BOOK REVIEW

ON

THE MONSOON WAR : YOUNG OFFICERS REMINISCE

1965 INDIA – PAKISTAN WAR

AMARINDER SINGH
LT GEN TAJINDER SHERGIL, PVSM

Reviewed By:
 CONTENTS

1. Introduction.

2. About the author.

3. Critical Review

4. About the book

5. Publication and Presentation

6. Conclusion.
 BOOK REVIEW ON THE BOOK ‘THE MONSOON WAR : YOUNG OFFICERS
REMINISCE – 1965 INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR’

Introduction

1. Amrinder Singh and Tajinder Shergill’s history-cum-memoirs of the 1965 Indo-

Pak war come at the tail end of the 50 th anniversary celebrations of the military
stalemate between the two South Asian neighbours.

2. Monsoon war is an excellent and very thorough work about the conflict.  It is
to the credit of both authors that despite close personal relationship with some senior
officers, they have remained objective and critically evaluated the conduct of war by
senior brass.  This book should be on the shelves of every military institution of
training and instruction of India and Pakistan. The authors of this very detailed
account of this two-part war have chosen to call it ‘The Monsoon War’, since the
military operations lasted through the monsoon months – from early August to third
week of September – of 1965.

3. Due to the wide experience of the authors, the book contains interesting titbits
about the participants of the war. One such case is of the Pakistani ruler during the
war, Ayub Khan, who had granted himself the rank of Fd Marshal. With detailed
background research, the authors show that Ayub had performed very poorly as an
Offr during the Second World War. He was shifted from 1/14 th Punjab to 1 Assam Bn
as an offg Commanding Offr when he was nearly sacked in Burma and then to
commanding one Chamar Bn, which was disbanded imdt after the war. Ayub had not
volunteered for Pakistan Army’s Kashmir Ops in 1948 and was seen as a very
hesitant and irresolute cdr. This was manifest during the 1965 war.

About the Authors

4. Amarinder Singh and LT Gen Tajinder Shergill both participated in the war.
Capt (retd) Amarinder Singh as the ADC to the Western Army Cdr, Lt Gen
Harbaksh Singh, and Lt Gen Tajinder Shergill as a tp ldr of 1 Troop C Squadron,
Deccan Horse, and was taken prisoner of war after a forlorn hope tank attack.  

5. Captain (Retd) Amarinder Singh.

(a) Captain (Retd) Amarinder Singh (born 11 March 1942) is an Indian

politician of the Indian National Congress. Head belongs from the royal family
of the erstwhile State of Patiala. He  is the son of Maharaja Yadavindra
Singh and Maharani Mohinder Kaur of Patiala belonging to the
Phulkian Jat dynasty of Sidhu Brar descent. He attended the Welham Boys'
School and Lawrence School, Sanawar before going to The Doon School,
 Dehradun. He has one son, Raninder Singh, and one daughter, Jai Inder
Kaur.

(b) He joined the Indian Army in June 1963 after graduating from

the National Defence Academy and Indian Military Academy before resigning
in early 1965. He rejoined the Army again as hostilities broke out
with Pakistan and served as Captain in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War

(c) He was Chief Minister of Punjab from 2002 to 2007. Presently, he is

the President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee (PPCC).

Critical Review

6. Ayub Khan was goaded by Pakistani hawks, led by a young and ambitious
Zulfikar Bhutto, to make the most of India’s military disadvantages – low morale and
a yet-to-be fully modernised military force – in the aftermath of the 1962 Chinese
invasion. Bhutto was confident that an Algeria-like uprising could be created in the
Kashmir Valley through large scale military infiltrations by soldiers disguised as
freedom fighters (an obsession with Pakistani planners even till today), and then
when the Kashmir Valley would be up in flames with this operation (Op-Gibraltar),
Pakistan was to launch an air-cum-land offensive near Jammu (Op-Grand Slam) to
cut Kashmir off from India, and complete the unfinished agenda of partition. But
India’s military response took Ayub Khan and his cronies by surprise, and India’s
counter offensive was stopped just when India’s forces were poised to inflict a
humiliating defeat on the Pakistani army.

7. Authors provide details of some of the challenges faced by Indian army in the
aftermath of Indo-China conflict of 1962. Rapid expansion of Indian army resulted in
poorly armed and poorly trained formations.  If Indian army was producing ‘nine
months wonders’ for Indian army officer corps, Pakistan army was producing ‘pre-
mature’ officers from Officers Training School with only eight months of training.  In
early 1960s, Pakistani officers were not happy with the pay as it had remained
stagnant as well as lack of accommodations.  When troops were used to construct
accommodations, there was resentment among soldiers as they saw it below their
dignity to work as labourers.  Pakistani tanks had not carried out any tank firing for
over two years as training ammunition provided by Americans was hoarded as ‘war
reserve’. However, when war broke out majority of officers and soldiers on both
sides fought to the best of their abilities.

8. Contrary to popular perceptions in Pakistan about Muslims of India, it is

interesting to note that a number of Muslim soldiers and officers fought on Indian
side.  Lieutenant Colonel Salim Caleb (later Major General) was commanding 3rd
Cavalry. 4th Grenadiers was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Farhat Bhatti (later
Major General) and class composition of the battalion was A coy and B coy with
Jats, C coy with Kaim Khani Muslims and D coy with Dogras. GSO-3 of a division
was Abdul Rasul Khan of 4th Grenadiers (later Colonel). Lieutenant Colonel Salim
Chaudhri was CO of 4th Rajputana Rifles, Major A. K. Khan was 2IC of 8th Garhwal
Rifles and B Squadron of 18th Cavalry was a Muslim squadron. Ironically, the
platoon that ambushed Pakistani Brigadier A. R. Shami’s jeep in which he was killed
was a Muslim platoon of 4th Grenadiers. Company Quartermaster Havaldar Abdul
Hamid of 4th Grenadiers won a posthumous highest gallantry award Param Vir
Chakra (PVC).

9. On page 108, it is suggested that change of command of 12th Division in the

middle of operations from Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik to Major General
Yahya Khan may be due to the fact that Malik was an Ahmadi (a heterodox sect of
Muslims) and high command wanted to deny him the honor.  The question of change
of command has never been explained but sectarian factor was probably not the
reason.  Official ostracization and persecution of Ahmadis started much later in
1970s.  At the time of 1965 war, disproportionately large number of Ahmadis was
serving in all branches of armed forces.  A number of Ahmadis were senior officers
and many performed very well.

10. Book gives some insight into regimental intrigues.  It is claimed that Corps
Commander XV Corps Lieutenant General Katoch due to resentment over not being
appointed Colonel of Sikh Regiment was responsible for not forwarding gallantry
awards recommendations for 2nd Sikh Regiment. It is to the credit of Indian army as
well as government that people were taken to the task for the acts of omission and
commission.  161st Field Artillery Regiment serving under 10th Infantry Division
abandoned its guns.  Later, CO of the regiment was court martialled and GOC of
10th Division Major General B. D. Chopra was relieved of his command.  GOC 15th
Division Major General Niranjan Prasad was relieved of his command on September
07 and replaced by Major General Mohindar Singh.  In fact irate Corps Commander
XI Corps Lieutenant General Jogindar Singh Dhillon threatened Prasad with an
immediate court martial in the field with the likelihood of being found guilty and shot.
CO of 15th Dogra Lieutenant Colonel Indirjeet Singh was one step ahead of his
retreating soldiers when panic struck the battalion.  He first went straight to brigade
headquarters and despite Brigade commander’s efforts raced all the way back to
division headquarters.  He was promptly placed under arrest, later court martialled,
dismissed from service and given three year imprisonment sentence.  CO of 13th
Punjab was also removed from command. 48th Brigade Commander Brigadier
K.J.S. Shahany was also relieved of his command and replaced by Brigadier Piara
Singh. Pakistan army also penalized some officers but many were simply removed
from the command and no detailed inquiries were conducted. 

11. Book mentions role of some officers in 1965 war with amazing life
experiences. Brigadier Anthony Albert ‘Tony’ Lumb was commander of 4th Armored
Brigade of Pakistan army consisting of 5th Probyn’s Horse and 10th Frontier Force
(FF).  He was commissioned in 9th Royal Deccan Horse and this regiment was
allotted to India in 1947. Tony opted for Pakistan army.  In Khem Karan theatre,
Tony was fighting against his old regiment Royal Deccan Horse of Indian army. In
1947 when Indian army was divided, Proby’s Horse and Deccan Horse had
exchanged squadrons. In 1965, old Probyn’s squadron now carrying regimental color
of Royal Deccan Horse was fighting against its own old regiment as Probyn’s Horse
was part of 4th Armored Brigade.  Tony was a Gallian; alumni of Lawrence College
Ghora Gali. He migrated to Canada in 1967 where he died in 2013.

12. Major General Niranjan Prasad was commissioned in 4th Battalion of 12th
Frontier Force Regiment (now 6 Frontier Force Regiment). This is parent battalion of
Pakistan army Chief General Raheel Sharif.  Prasad was later seconded to Royal
Indian Air Force (RIAF) as Flight Lieutenant and fought Second World War with air
force. He served with No: 1 Squadron commanded by K. K. Majumdar.  Even in this
capacity, he saved his battalion.  4/12 FFR was in Burma and during withdrawal
towards Sittang and in the fog of war was strafed by RIAF planes. Prasad
recognized the markings of his own battalion and helped in stopping the strafing by
calling off further attacks.  Later, he commanded No 8 Squadron.  Many other army
officers also joined RIAF and never reverted back to army.  Asghar Khan later
became Air Marshal and C-in-C of Pakistan air force and Diwan Atma Ram Nanda
retired as Air Vice Marshal in Indian air force.  Prasad reverted back to army as he
had problems with his commander.  In 1962 Indo-China war, he was commanding
4th Division, was blamed for the disaster of 7th Brigade and sacked.  A humiliated
Prasad went to the airfield alone and not even a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO)
was sent to see him off.  He petitioned the President against his sacking and was re-
instated.  15th Division was raised in October 1964 and Prasad was appointed GOC.
After the war games, his Corps Commander and Army Commander recommended
his removal as he was found not fit to command. In a meeting with Chief of Army
Staff (COAS), he was only given warning but not removed from the command.  Chief
gave the reason that Prasad had influence with higher authorities in Delhi and that
they should ‘go easy on him’. Poor command cost Indian army dearly and a day after
the start of the war Prasad was removed from the command. He had already written
a representation against his sacking and Pakistanis got hold of it when his jeep was
captured that contained his brief case.

13. This book beautifully describes the landmark war that witnessed one of world
history’s most noteworthy tank battles (the Battle of Phillora), the events of 1965 are
remembered as among the most significant victories of the modern Indian Armed
Forces. The victory not only served as a morale booster to the nation as a whole, but
is also a testament to the leadership of Harbakhsh Singh, who had over the course
of the War even implemented an effective solution to the Kashmir territorial dispute.
However, over the course of peace talks between the then Indian Prime Minister, Lal
Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, many of Harbakhsh Singh’s
tactical solutions were waylaid – which is perhaps one of the many reasons why the
Kashmir dispute still has the potential to sour the relationship between the two great
nations.
14. The book is not without its share of errors.

(a) A photograph of Lt.Col AS Vaidya, gives a PVSM and AVSM along

with his name, though these were acquired later as he rose to become army
chief (page 256). In the 1965 war, Vaidya was a Lieutenant Colonel and was
awarded the MVC.

(b) There is also a discrepancy in the the account of the gallantry of

CQMH Abdul Hamid of 4 Grenadiers. While on page 221 he is credited with
having knocked out 3 enemy tanks before he died in action, on page 228, a
more detailed account of the his action in the Khemkaran sector credits Abdul
Hamid with at least 7 enemy tank kills! Surely a bit of cross checking about
the facts on the most talked about individual act of gallantry by an Indian in
that war, should have been done. And though there is a photograph of Maj
MAR Sheikh, awarded a posthumous VrC, there is little mentioned about his
act of gallantry, whereas several individuals and their acts in battle have
merited mention in much greater detail.

About The Book

15. The 1965 Indo-Pak war has been in many ways a war that Indians at least,
had forgotten. Pakistan however celebrates it as a victory, for reasons best known to
them, even though most analysts say that the conflict ended in stalemate. India’s
massive military reply to Pakistan’s two-part aggression was stalled midway,
following false promises by Western powers that pushed for a ceasefire to prevent
the humiliation of their ally, Pakistan’s military ruler General (and self promoted Field
Marshall) Ayub Khan, while offering India the hope of a favourable settlement over
Kashmir.

16. This book is a example of well-timed and impressive study, released to mark
the 50  anniversary of that war, the authors have given the readers the truth behind
th

the falsehoods that Pakistan trumpets as a ‘victory’ over India. Like all Pakistan’s
military campaigns, this one too began under a cloak of deception and denials, until
things eventually went awry, and a ceasefire saved shattered assumptions.

17. Captain Amarinder Singh – who has in the past repeatedly produced
outstanding compilations on India’s military history, and has perhaps no equal in the
genre – had a ring side view of the happenings all through the conflict as he was the
ADC to the main Indian military commander in that war, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh,
GoC-in-C Of India’s Western command.  As the conflict was fought largely on the
J&K and Punjab borders, General Harbaksh Singh was quite literally the theatre
commander, as there was no Northern Command in those days. A tough and great
soldier, General Harbaksh is credited by many for personally influencing the course
of this war, and the authors have rightly dedicated this book to him.
18. Credit must also go to the co-author for this work, Lt Gen Shergill, who had
not only taken part with his regiment in the massive tank battles in the plains of
Punjab – apparently the biggest since World War II – that brought Indian tanks to the
gates of Lahore and Sialkot. General Shergill’s father, Maj. Gen. Mohinder Singh, a
renowned tank-man twice awarded the rare Maha Vir Chakra and better known as
‘Sparrow’ in military circles, was in command of the Indian 1 Armoured division that
spearheaded the Indian thrust across Punjab. Maybe that explains why each tank
battle is narrated in great detail; the same, however cannot be said about the
coverage of the operations in Rajasthan’s Barmer sector, where some significant
battles were also fought. Unlike ‘Op-Riddle’ battles in Punjab, the actions of some
units has merited no mention whatsoever, like that of 3 rd Grenadiers, that did well
enough in the war to be posted to Delhi to take up the ceremonial role in Rashtrapati
Bhawan.

Publication And Presentation

19. This book is written in plain English and is well presented. The book is
published in hardbound edition and is reasonably priced. The quality of printing and
paper binding is good. It contains colourful maps for better assimilation and
understanding, it makes reader to develop a deep interest in the course and facts of
the war till date unknown or forgotten. Few details about the books:

(a) Book : The Monsoon War : Young Officers Reminisce – 1965

India-Pakistan war.

(b) Author : Amarinder Singh and Lt Gen Tajinder Shergill, PVSM.

(c) Publisher : Lustre Press, Roli Books.

(d) Size : 11.3’’ x 8.8’’

(e) Pages : 528.

(f) Price : 1,995.

(g) Hardbound.

20. Relevance. This book is found to be a very comprehensive, helpful

guide. Especially advised for military brass. Writers’ looks into history and a
detailed account has been given of the war. This book is recommended to
everyone in Indian Army. It seeks and in large provide us insight detailed
description of 1965 Indo-Pak war with availability of colorful maps / sketches and
photographs.

Conclusion

20. The book is recommended reading for anyone interested in having an insight
view of Indo Pakistan War 1965 as a detailed account has been provided in the
book. The book seems to be an unbiased account, which is rare and helps the
reader viewing the events from a neutral position and an extensive focus has been
laid on the events that has turned the table in course of the war. The authors do not
restrict the book to their personal experiences. They allow their experiences to
provide the context for the events that led to the war, the conduct of the war itself,
and post-war negotiations. By faithfully collating existing material, and backing it up
with professionally produced maps and unseen black-and-white photographs, the
authors have produced a book which can be used as a reference book in mil lib. The
Monsoon War is a visual treat, bound to earn a few admiring glances in mil messes
too.

21. It is a good read for anyone to accumulate a better understanding and

importance of planning and execution of the war. Authors used avlb literature, both
published and unpublished, to capture the distinct flavor of a war fought between two
armies which knew each other rather well. While providing great details of every
single Mil Ops during the 1965 war, the book, however, has no new insights or
revelations to offer. The depth of coverage of each Ops may be enthuse a mil buff
but is liable to put of a lay reader.