AGRT04-19 - Guide To Road Tunnels - Part 4 - Retrofitting Tunnels

Guide to Road Tunnels Part 4:
Retrofitting Tunnels
Sydney 2019
Guide to Road Tunnels Part 4: Retrofitting Tunnels
Publisher
Prepared by: Les Louis
Austroads Ltd.
Level 9, 287 Elizabeth Street
Project manager: David Kimpton Sydney NSW 2000 Australia
Phone: +61 2 8265 3300
austroads@austroads.com.au
www.austroads.com.au
Abstract
Part 4 of the Guide to Road Tunnels provides guidance on the retrofitting About Austroads
of existing tunnels, including the need for refurbishment, the types of
refurbishment and processes for developing project requirements. Austroads is the peak organisation of Australasian road
Guidance is provided on geometric considerations relating to cross- transport and traffic agencies.
sections, traffic management functions including signs and lighting, fire
Austroads’ purpose is to support our member
and life safety including fire protection and evacuation, mechanical
organisations to deliver an improved Australasian road
systems including pumps and lifts, electronic systems including power
transport network. To succeed in this task, we undertake
supply and energy efficiency.
leading-edge road and transport research which
underpins our input to policy development and published
guidance on the design, construction and management
of the road network and its associated infrastructure.
Austroads provides a collective approach that delivers
Keywords value for money, encourages shared knowledge and
drives consistency for road users.
Retrofit, refurbishment, geometric considerations, process development,
safety file, fire and life safety, traffic management, mechanical features, Austroads is governed by a Board consisting of senior
ventilation, electrical systems, power supply, drainage, energy efficiency. executive representatives from each of its eleven
member organisations:
• Transport for NSW

• Roads Corporation Victoria
ISBN 978-1-925854-35-0 • Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads
Austroads Project No. ART1971 Pages 54 • Main Roads Western Australia

• Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure
Austroads Publication No. AGRT04-19
South Australia
• Department of State Growth Tasmania
• Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Logistics
Northern Territory
• Transport Canberra and City Services Directorate,
© Austroads Ltd 2019 Australian Capital Territory
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the • The Department of Infrastructure, Regional
Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without Development and Cities
the prior written permission of Austroads. • Australian Local Government Association
• New Zealand Transport Agency.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution to this report by the Austroads Road Design Task Force and Key
Stakeholder group which comprised of: David Kimpton (VicRoads, Project Manager), Nigel Casey (Roads and Maritime NSW), Nigel
Lloyd (NZTA), John Venables (MRWA), Yanyan Xiao (DPTI SA), Mohamed Nooru (TMR QLD), Michael Tziotis (Australian Road
Research Board), Geoff McKernan (ATOG), Tony Peglas (ATS), Bob Allen (ATOG), Greg Buckley (Fire and Rescue NSW) and
George Mavroyeni (World Road Association (PIARC)). The authors would like to acknowledge the permission to reproduce images
from The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy and the World Road Association (PIARC), Centro Inox – the Italian Stainless
Steel Association and the International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering.
This Guide is produced by Austroads as a general guide only. Austroads has taken care to ensure that this publication is correct at
the time of publication. Austroads does not make any representations or warrant that the Guide is free from error, is current, or,
where used, will ensure compliance with any legislative, regulatory or general law requirements. Austroads expressly disclaims all
and any guarantees, undertakings and warranties, expressed or implied, and is not liable, including for negligence, for any loss
(incidental or consequential), injury, damage or any other consequences arising directly or indirectly from the use of this Guide.
Where third party information is contained in this Guide, it is included with the consent of the third party and in good faith. It does not
necessarily reflect the considered views of Austroads Readers should rely on their own skill, care and judgement to apply the
information contained in this Guide and seek professional advice regarding their particular issues.
Contents
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Scope of Part 4 ......................................................................................................................................... 1
2. General Requirements for Tunnel Retrofitting/Refurbishment ......................................................... 2

2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 Providing a Safe System .......................................................................................................................... 2
2.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection ............................................................................................................... 2
2.4 Risk Analysis ............................................................................................................................................ 3
2.5 Traffic Management During Retrofitting/Refurbishment ........................................................................... 4
2.6 Testing and Commissioning ..................................................................................................................... 5
3. Establishing the Need for Refurbishment ........................................................................................... 6

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 6
3.2 Tunnel Inspections Regime ...................................................................................................................... 7
3.3 Process for Developing Project Requirements ........................................................................................ 7
3.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7
3.3.2 Safety File ................................................................................................................................... 7
3.3.3 Overall Process .......................................................................................................................... 8
3.3.4 Developing and Implementing the Concept ............................................................................. 10
3.3.5 Summary .................................................................................................................................. 11
3.4 Types of Refurbishment/Retrofit/Renewal ............................................................................................. 11
4. Traffic Capacity Expansion ................................................................................................................. 12

4.1 General ................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Additional Tubes ..................................................................................................................................... 12
4.3 Widening Existing Tubes ........................................................................................................................ 12
4.4 Rearranging Lane Configuration ............................................................................................................ 14
4.5 Geometric Design Considerations .......................................................................................................... 14
4.5.1 General Requirements ............................................................................................................. 14
4.5.2 Design Requirements ............................................................................................................... 14
5. Traffic Management Functions ........................................................................................................... 16

5.1 Signs and Lighting .................................................................................................................................. 16
5.1.1 Signs ......................................................................................................................................... 16
5.1.2 Lighting ..................................................................................................................................... 16
5.2 Traffic Management Systems................................................................................................................. 16
6. Fire and Life Safety .............................................................................................................................. 18

6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 18
6.2 Fire Protection ........................................................................................................................................ 18
6.3 Evacuation .............................................................................................................................................. 18
6.4 Structural Fire Protection ........................................................................................................................ 19
7. Mechanical Engineering Features ...................................................................................................... 20

7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 20
7.2 Ventilation Systems ................................................................................................................................ 20
7.3 Other Mechanical Components .............................................................................................................. 21
7.3.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 21
7.3.2 Pumps and Pumping Stations .................................................................................................. 21
7.3.3 Crane and Hoist Systems ......................................................................................................... 21
7.3.4 Lifts ........................................................................................................................................... 21
Austroads 2019 | page i

8. Electrical/Electronic Engineering Features ....................................................................................... 22

8.1 Electronic Control Systems .................................................................................................................... 22
8.2 High Voltage/Low Voltage Power Supply and Distribution Systems......................................................23
8.3 Other Electrical/Electronic Systems ....................................................................................................... 23
8.4 Network and Systems Architecture ........................................................................................................ 24
9. Other Refurbishment and Repairs ...................................................................................................... 25

9.1 Tunnel Structure ..................................................................................................................................... 25
9.1.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 25
9.1.2 Concrete Structural Elements................................................................................................... 25
9.1.3 Water Ingress ........................................................................................................................... 26
9.1.4 Supported Ceilings and Hangers.............................................................................................. 26
9.1.5 Unlined Rock Tunnels .............................................................................................................. 26
9.2 Cladding ................................................................................................................................................. 27
9.3 Other Structural Features ....................................................................................................................... 28
9.4 Pavements .............................................................................................................................................. 28
10. Drainage ................................................................................................................................................ 29
11. Energy Efficiency ................................................................................................................................. 30

11.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 30
11.2 Ventilation ............................................................................................................................................... 30
11.3 Lighting ................................................................................................................................................... 31
11.3.1 Lighting Equipment ................................................................................................................... 31
11.3.2 Portal Treatments ..................................................................................................................... 31
11.3.3 Control Equipment .................................................................................................................... 31
11.3.4 Reflective Properties of Pavement and Walls .......................................................................... 31
11.4 Drainage ................................................................................................................................................. 32
11.5 Temperature Regulation ......................................................................................................................... 32
11.6 Environmental Considerations ............................................................................................................... 32
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 33
Case Study 1: M2 Norfolk Twin Tunnels ............................................................................... 35
Case Study 2: Refurbishment of the Terrace Tunnel, New Zealand ..................................46
Figures
Figure 3.1: Safety File development ........................................................................................................... 8
Figure 3.2: Safety assessment process .................................................................................................... 10
Figure 4.1: Cross-section of the widened tunnel together with the original cross-section ........................13
Figure 6.1: Example of fire protection sheet in the Conwy Tunnel (United Kingdom) ..............................19
Figure 9.1: Shotcrete repair and arch roof lining ....................................................................................... 27
Figure 9.2: Example of cladding (Valtournenche, Italy) ............................................................................ 28
Austroads 2019 | page ii

1 Introduction
The Guide to Road Tunnels (GRT) is written in four Parts:

• Part 1: Introduction to Road Tunnels (GRT Part 1) (Austroads 2018a)
• Part 2: Planning, Design and Commissioning (GRT Part 2) (Austroads 2019)
• Part 3: Operation and Maintenance (GRT Part 3) (Austroads 2018b)
• Part 4: Retrofitting Tunnels (this Part).
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the four-part guide is to provide practitioners with high-level assistance when making
decisions on the planning, design, operation and maintenance of new road tunnels; and when retrofitting,
refurbishing, or undertaking major renewals of assets in existing tunnels in Australia and New Zealand. The
principles and standards provided are based on experience across Australasia and other countries where
tunnels have been operated over a long period of time. Practices provided from other countries have been
considered in the context of Australian and New Zealand conditions, experience and legislative
requirements, and have been adopted with due consideration of these factors.
1.2 Scope of Part 4
Part 4 examines the reasons for deciding to retrofit, refurbish or undertake a major renewal of some or all
elements of an existing tunnel, using the results of an appropriate inspection regime. Guidance is provided
on the process to be used in developing the project to achieve the required objectives. The types of retrofit,
refurbishment, or major renewal are described, and the requirements and standards for those projects are
established. These types of projects range from traffic capacity improvements to replacement of the various
systems used in the tunnel e.g. traffic management, fire and life safety, mechanical engineering features
such as ventilation, electrical and electronic systems, intelligent transport systems and control systems,
instrumentation and structural components. An important issue addressed in all project types is the
appropriate traffic management arrangements, that is, the requirements for managing traffic to minimise the
disruption to road users. Some guidance is also provided on energy efficient systems that can be used in
refurbishing tunnels.
In addition, the acceptable geometric design standards for a retrofit are examined, together with an
assessment of the impact of adopting such standards on tunnel operations and costs.
Austroads 2019 | page 1

2 General Requirements for Tunnel

Retrofitting/Refurbishment
2.1 Introduction
Tunnels are an important part of the road network and their retrofit or refurbishment may be required in order
to maintain safety or traffic capacity. There are some general requirements to be considered to establish and
maintain the operations in a safe manner, whilst minimising disruption to tunnel users and the broader road
network.
These general requirements are outlined in the following sections.
2.2 Providing a Safe System
The adoption of the Safe System approach to road safety is key to the Australia National Road Safety
Strategy 2011-2020 (Australian Transport Council 2011), and Safer Journeys: New Zealand’s Road Safety
Strategy 2010-2020 (Ministry of Transport 2010).
Safe System principles take a holistic view of the road transport system and the interactions amongst the
roads, the roadside environment, travel speeds, vehicles and road users. The System also recognises that
people inevitably make mistakes that may result in crashes, and when crashes do occur, death or serious
injury should not result.
The Safe System framework requires that:

• the road system is designed, built and maintained so that the impact forces road users are subjected to in
collisions will not result in death or serious injury
• roads and roadsides are improved to reduce the risk of crashes and the severity of impacts when crashes
do occur
• effective active and passive safety systems are encouraged in vehicles to reduce the number of crashes
which occur and reduce the impact forces on occupants and road users outside the vehicle when they do
occur
• speeds are managed, taking account of the risks on different parts of the road system.
Research and guidance about the Safe System principles is available in the Guide to Road Safety Part 1:
Road Safety Overview (Austroads 2013) and from the Austroads website (www.austroads.com.au).
A retrofit/refurbishment needs to identify and apply opportunities to eliminate or minimise the risks to tunnel
users.
2.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection
Tunnels are items of critical infrastructure for the community. Systems are provided in the tunnel to provide
security of the infrastructure, and an operational plan for the use of these systems needs to be developed.
Operators of the tunnel should devise their operation strategies and systems in accordance with this
protection plan and ensure that their personnel are aware of the consequences of lack of adherence to the
plan. Management systems need to ensure continual vigilance, and training of personnel should emphasise
that systems must not be bypassed for short-term convenience.
Care is required in the refurbishment or renewal process to ensure that the systems in place for the tunnel
are not compromised by the project activities.

2.4 Risk Analysis
The principles of risk analysis and management are described in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 1:
Introduction to Road Tunnels (Austroads 2018a). It is necessary to adopt a formal risk management process,
in accordance with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and 2013 and the tunnel operator’s guidelines for the operation
and maintenance of road tunnels. Additional information and guidance are contained in the Risk Analysis for
Road Tunnels (World Road Association (PIARC) 2008a) and Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road
Tunnels (World Road Association (PIARC) 2013). Similarly, AS 61508.1:1999 may support the risk analysis
and mitigation process for the life cycle of electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems within
tunnels. Design reviews of these systems may influence or require design reviews in other systems such as
fire protection.
World Road Association (PIARC) (2016) notes that typical applications for risk analysis when performing the
retrofitting or refurbishment of a tunnel include:
• demonstrating that the tunnel is safe enough
• using the risk analysis as a decision-making tool to compare various alternative mitigation methods or to
decide on risk
• determining the performance and/or reliability requirements of the safety system
• providing insight into the residual risk
• classifying the tunnel with respect to transport of dangerous goods.
The greatest influence on avoiding or mitigating risks associated with retrofitting and refurbishing road
tunnels can be achieved during the design stage of the project. Accordingly, GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019)
refers to the necessity for design to adequately consider and address the long-term operation and
maintenance consequences of design decisions, particularly regarding the safety of tunnel users and
construction and maintenance workers. The involvement of experienced road tunnel operation and
maintenance (O&M) professionals in the early stages of tunnel design is essential to realise the best
outcomes.
Most jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand have imposed legal obligations on project designers to
formally review O&M safety risks and avoid or mitigate them in the design. Refer to the WHS legislation in
each state or territory and to NZ Transport Agency (2016) for the relevant safety in design standards
required.
The objectives of the risk analysis include:

• ensuring the safety of workers on the project
• ensuring the safety of other tunnel occupants (if construction is under traffic)
• facilitating effective response to incidents
• minimising interruption to tunnel operations (where closure is not undertaken).
Measures that can be implemented to reduce both the likelihood and consequences of incidents during a
tunnel retrofit or refurbishment include:
• public education on driving in tunnels and what to do in the event of incidents
• implementing effective traffic management plans for normal operation
• implementing alternative traffic management plans in a timely manner when circumstances change
• implementing effective traffic enforcement practices
• notifying motorists of changed traffic conditions as early as possible, by all available means
• controlling prohibited vehicles effectively

• scheduling and implementing activities to minimise risk and inconvenience to road users
• minimising occupational health and safety (OH&S) risk to tunnel construction, operations and
maintenance personnel
• training personnel comprehensively and effectively.
All existing tunnels should have a risk register covering aspects of O&M (refer to GRT
Part 3 (Austroads 2018b), clause 2.4), and any refurbishment or major renewals need to be considered
within this process. As part of the overall tunnel risk management process, a specific risk register should be
developed for the refurbishment and major renewals work, which clearly identifies the risks and how they are
to be managed until completion. Amended and residual risks need to be carried into the O&M risk register.
The development of a risk register in the planning of a retrofit or refurbishment will help to inform key design
decisions and form the basis for development of incident response procedures for the numerous and varied
risk scenarios that are relevant to road tunnel construction and operation (if construction is under traffic). The
initial register should be a continuation of the register maintained throughout the development and operation
of the tunnel with the addition of the issues relevant to the retrofitting/refurbishment project.
2.5 Traffic Management During Retrofitting/Refurbishment
Safe tunnel operations must always be maintained, and special attention to this aspect will be required when
any refurbishment or retrofitting project is being implemented. It is not likely that extended periods of closure
of the tunnel will be tolerated, so it will be necessary to carefully plan the work to minimise the need for
closure and to manage the operations when work is going on under traffic.
In NSW, for example, a system of road occupancy licences exists where those wanting to undertake
maintenance or upgrade works are obliged to seek a licence from the NSW Traffic Management
Centre (TMC).
With the competing demands of providing operational road capacity and the necessity of maintaining
infrastructure, it can be difficult to apportion closure time to upgrade works. If only restrictive road
occupancies are granted (i.e. short periods on multiple occasions) this can significantly affect the program
and cost of upgrade works.
The specific requirements will depend on the type of refurbishment and its effect on the physical elements
and operating systems being used. If the refurbishment is related to the tunnel structure, the degree to which
work can be undertaken while traffic is flowing will be limited, particularly during peak traffic times and so
only limited times will be available for that work to be done. Refurbishment of operating systems will require
the systems to be inactive, at least during the changeover period, and this will only be feasible in periods
when the tunnel is able to be closed e.g. weekends or night-time. Specific times for closure will depend on
the traffic patterns prevailing at the site and possible alternative routes for off-peak traffic. The Norfolk Twin
Tunnels Case Study (Appendix A) provides an example of closure times and management of traffic found
acceptable during the undertaking of the works.
Some refurbishment activities will be possible using partial closure (e.g. one traffic lane) during non-peak
traffic times. Activities such as replacement of lighting and signs and ventilation fans may be possible with
partial closure. The safety of both workers and the tunnel users is paramount, and appropriate measures to
ensure their safety will be required. Devices such as moveable barriers, temporary traffic signals and
detailed signing may be required.
From a study of the impacts of the works on traffic flows, a traffic management plan should be developed
and approved by the road agency, demonstrating that the effects of the works on the traffic are acceptable.
Further details of the requirements are examined in Section 3.4 which outlines the various types of
refurbishment or retrofitting. It is likely that the restraints imposed by these requirements will determine the
type of design that is possible, the method of construction that will be feasible and the time frame over which
the work can reasonably be completed.

2.6 Testing and Commissioning
As with the construction of a new tunnel, it will be necessary to undertake a testing and commissioning
process to ensure that the refurbished components are working appropriately. The procedures described in
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) should be adopted to plan and implement this process.
The major difference with a refurbishment project is that tunnel operations are ongoing during the testing
period, and it will be necessary to modify the procedures accordingly. Where testing requires the tunnel to be
closed, the available times for refurbishment will be limited, and planning the procedure/s must
accommodate this requirement. If the testing discovers a problem, then it will be necessary to have a plan in
place to avoid extended closure of the tunnel. For example, operation may be possible by reducing speeds,
or it may be necessary to prevent certain types of vehicles using the tunnel until the problem is solved.
Complete documentation as indicated in GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) will be required.
Note: It is common practice in tunnel construction/refurbishment projects that the physical works over-run
their schedule, and consequently, the commissioning period becomes compressed. This usually results in
legacy issues that require resolution during the O&M phase. It would be good practice if the commissioning
period was fixed and appropriate measures were put in place to prevent any reduction to the commissioning
period.

3 Establishing the Need for Refurbishment
3.1 Introduction
The need to refurbish a tunnel, as opposed to maintaining the existing infrastructure, may be indicated by the
following issues:
• excessive congestion on the approach roads to the tunnel and within the tunnel (lack of carrying capacity)
• excessive maintenance requirements for the systems in the tunnel, either individually or as a whole
(unwarranted cost of operation)
• the need for improved network availability and resilience of the tunnel due to the impact of any incident or
closure
• obsolescence of any of the systems (improvements in technology; end of life of equipment or systems)
• failure of the equipment or systems-in-use
• deterioration of structural elements (asset protection, public safety)
• legislation requiring a higher standard of safety
• level of safety of the existing tunnel not satisfactory.
The records of the operation of the tunnel and the results of the inspections carried out as part of the tunnel
operation (refer to GRT Part 3 (Austroads 2018b)) are an important input into raising these issues.
The trigger for such work may be a significant event (e.g. Mont Blanc, Tauern and Gotthard Tunnel
disasters), or ageing of existing equipment, or lack of traffic capacity (e.g. M2 Norfolk Twin Tunnels in
Sydney). In any event, a clear definition of the requirements will be required and an appropriate strategy for
the work will need to be developed (Miezio & Cooper 2013; World Road Association (PIARC) 2012). World
Road Association (2008b) states ‘When planning a major refurbishment, it is recommended to use the same
approach as to a new design’.
The inspections regime in place for the tunnel will reveal the issues to be addressed (refer to Section 3.2).
The approach to asset management will vary between tunnels but is often based on an ongoing cycle of
asset renewals as part of a forward works program, as assets reach their end of useful life or need to be
replaced for the above reasons. Many assets can be replaced without the need for significant closures;
nonetheless, the risks and processes in renewals need to be considered and followed. Some asset renewals
are more significant in terms of cost, complexity of design and construction, and impact on existing
operations. It is often the case that more significant renewals or refurbishment works are aggregated into a
major refurbishment project in order to minimise impact, closures and costs and maximise resources and
provide better outcomes. Maintaining life cycle asset management plans will be beneficial in determining the
need for refurbishment. These plans should provide a global view of the assets, the economic and reliability
performance of the tunnel, and an indication of when various items of plant and equipment are reaching the
end of their economic lifespan.
Periodic review of the tunnel’s fire and life safety design/quantitative risk assessment (see GRT Part 3) will
also provide input to decision-making by providing an assessment of the current risk and safety levels, as
well as the benefits of improvements.

3.2 Tunnel Inspections Regime
GRT Part 3 (Austroads 2018b) describes the inspection regime required for tunnels and the reports that will
emanate from that regime.
The inspection regime should be designed to provide information on trends in deterioration of the features of
the tunnel. It is important to undertake deterioration or condition assessments, as these provide information
to enable tunnel operators to identify and undertake any repairs or replacement of features, which will
minimise disruption to tunnel users. These trends will provide guidance to tunnel owners and operators on
the remaining life of components and a likely timeframe for their replacement. Using this information will
allow both a normal maintenance program to be designed and major replacement and/or retrofitting
components to be planned well in advance of the need occurring. For tunnel fire and life safety systems,
reports will also be provided from the results of the required regulatory tunnel inspection and testing.
3.3 Process for Developing Project Requirements
3.3.1 Introduction
The first step in the potential refurbishment of a tunnel or the retrofit of any equipment is establishing the
need for such work (Miezio & Cooper 2013, World Road Association (PIARC) 2012, 2015). This will involve
the proper inspection and analysis of the existing tunnel features, including an assessment of the standard of
these features.
Current requirements for tunnel maintenance include an appropriate inspection regime combined with
appropriate maintenance strategies (GRT Part 3 (Austroads 2018b)). A decision will need to be made on
whether the need for maintenance is overcome by the need for more major works e.g. refurbishment or
retrofitting of new equipment or systems.
It should be noted that the extent of the works undertaken as part of the refurbishment process may extend
the Scope of Works and Technical Criteria (SWTC) with respect to the original Conditions of Planning
Approval such that new planning conditions may need to be imposed.
3.3.2 Safety File
Miezio and Cooper (2013) describe the process used in refurbishing two tunnels in New Zealand and
emphasise the development of a Safety File for the project. The development of the process included an
examination of European requirements for a Safety File.
The Safety File is a document that describes the tunnel infrastructure and equipment, the condition of the
existing tunnel, traffic statistics, risk analysis and how the tunnel is managed (roles and responsibilities). It
can be used as an enduring document throughout the life of the tunnel, providing a vehicle for the
management of tunnel safety. It is very useful in identifying the objectives of the refurbishment process and
providing input into the design of the elements required (e.g. fire safety) in a tunnel.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the inputs required for the development of the Safety File. Further information is
contained in Appendix B.

Figure 3.1: Safety File development
Source: McGavin (2014). Paper presented at the 15th Australasian Tunnelling Conference Sydney 2014. Reproduced
with the permission of The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.
3.3.3 Overall Process
A robust process of inspection, analysis and assessment of the existing tunnel is required to enable the need
for refurbishment to be established and to allow an appropriate scope of work to be determined for that
refurbishment. It is important to note that the degree of flexibility available for undertaking a refurbishment is
less than for new tunnels because of the need to accommodate the existing space and constraints. World
Road Association (PIARC) (2015) provides more detail on the process to be adopted.
Detailed and rigorous diagnosis of a tunnel is an essential stage in the process of upgrading or renovating
and must be performed before decisions are made on the extent and type of refurbishment required. World
Road Association (PIARC) (2015) states:
The physical diagnosis of a tunnel requires:
• to establish in detail and to describe in a precise manner the functions and the
geometry of the structure,
• to establish a detailed condition statement of the structure. To evaluate in particular
fire resistance, uncertainties and potential risks, and to list the tests that would be
needed in order to provide a solid basis for the detailed design,
• to list all existing equipment, their functions, their condition, their technology, their
actual features (tests or measurements will be required) and the stock of spare parts
that might be available,
• to evaluate the remaining life span of the aforementioned equipment before their
replacement, and to identify the availability or not of spare parts on the market
(notably because of the technological obsolescence),
• to identify maintenance and inspection reports, equipment malfunctions and the rate
of breakdowns.

In addition, it notes that the organisation, maintenance and operation procedures, together with the relevant
documentation of those procedures must be analysed. All documents relating to the organisation and
management of safety and rescue interventions must also be assessed.
The diagnosis should be followed by a risk assessment based on the actual state of the tunnel to determine
whether the tunnel can continue to be operated in its present state prior to refurbishment, or if it is necessary
to make temporary arrangements to ensure an adequate level of safety for the users (e.g. restriction of types
of vehicles, a higher level of surveillance and intervention, and the need for any additional equipment). This
may mean that the operational safety level of the tunnel may need to be reduced for limited periods during
the refurbishment because of logistical restrictions in maintaining service capability. Appropriate mitigation
measures will be needed.
In addition, this analysis provides a reference point for the existing state of the tunnel and allows refinement
of the refurbishment program (World Road Association (PIARC) 2015).
During this process, it is necessary to establish whether any of the existing facilities can be re-used or
modified to fit in with the new and updated facilities. Technology compatibility may be an issue in this
assessment, given the rapidity of change in the electronics field.
Rock, Arch and Ireland (2006) make the valid point that the costs of forced rehabilitation and maintenance
are likely to be much greater than planned activities, particularly if the forced work results in closure of the
tunnel:
The identified threat or weakness may have the potential to force closure of the tunnel be
it long-term, temporary or intermittent, e.g. planned night-time closure of the tunnel. In this
case approximate knowledge of the economic impact arising as a result of interruption of
tunnel service is a very useful decision-making aid particularly as the cost of unplanned
maintenance and rehabilitation can be very great compared with planned maintenance
and rehabilitation costs. The cost to 3rd parties notably the travelling public of unplanned
tunnel maintenance or rehabilitation closure can typically be an order of magnitude
greater than the direct cost of the maintenance or rehabilitation proper.
A process for assessing and improving safety in existing tunnels is outlined in World Road Association
(PIARC) (2015), and the process is presented in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Safety assessment process
Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2015). Reproduced with permission.
3.3.4 Developing and Implementing the Concept
Using the information from the Safety File and the results of the Principal inspections (refer to GRT Part 3
(Austroads 2018b) carried out, options for the required improvements should be developed and the most
appropriate one adopted. This process will require the development of an implementation and construction
program that considers the restraints and restrictions that apply to the tunnel.
This program should be validated by (modified from World Road Association (PIARC) 2015):
• developing a risk analysis based on the final state of the tunnel after upgrading to test the new
arrangements introduced by the program
This analysis should be established with the same methodology as the one used for the prior analysis
based on the initial state. It also enables a search for optimisations.
• examining in detail the feasibility of the works to be carried out for the refurbishment under the requisite
conditions of operation, e.g. whether the works are to be carried out under traffic or if tunnel closure is
required
• resolving any incompatibilities between the proposed program and the restraints that may apply. For
example, if tunnel closures are not permitted and the program needs that to happen, an iterative process
will be required to reach a conclusion on the optimum way of achieving the objectives of the program.

Resolution of these issues will then allow the required plans and specifications to be developed. Finalising
these plans and specifications will require a detailed analysis of:
• the successive stages of construction, the content of each stage, the logical and priority sequences of the
works
• safety conditions inside the tunnel at each construction stage
This requires risk analyses and the implementation, if necessary, of intervention levels, mitigation
arrangements, traffic restrictions, road patrols.
• traffic conditions inside the tunnel and on its approaches, with partial and temporary restrictions according
to the various stages of works (different arrangements may be in place for daytime and night-time, and
normal travel periods and holiday or low-flow periods), potential diversions, network-level impact on the
traffic and safety conditions, in the areas affected by the works
• constraints and impacts on users and the public generally
• contractual deadlines for the works, including any intermediate hold points or timing requirements
• all necessary temporary arrangements
• advertising and information to tunnel users and nearby residents.
3.3.5 Summary
In summary, the process for development of the refurbishment, adapted from World Road Association
(PIARC) (2015), McGavin (2014) and Rock, Arch and Ireland (2006) is:
• Develop the Safety File.
• Undertake a complete diagnosis of the existing tunnel.
• Define the safety features.
• Undertake a complete risk assessment, particularly of fire and life safety systems.
• Identify and analyse the weaknesses and threats in the existing tunnel.
• Identify a short list of options that addresses the weaknesses and threats.
• Develop the assessment criteria and methodology to be used in assessing the options.
• Identify the preferred option, considering the fire and life safety risk, the assessment criteria and
whole-of-life costs.
• Validate the program.
• Implement the program and construct any works required.
3.4 Types of Refurbishment/Retrofit/Renewal

Refurbishment, retrofitting, or major renewal of existing tunnels may involve some or all elements of a tunnel,
depending on the outcomes of the lifespan of tunnel infrastructure (refer to GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) and
GRT Part 3 (Austroads 2018b)), general inspections, and assessments, such as traffic flow capacity of the
tunnel. The extent of work can range from major structural replacements, widening of the existing tunnel,
installation of complete systems or installations of a single system (e.g. ventilation system). The various
types of refurbishment or retrofit can be summarised as:
• traffic capacity expansion (refer to Section 4) and traffic management functions (refer to Section 5)
• fire and life safety upgrade/retrofit (refer to Section 6)
• mechanical engineering features (refer to Section 7)
• electrical/electronic engineering features (refer to Section 8)
• other refurbishment and repairs (refer to Section 9).

4 Traffic Capacity Expansion
4.1 General
Traffic capacity expansion will be required when traffic volumes reach a level where the congestion in the
tunnel and on approach roads is no longer tolerable. In general, tunnel operators will manage the tunnel to
ensure that conditions inside the tunnel are tolerable. This may have the result of excessive traffic
congestion on the approach roads, some of which will divert to other roads with consequent addition to
congestion on those roads.
A full traffic and transportation study will be required to assess the overall network and determine the
appropriate actions needed. If an increase in the traffic carrying capacity of the tunnel is determined, a range
of solutions may need to be considered, see Section 4.2 – Section 4.4.
If should also be noted that works designed to increase traffic capacity at the tunnel portals may differ from
those within the tunnel structure, and therefore additional transitioning works may be required.
4.2 Additional Tubes
In those cases where the existing tunnel is a single tube operating in both directions, i.e. bi-directional, an
additional tube is likely to be the appropriate solution. An additional tube may also be considered where two
tubes are in operation, if it is feasible to use the third tube in alternate directions for the prevailing peak
period. This would only be appropriate where the directional split warrants this type of operation. For other
cases, two additional tubes would be required, with traffic in one direction splitting into the two tubes for that
direction.
The design of additional tubes should be undertaken following the principles and standards outlined in GRT
Part 2 and Part 3 (Austroads 2019, 2018b).
4.3 Widening Existing Tubes
Where an additional lane is required, it may be feasible to widen the existing tunnel to create the additional
space required. This will only be possible where the tunnel is constructed in competent rock without a
structural internal lining (Clarke et al. 2014). Where the tunnel relies on the lining for its structural integrity,
reconstruction involving widening is not likely to be possible.
In all cases, maintaining existing traffic flows is a major requirement and any project must ensure that the
safety of the existing tunnel users and the construction crews is paramount (World Road Association
(PIARC) 2004 and 2008b).
World Road Association (PIARC) (2004) notes the following:

When it is inevitable that work must be carried out in a tunnel while traffic is present, it is
necessary to take measures such as:
• safety measures and environmental measures for workers according to national law
and/or standards. The implication is that working in a tunnel tube is not allowed while
traffic is present unless extensive (and expensive) measures are taken to protect
workers (e.g. the construction of temporary barriers to separate the workers from the
traffic);
• in twin tube tunnels, one tube can be closed for renewal while bi-directional traffic
flow is allowed in the other tube. In heavily trafficked tunnels this is no longer
justifiable, because accident rates will rise considerably in this situation;

• a safer alternative to bi-directional traffic in one tube could be alternating

unidirectional traffic in each direction for periods, depending upon the relative sizes of
the flows in each direction. This certainly reduces the risk of head-on collisions and
the number of vehicles potentially involved in any incident;
• the convoying of dangerous categories of traffic through the tunnel.
In designing the cross-section to be used in tunnel widenings, consideration should be given to adopting the
dimensions discussed in Section 4.5.
Figure 4.1 shows the widened cross-section for the M2 Norfolk Twin Tunnels in Sydney (Clarke et al. 2014).
This project was undertaken while the tunnel was in operation with closures only occurring at night on
weekdays and for longer periods on weekends. Clarke et al. (2014) provides a comprehensive description of
the approach to the design, the details of the construction and of the monitoring and control of the
construction work and provides a case study for the implementation of this type of work (see Appendix A).
Figure 4.1: Cross-section of the widened tunnel together with the original cross-section
Source: Clarke et al. (2014). Paper presented at the 15th Australasian Tunnelling Conference Sydney 2014. Reproduced

4.4 Rearranging Lane Configuration
Where the existing tunnel has sufficient width, it may be possible to rearrange the lane configuration to
increase the traffic capacity of the tunnel. Section 4.5 provides guidance on the dimensions that could be
used. A cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken to determine whether this approach is appropriate.
Possible approaches include:

• using any emergency stopping lane for through traffic
• re-marking the lane lines to use some or all of the shoulder provided, together with reducing the width of
the traffic lanes to achieve an additional lane.
It is likely that the tunnel pavement will have to be re-surfaced to undertake this rearrangement successfully.
It is probable that overhead signs (fixed and variable message) will have to be relocated to ensure their
effectiveness.
4.5 Geometric Design Considerations
4.5.1 General Requirements
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) provides details of geometric elements for new tunnels, and the dimensions
suggested are appropriate for refurbishment projects where there is sufficient available space. It may be
possible to adopt reduced values for some elements where space restrictions preclude adopting the desired
value, without unduly compromising safety of operation. In tunnels, this requirement will almost always relate
to the cross-section widths, since the vertical and horizontal geometry will not be changed.
4.5.2 Design Requirements
Sight distance
In tunnels where the additional lane has been achieved by narrowing the lane width and reducing the
clearance to the walls, the effect on horizontal sight distance needs to be assessed. It is likely that sight
distance will be marginally reduced, but it may still be acceptable if criteria such as driver reaction times
(refer to the Guide to Road Design Part 3 (GRD Part 3) (Austroads 2016)), used in the calculation of sight
distance, are able to be reduced.
Horizontal alignment
It is highly unlikely that any changes to the horizontal alignment will be feasible in any tunnel refurbishment
project.
Vertical alignment
It is highly unlikely that any changes to the vertical alignment will be feasible in any tunnel refurbishment
project.

Cross-section
It may be feasible to adopt some reductions in the widths of traffic lanes and shoulders to allow an additional
lane to be achieved in a tunnel. The GRD Part 3 (Austroads 2016) indicates that for roads in urban
environments, lane widths of 3.0–3.4 m may be appropriate on low-speed roads with low truck volumes.
Given the restricted nature of a tunnel cross-section, adopting 3.0 m should be undertaken with caution and
only with a shoulder of at least 0.5 m. An important consideration in the selection of an appropriate lane
width is the tracking characteristics of the vehicles permitted to use the tunnel, e.g. B-doubles, and the
potential increase in crash risk. Gillard and Arch (2000) describe refurbishment of the Queensway tunnel
(speed limit 50 km/h) in the United Kingdom where four lanes of 2.7 m width have operated for some time.
It is not appropriate to allow reductions in cross-section geometry where larger vehicles are permitted
(e.g. road trains). It may also be required to prevent Dangerous Goods vehicles from using a tunnel when
lane widths have been reduced without being subject to a rigorous risk assessment.
In general, shoulder widths may be reduced to 0.5 m in refurbishment projects to allow full use of the space
available, provided that the working width (refer to GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019)) remaining is still suitable.
Refurbishment projects should not have any need to reduce vertical clearances, and in any case, reductions
below those required in GRT Part 2 are not permitted.

5 Traffic Management Functions
5.1 Signs and Lighting
5.1.1 Signs
Upgrading of signs (including road markings) and lighting may be more frequent than other types of
rehabilitation, given the expected life span of the components involved and the potential for changes to the
traffic system requiring new signage. Physical replacement or the addition of new signs may also become
necessary from time to time. The types of signs include static signs and variable message signs (VMS) (refer
to Section 5.2).
Installation of the new signs and infrastructure should be done without tunnel closure on a long-term basis.
Any closures need to be short and undertaken when traffic volumes are low. If possible, it is preferable to
close a single lane with appropriate safety measures, to minimise disruption to traffic flows.
Information on sign installations associated with emergency egress is also available in Suggested Good
Practice for Road Tunnel Emergency Egress Signage (Austroads 2018c).
5.1.2 Lighting
Developments in efficient lighting systems may lead to the need for replacement of existing lighting systems.
LED lighting systems are more efficient than the current commonly used systems and provide significant
energy savings for tunnels when they are used (refer to Section 11). Salata et al. (2015) notes that LED
systems have a higher capital cost and in transition zones such as portals, may not be economical because
of the number of lights required. However, this situation is likely to change as LED technology and pricing
improves.
Salata et al. (2015) provides some case studies using LED systems. A further example of the use of LED
systems can be found in the refurbishment of the Ayazağa and Beylerbeyi tunnels in Istanbul, Turkey
(reported in <http://emea.gelighting.com/LightingWeb/emea/projects/istanbul-tunnel.jsp>). LED lights have
been installed in the SH1 Mt Victoria Tunnel in Wellington and prior to that the Karori Tunnel (Wellington
City). LED lighting is installed in WestConnex M4 East and is to be installed in NorthConnex and all other
stages of WestConnex.
Other considerations include:

• avoiding clashes with other essential services such as ventilation fans
• accounting for tunnel curvature
• coordinating with the location of existing luminaires.
In some tunnels (Terrace Tunnel), the refurbishment may entail progressively removing all of the existing
permanent services and replacing them with temporary services (including lighting). This was because the
ceiling supporting the existing lighting was progressively removed. In the Mt Victoria Tunnel refurbishment
Stage 2, it was possible to leave the existing lighting in place while installing the LED lighting.
5.2 Traffic Management Systems
Traffic management systems include the variable message sign systems, variable speed limit systems and
the electronic systems to control and monitor them. Developments in the electronics of these intelligent
transport systems are rapid and may lead to obsolescence in a relatively short time. Upgrading or replacing
these systems constitute a major retrofit for the tunnel (see also Section 8.1).

It may be necessary to devise a method of undertaking a project to replace these systems without closure of
the tunnel on a regular basis. Maintenance of the existing traffic control features during the project is
essential, and a short changeover time will be required to ensure effective operation of the tunnel.
Depending on the traffic volumes and their distribution throughout the day and/or week, temporary closures
to undertake work may be possible in low-volume traffic conditions, e.g. between 9.00 pm and 3.00 am
weekdays. Careful planning of the required tasks will be needed to ensure that traffic control functions are
always available during normal operating hours.

6 Fire and Life Safety
6.1 Introduction
In general, retrofitting of fire and life safety systems will generally be required when the systems have
reached the end of their life or have experienced significant damage, since these systems are mandatory in
new tunnels.
Many tunnels in Europe have undergone retrofitting of fire and life safety systems following the incidents in
the Mont Blanc, Tauern and Gotthard tunnels and the subsequent EU Directive 2004/54. In some cases,
retrofitting has involved providing additional evacuation points, a new tunnel for evacuation or using the
existing ventilation ducts for evacuation purposes, which required significant changes to the ventilation and
smoke removal systems.
Tunnels are normally provided with automatic fire alarm and warning systems, including Linear Heat
Detection, which in some cases has introduced a high level of complexity and integration with the
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and Tunnel Management Systems. Major refurbishment of
the fire alarm and warning systems needs to take this into account and take a systems integration approach
(refer also to Section 8.1).
Implementing these retrofitting projects will require careful planning to avoid the need for long-term tunnel
closures. Closures for short periods during low-traffic flows may be acceptable.
6.2 Fire Protection
Deluge systems have generally been provided in Australian and New Zealand tunnels and retrofitting may be
required for those tunnels that have not required such a system, and where it has become necessary to have
this type of system installed. Design requirements are contained in GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019).
Misting systems may also be a possible solution for some tunnels.
If installing a deluge system forms part of the refurbishment, consideration should be given to some trade-off
with the passive fire protection system. As an example, no fire protection of the structure was provided for
the Terrace and Mt Victoria Tunnels in New Zealand and critical items of cables and cable trays were
afforded the appropriate level of fire protection.
Providing effective passive fire protection can be challenging as there are many penetrations that require
careful treatment.
6.3 Evacuation
Sturm and Bacher (2015) describe an innovative use of the ventilation system in the Arlberg tunnel in Austria
to provide for safe evacuation, where:
The existing fresh air duct will be used as safe escape way between the existing egress
possibilities. This solution has big impacts on the ventilation system and on the
requirements for thermal structure protection of the new egress ways, i.e. the fresh air
duct. In order to overcome this problem, massive changes in the ventilation design have
to be performed, accompanied by the installation of a high-pressure water-mist system for
structure protection.

6.4 Structural Fire Protection
Kaundinya (2013) discusses experience in Germany in developing suitable guidelines for ensuring the
integrity of structural elements in tunnels when exposed to severe fire. The paper examines the requirements
for fire protection and discusses the ’fire curves’ (temperature vs time curves) used in Germany – typical fire
curves are provided. Kaundinya (2013) provides some useful guidance on the retrofitting of additional fire
protection to the tunnel structure. This could be applied to both a planned improvement/addition to the
structural fire protection in a tunnel or to refurbishment required after a fire:
Basically, there are two possible additional structural fire protection measures which
could be applied for existing tunnels:
1. Linings installed on the tunnel wall and ceiling, e.g. fire protection sheets (Figure 6.1).
2. Sprayed on fire protection, e.g. fire-protection render.
Figure 6.1: Example of fire protection sheet
Source: Kaundinya (2013). Reproduced with permission from the International Association for Bridge and Structural
Engineering.

7 Mechanical Engineering Features
7.1 Introduction
The major mechanical engineering feature of tunnels is the ventilation system, but there are several other
important features falling under this heading – pumps and pumping stations, cranes and hoists, and lifts.
These are discussed in the following sections.
An overriding consideration in all cases to minimise maintenance issues is to, where possible, investigate
minimising the number of moving parts in the tunnel’s mechanical and electrical systems e.g. using mains
pressure water supply for deluge and hydrant mains instead of pumped systems; and ring main fed high
voltage power supply instead of backup generators.
This will reduce maintenance requirements in the tunnel and place emphasis on inspection and testing.
7.2 Ventilation Systems
Replacement or upgrading the ventilation system may be required due to wear and tear of the system
leading to excessive maintenance costs or due to damage inflicted by a major fire or other incident. Further,
it may be necessary to re-examine the system due to changes in the vehicle fleet or substantial increases in
traffic volumes.
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) requires the design of the ventilation system to be sufficient for a 20-year
period but with a staged implementation sufficient to accommodate the first five years of operation. This
design should be suitable to allow easy upgrading for expected increases in traffic volumes. If the increases
are greater than expected, then the design of the system will have to be reviewed.
An additional factor to be considered is the potential for the vehicle fleet to have significantly lower emissions
than the fleet for which the system was designed. Rudolf and Höpperger (2008) describe the ventilation
system upgrade for the Bosruck tunnel in Austria, including the consideration given to changes in the vehicle
fleet since the original construction (reduced emissions leading to reduced ventilation requirements
compared with the original concept).
Rudolf and Höpperger also noted the need for such a project to allow for bi-directional traffic during the
upgrade:
Even though the tunnels will primarily be used in ‘(uni)’ directional traffic, the ventilation
system fully accommodates for two-way traffic. Two-way traffic is necessary during the
refurbishment of the east tube (2013–2014) and in case of intentional or accidental
closure of one of the tubes.
And:
During the main project, it was found that vehicle emission values have significantly been
reduced in the meantime, resulting in much lower fresh air rates than predicted 30 years
ago. Also, the requirements of local smoke extraction as well as the consideration of
unfavourable weather conditions (pressure, wind) gave rise to a change of priorities.
Therefore, the ventilation concept from the initial study needed to be revised.
Rudolf and Höpperger provide a discussion of the process used to develop the ventilation concept and the
results of that process.
Day and Norghauer (2005) discuss the refurbishment of ventilation and escape facilities for the Milchbuck
tunnel in Switzerland, providing recommendations for bringing them up-to-date and a process for
refurbishment.

Maintaining the operation of the tunnel during the refurbishment is essential. However, the tunnel cannot
remain open while the ventilation system is not working, and replacement of components therefore has to be
organised to occur in off-peak traffic periods, with enough time to undertake the necessary tests for
commissioning purposes. Appropriate staging may be required to allow the works to be completed in
sections compatible with the time available. It may also be possible for the tunnel to remain open with a
degraded ventilation system (e.g. some jet fans removed for repair/replacement but others still in place) – a
risk assessment should be undertaken if this approach is considered.
7.3 Other Mechanical Components
7.3.1 General
Other mechanical components include pumps and pumping stations, cranes, hoists and lifts (where
installed). Cranes, hoists and lifts will generally have little impact on traffic operations, so they should be
amenable to retrofitting or refurbishment at any convenient time.
7.3.2 Pumps and Pumping Stations
Where installed, pumps are required to ensure proper drainage and remove any water entering the tunnel
from any source, including the removal of water used for cleaning, from the deluge system and from spills,
which is considered a common use. It is expected that these installations will have a relatively long life, and it
is always necessary that they be kept in reliable working condition to ensure the safety of the tunnel.
When they must be replaced, any shutdown period during the refurbishment process will be a matter for
assessment by a robust risk analysis. Clearly, cleaning activities can be suspended during the process and
temporary arrangements may be possible for random spills and deluge system water. Where the pumps are
required to remove stormwater, the likelihood of rainfall during the construction and commissioning period
must be assessed.
If it is decided to proceed with the work and operate the tunnel while the pumps are not fully functional,
emergency procedures must be established to account for the possibility of water ingress. In those cases
where the risk cannot be taken, some form of redundancy should be designed into the system to allow for
replacement of one set of pumps while the other remains available for use if required. This redundancy is a
usual requirement in the design of tunnels (GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019)).
7.3.3 Crane and Hoist Systems
Crane and hoist systems are not generally critical to the day-to-day operation of the tunnel and their
replacement should be arranged to suit the usage pattern for them. Emergency procedures may be required
where an incident that needs to use them occurs when the replacement process is in progress.
7.3.4 Lifts
Where lifts have been installed, their replacement may be possible without any effect on the operation of the
tunnel. Arrangements for movement of people and goods between levels will still be needed to cover the
period of the work, including any actions to cater for any people with special needs, including disabilities.

8 Electrical/Electronic Engineering Features
8.1 Electronic Control Systems
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) sets out the design requirements of the operations management and control
system and the plant management and control system. As with other systems used in a tunnel, the need to
revise and upgrade these systems to incorporate improvements in technology and methodology will arise.
As new technology develops, existing supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems may
become outdated and may no longer be supported by the provider and warrant/need replacement with the
latest technology. As with other upgrades and retrofits, maintenance of service to existing users is a prime
consideration in designing and implementing the new system. It is likely that major refurbishment will also
require the upgrading or reconstruction of the SCADA system (World Road Association (PIARC) 2008b).
World Road Association (PIARC) (2008b) states:

Any reconstruction of the SCADA system, or parts of that system, must be planned to
maintain safety in the tunnel and to ensure proper control of all elements at every
moment. Each stage of the refurbishment must be analysed in detail. A risk analysis must
be done regarding the migration process and the transitional periods.
Reconstruction could, for example, include:

• removal of the parts of the SCADA system for controlling and monitoring the
equipment that is taken out of the tunnel during the refurbishment, and modify
response for these parts
• reconfiguring the system for new equipment and modify the response for this
equipment
• introducing automatic response by SCADA system in case of an incident, accident or
system defect:
 warning of the control centre operative
 closure of a lane, tunnel tube or the entire tunnel
 switching equipment into emergency mode (lighting, ventilation, escape ways
etc.)
• integration in wider traffic system
• integration in a traffic information exchange network for informing the public on
congestion and incidents.
The SCADA controls are intrinsically linked with inputs and outputs of other key systems such as the fire
alarm warning systems, the tunnel message system, operator human-machine interface and other devices or
subsystem networks. Due to this complexity, a systems integration approach and plan is required with
respect to upgrading and changing the SCADA or operating systems. SCADA and data systems need to
allow for the easy extraction of real-time performance data, history and trending, to better inform
maintenance and asset renewal strategies.
When a command is entered, the SCADA system should not only confirm the operator’s command, but also
display the status of the system (e.g. processing command/switching on/starting up/functioning correctly).
Consideration should be given to using a dual control system, i.e. using the old and new SCADA system in
parallel, during the transition period. Work around arrangements will be required to allow for any problems
that may arise during the implementation and testing phases.

Operation and maintenance personnel must be kept informed of the new requirements, the progress of
implementation and any reduction in performance of the system during the changeover period. They must
fully understand the situation and the actions necessary to overcome any problems that may arise. This will
lead to the need to:
• provide a comprehensive training program for operation and maintenance personnel in the use of the new
equipment
• revise the documentation of procedures for operation, maintenance, emergency situations, operator
activities etc. to reflect the changes.
Operating the SCADA system in simulation mode can assist in the training and education function. This may
also be useful for checking and improving procedures (World Road Association (PIARC) 2008b).
It is desirable that the full operational safety of the tunnel is maintained while any implementation of a new
system is taking place. This may require the new system to be run in parallel with the old system while the
changeover takes place, which will allow the tunnel operations to continue uninterrupted and provide a
means of implementation that ensures that the new system meets all requirements.
However, the operational safety level of the tunnel may need to be reduced for limited periods during the
refurbishment because of logistical restrictions in maintaining service capability. This would require a safety
assessment to be made and appropriate mitigation measures to be put in place.
It may be possible to undertake critical changeover activities while the tunnel is closed for short periods (refer
to Section 2.5).
8.2 High Voltage/Low Voltage Power Supply and Distribution Systems
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) sets out the requirements for power supply to a tunnel. Retrofitting an existing
tunnel may be required to:
• bring an existing tunnel up to the standard required by GRT Part 2
• increase the capacity of the power supply to meet the needs of a major refurbishment.
In any case, the design of the new system should be in accordance with the principles of GRT Part 2.
Appropriate consultation with the relevant power supply agency will also be required. Any proposal to adopt
lower standards than required by GRT Part 2 will need to be subject to a rigorous risk assessment, with
appropriate mitigation measures applied if adopted.
Implementation of any new supply system (both high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV)) must ensure the
ongoing safety of the tunnel operation and tunnel workers during the process. Tunnel closures will only be
permitted in low traffic conditions (refer to Section 2.5).
8.3 Other Electrical/Electronic Systems
Electrical and electronic systems include:

• public address (PA) and electrical wiring and interconnect systems
• radio and mobile phones
• radio rebroadcast (RRB)
• closed circuit television
• automatic vehicle detection systems
• overhead height detection systems

• telephones
• speed cameras.
During the construction period, it may be acceptable, for a designated period of time, to reduce the levels of
safety, e.g. having the RRB out of operation but still having the PA system fully operational or vice versa.
Each of these systems has an important role to play in the operation of the tunnel, particularly during
incidents and emergencies. It is therefore necessary to undertake retrofitting or refurbishment of the systems
without stopping the service they provide. This may mean that the new system must be installed in parallel
with the old system, the changeover to the new occurring over a short period when the tunnel can be closed
(weekends and night-time).
Installation of the physical infrastructure for these systems may need to be done under traffic and rely on
partial closures or full closure of the tunnel during limited time periods.
Testing and commissioning before completion will be necessary, with work-around plans available for those
cases where the new installation fails to meet expectations and requires further work (refer also to GRT
Part 3 (Austroads 2018b)).
8.4 Network and Systems Architecture
The network and systems architecture for the tunnel, and its interrelations with other networks and systems,
is a critical infrastructure asset for operations, resilience and reliability. Road agencies need to determine
strategies and requirements for the network and systems architecture; determine how they are to be
established; and provide flexibility to allow them to be adapted to future needs. This may also include virtual
and cloud-based network and infrastructure.
The network and systems architecture needs to take into account control centre locations, redundancy and
recovery. All refurbishment works need to align with the strategy and be accounted for in systems integration
plans.

9 Other Refurbishment and Repairs
9.1 Tunnel Structure
9.1.1 General
Refurbishment of the structural elements of a tunnel may be required because of:

• cracking of the concrete structure (durability issues with conventional reinforcing)
• deterioration of the structural lining of the tunnel caused by
– ingress of water causing corrosion and deterioration of the liner
– earth movement causing cracking of concrete in the liners (durability issues with conventional
reinforcement)
• failure or excessive deterioration of supported ceilings and/or hangers for elements such as ventilation
fans and lighting
• spalling of rock faces or falling rock fragments in unlined tunnels.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) (2010) provides detailed
guidance on a range of repair and refurbishment issues with discussion of methods and materials.
Clearly, structural repairs, upgrades and retrofits will have significant consequences for traffic management,
which may form a major part of the considerations for design as well as implementation. Careful staging of
the implementation will need to be considered, with work occurring only in off-peak periods, allowing full
traffic use of the tunnel in busy periods. This may mean that daytime construction during weekdays is not
possible in some cases. Detailed study of the traffic patterns and traffic volumes will be required to determine
the appropriate approach.
If should also be noted that works undertaken at the tunnel portals may differ from other aspects of the
tunnel structure thus requiring a different approach to be taken as part refurbishment work.
9.1.2 Concrete Structural Elements
Failed sections of the concrete structure will have to be removed and replaced, or it may be possible to
remove and repair damaged sections. AASHTO (2010) addresses the structural bonding of cracked concrete
and provides details of methods for demolition, surface preparation and placement of concrete to complete
repairs.
Depending on the scale of the repair required, two methods have been traditionally used:
• hand applied mortars for smaller repairs
• shotcrete for larger repairs.
The essential requirement is that the repairs be rapid and effective to allow the work to be done in the short
time available during allowable closure of the tunnel. AASHTO (2010) notes ‘the repair process must be
rapid, not infringe on the operating envelope of the daily traffic and be a durable long-term monolithic repair’.
[see Commentary 1]

9.1.3 Water Ingress
Water leaks in the structure need to be repaired to prevent both further structural deterioration and hazards
to traffic operation. The extent of the water leak should be assessed before deciding on the repairs required
and the most appropriate method of repair to adopt. Water ingress may be repaired either external to the
tunnel structure or internally.
External repairs involve some form of formation grouting outside the tunnel. These repairs require a detailed
geotechnical assessment and design by experienced specialists in this discipline. Practitioners should seek
such professional advice before proceeding with this type of work.
Internal repairs will require grouting of cracks or injection of grout behind the lining depending on the extent
and type of leakage. AASHTO (2010) notes ‘The selection of the grout is dependent on the width, moisture
content, and potential for movement within the crack or joint. For joints that move, only chemical grout is
appropriate. The movement of the joint or crack will fracture any particle grout and will cause the leak to
reappear’. AASHTO (2010) also provides guidance on the details of possible grouts to use for the repairs. In
some cases, it may be possible to capture the leaking water (channels, drip sheds) and transfer it to the
tunnel drainage system.
In older tunnels it can be difficult sealing-off cracks where services have been attached to the lining.
Depending on the methodology of the original construction, repairing all cracks may not prevent all water
ingress. A plumbed weephole and drainage system may have to be installed to control the water discharge
into the tunnel. This needs to be appropriately detailed such that any calcite/iron build-up can be easily
removed on a suitable maintenance.
9.1.4 Supported Ceilings and Hangers
Where the components supporting any ceiling panels, ventilation or other equipment have lost their strength
and are a danger to tunnel users and maintenance personnel, they must be removed and replaced.
[see Commentary 2]
9.1.5 Unlined Rock Tunnels
Unlined rock tunnels are constructed in competent rock, which may or may not require some form of
reinforcement such as rock bolts or similar inserted at various angles to accommodate discontinuities in the
rock mass. Where these have deteriorated (corrosive environment and exposure) and lost strength, they
require replacement and installation of new rock anchors. Repair of this type of failure requires a detailed
investigation by geotechnical engineers and appropriate design to address the deficiencies.
These cases will require closure of the tunnel to undertake the repairs. This is likely to be possible only for
short periods and the design and implementation will have to be undertaken to accommodate this restraint.
The other common issue with unlined tunnels is the matter of spalling rock and loose rock fragments falling
onto the roadway. This may be overcome by regular removal of loose fragments and appropriate repair by
grouting, sealing with shotcrete, adding rock bolts or installing wire mesh to hold the rock in place. In some
cases, it may be necessary to install a liner to prevent any loose rock from falling. Shotcrete on areas of
concern may also be a solution to the problem (AASHTO 2010). An example of these types of repairs are
shown in Figure 9.1.

Figure 9.1: Shotcrete repair and arch roof lining
Source: AASHTO (2010).
9.2 Cladding
Replacement of the cladding installed in the original tunnel may become necessary or it may be necessary to
install new cladding where none existed before. In Australia, this would probably be a rare event and could
not be achieved where the lining is an integral part of the structure.
Architectural panels are a common feature of tunnels in Australia and New Zealand. These are separate
from the lining and may need to be replaced from time to time because of damage or deterioration of the
light-reflecting qualities of the surface of the panels.
Where there is a weephole behind the cladding, it should be designed and installed so that it requires
infrequent maintenance. The panel system should also be detailed so they can be easily removed to gain
access to any services located behind the panels.
An example of cladding is shown in Figure 9.2.

Figure 9.2: Example of cladding (Valtournenche, Italy)
Source: Reproduced with permission of Centro Inox – the Italian Stainless Steel Association (www.centroinox.it).
9.3 Other Structural Features
Other structural elements associated with a tunnel include any ancillary buildings and major sign structures.
Refurbishment or retrofitting of these elements are issues of building construction and outside the scope of
this document.
9.4 Pavements
Pavements are designed for a finite life and may need major refurbishment or replacement at the end of that
life or sooner if major failures occur. In addition, the asphalt surfacing often used may require replacing more
often than the underlying pavement structure. This work should be possible under traffic by closing one lane
at a time and reducing traffic speeds during the closure. Closures should only occur during periods of low
traffic flow. Pavement design specialists should be consulted to establish appropriate design and
construction methods. Refer to Section 5 Pavement Design in the Guide to Road Tunnels Part 2
(Austroads 2019).

10 Drainage
GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) sets out the design requirements for the tunnel drainage system. Any
retrofitting of drainage components to an existing tunnel must be in accordance with these requirements.
Retrofitting or refurbishment may be required:
• where the existing tunnel fails to meet the requirements of GRT Part 2
• where expansion of the tunnel requires adjustment of the drainage facilities
• when the drainage components have failed or deteriorated to such an extent that replacement is required.
Drainage components should have been designed and installed to be clear of the normal tunnel operations
(refer to GRT Part 2). In these cases, replacement may be feasible with little or no interruption to tunnel
operations. It will be necessary to ensure that during implementation, any event requiring the drainage
system to function is adequately handled. This may mean the use of temporary facilities such as sumps and
pumps.
Replacement of failed or deteriorated facilities will require careful planning to ensure that the tunnel is kept
safe during any event requiring those facilities. Timing of the implementation to avoid known periods of high
frequency events will be required. Manageable activities such as tunnel washing and live emergency
simulations must be curtailed during the implementation.
Many existing tunnel drainage systems may be undersized as they have been designed for ground and
stormwater ingress only. In some tunnels, the longitudinal drains may be embedded in a concrete base
which is an integral part of the tunnel structure. This means that it may not be feasible to replace the pipes
due to the time/operational constraints to open up and close any trench in order to have the tunnel reopened.
Any departures should be recorded in the Safety File.
Any implementation activity requiring tunnel closure should only occur during low traffic periods (refer to
Section 2.5).
Energy efficient solutions to drainage issues are discussed in Section 11.4.

11 Energy Efficiency
11.1 Introduction
For long-term sustainability and minimisation of cost of operation, it is necessary to ensure that the solutions
adopted for refurbishment of a tunnel are as energy efficient as possible. Peeling et al. (2016) states:
The construction of a road tunnel is energy intensive due to the volume of excavation
required and the energy embodied in the materials that form the structure of the tunnel. In
operating a tunnel, energy is consumed to provide adequate lighting, signing and
ventilation for drivers, to maintain drainage systems and to deal with emergency
situations.
The long life of tunnels (often more than 100 years) means that the use of energy during operation will
probably outweigh that due to construction (Peeling et al. 2016).
Issues to consider include ventilation, lighting, pavement surfaces, drainage, and temperature regulation.
Peeling et al. (2016) describes a research study into potential technologies to address these issues.
Development of technologies emanating from these considerations may form the basis for retrofitting
projects.
Smart electricity meters can provide separate power usage for ventilation and lighting or any other function
considered necessary, allowing real-time monitoring which is invaluable in energy minimisation.
Renewable energy sources have the potential to reduce the energy demand where they can be incorporated
into the tunnel project. As an example, the energy demand profile of tunnel lighting (which often is the most
demand on power in a tunnel), due to the requirements for light/dark transition, gives a near-perfect
alignment with the output capability profile from solar energy. As technology advances in this area, the cost
benefits and reliability of solar energy will become increasingly more viable.
11.2 Ventilation
Ventilation is one of the most intensive energy consuming elements in tunnel operation. Reducing energy
use in this area can result in significant savings in operating costs and reductions in environmental impacts
(through reduced consumption of power and potentially reduced emissions). Reducing the energy
consumption of the ventilation system can be achieved in the following ways:
• improving the efficiency of the ventilation equipment, e.g. jet fans, refer to Tarada (2015)
• changing the ventilation system, e.g. allowing some portal emissions to reduce the load on the ventilation
system
• improving the monitoring and control system to optimise the use of the ventilation equipment (e.g. control
algorithm to limit the ventilation to those times when it is necessary, refer to Peeling et al. 2016)
• ensuring that the ventilation system controls the air quality to the levels required, rather than a continuous
system that may achieve higher quality levels at low traffic levels (refer to Cervar & Jakobovic 2012).
For long tunnels with vertical ventilation outlets and zero portal emissions requirements, tunnel ventilation will
claim over 70% of energy consumption. A key area of energy efficiency applied both on EastLink and
CityLink in Victoria involves relaxation of the zero portal emissions restriction during off-peak periods. An
outline description of the strategy is provided in Conway (2017).

11.3 Lighting
Lighting is also a large consumer of energy in tunnels, with up to 50% of the energy consumed (Vercammen
& Audenaert 2016), especially since it is required 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Several avenues for
reducing energy consumption are available:
• improved lighting equipment (bulbs, luminaires, driver)
• reduced demand in high demand areas (entrance and exit) through better design
• better control mechanisms to ensure that lighting reflects the requirements at the time (e.g. lower levels in
the entrance and exit zones when ambient light levels are reduced by cloud cover or the like)
• improved reflection properties of pavement and tunnel wall materials.
11.3.1 Lighting Equipment
Significant energy savings have been obtained by using LED lighting systems for the tunnel lighting. The
cost of LED equipment is greater than that of other systems, but the operating costs and life-expectancy of
the LED is greater than the other types of lighting systems. Vercammen and Audenaert (2016) and Peeling
et al. (2016) provide some information on the implementation of LED systems and the improvements
achieved. Salata et al. (2015) provides information on four case studies of different lighting systems and
surface characteristics and shows significant economic benefits with using LED lighting in conjunction with
conventional lighting.
11.3.2 Portal Treatments
Lighting levels required in the entrance and exit zones of tunnels are determined by the ambient lighting level
outside the tunnel; therefore, there are gains to be made by reducing this ambient level. The objective is to
provide the necessary lighting level threshold from natural light as opposed to artificial means. Reducing the
percentage of sky and bright objects in a 20 degree field of view, viewed from the design-vehicle stopping
distance to the tunnel entrance is required. Using sun-tight screens (transparent structures), darkening
structures and landscaping (i.e. tree planting over the portal) have been effective in achieving these
objectives. For more information refer to Peeling et al. (2016) and Vercammen and Audenaert (2016).
11.3.3 Control Equipment
LED lighting systems with adaptive controls can be used to match the required lighting level determined by
the ambient lighting conditions. A closed loop feedback system can be used to calibrate what the portal
photometer ‘sees’ and is being delivered by the installed lighting. This would ensure that the correct level of
lighting within the tunnel is being delivered according to set parameters and would allow for instant
adjustment against outside ambient lighting conditions (Peeling et al. 2016).
11.3.4 Reflective Properties of Pavement and Walls
Since the lighting required depends on the reflective properties of the road surface and the tunnel walls,
optimising these properties will increase the lighting efficiency and result in a reduction of the power required.
The materials used for the walls and pavement surface will determine the reflective properties and white
walls are the optimum colour, but the greatest effect is from the pavement surface.
The nature of the road surface, its physical state, and the direction in which the road surface is irradiated and
viewed by the driver, determine the reflection characteristics of the road, the nature of the surface being the
most important (Vercammen & Audenaert 2016). Concrete pavements provide a light colour and have good
reflection characteristics. Normal asphalt is dark with much poorer characteristics. A type of asphalt with a
relatively high-reflection coefficient is becoming available and may provide a superior surface for this
purpose. A binder made of hydrocarbon resin with low asphaltene content is being used. It is characterised
by a yellow light colour (Salata et al. 2015).

These factors should be considered when designing replacement systems for existing tunnels.
11.4 Drainage
Greater efficiency in the drainage system may be achieved through better controls of the pumps and
pumping system. Peeling et al. (2016) identified the following as being available and with potential to achieve
improvements in energy efficiency:
• Surface treatments and coatings to pumps – applying polymer and epoxy-based treatments reduces
friction and reduces corrosion, helping to reduce internal turbulence and improve hydraulic efficiency.
• Soft start technology for pumps – used to allow gradual motor speed acceleration. Energy efficiency is
improved by limiting in-rush currents. Soft starters can reduce the long-term damage to the mechanical
system and reduce problems with the electrical system, thus extending the system life.
• Start-stop technology for starter motors and pumps – allows these to automatically switch off when not in
use, with consequent savings in fuel use and reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.
11.5 Temperature Regulation
Two aspects need to be considered when designing the most energy efficient ventilation system:
• temperature gradients in the tunnel during normal operation (summer and winter), refer also to
Steinemann, Zumsteg and Wildi (2004)
• temperatures developed during a fire situation, refer also to Brahim et al. (2011).
Both scenarios influence the ventilation design, which must be considered if the optimum solution is to be
found.
11.6 Environmental Considerations
For the environmental considerations, guidance provided in GRT Part 1 (Austroads 2018a), Part 2
(Austroads 2019) and Part 3 (Austroads 2018b) is relevant for the retrofit and refurbishment of tunnels and
should be followed.

References
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Case Study 1: M2 Norfolk Twin Tunnels
This case study is based on ‘Design and construction for the widening of the M2 Norfolk twin tunnels’ in New
South Wales (Clarke et al. 2014). For detailed results of measurements and some details of construction
methods reference should be made to Clarke et al. (2014).
The Project
The Hills M2 Motorway is a key route in Sydney’s road network connecting directly with the Lane Cove
Tunnel in North Ryde and the Westlink M7 Motorway at Seven Hills. The M2 Upgrade Project (upgrade),
which was completed between 2010 and 2013, involved widening 15 km of the existing motorway between
Windsor Road and Lane Cove Road. This included widening the twin 460 m long Norfolk Tunnels, which are
located beneath the suburb of North Epping.
The tunnels carry 35 000 vehicles per day per carriageway (2013 data).
Each of the tunnels was widened from a span of 11.7 m to 15.4 m, which allowed three traffic lanes in each
direction and a breakdown lane. The widening work was undertaken while maintaining operation of the
motorway.
The works for these tunnels were fundamentally different from other ‘greenfield’ tunnel projects, in that:
• the design investigation was able to review existing ground conditions and construction records for input
into the design
• the widening works were required to integrate with residential dwellings, roads and a cricket oval
• operation of the tunnel was maintained throughout construction, with motorway traffic permitted close to
the excavation faces on a daily basis.
Original Tunnels
The original twin 460 m long Norfolk Tunnels were opened in May 1997 with spans of 11.7 m separated by a
6.5 m wide rock pillar. Originally each tunnel comprised two traffic lanes and a breakdown lane, with a
posted speed limit of 100 km/h. In April 2007 the breakdown lane in the westbound carriageway was
converted into a third traffic lane and the speed limit reduced to 70 km/h. The cross-section of the original
tunnel and the widened tunnel is shown in Figure A 1.
The tunnels are wholly within the Hawkesbury sandstone and were supported with 3 m long, 24 mm
diameter steel bolts fitted with mechanical anchors installed at 1.5 m and 2.0 m centres with 100 mm and
50 mm thick steel fibre reinforced shotcrete (SFRS), respectively.

Figure A 1: Cross-section of the original tunnel together with the cross-section of the widened tunnel
Source: Clarke et al. (2014). Paper presented at the 15th Australasian Tunnelling Conference Sydney 2014. Reprinted
Widened Tunnels
Each of the tunnels was widened by 3.7 m to achieve a total span of 15.4 m (Figure A 1). The
cross-sectional area of rock excavated in each tunnel was 27 m2 (excluding electrical niches and the service
trench). The crown of the widened section ranged in height from 4.6 m at the wall and merged with the
original tunnel crown at a height of 6.7 m above pavement level. The width of the widened crown was 6.7 m.
Four new electrical niches were constructed within each tunnel, with each being about 10 m long and located
in the central pillar. The niches were located ‘back-to-back’, such that the width of the rock pillar between
them was reduced to as little as 2.7 m (Figure A 2).
Relocation and upgrading of tunnel services involved excavation of new trenches along each side of the
central pillar. Each trench was 1.3 m wide and about 1.0 m deep.
The original portals were extended and fitted with new precast concrete panels for aesthetic purposes.

Figure A 2: Cross-section through the rock pillar at the location of the electrical niches
Design of the Support
A.4.1 Geotechnical Assessment

The original tunnel construction records were fully utilised to minimise the degree of potentially disruptive
additional geotechnical investigation required. The major stratigraphic units comprise:
• residual soil, topsoil, and fill (up to 3.8 m thickness of fill), overlying
• Hawkesbury sandstone, highly to extremely weathered (maximum depth of 4 m below ground surface),
overlying
• Hawkesbury sandstone, fresh to moderately weathered, typically high strength, Class II with some
Class III.
Six rock mass models were developed to represent the geotechnical conditions in the tunnel; two of them
reflecting conditions at the portals. Detailed geotechnical analysis is discussed in Clarke et al. (2014).
A.4.2 Widening Design
The analysis of the structural design of the tunnel support was carried out utilising several different
techniques including precedent, analytical closed-form solutions and finite element modelling. Further
discussion is included in Clarke et al. (2014).

The six rock mass models were investigated, including sensitivity analyses regarding in situ rock stresses
and original support details. Two support types were developed, with each comprising 5 m long double
corrosion protection (DCP) bolts and a minimum of 100 mm SFRS applied over the widened section of the
crown. The main difference between the support types was the face advance distance and bolt spacing,
which ranged from 2.0 m (Type 1 support) to 1.5 m (Type 2).
A.4.3 Portals
The original portal structures were about 5.0 m in length, with cast-in-situ concrete walls and precast
concrete arch panels in the crown. The tunnel widening work involved the demolition of about a third of the
original portal structure.
Due to the relatively short work periods available, this demolition work was completed over a period of a few
days with traffic flow beneath the partially demolished portal in between possessions. To manage the risks
associated with this progressive demolition, additional temporary bolts were installed to support the partially
demolished precast panels.
The original portal geometry was simulated with thick shotcrete in the sidewall and crown. Permanent
support was provided by radially installed rock bolts in the crown and bolts parallel to the tunnel located in
the rock face above the portal (brow bolts).
New precast concrete architectural panels were placed over the ends of each portal.
A.4.4 Bolt Durability Details
Under the project deed all permanent works were required to have a 100-year design life.
DCP bolts were used for the permanent rock bolts. These employed a high density polythene (HDPE) sheath
covering the steel shaft. Stainless steel was used in the construction of the anchor plate and spherical head.
A plastic sleeve and insulating washers were used to provide a physical separation between the stainless
steel and high tensile steel components.
Rock bolt head details varied between those installed within the original portions of the tunnel and those
installed in the widened crown (Figure A 3). The poor access to the crown due to the existing mechanical
and electrical infrastructure necessitated developing a special rock bolt head detail for corrosion protection.
Bolts installed through the original shotcrete crown, the precast concrete panels at the portals and in the rock
face above the portals incorporated a grout-filled stainless steel cap to protect the nut and end of the bolt
shaft.
In the widened crown, shotcrete cover was used to provide corrosion protection to the nut and end of the bolt
shaft. These bolts incorporated two ‘handles’ welded to the anchor plate to provide a mechanical connection
to the shotcrete.

Figure A 3: Bolt head details
Widening Construction
Clarke et al. (2014) discusses options considered for the project:

• Option 1: The excavation sequence would involve full-face excavation, commencing
at one end of each tunnel and progressing in a linear fashion towards the other end.
This was to take place while the remainder of the tunnel was open to traffic. This
option was not pursued because of risk to traffic and the restrained work space.
• Option 2: The excavation sequence involved excavation of the outer walls in
‘hit-and-miss’ panels. This would require a full possession of the tunnel to undertake
the works; it was envisaged that this would occur on weekends. This option involved
difficulties in managing ventilation and dust control and was not pursued.
• Option 3: (The adopted method) The construction method involved excavation by two
road headers and two excavators (refer to Clarke et al. (2014) for details). The
excavation of the eastbound tunnel was done first, followed by the westbound tunnel.
Refinements in the construction process were achieved with the experience of the
first tunnel. New bolts installed in the original tunnel crown were drilled manually
using pneumatic drills on a scissor lift platform. A tamrock jumbo (rock drill) was used
to install bolts in the widened section of the crown.
Shotcrete was applied using two robotic rigs and two specialist sweepers (S1200 Beam
sweepers) were used to clean the road surface for public use every day after a night of
tunnelling. These sweepers greatly reduced clean-up times.

A.5.1 Stabilisation of Original Shotcrete
The condition of the original shotcrete within the tunnel was considered to present a potential fall hazard
during construction activities. A thin spray-on membrane (tekfex), was used as a means of mitigating this
risk. Other materials considered were plastic geo-grid and steel mesh. The membrane was a
dual-component material comprising a water-based polymer emulsion mixed with a cementitious based
powder, with short nylon fibres also in the mix. The membrane was sprayed on to achieve a layer thickness
of at least 4 mm.
The additional support provided to the original shotcrete by the membrane was further augmented by the
permanent rock bolts, which were installed against the original shotcrete surface (Figure A 3A).
A.5.2 Tunnel Services
Hills Motorway became aware that the tunnel services had degraded much quicker than originally designed
and decided to replace the majority of the services as part of the upgrade. Where groundwater inflows were
continuously in contact with services, they were often highly corroded. The existing unlined service niches
were particularly wet, and as a result the original electrical panels were in poor condition. Isolation points in
some cases had fully perished.
The first phase of the tunnel operations was to make these services safe for the tunnel construction workers
and to ensure that they could be reliably isolated and successfully reactivated after each isolation during the
works.
A key feature of the upgrade was to ensure that the existing services were managed and modified in a
manner which ensured that the requirements for tunnel operation, fire and life support could be met during
the works, i.e. following each isolation. These requirements were identified through a diminished assets plan.
The tunnel services, in the location where construction was occurring each night, had to be completely
isolated and switched off for the construction activities to safely occur. At the end of each shift up to two
hours of regression testing was required to ensure the services were functioning at an acceptable level to
allow public traffic back into the tunnel during the day.
The new tunnel services were installed while the existing services were operating.
The two most significant features were the management of the existing jet fans and the introduction of a new
high-voltage substation to service the tunnel.
The jet fans posed a particular problem in that they were in a dilapidated condition and caused many
problems during regression testing. Ultimately agreement was reached to operate the tunnel with a reduced
number of jet fans in operation. This allowed removal and refurbishment, as well as in some cases,
relocation of the jet fans. The original design had called for the jet fans to be relocated to suit the geometry of
the new tunnel, but unevenness in the existing crown created difficulties and ultimately most of the jet fans
remained in their original location. The jet fans were also refurbished as part of the upgrade project.
The high-voltage substation provided a standalone power source for the tunnel, which operated from the
existing power network. As the power could not be interrupted for any longer than a short period without the
tunnel being completely closed for use, this required the introduction of a temporary power supply provided
by a containerised substation. A long and complicated sequence of work was required to switch-over from
the original permanent supply to temporary supply, to temporary permanent supply and ultimately to the final
permanent supply.
A.5.3 Sequencing of Works
The tunnel excavation sequence proceeded first with the eastbound tunnel followed by the westbound
tunnel. During this time tunnel traffic was managed with a contraflow arrangement (i.e. two lanes in each
direction), allowing all traffic to be diverted through one tunnel, enabling work to be performed in the other.

Work within the eastbound tunnel was severely constrained by the need to maintain traffic flows, such that
work could not commence before 8.00 pm each night (Monday to Thursday inclusive). The tunnel had to be
evacuated by 4.00 am daily to allow regression testing to occur. When considering the time required for
set-up and demobilisation, the actual time to undertake excavation was limited to 10.00 pm to 3.00 am,
which was only enough to undertake a single cut, bolt and shotcrete sequence per night. Work periods on
Friday nights were longer, up until 9.00 am on Saturday morning. Saturday night provided the longest
continuous tunnel possession, with 8.00 pm access, extending through to 5.00 am Monday. Further details of
the construction are described in Clarke et al. (2014).
Dust control was managed using a 30 m³/min dry air scrubber with a bulkhead placed some distance in front
of each excavation face. A vinyl curtain suspended from a wire running along the existing tunnel crown
allowed the scrubber to extract airborne dust from the excavation face. An optimum distance of up to 50 m in
advance of excavation provided the dust control required. Dust control was difficult due to the large volume
created by the widened tunnel. Even with the jet fans to direct the air to flow appropriately, it was necessary
to cease work on several occasions and alter the dust control plan. This was a problem when the morning
breeze developed, or the temperatures dropped very low. The acoustic panels at the portals also had to
remain closed to control airflow and noise.
With the completion of the widening of the eastbound tunnel, construction of the westbound tunnel was
subject to fewer traffic flow constraints and it was possible to provide a contraflow in the eastbound tunnel
from 7.00 pm to 3.00 pm, Monday to Thursday. From 3.00 pm to 7.00 pm a single traffic lane was required to
operate through the westbound tunnel due to the afternoon traffic volumes. On weekends this traffic
arrangement allowed work from 8.00 pm on Friday night through to 3.00 pm on Monday.
Excavation in the westbound tunnel was undertaken differently, refer to Clarke et al. (2014) for more details,
and lessons learnt during the excavation of the eastbound tunnel were applied. An example of the bolt
installation in the westbound tunnel is shown in Figure A 4.
Figure A 4: Example of the bolt installation in the westbound tunnel
Note the extent of services and new bolt ‘cans’ in the crown of the original tunnel.

A.5.4 Construction Noise
Construction noise was managed using acoustic curtains placed across the portals. Noise modelling had
suggested that the curtains would have to remain closed for the duration of the excavation., but monitoring
results demonstrated that the curtains were only required where excavation was undertaken within 50 m of
the portals. Ground-borne noise affected two properties but only for very short sections of the tunnel.
A complaint was received during the excavation of the new service trench and monitoring was undertaken
which indicated that the noise and vibration levels were well within the specified limits.
A.5.5 Construction Monitoring
Permit to tunnel
A permit to tunnel (PTT) system was developed to ensure tunnel stability was rigorously and consistently
reviewed prior to allowing traffic back into the tunnel following excavation work. This system required a high
degree of reliability to ensure safety of the public. It involved documented inputs and sign-off from both the
designer’s and contractor’s representatives and was undertaken daily between shift changes. This process
was also employed for the excavation and support of the electrical niches.
Geological mapping
Mapping of the excavated face and sidewalls was undertaken in a regular and systematic manner after
cutting and before shotcreting and formed a key input to the PTT process. The mapping typically confirmed
the expected ground conditions.
Mapping data was compiled into an overall geological model for each of the tunnels and proved useful in
identifying some of the mechanisms associated with the deformation monitoring trends.
Instrumentation
A comprehensive suite of instrumentation was maintained to provide reliable and robust monitoring data to
support the PTT process. The monitoring was routinely compared with design predictions to check the
adequacy of the support measures being installed and confirm the validity of the design. Displacement
monitoring included survey prisms spaced at 10 m centres along the tunnel with simple wire extensometers
and tape convergence sections spaced at 30 m centres. Five multipoint rod extensometers were installed
within each tunnel with readings recorded by a data logger.
The tape convergence section included both diagonal and vertical components (Figure A 5). For the vertical
readings, an eye bolt was recessed in the road surface. The vertical readings were particularly useful, as
they were very reliable, with repeatability of less than 0.5 mm. This was somewhat better than the survey
prisms, which often displayed variations in the order of ±3 mm. Reading of the diagonal component was
often hindered by tunnel services in the crown and along the walls, resulting in poorer repeatability and
accuracy than for the vertical readings. The reliability of the tape extensometers was achieved by training
operators in the use of the equipment and establishment of a stable baseline for checking and training
purposes.
Temperature corrections were also applied, as these could result in up to 2 mm difference in measurements.

Figure A 5: Section showing excavation configuration and monitoring instruments
Crack gauges were installed at the portal during their partial demolition. This instrumentation routinely
achieves repeatability of 0.05 mm.
In one location, the crown sag, indicated by the tape extensometer, was greater than the rod extensometer
and survey data recorded at the same location. Due to the confidence gained in the monitoring data, it was
conceived that this inconsistency may be due to upwards movement of the invert, as this only affected the
tape extensometer. Digital survey levelling of the floor eye bolt was initiated, and showed excellent
agreement with the ongoing tape extensometer monitoring, indicating an overall invert heave of at least
10 mm. A hole was also drilled in the invert and investigations with an endoscope camera and footing ‘spoon’
confirmed the presence of open defects at depths of 0.7 m to 2.0 m, which were consistent with the location
of bedding plane shears that were subsequently mapped in the adjacent bench excavation. The monitoring
confirmed that the exceedance did not relate to potential problems or inadequacies with the crown support
design or construction.
Measured crown sag was typically less than 2 mm. A comparison of measured crown sag and design
predictions indicated reasonable agreement, with the design values generally over-predicting displacements.
Surface settlement was monitored using digital levelling techniques. The results highlighted ground
movement due to normal shrink-swell behaviour only, with no measurable settlement associated with the
widening of the tunnel.
A.5.6 Quality Control
Shotcrete strength
Testing comprised mainly compressive strength cylinders obtained from both moulded samples and samples
cored from test panels. The results typically conformed to the requirements of the specification.

Round determinate panel testing was also undertaken. These results showed a large degree of scatter and
an unacceptably high proportion did not achieve the limits in the specification. In some instances, this
necessitated reassessment of the specific ground conditions encountered, support requirements and
consideration of the as-built shotcrete thickness, to confirm the adequacy of the as-built support.
Limited EFNARC 1 beam testing was undertaken to provide an alternative measure of flexural strength with
variable results obtained.
Non-destructive strength testing (a stud-driving method) was undertaken in one of the completed electrical
niches to check low-strength results indicated from moulded samples. Over 20 tests were undertaken, both
in shotcrete within the niche, and also shotcrete at one of the portals for comparison purposes. The tests
results at both locations were similar, and the correlations suggested that the average strength was in the
order of 45 Mpa, which was deemed acceptable.
Shotcrete thickness
The design required that the thickness of the shotcrete in the crown of the widened portion of the tunnels
was no less than 100 mm. Depth gauges were stuck to the exposed rock surface using a long pole from
beneath supported ground to provide a visual guide to the shotcrete nozzleman.
The excavated rock surface was surveyed prior to the spraying of shotcrete. The completed shotcrete
surface was also surveyed. The survey was undertaken in sections spaced at 1.0 m intervals along each
tunnel, with typically 40 survey points measured at each section. This allowed the as-built thickness of the
shotcrete to be calculated with a high degree of confidence and identify any areas which may have required
application of additional shotcrete. For the westbound tunnel, the thickness at 7820 locations were calculated
from the survey, and indicated an average thickness of 187 mm, and that 98.3% of the shotcrete was thicker
than 100 mm.
Rock bolts
Survey was used to mark out bolt locations and make certain that the bolt spacing was within the allowable
tolerances. The original crown contained various services, including cable trays, lights and jet fans, and
necessitated the use of additional bolts and adjustments in the bolt pattern to achieve the spacing
requirements.
Pull-testing was undertaken of both preproduction short bolts, as well as production bolts. Bolts installed
within the original tunnel crown were grouted by manual coupling of a grout hose to the DCP bolt heads,
while those within the widened section were grouted remotely using the jumbo and a compression gasket.
The remotely grouted bolts needed to be tested; however, because the bolt heads were covered by
shotcrete to provide supported ground, it was difficult to pull-test them. To permit the adequacy of the
remotely grouted bolts to be checked, the same technique was used to place bolts in the existing crown,
which allowed pull testing to be undertaken.
The initial specification required the bolts to be prestressed to 50 kN prior to grouting. Following excessive
crown sag at one location in the eastbound tunnel, this was increased to 75 kN.
Space control
The size of the tunnel widening was dictated by the requirements of the scope of works and technical criteria
which included requirements for clearance envelopes within the tunnel.
1 EFNARC is the European Federation of National Associations Representing producers and applicators of specialist building products
for Concrete. EFNARC produce technical specifications, guidelines, checklists and training in the specialised construction and
concrete systems industry.

At the start of the upgrade, the design provided 5.3 m clearance to tunnel services (e.g. fans, lights,
sprinklers, cable trays) and a smaller vehicle clearance height. Midway through the project the 5.3 m
clearance was noted as being required across the full width of the pavement. For the westbound tunnel the
geometry was adjusted to achieve this.
The as-built eastbound tunnel achieved the 5.3 m clearance everywhere except at the portals (above the
breakdown lane, next to the tunnel wall) and at a few locations between the portals. These locations were
trimmed to provide additional clearance and included trimming and cutting of a triangular notch from the
precast concrete architectural panels at each portal. These were partially filled with a friable material
resulting in an irregular portal profile which is still evident in the completed eastbound tunnel.
A.5.7 Conclusions
The approaches and methodologies developed for the widening of the Norfolk Tunnels were effective in
maintaining the safe operation of the tunnels throughout the two years of construction and provide a
framework for increasing the capacity of other tunnel infrastructure in the future.
Robust and redundant instrumentation ensured accurate and detailed information to enable provision of
engineering advice that was both reliable and able to be provided in a timely manner in accordance with the
short tunnel possession times available in the construction sequence.
Improvements in the understanding of rock bolt testing provide a sound basis for more reliable assessment
of the adequacy of such bolts for future tunnel projects. Testing of installed rock bolts ensured compliance
with the design, and identification and correction of any potential defects in the installation process.
Detailed survey measurements of the excavated rock surface and the completed shotcrete surface permitted
accurate assessment of the as-placed shotcrete thickness. This measurement provided confirmation that the
design intent had been properly implemented, and that any areas of under-thickness could be corrected prior
to completion of the works.

Case Study 2: Refurbishment of the Terrace

Tunnel, New Zealand
This case study is drawn substantially from ‘The Refurbishment of the Terrace and Mt Victoria Tunnels,
Wellington, New Zealand’ (McGavin 2014).
Background
The construction of the Terrace Tunnel commenced in 1974 and the tunnel was opened in 1978. In
2010–12, the tunnel was refurbished and provided with modern fire and life safety systems.
The tunnel is on State Highway 1, providing one of the major routes into Wellington. It also serves the
Wellington airport and the main regional hospital. The annual average daily traffic is 44 000.
The completed bore is 460 m long and operates as a bi-directional tunnel, with one southbound (SB) lane
and two northbound (NB) lanes out of Wellington. It has a 3% longitudinal gradient and a 450 m radius curve
at the northern portal that limits the sight distance for approximately 100 m. There is a signalised intersection
south of the south portal, which occasionally causes queuing in the SB lane of the tunnel.
Mechanical and electrical services originally provided included 18 jet fans, air quality monitors, queue detection,
a fusible sprinkler system, manual call points and lighting. There was a single point of power supply, from a ring
main into the tunnel at the south portal, from a single control building. Services into the tunnel were channelled
through a timber plenum above the road surface. Cement fibreboard linings were installed.
During the 1990s the panels were replaced with polypropylene panels and additional services added,
including four cameras and smart stud road markers. Cameras were installed and monitored in a manned
regional monitoring centre, which could oversee the whole Wellington regional network from 6.00 am to
7.00 pm. Night-time operations were overseen from the Auckland control centre.
The Terrace Tunnel Refurbishment
The Terrace Tunnel required significant improvements: new power supplies, control buildings, lighting, wall
panels and jet fans, a deluge system, emergency exit lights and way-finding lights, a public address (PA)
system, a radio rebroadcast (RRB) system, lane control signs (LCS) and variable message signs (VMS), an
over height detection (OHD) system and a new tunnel management system.
The tunnel refurbishment and enhancement process involved:

• developing a project Safety File
• defining safety features
• undertaking risk-based assessments of fire and life safety strategies
• identifying a short list of options
• developing a multi-criteria assessment of the shortlisted options
• identifying a preferred option considering fire and life safety risk, multi-criteria assessment and
whole-of-life (WoL) costs.

The Wellington Tunnels Alliance 2 sought to adopt the Safety File approach (refer Section 3.3.2) to the
refurbishment of the Terrace Tunnel with the stated aim to provide a consistent approach to a tunnel’s operation,
and delivering a tunnel that meets an agreed level of operational safety for operations and maintenance.
The safety documentation (Safety File) is a living document which is permanently kept up to date. The Safety
File is the responsibility of the tunnel manager who has the documentation signed off by the tunnel’s safety
officer.
B.2.1 Safety Features
Many of the components of the refurbishment were common, regardless of the ventilation/egress
combination selected, and were therefore not considered in detail as part of the option selection process.
These components were included in the initial estimates and included:
• fire and life safety systems (detection, alarms, public address, emergency lighting, vehicle stop detection)
• reliable water supply (dual connections to each tunnel, fire suppression systems, hydrants)
• drainage with flame traps, containment and treatment
• tunnel cladding
• general tunnel mechanical and electrical systems (dual power supply to each tunnel, lighting,
closed-circuit TV (CCTV), switch rooms, transformers)
• remedial works to the tunnel structures (lining, portals and the tunnel approach walls)
• refurbishment of switchgear rooms
• construction of a new switch room for the Terrace Tunnel (for additional power required for fire and life
safety systems)
• temporary mitigation measures to minimise disruption (i.e. automatic traffic management system (ATMS),
intersection improvements)
• permanent improvements to traffic management (signal phasing changes, ATMS signage, etc.)
• new control system operating on a DYNAC (ATMS software program) platform.
B.2.2 Fire and Life Safety Risk Assessment
Three aspects were considered:

• traffic characteristics – bi-directional traffic, volume and accident history
• ventilation – control of pollutants and smoke control
• egress – provision to facilitate evacuation in the event of an incident.
The level of residual fire and life safety risk in the tunnel was determined by the interaction between each of
these aspects. Only options with assisted ventilation were taken forward as the traffic flows are bi-directional.
Risk was demonstrated graphically, in the form of displacement-time or ‘x–t’ diagrams. These diagrams
demonstrated the movement of smoke, and the loss of tenability along the tunnel with time, relative to the
nominated range of egress speeds. Most people will have a sufficient level of physical fitness to self-rescue
during the initial stages of the incident. However, mobility-impaired people, including the elderly, young
children and the disabled, were also considered.
2 The Wellington Tunnel Alliance was established to undertake the refurbishment of the Mt Victoria and Terrace tunnels. The alliance
comprised the NZ Transport Agency, Leighton Contractors, AECOM, and Sinclair Knight Merz.

Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) was used to model various ventilation options and fire scenarios.
B.2.3 The Options for Ventilation and Egress
The options selected for multi-criteria analysis and development in rough order cost estimates for Terrace
Tunnel were:
• option 1 – replace the existing jet fans, portal egress
• option 2 – develop portal fan houses containing supply fans and develop a new ventilation shaft with
exhaust fans, portal egress
• option 3 – develop portal fan houses containing supply and exhaust fans, portal egress
• option 4 – replace the existing jet fans and provide a new egress point in the tunnel.
B.2.4 Multi-criteria Assessment
In carrying out the assessment of the four options it was important to consider:
• enhancing traffic management, i.e. safety
• maintainability
• durability (structural integrity)
• interface with future projects
• disruption during construction (traffic and noise)
• constructability (program, complexity and risk)
• social and environmental factors.
B.2.5 Combined Assessment – Multi-criteria and Whole-of-Life Cost
The WoL costs for each option were estimated as a range based on sensitivity analysis and estimates of
uncertainty. Preferable options had a high multi-criteria assessment score and low WoL cost, i.e. the best job
for the lowest price.
All the shortlisted options ensured a low level of residual fire and life safety risk. Based on the combined
assessment, option 1 – jet fans and portal egress was clearly the preferred option as it had the highest
MCAT score and also the lowest WoL costs.
The Fire and Life Safety Systems
Fire and life safety
The main functions to be addressed for a tunnel fire are:

• detection
• initial response from the transport operations centre
• self-rescue
• emergency response.
Table B 1 shows the items that were installed in the tunnel and their road safety/fire and life safety functions.

Table B 1: Fire and life safety and road safety functions
Item Fire and life safety function Non-fire and life safety function
Road surfacing, drainage and road Containment (sump lead traps) Road safety
barriers and wall cladding
Weepholes and plumbing N/A N/A
ATMS and OHD system Initial response/evacuation Road safety
Lighting N/A Road safety
Smart studs Evacuation Road safety
Cameras (PTZ and AVIDs) Detection/initial response/emergency Road safety
response
Jet fans Evacuation/response N/A
Linear heat detection Detection N/A
Emergency exit lights Initial response/evacuation N/A
Emergency systems (PA and RRB) Initial response/evacuation N/A
Deluge system Initial response/containment/ N/A
suppression
Fire hydrants Response N/A
B.3.1 Design Fire
A design fire of 50 MW was chosen as this represented the maximum fire load from a burning truck. For fire
engineering analysis, it was assumed that a fire with ultra-fast growth would reach peak heat release in nine
minutes.
B.3.2 Detection
With a 24/7 surveillance from the tunnel operations centre (TOC) the primary method of detection is from the
automatic video incident detection (AVID) cameras which can detect any smoke or heat. The detectors send
an alarm to the TOC which can respond within two minutes. Responses within 30 seconds can easily be
achieved.
There are nine automatic AVIDs and four pan-tilt zoom cameras (PTZ) which provide live streaming to the
TOC. The AVIDs have a module which allows the detection of vehicle queuing, pedestrians and smoke
detection.
The linear heat detection (LHD) system is a secondary detection system and will pick up any rate of rise in
temperature above 10 °C/min or a temperature of 60 °C. This will trigger the deluge system in that particular
zone and the nearest adjacent zone, unless it is manually overridden by the TOC operator. If the detection
from the LHD is not picked up within two minutes, the fire and life safety switches to automatic mode,
triggering the deluge system. Fire control ventilation and deluge operations run in parallel, independently of
each other.
The immediate responses to a fire alarm are to:

• display the emergency response plan to the operator
• trigger the deluge system
• stop the jet fans
• stop traffic and close the tunnel
• broadcast emergency, initiate evacuation
• alert emergency services and the traffic network system.

B.3.3 Emergency Response Systems
RRB allows the TOC operator to cut into the vehicle radios with an emergency message, either pre-recorded
or manual. This transmits over 23 frequency modulation (FM) stations and six amplitude modulation (AM)
stations in the Wellington area. The same messages are also broadcast over the PA system.
In emergency mode the pre-recorded message that is constantly repeated is ‘Emergency, emergency,
evacuate the tunnel, evacuate the tunnel’.
B.3.4 Lighting
Emergency exit lights
Emergency exit lights (EELs) are spaced at 50 m centres in the tunnel. These lights illuminate only when the
tunnel is in emergency mode and show a running man, direction arrows and distance to each portal for
evacuation to exit.
The EEL is backed up by an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) with a two-hour battery capacity, which is
also backed up by the main UPS.
Emergency lights
In the tunnel, there are two rows of 58 W fluorescent lights above each lane, with each row having 407 lights.
Every fifth light is an emergency light, which can run off a UPS in the case of power failure.
Smart studs
Smart studs (electronically illuminated raised road pavement markers) are placed at 10 m centres. These are
normally illuminated in the direction of travel, except for the centreline markers which are illuminated in both
directions. In the event of an emergency, both sides of the studs are switched to full illumination and they
then act as wayfinding lights.
The EEL, the emergency lights, the smart studs, together with the fire alarm panels and control systems, are
backed up by UPS systems with a minimum of four hours backup. The UPS can run for more than 24 hours
but goes into load shedding mode after two hours.
B.3.5 The Terrace Tunnel Deluge System
To contain a fire likely from a 50 MW fire load, CFD modelling has shown that 6.5 mm/min water deluge is
adequate. The deluge system has enough capacity to continually provide sufficient water for an extended
period from two zones while simultaneously discharging 12.5 l/sec, from each of three hydrants.
The deluge valves are activated: automatically via programmable logic controller (PLC), manually by a TOC
operator and manually from the fire alarm indicator panel (FAIP) by the Fire Service using hydraulic valves.
In the tunnel there are 18 zones with emergency exit cabinets (EEC) sited at 50 m centres. The cabinets
contain the deluge valves, hydrants (two per zone) and fire hose reels. The 50 m zone coincides with the
length of the fire service hoses.
B.3.6 Jet Fans
Jet fans provide sufficient capacity to prevent back layering under extreme conditions, even with only six of
the eight jet fans working. An example of such a scenario would be a fire at the northern end with an adverse
portal pressure of 16.2 Pa, a failure of the deluge system and the need to blow the smoke down the tunnel
against the grade.

The tunnel has eight 1.25 m diameter reversible jet fans, with a rated thrust of 2136 KN, spaced in banks of
two at approximately 75 m centres. The critical air speed to prevent back layering is 2.9 m/sec.
The measured thrust after installation was 79% of the rating. This was probably due to the proximity of the
fans to the bank of lights and the cable trays, which could well interfere with the jet stream. The fans were
positioned because of the need to accommodate more services in the space above the roadway.
B.3.7 Hydrant System
The water for the hydrant system is fed into the tunnel by 150 mm diameter pipes from separate ring mains.
A booster station is located at the southern portal which ensures that with four inlets and four outlets, the fire
service can pump 37.5 l/sec. A hydrant station is located at each EEC containing a double-headed hydrant
and hose-reel.
B.3.8 Fire Alarm Indicator Panel (FAIP)
There is a FAIP at the southern portal for use by the fire service during an emergency, which contains a
hydraulic valve for each deluge zone that can be manually activated. A microphone allows the fire service to
override the emergency messaging and allows them to broadcast over the PA and RRB systems. There are
also controls for the fans so that the fire service can provide smoke management as they see ft. In addition,
there is a dedicated telephone connected to the TOC. This is used to provide instructions to the TOC
operator and receive intelligence from the video cameras.
B.3.9 Control Buildings
New control buildings were constructed at the north and south portals. The buildings are ancillary structures
which house the site transformers, switchboards and variable speed drives.
An unmanned control room is located within each building which houses the fire, mechanical, electrical and
security equipment for the tunnel and building services. The control room contains all the service and
monitoring panels, UPS and the PLC for the tunnel.
The control buildings contain duplicate mechanical and electrical control modules which offer full tunnel
redundancy.
The power supply provided by each control building feeds the north and south ends of the tunnel. The power
supply to the dual 125 kVA transformers at each end are each fed off separate ring mains offering full
redundancy.
The TOC monitors all service control functions and fault alarms.
B.3.10 Automatic Traffic Management System
An automated traffic management system (ATMS) is provided on approach and within the tunnel. VMS are
provided for motorist-specific incident notification.
LCS are installed, in six banks, above each of the three lanes in the tunnel. These signs indicate whether the
lane is open or not by a green tick or a red cross. In the event of an emergency the signs change to a turn on
radio message for motorists. The emergency message is communicated via the RRB.
The ATMS is monitored and controlled at the TOC.

B.3.11 Other Safety Features
Long-lasting skid resistance is provided by 50 mm deep stone mastic asphalt placed over the concrete floor.
Delineation in the tunnel is excellent. A year after the completion, there was a significant drop in the number
of nose-to-tail, cross-lane and head-on incidents. Safe-hit posts (i.e. flexible posts) at 5 m centres, installed
in the double-yellow lines separating the north and southbound lanes, with smart studs, and the alignment of
the lights above are largely considered responsible. The value of lighting in providing safety benefits comes
from enhancing the delineation and sightlines.
Reassurance to motorists is provided by the RRB as when entering the tunnel there is no longer a loss in
radio reception and so motorists do not suffer a feeling of isolation (the psychological effects that people
suffer when entering tunnels is well-documented).
B.3.12 Conclusion
Some constraints have limited the extent of safety improvements that were possible in this project:
• There is no physical barrier separation between the northbound and southbound lanes.
• There are portal exits but no constructed escape routes.
• Ventilation is longitudinal rather than transverse.
• The structure is not fire-proofed.
• Services are located in the roof space.
The deluge system provides much of the benefit. To achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness from this
system, quality detection, evacuation and emergency response systems are required. An appropriate level of
redundancy is required to ensure reliability of these systems.
Tunnels contain complex interacting aerodynamic, traffic and life safety systems, monitored by dedicated
trained operators. Tunnels operate effectively and efficiently when the systems are appropriate and work
together.
The multi-criteria assessment and Safety File approach to the assessment, design, construction and
operation of the Terrace Tunnel refurbishment, has proved robust. Using the Safety File approach, the
refurbishment of the Terrace Tunnel has produced a tunnel that provides strong fire and life safety systems.

Commentary 1
Prior to repairs starting, the concrete surface must be properly prepared by removing all unsound concrete
and cleaning the reinforcing steel. All rust must be removed and if this results in a reduction in the strength of
the concrete, the damaged steel must be removed and replaced (AASHTO 2010). A mechanical coupler to
join the new steel to the old saves space and is effective (Figure C1 1).
Figure C1 1: Example of a mechanical coupler
AASHTO (2010) provides guidance on the details of these repair methods.
Further general guidance may be obtained in SA HB 84:2018.
[Back to body text]

Commentary 2
The repair depends on the type of defect. Damaged rods or other parts of the suspension system can be
replaced with similar parts (Figure C2 1).
Figure C2 1: Example of a common hanger assembly

However, loose connections indicate failure of the connection and the whole connection needs to be
replaced. Where adhesive anchors have been used, they should be replaced with undercut mechanical
anchors (Figure C2 2).
Figure C2 2: Typical undercut mechanical anchors
[Back to body text]

AGRT04-19 - Guide To Road Tunnels - Part 4 - Retrofitting Tunnels

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Guide to Road Tunnels Part 4:

• Transport for NSW

Austroads Project No. ART1971 Pages 54 • Main Roads Western Australia

2. General Requirements for Tunnel Retrofitting/Refurbishment ......................................................... 2

3. Establishing the Need for Refurbishment ........................................................................................... 6

4. Traffic Capacity Expansion ................................................................................................................. 12

5. Traffic Management Functions ........................................................................................................... 16

6. Fire and Life Safety .............................................................................................................................. 18

7. Mechanical Engineering Features ...................................................................................................... 20

Austroads 2019 | page i

8. Electrical/Electronic Engineering Features ....................................................................................... 22

9. Other Refurbishment and Repairs ...................................................................................................... 25

10. Drainage ................................................................................................................................................ 29

11. Energy Efficiency ................................................................................................................................. 30

Austroads 2019 | page ii

The Guide to Road Tunnels (GRT) is written in four Parts:

1.2 Scope of Part 4

Austroads 2019 | page 1

2 General Requirements for Tunnel

These general requirements are outlined in the following sections.

2.2 Providing a Safe System

The Safe System framework requires that:

2.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Austroads 2019 | page 2

2.4 Risk Analysis

The objectives of the risk analysis include:

Austroads 2019 | page 3

2.5 Traffic Management During Retrofitting/Refurbishment

Austroads 2019 | page 4

2.6 Testing and Commissioning

Complete documentation as indicated in GRT Part 2 (Austroads 2019) will be required.

Austroads 2019 | page 5

3 Establishing the Need for Refurbishment

Austroads 2019 | page 6

3.2 Tunnel Inspections Regime

3.3 Process for Developing Project Requirements

3.3.2 Safety File

Austroads 2019 | page 7

Figure 3.1: Safety File development

3.3.3 Overall Process

Austroads 2019 | page 8

Austroads 2019 | page 9

Figure 3.2: Safety assessment process

Source: World Road Association (PIARC) (2015). Reproduced with permission.

3.3.4 Developing and Implementing the Concept

Austroads 2019 | page 10

3.4 Types of Refurbishment/Retrofit/Renewal

Austroads 2019 | page 11

4 Traffic Capacity Expansion

4.2 Additional Tubes

4.3 Widening Existing Tubes

World Road Association (PIARC) (2004) notes the following:

Austroads 2019 | page 12

• a safer alternative to bi-directional traffic in one tube could be alternating

Austroads 2019 | page 13

4.4 Rearranging Lane Configuration

Possible approaches include:

4.5 Geometric Design Considerations

4.5.1 General Requirements

4.5.2 Design Requirements

Austroads 2019 | page 14

Austroads 2019 | page 15

5 Traffic Management Functions