CAYETANO V.

MONSOD 201 SCRA 210

Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR
23) Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Cayetano vs.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210, G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991:

NEGROS STEVEDORING V. COURT OF APPEALS 162 SCRA 371

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

RULE 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection forthwith
shall render him liable.

The excuse proffered by Delgado’s counsel cannot be considered a good and sufficient cause or justification for the
failure to file on time the appellant’s brief.—The excuse proffered by DELGADO’s counsel cannot be considered a good
and sufficient cause or justification for the failure to file on time the appellant’s brief. It is evident from the reason given
by DELGADO’s counsel that there was negligence not just on the part of the receiving clerk who inadvertently handed
the notice to a lawyer, not in charge of the case, but, also on the part of the latter who did nothing to inform the lawyer
in the same law firm, handling the case, of said notice, and principally, on the part of the lawyer handling the case who
was just waiting for the notice, without doing anything to find out whether such notice might have already been
received by the law firm. Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 371, No. L-36003 June 21, 1988

DONALD DEE V. AMELITO MUTUC 176 SCRA 651

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services
he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client. Petitioner, however, denied the existence of
any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and private respondent. He admits that he and his
father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee’s gambling account. However, he insists that
such visit was merely an informal one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle the
problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services “as a friend of defendant’s family”
to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner
claims that it was not in the nature of attorney’s fees but merely “pocket money” solicited by the former for his trips to
Las Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly voluntary services. Dee
vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651, G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989

The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent
for lack of a written contract to that effect. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was
a professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is
not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter.12 Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651, G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989

A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the
interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees.18 Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651, G.R. No. 77439
August 24, 1989

BATES V. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA 433 US 350

The Court upheld the right of lawyers to advertise their services. In holding that lawyer advertising was commercial
speech entitled to protection under the First Amendment (incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment), the Court upset the tradition against advertising by lawyers, rejecting it as an antiquated rule of etiquette.
The Court emphasized the benefits of the information that flows to consumers through advertising, positing that lawyer
advertising would make legal services more accessible to the general public and improve the overall administration of
justice. The Court had previously held in Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council that
advertising by pharmacists regarding the price of prescription drugs was commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment.

SANTIAGO V. FOJAS 248 SCRA 68

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him
to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: “A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.”

The respondent’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a “losing cause” for the
complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the
complainants’ act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly
persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have
seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Santiago vs. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68, Adm. Case No. 4103 September 7, 1995

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES V. NLRC 269 SRCA 733

It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and received a just and reasonable compensation for services
performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to
represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.26 It will
thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under
the retainer agreement27 entered into by him and petitioner. Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent vs.
NLRC, 269 SCRA 733, G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997
The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the
instant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover
the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in
Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render
the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733, G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997

A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any
ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The
future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a
fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether
or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the
opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunities.

A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may
have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent
contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special retainer. Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent
vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733, G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997

For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data
as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our
sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services
rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733, G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997 – QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he
deserves)

NAKPIL V. VALDEZ 286 SCRA 758

Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to
his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession

Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell
the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and
the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation. Nakpil vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, Adm. Case No.
2040 March 4, 1998

It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. Nakpil vs.
Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, Adm. Case No. 2040 March 4, 1998

SOTTO V. SAMSON 5 SCRA 733

CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients

Attorney and Client; Prohibition against counsel to buy client's property.—The conveyance of the property in litigation
by the litigant to his counsel during the existence of attorney-and-client relationship is void. The statute prohibiting such
sale is designed to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of their confidential association.
Sotto vs. Samson, 5 SCRA 733, No. L-16917 July 31, 1962

This is a review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in a
litigation which began with a complaint of Quintillana Samson (Sanson) to annul the sale of a lot executed by her in favor
of defendant Vicente Sotto. She alleges that, as her attorney, Sotto had taken advantage of her financial difficulties and
mental weakness and of the confidence she had reposed in him. Sotto vs. Samson, 5 SCRA 733, No. L-16917 July 31,
1962

On this paramount issue, we must declare that on May 11, 1926 when this sale was first agreed upon, Sotto was
Samson's lawyer in a litigation involving the subject of the contract. Therefore, Sotto was disqualified to buy under
article 1459 of the Civil Code, Sotto vs. Samson, 5 SCRA 733, No. L-16917 July 31, 1962

Indeed, because of their client-attorney relationship Sotto probably unduly influences Samson, not only to sell the lot to
him but also to accept terms less favorable to her. Sotto vs. Samson, 5 SCRA 733, No. L-16917 July 31, 1962

RUBIAS V. BATILLER 51 SCRA 120

"On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could
proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have a cause
of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law,
Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to
this Court and docketed as CA-G-R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-
in-law, Francisco Militante. Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120, No. L-35702 May 29, 1973

LORENZANA FOOD V. DORIA 197 SCRA 428

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Daria, 197 SCRA 428, Adm. Case No. 2736 May 27, 1991

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted in
complainant LFC’s default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence. The
respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the
scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not.4 Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Daria, 197 SCRA 428,
Adm. Case No. 2736 May 27, 1991

CANON 21- An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after
the relation of attorney and client has terminated Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Daria, 197 SCRA 428, Adm. Case
No. 2736 May 27, 1991

CANON 17—A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the
counteraffidavit,12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a
matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is
also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant
and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. Daria, 197 SCRA 428, Adm. Case No. 2736
May 27, 1991

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN 262 SCRA 122

CANON 17—A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Accra Lawyers impleaded by the PCGG – The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG’s COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away
from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No.
105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a
matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262
SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

Exceptions to the general rule of disclosure:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA
122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First
Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure,
framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners’ legal service
to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan,
First Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, “that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime.”47 Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First
Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act,
as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot
use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.48 The reason for the second
has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client
privilege, in general, exists. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113
September 20, 1996

HILADO V. DAVID 84 PHIL 569

CANON 17—A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIBNT, WHEN EXISTS.—"To constitute professional employment
it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion * * *. It is
not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established * * *."

2.ID. ; ATTORNEY Is INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES.—There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court
prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are
opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule
123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569, No. L-961 September 21, 1949

MARTINEZ V. BANOGON 7 SCRA 913

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees

For one reason or another, the case was not closed and terminated as expected. Up to the filing of his claim for
Attorney’s fees, Atty. Martinez had already received P1,320.00 as compensation for the services rendered by him as
counsel in this case.

On March 5, 1957, in the same proceedings, a petition was filed stating that the reasonable value of all the services
rendered by him up to the termination of the case is P6,000.00; that this amount be taken and considered as part of
the expenses of administration minus the amount of P1,320.00 already paid out of the proceeds of the product of the
estate and duly approved by the court; and that the said amount of P1,320.00 is not a reasonable compensation. In
support of his claim, Atty. Martinez made an itemization of the services rendered by him, together with an
information as to the real worth and income of the estate, and the length of time it took this case to be closed and
terminated. While admitting the existence of the contract for professional service above-mentioned, Atty. Martinez now
contends that the same is not binding for the reason that the heirs were not duly authorized by the former
administrator to enter into such contract. On the other hand, the heirs allege that Atty. Martinez had been fully paid for
his services in accordance with the contract in question and that he had also been paid an additional sum of P520.00, for
other incidental services. Martinez vs. Banogon, 7 SCRA 913, No. L-15698 April 30, 1963
Attorney and client; Compensation of attorneys; Circumstances to be considered in determining compensation.—The
circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an attorney: (1) the amount and character of the
services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of
the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a
recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.
(Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil. 419.) Martinez vs. Banogon, 7 SCRA 913, No. L-15698 April 30, 1963

A lawyer of long experience and good standing is presumed to have sized up the entire situation before entering into a
contract of professional services. The fact that he had been rendering services to his client before he entered into a
contract with him, is immaterial in determining his compensation, because even the time employed is not an
appropriate basis for fixing the amount of compensation Martinez vs. Banogon, 7 SCRA 913, No. L-15698 April 30, 1963

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC 223 SCRA 378

FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following
advertisements: (Guam Divorce, Secret Marriage)

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case
of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and whether
the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case of Cayetano
vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed
that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf
of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business (Canon 3.04).