Mohammad H atta

on Bangka, A p r i l 19^9
 IN MEMORIAM: MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902-1980)

George McT. Kahin

Mohammad H a tta, one of th e two major political fig u re s o f modern Indonesian

h is to ry , died on M arch 14 o f th is y e a r. T o g eth er w ith S u k a rn o , he held a command­
in g position both in b u ilding th e p re w a r Indonesian n atio n alist movement and as a
le ad e r of th e Indonesian rev o lu tio n . And it was he who played th e major role in
g u iding his c o u n try su ccessfu lly th ro u g h th e difficult seven-m onth tra n s itio n p e r ­
iod following th e official tr a n s f e r of so v ereig n ty from The N eth erlan d s at th e end
o f 1949. T h e re a fte r he rem ained la rg e ly off c e n te r s ta g e , b u t continued in te rm it­
te n tly fo r almost a decade to e x e rt a sig n ifican t in flu en ce on th e co u rse o f h is coun­
t r y 's political life.
B orn in B u k ittin g g i on A ugu st 12, 1902 in to a prom inent and stro n g ly Islamic
fam ily, Mohammad H atta was the g ran d so n of a widely re s p e c te d ulama from B atu
Hampar (n e a r P ayakum buh). His fa th e r, Haji Mohammad Jam il, died before H atta's
fir s t b ir th d a y , and he was ra ise d b y th e family of his m o th er. Coming from a weal­
th y fam ily, she ra n h e r own mail tra n s p o rt b u s in e ss. H atta's in tellectu al p re c o ­
ciousness was soon e v id e n t. In B u k ittin g g i he was able to s tu d y D utch as well as
th e Koran a fte r school, and his family helped d ire c t him tow ards th e b e st e d u c a ­
tional facilities available. A fter a tte n d in g th e Sekolah Melayu in B u k ittin g g i, he
was sen t to th e D utch language elem entary school (E L S --E uropeesche Lagere
School) in P adang from 1913 to 1916. When th irte e n ,h e p a sse d th e exams e n titlin g
him to adm ission to the HBS (D utch L anguage S econdary School) in B atav ia, b u t
because of h is y o u th his m other in siste d he rem ain on fo r a while in P ad an g and
fir s t a tte n d the MULO (junior seco n d ary school) th e r e . With e x tra time on his
h a n d s , he took a job w ithout h e r know ledge in th e p o st o ffic e --fo r which p a ssin g
th e HBS exam qualified him --w hile a t th e same time becoming in te re s te d in p o litics.
Via his MULO's soccer association , o f which he was made ch airm an , he bro ad en ed
his c o n ta c ts. In th e offices o f th e S arik at Usaha (U nited E n d e a v o r), a m erch an ts'
educational association led b y T a h e r Marah S oetan, he avidly re a d th e political
coverage o f th e available n ew sp ap ers and re p o rts of th e V olksraad d e b a te s . At
th e age o f s ix te e n , his in te re s t in politics and th e n atio n alist movement alre ad y
well k in d le d , he was chosen tr e a s u r e r of th e b ra n c h o f th e Jong Sum atranen Bond
th a t was fir s t e sta b lish e d in P adang in 1918.
In 1919 H atta went to B atavia to a tte n d th e HBS, w here he com pleted his
stu d ie s w ith d istin ctio n in 1921. T he n e x t y e a r he d e p a rte d for w hat was to be a
d e ca d e 's re sid en c e in The N eth erlan d s and e n te re d th e R otterdam School o f Com­
m erce. He e arn e d th e d eg ree of D octorandus (D r s .) in 1932, a fte r h av in g stu d ie d
in te n siv ely sev e ra l fields of economics and completed all req u irem en ts for h is doc­
to ra te w ith th e exception of th e th e s i s , w hich he n e v e r fin ish ed b ecause o f his
immersion in political life.
In Holland H atta quickly assum ed a position o f lead ersh ip in th e major In d o n e­
sian n atio nalist o rg a n iz atio n , th e Perhim punan In d o n esia. He was its tr e a s u r e r
from 1922 to 1925 and th e n its chairm an u n til 1930. T he P i's unequivocal demand

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fo r In d o n esia's in d ependence and th e m ilitary tone o f nationalism th a t H atta e x ­

p re s s e d in m eetings of th e organization and in its jo u rn a l, Indonesia Merdeka, in ­
c re asin g ly alarm ed th e D utch a u th o ritie s . T h eir co n cern was f u r th e r h e ig h te n ed b y
H a tta's activ itie s as Indonesian delegate to th e League A gainst Imperialism b e g in ­
n in g w ith its establishm ent in 1927. (It was th ro u g h th e League th a t he developed
a close and lo n g -la stin g frie n d sh ip w ith N eh ru ; a n d , like him, he e v en tu ally became
c ritic a l of some of its policies, e ith e r re sig n in g o r b ein g expelled in 1931.) L ater
in 1927 he was a rre s te d and im prisoned b y th e D utch fo r n e arly six m onths, along
w ith fo u r o th e r Indonesian n a tio n a lists active in th e P erhim punan In d o n esia. At his
tria l he made a s p irite d d efense which gained him g re a te r prom inence among In d o n e­
sian n a tio n a lis ts , and th e su b se q u e n t publication of th is sp eech u n d e r th e title In d o ­
nesia Vrij (F ree Indonesia) became an im portant docum ent of th e n atio n alist move­
ment .
Upon r e tu rn in g to Indonesia in Ju ly 1932, H atta immediately became prom inent
in th e natio n alist movement th e r e , when he assum ed th e lead e rsh ip o f th e more ra d i­
cal of th e re sid u a l com ponents o f S u k a rn o 's b an n ed PNI (P a rta i Nasional In d o n e s ia ).
With th e help of Sutan S ja h rir and o th e rs , he b u ilt th is up in to a small b u t in flu e n ­
tia l political movement known as th e Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (In d o n esian
National E ducation Club) or PNI B aru (new P N I). T hey o rg an ized th is aro u n d th e
p rin cip le th a t a small body of w e ll-tra in e d , d e d ic a te d , and s e lf-re lia n t c a d re would
have more s ta y in g p o w e r--a n d ultim ately more in flu e n c e --th a n th e ty p e o f mass
p a rty th a t Sukarno h e a d e d , which th e y re g a rd e d as too re lia n t on a few v u ln erab le
le a d e rs . T h e ir e ffo rts la sted for only a y e a r and a h a lf, when H atta found th a t
D utch concepts of ju stice w ere much h a rs h e r in h is homeland th a n in Holland.
In F e b ru a ry 1934 H atta was a r r e s te d , along w ith S ja h rir, B ondan, B u rh a n u d -
d in , and se v e ra l o th e r members o f th e Club P en d id ik an , and in c a rc e ra te d fo r most
of a y e a r in B atav ia 's Glodok jail. T h e n , still w ithout tr ia l, th e y w ere exiled to th e
notorious fe v e r-rid d e n jungle co n cen tratio n camp o f T anah Merah at Boven Digul in
w e ste rn New G uinea. In 1936 th e D utch tr a n s fe rre d him , along w ith S ja h rir, to in ­
d efinite in tern m en t on th e rem ote b u t more salu b rio u s islan d o f B anda N eira, w here
th e y joined two o th e r p ro m in e n t, exiled n atio n alist le a d e r s , Iwa K usum asum antri
and D r. T jipto M angunkusum o. T h e re H atta rem ained u n til late 1941, w hen, on th e
v e ry eve of th e Jap an ese a tta c k , th e D utch ev acu ated him and th e se o th e r national­
is t le ad e rs to Ja v a .
H atta was re g a rd e d b y officials o f th e Jap an ese occupation adm in istratio n as a
prom inent Islamic le a d e r, whose influence in Indonesia was so g re a t th a t th e y had
to avoid antag o n izin g him too f a r. Like S u k a rn o , alth o u g h H atta co o p erated with
Jap a n e se a u th o rity , he is gen erally c re d ite d w ith h av in g attem p ted to use his p o si­
tion to build In d o n e sia's natio n alist s p ir it, w ith ultim ate in d ep en d en ce his goal.
D urin g th e occupation he was app o in ted Vice Chairman o f th e P o etera (Poesat Te-
n aga R akjat) and la te r of th e PPKI (P an itia P ersiap an K em erdekaan In d o n e sia --
Committee for P rep a ra tio n fo r Indonesian In d e p e n d e n c e ), as well as a member of
sev e ra l a d v iso ry bo d ies.
With th e o u tb re a k of th e Indonesian re v o lu tio n , H atta immediately moved to th e
fo refro n t o f its le ad e rsh ip alongside S u k arn o . T o g eth er th e y d eclared th e ir co u n ­
t r y 's in d ep en d en ce on A ugust 17, 1945, a n d , s h a rin g top a u th o rity as P re sid e n t and
Vice P r e s id e n t, th e y c o n stitu te d th e e sse n tia l apex o f th e national le ad ersh ip th a t
saw th e ir c o u n try th ro u g h to in d e p en d e n c e. T h ro u g h o u t th e five y e a rs o f national
revolution th a t, in fa c t, en d ed only in Septem ber 1950, th e y u su ally w orked well
and harm oniously to g e th e r. T h eir in d iv id u al q u alities and th e p o p u lar im ages th e y
evoked w ere com plem entary and m utually re in fo rc in g , c o n trib u tin g to th e a tta in ­
ment and m aintenance of national u n ity --a n objective th a t o b sesse d bo th o f th em --
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as well as to th e d riv e and e ffectiv en ess of th e rev o lu tio n 's le a d e rsh ip . B oth were
convinced th a t th e p ric e of u n ity was for socio-economic rev o lu tio n to wait u n til
th e national revolution was com pleted, and th e ir agreem ent on th e se p rio ritie s
helped hold them to g e th e r u n til well a fte r th e tr a n s f e r of so v e re ig n ty . To S u k a r­
n o 's charism a, keen political p e rc e p tiv e n e ss , and ab ility to in sp ire mass s u p p o rt,
H atta added o rganizational and ad m in istrativ e tale n t and an u n d e rs ta n d in g of eco­
nomic problem s. A lthough no one could have d e sc rib e d him as ch arism atic, he v e ry
clearly p ro jected a q u a lity of firm , s e lf-a s s u re d , n o -n o n sen se a u th o rity th a t few
men w ere p re p a re d to c o n test o p en ly . In th e symbolism o f h is dual lead ersh ip with
S u k a rn o , H atta was seen as re p re s e n tin g Sum atra a n d , more g e n erally , th o se In d o ­
n esian s who took th e ir Islamic religion most serio u sly .
H a tta's in flu en tial position in governm ent gave many Sum atrans a g re a te r con­
fidence in th e re v o lu tio n a ry R epublic and its policies. D u rin g th e s tru g g le ag ain st
th e D u tch , he se rv e d as Y o g y ak arta's main liaison w ith , and re p re s e n ta tiv e in ,
S um atra, m aking n u m e ro u s--o ften h a z a rd o u s --trip s to th e isla n d . For six months
following th e lau n ch in g o f th e D utch a tta c k o f Ju ly 1947, he rem ained b ased in
B u k ittin g g i as head o f th e R ep u b lic's governm ent on S um atra. A lthough only p a r ­
tially su cc e ssfu l in overcom ing schism s among Sum atran civilian and m ilitary le ad ­
e r s , he pro v id ed an im portant c o u n terv ailin g force fo r u n ity .
In Ja n u a ry 1948, he re tu rn e d to Y ogyakarta to ta k e o v er as Prime M inister at
a time when th e b itte rn e s s of in te r p a r ty s trife ru le d out a n o th e r p a rty -le d g o v e rn ­
m ent. It was th e n th a t, in th e face o f a w ell-founded disillusionm ent and em b itter-
ment tow ards th e US, he su ccessfu lly in siste d on In d o n e sia's co n tin u in g ad h eren ce
to an in d e p en d e n t and nonaligned foreign p o lic y --a n objective to which he was to
a d h ere th ro u g h o u t his life.
T h ere is still no soundly b ased h isto rical judgm ent as to how fa r his forceful
in siste n c e upon seeing th ro u g h th e d raconian army ratio n alizatio n for which Colonel
N asution and some o th e r army le ad e rs were p re s s in g , p ro v o k ed th e defection of
pro-C om m unist m ilitary commanders whose positions were th e re b y th re a te n e d and
c o n seq u en tly led to th e Madiun reb ellio n . B ut th e re is no d oubt th a t, once th a t
challenge was u n d e rw ay , he dealt w ith it decisively and firm ly. The major r e g re t
he e x p re sse d when I talk ed w ith him about th is episode was th a t some army officers
d ire c tly violated his o rd e rs th a t p ris o n e rs who had been a rre s te d in connection
w ith th e rebellion be re le a s e d --n o t m a ssa c re d --if th e y could not be ev acu ated
ahead o f th e a tta c k in g D utch fo rce s.
H atta had only re c e n tly re tu rn e d from one of his many trip s to S u m atra, and
was ill, la rg e ly from o v erw o rk , when th e D utch lau n ch ed th e ir s u rp ris e b litz assau lt
on Y ogyakarta on December 19, 1948. One consequence o f his in tern m en t on th e
islan d of B angka fo r th e n e x t h alf y e a r was th a t, reliev ed of his ad m in istrativ e b u r ­
d e n s , he was able to re c o v er his h e a lth . And for me, th e re was th e a d v an tag e th a t
he could sp a re th e time for lo n g , s e a rc h in g d iscu ssio n s su ch as had been im possible
in th e R epublic's c ap ital.
In e arly J u ly , a fte r Indonesian re sista n c e and m ounting p re s s u re s from o th e r
c o u n trie s and from w ithin Holland had forced th e D utch governm ent to move tow ards
accep tin g th e R ep u b lic's claim to in d e p en d e n c e, H atta resum ed his position as th e
active head of its governm ent. From A u g u st 23 to November 2, he led th e R ep u b ­
lic 's delegation to th e Round Table C onference at The Hague for th e final n eg o tia­
tio n s w ith th e D u tch . A lthough for th e most p a rt an effectiv e n e g o tia to r, in th e
view of his colleagues H atta placed too much tr u s t in Merle C ochran, th e American
re p re s e n ta tiv e th e r e . While s e rv in g as Chairman of th e UN's Good O ffices Commit­
te e , C ochran clearly m isrep resen ted th e actual tem per o f a US Senate th a t had
finally in te re s te d its e lf in th e D u tch -In d o n esian d isp u te, and th e scope th a t th e
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Trum an A dm inistration was willing to give C ochran him self in th e n e g o tia tio n s. On
at least one is s u e -- th e amount o f d e b t th a t th e new Indonesian governm ent was
obliged to ta k e o v e r from th e colonial a d m in istra tio n --it is clear th a t C ochran s e r i­
ously misled H atta as to W ashington's a ttitu d e , in d u c in g him to ag ree to a c o n sid e r­
ably la rg e r d e b t load th a n was e ith e r eq u itab le o r n e c e s sa ry . (H a tta 's su b se q u e n t
frig id ity tow ards C ochran re fle c te d his realization th a t th e man in whom he had
placed so much confidence had deceived him , and th is was u n d o u b ted ly one o f th e
re a so n s for C ochran's in e ffe c tiv en e ss as W ashington's fir s t am bassador to J a k a r ta .)
In th e fir s t seven m onths of 1950, ju s t a fte r th e formal tr a n s f e r o f D utch so v ­
e re ig n ty , H atta made one of his fin e s t, th o u g h , I th in k , o ften in su ffic ie n tly re c o g ­
n iz e d , c o n trib u tio n s to his c o u n try 's political developm ent. With g re a t skill and
ta c t, he se rv e d as th e re s p e c te d m oderator in th is te n sio n -rid d e n tra n s itio n perio d
d u rin g which th e fe d e ra list legacy o f D utch e ffo rts at divide an d ru le gave way b e ­
fore th e p re s s u re s of the b ro ad ly b ased U nitarian movement th a t dem anded its liq u i­
d atio n . T his involved not only delicate and ard u o u s n e g o tia tio n , b u t also a d iffi­
cult p ro c e ss of co n stitu tio n al re v isio n . And it was d u rin g H a tta's la st to u r
as Prime M inister, which ended on Septem ber 6, 1950, th a t th e com plex, emotion­
ally c h a r g e d , and d an g ero u s program of re d u c in g th e armed forces and fu sin g th e
arm ies of th e R epublic w ith th e re sid u a l KNIL (th e D utch Colonial Army) was mostly
accom plished. In th is p erio d he was also able to make im portant p ro g re s s in th e
parallel e ffo rt to fu se , ratio n a liz e, and re d u c e th e enorm ous b u re a u c ra c y left by
th e s tru g g le a g ain st th e D utch--som e 240,000 R epublican and 180,000 F ed eralist
civil s e r v a n ts . T hough th e p lann ed o v erall re d u c tio n to a composite body of
230,000 civilian officials was n e v e r a tta in e d , H atta p ro b ab ly tack led th is th a n k le ss
job as effectiv ely as anyone could have done u n d e r th e circu m stan ces.
T hat th e poten tially explosive p assag e from th e D utch-im posed fed eral o rd e r
to a u n ita ry R epublic in Septem ber 1950 was a tte n d e d by so little political traum a
and bloodshed m u s t, I th in k , be c re d ite d to his statesm an sh ip more th a n to th a t of
any o th e r m an. It was one o f th e c ru e l iro n ies o f h is life t h a t , h av in g led his coun­
tr y away from th e d isc re d ite d artificial fe d e ralist o rd e r th a t th e D utch had e s ta b ­
lis h e d , he was n e v e r ab le, d e sp ite p e rs is te n t e ffo rt, to move it to w ard s th e genuine
decen tralizatio n th a t he believed its c h a ra c te r and political h ealth re q u ire d .
T h e re a fte r, on only th re e occasio n s, and in e v e ry case only b rie fly , did H atta
again assum e a c e n tra l political ro le. When in m id-July 1955, S u k a rn o , momentarily
outm aneuvered b y elem ents of the arm y, ab se n te d him self from th e c o u n try on a
to u r a b ro a d , H atta assum ed full p re sid e n tia l pow er. In th a t cap acity he d esig n ated
B u rh an u d d in H arahap of th e Masjumi as form ateur o f a cabinet th a t e n d u re d th ro u g h
th e lo n g -d elay ed elections and th e em ergence of a new p arliam en tary governm ent
led by Ali Sastroam idjojo and th e PNI on March 24 o f th e following y e a r.
B egin ning in the la st m onths of 1956, H atta once again moved u n d e r th e p o liti­
cal sp o tlig h t with his s tro n g public criticism of th e Guided Democracy w ith which
Sukarno and the army were aiming to su p p lan t th e elected p arliam en tary g o v e rn ­
m ent. H atta saw th e system o f p arliam en tary governm ent as b asically sound and
poten tially well su ited to Indonesian conditions. It had failed th u s fa r in In d o ne­
sia , he b e lie v e d , because it had not been ap p ro p ria te ly ad ap ted to local co n d itio n s.
Its application in the p o stre v o lu tio n a ry p e rio d , he a rg u e d , had been a sim plistic
m irro rin g of a v a ria n t borrow ed from The N e th e rla n d s , one a ttu n e d to D utch r e ­
q u irem ents and e x p e rie n c e --n o t Indonesian re a litie s. D espite th e force of his a rg u ­
m ents , he was unable to p re v a il ag ain st th e pow erful m arriage o f convenience b e ­
tw een Sukarno and th e arm y. W anting no place in th e a u th o rita ria n governm ent
th e y were in tro d u c in g , he re sig n e d from his position as Vice P re sid e n t on Decem­
b e r 1, 1956.
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For most o f th e n e x t two y e a rs he was occupied in m ounting a re a rg u a rd action

a g ain st th e p ro p o n e n ts o f Guided Democracy and in attem p tin g to head o ff th e th re a t
of regional sep aratio n p re c ip ita te d in p a r t b y e ffo rts at in c re a se d cen tralizatio n of
pow er in b o th th e governm ent and th e m ilitary. In e arly 1958, w ith th e o u tb re a k
of th e PRRI and Perm esta rebellio n s in Sum atra and Sulaw esi, he was once again in
a position of p o te n tia l political im p o rtan ce. It is logical to conclude th a t he stood
a reaso n ab le chance of succeed in g in his stre n u o u s e ffo rts to find a common g round
fo r compromise betw een Sukarno and th e d issid en t Masjumi political le ad e rs w ithin
th e PRRI. H ow ever, he had little ra p p o rt and influence w ith th e d issid e n t colonels,
on e ith e r Sum atra o r Sulaw esi, who h ad b een th e o rig in al in s tig a to rs of th e re b e l­
lio n s. From th e ta lk s I su b se q u e n tly had w ith him about th e se developm ents, it
alw ays seemed to me th a t in h is m ediating role he h ad been serio u sly d isad v a n ta g ed
b y th e e x te n t to w hich he was cu t o ff from im portant intelligence th a t n eed ed to be
facto red into any su cc e ssfu l e ffo rt at compromise. T h u s , H atta and th e Masjumi
political le ad e rs on Sum atra w ith whom he was try in g to n eg o tiate w ere a p p a re n tly
almost equally ig n o ra n t about th e e x te n t of th e tie s of th e d issid e n t reg io n al colonels
and th e ir financial a d v ise r, P ro fe sso r Sum itro, w ith th e CIA and th e US and T ai­
w anese m ilitary e sta b lish m e n ts. Had H atta still been Vice P r e s id e n t, he would p r e ­
sum ably have been p riv y to th is inform ation--w hich clearly affected th e a ttitu d e s
of S ukarno and Prime M inister D juanda, as well as G eneral N a su tio n --a n d h is e f­
fo rts at m ediation might have b een more effe ctiv e.
A lthough th e se ab o rtiv e reb ellio n s ag ain st J a k a rta led to g re a te r cen tralizatio n
of its pow er, H atta continued for many y e a rs to arg u e cogently for a devolution of
p o litical, ad m in istra tiv e , and fiscal a u th o rity in k eep in g with th e c o u n try 's ex p an se
and d iv e rs ity . He held th a t, for a s ta te of In d o n esia's p ro p o rtio n s and c h a ra c te r,
"dem ocracy is incom patible w ith th e p rin c ip le o f cen tralism . . . . th e la rg e r th e
national te r r ito r y and th e more d ifferen tia tio n in th e v ario u s a sp e c ts of life, th e
more specific problem s th e re a re p e rta in in g to th e se se p a ra te a re as th a t cannot be
dealt w ith from th e c e n tra l seat o f th e national g o v ern m en t." He re fu s e d to s u p ­
p o rt those who advocated a s e n a te , believing th a t su ch an additional r e p re s e n ta ­
tiv e body would slow th e p ro c e ss o f n ational governm ent too much. He re g a rd e d
th e e x istin g p a tte r n of decen tralizatio n th ro u g h p ro v iees as larg ely a facad e, and
was convinced th a t th e k a b u p ate n and its o u te r islan d e q u iv alen ts were th e a p p ro ­
p ria te u n its for local self-g o v ern m en t and national e lectio n s, and th a t th e p ro v ­
in c e 's ch ief function should be as a co o rd in atin g body fo r th e sev e ra l k a b u p ate n
in its te r r ito r y . Single-m em ber election co n stitu en cies b ased upon th e k ab u p aten
u n i t , v o tin g on an absolute m ajority b asis w o u ld , he was c o n v in c e d , have had a
politically in te g ra tin g e f f e c t, as well as more effectiv ely re p re s e n tin g regional
n e e d s. Political p a rtie s ad ap ted to su ch a system co u ld , he was co n v in ced , have
p ro v id e d a much s tro n g e r foundation for p arliam en tary governm ent th a n th e p a rty
and election system th a t had been so m indlessly borrow ed from The N eth erlan d s.
If th e k a b u p a te n were th e major u n it o f national autonom y, H atta believed it
would be p ossible to guide th e g rad u al developm ent of village self-ad m in istratio n ;
b u t w ithout th is devolution and an in c re a sin g s e lf-ru le at th e village le v el, it would
be im possible to realize h is lo n g -c h e rish ed p lan s for village c re d it and sales coop­
e ra tiv e s . H aving ju stifia b ly e a rn e d th e name o f " fa th e r o f coo p erativ es" in his
c o u n try , H atta was deeply d isap p o in ted th a t, a decade a fte r th e re v o lu tio n , his
long e ffo rts to root them in th e v illages had p ro v e d a fa ilu re . In d isc u ssin g th is
w ith me in e arly 1960 he a sc rib e d th e ir w eakness to two main c a u se s--in su ffic ie n t
tra in in g of local ad m inistrative p e rso n n el and too little financial s u p p o rt from th e
governm ent to get them fa r enough u nderw ay to sta n d on th e ir own. He saw In d o ­
n e sia 's C hinese as still perfo rm in g a n e c e ssa ry role in m ark etin g and d isp en sin g
c re d it in r u r a l society and believed th a t co n sid erab ly more time and p re p a ra tio n
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would be n e c e ssa ry before it would be feasible to rep lace them w ith p e asa n t coop­
e ra tiv e s . He c o n tin u e d , h o w e v er, to see co o p erativ es as p o ten tially p ro v id in g th e
means for lig h te n in g th e p e a s a n ts' b u r d e n s , and h elp in g in s u re th a t th e y could hold
on to th e ir la n d . C ooperatives w e re , he b e lie v e d , th e most prom ising in stru m e n t
available for giving th e village th e s tre n g th to m aintain a h ealth y autonomy in th e
face of th e c e n tra l governm ent's grow ing w eight and for in s u rin g g re a te r social
ju stic e for In d o n e sia's exploited r u r a l m ajority, o r, as he p u t i t , "a b rid g e tow ard
economic dem ocracy."
A lthough I was fo rtu n a te enough to ta lk to H atta many tim es from 1948 to 1976,
th e la st time I v isite d In d o n e sia, th e re were th re e p erio d s w hich w ere especially
conducive to ex ten d e d and in te n siv e d iscu ssio n s and which p ro v e d p a rtic u la rly
helpful to me in ex p lo rin g and u n d e rs ta n d in g his view s. The fir s t was in May
1949, when I v isite d him on B angka w here he had been in te rn e d b y th e D utch
along w ith se v e ra l o th e r prom inent le ad e rs o f th e R epublic. The second was d u r ­
in g my n e x t v isit to Indonesia in 1954-55, when I was in th e p ro c e ss o f e s ta b lis h ­
in g th e C ornell Modern Indonesia P ro jec t. Among th e le ad e rs w ith whom I d iscu ssed
its p la n s , he was especially in te re s te d and help fu l in e sta b lish in g th e guidelines of
its re s e a rc h --b o th for its Indonesian and W estern p a rtic ip a n ts ; b u t th e re was an
u n ex p ected e x tra b e n e f it, for in. th e co u rse o f ta lk in g about th e k in d s o f re s e a rc h
th a t would be more u sefu l to Indo n esia we to u ch ed on a w ider ra n g e o f su b jects
th a n we would p ro b a b ly have o therw ise d isc u sse d . A nother occasion fo r su ch e x ­
te n d e d ta lk s aro se d u rin g his v is its to Ith aca in 1960 and 1968 as a g u e st of C or­
n e ll's Indonesia P ro jec t. A lthough some of th e se d iscu ssio n s w ere on su b jec ts well
c o v ered in H a tta 's w ritin g s, o th e rs y ielded im pressions about im p o rtan t a sp e c ts of
his th in k in g th a t I believe have not been widely a p p re c ia te d . In th e h o p e , th e n ,
o f m aking his c h a ra c te r and id e as a little c le a re r, let me re fe r to a few o f them .
F ir s t, d e sp ite th e p erc ep tio n th a t many have h a d , H atta was n o t-- a t least in
th e middle y e a rs when I knew him b est--d o g m atic and rig id . He did always in s ist
on in te lle ctu al p re c isio n , and he had s tro n g views on a num ber o f su b je c ts ; b u t I
found him re fre s h in g ly open-m inded and in d e p en d e n t in his political and social
th o u g h t. One o f my fir s t im pressions when we talk ed in 1948 and 1949 was h is r e ­
fu sal to ta lk in d o c trin a ire and stereo ty p ica l te rm s. T his was e v id en t ev en when
we talk ed about men who were s tro n g ly opposed to him politically. T h u s , he saw
Musso as b ein g "more o f an a n a rc h ist th a n a com m unist." S jarifu d d in was "too
religious to be a com m unist," a n d , if he in siste d on calling him self o n e , th e n it
"m ust be a new k in d of communism." Tan Malaka he re sp e c te d as a d ed icated
n a tio n a list, whose communism se rv e d his nationalism , who was unw illing to accept
any directio n from Moscow, and who had a sound u n d e rs ta n d in g o f M arxism .
(H atta was alw ays ju stifiab ly p ro u d of h is own command o f M arxist th e o ry and
lite ra tu re and at th is time recognized only one PKI le a d e r--T a n Ling D jie--as
b ein g re a lly know ledgeable.)
B ut c e rtain ly about th e p rin c ip le s he held most s tro n g ly he was ste a d fa s t and
u n y ield in g . He n e v e r abandoned his belief in In d o n e sia's m aintaining s tric t a d h e r­
ence to in dependence and nonalignm ent in foreign policy. Alignment on a p a rtic u ­
la r issu e at a p a rtic u la r tim e, y e s; b u t n e v e r s u rre n d e rin g h e r in d ep en d en ce and
freedom of choice to a long-term commitment to any pow er, no m atter w hat th e in ­
ducem ent , economic o r o th e rw ise . He p ro b ab ly a rg u e d his position most eloquently
in th e A pril 1953 issu e of Foreign Affairs. The d ate of th a t a rtic le was im p o rtan t,
for it ap p ea re d at a time th a t John F o ste r Dulles was making clear th a t su ch in d e ­
pendence was im possible in th e bip o lar world he and Eisenhow er p e rc e iv e d , and
th a t In d o n esia's nonalignm ent meant aiding and a b e ttin g th e Communist bloc. In
la te r y e a r s , I sen se d th a t th e economic dimension of th e problem of m aintaining an
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in d e p en d e n t foreign policy was th e one which most co n cern ed H atta, and th u s he

ap p ea re d in c re a sin g ly w orried o v e r In d o n esia's grow ing dependence on th e United
S tates and Ja p a n .
His deep commitment to dem ocratic governm ent i s , o f c o u rs e , well k n o w n , and
it su rfa c e d in n e a rly all o f o u r d isc u ssio n s. He felt th a t to have ta k e n o v e r th e
D utch system o f p a rtie s and elections was a major m istake and t h a t , as a co n se­
q u e n c e , In donesia had n e v e r had a fa ir te s t of dem ocracy. He was s tro n g ly o p ­
posed to functional re p re s e n ta tio n , re g a rd in g it as a device employed b y g o v ern ­
m ents for m anipulating politics so as to in s u re th e ir own co n tin u in g dom inance.
He was contem ptuous of th e m ilitary 's a sse rtio n of a r ig h t to a "dual fu n c tio n ,"
seein g th e arm y's sp re a d into ad m in istrativ e and economic life as g ro ssly incom pat­
ible w ith m aintenance of professionalism and morale among o fficers and s o ld ie rs ,
and as in v o lv in g a level of c o rru p tio n and mismanagement o f th e economy th a t was
ru in o u s for th e c o u n try .
T h e re w as, how ever, a n o th er su b ject about which he seemed to me to feel even
more s tro n g ly . T his was th e socio-economic role of Islam in Indonesian so ciety .
It was on May 4, 1949, in one of o u r d iscu ssio n s on B an g k a, th a t he fir s t in tr o ­
duced th is s u b je c t. "T he b a sis o f Islamic th o u g h t," he s a id , "is in th e d irectio n
of socialism , and it would be possible in Indonesia to make a w orking sy n th e sis"
of Islam and socialism , w ith in d iv id u als following Islam and socialism to g e th e r . He
w ent on to o b se rv e th a t "social ju stic e and th e b ro th e rh o o d of people are th e p il­
la rs of Islam ; if I have only one loaf o f b re a d for to d ay and tom orrow , I m ust give
h a lf to a d y in g man; th a t is th e economic b asis of Islam ." As we d isc u sse d th e
situ atio n f u r th e r , he made c lea r th a t w hat he believed b e st su ite d to Indonesia
would be a mixed economy w ith a la rg e socialist s e c to r, a s u b sta n tia l cooperative
s e c to r--p rim a rily at th e r u r a l le v el--a n d a limited c ap italist sp h ere w hereby small
b u sin e ss would continue to coexist with th e se la rg e r s e c to rs . He did not th in k it
would be n e c e s sa ry to develop "a c ap italist middle class before a b asically socialist
society could be e sta b lis h e d , o r even in o rd e r to have th e n e c e ssa ry ad m in istrativ e
p e rso n n el to man th e a p p a ra tu s of a socialist s o c ie ty ." Most su itab le fo r In d o n esia,
he b e lie v e d , would be a m ixed, b u t heavily s o c ia lis t, econom y, re s tin g on demo­
c ra tic political fo u ndations. A ccording to my n o te s, he concluded th a t d iscu ssio n
w ith th e o b serv atio n th a t he felt th a t w ithin his lifetime h is people would have
formed su ch a so ciety .
H atta w as, of c o u rs e , disap p o in ted in his e x p e c ta tio n s, and in la te r y e a rs he
came to low er his s ig h ts . B ut n e v e r did he abandon h is belief th a t Islam could
play a p ro g re s siv e socio-economic role th a t would lead Indonesia to g re a te r social
ju s tic e . T hat idea was v e ry much in h is mind in ta lk s I had with him in 1967, and
th e n and in su b se q u e n t ta lk s he e x p re ss e d g re a t disappointm ent and b itte rn e s s
th a t the S u h arto governm ent p ro h ib ite d his e sta b lish in g and leading a political
p a rty d edicated to th a t goal. T h at one o f th e two p rin c ip a l fo u n d in g fa th e rs of a
nation was denied such an o p p o rtu n ity and had h is political freedom a b rid g e d for
th e rem ainder of h is lif e , re v e als th e sen se of in s e c u rity of th o se who made th e se
d e c isio n s.
B ut even th o u g h sh u t out from p artic ip a tio n in p o litic s, H atta rem ained some­
th in g o f a political sym bol, one th a t was d is tu rb in g ly awkward for th o se who held
pow er. For in th e face o f a governm ent th a t was in c re asin g ly d ic tato rial and c o r­
r u p t , he stood o ut as a so rt o f stu b b o rn rem inder th a t political le ad ersh ip in
Indonesia had been possible w ithout th e se q u a litie s, and th a t one o f th e c o u n try 's
tr u ly g re a t men rem ained in tellectu ally h o n e s t, u n c o r r u p t, and genuinely devoted
to social ju stic e and dem ocratic g overnm ent.