explanatory role in the formation of phenomenal beliefs. This makes it difficult to understand
how we can have doxastically justified beliefs about our phenomenal properties if they do not causally
influence belief formation.
Propositional vs. doxastic justification:
(i) Fido and Fif: This article discuss Smithies' example of phenomenal/internal duplicates looking at
visually indistinguishable apples (Fido and Fif). Smithies argues that both duplicates have the same
propositional justification to believe in both Fido's and Fif's rottenness. However, author raise the
issue that when considering two phenomenal duplicate twins looking at scenes with Fido and Fif in
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different positions, they can both form conflicting beliefs even though they supposedly have
propositional justification for both beliefs. This seems to contradict Smithies' Modified Linking
principle.
(ii) Rationality and attention: Smithies claims that an ideally rational agent can always convert
propositional justification into doxastic justification, and failures to do so are due to departures from
rationality. However, this article propose that limitations in attention, similar to perceptual
limitations, should not be seen as failures of rationality. The author argue that our cognitive access to
conscious experience goes through the faculty of attention, and if it provides less than full access, it is
akin to a perceptual limitation.
Moorean propositions:
(i) On Moorean Finkishness: Smithies considers Moorean propositions to be "Finkish" because
forming a belief in such propositions changes our evidence and renders the belief false. Although
Smithies claims that one can be in a position to know Moorean propositions, the author find this
formulation somewhat strange. This article question the notion of being in a position to know a
proposition that is necessarily impossible to know, and author highlight the Finkishness as the
reason why converting propositional justification into knowledge is impossible.
Overall, the author comments raise thought-provoking questions and engage with the ideas
presented in Smithies' book.
2.2 What are the rebuttal arguments of the author for each of the specific contents
identified?
Zombies:
This article discuss the idea of zombies and their mental states, particularly focusing on the ascription
of rationality and justification to zombies. Author suggest that if zombies exist and exhibit behavior
similar to humans, our best theories would likely appeal to notions of rationality and justification to
make sense of their behavior. The author question the distinction between genuine
rationality/justification and rationality*/justification* and argue that it would be implausible to
consider zombies as having only the latter.
Propositional vs. doxastic justification:
This article delve into the discussion of propositional and doxastic justification, specifically
examining a scenario involving phenomenal duplicates looking at visually indistinguishable scenes.
The author raise a concern about Smithies' position that both duplicates have propositional
justification for believing contradictory de re propositions. The author argue that both duplicates
should be able to form both conflicting beliefs, which contradicts Smithies' Modified Linking
principle. Additionally, author discuss the role of rationality and attention in relation to propositional
justification, suggesting that limitations in attention should not be seen as failures of rationality.
Moorean propositions:
Authors address Smithies' characterization of Moorean propositions as "Finkish" and discuss the
idea that even though one can be in a position to know a Moorean proposition, it is necessarily

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impossible to know it due to the Finkishness of the situation. The author express some skepticism
about this characterization and the notion of being in a position to know a proposition that is
necessarily unknowable.
2.3 Do you support the authors rebuttal for each of the content being argued? Why or
why not?
I think I support the first rebutttal for author about Zombies. The article discuss the idea of zombies
having representational mental states and argue that if zombies exist, they would also possess
properties like justification and rationality. I suggest that in a world of zombies, notions of rationality
and justification would be indispensable for understanding their behavior. However, that has a
question whether the appeal to scientific indispensability for representational mental states is equally
strong for rational and justified mental states in zombies. Meanwhile I also agree with author raise
concerns about the basing relation and how it applies to phenomenal beliefs and Z-beliefs.
About the second rebuttal of Propositional vs. doxastic justification, I don’t think so the author
critique Smithies' position on phenomenal/internal duplicates and their propositional and doxastic
justification. Specifically, article raise a case involving phenomenal duplicate twins and argue that
both twins can form conflicting beliefs despite having propositional justification for both. About the
role of rationality and attention in the formation of justified beliefs about one's conscious experiences,
questioning whether limitations in attention should be seen as a failure of rationality, I don’t think
they are the same siutuation to compare with.
I support the last rebuttal for author about Moorean propositions. The author focus on Smithies'
treatment of Moorean propositions and their "Finkish" nature. I agree with author express some
skepticism about the idea that one can be in a position to know a Moorean proposition while also
acknowledging that it is necessarily impossible to know it. Even though author question Smithies'
distinction between propositional justification and knowledge in the context of Moorean
propositions.
These are complex philosophical topics, and it would require a detailed analysis of Smithies'
arguments and positions to provide a comprehensive response. But for me, they are really too
complex to understand or comment it.