Trizio 11

Knotenpunkt Byzanz
Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen

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Knotenpunkt Byzanz
Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen
Edited by Speer, Andreas / Steinkrüger, Philipp
DE GRUYTER
2012
Pages: i–iv
ISBN (Online): 9783110272314
DOI (Chapter): 10.1515/9783110272314.fm

DOI (Book): 10.1515/9783110272314
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A Neoplatonic Refutation of Islam
from the Time of the Komneni *
MICHELE TRIZIO (Bari)
The commentary of Eustratius of Nicaea on book VI of Aristotle’s ‘Nico-

machean Ethics’ contains a five-page autonomous digression refuting Islam that
has remained curiously unstudied 1. The text lies within a commentary on Aristotle
and not within a theological refutation of a ‘heresy’, a fact which might explain
why it has been ignored by specialists in Byzantine anti-Muslim apologetics 2. It
only explicitly declares its target at the very end of the digression3. Eustratius
does not address the traditional theological topics discussed by the other Byzan-
tine polemicists in response to Muslim criticisms – such as the Trinity or the
Qur’an as ‘holy scripture’; nor does he follow his predecessors’ usual reconstruc-
tion of the history of the Muslim faith and Mohamed’s life4. His approach is
* I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Guy Guldentops, Yannis Demetracopoulos and

Antonio Rigo for their thoughtful suggestions in the writing of the present paper.
1 On Eustratius’ biography and bibliography see M. Cacouros, Eustrate de Nicée, in: R. Goulet
(ed.), Dictionnaire de Philosophes Antiques, III, Paris 2000, 378–388. The text is found in
Eustratii et Michaeli et Anonyma, in: Ethica Nicomachea commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut (Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 20), Berlin 1892, 272.9–277.17. I will refer to this text and to
other passages from Eustratius’ commentary on book I and VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’
contained in this volume only by quoting the page and line numbers.
2 I shall mention only the most relevant and consequential contribution to this topic: G. Güter-
bock, Der Islam im Lichte der byzantinischen Polemik, Berlin 1912; W. Eichner, Die Nachrichten
über den Islam bei den Byzantinern, in: Der Islam 23 (1936), 133–162, 197–244; E. Trapp,
Manuel II. Palaiologos. Dialoge mit einem ‘Perser’, Wien 1966; A.T. Khoury, Les théologiens
byzantins et l’Islam. Textes et auteurs (VIIIe–XIIIe s.), Louvain–Paris 1968; Id., Polémique byzan-
tine contre l’Islam (VIIIe–XIIIe s.), Leiden 21972. None of these contributions mentions Eustra-
tius’ refutation of Islam contained in his commentary on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’.
It seems that the forthcoming D. Thomas/A. Mallett, A History of Christian Muslim Relations,
3 (1050–1200), Leiden, does not mention it either. The only reference I could find to Eustratius’
refutation of Islam is the prefatory introduction to the volumes of the “Ancient Commentators
on Aristotle” series, like in Dexippus, On Aristotle’s Categories, translated by John Dillon (The
Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, 5), London 1990, 135.
3 Eustratius’ refutation of Islam is not contained in the main manuscripts collecting most of the
Byzantine anti-Muslim works, such as the Lavra W 44 (1854). On this manuscript and the related
bibliography see A. Rigo, Niceta Byzantios, la sua opera e il monaco Evodio, in: G. Fiaccadori
(ed.), In Partibus Clius. Studi in onore di Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, Napoli 2006, 147–187,
164–167.
4 E.g. Niketas Byzantios, Refutatio Mohamedis, ed. K. Förstel, Niketas von Byzanz, Schriften zum
Islam I, Würzburg–Altenberge 2000, xxvii, 2–3, 138.18–140.64; Georgius Hamartolus, Chro-
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146 Michele Trizio
revealing of a more subtle, if not unique, rejection of Islam through a philo-

sophical argument. Thus, this digression does not only represent a missing piece
in Byzantine anti-Muslim apologetics, but mirrors the intellectual trends of
Eustratius’ time.
I. T he Str ucture of the Text
The digression begins: “if the discussion will be prolonged towards the in-
vestigation of this topic, no-one would mind” 5. It ends some five pages later with
a rhetorical question: “what can be added to what has been said up to now, for
enough has been yet said to refute the irrationality of the dogma, since discussing
this issue does not fit in with the scope we settled at the beginning?” 6. The whole
text is introduced by an aporia that takes its cue from an Aristotelian passage that
Eustratius encountered while commenting on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’. Here, Aristotle writes that “we have therefore to ascertain what disposi-
tion of each of these faculties, i.e. the scientific and the deliberative one, is the
best, for that will be the special virtue of each” (1139a15–16), and concludes that
“the virtue of a faculty is related to the special function which that faculty per-
forms” (1139a16–17). While commenting on this latter passage, Eustratius writes:
“Yet, there is an aporia. In fact, if each potency must proceed into a disposition, and
each disposition into its proper act, so that each thing obtains in such a way its perfec-
tion, on what basis the intemperate (oi™ a¬kolastaínontev), those who do wrong, the
cheaters and those who perform other things of this kind are to be judged as worthy of
punishment? In fact, while using the corresponding potency and acting accordingly,
each of these acquires a habit and performs actions according to that habit, and in such
a way gains the perfection of that potency, so that his proper potency is not wasted.”7
Clearly, Eustratius uses this argument as a pretext for introducing his criticism
because he must have known that, according to Aristotle’s book VI of the ‘Nico-
machean Ethics’ (1144a9–11), not every faculty or part of the soul has a virtue
that contributes to the proper function of man. For example, there is no virtue of
the nutritive faculty. A close look at the structure of this digression, however,
shows that it is aporematic as it reproduces the scheme of the philosophical trea-
tises by Michael Psellus and John Italus, two of Eustratius’ predecessors. Starting
nicon, ed. C. de Boor, Georgii monachi Chronicon, vol. II, Leipzig 1904, 705.22–706.20; Euthy-
mius Zigabenus, Panoplia Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130, 1133A–D. Cf. Khoury, Polémique
(nt. 2), 60–71; A. Rigo, Gli Ismaeliti e la discendenza di Abramo nella Refutazione del Corano di
Niceta Byzantios (metà del IX secolo), in: G. Ruggeri (ed.), L’immagine del nemico, Bologna
1997, 83–104. In the present paper I shall compare Eustratios’ refutation of Islam only with
those anti-Muslim works written before or during Eustratios’ life.
5 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272.12–13
6 Ibid., 277.13–15
7 Ibid., 272.3–9.

A Neoplatonic Refutation of Islam from the Time of the Komneni 147
from the more general the author proceeds to the more particular, first by clari-
fying the main points of the problem and its basic notions, and then providing
the reader with the solution to the problem. In so doing, Eustratius repeatedly
addresses an imaginary opponent, whose foolishness and ignorance are revealed
by his repeated denials of what any educated person would know. The structure
of the text consists of four main points: (1) the division of the faculties of the
soul into cognitive and appetitive, and into rational and irrational (272.17–274.14);
(2) the cardinal virtues: a refutation of those who believe that bodily pleasures are
good (274.14–275.1); (3) why God endowed man with irrational potencies or
faculties (275.1–276.20); and (4) solution (276.20–277.17).
II. T he Anti-Muslim Vocabular y
Apparently, the vocabulary of Eustratius’ anti-Muslim digression reveals ele-

ments that might be traced back to earlier Byzantine polemicists. The introductory
formulas were widely used by the Greek Fathers and the later Byzantine theo-
logians to address the heretics. In fact, Eustratius refers to “those who babble
these idle things” 8 as the target of his digression, and identifies them as “those
who talk theses non-senses9. The latter is an expression used by George Hamarto-
lus to refer to Mohamed in his ‘Chronicon’10. Yet much of Eustratius’ vocabulary
is only vaguely reminiscent of the Byzantine apologists’ allegations against the
Muslim faith and Mohamed.
Only at the very end of the digression does Eustratius declare his target expli-
citly, which, given the original character of the whole text, complicates the rela-
tionship between the conclusion and the preceding five pages. Nevertheless,
when Robert Grosseteste († 1253) translated Eustratius’ commentaries on the
‘Ethics’ into Medieval Latin he demonstrated remarkable alacrity in recognizing
the Anti-Muslim overtones of the text. When rendering the Greek word yeudo-
profäthv as “pseudopropheta” he records in the margin of the text: “scil. Macho-
metus” (277.6) 11. Thus, the first Latin reader of Grosseteste’s translation, Albert
the Great, comments on Eustratius’ digression: “et quia Commentator disputat hic
multum contra Machumetum ” 12. As a matter of fact, the word ‘pseudoprophet’ to
refer to Mohamed was common among the Byzantine authors, especially among
Byzantine apologists and historians13.
8 Ibid., 272.13: “pròv toùv laloûntav tà mátaia”.

9 Ibid., 272.23–24: “toùv e k¬ eîna tà lhrämata légontav”.
10 Georgius Hamartolus, Chronicon, 703,18.
11 Robertus Grossatesta, Eustratii Metropolitani Nicaeae enarratio in sextum Aristotelis Moralium
ad Nicomachum, Vat. Lat. 2171, fol. 1r–211v, 101rb.
12 Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica, ed. W. Kübel, Opera Omnia 14.2, Münster 1987, 404, 63–64.
13 See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus, 100, ed. P.B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes
von Damaskos, vol. 4 (Patristische Texte und Studien 22), Berlin 1981, 60, 11; Theophanes,
Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor, Theophanis Chronographia, vol. 1, Leipzig 1883, 333.1–2,

148 Michele Trizio
Likewise, Eustratius regards the mistaken interpretation of Aristotle’s text as a

heresy of Islam, attributing the relativistic idea that man’s perfection can be achiev-
ed through actualizing any faculty of the soul, and introduces the digression with
the formula “ toiaûta kaì polloùv oi®da proteinoménouv tøn mocjhrøn
kaì dóxav toiaútav katà jrhskeíav kratoúsav kaì ei¬v e ¢jnh e x¬ aplouménav
o™lóklhra” (“I came to know that many wicked people support such views and
I am aware that similar opinions that go against religion are prevailing and
spreading through entire peoples”)14. This is a paraphrase of the beginning of
chapter 100/101 of John of Damascus’ ‘De haeresibus’ where the author
famously writes “ ºEsti dè kaì h™ mécri toû nûn kratoûsa laoplanæv jrhskeía
tøn ’Ismahlitøn pródromov ou®sa toû a¬nticrístou” (“There is also the deceiving
religion of the Ishmaelites prevailing until now as forerunner of the Anti-
christ”)15.
Although the target of Eustratius’ attack is only explicitly declared at the very
end of the text, as indicated above, there is no doubt whatsoever about the anti-
Muslim intent of the whole digression. In fact, while avoiding any reference to
the Muslims as Agarens, Ishmaelites or Saracens, the author addresses himself to
the ‘pseudoprophet’,
“Whom the Arabs, Egyptians, Persians, and all those who live a similar life deem their
prophet and law-maker (profäthn e™autøn kaì nomojéthn), a shameful manikin full of
licentiousness who was not ashamed of doing things that took place in Sodom and
Gomorrah, which were burnt by the God-sent fire, for they used to perform the very
same thing that he ordained by law, so that also the earth upon which their inhabitants
walked in licentiousness was burnt and reduced to ash.” 16
In referring to Mohamed as prophet and legislator, this passage shows simi-
larities with the Byzantine anti-Muslim apologetics17. Interestingly, Eustratius’
417,4–5 (quotation from Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus, 100, 60, 1–2); 424.18; 429.9;
Theodorus Studites, ∫Ek tøn sticistikøn lógwn Qedårou Stoudiåtou tøn katà ai™résewn,
ed. A. Rigo, La sezione sui musulmani nell’opera di Teodoro Studita contro le eresie, in: Revue
des études byzantines 56 (1998), 213–230, 228,17. Georgius Hamartolus, Chronicon, 697.12–13;
Arethas (dub.), Pròv tòn e n¬ Damaskøı a¬mhrân, protropñı ¿Rwmanoû basiléwv, ed. L. G. Weste-
rink, Arethae archiepiscopi Caesariensis scripta minora, 26, vol. 1, Leipzig 1968/1972, 243.2–3;
Constantinos VII Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio, ed. G. Moravcsik, Constantine
Porphyrogenitus. De administrando imperio (Dumbarton Oaks Texts 1), Washington, D.C.
21967, 80.3–4 (taken from Theophanes); Georgius Cedrenus, Compendium historiarum, ed.
I. Bekker, Georgius Cedrenus Ioannis Scylitzae ope, vol. I (Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzan-
tinae), Bonn 1838, 175.13; Euthymius Zigabenus, Panoplia Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130,
1133AB.
14 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272.9–11.
15 On this passage see D.J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam. The ‘Heresy of the Ishmaelites’,
Leiden 1972, 68–69.
17 See e.g. Euodius, Vita Martyrum XLII Amoriensum, ed. P. Nikitin/V. Vasilievskij, Skazanija o 42
amorijskich mucenikach, St. Petersburg 1906, 70.15–16.

commentaries seem to assimilate the biblical and Aristotelian notion of legis-

lation. In his commentary on book I of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ (4.3–7;
109.5–9) Eustratius deems Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Job as exemplifying the
practice of Aristotelian oikonomia, i.e. the care of the house and its inhabitants,
whereas Moses and Jesus the son of Naue for the Hebrews, and Minos, Lycour-
gos, Solon for the Greeks practiced Aristotelian political science, i.e. the care
of the city or community of people. Eustratius, who elaborates on Clement of
Alexandria’s ‘Stromata’, does not consider Mohamed as one of these wise
law-makers18.
More importantly, while referring to Sodom and Gomorrah, Eustratius hints
at the depravity of Muslim sexual habits – a traditional topic of anti-Muslim apo-
logetics. Unlike his predecessors, however, he avoids discussing the issues in great
detail and does not include references, for example, to the Byzantine criticism of
polygamy19. Elsewhere in the same text, however, Eustratius’ arguments fore-
shadow the specific issues present in previous apologists’ works. Consider, for
example, the genitivi absoluti “gámwn te kaì a¬llotríwn e x¬ oruttoménwn dià tò pròv
jhlumanían a¬kóreston kaì tñv fúsewv a¬dikouménhv au¬tñv dià tò toîv a¢rresi
crñsjai i ¢sa kaì jälesi “ (“since other people’s marriages are destroyed by the
insatiate desire for women, and nature itself is violated because of indiscriminate
sexual intercourses both with men and women”) 20. Eustratius’ reference to jhlu-
manía echoes his own notes (35.19–21) on the Aristotelian reference to Sarda-
napalus (1095b21–22), where he writes “basileùv dè Persøn o™ Sardanápalov,
a¬nær jhlumanæv kaì a¬kólastov kaì a¬selgéstatov, ou© tøn tñv trufñv dihghmá-
twn tà tøn palaiøn gémei suggrámmata ” 21. More importantly, jhlumanía, and
in general adultery, as the cause for destruction of other people’s marriages is
reminiscent of the episode of Mohamed’s life reported by several apologists, in
primis by John of Damascus, concerning his marriage with Zaid’s wife that caused
18 See e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 1,21, ed. L. Früchtel/O. Stählin/U. Treu, Clemens
Alexandrinus, vol. 2, (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 52 (15), 17), Berlin 31960, 107,5,
2–3; 1,25, 165,1,1–3.
19 See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De Haeresibus (nt. 13), 100, 64, 90–95; Theodorus Abucara,
Op. 24, Patrologia Graeca 97, 1156A; Anonymus, Contra Muhammed, Patrologia Graeca 104,
1452A; Euthymius Zigabenus, Panopolia Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130, 1349CD. On this
topic see Khoury, Polémique (nt. 2), 260–265.
20 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 274.22–24. The expression ‘gámwn te kaì
a¬llotríwn e x¬ oruttoménwn’ is quite rare. Yet, in many Patristic and Post-Patristic works one can
find the form diorútt- instead of e x¬ orutt- (which literally refers to the idea of mining or
digging). See Theodoretus Cyrrhensis, Interpretatio in Psalmos, Patrologia Graeca 80, 1841CD.
21 The reference to ‘tà tøn palaiøn gémei suggrámmata’ goes to, among the many works,
Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, I, ed. K.T. Fischer (post I. Bekker & L. Dindorf) and
F. Vogel, Diodori Bibliotheca historica, Leipzig 31888, 23.1–3 (repr. Stuttgart 1964); Hesychius,
Lexicon (P– W), ed. M. Schmidt, Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, vol. 4, n. 200, Halle 1862, 267;
Lexicon Suidae, vol. 4, S 122, ed. A. Adler, Suidae lexicon, Leipzig 1935 (repr. 1971) (Lexicographici
Graeci 1.4), 326.25–27.

150 Michele Trizio
the breaking of relations between Zaid and his spouse Zainab 22. Other references
to sexual perversion, like Eustratius’ claim that “The immoderate tendency to-
wards sexual intercourses, for committing adultery with a woman and lusting for a
man indifferently, is totally irrational and unbridled” 23, hint at the platitudes,
widespread among earlier polemicists, about Mohamed’s sinful way of life 24.
Another argument alludes to something found already in Eustratius’ prede-
cessors: the denial of Mohamed’s prophetic mission as being derived from God.
While stating that the lower potencies of the soul – sense-perception and imagi-
nation – lead to error and deception, Eustratius writes that
therefore is deceitful (plánhv) the law-maker who persuades to live according to these
(i.e. sense-perception and imagination) and seeks for pleasures of this kind (i.e. the
sensitive ones), and therefore is far from God. Therefore, how can someone who is far
from Him and is the cause of such a deception for his followers be a prophet sent by
God?” 25
This sentiment is quite a common-place among the Byzantine polemicists, who
elaborate it by stating that, contrary to Christ, Mohamed was neither announced
by the other prophets, nor did he prove himself worthy of the title of prophet 26.
In fact, Eustratius’ denial of Mohamed’s prophetic mission is reminiscent of a
passage found in Niketas of Byzantium’s refutation of Islam where the author
speaks of Mohamed as “deceitful” or as an “impostor” (plánov) 27.
As is clear from this overview, the author’s vocabulary hints at some of the
issues traditionally debated by earlier polemicists concerning the figure of Mo-
hamed. Although Eustratius never attempts to discuss these issues at length, the
denial of Mohamed’s prophetic mission and the critique of his way of life and
Muslim law concerning sexuality clearly lurk behind his choice of vocabulary.
Interestingly it is only after the critique of Islam that Eustratius chooses to name
his target explicitly. However, these criticisms were so familiar within the context
of Byzantine anti-Muslim literature that they could have hardly been overlooked
by an educated reader of the time.
22 See Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus (nt. 13), 100/101.95–111; Anonymus, Contra Muham-
med, Patrologia Graeca 104, 1452A–D. On polygamy as a major threat for the marriages and the
family see also Theodorus Abucara, op. 24, Patrologia Graeca 97, 1156BD.
23 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 274.4–6: “tò d’ a¬métrwv féresjai pròv tàv
míxeiv kaì a¬diafórwv pròv au¬tàv ec¢ ein w™ v kaì moiceúein kaì a¬ndromaneîn, a¢logon pánthı kaì
a¬calínwton”.
24 On this see the witnesses found in Khoury, Polémique (nt. 2), 90–93; 260–269.
26 See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus (nt. 13), 100, 61–62, 32–47; Niketas Byzantios,
Refutatio Mohamedis (nt. 4), xii, 100.40–43; Euthymius Zigabenus, Panopolia Dogmatica, Patro-
logia Graeca 130, 1356D–1357A. On this topic see the documents collected by Khoury, Polé-
mique (nt. 2), 21–58.
27 Niketas Byzantios, Refutatio Mohamedis (nt. 4), iii, 70, 42–45.

III. T he Faculties of the Human Soul
Although vaguely reminiscent of the Byzantine-Muslim theological debates,

Eustratius’ refutation of Islam shows an originality not found in any of the works
of his predecessors. For instance, the first part of the text contains a discussion
of the faculties of the soul and their function that is not present in any of the
previous refutations of Islam.
While introducing the section of his anti-Muslim digression that concerns the
division of the faculties of the soul, Eustratius writes “tñv gàr a¬njråpou yucñv
pollaì dunámeiv eis¬ í” (“many are the faculties that belong to the human soul”) 28,
which seems to echo a passage of Plotinus’ ‘Enneads’ 29. Then, quite traditionally,
Eustratius divides these faculties into the cognitive and the appetitive, and distin-
guishes between them the rational and irrational faculties30. Among the cognitive
faculties ai s¢ jhsiv and fantasía are the irrational ones, whereas dóxa, diánoia
and noûv are rational. By the same token, among the desiderative ones boúlhsiv
and proaíresiv are rational, whilst jumóv and e p¬ ijumía are irrational 31. Seemingly,
Eustratius’ description of the cognitive faculties seems to be borrowed from
Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’, like, for instance, the author’s
claim that the difference between dóxa and diánoia lies in the former knowing
things “without the cause” (a¢neu tñv ai ¬tíav), whereas the latter implies a know-
ledge “with the cause” (metà tñv ai t¬ íav), i.e., the middle term of the syllogism 32.
That the tradition of the Late-Antique commentators lies behind Eustratius’
account of the different cognitive faculties of the soul and their function be-
comes evident elsewhere as well. It can be detected in the author’s claim that the
intellect is the most eminent of all faculties as it “gets an intuition of the intelli-
gibles above the cause, by grasping them by means of direct apprehensions
(a¬mésoiv e p¬ ibolaîv), and thus it becomes, so to say, capable of seeing them by
itself, and joins them without any mediation”.33 In fact, Ammonius argues that
28 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,17.

29 Plotinus, Enneades, ed. P. Henry/H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini opera, vol. 1, Leiden 1951, I.8, 14.24.
30 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,17–19.
31 This distinction is the standard one among the Late-Antique Aristotle commentators, like in
Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse, Ammonius in Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque
voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.3), Berlin 1891, 11,16–17; Joannes Philoponus, In
Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de
anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 15), Berlin 1897, 1,9–15. Among
the Byzantine authors, see Joannes Italus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 28 (Ei¬v tò Perì e™rmhneíav
e k¢ dosiv e¬pítomov), ed. P. Joannou, Joannes Italus. Quaestiones quodlibetales (∫Aporíai kaì
lúseiv) (Studia patristica et Byzantina 4), Ettal 1956, 4, 29,3–30,11.
32 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,29–37. Cf. Ammonius, In Aristotelis
analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium, edidit M. Wallies, Ammonii in Aristotelis analyti-
corum priorum librum i commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.6), Berlin 1899,
26,6–11; Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria (nt. 31), 1,16–2,6.
33 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 273,6–8: “oçti kaì u™pèr ai¬tían tøn gnwstøn
e n¬ tòv gínetai a¬mésoiv e p
¬ ibolaîv katalambánwn au¬tá, wçsper au¬tópthv au¬tøn ginómenov kaì
e™autøı au¬toîv sugginómenov mhdenòv mesiteúontov.”

152 Michele Trizio
the intellectual faculty of the soul “knows what it knows by means of direct
apprehensions, and not by syllogisms” 34, whereas in his commentary on Aristotle’s
‘De anima’, after discussing the difference between dóxa and diánoia, Philoponus
contends that “the intellect grasps the intelligibles by means of a direct apprehen-
sion in a better way than the knowledge by demonstration” 35.
One may still fruitfully ponder the purpose of Eustratius’ long but ‘scholastic’
description of the different faculties of the soul, and such questioning will
lead one to conclude that, according to Eustratius, the Muslims seem to
regard the irrational and lower faculties as better than the rational ones. Thus, the
author repeatedly asks rhetorical questions to an imaginary opponent: “Which
(of these faculties) seem to you to better, the rational or the irrational ones?” 36;
“I ask those who say these absurdities, whether they regard all the above men-
tioned faculties as equal in honour, or whether in evaluating them it is possible to
distinguish among these faculties between that which is better and that which is
worse” 37; and,
“That the rational faculties are superior to the irrational ones among both the cognitive
and appetitive potencies, this no-one will deny it, unless he is a fool; nor will he deny
that these faculties are in mutual opposition and that when reason presides over the
irrational appetites and submits them under its control, man attains the good; on the
contrary, when reason surrenders to these appetites and follows the related impulses,
then the fall towards the vice will be visibly evident and effective.” 38
Elsewhere, such rhetorical questions and statements are more direct, illumi-
nating Eustratius’ allegation of his Muslim opponent. He writes:
“How not to regard the temperate well-being (eu¬pájeia) as preferable to the immode-
rate impulse and inclination towards the passions? The immoderate tendency towards
sexual intercourses, for committing adultery with a woman and lusting for a man in-
differently, is totally irrational and unbridled. How won’t he obtain the worst result and
renounce altogether reason he who in renouncing reason places himself on the side of
the irrational animals? To tell the truth, he who places reason under the passions
has surpassed in viciousness even the beasts, as he proclaims that which is superior by
nature slave of that which is by nature worse, always performing actions of this kind in
accordance to an irrational appetite. Therefore, who can deny that he who ordains by
34 Ammonius, In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium (nt. 32), 3.18–19:

“ou¬ dià sullogismøn a¬ll’ a™plaîv e p¬ ibolaîv ginåskei aÇ ginåskei”; cf. also 24.31–25.5.
35 Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria (nt. 31), 2.11–12: “o™ noûv a™plñı
¬ ibolñı ginåskei tà nohtà kreittónwv h£ katà a¬pódeixin”. On the occurrence of the expres-
ep
sion “a™plaîv e p¬ ibolaîv” in Eustratius’ philosophical commentaries and the author’s doctrine of
the intellect, see M. Trizio, Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary
on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, in: C. Barber/D. Jenkins (eds.) Medieval Greek Com-
mentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden–Boston 2009, 71–109 here 90–99. Here I suggest
also Proclus as a source for Eustratius’ treatment of the topic of the intellect.
37 Ibid., 272.23–26.
38 Ibid., 273.29–35.

law the worse things and that which drives human being, who is rational by nature, out
of his mind, and thus renders him worse than the irrational animals, is utterly evil and
ugly?” 39
Eustratius keeps attacking the way of life of those who strive for bodily pleas-
ures and allow jumóv and e p¬ ijumía to overtake reason and obnubilate the cardinal
virtues. “Perfection”, cries the author, “does not consist in the excess of the irra-
tional faculties’ operation, but in obeying to reason as the right principle that
functions as measure and weight” 40. While combining Aristotle’s notion of ‘right
principle’ (o™ o¬rjòv lógov) as that which determines the mean of excess and
defect in moral agency,41 and the notion of ‘measure and weight’ (métron kaì sta-
jmóv) used by the Greek Fathers to describe God as the ruler of the Universe 42,
Eustratius rejects the view that perfection consists of increasing the activity of
the irrational faculties. “He is mistaken”, continues the commentator, “he who
believes that the irrational faculties become perfect by unfolding more and more
their irrational nature” 43. And the previously mentioned passage,
“therefore is deceitful the law-maker who persuades to live according to these (i.e.
sense-perception and imagination) and seeks for pleasures of this kind (i.e. the sensitive
ones), and therefore is far from God. Therefore, how can someone who is far from
Him and is the cause of such a deception for his followers be a prophet sent by
God?” 44
As demonstrated above, this latter claim is reminiscent of the denial of Mo-
hamed’s prophetic and divine mission stated by the earlier polemicists. Yet,
Eustratius’ discussion of reason as the right principle and measure of the irra-
tional impulses that derive from jumóv and e p¬ ijumía stems from a similar discus-
sion found in his commentary on book I of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ 45. Eustra-
tius’ commentary on Aristotle’s reference to those who identify the good life with
pleasure, against either the political life or the contemplative one, is revealing. He
notes that, after describing the life of enjoyment, Aristotle continues an investiga-
tion of the political life, which includes the following passage: “From the life
affected by the passions to the moderation of these, for the political life allows
the passions only to a certain extent and under the rule of reason, which acts as
both measure and weight” (e¬k toû e ¬mpajoûv ei v¬ tòn metriopajñ, en¬ didónta mén
phı toîv pájesi, plæn kanóni toû lógou, métrwı te kaì stajmøı ) (1095b14–18).
39 Ibid., 274.3–13.
40 Ibid., 275.20–22; cf. also Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 303.8–9, where
reason as the right principle is said to be the “measure and weight of the actions”.
41 Cf. e.g. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 11, 1138b18–20.
42 Cf. e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus, 69, ed. M. Marcovich, Clementis Alexandrini Pro-
trepticus, Leiden 1995 (Vigiliae Christianae/Supplements 34), 105.10–12; Basilius Caesariensis,
Epistulae, ep. 219, ed. Y. Courtonne, Saint Basile. Lettres, vol. III, Paris 1966, 1, 1.
44 Ibid., 276.9–12.
45 Ibid., 34.14–23.

154 Michele Trizio
Likewise, in his anti-Muslim digression Eustratius positions himself against “the

things lightly said by those who are in such a way affected by the passions” 46,
and regards the Muslims as those “who posit the Good in the life according
to pleasure and bless the excess in the enjoyment of this way of life” 47. This
suggests that Eustratius combines some of the traditional concerns of the earlier
anti-Muslim polemicists with the Aristotelian discussion of the life of enjoyment
and its related vocabulary.
The structure of the whole text is, as I said before, quite original, insofar as
Eustratius’ description of the faculties of the soul can hardly be traced back to
any of the earlier polemicists. Yet the aim of this description is traditional, in that
it emphasises the alleged sinful and perverse nature of the Muslim law. Eustratius
goes so far as to say that Muslims live according to the lower faculties. Thus, the
‘mistake’ of the Muslims, which Eustratius identifies as a mis-interpretation of
Aristotle’s text, consists of regarding the irrational faculties as better than the
rational ones, and in the related belief that one can achieve perfection by increas-
ing or stretching the activity and operation of the former, rather than by relying
on the latter. As I showed earlier, Eustratius summarizes this allegation as follows:
“He is mistaken he who believes that the irrational faculties becomes perfect by
unfolding more and more their irrational nature” 48.
Interestingly, the allegation at stake is not shorn of logical argumentations
since immediately afterwards Eustratius writes:
“Furthermore, if the irrational faculties’ perfection consists in stretching up to the
maximum their irrational nature (e n¬ tøı e t¬ ì pléon tæn a¬logían e ¬kteínesjai), then their
imperfection will consist in doing away with reason and reducing its irrational element.
In fact, if the one is the contrary to the other, the one contrary correspond to the
other, and if this is the case, the lack of rationality will be more preferable than
reason.” 49
Here, Eustratius elaborates, in a paradoxical form, on Aristotle’s discussion of
contradictory postulates present in the ‘Topics’ and Alexander of Aphrodisias’
commentary on this work. Eustratius must have known these since his teacher
John Italus incorporated many fragments of Alexander’s commentary into his
own exegesis on the same work50. This demonstrates once more that the whole
46 Ibid., 272.16–17: “tà parà tøn e m¬ pajøv ouçtwv e c¬ óntwn kaì faúlwv legómena.” The form
e m¬ pajeîv is found as referred to the Muslims in Arethas (dub.), Pròv tòn e n¬ Damaskøı a¬mhrân,
protropñı ¿Rwmanoû basiléwv, 237.21 (nt. 13).
47 Ibid., 274.36–37: “oi™ tòn h™dupajñ bíon a¬gajòn tijémenoi kaì tò u™perbállon tñv kat’ au¬tòn
a¬polaúsewv makarízontev”.
48 Ibid., 275.26–27: “peplánhtai a¢ra o™ légwn tàv a¬lógouv teleioûsjai dunámeiv e¬k toû mâllon
kaì mâllon au¬taîv tæn a¬logían e k¬ teínesjai”.
49 Ibid., 275.27–31.
50 Cf. e.g. Aristoteles, Topica, 113b15–114a6; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis topicorum
libros octo commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros
octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2), Berlin 1891, 193.8–195.28; Ps.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis (re vera Michael Ephesius), In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ed.

text of Eustratius’ anti-Muslim digression is a unique composition among the

vast number of Byzantine works devoted to the refutation of Islam. Even when it
refers to issues discussed by earlier scholars, Eustratius’ approach remains auto-
nomous and philosophically oriented, rather than dogmatic.
IV. Eustratius’ Byzantine Sources
It is clear that Eustratius regards Islam as an irrational and sense-perception

based religion. On this basis he deems Mohamed an ‘impious law-maker’ and
‘deceitful prophet’; and, like his predecessors, denies his prophetic and divine
nature. The argument that Islam could not be a true religion, in so far as it does
not propose an acceptable conception of ethics and moral agency, was quite
common among earlier polemicists. Yet, Eustratius’ digression is made somewhat
original by the author’s avoidance of most of the theological issues debated by
earlier apologists in favour of a standard philosophical discussion of the role and
function of the soul’s faculties. Even when Eustratius hints at the arguments of
his predecessors, his approach was novel.
As shown above, while introducing the aporia that forms the basis for Eustra-
tius’ anti-Muslim digression, the author mentions the intemperate (oi™ a¬kolastaí-
nontev) as a class of people who cannot be regarded as deserving of punishment
if one assumes that perfection can be achieved by actualizing any faculty or power
of the soul, even a lower one. Thus, a¬kolasía (“intemperance” or “licentious-
ness”), together with jhlumanía (“going mad after women”) and h™dupájeia
(“pleasent living” or “luxury”), form the conceptual framework of Eustratius’
depiction of Islamic ethics. Where does Eustratius inherit this conceptual frame-
work from? His comments on Aristotle’s reference to Sardanapalus, mentioned
above, provide a clue. Here, Eustratius writes that “Sardanapalus was the king of
the Persians, a man who was mad after women, intemperate and wholly licen-
tious” 51. Beyond this, the commentator states that “in fact, if those who exercise
authority over cities or peoples were not affected by passions (e m¬ pajeîv), but lived
in a diligent and virtuous way, they would never permit the more knavish of their
subjects to have access to themselves, but rather they will banish them, and there-
fore not only the vice, finally set at naught, will not increase, but it will even
M. Hayduck, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in

Aristotelem Graeca, 1), Berlin 1891, 218.16–17. Italus’s commentary on the ‘Topics’ is published
in a modern critical edition in S. Kotzabassi, Byzantinische Kommentatoren der aristotelischen
Topik: Johannes Italus und Leon Magentinus (Etaireia Byzantinon Ereynon 17), Thessaloniki
1999. For Italos’ dependence upon Alexander’s commentary on the Topics, see M. Wallies, Prae-
fatio, in: Alexandri Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria (Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2.), Berlin 1891, xlvii–l and id., Die griechischen Ausleger der
Aristotelischen Topik, Berlin 1891, 24–27.
51 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 35.19–20: “basileùv dè Persøn o™ Sarda-
nápalov, a¬nær jhlumanæv kaì a¬kólastov kaì a¬selgéstatov”.

156 Michele Trizio
decrease very much or totally disappear. But if those who exercise authority are
vicious and luxurious (h™dupajeîv) and behave like Sardanapalus, they will sur-
round themselves with those who resemble them and will cause the increasing of
the vice” 52.
Eustratius’ comments on Sardanapalus are obviously not original and can be
traced easily to Greek historians and lexicographers. Eustratius himself suggests
this when, concerning Sardanapalus, he writes: “the works of the ancients are full
of tales about his licentiousness” 53. Unsurprisingly, when Robert Grosseteste
translates this section he introduced a marginal note on Sardanapalus composed
of excerpts from the related entry in the ‘Suda’ lexicon, which he had partially
translated into Latin himself 54. More importantly, it seems quite clear that Eustra-
tius deploys the same vocabulary to the “impious law-maker” Mohamed as that
used in regard to Sardanapalus (h™dupajäv, e m¬ pajäv etc.). Mohamed, like the king
of the Persians, was someone who lived a sinful and licentious life, an intemper-
ant womanizer affected by passion and luxuries, unfit to be a model of virtuous
law-maker.
Eustratius, however, combines the antique lexicographical tradition on Sarda-
napalus with an argument found in the work of an earlier Byzantine polemicist.
In fact, Eustratius’ emphasis on the passions’ usurpation of the rational part of
the human soul as the peculiar trait of Islam, refers to passages of Niketas of
Byzantium’s Answer to the ‘Second Letter of the Agaren’ (9th century). That
Eustratius draws upon this composition is surprising, as it is less well circulated
than Niketas’ other anti-Muslim work the ‘Refutatio Mohamedis’, which was
popularised through the paraphrase of the work produced by the monk Euo-
dius55. Yet, an argument contained in Niketas’ ‘Second Letter’ has close parallels
with Eustratius’ allegations against Islam, and it is possible to cautiously suggest
that parts of the digression are dependent upon Niketas’ contribution56.
52 Ibid., 35.12–19.
53 Ibid., 35.20–21 (cf. nt. 21).
54 Eustratius, Enarratio in primum Aristotelis moralium ad Nicomachum, ed. H.P.F. Mercken, The
Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert
Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln ( 1253), vol. 1: Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia
on Books II, III, and IV (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI,1),
Leiden 1973, 59.41–61.63. On Grosseteste’s translation of the Lexicon Suidae, see A.C. Dioni-
sotti, Robert Grosseteste and the Greek Encyclopedia, in: J. Hamesse/M. Fattori (eds.), Ren-
contres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l’antiquité tardive
au XIVe siècle, Actes du Colloque international de Cassino 15–17 juin 1989 organisé par la
Société Internationale pour l’ Étude de la philosophie médiévale et l’Università degli Studi di
Cassino, Louvain – La-Neuve/Cassino 1990, 337–353.
55 On this see Rigo, Niceta Byzantios (nt. 3), 163–182.
56 The text of Niketas’ Answer to the Second Letter of the Agaren is edited in A. Mai, Nova
Patrum Bibliotheca, IV, Romae Typ. S. Cons. prop. Christi nomini, 1847, 418–431; Patrologia
Graeca, CV, 821–841; Niketas Byzantios, ∫Antírrhsiv kaì a¬natropæ tñv deutérav e p ¬ istolñv
tñv staleíshv parà tøn a¬garhnøn pròv micaæl basiléa ui™òn jeofílou, e p
¬ ì diabolñı tñv tøn
cristianikøn pístewv, ed. Förstel, Niketas von Byzanz (nt. 4), 176–198 (= ∫Antírrhsiv kaì

In his ‘Answer’, Niketas elaborates on the Greek Patristic view of man as parti-
cipating in both the angelic or intellectual nature and the irrational and sensitive
one, respectively through the logistikón and the diakritikón, on the one hand,
and the jumikón and e p¬ ijumhtikón, on the other 57. Human beings keep their na-
tural condition when the rational part of the soul, the logistikón, dominates over
the jumikón and e p¬ ijumhtikón. Thus, writes Niketas,
“when the condition contrary [to man’s rationality] becomes evident in him, then, on
the one hand, the passions prevail over reason; on the other, the latter becomes a
servant (doubtless this is what happens to the intemperate and murderous people).
Then it is clear: when man performs the worse actions he descends from the realm of
the natural and supernatural things to that of things against nature. Whence, so much
the irascible and appetitive faculties are left out of control, so also the passions frisk; so
much they frisk, so they also grow; so much they grow, so man becomes similar to the
irrational animals.” 58
Everything here foreshadows Eustratius’ argument and vocabulary. Niketas’
reference to the intemperate is also found in the incipit of Eustratius’ digression,
where he questions the basis of punishing the intemperate. Furthermore, both
authors emphasise that when reason is dominated by the passions and the irra-
tional faculties, human beings, who are rational by nature, become similar to, if
not worse than, the irrational animals.
In another passage Niketas writes,
“therefore, since your faith promises and foretells the intemperate life (tòn a¬kólaston
bíon) and the increasing and domination of the passions (tøn pajøn tæn au¢xhsin kai
ep¬ ikráteian) more than that of reason […] we profess that a religion that ordains simi-
lar commandments is harmful and inconvenient […]. That is why our faith promises
the opposite of yours: the latter promises intemperance, the first temperance; yours
promises gluttony, ours self-control; yours promises concupiscence, ours liberality; it is
evident that your religion is harmful and not appropriate to God, for it renders its
followers more similar to the irrational animals.” 59
While remarking that a true religion must be founded on rationality, Niketas
refers to the the faith of the ‘Saracens’ as prescribing the increase, au¢xhsiv, of the
passions. This corresponds to Eustratius’ reference to his opponent’s view that
perfection consists in “unfolding or increasing [e k¬ teínesjai] more and more
man’s irrational nature”, and to the aforementioned description of Sardanapalus
a¬natropæ tñv deutérav e p ¬ istolñv). In the present paper I will refer to the Förstel edition. For a
full bibliography of Niketas, see Rigo, Niceta Byzantios (nt. 3), 148, n. 1.
57 See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, Expositio Fidei, ed. P. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von
Damaskos, vol. 2, Berlin 1973 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 12), 25.42–43. Eustratius himself
refers to this widespread view in his theological writings, like in Eustratios, Diálogov e k¬ tejeìv
oçte h™ a¬mfisbäthsiv perì tøn a™gíwn ei¬kónwn e g¬ éneto, ed. A. Demetrakopoulos, ∫Ekklhsiastikæ
Bibliojäkh, vol. 1. Leipzig 1866, 138.16–24.
58 Niketas Byzantios, ∫Antírrhsiv kaì a¬natropæ tñv deutérav ep¬ istolñv (nt. 56), 186.207–214.
59 Ibid., 186.228–232.

158 Michele Trizio
as an example of a ruler whose habits cause the increase of vice and licentious-
ness among his subjects.
The very style of Eustratius anti-Muslim digression often reflects the earlier
polemicists’ works. For example, large sections of the text are full of rhetorical
questions introduced by pøv, which is a strategy also used in the ‘Letter to the
Emir of Damascus’ attributed to Arethas. Yet, despite all the similarities with the
traditional arguments developed by Eustratius’ predecessors, his solution to the
aporia and conclusion of the digression cannot be said to derive from the earlier
Byzantine scholars who engaged with Islam.
V. T he Solution to the Aporia
As has been established, Eustratius utilised Niketas’ emphasis on the ‘irration-

ality’ of the Muslim faith as a model for his digression, rather than a source to be
directly quoted. Yet, Eustratius’s work is also marked out by an autonomous
approach which is particularly evident in what I have defined as the ‘solution’ of
the aporia, which can be divided into two parts. In the first one, Eustratius in-
vestigates the reason God provided human beings with irrational faculties in
terms of ‘aim’ (tínov eçneken) 60. In the second one, the commentator delves more
deeply into this topic by delineating the scope of the union between rational and
irrational faculties in human beings, and, finally, provides the reader with the defi-
nitive answer 61. Interestingly, there the anti-Muslim undertones of the discussion
become of secondary importance as the traces of a contemporary debate on the
soul attract Eustratius’ attention.
In the first part of the solution, Eustratius simply states that, by nature, the
irrational faculties are supposed to be dominated by the reason, allowing them to
become rational through “participation” (metecóntwv). He frames this statement
within a Neoplatonic metaphysical scheme, and, accordingly 62, something ac-
quires perfection only when it reverts to the superior principle. Yet, Eustratius
shapes his Neoplatonism with expressions taken from the Greek Fathers. For
example, the commentator states that, when out of control, the irrational faculties
are “thrown down into an abyss of perdition and they dispose of it (scil. the
reason) as servant of evil thoughts” (ei¬v bujòn a¬pwleíav katakrhmnízousai kaì
u™pourgòn au¬tò e c¢ ousai pròv e p¬ inoíav kakøn ) 63. This is constructed by joining
together two expressions, “ei¬v bujòn a¬pwleíav and pròv e p¬ inoíav kakøn“ found
in a similar context in the Church Fathers 64. Nonetheless, the whole argument
60 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275.1–276.12.

61 Ibid., 276.12–38.
62 Ibid., 275.12–20.
63 Ibid., 275.11–12.
64 For the expression ei¬z bujòn a¬pwleíav see Eusebius Caesariensis, Historia Ecclesiastica, IV, vii,2,
ed. G. Bardy, Eusèbe de Césarée. Histoire ecclésiastique, Livres I–IV, t. 1, Paris 2001 (Sources
chrétiennes 31), 167; Gregorius Nazianzenus, De vita sua, ed. C. Jungck, Gregor von Nazianz.

remains Neoplatonic. The very formula “yet, each thing which acquires its perfec-
tion is perfected by something superior to it, and refers to it” (e t¢ i eçkaston tøn
teleiouménwn e k¬ toû kreíttonov au¬toû teleioûtai, a¬naferómenon pròv au¬tó) 65 is
a re-elaboration of at least three propositions of Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theo-
logy’ 66. Besides, Eustratius’ claim that “the rational soul won’t acquire its per-
fection without referring to the Intelligence and, through the Intelligence, to God,
so that it is illuminated by them, insofar as they are superior principles, and re-
ceive its perfection” (h™ logikæ yucæ ou¬k a£n tò téleion eçxei potè mæ pròv noûn
a¬naferoménh kaì dià noû pròv jeòn kaì u™p’ au¬tøn w™ v kreittónwn e l¬ lampoménh
kaì decoménh tæn teleióthta ) 67 closely resembles Proclus’ notes on proposition
193 of the aforementioned ‘Elements of Theology’. Here Proclus writes that “if
the proximate source of the soul’s perfection is the Intelligence, then it reverts to
an Intelligence” (ei¬ dè prosecøv u™pò noû teleioûtai, kaì e p¬ istréfetai pròv
noûn) 68.
Thus, according to Eustratius, the irrational faculties attain perfection by
obeying the principle that is prior and superior to them, i.e., reason, in the same
way as reason and the rational soul acquire their perfection by reverting to the
principles superior to them, i.e. the Intelligence and God. Eustratius, however,
regards this explanation as insufficient, adding: “Let us inquire which is the very
scope (tív dè kaì o™ skopòv ) of the creation in attaching the irrational and vegeta-
tive lives to the rational soul” 69. This more detailed investigation occupies the
second part of Eustratius’ solution, and discusses the providential plan con-
cerning the link between the rational and irrational faculties: whether this link
exists “in order that the rational beings live irrationally, submitting their reason to
the passions, or because of the soul’s bond (dià tòn súndesmon tøn yucøn ) with
the carnal, mortal and earthly flesh (pròv tæn pacutéran taúthn sárka kaì
jnhtæn kaì a¬ntítupon )” 70. The latter view is endorsed by Eustratius, who regards
the first as absurd, insofar as it would be absurd for God to place the superior
realities under the command of the inferior ones. More importantly, Eustratius’
preferred view is borrowed word by word from Gregory the Theologian’s ‘In
Sanctum Pascha’. Here, Gregory explains that, since man was banished from the
De vita sua, Heidelberg 1974, 110, 1148. For the expression pròv e p¬ inoíav kakøn see Gregorius
Nazianzenus, ep. 206, ed. P. Gallay, Saint Grégoire de Nazianze. Lettres, vol. 2, Paris 1967, 98.7.
66 Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 24, ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 21963, 29.8–9; prop. 31,
34.28–29; prop. 35, 38.9–10.
68 Proclus, Elementatio Theologica (nt. 66), prop. 193, 168.24–25. The English translation of this
passage is that of Dodds, slightly modified. Eustratius’ sentence “u™p’ au¬tøn w™ v kreittónwn
e l¬ lampoménh kaì decoménh tæn teleióthta” shows remarkable similarities with Simplicius,
Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion, ch. 37, ed. I. Hadot, Leiden–New York–Köln 1996,
p. 354.229–230: kaì u™pò tøn kreittónwn e l¬ lampoménh dià tæn teleióthta. That which is illu-
minated is in this case the virtue.
70 Ibid., 276.14–16.

160 Michele Trizio
tree of life, paradise and God, he “was clothed in skin, that is to say the carnal,
mortal and earthly flesh (kaì toùv dermatínouv a¬mfiénnutai citønav, i ¢swv tæn
pacutéran sárka, kaì jnhtæn, kaì a¬ntítupon )” 71.
The loss of the Adamic condition seems to be the background of the whole
discussion.72 Eustratius’ choice of focus, however, lies on explaining the soul’s
composition as a compound of rational and irrational faculties and God’s pro-
vidential plan behind them, above the moral and eschatological consequences of
humankind’s present state. “It is therefore necessary”, continues the commen-
tator, “to scrutinize the cause of the bond in one and the same thing between
contrary elements” 73. At this point every word must be examined carefully.
At first, Eustratius’ argument is a general one: “in fact”, he writes, “as well as
creating these things, that is to say the mortal, material and perishable things,
God, the creator of the universe, did not deny that even those realities could par-
ticipate in one and the same goodness, disposition and order” 74. What is relevant
here is not just that the argument is reminiscent of John of Damascus’ ‘Expositio
Fidei’, where one can find the sentence “o™ a¬gajòv kaì panágajov kaì u™perága-
jov jeóv, oçlov w£n a¬gajóthv, dià tòn u™perbállonta ploûton tñv au¬toû a¬na-
fóthtov ou¬k h¬nésceto mónon ei®nai tò a¬gajòn h¢toi tæn e a
™ utoû fúsin u™pò mhdenòv
metecómenon” 75, but also that the lower potencies of the soul fall within the class
of lower realities. That is to say, despite their inferior rank, they participate, to a
certain extent, in the divine goodness. “That is why”, explains Eustratius,
“he [scil. God] created the rational souls as capable of entering in contact with the
bodies, which are made out of contrary elements, and, concerning the conjunction,
he wanted it as capable of taking place directly, although the bodies can neither be
rendered good (a¬gajúnesjai) by the rational soul, nor receive its illumination without
any intermediary.” 76
This passage is a difficult one77. However, the author clearly suggests that the
bodies receive and participate in the divine goodness through their bond with the
71 Gregorius Nazianzenus, In Sanctum Pascha, Patrologia Graeca, 36, 633A.

72 On Eustratius’ view on this issues, see Trizio, Neoplatonic (nt. 35), 100–101.
74 Ibid., 276.22–25: “o™ gàr pánta paragagœn jeòv dià tæn au™toû a¬gajóthta, e p ¬ eidæ kaì tà
jnhtà taûta kaì e n¢ ula kaì pefukóta taîv ou¬síaiv kakúnesjai parñxen, ou¬k h¬nésceto mæ kaì
taûta metécein a¬gajóthtov o™moû kaì lógou kaì táxewv”.
75 Joannes Damascenus, Expositio Fidei (nt. 57), 86.
76 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276.25–29: “dià toûto yucàv logikàv
parágei dunaménav sumplékesjai såmasin, aÇ e x¬ e n¬ antíwn suntéjeintai, tò dè tñv sumplokñv
dunatòn a¬méswv gínesjai, mæ dunaménwn tøn swmátwn a¢neu mésou tinòv e¬k tñv logikñv
yucñv a¬gajúnesjai kaì tàv e l¬ lámyeiv au¬tñv paradécesjai”.
77 It might be that the text is corrupted. The sentence tò dè tñv sumplokñv dunatòn a¬méswv
gínesjai seems part of a mèn/dè period which is missing in the Heylbut text. Thus, there is an
apparent contradiction between tò dè tñv sumplokñv dunstòn a¬méswv gínesjai and what
follows afterwards concerning the fact that the conjunction cannot occur without any medium.
Unfortunately, neither Grosseteste’s Latin translation nor a new collation of the manuscript used
by Heylbut (Paris, Bibl. Nat., Coisl. 161) were helpful for improving the text.

rational souls. Despite the aforementioned quote from John of Damascus’ ‘Ex-
positio Fidei’, the whole argument hints at a Neoplatonic model of providence.
In fact, the commentator’s vocabulary can be traced back to Proclus’ ‘Tria Opus-
cula’ on evil and providence which is currently only available in the Latin trans-
lation by William of Moerbeke and in its re-elaboration by Isaac Comnenus the
Sebastocrator, probably the brother of the emperor Alexius I 78. Eustratius knew
the work of Isaac. For example, the word a¬gajúnesjai used by Eustratius to
describe the benefits for bodies that derive from the link with the soul is the same
one used by Proclus to remark that divine providence makes everything better,
“not only the eternal realities, but also each of the perishable ones” 79.
More importantly, Eustratius’ wording “tàv e l¬ lámyeiv au¬tñv [scil. the soul]”
that explains the effect of the soul on the body in terms of illumination is prob-
ably taken from another passage of Proclus’ ‘Tria Opuscula’, not extant in
Sebastocrator’s Greek version. In fact, Moerbeke’s translation reports a passage
that concerns the different kinds of soul, stating that there are two main types:
“On the one hand, those which are substance and are separable from the bodies;
on the other, those which exist as illumination in the bodies coming from the sub-
stantial souls” (hee quidem substantiales et separabiles a corporibus, hee autem in corporibus
illustrationes ab hiis que secundum substantiam animabus) 80. Proclus’ “in corporibus illustra-
tiones” refers to the embodied soul as the principle that organizes the vital func-
tions of the body. This matches perfectly with Eustratius’ usage of the word e l¬ -
lámyeiv regarding benefits granted to the bodies by the bond with the rational
souls. As a matter of fact, in Proclus, these illustrations (e l¬ lámyeiv) are said to
come from the soul which are such “by essence” or “substantially” (secundum sub-
stantiam).
Accordingly, then, after mentioning the e l¬ lámyeiv of the rational soul in the
bodies, Eustratius makes it clear that “in fact, the rational soul is by nature separa-
ted from the body both in its substance and operation” (h™ mèn gàr logikæ yucæ
kaì tæı ou¬síaı kaì tñı e n¬ ergeíaı toû såmatov cwrízesjai péfuken ) 81. The commen-
tator disagrees with Aristotle, and argues that the soul is not just the entelechy of
the body.82 On the contrary, it keeps its substantial and operative independence
from the body, and is only indirectly responsible for vital bodily functions of the
body, through certain roots it has in the body itself. In fact, according to Eustra-
tius the bond between the soul and the body cannot take place without an inter-
mediary. In arguing this, Eustratius agrees with the Neoplatonists in admitting
that, while remaining unaffected in its substance, the soul organizes the vital func-
78 Cf. Proclus, Tria Opuscula (de providentia, libertate, malo), latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka ver-
tente et graece ex Isaaci Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, ed. H Boese, Berlin 1960.
79 Proclus, De decem dubitationes circa providentiam, q.3, 17, 31.6–9 (nt. 78).
80 Ibid., q. 9 et 10, 63, 102.31–33. As a matter of fact, through all his translation of the ‘Tria
Opuscula’ ‘illustratio’ is the term used by Moerbeke to translate the Greek ‘e l¢ lamyiv’.
82 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, 412b5–6.

162 Michele Trizio
tions of the body through certain roots or lives 83. “That is why”, continues
Eustratius, “God yoked the soul with the vegetative and sensitive lives, so that,
due to their affinity with the rational soul and the body, they could act as media-
tor, for by nature they are akin to both of them” (dià toûto futikæ zwæ kaì
ai¬sjhtikæ sunézeuktai taúthı, mesiteúousai tñı tñv logikñv yucñv kaì toû såma-
tov koinwníaı pròv a¢llhla dià tæv pròv a¢mfw suggéneian ) 84. The source is, in
this case, Philoponus’ polemical statement that “we admit that nature and the
irrational potencies, that are generated and, as such, perishable, mediate between
the rational soul and the body” (mesiteúein gàr tñı logikñı yucñı kaì tøı såmati
tän te fúsin kaì tàv a¬lógouv dunámeiv genhtàv ou¢sav kaì au¬tàv kaì fjartàv kaì
h™meîv sugcwroûmen ). Evidently, Eustratius expounds the general Neoplatonic
view that the lower potencies of the soul, the irrational lives, are roots that the
soul itself puts forth to bond with the body 85.
The Christian undertones present in the text do not affect this conclusion, as
is clear from Eustratius’ subsequent claim that these lives can be conceived as
separate from the bodies only by thought and “because of this those who investi-
gated these matters called them ‘inseparable acts’” (diò kaì a¬cwrístouv e n¬ tele-
ceíav taútav eir¬ äkasin oi™ perì taûta spoudázontev ) 86. Who are “those who
investigated these matters”? All the evidence suggests that no Christian author is
meant here. To answer the question one might fruitfully look at what Eustratius
writes elsewhere in his commentary on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’,
where he states: “for what comes after the rational soul is neither immediately
nature, nor the bodies, but some other lives, which they call ‘acts’ and are insepa-
rable from the bodies” (w™ v kaì metà tæn logikæn yucæn ou¬c h™ fúsiv eu¬jùv kaì tà
såmata a¬llá zwaí tinev eçterai, aÇv e n¬ teleceíav fasìn ei®nai, a¬cwrístouv ou¢sav
swmátwn) 87. This passage derives from Proclus’ refutation of the view that the
soul is an act or a series of acts of the body found in his commentary on Plato’s
‘Timaeus’. When speaking about the link between the soul and the body, Proclus
observes: “Are we going to speak of such an intermixture, as some say, as if the
soul is present in the body through partible powers, acts and inseparable lives? No
way” (e t¢ i tæn diaplokæn toiaúthn a¬nexómeja légein, oi çan tinèv légousin, w™v
meristaîv dunámesi kaì e n¬ teleceíaiv kaì zwaîv a¬cwrístoiv tñv yucñv tøı såmati
paroúshv; mhdamøv ) 88. Obviously, as known to Proclus’ specialists, Proclus him-
83 On this topic see C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism:
Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978.
85 This view can be found for example in Iamblichus, “e p ¬ istolæ pròv Makedónion perì ei™mar-
ménhv”, apud Stobaeum, Anthologium, 2, 8.45, ed. O. Hense/C. Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei
anthologium, vol. 2, Berlin 1884, p. 174.25–31; Simplicius (re vera Priscianus Lydus), In libros
Aristotelis De anima commentaria, edidit M. Hayduck (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9),
Berlin 1882, 242.4–6. Cf. Steel, The Changing (nt. 83), 52–68.
87 Ibid., 317.32–34.
88 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, vol. 2, Leipzig 1904, 2,285.23–26. On
this passage as a source for Eustratius see Trizio, Neoplatonic (nt. 35), 92–93.

self admits the existence of such lives, but denies that the soul is made up of just
these acts89. What counts here is that Eustratius simply takes Proclus’ “tinèv
légousin” and the related doxography and incorporates it in his commentary, as is
evidenced by the form “fasín” that Eustratius introduces in the reference to the
notion of inseparable lives.
Seemingly, the previously mentioned passage from Proclus’ ‘Tria Opuscula’,
which appeared to be the source of Eustratius’ reference to the ‘e ¬llámyeiv’ that
the bodies receive from the souls, states that “animatum secundum participationem ani-
matum quadam anima in ipso facta, quam vocet quis entelecheiam, cui amicum sic vocare ani-
mata vincula”. Here “entelecheiam” refers to the Aristotelian definition of the soul
and “animata vincula” to a rather Platonic view90. Furthermore, it is worth men-
tioning that in his theological writings Eustratius refers to the Plotinian view that
the soul does not join the body directly, but only through an illumination, a mere
“image” or “reflection” ( i¢ndalma) of the soul 91. Indeed, Plotinus’ view is not the
same as Proclus’ 92. In general, there were different Neoplatonic views on the
bond between the soul and the body, but Eustratius seems more interested in
the common trait between the different Neoplatonic solutions to the problem
at stake: the idea that the soul cannot bind with the body directly. That is why,
according to Eustratius, the Creator posited lower and irrational lives that could
mediate between them.
Yet, once again, Eustratius’ strategy might seem bizarre: what does this Neo-
platonic account for the link between soul and body have to do with Islam and
the debate among Byzantine and Muslim polemicists? Indeed, Eustratius’ point,
which he shares with Niketas of Byzantium, concerns the irrational faculties of
the soul and the traditional idea that living according to the irrational faculties
renders men worse than the beasts. The evidence here, however, suggests that this
text has much more to do with the intellectual trends of Byzantium in the 11th
and 12th century, such as the Neoplatonic tendencies apparent in many authors of
the time, than the traditional Byzantine-Muslim theological debate93. But there is
something more. Eustratius’ way of discussing the soul’s faculties and the reason
why rational and irrational potencies co-exist at the same time in terms of scope
89 Cf. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. C. Steel, Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria,
vol. 1, Oxford 2007 (Oxford Classical Texts), 819,24–25.
90 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 38e5.
91 Cf. Eustratios, Toû au¬toû lógov deúterov perì toû a™gíou Pneúmatov, ed. Demetrakopoulos,
∫Ekklhsiastikæ (nt. 57), 80.23–26. The notion of i n¢ dalma as referred to Plotinus’ view is found
in Proclus’ account of it found in his lost commentaries on Plotinus’ Enneads and reported by
Michael Psellus. Cf. L. G. Westerink, Exzerpte aus Proklos’ Enneaden-Kommentar bei Psellos,
in: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 52 (1959), 1–10, here 7.
92 Cf. Steel, The Changing (nt. 83), 69–75.
93 On the 11th–12th-century readers of Proclus and the other Neoplatonists, see G. Podskalsky,
Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz, in: Orientalia Christiana Periodica
42 (1976), 509–523; L. Benakis, Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz, in: G. Boss/G. Seel
(eds.), in Proclus et son influence, Zürich 1987, 247–259.

164 Michele Trizio
or aim is similar to another text written around the time of John Italus’ condem-
nation of 1082 when Eustratius, who was Italus’ former pupil, was still a young
scholar; Nicetas Stethatus’ ‘Treatise on the Soul’ 94.
A comparison between Stethatus’ Lógov perì yucñv and Eustratius’ anti-Mus-
lim digression demonstrates that Eustratius’ digression against Islam reproduces,
in miniature, the structure of Stethatus’ long ‘Treatise on the soul’, which heavily
relies on John of Damascus’ ‘De Fide Orthodoxa’. Like Eustratius, Stethatus dis-
cusses the soul’s faculties and their function95 and mentions the four cardinal vir-
tues96 and the effect of jumóv and e p¬ ijumía on the rational part of the soul 97.
More importantly, from the very beginning of the text, Stethatos intends to inves-
tigate “which is the divine plan (tív te o™ jeîov skopóv ) according to which man’s
creation took place after the creation of beings from non-being”. Like Eustratius,
he mentions the fact that human being participates in both the rational and irra-
tional nature “through the combination and conjunction in him of contrary ele-
ments” 98.
The point here is not the originality of Stethatus’ arguments, but his insistence
on the notion of skopóv. In fact, he discusses the providential plan concerning
the soul’s faculties in terms of oi¬konomía and skopóv. Interestingly, while discuss-
ing the reason why man was also created with irrational faculties which cha-
racterize his present state, he answers “to the end that man suffers, and in so
doing he remembers the glory and freedom from which he fell and what sort of
slavery he received instead of this freedom” 99. This is what Stethatus calls “the
providential plan concerning the soul’s faculty” 100. As we have seen, Eustratius
investigates the same issue as he wonders about the providential plan for the
bond between the soul and the body. But the solutions given by these authors to
the same problem could not have been more different. Eustratius, on the one
hand, is merely concerned about the philosophical explanation of the lower lives
of the soul as the mediators between soul and body. Stethatos, on the other hand,
openly conceives this problem within a broader and purely eschatological per-
spective concerning man’s salvation.
94 Nicetas Stethatus, Lógov perì yucñv, ed. J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et Lettres
(Sources chrétiennes 81), Paris 1961, 64–153.
95 Ibid., 31, 96.1–16; 37, 100.1–12.
96 Ibid., 26, 86.1–88.12.
97 Ibid., 57, 118.1–12.
98 Ibid., 1, 64.11–17.
99 Ibid., 46, 110.11–12: “i çna páschı kaì páscwn u™pomimnäıskhtai h©v e x¬ épese dóxhv kaì e l¬ eujeríav
kaì oi çan a¬nj’ oi çav douleían h¬lláxato”.
100 Ibid., 47, 110.1–2.

VI. Conclusions
Concerning Eustratius’ career as a theologian, we know that he was involved

in discussions with the Latins and the Armenians, and he also wrote against Leo
of Chalcedon on icons101. When referring to the Muslim ‘heretics’ in this digres-
sion, he writes “o™poíoiv e g¢ wge diafóroiv w™mílhsa” 102, suggesting the author’s
direct acquaintance with his opponents. Are we looking at an unknown chapter of
Eustratius’ career and, more generally, of Byzantine-Muslim theological relations?
Is Eustratius’ opponent fictitious or does he correspond with a real defendant in
a theological debate? It is, of course, difficult to answer these queries without
producing conjectures that are difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
Eustratius’ anti-Muslim digression takes on the appearance of a series of
Chinese boxes in which several different textual levels fit into one another. The
reader is faced with a refutation of Islam conveying both Niketas of Byzantium’s
emphasis on the irrationality of the Muslim faith and the Neoplatonic view on
the soul’s lower lives or potencies, which, in turn, Eustratius shapes with some
Christian elements. At the same time, the text reflects a contemporary debate on
the soul, and, in general, is representative of the inner tensions within the Byzan-
tine intellectual scenery concerning the value and use of pagan philosophical
source-material. It is obviously difficult to demonstrate that Eustratius’ treatment
of the soul-body problem is directly addressed against Nicetas Stethatus. Yet, the
difference between these two authors in discussing the same issue cannot be re-
garded as accidental.
Thus, I believe that the question concerning Eustratius’ direct or indirect
acquaintance with Islamic theology and the Qur’an becomes less relevant as his
text seems to be entirely the product of the Byzantine scholarship of Eustratius’
time. His attitude seems to be ‘philosophical’ in avoiding any involvement with
theological issues as much as possible. He introduces his digression by wondering
“on what basis the intemperate, those who do wrong, the cheater and those who
perform other things of this kind are to be judged worthy of punishment” 103.
Apparently, the argument concerns Aristotelian moral agency since the ‘Nico-
machean Ethics’ discusses ‘punishment’ (kólasiv) and ‘reward’ as the prerogative
of the legislator, and in this same work the philosopher states that the ‘bad-tem-
pered’ (calepoí) cannot be reconciled “without vengeance or punishment” (a¢neu
timwríav h£ kolásewv ) 104. Yet, Eustratius’ sentence hints at man’s punishment and
reward in a theological sense as well, probably related to the final judgement,105
101 On Eustratius’ career as theologian, see Cacouros, Eustrate de Nicée (nt. 1), 380–382.
102 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272.14.
103 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272.5–6 “dià tí kolásewv a£xioi krínontai
oi™ a¬kolastaínontev h£ a¬dikoûntev h£ a¬patøntev kaì a£llo ti toioûton katergazómenoi”.
104 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, 1126a26–28.
105 As a matter of fact the very expression “kolásewv a£xioi” used by Eustratius is found in several
Patristic works as referred to a divine punishment. Cf e.g. Maximus Confessor, Capita de caritate,
I,56, ed. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, Massimo Confessore. Capitoli sulla carità, Roma 1963, 70.

166 Michele Trizio
although this theological allusion is left unaddressed. By the same token, Eustra-
tius’ discussion about the soul deliberately avoids the most crucial theological
problems of the time, such as the denial of the pre-existence of the soul and the
soul’s post-mortem destiny 106.
So who were the readers of this anti-Muslim digression? It seems likely that
they were the erudite ‘philologoi’, a circle of erudite and highly ranked readers
around some important member of the imperial court 107. This group was
probably composed of those who Eustratius rhetorically refers to as his e™taîroi,
‘fellows’, elsewhere in his work and they might have included the princess praised
by Eustratius at the beginning of his commentary to book VI of the ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’ 108. Beyond this circle, the text could have hardly been presented as a piece
of ‘official’ apologetics. Perhaps it is better seen as a theological treatise written
for courtiers, which, as a result, did not need to strictly follow the standard path
of the official theological works. But this was also Eustratius’ final attempt at
theology. In the beginning of his commentary on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’ he describes himself as old and affected by all sort of diseases. Having, in
all likelihood, already been condemned for his theological writings (1117), the
digression could also have been an attempt to regain a reputation for being a
reliable theologian109. Yet, as I demonstrated in the present paper, until the very
end of his career he did not give up referring to his beloved Neoplatonists, like
Proclus, even when he turned to theological matters.
106 This theological concern is found for example in Niketas Stethatus, Epistulae, 4, ed. J. Darrouzès,
Nicétas Stéthatos, 244.1–9; Lógov perì yucñv, 26, 88.11–12 (nt. 94). Obviously Stethatos’
reference to the simultaneous creation of the soul and the body is reminiscent of the Patristic
refutation of Origen’s doctrine and the Manichean heresy.
107 Eustratius, In Aristotelis analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium, ed.
M. Hayduck, Eustratii in analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium (Commen-
taria in Aristotelem Graeca 21.1), Berlin 1907, 123.27–29. The reference to a request by fellows
as the cause for the composition of a work is rhetorical insofar as it is an antique ‘topos’, found
for instance in Galenus, De compositione medicamentorum per genera libri vii, C. G. Kühn,
Claudii Galeni opera omnia, vol. 13., Leipzig 1827, 887.17–19. Obviously, despite being rhe-
torical, Eustratius’ reference to his fellows can hardly be regarded as fictitious.
109 On Eustratius’ condemnation see P. Joannou, Eustrate de Nicée: Trois pièces inédites de son
procès (1117), in: Revue des Études Byzantines 10 (1952), 24–34; Id., Der Nominalismus und die
Menschliche Psychologie Christi: Das Semeioma gegen Eustratios von Nikaia (1117), in: Byzan-
tinische Zeitschrift, 47 (1954), 369–378; Le sort des évêques hérétiques réconciliés: Un discours
inédit de Nicétas de Serres contre Eustrate de Nicée, in: Byzantion 28 (1958), 1–30; J. Darrouzès,
Documents inédits d’ecclésiologie byzantine, Paris 1966, 57–60; 306–309; J. Gouillard, Le Syno-
dikon de l’Orthodoxie. Édition et commentaire, in: Travaux et mémoires 2 (1967), 56–61;
207–210.


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Knotenpunkt Byzanz

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The commentary of Eustratius of Nicaea on book VI of Aristotle’s ‘Nico-

* I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Guy Guldentops, Yannis Demetracopoulos and

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revealing of a more subtle, if not unique, rejection of Islam through a philo-

I. T he Str ucture of the Text

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II. T he Anti-Muslim Vocabular y

Apparently, the vocabulary of Eustratius’ anti-Muslim digression reveals ele-

8 Ibid., 272.13: “pròv toùv laloûntav tà mátaia”.

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Likewise, Eustratius regards the mistaken interpretation of Aristotle’s text as a

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commentaries seem to assimilate the biblical and Aristotelian notion of legis-

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III. T he Faculties of the Human Soul

Although vaguely reminiscent of the Byzantine-Muslim theological debates,

28 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,17.

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34 Ammonius, In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium (nt. 32), 3.18–19:

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Likewise, in his anti-Muslim digression Eustratius positions himself against “the

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text of Eustratius’ anti-Muslim digression is a unique composition among the

IV. Eustratius’ Byzantine Sources

It is clear that Eustratius regards Islam as an irrational and sense-perception

M. Hayduck, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in

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V. T he Solution to the Aporia

As has been established, Eustratius utilised Niketas’ emphasis on the ‘irration-

60 Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275.1–276.12.

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71 Gregorius Nazianzenus, In Sanctum Pascha, Patrologia Graeca, 36, 633A.

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Concerning Eustratius’ career as a theologian, we know that he was involved

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