Introduction

For almost 50 years after their emergence as independent

nation states in the late 1940s, India’s relationship with China
had a highly uneven trajectory, marked by extreme vicissitudes.
These decades do not lend themselves to easy periodization,
punctured as they were by intense mutual suspicion, an
occasional turn to fraternal bonhomie, a border war, bitter
exchanges, and near conflict scenarios. It took almost three
decades after the 1962 conflict for this relationship to start
acquiring a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional
character. Significant hurdles have marred the progress
towards normalization, namely, the issue of Tibet, the China–
Pakistan alliance, the contested boundary, the nuclear issues,
and the role of major powers.
As civilizational countries, these two Asian giants were
expected to settle their disputes peacefully. However, this
couldn’t happen because of their Asian rivalry in particular and
international relations in general.
In the following study, our attempt would be to analyse Sino-
Indian relations in its multiple dimensions – territorial relations,
nuclear relations, diplomatic relations, encirclement of India by
China and international relations.
A Brief History

India and China gained their independence in 1947 and 1949

respectively. In both the countries, the independence struggle
was opposite – India, for most part, had a non-violent freedom
struggle whereas Chinese had fought their way to
independence. This difference led to different types of
governments being formed in both the countries – democracy
in India and communist rule in China. India was the first non-
communist country to recognize People’s Republic of China.
After an initial period of friendship, this difference began to
show when Chinese started stating their claims on different
territorial positions and India refusing their claims. It ended
with a war in 1962 which severed the ties for decades.

Yin and Yang of Sino-Indian Relationship

The yin and yang of India–China relations may be stated in terms of

a paradox: on the one hand, there is a visibly expanding and
deepening multilevel engagement, and the remarkable increase of
trade, and on the other hand the low levels of mutual trust and
confidence. The mistrust most noticeably pervades the strategic
communities on both sides, resonating in public perceptions as well
the Indian media, which interrogate China’s actual intentions and
stress the areas of competition within a framework of rivalry and
conflict of interests. In fact, the belief that China would obstruct
India’s rise as a major Asian and world power has a fairly tenacious
hold in certain sections. The ‘Strategic Partnership’, by implication,
affirmed that the India–China relationship had acquired a global
and strategic character.
It is clear that there is also a competitive dimension within which
both countries are fashioning their respective ‘rise’, commensurate
with their self-image and perception. Six issues amply demonstrate
the manner in which the yin and yang are playing themselves out.

1. Economic Dynamism
Trade between the two countries resumed in 1978 and the Most
Favored Nation Agreement was signed in 1984. Trade between the
two countries has increased from a mere US$339 million in 1992 to
US$57.4 billion in 2018.
Analysts, however, highlight two drawbacks: in terms of product
composition, the Indian export basket is still extremely limited,
comprising mostly primary products, and since 2005–6, we see a
continuous and rising trade deficit in favor of China. India has
consistently demanded that China give greater market access to
Indian pharma and IT sectors (two areas where India is
competitive) and there is undoubtedly urgent need to restructure
India–China trade relations.
The proposed Free Trade Area (FTA), putting together the markets
of two of the most populous nations in the world would be even
bigger than the current FTAs such as the European Union, NAFTA,
ASEAN, APEC, etc. It is estimated that within the next decade,
India and China will be among the ten most important bilateral
trading relationships in the world.
This trading partnership is viewed as window for peace by both the
nations.

2. Pakistan as a factor in Sino-India relations

Arguably, it is the Sino-Pak alliance and their military ties, both in

the conventional and nuclear aspects, that generate greater
mistrust within India. Indian policy-makers continue to be
concerned about the range of conventional military sales, China’s
construction of the Gwadar Port, and in particular, China’s violation
of the NSG rules to supply civilian nuclear plants to Pakistan.
Above all, Chinese presence and infrastructure building activities in
the territory ceded to China by Pakistan in Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir, have generated serious concerns in India.
The present Chinese position is that whatever cooperation there
might have been between the two states earlier, it is clearly a thing
of the past and in any case, such cooperation is not directed
against any third country. However, the mistrust between the two
states has led India to believe that the all-weather friends with
common hostility towards the country see each other as
counterbalance to India.

3. The US factor

India and China have attempted, with varying degrees of success,

to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by the post-Cold War
environment, to have multi-dimensional engagements with all
major powers. The investment/technology need of both has also
enhanced the importance of strong ties with the advanced West. In
this context the role of the United States—as the sole
superpower—acquires a special significance. The United States
and China have experienced a longer period of close political-
strategic cooperation, and since the end of the bipolar world, the
United States has been firmly in the center of Chinese strategic
calculations and considerations.
India too, had been moving closer to the United States, particularly
since the late 1990s. Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation has also
raised questions on the nature of this proximity and implications for
the autonomy of Indian foreign policy. In the current scenario, the
US response has been two-pronged: on the one hand it has sought
to deal with China’s ‘rise’ by accommodating it as a responsible
stakeholder in the globalizing world order, and on the other
attempted to promote a strategic partnership with India which
could constitute the classic counterweight.
Indian reaction to the Sino-US collaboration and dialogue in the
past has displayed a high degree of uneasiness and even umbrage.
Similarly, the PRC’s apprehensions about India becoming a willing
partner (or tool) of the Americans in containing China, could have a
negative fallout. Both India and China would have to take full
cognizance of the relationship of each with the United States (and
the West)—neither in zero-sum terms nor as a hurdle in political
cooperation amongst them.

4. India-China nuclear relations

India has claimed that China has assisted Pakistan to set up its
nuclear program despite the NSG guidelines. This, along with
China’s nuclear tests of 1964 are the major reasons behind the
development of India’s nuclear program.
This response irked the Chinese and was responsible for tensions
between the two nations.
There are various examples to support India’s claims. For example,
Nehruvian denial for nuclear research till 1962 and his acceptance
for the same in 1964. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to the then
US President Bill Clinton and the statement of Indian Parliament on
27th May 1998 proves the above claims.
Beijing, however, denied India’s claim of any threat posed by it to
New Delhi.
5. Encirclement of India by proxy and India’s counter
6. Territorial disputes
a. Chinese territorial claims
i) McMohan line