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Asian Journal of Political Science

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On the practical significance of critical international

relations theory
a b
Raymond Duvall & Latha Varadarajan
a
Morse‐Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor and Associate Director at the
Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change, Department of Political Science,
University of Minnesota, USA
b
Ph.D. candidate and MacArthur Scholar at the Department of Political Science, University
of Minnesota, USA

Version of record first published: 02 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Raymond Duvall & Latha Varadarajan (2003): On the practical significance of critical international
relations theory, Asian Journal of Political Science, 11:2, 75-88

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 Asian Journal of Political Science Volume 11 Number 2 (December 2003)

On the Practical Significance

of Critical International
Relations Theory
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Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan

The question of relevance of international relations theory must be approached through

an awareness of the distinctiveness of various perspectives' relations to existing structures
of power. It becomes, in effect, a matter of asking for whom and for what purposes of
practical action the theory is or is not relevant. Critical theories of international
relations, ranging from modernist to post-structural forms, share a commitment to
challenging the naturalness of the existing world order and the acceptability of its
dominant relations and practices of power. Critical theory focuses analysis on the effects
of power on the differential ability of actors to control their own circumstances. It also
goes beyond that theoretical contribution to provide impetus for practical political action
in challenging, confronting, and disrupting existing relations of power. Thus, in the
contemporary era, critical IR theory is relevant, among other ways, as a stimulus to
resist empire in its many guises.

Introduction
"Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists."'
- George W. Bush

T he "War on Terror" is not only a violent campaign to defeat "terrorists"

militarily. It is also very much a project to establish a dominant
framework for interpretation and action in which a broad array of
opposition is disempowered by being made to seem illegitimate. In that
respect, some world-views and modes of thought are under attack in this war,

Raymond Duvall is Morse-Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor and Associate Director

at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change, Department of Political
Science, University of Minnesota, USA. Latha Varadarajan is a Ph.D. candidate and
MacArthur Scholar at the Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, USA.
 76 • Asian Journal of Political Science

just as are those people alleged to be the perpetrators of acts of terrorism.

Among the targets are a variety of "critical" perspectives; including critical
international relations theory.2
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center
(September 11, 2001), George W. Bush departed from the tradition to address
a joint session of Congress. Framed as a declaration of the continuing strength of
the state of the union, his speech was the first of a series of attempts by the US
government to rally its citizens and allies around the idea of a new "War on
Terror". This war, the audience was told, would be waged against the "enemies
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of freedom" who wanted to destroy a "way of life". This was a way of life that,
in Bush's particular representation, the US embodied in and through its many
freedoms: "[the] freedom of religion, ... freedom of speech, ... freedom to vote
and assemble and disagree with each other".3 Paradoxically, this last-mentioned
"freedom of disagreement" has suffered substantially as the "War on Terror" is
prosecuted in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and elsewhere. As events,
such as the fining of US citizens who acted as human shields in Iraq, have
revealed, disagreeing with the government's position has become a pursuit
fraught with danger.
President Bush's seemingly imperial decree regarding the two possible
positions on the war ("with us" or "against us") was ostensibly aimed at "every
nation in the world". However, the ultimatum was soon expanded to cover not
just sovereign states, but virtually any group that criticised the US government's
position. In the Manichean world represented in Bush's statement, any view
critical of "us" (which in terms of this definition was the US government and its
allies) and "our" actions, was necessarily allied with terrorism. Although carrying
an imperial imprint, this strategy to counter and even eradicate critical views has
not been limited to the US, however, but instead has become an almost-coordinated
transnational project involving several countries. Governments have institutionalised
a circulating sense that critical thought is not only dangerous but part of the
problem that manifested itself in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.4
This globally extensive, even if logically flawed, coupling of terrorist action with
critical perspectives emerged in response to the analyses of September 11 that
highlighted the history of the United State's not-so-innocent involvement in
various parts of the world, particularly the Middle East. While most such critical
analyses strongly denounced the attacks on the World Trade Center, influential
commentators were quick to argue that the existence of a body of thought that
viewed the existing order negatively, and thereby expressed some understanding
of struggles against it, actually served to legitimise violent uprisings, even terrorism.5
In such a world, where the context and meaning of action and thought seem
to be changing very rapidly, and where indeed critical interpretations, explanations
and evaluations are almost held responsible for catastrophic events, does critical
international relations theory have a role to play in the analysis and practice of
international relations? In this essay, we attempt to answer that question with a
resounding "yes".
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan • 77

Prologue to the Argument

In keeping with post-positivist traditions in the discipline, we start with the
assumption that the international system is not composed of discrete entities or
events that can simply be observed in their objective reality by actors who are
outside of it and can survey it through a panoptic gaze. It is not possible to "see"
or make sense of events in the international system — even "war" or "terrorist
attacks" — without (implicit or explicit) recourse to theoretical categories and
assumptions. In fact, even recognising an "event" is dependent on theoretic
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assumptions.6 Multiple, competing descriptions of the contemporary international

system are dependent on various theoretic perspectives that have implicit
commitments. Some, such as descriptions of the current system in terms of
stabilising hegemonic leadership or asymmetric multilateralism, largely take for
granted the existing world order, in effect naturalising and normalising its social
structures and institutions. Other theoretic perspectives, such as Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri's Empire, challenge those taken-for-granted assumptions by
making visible the contingency of the social world and focusing on the sites and
modes of resistance to systemic oppressions and exclusions.7 In understanding the
international systemic context differently, various theoretic perspectives become
relevant to practical political action (or "policy") in distinct ways for different
kinds of actors. The question of the relevance of theory, we argue, then, must be
approached through an awareness of the distinctiveness of various perspectives
and their respective relation to existing structures of power. It becomes, in effect,
a matter of asking for whom — defined in power-positional terms — and for what
purposes of practical action the theory is or is not relevant.
To illustrate our point, we look briefly at current discussions on the concept
of "empire" as a descriptive (and prescriptive) view of the contemporary
international system. Building on longstanding theoretical concerns for analysing
how, why and with what implications world orders (and disorders) come into
being, much scholarly literature from a number of distinct political and theoretic
vantage points currently focuses on the "US empire" and its effects.8 At the same
time, not surprisingly, policy deliberations and popular political commentary now
largely revolve around the question of appropriate strategies for the global exercise
of power by the US9 Accordingly, the notion of the US as a "great power" that
can, will, and, some argue, should flex its military and economic might to shape
and secure yet another "new world order", seems to abound in and be central to
that intersection that is often called "policy-relevant scholarship". Sebastian Mallaby,
for instance, argues that the only way to rescue "failed states" from the trap of
"poverty, instability, and violence" is to revive the "institution of imperialism".10
Mallaby, of course, is far from being alone in nostalgically recounting the glory
days of imperial Rome and the British Empire. Focusing on the alleged benefits of
an imperial order, scholars like Niall Ferguson have added significant academic
sanction to a widely held view that the US should take up the mantle of empire.11
Theory, it seems, has become principally concerned with assisting the already
 78 • Asian Journal of Political Science

powerful to better and more effectively manage the disorder of world affairs. In
this rhetorical context, columnists, talk-show hosts, and policy-analysts are revealing
an increasing comfort with terms generally used by realist theory, such as
"overwhelming military superiority", "balance of power", "sphere of influence",
and "pre-emptive war". Thus, political realism appears to have recaptured the
popular and policy imaginary after a decade-long post-Cold War hiatus, during
which liberal theory and constructivism partially displaced it.
However, contemporary discussions on US hegemony or empire cannot
and should not be understood necessarily to signal the re-ascendance of realist
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theory and concomitantly a re-legitimation of it as the perspective on international

relations solely and uniquely pertinent to practical political action. Nor should
liberal or constructivist theory be seen as the only "policy-relevant" alternatives. If
empire or kindred concepts are aptly descriptive, then there is an important
practical role for critical theory as well, because these concepts connote a
tremendous asymmetry of power that invites challenges. Realism, liberalism, and
(mainstream) constructivism all, in significant respects, take for granted the
normalcy of the contemporary international system. Accordingly, an imperial
order tends to be seen from these theoretical perspectives as something of a
natural fait accompli, even if not a desirable one. It may be viewed as productive
of problems that need to be handled, managed, or otherwise dealt with. But it is
the assumed overarching structure of power — the fundamental institutional
context — in and through which any action to "solve" those problems must be
carried out. In contrast, critical theory highlights ways to understand and make
sense of empire as an always contingent production of contested power, not a
natural order or structure of power. As a result, a critical theoretical perspective
undergirds practical political resistance to the production and reproduction of
empire, in that any inordinate concentration of power is seen as not desirable.12
We argue that critical theory, as a broad category, enables movement beyond the
(even if only implicit) acceptance of a dominant global power structure, and
provides the analytical tools needed for the politically, as well as theoretically,
important project of highlighting its contingency and challenging its reproduction.
The main body of this essay, the next section, is divided into two parts. In
the first, we explicate the importance of critical theory by challenging its widely-
assumed disconnection from "problem-solving" theory. In the second part, we
spell out its particular form of practical relevance in undergirding political actions
of resistance by explicitly connecting it to structures of power.

On the Politics of Theory and Theory for Political Praxis

The False Premise of "Problem-solving Theory"

In a lecture given to the students of the London School of Economics more than
a decade ago, Fred Halliday pointed out that the discipline of International
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan • 79

Relations (IR) suffers from a strange problem of "theoretical invisibility".13 His

point was that unlike the social awareness (albeit minimal) of theoretical work in
other disciplines, there is a common notion that insofar as the understanding of
international relations is concerned, "a brisk combination of current affairs and
common sense, with the odd historical reference thrown in, can do the work".14
There is, he argued, an urgent need to arrive at an "adequate balance" between the
two dimensions of IR — the academic and policy-related domains. However,
what Halliday left unsaid was that these two dimensions of IR are never quite that
distinct to begin with. As Ido Oren has argued recently, the history of the
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discipline has been inextricably interwoven with the political agendas of the
nation-state.15 The reasons for the "theoretical invisibility" that Halliday highlights,
then, have less to do with a lack of clear definition of the field, to which he
pointed, and more to do with its dominant orthodoxy.
For much of its life as a formal academic field, IR has been dominated by
the theoretical tradition of realism (and its "neo"-variants), which has been
characterised by a positivist epistemology and empiricist methodology. The
ostensible purpose of social inquiry that underlies the realist tradition, as well as
liberal IR theory and (mainstream) constructivism, is to act as "problem-solver" —
to identify the systemic causes of conflict and threats to security (that could be
observed objectively by the analyst) and provide policy-makers (i.e. state officials)
with the tools to manage them. This outlook finds clear statement in the work of
Kenneth Waltz, who argues that it is important for the analyst not just to avoid
being distracted by the complexities of the international system, but also to isolate
and study only the most dominant and strategically decisive forces in international
relations.16 Given its emphasis on merely sharpening a focus on a reality that is
already out there, it is not surprising that the academic discipline of IR itself
contributes to its "theoretical invisibility". This is not to suggest, however, that the
dominance of realism goes unchallenged.17
Starting with the claim that "theory is always for someone and for some
purpose", Robert Cox was one of the first scholars to foster a sharp distinction
between "problem-solving theory" and "critical theory".18 He argued that the
distinction between the two lies not so much in their perceived utility (or lack of
it), but rather in the premise that each begins with. While the former takes the
"world as it finds it," the latter stands "apart from the prevailing order of the world
and asks how that order came about".19 According to Cox, the historical sensibilities
of critical theory enable it not just to take into account the role of the past in
constructing the present socio-political order, but also to treat the present order
as dynamic. Of course, this implies that critical theory will not be characterised by
the precision that emerges from having a "fixed order as a point of reference".
However, the virtue of fixity valued in "problem-solving theory" is a false premise
"since the social and political order is not fixed".20 Using the perspective of critical
theory, Cox further contends that "problem-solving theories can be represented
... as serving particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable
within the given order". 21 This means that despite their methodological
 80 • Asian Journal of Political Science

commitment to being value-free, "problem-solving theories" are characterised by

an ideological bias, for they "implicitly accept the prevailing order as [their] own
framework" and work to ensure the smooth functioning of that order.22 In Cox's
schema, the two categories of "problem-solving" and "critical" theory are used to
make visible the implicit political commitments of much of IR theory and call into
question the notion of theory as abstracted from socio-political time and space. In
short, they make problematic the theoretic invisibility which Halliday points out.
However, subsequent to Cox's initial formulation, the concept of a discipline
constituted by this theoretical dichotomy was appropriated in a different way by
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the mainstream to establish the boundaries of acceptable approaches to knowledge.

Anticipating critical theoretic challenges to rationalism, Robert Keohane
proposed his own dichotomy to understand the nature of theoretical differences
in the discipline. Though couched as a sympathetic reading of the two main
approaches to the study of institutions (rationalist and "reflective")23, Keohane's
argument, articulated in his Presidential address to the International Studies
Association in 1988, is a masterful exercise in disciplinary boundary building. He
argues that, while rationalist theory suffers from some "inherent limitations" that
need to be and have been critiqued, the "reflective school" has "by no means
demolished the rationalist research programme".24 Furthermore, the main weakness
of the "reflective school" pertains to the fact that it itself does not put forth a "clear
... research programme that could be used by students of world politics".25 This
is an important issue, for:

[until] the reflective scholars or others sympathetic to their arguments have delineated
such a research programme and shown in particular studies that they can illuminate
important issues of world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field, largely
invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly or
implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic premises.26

The difference between the rationalists and their critics is that, while the
former, despite their limitations, focus on "important issues of world politics", the
latter are not particularly concerned (or at least have not yet revealed a concern)
with providing a way to deal with those real issues. In other words, in theorising
international relations, one can either choose a way (albeit "inherently limited") to
illuminate and resolve issues, or remain on the margins of the field by embracing
what is mainly a critique sans research programme.
Keohane's move is expressive of a nominal mainstream acceptance of the
notion that can be best captured by paraphrasing James Rosenau: "we (scholars of
international relations) are all theorists" in some ways. But implicit even in this
acceptance is the idea that some of us are more "useful" theorists than others. The
very notion of "problem-solving", as it has been appropriated since Cox's
formulation, suggests that some forms of theory are less abstract and more focused
on real world issues — more committed to "action", to dealing with real problems
— and hence have a better utility-value (in terms of policy-making) than others.
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan * 81

"Critical theory", as its moniker at least in framing this dichotomy suggests, is

treated as an entirely "negative" project — critique for the sake of criticism alone
— something that does not lead to substantial propositions that might be alternative
means to bring order to our anarchical world.
We argue in this essay to the contrary, that the difference between various
theories rests not on their level of abstraction and programmatic focus, as argued
by Keohane and others, but on the nature of their relationship to the exercise of
power and the social-relational positions and practices through which power
operates. For theory is but the way in which we try to understand the world we
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live in. All theories carry in them the framing of what constitutes reality and the
manner in which knowledge about that reality can be produced. Since no action
makes sense outside of those premises, theory is political and political action is
theory-laden. The preponderance of "problem-solving" theories and their noted
"invisibility" stems from the fact that they have attempted to naturalise and mask
these processes. A positivist ontology and empiricist methodology implies that
one starts with questions of what social reality consists of. Issues of world politics
are, then, treated as objective conditions that need to be managed. This
epistemological framework consequently makes "problem-solving" theories ideal
to serve (and reinforce) existing relations of power in one form or the other, even
while "reforming" aspects or implications of those relations. After all, if the
existing institutions and structures of power in the international system are the
natural order of things, the question of fundamentally challenging or effectively
resisting them never comes into play. What remains at the forefront is the
question of how the analyst can help maintain the fundamentals of this order
while solving problems that arise within it. Given this proclivity, it is not surprising
that the practical relevance of "problem-solving" theory is taken for granted. On
the other hand, the range of theories characterised as "critical" focus on inequalities
engendered by the existing structures, practices, and/or discourses of power; they
challenge the naturalness (and, by extension, the desirability) of the existing
order. These theories speak, therefore, not to those in positions of power, but to
those who seek to resist and challenge them.

Critical Theory and Practical Action

Though the dichotomy of "problem-solving"/ "critical theory" rests on false premises,
it is a useful starting point for identifying what we refer to as critical international
relations theory. As mentioned earlier, "problem-solving" theories begin with the
premise that the purpose of social and political inquiry is to interpret the world
that exists and to contribute to the ability of societal institutions to deal with
problems that arise within it. What differentiates "critical theories" at the most
basic level is a commitment to the cause of challenging the naturalness of the
existing world order and the acceptability of its dominant relations and practices
of power. There are, of course, as many scholars have pointed out, a range of
 82 • Asian Journal of Political Science

"critical" theories that sometimes seem to be separated by a vast gulf. Accordingly,

it is difficult to make sense of this array with a single label. But for our purposes
in this essay, it is helpful to do so, nevertheless.
In one of the most succinct statements on critical theory, Richard Price and
Christian Reus-Smit argue that what unites modern and postmodern forms of
critical theory is a set of "four intellectual orientations":

Epistemologically, critical theorists question positivist approaches to knowledge, criticising

attempts to formulate objective, empirically verifiable truth statements about the natural
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and social world. Methodologically, they reject the hegemony of a single scientific
method, advocating a plurality of approaches to the generation of knowledge while
highlighting the importance of interpretive strategies. Ontologically, they challenge
rationalist conceptions of human nature and action, stressing instead the social construction
of actors' identities, and the importance of identity in the constitution of interests and
action. And normatively they condemn value neutral theorising, denying its very possibility,
and calling for the development of theories explicitly committed to the exposure and
dissolution of structures of domination.27

Together, those four commitments demarcate the domain of critical

theory from other forms of theorising, be they "problem-solving" or not. For our
argument, the last of the commonalities listed by Price and Reus-Smit is
particularly crucial. However, before turning to the implications of that integrative
theme, we do not wish to skirt the question of differences amongst various
forms of critical theory either.
In one of the early statements on the role of critical social theory in IR,
Andrew Linklater argued that the main purpose of critical theorists is to "promote
emancipation by providing enlightenment about the constraints upon human
autonomy".28 What Linklater failed to add was that this is, at best, an arguable
proposition, for the language of "emancipation" does not fit comfortably within
some forms of critical theory, especially those that express a post-modern or post-
structural perspective. Linklater's views, in that respect, represent only "modernist"
variants of "critical theory".
The distinction between "modernist" and "post-modernist" (and post-
structural) strands is revealed in their respective understandings of the implications
of one of Marx's best known adages: "The Philosophers have only interpreted the
world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."29 While modernist
critical theories have taken seriously the project of emancipation, as well as the
task of the theorist to facilitate this, a wariness with meta-narratives has led post-
modern and post-structural theorists to eschew this project as the means "to
change the world".
An illustration of what constitutes a modern critical perspective is provided
by Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith in their introduction to a collection of essays
on international relations, firmly rooted in the historical-materialist tradition.30
In explaining the logic of the volume, Rupert and Smith state that, apart from
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan • 83

explaining and re-establishing the relevance of the historical-materialist tradition

for making sense of the contemporary international system, their main goal is to
"critically interpret and intervene in the politics of globalisation" in order to
"help change the world we live in".31 Underlying this project is the idea that
social classes are constantly engaged in struggles with each other. While there
may be no guarantee about a "positive" outcome of the struggle, intervening in
the "politics of social existence" demands a commitment to the potential and
desirability of emancipation.
In almost a direct contrast, Richard Ashley presents the goal of post-
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structuralism as specifically not imposing a "general interpretation, a paradigm of

the sovereignty of man, as a guide to the transformation of life on a global scale".32
The "post-modernist"/post-structuralist position, unlike modern social theory,
rejects foundationalism. This position stems from a conviction that positioning
certain knowledge claims above others invariably leads to the silencing and
marginalising of alternative experiences and ends up reproducing relations of
dominance.33 A commitment to "changing the world" implies a commitment to a
particular vision of what the changed world ought to look like. Rather than
attempting to fix an emancipatory vision, post-modernist forms of critical theory
embrace what Ashley categorises as a "radical interpretivism" that emphasises the
undecidability of social practices. In Mark Hoffman's words:

Instead of asking "what" questions, post-structuralism asks "how" questions: how are
structures and practices replicated? how is meaning fixed, questioned, reinterpreted and
refixed? In answering such questions, it turns to the interplay of "texts", of knowledge
practices in order to invert dominant hierarchies. Thus, post-structuralism ... reinscribes
[theory] by locating [it] at the "margins" of its own discourse where boundaries are
constantly being redrawn and transgressed.34

Rather than the project of emancipation, the project embraced by post-

modern theorists can be best summed up as one of unmasking the relations of
dominance, and making possible (creating a space for) a politics of resistance.
The differences between modern and post-modern forms of critical theory
are often treated as irreconcilable. But that is not entirely necessary. For one
thing, some strands of critical theory have managed to traverse both camps.35
The field of postcolonial studies can be seen to exemplify this point. 36 Questions
regarding the meaning of "post-coloniality", its conceptual utility and its
disciplinary boundaries have been the subject of well-documented, intense and
often acrimonious debates.37 Without going into the merits of various positions,
we would like to highlight the fact that what unites an often conflicting, cross-
disciplinary body of work identified as "post-colonial" is a notion that the "post"
does not merely refer to a chronological condition, in the sense of speaking
about the period after the official end of colonialism.38 Broadly speaking, the
term "post-colonial" has tended to serve two purposes. The first has been to
serve as shorthand for the socio-political and economic condition that emerges
 84 • Asian Journal of Political Science

as a result of the particular historical experience of colonialism. This entails an

analysis of not just forms of geopolitical, cultural and economic domination, but
also struggles waged against these structures of domination, and the nature of
the resulting political communities. In its other (though connected) usage, the
notion of the "post-colonial" has served as a deconstructive tool challenging
universalising discourses of colonialism, modernity and nationalism (even in its
anti-colonial form). 39 We emphasise the two meanings of post-coloniality to
contend that the field of post-colonial studies has been constituted through the
contribution of scholars representing both, modernist and post-modernist,
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perspectives — that is, through the productive tension between modern and
post-modern scholarship. This is not to imply that the relationship between the
two kinds of critical theory has been harmonious, even in the field of post-
colonial studies.40
However, what needs to be noted is that even when different forms of
critical theory might seem incompatible with each other, their conflictive
relationship is oftentimes productive of ways of making sense of the world that
challenge structures of dominance and the oppressive exercise of power. The
challenge, as mentioned earlier, ranges from the modernist pursuit of emancipation,
liberation and the countering of exploitation to post-modern concerns with
disrupting and destabilising the taken for granted identities and presumptions of
existing power relations through various practices of resistance. This shared
implication for practical political action is a second, and in our view most significant,
reason not to see modernist and post-modernist traditions of critical theory as
necessarily and entirely irreconcilable.
Critical international relations theory provides tools to "see" the operation
of various modes of power — the ways in which they are intrinsically involved in
the production of world order. If, as we claimed earlier, international relations are
profoundly marked by a "War on Terror" set in a systemic context of empire, a
first question that needs to be asked is: how can the modes of power in this
imperial war best be conceptualised in ways that do not limit thinking to a realist
worldview in IR theoretic terms? Critical IR theory not only offers the means to
address that question by focusing analysis on the multiple ways in which power
operates and the effects of power in its multiple forms on the differential ability
of actors to exercise control over their own circumstances.41 It also goes beyond
that theoretical contribution to provide impetus for practical political action.
Specifically, the common element that links the distinct, even seemingly
irreconcilable, forms of critical theory is a suspicion — a disdain — for relations
of dominance in power, even that power that is engaged in warring against
something as objectionable as "terrorism". Enduring structures and practices of
power, including globally stabilising and "securitising" empire, are to be challenged,
resisted, disrupted, even, perhaps, overthrown, without at the same time condoning
the heinous acts of violent behavioural power of "terrorists". This is, in some sense
of the term, a "guide" for action. But, unlike "problem-solving" theories, with their
self-evident "policy-relevance", this guide is not directed at those who occupy
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan • 85

institutionalised positions of power. It is instead a "policy tool" for those who are
involved in challenging, confronting, and disrupting existing relations of power.
Thus, we argue that the relevance of critical international relations theory is not
merely restricted to an academic domain, but lies as well in its manifestation as a
call to practical political action.

Notes
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1 President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of the Congress, 20 September 2001.

www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html
2 We most certainly are not claiming that critical international relations theory is a
principal target. To do so would be to inflate, rather grotesquely, a sense of
academic self-importance and persecution. However, in the current context of
"War on Terror", critical thought is decidedly suspect in the eyes of many
powerful actors, and that suspicion extends to academic traditions of theory
systematised in critical terms. We want also to make clear that we are not equating
criticism of, or critical perspectives on, the "War on Terror" with critical
international relations theory. While, in this war, powerful actors are suspicious
of—and attempting to curtail, if not eliminate—any and all forms of critical
thought, there are important distinctions for our purposes. A great deal of
criticism of the "War on Terror" is not expressive of critical theory, and the latter
tends to focus critique less on the specifics of the war than on the conditions of its
possibility and on its implications. In this article, our concern is with the status and
practical significance of critical international relations theory in the context of the
"War on Terror"; we are not attentive here to criticism of that war, per se, despite
using such criticism as a point of entry into our argument.
3 Bush's Address, op tit.
4 Legislative measures enacted in countries such as India, Britain, Canada, Germany,
and South Africa reveal some striking similarities to the Patriot Act that came into
force on 26 October 2001 in the United States. All provide sweeping new powers to
police and intelligence agencies, including access to new forms of surveillance, and
the right to carry out secret searches and to detain suspects without charges for long
periods of time. Despite threats to foundational principles of liberal democracy,
these measures ironically have been justified by state authorities as essential to
protect democratic societies from "terrorism".
5 One such argument can be found in Edward Rothstein's tirade against certain
academic traditions, wherein he blames post-modern and post-colonial theory for
making possible events such as the attacks of September 11th . Edward Rothstein,
"Attacks on US Challenge Perspectives of Post-modern True Believers," The New
York Times, 22 September 2001. For a description and analysis of a series of efforts
made by various sources to "demonise, distort and silence" critique, see "Jihad This,"
The Daily Howler, 29 September 2001. http://www.dailyhowler.com/
h092901_l.shtml
6 This point is also made by James Rosenau in the introduction to this special issue.
7 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2001).
 86 • Asian Journal of Political Science

8 Despite some minor quibbles over the use of terms to describe the US role in the
current world order ("empire"/ "imperial power"/ "global hegemon" / "sole
superpower"), there has been a virtual flood of books and articles that see the
appropriateness of such concepts for analysing the contemporary context. See, for
instance, Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of
U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson,
Empire: The Rise and Demise of British World Order and Lessons for Global Power
(New York: Basic Books, 2003); G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The
Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Robert
Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New
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York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era:
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the
World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002); Martin Shaw, "Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State
and Empire in the Global Era," Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol.31, No.2 (2002), pp.327-36.
9 Thomas Friedman's and Nicholas Kristof's weekly columns for The New York Times
illustrate this point well.
10 Mallaby's analysis is quite remarkable in papering over the issue of how some states
"failed" and what role "the institution of imperialism" might have played in the
process. Its framing of imperialism as the duty of reluctant great powers bears a
striking resemblance to Kipling's description of the "White Man's Burden" in the
19th century. Sebastian Mallaby, "The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed
States, and the Case for American Empire," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March/
April 2002), pp. 2-7.
11 Niall Ferguson, op c i t .
12 In his review of Niall Ferguson's book, Immanuel Wallerstein observes that the
idea of "empire" used by neo-conservative commentators to glowingly describe the
US role in world politics is not new. What is new is the manner in which
imperialism — which was originally a critique of the very same role — has been
adopted positively by the supporters of those who hold and exercise power.
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Hail Britannia," Yale Global Online, h t t p : / /
yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.artide?id=2160
13 Fred Halliday, "International Relations: Is There a New Agenda?" Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No.1 (1991), p. 66.
14 Ibid.
15 Ido Oren, Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
16 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley,
1997).
17 A widely-read edited volume focuses on various critiques of neorealism. Though
there is some space given to critical theoretical arguments, Robert Keohane's piece
is more indicative of the general tenor, which is to emphasise the point that
"Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics, because
its focus on power, interests and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the
subject." Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and
 Raymond Duvall and Latha Vamdarajan * 87

Beyond," in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), pp.159-203. Some of the more trenchant critiques of
realism were put forth by scholars committed to a historical-materialist tradition in
the late 1970s. We will return to the historical-materialist critique in the next sub-
section of the paper. For a description of the theoretical alternatives provided by
scholars like Robert Cox, see, Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in
International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View," Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No.1 (1991), pp. 77-98.
18 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," in Robert W. Cox and
Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge
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University Press, 1996), p. 87.

19 Ibid., p. 88.
20 Ibid., p. 89.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 90.
23 The category of "reflective" is introduced by Keohane to stand in for the disparate
array known as sociological approaches to the study of institutions. Keohane groups
scholars such as John Ruggie, Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley and Friedrich
Kratochwil as belonging to the "reflective school", "since all of them emphasise the
importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the
character of world politics." Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two
Approaches," International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International
Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-79.
24 Ibid., p. 172.
25 Ibid., p. 173.
26 Ibid.
27 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical
International Theory and Constructivism," European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1998), p. 261.
28 Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory," op
cit., p. 86
29 Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels
Reader (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), p.145.
30 Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds.), Historical Materialism and Globalization
(London: Routledge, 2002).
31 The authors, however, do not subscribe to a notion of vanguardism. As they point
out, "change does not come about automatically or simply because the world can be
understood better through the instruments provided by historical materialist
analysis.. [it] comes about through the self-organisation and struggle of those social
classes marginalised by capitalist social relations and those individuals and groups
who are allied with them." Ibid., p. 4.
32 Richard Ashley, "Living on Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War," in
James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual
Relations: Postmodern Reasings in World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1989), p. 284.
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33 This position has provided fodder for frequently highly exaggerated and misplaced
charges of cultural relativism that are leveled against post-modern and post-
structural scholars.
34 Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four
Voices in Critical International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 20, No.2 (1991), p. 178.
35 Feminist theory, which we do not deal with in this paper, is a good example. See for
instance, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory,
Practicing Solidarity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
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36 For an illustration of the manner in which both modernist and post-modernist

positions have been key to post-colonial theorising, see Ranajit Guha (ed.), A
Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986 - 1995 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997).
37 While some scholars have argued for the need to devote greater attention to
understanding the condition of post-coloniality in the age of late capitalism, others
have tended to treat any question regarding post-colonialism as an academic fetish.
One of the best exemplars of the latter position is Kwame Anthony Appiah, who
ironically remarked that post-coloniality mainly seemed to be "the condition of what
we might ungenerously call a comprador intelligentsia: a relatively small, Western-
style, Western-trained group of writers and thinkers, who mediate the trade in
cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery." Kwame Anthony
Appiah, "Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?" Critical Inquiry,
Vol. 17, No.2 (1991), p. 348. See also, Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third
World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2
(1994), pp. 328-56.
38 Some examples of post-colonial scholarship in the discipline of International
Relations include, Sankaran Krishna, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A
Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory", Alternatives, Vol. 18
(1993), pp. 385-417; Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, "Bridging International
Relations and Postcolonialism," Alternatives, Vol. 19 (1994), pp. 371-98; and
Himadeep Muppidi, "Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity:
The Persistent Puzzle of U.S. - Indian Relations", in Jutta Weldes, et al. (eds.),
Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 119-46.
39 Our delineation of the two main usages of the term "post-colonial" is similar to what
Desai refers to as "post-coloniality" (the condition, as it were) and "post-colonial
critique" in her study of South Asian diasporic cinema. Jigna Desai, Beyond
Bollywood: The Cultural Politics of South Asian Diasporic Film, (New York:
Routledge, forthcoming).
40 See for instance, Sumit Sarkar, Writing Social History, (Delhi, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
41 For a systematic exposition of different concepts of power operative in the
production of world order, and the various forms of resistance that those distinct
forms of power respectively generate, see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall,
"Power in Global Governance", in Barnett and Duvall (eds.), Power and Global
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).