Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court No.

L-74457, 148 SCRA 659 [Mar

20, 1987]
ISSUE: Whether due process is violative of due process clause of the Constitution?
FACTS: Ynot challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. of Marcos: (1)
prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabeef and the slaughtering of carabaos,
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose; (2) carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of EO shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.
• Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo.
• The carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. • Ynot sued for recovery at RTC.
RTC issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
• After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
• RTC declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
• The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
• IAC upheld the trial court
• Ynot filed a petition for review on certiorari.
CONTENTIONS OF YNOT (UNCONSTITUTIONAL: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS)
• it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries.
• The penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
• Improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution.
SG: Affirmed the Constitutionality of EO 626-A for the "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs (except: F-11y/o, M7y/o)."
RULING: Lower Courts are not prevented from examining constitutional questions whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. Therefore, the resolution of Ynot’s
case may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
EO 626 A is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
• Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more
than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
• The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported.
• Omission of the right to a previous hearing may be allowed if there is immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
• In the case, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the
executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the
 
 Tio vs. Videogram regulatory Board
151 scra, GR. No. L-75697
June 18, 1957

FACTS:
TIO IS a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate ND SUPERVISE the
videogram industry. The Presidential Decree was also reinforced by Preseidentila decree 1994
which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that ‘ there shall be
collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback , regardless of length , an
annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Decree on the ground
that is undue delegation of power and authority.

ISSUE: WON PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included.

HELD: No. the title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough
to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be the index of the
decree. The express purpose of the PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from
Preamble. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. Neither
can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA V. BOT,119 SCRA 597 (1982)

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is safety and comfort of the riding public form the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights.

FACTS: 
To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the
commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to
be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.,
Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and
Memorandum Circular of the BLT.

ISSUES: 
Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection
against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or
persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit
position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide
discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as
taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ (RTC Judge), and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO (City Fiscal) [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

ISSUE: Whether BP22 is constitutional.

FACTS: These are several petitions arising from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22.
• Defendants all moved to quash the informations, the statute being unconstitutional.
• The motions were denied by the RTC
• The parties adversely affected have come to SC for relief.

Question in the constitutionality of BP 22:

(1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
(2) it impairs freedom of contract;
(3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
(4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
(5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

SG: it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying their motions to quash,
these orders being interlocutory.

BP22: Purpose: stop the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, because of the injury it causes to
the public interests.
• The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused to the property rights of the
victim. BP 22 covers those checks issued in payment of pre-existing debts, which is not covered in Art. 15
(d) of RPC. The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous
exchange for something of value.

BP 22 punishes a person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value:
• knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or
• would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment; or
• having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues
a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of 90 days from the date of the check, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.

In order to prevent violation of BP22: The statute provides 5 banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the
holder the amount of the check.
Ruling:
the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
1. BP 22 does not impair freedom of contract.
• The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts.
• Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.
• Checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts.
• It is a commercial instrument which has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms
part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the
state.

2. BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
• People v. Vera Reyes case— "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on
the part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries
agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties."
o The law was viewed to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare.
• What does the statute prohibit and punishes as an offense?
o BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment; not the nonpayment of an obligation which the
law punishes.
o The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
o The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law.
o The law punishes the act as an offense against public order.
o Issuance of bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, hence, BP22 is enacted
through Police Power.
o The basis or foundation of making a check a medium for payment is confidence. If
such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would diminish.
o Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred, for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community. The petitions were dismissed.
Agustin v. Edu No. L-49112, 88 SCRA 195 [Feb 2, 1979]

Pacta sunt servanda. Literally means “agreements must be kept.” A basic principle in civil and
international law that the pact is binding upon the parties and must be fulfilled by them in good
faith. (Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195)

Facts.
In the interest of safety on all streets and highways, Pres. Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 229, directing, among others, all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles
to have at all times in their motor vehicles at least 1 pair of early warning device (EWD).
Petitioner Agustin after setting forth that he “is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car xxx
already properly equipped xxx with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an
EWD xxx” allege that said LOI is unconstitutional as it is an invalid exercise of police power. He
asserts it is contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device to the specified set of EWDs. He insists it is arbitrary and unconscionable to the
motoring public, and illegal and immoral because they will make manufacturers and dealers
instant millionaires at the expense of car owners.

Issue. Is the said LOI unconstitutional?

Held. No. While the Court found none of the constitutional defects alleged against the LOI, it still
exerted effort in making the following observation: “The conclusion reached by this Court xxx is
reinforced by [the] consideration that [this] petition itself quoted the whereas clauses of the
assailed LOI: ‘[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signal and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices, xxx.’ It cannot
be disputed then that [the Incorporation clause] in the Constitution possesses relevance xxx. It is
not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
Pacta sunt servanda36 stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.”
SOCIAL JUSTICE Art II, Sec 10. Social justice, classically defined - is neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces is the promotion of the welfare of all the people xxx through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in their interrelations of the members
of the community xxx through the adoption of measures xxx [and] the exercise of powers xxx of
[the government] on the xxx principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Calalang v. Williams No. 47800, 70 PHIL 726 [Dec 2, 1940]

Facts. The National Traffic Commission, under the direction of respondent Williams, resolved to
recommend to the Dir. of Public Works and to the Sec. of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along parts of Rosario St. and Rizal Ave.
during certain periods of time. Resolution was approved and executed. Petitioner Calalang, in
his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer, prayed for a writ of prohibition against
respondents contending, among others, that CA 548, under which said resolution was acted
upon, infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.

Issue. Is CA 548 an infringement of social justice?

Held. No. The promotion of social justice xxx is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
CHURCHILL & TAIT v. RAFFERTY

FACTS:

Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from the road and strongly built,
not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to
the morals of the community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue, decided to remove the
billboards after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls.

Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to remove after due investigation, any billboard exposed
to the public view if it decides that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.

In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and
still are offensive to the sight."

The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting and
enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section
100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the
property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?

HELD:

YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be suppressed by the State especially those
situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power of the state, as long as it is
justified by public interest and safety.

Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country,
and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon
such territory is amenable to the police power of the State.
Carrie BUCK VS. BELL
Facts of the case
Carrie Buck was a "feeble minded woman" who was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed
for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the
welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required
to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.

Question
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the
law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that
Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the
substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which
the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the
Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after
"months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that
there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes
affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped
with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

CONCLUSION:

The Court affirmed the state supreme court's judgment. The hearing procedure provided
before sterilization of those deemed to be feeble minded satisfied due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that the procedure was limited to people housed in
state institutions did not deny the inmates equal protection. The Court further held that the
state could properly sterilize those determined to be feeble minded to prevent the birth of
feeble minded children who might lead lives of crime or indigency. According to the Court,
the fact that the sterilization order procedure only applied to inmates in state facilities and
not to the general public did not deprive the inmates of equal protection.
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v ERICTA CASE
DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CITY GOV’T OF QUEZON CITY v ERICTA                               G.R. No. L-34915  June 24,
1983

FACTS: The City government of Quezon City enacted Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF". Sec. 9
of the said ordinance provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of
approval of the application.
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as
a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance
per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: NO. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of an (sic) private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use
as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant
to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the

taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
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Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that
‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there
are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary
attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not
reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under
the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in
the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public

welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property
of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public
use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
Jacobson v. Massachusettes
Facts of the case
A Massachusetts law allowed cities to require residents to be vaccinated against smallpox.
Cambridge adopted such an ordinance, with some exceptions. Jacobson refused to comply with
the requirement and was fined five dollars.

Question
Did the mandatory vaccination law violate Jacobson's Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty?

Conclusion
The Court held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the
public health and safety of its citizens. Local boards of health determined when mandatory
vaccinations were needed, thus making the requirement neither unreasonable nor arbitrarily
imposed.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of the campaign.

Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain
provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without
payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free
airtime is to authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on
Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.

ISSUE#1: Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question on the assailed
provision?
HELD#1: YES.
[W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the
requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free airtime is
sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.

ISSUE#2: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking of private
property for public use without just compensation?
HELD#2: NO.
Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among
other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when
the common good so requires.”
FACTS:

In separate trials, petitioner Yakus and another defendant were tried and convicted by the
United States District Court for Massachusetts upon several counts of indictments charging
violation of §§ 4 (a) and 205 (b) of the Emergency Price Control Act by the willful sale of
wholesale cuts of beef at prices above the maximum prices prescribed by §§ 1364.451-
1364.455 of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169 ("Regulation"). On appeal, petitioners
asserted that the Regulation did not conform to the standards prescribed by the Act, and that
it involved unconstitutional delegation to the Price Administrator of the legislative power of
Congress to control prices.

ISSUE:

Did the Emergency Price Control Act involve an unconstitutional delegation to the Price
Administrator of the legislative power of Congress to control prices?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as
amended, did not involve an unconstitutional delegation to the Price Administrator of the
legislative power of Congress to control commodity prices in time of war. According to the
Court, the Act, the declared purpose of which was to prevent wartime inflation, provided for
the establishment of an Office of Price Administration under the direction of a Price
Administrator appointed by the President of the United States. The Administrator was
authorized, after consultation with representative members of the industry so far as
practicable, to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities which in his
judgment were generally fair and equitable and would effectuate the purposes of this Act
when, in his judgment, their prices had risen or threatened to rise to an extent or in a manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. The Administrator was directed in fixing prices to
give due consideration, so far as practicable, to prices prevailing during a designated base
period, and to make adjustments for relevant factors of general applicability. Moreover, the
Court averred that the essentials of the legislative function were preserved when Congress
had specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directed that its statutory
command shall be effective.

US v. Toribio

UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, (A)

15 Phil. 85 (1910)

FACTS:
 The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao,
without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
the provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
 It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle
without a permit of the municipal treasure.
 It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being
provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of
slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in section 30 and
the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse.

HELD:
 No, The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and
to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will
readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and
marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and
persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by
slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses
 Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker
and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit
and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any
place without the permit provided for in section 30.