What Went Wrong in Turkey? From Muslim Democracy To Illiberal Democracy

What
Went Wrong in Turkey?

What Went Wrong in Turkey?
From Muslim Democracy to Illiberal Democracy

1

Post‐Kemalist but Still Illiberal Turkey

IHSAN DAGI
Cover Design: Gamze Uçak
October 2015, Ankara
ISBN: 978‐605‐9801‐13‐3
©Phoenix Yayınevi‐Ünal Sevindik
Şehit Adem Yavuz Sok. Hitit Apt. 14/1
Kızılay/Ankara
Tel: 0 (312) 419 97 81 pbx
Fax: 0 (312) 419 16 11
e‐posta: info@phoenixkitap.com
http://www.phoenixyayinevi.com
Printed by:
Desen Ofset A. Ş.
Sertifika No: 11289
Birlik Mah. 448. Cad. 476. Sk. No: 2
Çankaya/Ankara Tel: 0 (312) 496 43 43
Distribution:
Siyasal Kitabevi
Şehit Adem Yavuz Sok. Hitit Apt. 14/1
Kızılay‐Ankara
Tel: 0 (312) 419 97 81 pbx
Fax: 0 (312) 419 16 11
e‐mail: info@siyasalkitap.com
http://www.siyasalkitap.com

2



IHSAN DAGI
3


4


Contents
Introduction: Post‐Kemalist but Still Illiberal Democracy 7
Illiberal Democracy, Islamism or Postmodern
Authoritarianism? 13
AKP’s Authoritarian Turn 33
De‐Democratization of the “New Turkey” 57
Gezi Protests: Defense of Private and Public Spaces 91
Kurdish Peace: Pax‐Ottomana for the Kurds 131
From European Union to Eurasianism 157
Foreign Policy: From Soft Power to Neo‐Ottomanism 171
5


Introduction: Post‐Kemalist but Still
Illiberal Turkey

MANY, INCLUDING MYSELF, EXPECTED THAT THE DEFEAT OF
Kemalism by a broad coalition of liberals, democrats and
conservatives under the political leadership of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) would lead to a democratic regime
in Turkey with a liberal constitution.
A post‐Kemalist state has turned to be disillusionment

because it has not evolved into a democratic one. Kemalism is
dead but its state‐centric, Jacobin and illiberal sprit has been
reincarnated in the AKP. The similarities in the attitude and
the policies of the AKP and its Kemalist predecessors are
striking. Using the state apparatus to construct a “a new
society,” trying to subordinate individuals and civil society to
the state, employing the stateʹs coercive means to punish its
opponents, viewing the world from the perspective of a siege
mentality and describing the world as plotting against it are
common both to the AKP and its old rivals, the Kemalists.
Thus, the post‐Kemalist Turkey is still not a liberal

democracy because the Kemalist heritage has been passed on
to the AKP. Yes, the military has been stripped of the
undemocratic power that it used to enjoy in the name of
7


Kemalism. This could have been a very good start for building
a full‐fledged democracy with the principles of human rights,
the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Yet a new regime
has been established, a mirror image of the old one, in which
all power is monopolized by a single person, Erdogan,
without any check and balance mechanism.
What we have at the end, therefore, is not a liberal
democracy but a populist authoritarian regime that justifies its
illiberal intrusions in the economy and society as well as in the
lives of individuals by references to the vague notions of
national will, values of “our nation and civilization” and “our
historical mission.”
When these references fall short, the AKP does not

hesitate to resort to conspiracy theories that link dissenting
views and opposition protests to the “external enemies of
Turkey” in order to delegitimize and discredit its opponents.
Any opposition is portrayed as a plot to bring down the
government; each opposition movement and any dissenting
voices are accused of collaborating with the enemies of
Turkey. The logical and natural outcome of this trend will be
criminalizing the opposition.
In order to keep the party grassroots mobilized, irrelevant
analogies are constantly made between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
and former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, and coups
in Turkeyʹs past and the recent coup in Egypt. Most recently
the execution of senior Jamaat‐e‐Islami party leader Abdul
Qader Molla in Bangladesh is cited to this end. These
analogies not only spread fear and a deep sense of insecurity,
8


and thus the need for unity behind the party and the leader
but also pave the way for authoritarian measures against
actual and potential sources of opposition.
Especially since the Gezi protests, the AKP regards

politics as a matter of “survival,” securitizing the process,
actors and the language of political competition. We know
from our Kemalist past that through securitizing politics
comes justification for authoritarian policies. Therefore, it is
not surprising now that the AKP leaders constantly talk of
“internal enemies,” and Bulent Arinc, one of the leading
figures of the party threatens journalists, saying they “should
be prepared to spend four to five years in jail if they want to
be heroes.”
The government wants so much to be free of the
mechanisms of checks and balances that even the presence of
civil society is now viewed as a threat. For them civil society,
as in the old Kemalist days, should belong to the realm of the
state, rather than playing a role of interacting between society
and state. It seems that the AKP and its Islamist allies are
relying on the coercive and distributive power of the state to
force civil society to be subordinate to the state and the party.
In terms of its ideology and leadership, this is a post-

Kemalist state, but it is one that maintains its authoritarian
characteristics.
In the long run the nature of the state‐society relationship
in Turkey does not change. In the past, society in Turkey was
under the “tutelage” of the Kemalists, who controlled key
9


state institutions like the military, judiciary and high
bureaucracy. They dominated political actors and processes.
Society was weak, dependant on the state. With a struggle
conducted by a broad coalition of people that included
conservatives, liberals, the Kurds as well as various social and
economic groups, the tutelage system was largely eliminated
during the AKP reign. The military was put under the control
of the government, the judiciary ‐‐ including the
Constitutional Court ‐‐ was transformed and the bureaucracy
subdued. It appeared that society penetrated into the height of
power through the agency of the AKP and positioned itself
above the state.
Is this really the case? Is the society now more
autonomous vis‐à‐vis the state? Has the elimination of the
Kemalist tutelage empowered society?
Not really… It is hard to change the genetics of the state
and society as well as their relationship. A state‐centric culture
has been the tradition of this country. It does not change in a
decade or so. The state in this land has always been the
constituting agency dominating and shaping the society.
In the past, when the constituting role of the state was
performed with a secular “world view” that excluded
religious groups and masses from the power center, it
prompted an opposition of the conservatives. This opposition
appeared as being directed at undemocratic characteristics of
the state. Then, on the common ground of establishing a
democratic regime the secular democrats and conservatives
10


formed a broad coalition that indeed broke the Kemalist
tutelage over the society and politics.
After such a success, there is still talk about the possibility
of authoritaria nism in Turkey. The basis of this possibility I
think lay in the way in which the conservatives, the driving
force and political agents of this process, view the state and its
relationship with the society.
It seems that the political conservatives have never

questioned the central‐constituting role of the state. They did
not have any problem with the notion of a state that has a
“constituting role” over society, but only disagreed about the
content of this role. They objected to a state that undertook the
mission of raising secular Kemalist youth, but gratefully
approved the mission of the state to bring up a religious
generation.
Political conservatives, too, believe in the possibility of

“creating a new society” by state intervention. That is to say
that the “social engineering” of a “constituting state” is not
ruled out. This is the background to what Tayyip Erdoğan
said; “the new constitution will be in harmony with the values
of our nation.” This means that “values” attributed to the
nation are regarded as constitutive of the “new Turkey.” What
are those “values”? Who will interpret them and how will
they be integrated into the new constitution? Of course, all
these will be settled by the powerful, i.e., the state.
It seems that as the ownership of the state has passed
over to the political conservatives the “critical distance”
between the conservatives and the state started to disappear.
11


What the conservatives call the “state‐society merger” has
deprived this social group, which used to position itself vis‐à‐
vis the state, of its autonomy.
The marriage of conservatives and the state under the AKP

rule has weakened society and empowered the state - the
state of the conservatives this time.
Some may describe this as “bringing the conservative

periphery into the center via democratic participation.” This is
partly true, but this process does not empower and
emancipate society, instead society once again is defeated by
the patronage of the state. A striking example of this is the so‐
called “Anatolian tigers,” the conservative business circle that
started to emerge in the late 1980s.
The “Anatolian tigers” did not depend on the state and
they did not owe their existence to the state. They largely
benefited from Turkeyʹs opening up to the world and the
accompanying competition in the market. By the end of the
1990s, the Anatolian tigers pushed for democratic governance
and became the autonomous social agent that paved the way
for the emergence of the AKP. Where are they now? Are they
still autonomous of the state? Or have they become dependent
on state bids? The “AKP state” has overtaken the social and
economic space previously had been claimed by the
conservatives ending their autonomy and turning them into
dependant agents of the state. 15.12. 2013; 21.04.2013

12


Illiberal Democracy, Islamism or
Postmodern Authoritarianism?

Pursuing Islamism with Electoral Democracy
WHENEVER THE PROSPECT OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MUSLIM
world is debated, one crucial question has always been raised:
Is Islam compatible with democracy?
I have always thought this an irrelevant and even a

wrong question. The right one was to question the
compatibility of Islamism as a comprehensive social and
political program with democracy. Even on this the question
that should have been advanced given the plurality of the
Islamists movements is “Which Islamism?”
Radical Islamists object to any association of Islam with

democracy; the latter was believed to be the product of
Western civilization. For them Islam is more than a religion: It
is a comprehensive social, political and economic model that
does not need any Western concept. As such, Muslim
communities would be governed according to the rules of
Islam.
13

Illeberal Democracy, Islamism or Postmodern Authoritarianism?

Similarly, orientalists in the West argue that Islam is an
all‐encompassing system that does not embrace democracy,
pluralism and human rights, values produced in the West and
inherently alien to Muslims.
In sum, the “essentialists” in the Islamic world and the
West asked this question of compatibility came up with an
answer: No.
With the Arab Spring for the Islamist movements in the
region and the Western observers this old question has
become passé. Not much attention was paid to the answers of
the “essentialists” in the Middle East and the West. Islamists
in Tunisia and Egypt had fought for the downfall of
authoritarian regimes alongside the secularists and the
nationalists. The powerful Muslim Brotherhood and energetic
Ennahda Movement appeared not interested in establishing
an “Islamic state” but settled with some forms of democratic
governments. They took part in the electoral process and
engaged in drafting constitutions for a democratic system. No
one was talking about the “sovereignty of God.” All agreed
that the right to rule is derived from the consent of the people.
This might be interpreted as a sign that the Islamists have
abandoned their old objective of establishing an Islamic state,
an ideological state with a totalitarian social and political
program.
This had been the model of revolutionary Islamists who

struggled against authoritarian regimes that suppressed all
opposition, including the Islamists.
14


With the Arab Spring, there is no need to adapt a
revolutionary method. In a free and fair political competition,
the Islamists know that they can come to power through the
electoral process. The Arab Spring paved the way for free and
fair electoral competition in which the Islamists scored much
better than their nationalist and liberal rivals.
Now, the question is whether they will use their power in
government as a means to enact their values, lifestyles and
social vision into laws binding on all of society. Some time ago
a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood criticizing anti‐Morsi
demonstrators on a CNN news report revealed a common
belief in the virtue of majority rule: “The majority makes the
rules. The rest should obey them.” This reflects the mood
prevailing among the people as well as the leadership of the
Islamist parties in the post‐Arab Spring Middle East.
Islamist movements get an electoral majority in countries
where free elections are held. And they are inclined to make
“their rules” shape the lives of others.
It is not a secret, even to the Islamists, that there is no
possibility of an Iranian‐style “hard ideological state” in the
Middle East. But a “soft ideological state” that regulates social
and cultural space in accordance with an Islamic‐conservative
way of life through “democratic mechanisms” is possible. And
this is the question we have to tackle.
15


Instead of questioning the compatibility of Islam with
democracy, it is time to question what the Islamists will do
with democracy.
An Islamist‐dominated state with “elementary

democratic credentials” ‐‐ an elected legislation and
government ‐‐ may legislate a particular way of life and use
the state apparatus to impose its choice of morality, lifestyle,
value system. What shall we call such a state? It will not
amount to an Islamic state, but not qualify as a democratic
state either.
I call this tendency of the Islamists “postmodern

authoritarianism.” It is a kind of Islamism that is not justified
by a reference to the “text” but to the “people” and its will.
Such Islamism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is
“democratic and representative” in justification and process
but authoritarian in content and outcome. This is the
postmodern authoritarianism of contemporary Islamists who
instrumentalize pro‐Islamic masses to justify the
implementation of an Islamist social program with the state
apparatus.
It is more than “illiberal democracy” because Islamists

tend to use their majority to legislate their own values and
way of life as the normal and standard one. Russia under
Putin qualifies as an illiberal democracy in the sense that basic
rights and freedoms are not respected if not in law but in
practice.
16


The Islamists taking part in democratic competition have
a certain view of “good society,” “right morality” and “ideal
society.” When they make them the basis of legislation, and
thus use the coercion of the state to construct their vision of
the “good society” this is more than an illiberal democracy. It
is authoritarianism backed with the majority who “identify”
themselves with those in power and think that they will not
get hurt by the value‐imposing policies of the Islamists in
power.
The concept of postmodern authoritarianism explains a

lot about the attitude and policies of the AKP government in
Turkey after the Arab Spring as well as the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Ennahda Movement. All believe in the
normalcy of enacting Islamʹs social code as the only legitimate
way of life, while maintaining elementary standards of
democracy. 09. 12. 2012
The prospect for democracy in the Middle East will be
determined by the choices of the Islamists.
The Arab Spring has brought them to the forefront of
Middle East politics, this time not as radical outsiders but as
the most serious contenders for power throughout the region
where competitive politics have been introduced.
It is impossible to argue that Islamism in the Middle East
is passé or has failed. With the Arab Spring, they have
surfaced in new circumstances that are more favorable to them
than before when they were oppressed by authoritarian states.
Being subjected to suppression by authoritarian regimes had
17


made them more radically inclined to use violence and more
ideologically orthodox. Then, to acquire the power they
thought they needed revolutionary means, and once they got
the power they would establish an ideologically grounded
Islamic state.
Things are different now. The Islamists have developed a
practical‐pragmatic response to the question of democracy.
Instead of debating doctrinal issues of the Islam‐democracy
relationship, they have embraced the idea of majority rule
knowing that they will benefit from this arrangement as they
have a historically well functioning organizational network
and effective discourse and rhetorical skills.
In fact, well before the Arab Spring, the Islamists had
learned the “utility of democracy” in eliminating their secular
opponents and bringing them to power. The National
Salvation Frontʹs successes in the 1990‐1991 elections in
Algeria were the first case in which Islamists scored pretty
well in free and competitive elections. Then in 1994 came the
success of the Welfare Party (RP) in Turkey where in local
elections the biggest cities in the country, the Islamist party
won İstanbul and Ankara. A year later the RP won the general
elections forming a short‐lived government. Later in 2006 in
Palestine, Hamas won local and general elections against the
secular Al‐Fatah.
In Algeria the Islamistsʹ electoral success was suppressed
by a military coup. In Turkey they were forced to leave power
by a “post‐modern coup” known as the Feb. 28 process. In
18


Palestine, an attempt was made to invalidate the Hamas
victory by Western non‐recognition.
Out of all these the Islamists have learned something simple:

In a competitive political system, they are very likely to
come to power.
With the Arab Spring we saw the Islamists from Tunisia
to Egypt adopting electoral democracy as a new strategy for
power. They were now less doctrinaire, more pragmatic,
knowing their limits as well as strengths.
In the old days the strategic target was to set up an
Islamic state by a vanguard elite and through revolutionary
means. Then this “Islamic state” would fight against what
Sayyid Qutb called the “Jahiliyya” (not being fully aware of
the message of Islam) and erect a “new society” by means of
the stateʹs enlightening social and cultural policies. In short,
the old strategy of Islamism envisaged taking over the state
and using it to create a new society.
The Islamists now are at the stage of introducing a new
strategy, using the people as the source of inspiration, power
and legitimacy to construct a “new state,” not an Islamic state
but a state that regulates in accordance with the religious‐
cultural preferences of the society. Since an ideological state is
unattainable, the Islamists have settled for a state that has the
capacity to legislate social, cultural and moral codes for a
pious society.
19


Such a notion is likely to result in a post‐modern
authoritarian state, not an Islamic one. I call it post‐modern
because it carries ambiguities concerning its democratic and
authoritarian credentials, containing both. They talk of
democracy, freedom and choices. But they are all supposed to
lead to “Islam.” In a meeting in Tunisia in October 2012
Rashid Ghannuschi, the leader of the An Nahda movement
reflected on this notion. Taking about the position of the An
Nahda on the constitutional debate he said: “We do not want
Shariah in the constitution but freedom. Because once people
are free they will choose Islam.” What if they donʹt?
This is not merely an “illiberal democracy.” It goes

beyond this as Islamists are inclined to legislate their own
values and way of life through their electoral majority as the
normal. The “electoral” Islamists have a certain view of “good
society,” “right morality” and “ideal society.” Based on their
electoral majority using coercive apparatus of the state they
legislate their “good society” into law to be abided by all
society. Such a model is more than an illiberal democracy. It is
authoritarianism backed with the majority who is inspired by
Islamic notion of a “good society.” 16.12.2012
Imagining an AKP society
Islamists have a tendency to go authoritarian within an
elementary system of democracy. I do not describe the
marriage of Islamism and democracy as “illiberal democracy”
but postmodern authoritarianism. The difference between the
two is that in the former a majority simply imposes its will on
20


the rest, while in the latter the majority legislates a particular
way of life and uses the state apparatus to impose its choice of
morality, lifestyle and values system.
Once a majoritarian notion of democracy is

instrumentalized to create a “new society,” based on a set of
values that define what the “good society” is, postmodern
authoritarianism then emerges. It is a form of leadership
which does not amount to the totalitarianism of an ideological
state, yet uses state apparatuses to build a new society
inspired by the values upheld by the party.
Where do Turkey and the ruling Justice and

Development Party (AK Party) stand on this debate? Is it an
example of an Islamist party going authoritarian in its crude
or postmodern form?
Fist of all, I do not regard the AKP as an outright Islamist
movement. Yet it is a party that has come out of the evolution
of Islamist politics in Turkey. It is now a hybrid political entity
with Islamist, nationalist and democratic credentials. While its
democratic component pushes for reforms and advocates
open society, its nationalist tendency pulls the party toward a
notion of the disciplined society under the state. Islamist
elements within the party resurge on various social and
cultural issues with a ready formula of an “ideal society.”
These conflicting and contrasting identities might be seen
as part and parcel of a mass political party, but they create
“ambiguities” about the core values of the party and the place
the party may be taking the country. It benefits from
21


hybridity, the postmodern ambiguity. It is really hard to grasp
the “essence” of the party, its unchanged characteristics.
Instead, the AKP reflects multiple faces, identities and
objectives.
We are increasingly witnessing within the AKP a tendency

that can be described as a centrality of values instead of
ideas, likely a result of the party leaders' Islamist roots.
In public debates and in justification of social and cultural
policies, the party leader is increasingly relying on “values.”
He refers to them as “our national values,” “historical values,”
“our civilization” and “values that our nation represents.”
These are all fine, but vague. What do they mean? Their
lines need to be filled in by someone, an authority. For
example, Tayyip Erdoğan made comments calling the TV soap
opera “Magnificent Century” incompliant with the historical
values of “our civilization”. He went as far as calling on public
prosecutors to do something about this.
What we see in this anecdote is that an “imagined
history” with values attached to it is imposed not only on the
producers of the soap opera but on the society at large by the
apparatus of the state. This exemplifies “constructing a new
society” according to the “image” the powerful hold in their
mind.
The inheritance of Islamism in the AKP is the still
prevailing belief that a “new society” is possible, a new society
22


constructed by the state apparatus according to a set of
“imagined values.” This is not any different from the social
engineering Kemalism has implemented in Turkey.
ʺSo if the Kemalist conducted and achieved a social

engineering project in Turkey why not the AKPʺ, the ones
who “represent the true values of the nation” within a
democracy? Though I doubt the possibility of such an
endeavor in Turkey, a country that had experienced some
degree of democracy and pluralism before the ascendance of
the AKP to power, unlike the post‐Arab Spring countries.
Nevertheless, imagining a “new society,” a symptom of
Islamism still alive within the AKP leadeship, and trying to
construct it through coercive means cannot be justified by any
definition of democracy. 23. 12. 2012
Not Islamism but postmodern authoritarianism
The conservative and religious majority in Turkey may not be
disturbed by the new restrictions imposed on the sale and
advertising of alcohol.
They may even be pleased. But the bad news for them is
that such an omnipotent state with an interventionist
inclination to “construct a new society” may one day try to
regulate the mindset and lifestyles of each component of this
big, conservative majority too. This is so because such
restrictions and regulations diminish the autonomy of society
and revive the old interventionist state.
23


The underlining feature of the Kemalist regime was its
presumption that it could constitute a “new society” by means
of the state apparatus and interventions. The new society was
supposed to be ethnically “Turkish” and culturally “secular.”
Through the legal and institutional power of public
authorities, the Kemalists tried to “create” a new society in
accordance with this objective. In the process, those who did
not fit to the ideal model were not treated as proper citizens.
As a result the Kurds and devout Muslims were excluded,
marginalized and even suppressed by the Kemalist state.
Now, the AKP government seems to have a certain view
of what is good society, correct morality and ideal society.
And it no longer hesitates to make that the basis of legislation,
and thus uses the coercion of the state to construct its vision of
good society. In this, the ruling party relies on the
conservative religious majority who identify themselves with
those in power and will not be hurt by the value‐imposing
policies of the government.
So, Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly talks of his dream to raise
a “religious generation.” This is not, of course, for the sake of
religion only. Obviously, the idea is that a religious generation
raised by the AKP would be the natural power base of the
party. In order to perpetuate the power of the party, a new
generation subservient to values, cultural codes and references
of the AKP would be very instrumental.
The attitude and policy of the ruling party presumes a

hierarchy among different lifestyles. This is, in fact, not a
24


problem as such. Every person may think his or her views and
way of life is the best and superior. The problem is when
someone legislates and then enforces a particular way of life
believed to be superior as common, acceptable and normal.
From this, it can be inferred that the ruling party claims
to hold its moral values as superior to others. Is there a
qualitative difference between the idea of the “supremacy of
morality” and the “supremacy of race?”
Once the state upholds a set of moral values as supreme
and enforces it with the state apparatus, all the others who fall
outside the view of “good morality” defined by the state
would be marginalized, excluded and even suppressed, just
like those Kurds and conservatives under the Kemalist rule.
Contrary to the claims of secularists, this is not Islamism;
it is postmodern authoritarianism hidden behind the popular
support of conservatives that use the regulative power of the
state to impose “the only rightful lifestyle.”
In such a postmodern authoritarianism Islamically

oriented governments regulate the social and cultural space in
accordance with a conservative way of life through democratic
mechanisms. Such a government may enjoy popular
legitimacy, demonstrated through essentially democratic
elections, but do not refrain from enacting its values, lifestyles
and social vision into laws that bind all of society.
The new regulation on alcohol the AK Party government
has introduced is just an example of how postmodern
25


authoritarianism works and what it means. It is an attempt to
legislate a particular way of life and use the state apparatus to
impose its choice of morality, lifestyle and value system.
Postmodern authoritarianism assumes the normalcy of

enacting Islam's social code as the only legitimate way of
life, while remaining within the margins of democratic
procedural rules through the majority in Parliament.
This derives from the belief that a new society, as

imagined by the party leader and constructed through
legislation and the state apparatus, is possible. This is
obviously not different from the social engineering of
Kemalism that had attempted to construct a new Turkish and
secular nation. If the Kemalists succeeded in their project of
building a new society, why not the AKP that now owns the
same state?
We have seen postmodern authoritarianism in action. For
example Tayyip Erdoğan declared that his government is
preparing to intervene in private residences where unmarried
males and females are suspected of living together.
“Mothers and fathers cry out, asking ‘Where is the state?ʹ
These steps are taken to tell them that the state is here,”
Erdoğan said. As a conservative government, he asserted that
he and his party could not ignore information about mixed‐
sex accommodation. “We are assessing this information with
our governors and the police department. … If necessary, we
will introduce a new law,” he said.
26


This is a police state spying on its citizensʹ houses,
hunting for immoral behavior behind their doors.
How has Turkey ended up in such a situation while

trying to advance its democracy, working to improve its
human rights record, taking steps to open up to the world and
negotiating full membership with the European Union?
A broad coalition of conservatives and liberals, Kurds as
well as Turks, had come together to support the AKP for the
objectives of greater democracy, respect for human rights and
EU membership in the early 2000s. The AKP seemed to had
departed from its Islamist past and embraced democracy, civil
liberties and the rule of law. Erdoğan advocated the free
market, globalization and EU membership.
Against the secular authoritarianism of the Kemalists,

defended by the military and judiciary, democrats viewed the
AKP as the agent of change. The founders of the party had
suffered at the hands of the Kemalists. Many believed that
those who were once oppressed would truly want democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
It was expected that the AKP, led mainly by the Islamists,
had to deepen and institutionalize democracy in order to build
a barrier against the Kemalist establishment.
Instead, the Kemalist order was crushed without the

construction of a liberal democracy. In this regard, the 2010
constitutional amendments enabling the government to
27


control the judiciary and the Ergenekon trials that pushed the
military back into its barracks were the key steps.
In the absence of a viable political alternative, the AKP

and its leader were left unchecked and unchallenged. The
result was an unprecedented monopolization of power in the
hands of the AKP leader, Erdoğan, whose status as the one
who had beaten the Kemalist establishment added to his
charisma. The media, business circles, civil society and the
state apparatus, including the judiciary, have come to bow
before the “leadership and authority” of Erdoğan.
Having beaten its “enemies,” as had become clear by the
2011 elections, and claiming control over the entire state
apparatus, Erdoğan and his associates no longer needed the
protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Instead, the personal rule of Erdoğan, who has recently
displayed the attitude of an intrusive and authoritarian
statesman, has been established.
It appears that, with a combination of “democratic”

legislative power and a coercive state apparatus, he can do
whatever he wants. And what he wants now is to “regulate
and intrude” on the personal choices and private lives of
Turkish citizens. While the government has been increasingly
criticized for its growing authoritarianism in recent times, this
new controversy has raised a new question of whether
Erdoğan is inclined to “totalitarianism.”
The idea of creating a “new society” through state

intervention has become obvious to all. A conservative party
28


with Islamist roots appears to be trying to legislate a particular
way of life, using the state apparatus to impose its choice of
morality, lifestyle and value system on the population as a
whole. This is not done by an openly authoritarian regime, but
by a government that holds the mandate to rule and thus
enjoys “democratic legitimacy.”
What we face is neither authoritarianism nor democracy,

but postmodern authoritarianism, which contains both a
“democratic and representative” element and an
“authoritarian social engineering project” informed and
inspired by conservative-Islamic values.
Erdoğan seems to believe that the enactment of Islamʹs

social code as the only legitimate way of life is normal, while
also maintaining elementary standards of democracy. As such,
the governmentʹs move to regulate and intervene in private
houses displays the practice of postmodern authoritarianism
in action.
Yes, the AKP win elections. But the problem for the party
is that it has to keep winning. The ruling party cannot afford
to lose any single elections and has to win all the upcoming
elections and maintain popular support in order to prevent
legal charges of corruption against its leader.
Thus, the party and the state whose institutions now are
comfortably under the control of the party will
understandably do whatever it takes to secure an AKP victory
in every upcoming election.
29


This is tremendous pressure on the AKP and Turkish
politics. The first casualty of this has been the countryʹs
imperfect democracy, which has fallen victim to a
sophisticated authoritarian regime that is built on electoral
performance, Islamic legitimacy, a cult of personality and the
coercive capacity of the state.
As such, it is unlike the secularist authoritarian state of
the Kemalists, which lacked a sound and popular ideology,
never acquired democratic legitimacy and alienated the
conservative majority.
The AKP's “postmodern authoritarianism” combines

electoral legitimacy, Islamic solidarity, the search for a
strong man in Turkish political culture and populist
redistributive policies.
It generates support with an Islamic‐identity politics that
appeals to conservatives and a service‐provision policy that
distributes benefits to the poor while using discursive violence
and coercive power of the state against its opponents.
Can Turkey get out of this entrapment?
Turkey has never experienced such a concentration and

monopolization of power in the hands of a single party or, in
fact, a single person. Can the countryʹs social and economic
dynamics be suppressed by such a power center? In long term,
this may be difficult or even impossible, but the “new state”
seems determined to try. It is displaying the will to do so and
30


assumes that it has the power to ignore Turkeyʹs social and
economic dynamics to purse its own objectives. The result for
Turkey might be catastrophic.
Having already lost its democracy, Turkeyʹs social peace
is now at risk.
Domestic social peace is extremely difficult to maintain

without some degree of democracy. Everyone agrees that
Turkish society has become dangerously polarized along
ethnic, religious and sectarian lines, as well as political
leanings. Political competition has increased social tension.
People appear utterly angry, divided and intolerant of each
other. Assaults on liberties and a loss of hope in democratic
change may deepen social polarization and political tension.
We should bear in mind that social and political chaos
might serve to justify further authoritarianism by the
government. When order collapses, calls for the authority of
the state will be heard. We may therefore end up with a
vicious circle of social turmoil and authoritarian
countermeasures by the government.
Turkey is on its way either to a new state‐society contract
or confrontation. Will the elite of the “new state” opt for
contract or confrontation? 26.5.2013; 10.11.2013; 06.4.2014
31


AKP’s Authoritarian Turn
Explaining the AKP’s Authoritarian Turn
THE IDENTITY OF THE AKP HAS ALWAYS BEEN DEBATED. SOME
have called it “Islamist,” others “center‐right.” The party has
defined itself as “conservative democrat.” Many
commentators, myself included, have viewed the AKP, based
on its discourse and policies, as “socially conservative,
politically liberal.”
The party inherited the core leadership, organization and
grassroots of the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) while appealing to
non‐Islamic social segments with a discourse of democratic
reform and the EU membership objective. From 2002 until
2005, political reforms introduced by the party proved its
commitment to a liberal democratic model.
In those years, it was debated whether the AKP was
really changing to embrace liberal democratic values or simply
hiding its “true agenda,” to Islamize the state and society.
Then, I welcomed the democratic‐liberal turn of the old
Islamists, and did not rule out the possibility of the AKP
33


utilizing liberal political values in its political struggle. I
thought the search for security and legitimacy in the
environment of the Kemalist‐secularist institutional
architecture of the republic shaped the identity of the AKP.
The means and discourse used to achieve those objectives
would also construct a “democratic identity” for the AKP.
Anyhow, the new “liberal political language” of the AKP
empowered it vis‐à‐vis its political opponents. With such a
declared democratizing political agenda, the AKP managed to
build a unique coalition at home, bringing conservatives,
Islamists, liberals, democrats and the Kurds together around
the idea of a democratic and EU‐member Turkey.
Identities are not made of what we assert only about
ourselves; they are also constructed in opposition to the
“others.”
The “other” of the AKP in its early years was the
“tutelage regime” controlled by the military and the judiciary
and supported by radical secularists in politics and civil
society. They regarded the AKP as an outsider, an anomaly,
and as such ideologically unfit to rule despite the popular
mandate. These opponents of the AKP were strong, very
strong, in the state, in media and in business. To come to
power, remain in power and obtain control in power the AKP
had to overcome its opponents.
To do so, the political leverage the AKP had was
democratic electoral politics in which whoever wins the
elections gets the right to rule the country. So the AKP
34


advocated democracy, supremacy of the national will and
Parliament. This was to serve to disable the tutelage system of
the Kemalist elite, claiming the right to rule without “popular
mandate.” The AKP also had discursive leverage as it
developed a “new language” of liberties, human rights and
the rule of law. By advocating these “modern political values”
the AKP established a “discursive supremacy” in addition to
its “electoral supremacy” over its opponents, who still stuck to
the Jacobin method of “top‐down” imposition of Kemalist
values.
Moreover, the EU objective was instrumental in keeping

the Kemalist military and the judiciary at bay. These
institutions of the tutelage had long advocated
Westernization, and now it was very difficult to reject political
reforms introduced by the AKP in order to bring Turkey into
the EU. Thus, the EU membership process helped the AKP
keep its ardent opponents under control and, even further,
undermine their power through EU‐directed reforms.
Such a composition of political sides compelled the

liberal‐democrat circles both at home and abroad to support
the AKP in its struggle against an “undemocratic, nationalist,
inward‐looking” opposition bloc.
In earlier years, the “democratic identity” of the AKP was

instrumental in isolating and overcoming its opponents.
Once its opponents had abandoned their hope of

overthrowing the AKP through undemocratic means due to
35


the power of the “democrat coalition,” the undemocratic
elements in the identity of the ruling party surfaced.
In short, the AKP that struggled against “military

tutelage” and its civilian extensions had to be “democratic.”
Democratization, inter alia, served to weaken its opponents,
i.e., the military and the judiciary.
Today the AKP has won its political struggle. As it has
consolidated its power its perspectives on democracy, human
rights, liberties, the EU membership and pluralism have
dramatically changed. The change started on some specific
policy areas but then it has spread onto the discourse of its
leadership, the language of its grassroots, government policies
and legislations.
What has happened to the AKP?
The ruling AKP has been in power since 2002 wining
three consecutive elections. His founding leader was elected
president in 2014. Such continuous successes naturally boost
the confidence of the party and its leadership.
As a result, the government, instead of deepening

democratic reforms, resolving the Kurdish question and
making a new constitution, opts for populist conservatism,
with economic and social policies designed to satisfy its
supporters. This strategy manifests clearly: While the
demands of conservative members of society are met with
symbolic gestures, such as reintroducing the religious schools,
building a gigantic mosque in Istanbul and debating the
36


banning of abortion, funds are deftly spent on social projects
for the creation of a loyal conservative bourgeoisie.
The result is perfectly satisfactory both for the party and
the conservative masses, despite expressions of
disappointment from some liberal and democrat circles
claiming that the AKP has abandoned its original reformist,
democratizing and pluralistic political characteristics.
It is no surprise, of course, to see that this transformative
agent of Turkey over the last decade, the AKP, has also
transformed itself. It would be a grave mistake to confuse the
current AKP with the one that emerged in 2002, which was
regarded as an anomaly by the establishment, or with the one
that was threatened by a coup attempt in 2007 over the
election of the president, or the one that faced a closure case in
2008. All have passed, and by passing have transformed the
AKP.
Now the party has established itself within the system

and become capable of utilizing the available instruments,
including the military, the ideological educational structure
and the centralized religious institution, the Directorate of
Religious Affairs.
By coercive means and through the ideological instruments

of the state, the “new AKP” is now capable of perpetuating
its political power, social legitimacy and economic strength.
37


Thus the AKP today occupies social and political spaces,
leaving almost nothing outside its reach. This is further
justified by the discourse that the AKP is the party of the
whole nation, and that every person should find a place for
himself or herself within the party. This “invitation” to all is
understandable. But it also implies that the party sees itself as
the embodiment of the nation, the same way the Republican
Peopleʹs Party (CHP) viewed itself in the 1930s.
We should not forget that to claim to represent all
different ideas, identities and interests within a single party is
a homogenizing attitude that does not leave a free social and
political space for autonomous self‐expression of difference. If
agency is monopolized by a single actor that sees itself as the
embodiment of the state, there will be no room for democracy
and pluralism.
As a result the governing AKP has increasingly been

criticized for going authoritarian. These criticisms do not come
from diehard Kemalist opponents of the AKP but from liberal
circles that supported the party’s agenda of democratization.
And these recent criticisms are not altogether baseless. The
once reformist party of Turkey seems to have developed
statist, nationalist and even Islamist tendencies, which are the
likely grounds for a new authoritarian politics.
These tendencies can be discerned in the government’s

approach to the Uludere incident, in which 34 civilians
mistaken for terrorists were killed during a military air strike
near the Turkish‐Iraqi border, as well as its attempts to
38


legislate conservative values into law. We can start with
Uludere, where the government, from the beginning, acted
inconsistently, first admitting there was a mistake and then
making statements to the contrary. An investigation was
initiated, but after six months there still is no answer to the
simple question of who is responsible and what really
happened on that particular day.
Knowing the state tradition, I do understand why we are
not getting straight answers to these questions. What
disturbed me most is the attitude of the government towards
the victims. Tayyip Erdoğan pointed to the compensation paid
to the families of the victims, saying, “The government paid
the compensation, even more than required by law.” Instead
of apologizing Erdoğan seemed to reduce the matter to
compensation. This did not fit well in his own discourse of
“human‐based politics.” What is more is that he asked “why
smugglers do not step on the mines,” implying that the
villagers who were killed by Turkish fighter jets were
collaborating with the PKK, while in fact it is known that this
particular village was in fact the one armed by the state,
known as a “korucu” village.
The government’s Interior Minister went further by

saying that in the Uludere incident where 34 people were
killed by security forces “nothing happened that would
warrant an apology on the part of the government.” He
appalled many when he added, “if those villagers had not
been killed, they would have been tried for smuggling
39


anyway. Now the smuggling case against them is dropped.”
In this picture what is obvious is that the ruling party sides
with and protects state officials and security forces who made
the mistake of killing 34 innocent people. The statist and
nationalist tradition that was inherited from the Islamist
“national view” movement is being revived within the AKP
government.
The most recent debate about abortion reveals another

disturbing ideological element in the AKP. It has become an
observable fact that the ruling party is trying to enact its
conservative values into law. Two weeks ago this slipped out
from the mouth of Erdoğan, who said, “One country, one
nation, one flag and one religion, yes I say religion.” He
repeated his motto adding “one religion” into it in two
subsequent speeches, but after facing severe opposition in the
media he stepped back, saying that the addition of “one
religion” to the motto was mistake.
Mistake or not the fact is that religion has become a
constant reference point in the political arena. The process
started some months ago with a statement from Erdoğan, who
said he wants to “raise a religious generation.” This “wish”
was put into practice by introducing a new education law that
included optional Quran courses and courses on the Prophet’s
life throughout middle and high schools.
The AKP uses public sources and coercive capacity of the

state to raise a “religious generation,” which is basically the
Kemalist policy of “creating a new society” in reverse.
40


Then started a new debate on abortion that is leading to a
new law banning abortion. It is indeed not part of a global
debate between “pro‐life” and “pro‐choice” lines of argument.
The government’s move to ban abortion is due to a sudden
discovery that abortion is a trap for the future of the nation.
Prime Minister Erdoğan justified his sudden anti‐abortion
stand on the argument that “there is an international
conspiracy to erase this nation from the world.” Welcome back
to Erbakan’s world of conspiracies!!!
The following statements from the government side were
revealing indeed. Health Minister Recep Akdağ said: “Even if
the pregnancy is due to rape the mother should give birth. If a
mother does not want to raise the child, the state will look
after it.” Then came another appalling statement from the
head of the Human Rights Commission in Parliament, Ayhan
Sefer Üstün who supported his minister’s stand that even rape
victims should give birth by giving the unfortunate example
of the Bosnian rape victims, saying, “Didn’t the Bosnian
women give birth?”
It seems that discourse and policies of the ruling AKP are
changing dramatically. I think the state power that is now
fully controlled by the AKP is poisoning the party.
Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the

Turkish state. The bureaucratic elite that traditionally acted as
the spokesperson of Kemalism has lost its status within the
state apparatus, while the business elite has queued up to
collect the benefits distributed by the state run now by a non‐
41


Kemalist political elite. The military and the judiciary, the two
strongholds of Kemalism, have bowed to their new master.
Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two

faces of Kemalism, namely radical secularism and ethnic
nationalism, desperately need facelifts. Secularism as a
mechanism to exclude and oppress the conservatives cannot
be sustained. It should be included in a democratic content
that enables all faith groups to exercise full freedom for their
activities. An imagined “single nation of the Turks” is not
convincing, even for nationalist Turks. Recognition of the
Kurdish ethnicity and identity is a must to build social peace
and political order.
All of these would be good for the practice of democracy
in Turkey if only the “new elite” were immune to the bad
habits of the old elite. We see continuities in the usage of the
state apparatus to construct a “particular type of person”. It
seems that “state‐made citizens” is the constant objective of
governments in Turkey, be them Kemalist or conservative.
The end results they seek may be different in form and in
terms of values, but the means used and objectives sought
have not changed.
The attempt at social engineering by the state continues

with the AKP government. This has become visible in the field
of education and in cultural policies. It seems that Primer
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoganʹs stated objective “to raise
religious generations” is shaping the governmentʹs
educational and cultural policies.
42


The use of state power to “form” the minds, choices and
lifestyles of citizens cannot be reconciled with liberal values.
For the AKP, such a policy may be defended as part and
parcel of its conservative identity. But the problem is that once
the AKP uses the state apparatus to construct “conservative
citizens,” by, for instance, reorganizing the educational system
“to raise religious generations,” it appears to be following the
path of Kemalism, which for years sought to create “secular
and Turkish citizens.”
Such a path is not only unethical but is also impractical.
One should also not forget the tension and conflict generated
by cultural policies to create uniform citizens by state
intervention.
It is futile to construct “identities” through state

institutions and policies. If a particular identity is imposed by
the state, it will either fail or succeed. If such a project were to
fail, it would mean the resources used to this end would have
been wasted. Additionally, there would be the cost of the
conflict likely to erupt between the society subjected to
identity transformation and the state imposing its own values.
If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society

subservient to and dependent on the state that has lost its
dynamism, creativity and plurality.
This has been the case in Turkey since the formation of
the republic, when the Kemalist state imposed its own secular
and ethnic values on the masses and the people resisted these
43


state‐imposed identities. So, it is futile to try again, with the
state this time imposing conservatives values that are
“nationalized” by the state.
Besides, such a state would not only be dictating

conservative values to “secular” people, it would also be
imposing a particular set of conservative values on the
conservatives who may be denied their own choice of
conservatism. The teaching religion in all schools, as
envisaged by the recent change in the education system, will
empower the state over society and grant it greater presence in
religious affairs, which is supposed to belong to the realm of
society.
A state that teaches the people their religion steps into the
realm of society, which is where religion belongs. Out of this,
a hierarchical relationship will be built between the state and
society, in favor of the former.
Using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a

conservative society” will result in a post-Kemalist tutelage,
not a post-Kemalist democracy.
Conservative social forces will not be better off under

such a regime because the state will occupy all social space,
eliminating independent social forces, including the
conservative ones.
Should a state design its institutions and policies to create
a “religious generation”? Even if it does this, can it achieve
44


such an objective? On both accounts I think Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has described his government’s
objective as “bringing up religious generation,” is mistaken.
Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at

social engineering. It assumes a hierarchical relationship
between the state and society, and assigns the state the duty
and power to shape the minds, beliefs and lifestyles of the
next generations. This is what the Kemalists tried to do for
decades. Their mission was to “enlighten” the people with
positivist ideas that were expected to erode the influence of
religion over society and thus make it easy to generate loyalty
for the new secular regime. They dictated to the people what
to think, believe in and how to dress. To do this, the Kemalists
designed education, public institutions and law. And in doing
so, the Kemalists destroyed the right to choose, the right to be
different, and thus strangled democracy and pluralism.
Does the AKP now want to follow the same path as the
Kemalists? It seems so. As a conservative political party they
may wish to see the spread of a conservative way of life. This
is natural. But once they use state authorities and public funds
to generate such a society they fall into the trap of
authoritarian top‐down social engineering. From this moment
onwards they will lose the moral ground to criticize all other
attempts of social engineering at the hands of the state.
No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own

“imagined” society. This indicates not only an authoritarian
but also a totalitarian mindset.
45


In the long run it is futile and also not practical. The
Kemalists failed in creating their own “loyal generation.” If
they had succeeded we would have all been Kemalists,
positivists and non‐religious. We are not. Such policies do not
create new generations of either Kemalist or religious masses
but only destroy pluralism and democracy. At the end of the
Kemalist indoctrination that lasted for decades an ex‐Islamist
politician is the prime minister today.
So social engineering does not work. The AKP leadership
should know this the best. But the issue is not whether it is
possible to generate a “new generation,” the issue is that a
government trying to do this will turn into an authoritarian
one, dictating its own worldview to the people by using state
authority and public funds.
It is more an issue of democracy and pluralism than
secularism. Yet it clearly contradicts the notion of secularism
defended by the AKP itself as freedom of religion and
conscience and neutrality of the state vis‐à‐vis all religions.
Once the government asserts that “bringing up religious
generations” is its governmental objective, this will constitute
an intervention in the consciences of people. Here the term
“religious generations” obviously refers to Islamic religiosity
and a particular Sunni interpretation of it. Thus a state with
such a mission violates the neutrality principle of secularism.
In a normal secular state, even in the one so far advocated by
the AK Party, it is not the duty of the state to bring up
religious or non‐religious generations.
46


You may wish to live in a society in which religious
values and practices are upheld. This is perfectly fine.
Individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs and religious
circles should be free to spread their word. The problem is that
once you try to do it by using state authority and public funds,
you may end up with a state with a religious mission.
05.02.2012; 22.7.2012; 06.05.2012; 09.09.2012
Neither democrat nor conservative
The AKP used to be an agent of change in Turkey. It
transformed Turkish politics, eliminated the Kemalist‐
secularist old establishment and integrated conservative social
and economic groups into the state.
From its inception, the AKP posed as a centrist party,

distancing itself from its Islamist roots and embracing values
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It advocated
a free market economy, favored globalization and strove for
EU membership. In comparison to other alternatives, it
appeared the most “progressive” political party in line with
democratic values and in aspiring for integration into the
democratic world.
The Islamists in the past had never taken democracy

seriously. It was regarded as an alien system invented in the
West without any relevance to the governance of Islamic
societies. Their identity had been shaped by a sweeping
opposition to the West, the process of Westernization in
Turkey and what the West stood for in general. An Islamic
47


society, ambiguously and prudently named the “just society,”
was to be formed under the government of the “National
View,” the name the Islamist movement gave itself.
Departing from such a political tradition and adopting a
new identity was a monumental move on the part of the
Islamists in Turkey. I also hailed the AKP as demonstrating
the capability of the Islamists to transform themselves in the
face of the new challenges. Surely, the transformation of the
Islamists did not take place in vain. In the 1990s, their political
parties were closed down, leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
were imprisoned, foundations and associations were closed by
the Kemalist‐secularist establishment. For the Islamists,
embracing democratic values and a pro‐Western stance in
foreign policy was thus a matter of survival. As they were
isolated, intimidated and suppressed by the Kemalists in
Turkey, the Islamists sought protection in democracy and in
EU membership.
Their response was to come up with a new discourse,

leadership and themes representing a total break from its
Islamist past. Emerging as a centrist, democratic, pro‐market
economy and pro‐EU political movement, the AKP won the
2002 elections receiving the votes not only of the Islamists but
also those of center‐right voters. The new party was no longer
an Islamist but a centrist political party, appealing to the
masses, not just marginal Islamists.
The AKP faced resistance within the state from the old
Kemalist elites. To break the resistance of the anachronistically
48


Jacobin, anti‐democratic and inward‐looking old
establishment, the AKP pushed for reforms and
democratization steps, eliminating the power and influence of
the Kemalists‐secularists in the state.
But when it became clear by 2010 that the AKP had won
the ʺstruggleʺ against the old establishment and held the state
apparatus, we started to see a different face of the AKP:
authoritarian, exclusionary and interventionist, inclined to
conspiracy theories and skeptical of the West. While
democracy is now reduced to a ballot box notion of
majoritarianism, Islamic themes under the cover of
conservatism have been revived.
Just like the Kemalist regime tried to raise “loyal citizens,”

the AKP embarked on constructing its own “conservative
society” by using the state apparatus.
Especially centralized educational systems and the state‐

run religious networks are mobilized to this end. Furthermore,
ʺother identities” are treated as “anomalies” and “morally
low,” deserving to be “corrected.” This mindset has been
repeatedly demonstrated by statements made by the prime
minister that amount to interferences in peopleʹs private lives
and choices.
Turkeyʹs Erdogan has emerged as a cult leader. He is

treated as infallible and unaccountable by his supporters, who
try to silence whoever is critical of him. Any issue is linked to
his very personality and survival, leading to a revival of the
49


securitization of Turkish politics, especially after the Gezi
protests. With securitization, authoritarian tendencies surface.
In foreign policy, too, we see a new AKP that

aggressively interferes in the domestic affairs of regional
countries in the name of Islamic solidarity. From Syria to
Egypt and to the Gulf, the government has become party to a
Sunni axis vis‐à‐vis Iran. The prime minister repeatedly asks
for membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) instead of going for the EU. 24.11.2013
The AKP does not look like the party established in 2001
that championed democracy, human rights, a market economy
and EU membership. It is no longer the centrist party that we
used to know but one akin to a radical and adventurist
political movement ready to use the state apparatus and mass
political mobilization for its political survival.
The ruling AKP, in its early years of government, claimed
to be a conservative and democratic party. At times it acted as
such, demonstrating that a reformed Islamist party could
soften its ideological stance and embrace democracy as their
form of governance. It continued to appeal to the masses with
religious symbolism and discourse, but abandoned Islamism
as a comprehensive program for the state and society. Initially
during the AKP rule, Islam became more visible and Islamic
networks enjoyed the utmost freedom after years of
authoritarian secularism, and flourished. The AKP did
advocate a conservative social vision that included
moderation, family values, social solidarity, the glorification of
history, a dislike of alcohol consumption, etc.
50


More recently, the ruling party has gathered confidence to
seek a more assertive social agenda, imposing its values
through state apparatuses both to please its religious
grassroots supporters and intimidate its secular opponents.
This has turned into a new form of social engineering to
create a “new society” and “raise a religious generation,”
which goes far beyond a ʺconservativeʺ political agenda.
Besides, “conservative values” are being increasingly

questioned as a result of a recent corruption probe involving
top government people and their relatives. The attempt of the
government to cover up corruption allegations and stop the
investigation has added to a questioning of the moral values
claimed to be upheld by the ruling party. A system of
corruption and money laundering can hardly be justified on
any moral ground. Repeated lies made by people who occupy
public office, a government‐orchestrated media mechanism
spreading black propaganda and disclosed cases in which
Erdoğan himself intervenes in the daily management of media
outlets is eroding the image of morality championed by the
“conservative” AKP.
Moreover, the AKP has undermined the standing of

Islamic orders and groups. The AKP wants to establish a
monopoly over religious activities and networks, trying to
subordinate them all to its will and preferences.
Once autonomous social forces, Islamic groups have

come under the control of the government in return for
government funds and posts. In this patronage relationship,
51


the autonomy and self‐sufficiency of Islamic groups has been
left out. The damage of this dependency on the government is
that, in the long run, it will be very hard for Islamic orders and
groups to survive in the aftermath of the AKP rule.
Islamic activities and groups have been discredited as a

result of the governmentʹs attempt to control them all. This has
set a precedent for future governments with a strict secularist
agenda. If Turkey experiences an authoritarian secularist
regime again, all Islamic groups and networks may face
oppressive policies that follow from the policies and discourse
of the current “conservative government.”
In short, it is hard to regard the AKP as a conservative
party any longer. Its discourse, policies and core supporters
appear more radical and doctrinaire, determined to use the
state apparatus to perpetuate a rule of religious
authoritarianism, an authoritarianism justified and
popularized by Islamic references.
The ruling party has consumed all of its democratic

credentials. Under their control, Turkey is departing from
democracy with every new law passed by Parliament and
each regulation introduced by the government. For a long
time, the ruling party has given up bothering to look
democratic and respect the rule of law. The kind of a regime
that the ruling AKP is trying to establish has nothing to do
with democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Erdoğanʹs
is an authoritarian regime justified and popularized by
religious symbolism and monopolized by the AKP.
52


It is like a disease that was passed from the Kemalists to
the conservatives: making choices that people are supposed to
make. The Kemalists used to dictate who should rule, what
the people should believe in and wear and who to be. Now the
conservative government is inclined to do similar things. A
conservative way of life is encouraged by the state. “Raising a
religious generation,” as expressed by Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, was the motto of these efforts.
The Kemalists did not like democracy. They feared that

the people would not elect the “right” people in government ‐‐
the “right” people being the Kemalists themselves. Now the
conservatives do not like the “freedom to choose,” fearing that
the people would not choose the “right moral values,” thus
preaching morality ‐‐ the morality that they uphold.
I always believe in the freedom of ideas and to live the
way you choose. Once the state, with its resources, institutions
and authority, tries to promote something, then it is very
difficult for it to refrain from interfering in the realm of
individual choices. Interferences have come to the level of
choosing “the TV shows that people should watch.”
Erdoğan went on air condemning the TV series “The

Magnificent Century” and threatened the producers and the
owner of the TV channel which broadcasts the soap. “I
publicly condemn the directors of those shows and the owners
of the television station. We have warned the authorities on
this matter and await a decision by the judiciary. We canʹt
have this sort of an understanding; the nation needs to teach
53


the appropriate lesson, within the confines of the law, to those
who play with the peopleʹs values,” he said.
Here is a self‐righteous moralist speaking in Erdoğan. He
is becoming increasingly paternalistic: He knows whatʹs best
for the people. I remember his political career as the leader of
the AKP was entirely centered on challenging this
presumption of the Kemalists. He now poses to protect people
from harmful TV shows. This is an attitude assuming that
people are not mature enough to decide what is good or bad
for them. So they need a “benevolent ruler,” a tutelary leader
who can protect and decide on their behalf.
Both are types of elitism that do not consider people as
the ultimate decision maker. Following the “condemnation
and threats” of Erdogan, the people made “The Magnificent
Century” the most‐watched series for that night.
The message is clear: Do not interfere in the choices of the
people.
In the past I opposed the headscarf ban for university

students on the grounds that women have the right to choose
what to wear and did not need the state to tell them what to
wear, what to do, what to think or who to be.
Now, for some time I have noticed a similar attitude

among the members of the ruling party. The very top of the
party, Erdoğan, acts as if he is entitled to interfere in the lives
and choices of the people, as if he is responsible for their
choices.
54


The mandate to rule seems to have been interpreted by the
AKP rulers as a blank check to transform the identities and
lifestyles of the people.
To construct a conservative society via the state apparatus
is very similar to the efforts of the Kemalists to create a secular
society. This is unacceptable. Such “social engineering”
attempts distort the state‐society relationship. Those who try
to create a new society by using the state apparatus assume
that they are entitled to “shape” the minds, attitudes and
appearances of society.
It is wrong to assume that the people do not know what
is good for them. This “assumption” is wrong whether it is
made by Kemalists or by conservatives. Better not to play
“moralists” and stop viewing your mission as the salvation of
the people.
A “paternalistic state” is the last step before an

“authoritarian” one.
The bottom line is that any social engineering project

views society from above and sees a hierarchical relationship
between the state (the rulers) and the society, with the former
at the top. Such a view of society does not naturally give birth
to democracy but an authoritarian form of government.
24.11.2013; 23.02.2014; 02.12.2012
55


De‐Democratization of the
“New Turkey”
State and Society in Post‐Kemalist Turkey
WHAT CHARACTERIZES TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE IS ITS
state‐centrism: an omnipotent state shapes society and rules it
with or without the consent of the people.
In addition to the culture that treats the state as the key to
national survival there was once an ideology that placed the
state above the people: Kemalism. It was the founding idea of
the Turkish state that instructed its rulers to “modernize” the
country, of course under the leadership of the Kemalist elite,
disregarding whether the people supported it or not. A kind
of white manʹs burden; in our case the burden was on the
shoulders of the Kemalist elite.
However such a model could not survive the post World
War II era during which Turkey had to seek a Western alliance
vis‐à‐vis the Soviet threat, thus involuntarily moving into an
era of multi‐party politics. With the transition to competitive
politics the Democrat Party (DP) won three consecutive
57

De‐Democratization of the “New Turkey”

elections and dominated politics in the 1950s. Yet the leaders
of the DP did not have absolute control within the party.
Members of Parliament enjoyed great liberties because their
nomination in elections was determined locally by the party
delegation. So the party branches maintained great autonomy
vis‐à‐vis the center of the party and the members of
parliament. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes then had great
difficulties in managing the party group and provincial
branches due to the fact that both enjoyed a significant degree
of autonomy from the center.
State‐centrism remained an element of popular culture

but the people managed to underline their agency in politics.
As the Democrat Party emphasized people power vis‐à‐vis the
state power controlled by the CHP since single party years the
idea of “national will” sounded sacrosanct. The owners of the
national will, the people, were powerful as the agent, limiting
and shaping the state not vise versa.
With the military coup of 1960 a new narrative on old
institutional and cultural structure was built. Democracy was
formally reintroduced, the national will was curbed by civil
and military bureaucracy, and Kemalism was
instrumentalized as the ideology of the civil‐military
bureaucracy. This was a model of tutelage of the state (the
state elite and the Kemalist ideology) over society. The 1961
constitution thus ended the relative autonomy of society vis‐à‐
vis the state.
Democracy then was turned into an instrument of

generating consent for a state‐centric model of governance.
58


The multi‐party years after 1961 refer to such a model. A
formal democracy with elections and political parties existed,
but only to provide legitimacy for the power relationship
between the elected representatives of the people and the
bureaucratic representatives of the state.
Under such a model democrats with different political

views struggled against the tutelage of the bureaucracy
including the military and of the Kemalist ideology. They
complained that the state, its bureaucrats and ideology
occupied the space of the political depriving the people to act
independently from the state. The idea was that the political
actors, institutions and agenda should be freed from the
tutelage of the state; politics should be independent of the
stateʹs interferences with an autonomous space of its own to act.
Over the recent years this idea has overwhelmed the

tutelage model. Though constitutional and institutional roots
of tutelage are intact their actors have lost control in practice.
Now a political actor the AKP with strong popular legitimacy
controls the power independent of old “state elite” and its
ideology, Kemalism. Yet the state is still the central agency in
Turkey. With a difference of course: in the past the state was
represented by the Kemalist elite and institutions like the
military, judiciary, universities etc. while the elected
government enjoyed only limited power.
Now the integration of the two into one under the
leadership of the ruling AKP has not granted society the status
of an autonomous agent vis‐à‐vis the state. The culture of
59


dependence on the state continues and many view Tayyip
Erdoğan as a “fatherly figure.” As opposed to expectations the
(new) state is willing and capable of interfering in society. It is
the state that decides on matters that are supposed to fall into
the realm of the personal let alone the social.
In the past democrats called for an autonomous space for

the political vis-à-vis the state. Now, after the marriage of
the state and the political agency they demand autonomy of
society from the realm of politics.
Without an autonomous social space Turkey cannot

evolve into democracy. But those who used to believe and
support such autonomous social space, now cannot survive
without the support of the (new) state.
It is a big lesson to learn that the end of military tutelage
does not necessarily mean the delivery of democracy.
Authoritarianism may continue in different forms at the

hands of new actors unless the relationship between the state
and society changes fundamentally.
Popular culture treats the state as the primary actor on
which its survival depends. The sense of insecurity is so deep
and widespread that the state is seen as the source of the
peopleʹs salvation and wellbeing. Such a political culture was
surely constructed in Turkeyʹs modern history and was
shaped by a central focus on how to save the state.
60


The result is a Turkey in which the state is known as a
“father‐state.” What form would the relationship between the
state and society take in such a mental and cultural
framework? Once the state has been elevated to a paternal
position, there would naturally be a hierarchical relationship
between the two. The state would be empowered while
society would lose its agency and autonomy. As long as the
state is viewed as an omnipotent and transcendental entity,
democracy cannot flourish.
The experience of recent years in Turkey tells us that this

hierarchical relationship between the state and society does
not change whether the state is controlled by Kemalists or
conservatives.
Turkish political culture has not been able to free itself
from state domination, which is still the central, constituting
entity, by means of its own reason dʹêtre, independent of
society.
This argument of course begs the theoretical question as

to whether or not the state is closed to the influence of society.
In fact, even a nascent democracy in which parties compete to
receive the mandate of the people to rule is supposed to
transform the state‐society relationship in favor of the latter.
That is to say, society is expected to set limits for the state and
define its characteristics, not vice versa.
In a normal democracy, the social shapes the political.

However, in a country like Turkey, where the state tradition
61


and culture is strong and society has internalized a state‐
dominated relationship, we can talk about the state and
society as if they are distinct entities without interaction. More
than just a relationship without interaction, it is hierarchical.
This, I think, comes with the distributive power of the

state. By “distributive power,” I refer to the ability of the state
to punish and reward. With its ever‐growing resources and
punitive capabilities, the state is in a position to dominate
society. It is capable of destroying even powerful social and
economic actors but also it has the power to elevate them. We
can still speak of a Turkish state that is capable of distributing
wealth and status. There is no need to say that this form of
relationship deprives society of its autonomy with regards to
the state.
The culture of subordination to the state has been

reinforced in recent years by the distributive capabilities of
the state.
The so‐called “service politics” of the AKP has developed
relationship of clientalism between the party and voters.
Today, the state is the greatest distributive actor, transferring
benefits not only to the poor but also to the rich via state
tenders.
It provides the people with benefits and, in return,

expects loyalty from them. Those who do not display loyalty
may be deprived of the benefits. With this distributive power,
the state has co‐opted the people and continued the
62


hierarchical relationship between the state and society,
surprisingly even within electoral politics.
It is not only the poor but also the rich that need to win
the favor of the state. In a country where the people both rich
and poor are dependent on the state for their well‐being, you
cannot build democracy. This is the structural problem of
Turkish democracy. 10.03.2013; 05.05.2013
Turkey’s pendulum: democratic and autocratic axes
The Ergenekon case was an opportunity for Turkey to mature
its democracy, reform its judicial system and enhance the rule
of law. The outcome hasnʹt seemed to live up to the
expectations. No one can deny that Turkey had a coup
problem. Since 1960 Turkey has experienced three direct
military coups, one postmodern coup in 1997 and an
attempted coup by memorandum in 2007. The Turkish state
has been run under constitutions written by the military since
1961. Institutions, norms and processes that regulate the
operation of politics have been shaped by the military
constitutions.
Forming networks for coups became part of the militaryʹs
institutional culture. An over‐politicized military that neither
trusted nor respected the civilian leaders of the country was
constantly interfering in government affairs. They viewed
themselves not only as soldiers but the true owners of the
state. They acted as if they had an ultimate right to rule, based
on their assumption that they owned the state and their role as
63


the keepers of Kemalist ideology. The latter distinguished the
Turkish military from other Third World authoritarian
military rules and enabled it to sow its influence in the state
under the cover of protecting the official state ideology,
Kemalism.
Once the military gained the status of ultimate protector
of Kemalism, it was only a matter of will to act as the
supervisor of political actors and processes. Will was never
lacking after 1960, and a model was developed in line with
this “supervisory” role for the military. The model had to meet
the militaryʹs political ambitions while appearing
“democratic.”
These formative years were the years of the Cold War,
and Turkey was part of the Western alliance, a member of
NATO and other Western institutions. It would look very bad
to have a Turkey that opted for a permanent military regime
in the club. Besides, the Turkish military, under the influence
of the Kemalist discourse of Westernization, wanted to keep
up appearances. Thus, instead of an outright military regime,
a model was developed in Turkey called “tutelary
democracy,” in which the military would not govern but rule
by setting up an institutional and normative framework for
politics with a built‐in right to intervene directly at times of
“crises” in the name of “protecting the regime.” As a result,
the military made the rules and supervised their
implementation, starting with the 1960 coup.
64


Elections were held and civilian governments ruled, but
all within the limits set by the military and with the condition
that the rules of the game ‐‐ set by the military ‐‐ could not be
challenged. So democracy was never a genuinely liberal
democracy, but a tutelary one.
After years of struggle by politicians and social actors

committed to the idea of full‐fledged liberal democracy,
military tutelage seems to have ended. The ruling AKP has
played a central role in this process as the political agent of
demands for democracy. Through a series of constitutional
reforms, unwavering political stances and judicial processes
the central, autonomous and dominating role of the military in
Turkish politics has come to an end.
But Turkeyʹs search for democracy continues. The problem
is that neither the Ergenekon trial nor civilian control over the
military have brought a better and deeper model of democracy.
Yes, as an obstacle to establishing a democratic regime, the
military has been pushed aside. But this historic opportunity has
been hijacked by a power‐hungry political class.
Military tutelage is over, but the monopolization of power

and the usage of the state apparatus to dominate society
seem to be the central concerns of the new “power elite,”
not building a genuine democracy.
We are going through a period that reminds us of the bad
old days, the days when fear reigned and securitization
blocked the process of democratization.
65


But a short time ago, we were talking about the
possibility of making a new constitution, Turkeyʹs rise in the
region and emergence of it as a model for the post‐Arab
Spring countries, its economic successes and the expansion of
its civil society and economic actors into the region.
Now, the whole world ‐‐ including a significant portion

of people at home ‐‐ is discussing whether Turkey is on the
brink of an authoritarian regime. I think those who have
contributed to the making of a post‐Kemalist new Turkey do
not deserve such an end‐result.
The Kemalist authoritarians, who lacked popular

support, relied on the state apparatus to suppress and shape
the society according to their imaginary “ideal nation.” They
controlled and used the military, the judiciary and the high
bureaucracy against the majority, i.e., the conservatives, the
Kurds, the liberals and the democrats. They generated their
right to rule from their adherence to the founding ideology of
the republic: Kemalism. The reference to Kemalism as the
rightful claim to rule was in fact a “speech act” to exclude
conservatives, the Kurds and the liberals from the political
center. The Kemalists had a mission: to construct a new
society, one enlightened and liberated from the dogmas of
Islam, the past and traditions. In this, secularism came in
handy, first as a discursive tool to alienate the conservative
masses from the state, its central values and the ruling elite so
that the conservatives could not claim “ownership” of such a
state. Secularism also provided the Kemalist elite with a
66


never‐ending justification to resort to authoritarian methods in
government vis‐à‐vis “ignorant” and “backward”
conservatives.
But the Kemalists of the old regime still needed to rally
the support of the people at large; they were aware that they
could not always rely on coercion. To mobilize people in favor
of the state, they successfully invoked fear; insecurity; and the
perception that Turkey was surrounded by enemy nations,
that those external enemies had internal collaborators and that
Turkeyʹs territorial integrity was constantly being threatened,
etc. What came out of this is that it did not matter who ruled
Turkey, nor how. What mattered was uniting against the
external and internal enemies of Turkey and rallying behind
the state for the survival of the nation. The result was the
securitization of politics, society and daily life, postponing the
demands for democracy, human rights and respect for
differences.
After 1999, the double sources of authoritarianism ‐‐

Kemalist secularism and securitization ‐‐ had come to a halt.
Secularism was then interpreted in a more plural and
inclusive manner and a process of de‐securitization was
initiated via the democratization of domestic politics and a
cooperation‐based approach to foreign policy.
Instead of institutionalizing this “new Turkey” by

making a liberal‐democratic constitution, the AKP
government has recently moved to create a mirror image of
the “old Turkey.” Tayyip Erdoğan even repeated a slogan of
67


old Turkey: “Will the feet (the ordinary people) become the
head (the rulers)?” It is really hard to believe, but Erdoğan has
even started to borrow the vocabulary of old‐Kemalist Turkey.
Now, not secularism but its antidote, Islam, is used by the
government to generate support and legitimacy.
Increasing references to Islamic values and symbols by the

prime minister is turning into a “speech act” to exclude and
marginalize secular demands and social segments.
This strategy of utilizing Islam is certainly meant to

generate a religious legitimacy, in addition to democratic
legitimacy, to the ruling party.
Then the Gezi Park protests came and we saw how the
government has turned the protests into a justification for the
securitization of Turkish politics, society and even the
economy. Not only foreign governments but also international
social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook, NGOs, the
stock market, banks, artists, journalists, etc., are treated as
potential enemies aiming to bring‐down the AKP government
and Erdoğan. A new wave of fear, threats and insecurity is
being spread through the speeches of Erdoğan and pro‐
government media.
While struggling for a “rule by law” to reign in this
country, we are about to end up with a new wave of “rule by
fear” under an AKP that seems to have shifted its
democratizing axis. 11.08.2013
68


Turkey’s new path: de‐democratization
I do not claim that Turkey has ever been a fully functioning
liberal democracy. Its democracy can be described as limited,
electoral and imperfect. But even this seems at risk today.
The ruling Justice and Development Party is no longer an
asset for democratization in Turkey as it used to be, but a
liability. The way it responded to the social, legal and ethical
challenges that it has encountered since the Gezi Park protests
displays its readiness to sacrifice democracy and the rule of law.
This choice of the government seems purely pragmatic.

As it appears very difficult to diffuse social opposition to
Erdoğanʹs increasingly authoritarian rule and to stop legal
charges of corruption against members of the government by
remaining committed to the requirements of democracy and
the rule of law, the ruling party does not hesitate to give up on
them.
The problem is that the AKP managed to appeal to non‐
Islamist votes with its centrist and democratic standing, and to
a very large extent generated its legitimacy from its apparent
commitment to democracy. No doubt the years of the AKP
rule have created its own network of patronage, yet it is hard
to believe that an increasingly authoritarian party that resorts
to identity politics and whose public spokespeople have
happened to be hardcore Islamists would continue to appeal
to centrist voters, especially amid allegations of massive
corruption within the government.
69


Aware of this, the AKP leadership resorts to identity
politics on the one hand and to the politics of securitization on
the other. Through identity politics it tries to create a sense of
solidarity and self‐identification with the AKP among Islamic
and conservative masses. While this may be effective to some
extent, it may also portray the new AKP as Islamist, marginal
and non‐mainstream.
The politics of securitization pursued since the Gezi Park

protests has aimed to create a sense of emergency and fear
that justifies undemocratic and unlawful measures.
It evokes conspiracy theories, a siege mentality, suspicion
and enmity toward the world as well as vigilance against
inside forces collaborating with one another.
The utility of this securitization of politics is manifold:

The masses are mobilized; opposition and dissenting voices
are associated with international plots and are thus silenced;
authoritarian measures are justified. Under such
circumstances, a de facto emergency rule can be established.
This is in fact what has happened in Turkey since the Gezi
Park protests: With conspiracy theories and claims of plots
against the government, a de facto emergency rule that does
not abide by the principles of the rule of law and the
separation of powers has been justified and gradually
established.
In this context, it makes sense why Erdogan is

persistently using a language of warfare in his political
70


statements. Political struggle is described as the “second war of
independence” referring to Turkeyʹs War of Independence in
1920‐1922. Opponents are portrayed as enemies, traitors,
collaborators of foreign powers, agents, etc. As such, they are to
be annihilated, wiped out and destroyed by the might of the
state. Any challenge to the AKP is regarded not as legitimate
political opposition but as an existential threat to the ruling
party believed to be the embodiment of the state and the nation.
The problem is that all of this reinforces the image of the
ruling party as an authoritarian power, which decreases its
democratic legitimacy. This in turn leads the AKP to rely on
the coercive capacity of the state to rule and eliminate any
challenging actors in the social, political and judicial spheres.
In this way, the AKP, once a democratizing force in

Turkish politics, has become a risk for democracy, even for a
limited version of it. The party leadership has come to view
democracy as the unlimited rule of the majority, abandoned
its belief in the constitutional principle of the separation of
powers and begun to breach fundamental rights and civil
liberties.
Thus, it is not surprising that Freedom House, in its 2013
report, warned, “Civil liberties are at risk in Turkey.” I think
not only civil liberties but also democracy and the rule of law
as they stand today are at risk in Turkey. Can Turkey
overcome this risk? Maybe. Or it may go into an irreversible
path of authoritarianism.
71


It is hard to believe that in its fight for survival since the
graft probe was revealed, the government seems ready to
undo all the reforms it has introduced. Instead of going down
in history as one of the most reformist governments in Turkey,
it may be remembered as the one that invalidated its own
reforms.
The AKP was expected to consolidate democracy,

institutionalize the rule of law and deepen respect for human
rights. After an impressive record of reforms on the path to
EU membership, the party has turned against its own success,
reversing the process of reform.
The AKP today has become a liability for Turkish democracy,

as it has reduced democracy to the ballot box, breached the
constitutional principle of separation of powers and violated
fundamental rights.
This finale is surely a disappointment to those who, in

anticipation of a more democratic regime, supported the AKP
in its fight to overcome the undemocratic tutelage of the
military. While fighting against the Kemalist‐secularist
establishment, the AKP championed democracy, human rights
and the rule of law, but once it won the battle and eliminated
the military‐Kemalist tutelage, resulting in the consolidation
of its power within the state, it forgot all about those values it
preached at the outset.
The moment the AKP secured its power within the state,
it started to act like the old Kemalist state. Using the state
72


apparatus, it has tried to construct its own “imagined nation,”
i.e., a “conservative society” of subordinate individuals and
civil society that is expected to be “loyal” and punish its
opponents.
Viewing the world with a siege mentality and describing the

world in conspiratorial terms, the AKP has securitized
politics, which is then used to justify the authoritarian turn.
Since the Gezi protests, the government has come to

regard democracy, human rights and the rule of law not as a
source of strength but of vulnerability. Assuming the role of a
status quo power and acting as such, the AKP treats these
values and mechanisms as something likely to be “used” by its
opponents. The Gezi protests and the corruption probe have
reinforced the prevailing perception in the AKP leadership
that the previous reforms introduced by the party ties its
hands, limits its means to respond and thus, increases its
vulnerability vis‐à‐vis its opponents, and that it is not possible
to avert the social and legal challenges emerging against the
party by remaining within the boundaries of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
As a result, the ruling party seems to have decided to
relieve itself of the constraints of democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and the separation of powers.
The outcome is the current process of rolling back the
democratic reforms that were introduced by the government
itself during its days of struggle against the old status quo.
73


With this background we can understand the recent
interferences of the government in the judiciary, the purge of
police forces, the draft bills presented to Parliament about the
Internet and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors
(HSYK).
If the government is determined to discard democracy,

human rights and the rule of law, the worst may be yet to
come. Turkeyʹs pendulum is swinging back to where it was.
Yet it must be rare in the world to find a political actor
becoming both an agent of democratization and de‐
democratization within the span of a few years. 26.01.2014;
12.01.2014
Who is ‘questioning democracy’?
When the coup brought down the presidency of Mohammed
Morsi in Egypt, who was elected as a candidate of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the concern was that the Brotherhood would
become disenchanted with democracy, go underground and
resort to violent means to take power.
The Brotherhood resisted the coup peacefully. Millions of
Morsiʹs supporters and Brotherhood members took to the
streets, and hundreds were brutally murdered by the coup
regime. However, their struggle against the regime was based
on the notion of democracy. Their demand has been to restore
democracy and reinstall Morsi as president, since he is the
rightful and democratically elected president of Egypt. The
very legitimacy of their struggle is derived from the pro‐
74


democracy discourse they employ against the coup regime.
The fact that they refrain from violence despite very heavy
provocation increases their legitimacy. So, democratic
discourse and non‐violent political strategy are two valuable
sources of legitimacy and support for the pro‐Morsi groups in
Egypt.
While many were expecting disenchantment with

democracy among the members of the Brotherhood,
democracy was questioned by someone believed to represent
the idea that Islam and democracy are harmonious. This
person is Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
In a press conference reacting to the situation in Egypt

and criticizing the attitude of the West, he said “from now on
democracy will be questioned not only in the world but also in
Turkey.”
Only a day or two after, in a pro‐Morsi demonstration in
Istanbul organized by Islamists, a banner appeared saying,
“Down with Sisi, down with democracy.” This is undoubtedly
the action of a radical Islamist group that is hostile to the idea
of democracy.
It is hard to understand how the government and the
Islamist demonstratorsʹ logic works. It is the coup, not
democracy that is to blame for the current crisis and massacres
in Egypt. Hundreds were killed not by a democratic
government but a brutal military regime. So why do they
blame or question democracy? Besides, there is irony in this.
75


While the Islamists from the Brotherhood are calling for
democracy in Egypt, the ruling party and the Islamists in
Turkey start questioning democracy.
Questioning democracy does not bring Turkey closer to

the Brotherhood or help its cause, as it now strives for a
democratic Egypt according to their demands. On the
contrary, questioning democracy would only justify the coup
regime, since it is the one that has not come to power through
democratic means and is unwilling to give the government to
a democratically elected body. The Egyptian people are not
suffering because of democracy but due to an absence of
democracy.
It is also ironic because it was Turkey and the AKP that
were pointed to as a model for post‐Arab Spring countries in
the Middle East, as they merged democracy and an Islamic
identity together successfully.
So, why do they blame and question democracy?
At the moment we do not know whether the discourse of
“questioning democracy” is just a sentimental reaction or a
doctrinal rejection. If it is due to a sentimental reaction, it is
misconstrued. In any case, it does not help the Brotherhood in
Egypt restore its power. If it is a doctrinal rejection, this
increases doubts about the democratic credentials of the
Islamists not only in Turkey but in Egypt too.
Especially at a time when the ruling party is increasingly
criticized for becoming authoritarian, talk of “questioning
76


democracy” at the highest level is deeply worrying. While
expecting an “advanced democracy” as promised by Erdoğan
only a few years earlier, the ruling party seems now to have
adopted an understanding that reduces democracy to the
ballot‐box, where the one with a majority dominates the rest
without the restraints of civil rights and fundamental
freedoms. If democracy is further “questioned,” using Egypt
as an excuse, it is not difficult to guess what kind of regime we
will be living with in Turkey.
Social disturbances and political dissidence cannot and

should not be used as an excuse to leave democracy. The
drama of Egypt should teach us that democracy is one of the
best conflict‐management mechanisms to build and maintain
peace. 18.08.2013
Will an isolated Turkey remain a democracy?
During the AKP years, Turkey has not been isolated from the
world to the extent that it is now. It is not due to the foreign
policy problems it has encountered but instead with the way a
domestic political crisis has been externalized by the
government.
As foreign actors and interests are being found to be
responsible for what has happened in Turkey during the the
nationwide anti‐government protests, a revival of the old view
that Turkey is surrounded by enemies is taking place.
In fact, one of the greatest successes of the AKP rule was
to challenge this inward‐looking xenophobic worldview of the
77


Kemalist. The government, under the leadership of Prime
Minister Erdoğan, had abandoned the security‐centric view
that looks for enemies around the world and in the
neighborhood. Instead, the government looked for areas of
cooperation in the region, developing a policy of zero
problems with neighbors. A shift seemed to take place from a
conflict driven, security‐centric paradigm to one of
cooperation, partnership, dialogue and mediation. And I
strongly supported this, labeling it a “paradigm shift” in
Turkish foreign and security policy.
During those years, the AKP grassroots supported the

policy of integration with the world and neighborhood while
Turkish business and civil society explored the opportunities
that emerged out of this policy. Then we started to talk about
Turkeyʹs rising soft power in the region, and after the Arab
Spring, Turkey was depicted as a “model country.”
All of a sudden, with the Gezi Park protests the ruling party
has swung to the world of conspiracies, explaining domestic
problems by references to foreign plots.
For them, it is the foreign governments, NGOs, media

networks and intelligence organizations that are provoking
and promoting anti‐government protests in Turkey.
Opponents are linked to “international conspiracies”
determined to stop the rise of Turkey and bring down
Erdoğan. This reflects a mindset that views the world in the
lens of enmity, not partnership and cooperation.
78


It is not only Turkey where “international dark forces”
are trying to create a “Turkish Spring,” pro‐government
journalists argue. The Arab Spring was also instigated,
organized and managed by Western intelligence
organizations, say these journalists, forgetting that the Turkish
prime minister Erdogan himself gave his utmost support to
the Arab Spring and was welcomed later by the revolutionary
people of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as a hero.
It is really hard to explain this sudden change of “world
view” among the AKP leadership. Once, the AKP looked very
progressive. It was the party that started membership
negotiations with the EU, and was proud of this.
Foreign capital was welcomed by the AKP. A series of

laws easing foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey were
passed by the AKP majority in Parliament. It was a point of
pride for the ruling party to say that the amount of FDI during
the AKP years has surpassed the amount throughout the
republican era.
When the ruling party was doing all these things, it was
accused by the Kemalist‐secularist block of being a lackey of
international actors, selling Turkeyʹs assets to foreigners,
bowing to Western powers. The opposition to the AKP then
was anti‐West, anti‐globalization and anti‐market economy.
Everything foreign was suspicious and even dangerous for
them.
Now, the AKP is copying the discourse and the

arguments of its opponents. With such a conspiratorial view,
79


distancing itself from the EU, European institutions,
individual European countries, the US, international NGOs,
the media, etc. will result in the isolation of Turkey from the
world.
Foreign policy problems can be resolved in time, but an

inward-looking and xenophobic mindset that is being
reinforced nowadays will take a longer time to eradicate.
Furthermore, the mental break of the ruling party from

the world would have implications on the quality of
democracy in Turkey. Once anything foreign is treated with
suspicion, the emergence of an inward‐looking country
isolated from the world is imminent. Then, the problem for us,
the people of Turkey, is that a Turkey isolated from the world
would not be a democracy.
Can Turkey get out of its current authoritarian path and
embark on a new process of democratization on its own,
without the help of international actors?
Yes, it can. There is no other way, actually. In the recent
past, we naively expected that Turkeyʹs accession process to
the EU ‐‐ which necessitated comprehensive reforms to meet
the Copenhagen political criteria for membership ‐‐ would
consolidate Turkish democracy. Yet the ruling AKP proved
recently that the EU‐inspired reforms are superficial.
I think it is time we realized that democracy can only be
built by domestic dynamics. Does Turkey have the sources,
80


instruments and actors of its own to stop the AKPʹs creation of
a totally authoritarian regime and initiate a new process of
democracy building?
This is the only option. After the Gezi protests in the
summer of 2013 and the corruption scandal of December 2013,
the government has pursued an authoritarian line to counter
the social, legal and moral challenges it has faced. It has
resorted to blocking the freedoms of association and
expression in various ways and has moved to criminalize
opposition as reflected in the cases of the repeatedly renewed
Gezi indictments and the trial of Twitter users during the Gezi
protests.
To counter moral and legal charges of corruption, the

ruling party has purged the judiciary, eliminating the
separation of powers and violating the principle of the rule of
law and increasingly began to use Islamic references in its
public discourse to hold on to its conservative supporters.
Moreover, both the Gezi protests and the corruption

scandal were portrayed as part of a global conspiracy against
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the “rising power” of Turkey that
was carried out by domestic stooges. For the Gezi protests, the
guilty party was the Alevis, and the Gulen movement was
responsible for orchestrating the corruption scandal. Erdoğan
described the current struggle as “a new war of independence
for Turkey.”
All of this tells us that the leadership of the ruling party
regards any upcoming elections as a matter of survival, thus
81


justifying in their minds the use of any means possible to
attain their objective ‐‐ that is, to win elections and eliminate
opponents.
In such a state of affairs, it is not surprising to see the
government block access to Twitter. A government that faces
such damaging corruption charges would do anything
necessary to survive. Such a government would not refrain
from blocking access to Twitter. Erdoğan was clear: “We will
eradicate Twitter. … I do not care what the international
community says.”
By “international community,” he obviously means

Western democracies, the allies of Turkey, who were expected
to express concern about freedom of expression and
democracy in Turkey.
As expected, they have expressed their concerns, but

have done no more than that. Even if they wanted to do more
to improve the state of freedom of expression and democracy
in Turkey, they do not have any leverage to influence internal
events in the country.
They are not receptive to the advice of Western

governments, institutions and other actors. On the contrary,
the ruling party regards the West as the source of the
problems that they now encounter at home.
We know that in Turkeyʹs last democratization wave,

which took place after 1999 due to Turkeyʹs EU membership
ambitions, the EU functioned as an important external
82


stimulus. But these days have gone. The ruling elite no longer
need the EUʹs push for democratization that in the past was
used by the AKP to achieve a monopolization of power by
eliminating its opponents within the state, the military and the
judiciary.
The current ruling elite, with its self-image, confidence,

power and vision, is prepared to rule an inward-looking
Turkey. The prevailing mindset of the ruling elite is
ideologically and ontologically anti-Western.
They do not care about isolation from the world or the
economic cost of this isolation. Both are affordable, and may
even be necessary to justify an authoritarian regime at home
and rally the masses against alleged foreign interference.
The future of democracy in Turkey will be determined by
domestic dynamics alone, but this is not entirely bad. We
should have understood by now that building a democracy
requires strong domestic support for the idea. Whether
Turkey will be able to emerge from the current drift toward an
authoritarian regime depends not on what the world says or
does but on the will of the people at home. We will finally
learn if there is a domestic dynamic of democratization in
Turkey. 23.06.2013; 23.03.2014
Hierarchy of nations: Turks and others
The modern history of Turkey is one of nation‐building and,
not surprisingly, the primary agent is the state. From the late
83


Ottoman Empire to the young republic, the central
preoccupation of the state was to constitute a Turkish nation
as the pillar of state institutions and myths.
In the age of nationalism, the state needed the nation and
created it. The result is at least twofold. First, non‐Turkish
nations of the empire were suppressed, forced to leave or
chose to be assimilated. Armenians were massacred en masse,
Greeks were exchanged with the Muslims of Thrace and
Kurds were subjected to a policy of forced assimilation. The
result is a country that has in its entire history never had a
population with the current degree of ethnic and religious
homogenization. Just 50 or 100 years back in history there was
a greater plurality of ethnicities and religions in this land. The
policy of creating a nation‐state for the Turks eradicated the
pluralities of ethnic identities.
Another very important outcome of the process of nation‐
building at the hands of the state is that the power equilibrium
between the state and the nation has been constituted in favor
of the former. What I mean is that the all‐powerful state that
eliminated non‐Turkish ethnic elements within the country
and replaced them with a structured Turkish nation claimed
absolute authority and supremacy over the Turkish nation.
The role of the state in constructing the Turkish nation

created a hierarchical relationship with the state at the top
as the omnipotent power.
84


The nation was supposed to be loyal and subservient to
the state and whoever rules it. The state was the master of the
nation that was its own creation. The irony is that the nation,
in the name of the state, was taken hostage by the state, too. It
was not the master or the source of authority, power and
legitimacy, but an entity designed and expected to serve the
state. Naturally in such a model of nation‐building, democracy
and pluralism could not flourish. The state that supposedly
“liberated” the people, in fact, imprisoned them.
Injustice done to non‐Muslims and Kurds in modern

times in the name of Turkishness has haunted the “Turks” and
disabled them from establishing a working democracy simply
because “pluralism” had already been destroyed.
Imagining a homogenized nation at the expense of other

ethnic and religious groups was a curse on Turkish
democracy.
A founding philosophy that regarded the rights of non‐

Turkish society as being, in the words of Mahmut Esat
Bozkurt, the minister of justice in the early years of the
republic, “the right to serve the Turks, be slaves to the Turks,”
would not, of course, treat the Kurds as equals.
Thus, the words uttered by a member of Parliament from
the Republican Peopleʹs Party (CHP) declaring the superiority
of the Turks over the Kurds are not surprising. Someone
describing the Kurds as not equal to the Turks cannot be seen
in just the context of an individual case; rather, this derives
85


from the founding process and the narrative of the “Turkish
nation‐state.” As such, it cannot be attributed to the
nationalism of the CHP alone.
Viewing the Kurds as unequal and subservient to the

Turks is in fact the attribute of Turkish nationalism, whether it
be its Islamic, civic or secular version. 03.02.2013
Why Turkey’s liberals criticize the AKP
Liberals who supported the AKP in the past have increasingly
become critical of the party and its rule. This appears to the
AKP leadership as a case of disloyalty and to the opposition as
a vindication of their stand against the AKP in earlier years.
For those who really want to understand the liberal

critiques of the AKP, here is the clue. On October 11, 2007, I
wrote in Today’s Zaman a column entitled “Limits of liberal
support for the AKP.” Letʹs look at it again and we will start to
understand the recent disenchantment of liberals with the
AKP.
“Embracing liberal values has certainly gained sympathy
and even support for the AKP among liberal circles.
Continuation of this, however, depends on the performance of
the ruling party in some crucial policy areas.
“Most important of all is the EU process. Liberals attach
great importance to a speedy integration with the EU, viewing
the process as a unique opportunity to establish and
consolidate a working market economy, full democracy and a
86


universal standard for human rights in Turkey. While the
AKP government was hailed as the starter of negotiations
earned with courageous political reforms, it was also heavily
criticized for slowing down the reform process afterwards. To
see the continued commitment of the AKP to the membership
and its corollary, political reforms, is the key to the liberal
support. What is expected from the AKP in this post‐election
period and with the renewed mandate is to energize the
reform process and press hard for concluding the negotiations.
If the AKP seems unenthusiastic about EU membership, the
bases of the liberal‐democrat‐conservative coalition will
crumble. Without an EU membership perspective that
generates a broad progressive coalition, the AKP will commit
political suicide: It will either submit to or be defeated by the
pro‐status quo powers.
“Protection and promotion of human rights for all is

another key policy area on which the AKP should perform
well in order to keep the support of the liberals. This requires
a notion of protection of the rights and liberties of all citizens
without falling into the trap of ‘majoritarianʹ democracy.
Protection of minority views, lifestyles and beliefs is part

and parcel of a liberal democracy. Any deviation from this
would turn the liberals against the AKP.
“The AKP cannot refrain from taking steps to materialize
full democracy. If the AKP looks ready to compromise on the
principles of liberal democracy, including a proper form of
87


civil‐military relationship, it should forget about liberal
support. The appearance of the AKP negotiating with
bureaucracy ‐‐ with a result that sustains tutelage democracy ‐
‐ will certainly alienate the liberals. In this context, not to take
a step back from making a new liberal constitution is a test
case for the AKP.
“Another issue area that is important for liberals is the
Kurdish question and the issues of ethnic and religious
diversity. If the AKP falls into the trap, as pushed by the state
bureaucracy, of pursuing a homogenizing national policy
toward the Kurds and other ethnic and religious identities, it
cannot count on the support of the liberals. In order to make
peace with the civilian and military bureaucracy the AKP may
be tempted to play ‘toughʹ on the Kurdish issue and ‘softʹ on
political reforms. Both will strip the AKP off its reformist and
civilian characteristics.
“Another sine qua non of liberal sympathy for the AKP is
the expectation that the AKP fight against radical nationalism,
not only in Turkey but within itself. This is the soft belly of the
AKP. I think liberals are aware of the presence of the
statist/nationalist pull within the party… The party leadership
is capable of taming nationalism, but instead, if it falls victim
to radical nationalism, it will lose its reformist stand. Once this
happens the AK Party will dissolve into the state and status
quo just like its opponents. This would be the end of a
reformist party and the end of the
liberal/democrat/conservative coalition.
88


“It is clear that the AKP will face its greatest opposition
ever if it is seen as abandoning the objectives of building full
democracy and pursuing the EU membership. These two
broad objectives constitute the very basis of the liberal,
democrat, conservative alliance…”
Think of each and every issue I raised in 2007: the EU, a
new constitution, the danger of majoritarian democracy,
respect for minority views, values and lifestyles, the Kurdish
question, tendency for radical nationalism… On all these issue
the AKP has failed to perform. So, from a liberal point of view,
what else but criticize the AKP that has abandoned its own
claims and departed from the priorities of liberal perspectives!
30.12.2012
89


Gezi Protests: Defense of Private and
Public Spaces
“Old Politics” in “New Turkey”: Revival of
Authoritarianism
WHEN TURKISH POLICE DISPERSED GEZI PARK PROTESTORS IN
Istanbul’s Taksim Square on May 31 using water cannons and
tear gas, Turkish actor Mehmet Ali Alabora sent a twitter
message calling on the people to join the demonstrators. He
tweeted, “It is not just the Gezi Park, mate. Haven’t you
understood it yet? Come along.” This was one of 15 million
tweets sent throughout the day of unrest. Turkey’s Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took this particular tweet
personally. During an expansive AKP rally in Ankara
broadcasted live on Turkish television, Erdogan publically
targeted Alabora: “You see he has confessed that it is not
about Gezi Park. What is your problem then? To bring down
the AKP government. If there is law in this country you will
give an account of this. If not I am not a man.”
Aiming to criminalize the political opposition, the prime
minister’s public intimidation of Alabora reflects the
91

Gezi Protests: Defense of Private and Public Spaces

disproportionate power relationship between the government
and the protestors. Rather than quelling the protests,
Erdogan’s confrontational posture has instead bolstered their
determination and effectiveness.
The chain of events began when bulldozers moved into

Gezi Park on May 27 to undertake a government project of
building a shopping mall and luxurious residences. Initially, a
group of environmentalists and local residents interrupted the
construction by setting up tents in the park ‐‐ prompting
Prime Minister Erdogan’s show of strength: “we have made
our minds. Whatever they do we will go on with the project.”
The police then raided the park at dawn on May 31, triggering
solidarity protests in 77 Turkish cities.
The ruling party’s paternalistic and patronizing attitude has

played a decisive role in inciting people to occupy the park
and take to the streets.
The events that unfolded signaled the revival of a heavy‐
handed state determined to suppress any measure of
opposition or dissent. The government crackdown, which
featured the extensive usage of tear gas bombs, resulted in 8
deaths, including one policeman, 7,822 injuries, and more than
1,000 arrests.
Konda, a Turkish public opinion polling company,

interviewed around 4,000 protestors during the events. Asked
“what do you want?” 34 percent of protestors said “protection
of freedoms,” 18 percent “prevention of violations of rights,” 9
92


percent “resisting oppression,” and 9 percent “urging the
government to resign.” Responding to “why they came to
Gezi Park,” 49 percent said to protest police violence while
only 15 percent mentioned trees and the park itself.
The protests have not, however, called for a change in

government. Nor would protestors expect such a change
resulting from their activism; the ruling AKP has won three
consecutive elections with comfortable majorities, doubling
the votes of its closest rival. Indeed, the Erdogan government’s
entrenched and unrivaled political position was likely the key
factor that initially sparked the protests.
Fundamentally about rights and liberties, the Gezi Park

protests have aimed to assert the social and political
boundaries of government authority.
Another polling company, Metropoll, conducted a

Turkey‐wide survey inquiring about the root causes of the
protests. Answers to this open‐ended question included, in
order of popularity, “the accumulated reaction and anger
against the government,” “authoritarian and repressive
attitude of the government,” “wrong policies of the
government,” “Prime Minister’s tough rhetoric and attitude,”
and “influence of foreign powers.”
The majority of respondents in the Metropoll survey hold
the government responsible for the chain of events triggered
by the Gezi Park protest. Half of those surveyed think that
Erdogan’s statements on the events were provocative and
93


antagonistic, whereas 31 percent consider Erdogan’s
statements conciliatory. Moreover, one‐fourth of AKP voters
surveyed agree that Erdogan made provocative speeches.
Hence, the protestors’ message to the government is

clear: “do not interfere.” Does the Gezi Park episode reveal a
deeper problem in Turkey? Again, the polls say “yes.” As
public opinion data indicates, the Turkish population
perceives the government and its leader, Erdogan, as
gravitating toward authoritarianism.
The Metropoll poll shows that a significant portion of

those surveyed are concerned about their rights and liberties.
50 percent of respondents believe that the AKP is becoming
authoritarian, whereas 36 percent oppose this view. It seems
that the AKP’s democratic rating is lower than the votes it
received in elections two years ago, which was 50 percent.
More noteworthy, 27 percent of respondents who voted for
the AKP think it is moving in an authoritarian direction.
Research by Metropoll confirms that a significant part of
Turkey’s population perceives excessive government
interference in individuals’ private lives. There is an
increasingly widespread perception that the government
wishes to impose its values, morality, and way of life on the
rest of society. This is reminiscent of the old debate about
secularism. As the government has grown more confident
over the years and Erdogan has become more vocal in his
references to religious values, the old concern about a secular
94


social space as well as the future of the secular character of the
state has resurfaced.
Now, according to the Metropoll survey, 54 percent of

people think that the government interferes in their life styles
and preferences. More worrisome for the government,
however, is that one‐third of AKP voters share this view. This
suggests that a substantial number of AKP voters espouse
secular concerns, which is unsurprising given the party’s
diverse constituency. Though appealing to conservative and
religious groups, the AKP has succeeded in attaining sizable
support from center‐right voters identifying as secular. As the
party appears more conservative and less democratic, it now
faces the possibility of losing its “center” voters.
A related issue involves freedom of expression.

According to the Metropoll survey 50 percent of respondents
say that they are fearful to express their political views.
Moreover, 53 percent do not believe that the media is free.
It is ironic that Erdogan, once an outspoken critic against
secular authoritarianism, now increasingly displays the same
arrogant, self‐righteous, and autocratic tendencies. June 2013
Gezi protests: Rise of social opposition
On June 16 the ruling AKP gathered one million of its fans in a
rally in Istanbul. It was a showdown against anti‐government
protestors who oppose demolishing the Gezi Park in Istanbul
where the government plan to build a replica of the old
Military barrack in its place. The AKP meeting rallied
95


solidarity among its supporters when the moral was low, and
revived the confidence of then Prime Minister Erdogan. Yet it
was an ordinary party meeting.
A day after a young man, Erdem Gunduz, a performance
actor, started to stand still in Istanbul’s Taksim Square in
protest against the government’s Gezi Park project and
ensuing police violence. Labeled as the “duran adam”
(standing man) within hours became quite a phenomena with
thousands followers going “standing still” in different cities,
news channels broadcasting live, social media jumping in that
made the “duran adam” world’s top TT in Twitter for hours.
One single man vs. one million party supporters. This

represents and explains the struggle triggered by the Gezi
Park:
The minorities in terms of life styles, choices, values,

political views etc. do not want to be overrun by the
majority, and try to draw boundaries for the government not
to trespass.
These two forms of “act” reveals the difference between

the conventional political logos and the inventory social
activism. Erdogan viewing the protests as part of a political
plot to bring him down he develops political strategies to
confront protestors. But what he does not understand is that
the Gezi Park resistance is a social movement and as such it
cannot be crushed by political means, mechanisms and
strategies.
96


May be the question to raise is why the prime minister at
the center stage of a local construction project?
A project to build a replica of an old military barrack in a
park in a district of Istanbul would normally be debated
between the residents of the district and the mayor of Istanbul,
and even the mayor of the Bakirkoy district.
But it is Erdogan himself who makes the decisions in
Turkey at every level. He sees the Gezi Park protests directed
personally at him. This is true but also inevitable since there is
no other “official” to talk to with a capability to make decision
about Gezi Park. Erdogan has turned the issue into a test case
for his opponents and supporters. For his opponents he tests
the repressive efficiency of government authority while for his
supporters he tests their loyalty.
At the end the Gezi crisis tells this not‐very‐smart truth
about Turkish politics. While the AKP is criticized today for
failing to understand the dynamics and demands of the Gezi
Park demonstrators its electoral success in last decade was
made possible by its responsiveness to the demands of the
people for change, development, liberty and democracy. Now
the ruling party appears deaf to protests and demands in the
streets, and even portray them as foreign plots.
The government’s hold of judiciary and the military after
the 2010 constitutional referendum relieved the government of
institutional restraints in the absence of a strong opposition as
likely alternative to replace the ruling party in the elections.
This has led to monopolization of power at the hands of the
97


ruling party and in effect Erdogan. He has assumed full
control of the state without an effective checks and balances in
the system. He is the first prime minister in more than fifty
years who has been capable of appointing his choices to key
state posts like the Chief of General Staff, and the
undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization.
This hold of the state power coupled with the popular
support of 50 per cent that Erdogan received at polls in 2011
points to a rare concentration of power, a mind blowing
success in Turkey where only a decade ago the strongest
political parties used to receive around 20 percent vote and
top state institutions were rather autonomous of political
parties in government.
Erdogan has been seduced by the amalgam of the power
of the state apparatus he controls and popular votes he
generates. These almost never happened in Turkish politics. In
the 1960s when the center right Justice Party won two
consecutive elections with more 45 percent votes they could
not penetrate into the core state institutions like the military,
intelligence, judiciary and universities which were the power
reservoirs of the Kemalist‐secularist elite.
The result is that Erdogan came to believe that he can do
whatever he wishes to do as he enjoys democratic legitimacy
generated through elections, controls the state apparatus with
repressive capacity and utilizes Islamic values and symbols
that is capable of mobilizing the conservative masses. Then
came his statements, policy declarations and initiatives.
98


One, which is criticized for being an attempt to “social
engineering” just like what his predecessor Kemalists did, is
Erdogan’s declaration during an educational reform last year
that introduced teaching of Qur’an and prophet Mohammad’s
life in the curriculum of schools that he wishes to “raise a
religious generation.”
Then came the idea to build a majestic mosque on the top
of one of the hills of Istanbul as a reminder of the Erdogan era.
He personally pursued the project despite the objections of
many conservatives and religious writers, academics, art
historians etc. An architectural competition was quickly
organized the results of which were disclosed by Erdogan
himself who suggested some revisions and the architects of
the project had incorporated his suggestions into the project.
He even slammed a TV soap opera, the Magnificent

Century, publicly for representing historical figures
inaccurately as if he is in a position to decide about historical
authenticity of a soup opera. He opened up the abortion issue
as expected of a conservative leader, but he also waged a
campaign against a particular birth method, cesarean arguing
that it was a plot to cut down the birth rate in Turkey. He
constantly asks women to have at least three children, keeps
talking about smoking and drinking alcohol describing any
alcohol consumer as “drunken.”
With this patronizing and paternalistic attitude he

appears as the father of the nation just like Ataturk (literally
meaning, the father of the Turks).
99


From a fatherly figure that knows the best for his people
one expects to act like a father. And if this “father” controls the
apparatus of the state with legislative and executive powers
and views the nation as “his” an authoritarian style of
government is inevitable. He increasingly appears as a
powerful leader looking down on the people, an attitude of
the old Kemalist elite Erdogan had fought against in which
democrats of various ideological and ethnic background, not
only the Islamists, supported him. Now the most commonly
used word to describe Erdogan by the liberal democrats, once‐
his supporters, and his opponents is “arrogance.”
This public perception is the underlying cause of the Gezi
Park protests. Not that Erdogan has been ruling the country
for more than a decade but the way he has ended up ruling,
his increasingly authoritarian style, his paternalism, and his
self‐righteousness…
What is the Gezi Park demonstration all about?
It has never been about Gezi Park only. What is seen in
streets is more than an environmentalist movement. People
with different political inclinations are protesting a
government that in recent years have become increasing
arrogant, authoritarian and self‐righteous.
Those who protest the government know how unlikely

that they can change the government through street protests
or ballot box. In fact this is the very reason for the persistence
and the spread of the protests: they are not trying to change
the government but just reminding the government about the
100


limits of their power that they should be aware of. So, in effect
what they are trying to get it crossed to the government is that
they do not care who is in power, but whoever is should not
interfere with their choices. So it is not about “who is to
govern,” but “how.”
Right from the beginning the protests in Istanbul were

driven by the quest to show the government that they are
dissenting from the views, the style, the projects of Turkey’s
“one man.”
Those who “occupied” the park used their right to

dissent in a passive, peaceful way with humor reflected in
their slogans and social media messages. People in the Gezi
Park and in other cities protesting were simply saying: “do not
interfere in my life and choices.”
A polling company, Konda, asks the protestors in the

Gezi Park about their demands: 34 per cent says protection of
their private space, 27 per cent stop abuses of rights and resist
repression, 9 per cent calls on the government to resign. So,
what has triggered the Gezi Park protests and what is sought
is more than environmentalist concerns but a concern about
individual liberties and choices. Now that Erdogan has talked
to some representatives of the protestors and suggested a
plebiscite to decide whether to continue with the Gezi Park
construction project or not does not appease deeper concern
about Erdogan’s style of government and the future of
liberties under his rule.
101


In short the events that unfolded revealed the revival of a
heavy‐handed state with determination to suppress any
dissent movement in streets. The most astonishing was the
detention of the “standing men” in Taksim square and many
other who came up in various squares in cities without doing
anything at all. We will see whether “one” matters vis‐à‐vis
“one million” in Turkish democracy.
Monopolization of power
The irony is that the ruling AKP is not capable of
understanding the “new Turkey” that it has helped
constructing through policies of democratization, opening up
to the global world and market‐economy driven economic
growth.
When faced with an opposition questioning the wisdom

of its top‐down decision‐making model and demanding
grassroots participation in public projects, the ruling party
resorts to the reflexes of the “old Turkey.” Thus, it brings up
the issue of building a mosque in Taksim Square to hijack the
demands of protestors at Gezi Park and rally religious people
behind the AKP and its leader. When this does not work to
disperse the demands and mobilize the conservative masses,
the AKP and its supporters point to “foreign agents,”
“provocateurs” and the “enemies of Turkey” as the reasons
for the Taksim protests instead of trying to understand the
demands and dynamics behind the public discontent.
102


This was a typical attitude of the state in the “old
Turkey.” Turkeyʹs ‘former’ progressive party has today
become unwilling and incapable of understanding the social
and political roots of the discontent directed at the
government.
What we see in the streets is of course more than an
environmentalist movement. People with different political
leanings are protesting a government that in recent years has
become increasingly arrogant, authoritarian and self‐
righteous.
The government, since it commands an electoral majority,
believes that it has moral superiority over the rest; thus, it can
enact the morality of the majority through the electoral
process and the state apparatus.
The street protests are a reaction to what I call postmodern

authoritarianism that uses its electoral majority to impose
its moral codes on the whole of society.
The people in Gezi Park and in other cities who are
protesting are simply saying: “Do not interfere in my life and
personal choices. I can make my own decisions about my way
of life, my moral values, my beliefs, my drinks.”
Those who protest the government are aware that they

cannot change the government, as they are unlikely to get a
majority in the polls. In fact, this is the very reason for the
persistence and the spread of the protests: They are not trying
103


to change the government but just reminding the rulers that
they should be aware of the limits of their power. In the
absence of a viable political alternative in the opposition, the
protesters do not expect a change of government despite their
call for the resignation of the government.
Another irony about the AKP is that it was a political
movement that stood against the interference of the Kemalist‐
secularist state in the daily life and choices of religious‐
conservative groups. In those days, girls with headscarves
were banned from attending colleges, religious associations
and foundations were intimidated, and political parties were
closed down. Myself and many liberals and democrats
strongly opposed such a policy of suppression, exclusion and
marginalization of conservatives by the Kemalist‐secularist
state. We supported the rights of the conservatives to express
themselves, have their associations, run their newspapers,
compete for power with their political parties and to be
recognized as such. We claimed that the state had no right to
dictate a particular way of life, i.e. secular, on its citizens and
everybody was free to choose.
Now the AKP and the conservatives are doing exactly

what the Kemalists used to do. As they now command the
state they think that they can do whatever they wish to do ‐‐
shape people according to their morality, interpret history in
line with their conceptions, silence and even oppress opposing
views and decide who is a good citizen, who is to write for
104


newspapers, etc. It is impossible not to feel a shocking sense of
a déjà vu.
The AKP had come to power with promises of

democratization and civilianization. Now it seems to prefer an
authoritarian presidential system to a new liberal democratic
constitution, and tries to impose through its legislative and
executive power its choice of a “good society” for all the
people. 09.06. 2013
Criminalizing the opposition
Can you imagine a Turkey that criminalizes the opposition?
The way in which the Gezi Park protests were responded to
by the government, I am afraid, displays such a tendency.
Yet another sign of this tendency was revealed by the
prime minister who called on people, saying they should not
expect everything from the state and should bring to justice
those who protest against the government by hitting pans
(tencere tava) at night on their own.
This and other shows of intimidation and threats are

reflective of the disproportionate power relationship between
the government and the protesters as well as the opposition
forces. However this does not stop the expression of
dissenting voices against the paternalistic and patronizing
attitude of the ruling party.
This was demonstrated in the Gezi Park protests. Thus,

instead of explaining the Gezi Park protests by referencing
105


conspiracy theories, the government is advised to understand
the roots and dynamics of the “new opposition.”
There is empirical data from some polling companies that
can help understand the roots of the oppositionʹs discontent
with the government.
It appears that the overall agenda of the protests is not to

change the government but to demonstrate the boundaries
that the government should not cross.
Keep in mind that the political party against which

protests were directed had won three consecutive elections in
Turkey with a very comfortable majority, doubling the votes
of its closest rival. Thus even the protesters would not expect a
change of government as a result of their action or even at the
polls. This inability to change the government might have
triggered the whole Gezi Park process as they desperately
defended their park as well as their lifestyle choices vis‐à‐vis a
government that holds a majority. So it is not about “who will
govern” but “how.” What the protesters are saying to the
government is “Do not interfere.”
The Gezi Park protests are deeply rooted in the

perception that the government is interfering in individual
lifestyles and choices. A significant part of the population in
Turkey has observed the governmentʹs interference in their
private lives. There is an increasing perception that the
government wishes to dictate its own choices of values,
morality and way of life on the rest.
106


It is ironic that Erdoğan, once Turkeyʹs dissenting voice
against secular authoritarianism, has slipped into the same
water of arrogance, self‐righteousness and authoritarianism.
But, when it came to power the AKP was expected to
democratize the system that had suppressed dissenting voices
of non‐Kemalist social and political groups. Many
democratizing steps have been taken since then, but only up
to a point. Once further democratization meant that the AKP
would have to give up privileges accorded to the government
by the 1982 Constitution and empower the civilian sector vis‐
à‐vis the state now controlled by the conservatives, the idea of
genuine democracy was shelved away.
The Gezi Park protests have sped up not reform, but the
revival of authoritarianism in Turkey. There are abundant
examples of this revival.
What happened to actor Mehmet Ali Alabora because of a
Twitter message he shared calling on the people to join the
demonstrators is illustrative of criminalization of the
opposition. After Turkeyʹs Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan
publically targeting Alabora ha was lynched in social media,
and a public prosecutor started an investigation of the actor
Alabora about his Twitter message accused of “inciting an
armed rebellion against the government.” The case was
dropped later but Alabora now lives in self‐imposed exile in
London.
107


Such legal action against Alabora means that going out to
protest the government and calling on others to do so is being
criminalized. It is an instance in which the practice of a
fundamental human right is considered a criminal act.
Though the case on Alabora did not proceed the fact that
a public prosecutor would open such a case reflects the
prevailing mood among pro‐government circles in society and
within the state. This is an attempt to intimidate the people
who do not have favorable views of the AKP.
At the root of this attempt to criminalize the opposition
lays a perception that all instances of opposition are directed
at the very existence of their government and as such they
have to be eliminated. This is not new and is not dissimilar to
the attitude of Kemalist authoritarianism.
The ruling party views politics as a battlefield in which they

must either eliminate their opponents or be eliminated. Out
of such a securitization of politics, the criminalization of the
opposition comes naturally.
In line with the case of Alabora, a former public

prosecutor made a statement during the protests arguing that
the Gezi Park protesters should be prosecuted for attempting
to change the government by force and that if he were public
prosecutor he would ask for a life sentence for the protesters.
108


This reflects the current mindset among government
circles of “securitize the opposition” ‐‐ the logical outcome of
which is to “criminalize” it.
There are other examples. An academic in Bursa was

investigated by his university because he wore a T‐shirt with a
“diren” (resist) banner design on it. Last week, the top private
company TÜPRAŞ, owned by the Koç group, was raided by
the police and finance inspectors, resulting in a significant fall
in the market value of the groupʹs assets on the Istanbul Stock
Exchange. Remember that the group was publicly criticized by
the prime minister for harboring protesters in the Divan hotel
where some injured protesters sought shelter and some
injured were treated.
Another example of intimidating dissenting voices is the
firing of Yavuz Baydar, a news ombudsman, from the Sabah
newspaper. His fault was to publish in his column the
criticism of the editorial policy of the newspaper about the
Gezi Park protest made by readers. A journalist lost his job
because he did his job. All of these are worrisome… 28.07.2013
Resorting to religion to counter Gezi protests
Demolishing the park and building a shopping mall and
luxurious residences in its place was pointed out as proof of
the ruling partyʹs benefit‐driven policies in İstanbul.
Countering this argument proved to be very difficult for the
AKP. In the middle of the crisis Erdogan announced, just out
of blue, that they would build a mosque in Taksim.
109


Trying to shift the debate from building a shopping mall
in Gezi Park to the building of a mosque instead is a prime
example of how religion is used to cover up and generate
popular support in Turkey. The ruling party seems to have
been aware of the discontent in its grassroots and is trying to
unite them behind the idea of building mosque in Taksim.
This is obviously a populist tactical move that attempts to
imprison conservative and religious group within the AKP
block. The ruling party knows that as the debate revolves
around Islamic symbols and references it can control and rely
on the support of the religious masses. Polarization along
secular and religious lines is expected to benefit the AKP
because it has the potential to mobilize the religious masses. In
the past this was the method used by the Kemalists and
secularists. They used to expect that raising secular themes
and symbols would rally the people behind them. It did not
work as people were interested in democracy as much as
secularism and supported the AKP, which promised greater
democracy.
As the AKP turned its back on democracy and resorted to
violence to suppress demonstrators it started to make greater
emphasis on Islamic references. But there is a limit to the
effectiveness of such Islamic symbolism to justify AKP policies
and mobilize the religious masses. Don’t Turkey’s religious
masses care about democracy at all?
Violence used against people who oppose demolishing a
park in the center of İstanbul has brought the right to peaceful
110


demonstration in Turkey into question. Moreover, the lack of
media coverage of the event resulted in people not knowing
about the casualties raised doubt about freedom of the press.
Among the casualties of the events in İstanbul are basic
rights and freedoms like the right to peaceful demonstration,
freedom of expression and a free press. This is indeed not
what I would expect from the ruling AKP that came to power
in 2002 with promises of greater liberties and a deeper
democracy. What people encountered in İstanbul and other
parts of Turkey was a brutal state and insensitive
administrators. This just proves that the holders of power
change, but the nature of the state and its attitude towards
people remain as it was. For five days not only
demonstrators, but also almost the whole of İstanbul were
subjected to tear‐gas.
Thus, the disproportionate and indiscriminate violence

used by the police under the command of the government
turned an environmentalist movement into an anti‐
government protest. In this no doubt the paternalistic and
patronizing attitude of the ruling party in recent times played
an important role. Growing reactions against such an attitude
came out in the Gezi Park demonstrations. They were
certainly utilized by anti‐government political groups, but the
onset of the protests was to a large extent non‐partisan.
People with different backgrounds and ideological positions

came together to protest the hegemonic and patronizing
attitude of a paternalistic government.
111


I expected that the government would take steps to
reduce the tension. But the speeches made by Erdoğan show
that he has chosen confrontation in which religious symbols
and references are used as last resort instruments to mobilize
conservative and religious masses against the opponents of
the government. 02.06.2013
What did the world see in the Gezi protests?
Abdullah Gül, after his numerous meetings in New York,
where he joined in the opening of the UN General Assembly,
told journalists that everybody he met asked about the Gezi
Park protests.
One wonders why. Iʹm sure many analysts close to the
government will resort to conspiracy theories to explain this
“global interest in Turkey.” Let them blind themselves with
their fantasies.
Turkey is an important country with the potential to

disturb its environs if it gets unstable. The Gezi events, despite
a strong single‐party government with majority support,
showed that public order is fragile in Turkey, where there
exists deep‐seated popular discontent with a government that
is determined to crush it in the streets ‐‐ by force if necessary.
In a globalized economy, stability in Turkey matters for
foreign investors and trade partners. Of course they would try
to understand what goes on in Turkey, where public order
seemed to be crumbling during the Gezi protests a few
months ago.
112


It is also no surprise to see people abroad ask where
Turkey is heading because Turkey has been claiming to be the
rising star of the region with its economic development, social
capital and progress toward democratization. Naturally, the
international community turns its spotlight on such a country.
Remember that only two years ago, during the Arab Spring,
Turkey was portrayed as a “model country.” The police
brutality against the demonstrators in the streets and the
abundance of conspiracy theories put forward by pro‐
government circles ‐‐ in short the security‐oriented tendency
of Turkish politics ‐‐ raised question marks about the
appropriateness of this “model country” that itself plunged
into the trap of authoritarian politics.
Those in the US and Europe who ask about Gezi Park
probably also supported the AKP government until recently.
Shocked with the persistence of the protests and the way the
government responded to them, they now wonder what is
happening in Turkey and what the government is doing.
The ruling party showed a very different face during the
Gezi Park protests. For many in Turkey and abroad it was
something new and disturbing. It was the authoritarian face of
the AKP that was revealed during the Gezi Park events. For
those who used to believe that the AKP was a democratizing
force in Turkey, this was shocking.
To see the ruling party use excessive police force against
the demonstrators in the streets as well as bullying public
discourse may have raised questions about the commitment of
113


the AKP to democracy, freedom of expression and association,
and the rule of law, values it used to uphold in its struggle
against the Kemalist establishment.
Indeed, the AKP was a party of civil rights and liberties
when it struggled against the Kemalist establishment. Thus
domestic and international observers, former supporters of the
party, never thought that it would take the rather exalted view
of the state and its authority that it displayed during the Gezi
protests. So theyʹre asking what happened to the party they
once knew.
What is also shocking for many is seeing the AKP resort
to conspiracy theories to explain and discredit a social
movement. The prime minister blamed the interest rate lobby;
no one knows who or what this phantom is. In the pro‐
government media, protesters were portrayed as the lackeys
of foreign agents. Columns argued that a significant amount of
money was transferred from some foreign banks into the
accounts of the protesters. It was even reported in the pro‐
government media that 600 pizzas were sent to the protesters
through a bank account in Mexico!
Welcome to the world of conspiracy theories. This world
used to be occupied by the anti‐AKP nationalists and
secularists who regarded the AKP as a US plot.
With Gezi Park, the AKP resorted to the conspiracy theories

of its archenemies, rapidly shifting to an anti-globalization,
anti-Western, anti-free market and inward-looking position.
114


No one who used to support the AK Party in the West
expected such a radical shift. So they ask what is going on in
Turkey. The way in which the AKP responded to Gezi Park
has prompted a series of questions not only about Turkey but
also about the democratic credentials of its ruling party.
29.09.2013
Securitization of Turkish politics
Surely without attaining security for individuals as well as for
states, it is not possible to build a civilized state of affairs. The
freedoms and welfare of the people requires a mechanism to
protect them. But in some cases, the very freedoms and
welfare of the people may be threatened by mechanisms
supposed to protect them.
Concerns about security, when abused and exaggerated,

may indeed strangle rights and liberties. In a country where
all civil and political matters are somehow linked to security,
it is impossible to attain liberties and human rights. Once
security gives way to supreme and unquestioned authority,
leaving no space for the social and political autonomy of
society, society itself would be endangered. I remember for
instance a particular decision of the National Security Council
during the days of the Feb. 28 process that wine production
should be supported in Bozcaada, a small island in the Aegean
Sea, so that the local Turks would not be tempted to sell their
land to the Greeks who were trying to takeover land on this
island! It is absurd, but this is how a “security mentality”
works.
115


A “security mentality” is not only a paranoid mentality, but
also an appropriate tool for governing; “rule by fear.”
Through a security discourse, governments generate

authority and legitimacy, and become able to escape
accountability. Under “normal politics” it is very hard to sell
the people an authoritarian ruling machine. But if a situation
is believed to threaten the very existence of the society and the
state, everything may be justified.
In Turkey, the concern about the “security of the regime”
has been the key instrument to discipline the society at large
and suppress the opposition right from the beginning of the
republic. It justified the establishment of the single party rule
in 1925 and the closure of the opposition party at the time, the
Progressive Republican Party. From then on, protecting the
regime and maintaining the secular character of it was used as
a pretext to deepen the Kemalist regime.
There was also the “security of the state” to look after.
Countries that had ambitions on its unique geography, they
told us, surrounded Turkey. The Russians, the Greeks, the
Armenians, the Arabs as well as the great powers, all
conspired against Turkey.
Thus, people at home had to be united against immediate
threats in the neighborhood and even be aware of their
internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential
threat, the idea of a fully functioning liberal democracy,
116


human right and pluralism were regarded as luxurious and
even risky.
Once the survival and the security of the state and the
regime were attained, the primary demand for democracy,
rights and liberties could be put off indefinitely. The
emergence of the Kurdish question was regarded a constant
internal threat to the unity and integrity of Turkey and added
another justification for authoritarian forms of politics.
This is how the regime used in a dynamic way the
“security discourse” to eliminate its opponents and excuse its
authoritarian methods. In other words, Turkish
authoritarianism was driven by a securitization wherein all
other values and objectives are subordinated to security and it
was taken to be the absolute priority.
Recently, the ruling AKP is using this old language of
securitization in its domestic and foreign policies. With
increasing problems in the neighborhood, the old rhetoric of
“Turkey is surrounded by enemies” is being revived.
As political opposition increases and social discontent grows

the government tries to “externalize” the challenges by
invoking conspiracy theories.
Unrelated events are increasingly explained by references
to a conspiracy orchestrated by a single center. “Someone has
pressed the button” is frequently used to devalue critiques of
the government.
117


Authoritarianization and securitization come together to
silence the media and discipline society. Silencing the
opposition on security grounds is possible, but it is fatal for
democracy and pluralism. 14.08.2012
Why the AKP needs conspiracy theories
We are witnessing events that are difficult to explain. Who
could have imagined that the ruling party would have
plunged into conspiracy theories to explain and counter social
and political phenomena like the Gezi Park protests?
Why does such a powerful government need conspiracy

theories? What is behind the veil of conspiracy theories?
According to the AKP leaders and commentators close to
the party, the protests in Gezi Park were organized, financed
and administered by Western powers. Western governments,
NGOs, media networks, think tanks, companies, etc., are
accused of plotting against the AKP. Even the pro‐government
media has discovered “new” illegal organizations like the
“Twitter network.” For them protestors are puppets of foreign
powers or ignorant people who are easily deceived by foreign
agents.
In the past, the Kemalists used to treat people as if they
were ignorant or inclined to commit treason. So they had
established a tutelage system of government that ruled the
country heavy‐handedly with securitization that was justified
by references to “internal and external enemies” of the state. I
118


called this the “rule by fear” through intimidation of the
people instead of the “rule by law.”
Now it is shocking to see that the ruling AKP, which used
to be intimidated by the Kemalists in the past, has resorted to
the same rhetoric, discourse, means and mechanisms.
For the ruling party and their fans, there is no society with
its own dynamics and demands independent of “foreign
agents and plots.”
This is naturally a very problematic view of society and

social events. It is interesting to remember that until very
recently it was the AKP that was accused by the Kemalists‐
nationalists of being the tool of “foreign plots.” For them the
AKP collaborated with the US and the EU to crush the
independent‐minded patriotic military, the AKP sold out
national assets to foreign companies in the name of
privatization, Erdoğan was a lackey of the US as the co‐
chairman of the Greater Middle East Project and Western
powers plotted a regime change in Turkey via the AKP
government. So for them it was not the people who voted for
the AKP but the Western powers that brought Erdoğan to
power in 2002.
Were these claims true? Of course not, all were nonsense.
How can then the AKP leaders now say to the protestors
exactly what their opponents used to say about the AKP itself?
119


A party that came to power through the “agency” of the
people should not deny the will of the people who oppose its
project to build a military barracks, a replica of the demolished
one in Taksim. This is what I really cannot make sense of.
Instead of trying to understand the dynamics of the events

and the demands of the protestors, the AKP chose to
discredit them as the “agents of foreign powers.”
This may be an easy way of politicking to generate
solidarity in the party grassroots in the face of growing
discontent among the people at large. It is also an attempt to
play the “nationalist card” to appeal those who vote for the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Thus, it was no surprise
to see an MHP flag at the AKPʹs meeting in Ankara on
Saturday where the prime minister hailed his “nationalist
brothers.”
Now the AKP discourse appears xenophobic, anti‐

Western, inward‐looking, anti‐globalization and pro‐status
quo. I used to describe the Kemalists‐secularists‐nationalists in
these terms just a few years ago.
We are now back to where we were before: a total war for
survival against “internal and external enemies” of the (AKP)
state. The priority is to “crush” them. In such an extreme
“security” challenge, democracy, rule of law, human rights
and liberties will not, of course, be upheld and sought out.
Unfortunately, the unrest triggered by the authoritarian
120


policies of the AKP government is now likely to justify further
authoritarian measures by the government.
Conspiracy theories have always been popular in Turkey
among some circles with limited power and influence in
society. Islamists, nationalists and socialists all have their own
“theories” to explain the “things” around them. But
conspiratorial thinking has never been as popular, effective
and government‐driven as it has been in the period of the
post‐Gezi Park protests.
Previously conspiracy theories were used mainly by

Kemalist‐nationalists to explain whatever happened in
Turkey. For them, the Justice and Development Party was
brought to power by the US to carry out its “Greater Middle
East Project”; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül were
in fact Jews hiding their true identities; the AKP stands for the
American‐Kurdish‐Party designed to create a Kurdish state
with the help of the US; EU membership aims to finish off the
independence of the Turkish Republic and its secular regime;
the ruling AKP is just a lackey of the US and the EU, etc.
Nowadays, we do not hear such “theories” any more.

Instead there are those circulated by “the other side,” the
government and its supporters. Those who used to be
portrayed as traitors in earlier conspiracy theories by
Kemalists‐nationalists have now resorted to using conspiracy
theories. In their “theories” too are lots of references to foreign
plots, outside forces and their domestic partners, the Jews and
the Israelis, Turkeyʹs independence, the West and its inherent
121


anti‐Turkey nature. From the “interest rate lobby” to killing
the prime minister by “telekinesis,” conspiracies are
everywhere and their target is obvious…
Why would one need conspiracy theories? Why do they

resort to shadowy politics while they are still so powerful in
real‐life politics?
Of course conspiracy theories are always handy. They

offer a blueprint to explain so many complicated events with a
simple logic, a logic that is easy to grasp. One does not need
any sophistication to understand them. Besides, there is
nothing to understand. You just believe in them and you
become so comfortable in your parallel universe.
For a political party with millions of supporters from all

walks of life, such simple “explanations” create a “cognitive
community.” Neither ideas nor programs and projects are
more effective in mobilizing the masses.
They can also serve as an effective tool in creating a
personality cult.
Portraying someone as the target of the whole world, the
world of enemies, is an effective way of mobilizing the masses.
The person targeted is mystified and glorified. Without him,
everything is at stake so rally behind him, the savior and
protector. If this person is a politician already loved by
millions, portraying him as the target of a global plot secures
instant identification by the masses and their mobilization.
122


Conspiracy theories help rulers to avoid responsibility for
their own actions. It is certainly comfortable for politicians
to put the blame for their problems on foreign forces.
By doing so, they are neither responsible nor accountable
for whatever the problem, which is the making of some
hidden forces. If you make the people believe that economic
crises, social unrest or the international isolation encountered
by your government are all the making of “foreign
conspirators,” then you have a free hand to rule the country.
Besides, they help to silence the opposition. If the world
is united against your country, you are entitled to ask your
own people to unite behind you too. In such circumstances of
globally organized threats, freedom of speech, assembly and
association are all likely to be used by the “enemies.” One
cannot tolerate them.
What else can you expect from such a logic that utters,
“You either believe that there is a global conspiracy against
the government or you are part of it.” However comfortable it
may seem to rule and mobilize the masses with conspiracy
theories, in the real world there will be a heavy price to pay
for the country. Democracy, the right to dissent, pluralism and
the rule of law will be the victims of conspiratorial minds.
16.06.2013; 27.10.2013
Tweeting in English proves international conspiracy!
“Why do you tweet in English?” a pro‐government
commentator asked his opponent in a TV debate. “Why?” he
123


insists. For him, this is the proof that the corruption probe is
an international conspiracy. Otherwise why would some
people in Turkey tweet in English about corruption claims?
This is the level of arguments developed by the opinion
leaders who back the government.
Once again, the AKP government fails to understand the
situation. There is a corruption case that was brought to the
court by public prosecutors. The court took the evidence
seriously and decided to arrest a number of suspects,
including the sons of two government ministers. Then the
government moved in, interfering in the judicial process so
that prosecutors were unable to conduct the investigation. The
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) termed the
government intervention open interference in due process and
the independence of the judiciary, warning that the
government had violated the Constitution.
Today, Turkey can hardly be described as a country

where the rule of law reigns. The AKP government, instead of
respecting the judicial process and helping the corruption
investigation, has chosen to block due process. To justify this
clearly unconstitutional move, the AKP resorted to conspiracy
theories. “International dark forces” (the US, Israel, Germany,
the interest rate lobby) that want to bring down Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “pushed the button,” initiated
the investigation process and revealed the documents.
So, the public prosecutors and the judges involved in the
case, as well as those who ask for the proper course of events
regarding the corruption claims, are all lackeys of this
124


international conspiracy. As such, it is not those accused of
corruption who should be brought to justice, but rather those
who seek to bring them to justice that should be punished for
plotting against the government.
This is the prevailing logic in the AKP leadership. Instead
of doing what the principles of transparency and
accountability require them to do, the AKP government
regards the current graft probe as an international operation
directed at the government.
This is the end of rational politics. The proliferation of
conspiracy theories heralds an era of irrational political
fighting in Turkey.
Since the Gezi protests the AKP has interpreted any social
or legal challenge as an existential threat. What follows is a
basic instinct for survival, a state of affairs in which
anything is justified.
The response of the ruling party to the Gezi protests and
the corruption probe indicates that the AKP leadership is
prepared to do whatever it takes for its survival. In this fight,
democracy, the rule of law and individual liberties will be the
first casualties.
The ruling party suffers from a siege mentality. It sees

enemies wherever it looks. Both at home and abroad,
everybody is conspiring against the party and especially its
leader, Erdoğan. Even normal political rivalry, intellectual
dissent and social indifference are taken as enmity. This deep
125


sense of insecurity produces authoritarian politics directed at
disciplining and controlling the state in general and
eliminating opponents, in particular. Thus, the prosecutor
who investigated corruption becomes the enemy; media
outlets that ask for transparency and accountability are
accused of collaborating with “international dark forces.”
Resorting to conspiracy theories indicates that the AKP

has run out of ideas. Instead of trying to appeal to the masses
with ideas and projects, the government has chosen to
mobilize them with conspiracy theories.
The use of conspiracy theories is worrisome. Once you

portray politics in conspiratorial terms you see the world as
consisting of “enemies” and “friends.” People are either with
you or against you. Those who are against you are no longer
your political opponents but enemies. What would you do to
your enemies? Destroy and annihilate them by any means.
This is how a conspiratorial mind works.
Conspiracy theories reflect an authoritarian mindset. A

government cannot remain democratic once it leans on
conspiracy theories to explain the world that surrounds it.
As the AKP government resorts to conspiracy theories, it
marches full speed into the recklessness of authoritarianism.
Imagine a Turkey where pro‐government circles see an
international conspiracy in a tweet written in English…
29.12.2013
126


Foreign policy and conspiracy theories
We know it well that foreign policy is not only about foreign
policy. It is often directed at domestic politics and a domestic
audience. The Turkish government has taken this to a new
level. To understand Turkeyʹs foreign policy discourse and
moves more and more, one has to look at the governmentʹs
domestic political concerns, problems and calculations.
Governments generally exaggerate their successes. Let

them do this so long as there is an achievement delivered.
Exaggerating successes will not harm anyone.
The problem that I see in the management of the Justice
and Development Partyʹs foreign policy is something else:
Foreign policy is used to cover up failures at home and

divert the attention of people away from domestic political
crises.
Both cases of utilization lead to tension, confrontation

and conflict in Turkeyʹs relations with the governments and
other actors abroad. Recently, on two occasions, the AKP
government chose to turn a domestic issue into an
international one. These are the Gezi protests of the summer
20013 and the corruption scandal of December 2013, both of
which were explained by the government as being plots of
“dark international forces” that are determined to finish off
the ruling party by inciting domestic political crises. Once a
mindset of conspiracy becomes operative, criminalizing the
dissenting voices at home by depicting them as the lackeys of
127


foreigners becomes inevitable. A conspiracy‐based approach
to social and legal issues paves the way for
authoritarianization.
This is the reason why the government gets more

authoritarian with each large‐scale domestic crisis. It does not
know how to respond to social opposition and legal‐moral
charges of corruption allegations. What it knows and does
well is the ʺsecuritizationʺ of politics as an effective means to
silence dissenting voices and suppress the challengers.
Frequent references to international conspiracies by

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself are necessary and adequate for
the act of securitization. Here, Israel comes up as a handy
“dark force with collaborators at home.” But the US?
Erdoğan spoke in Samsun, linking the disclosure of

corruption cases to the plots of “dark forces,” pointing his
fingers this time to the US and its ambassador in Ankara. He
said: “These recent days, very strangely, ambassadors get
involved in some provocative acts. I call on them from here:
Do your job. If you leave your area of duty, this could extend
into our governmentʹs area of jurisdiction. We do not have to
keep you [Francis Ricciardone] in our country.ʺ
Following Erdoğanʹs remarks, the pro‐government media
demanded that Ambassador Ricciardone should be declared
persona non grata.
After the exceptional reception of Erdoğan in Washington
by the US administration back in May 2013, and given the
128


need to work together with the Americans on the Syrian crisis,
the emerging row with the US does not make much sense.
But Washington distancing itself from Turkeyʹs current

political and legal crisis has not prevented the eruption of a
crisis between the two countries. Because this crisis is not
about Turkish‐American relations but, to a large extent, it is
about the way in which Erdoğan has decided to govern the
corruption scandal. Such a mini‐crisis enables him to divert
the attention of the people at home away from corruption
allegations to an artificial foreign policy crisis. Moreover,
linking the corruption disclosure to the US serves to discredit
anyone involved in the corruption investigation as the “men
of the US,” and silences the dissenting voices who demand a
proper due process. It is also expected that a challenging
public stand against the US will be popular among Erdoğanʹs
Islamist followers.
But the question is that securitization of politics may not
be effective as a tool to silence the people when it comes to the
issue of corruption, and that the AKP voters are not only
composed of Islamists, but also of burgeoning middle class
and traditional center‐right people who highly value stability.
22.12.2013
129


Kurdish Peace: Pax‐Ottomana for
the Kurds

An Oriental Way to Solve the Kurdish Problem
HOW CAN A GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND
agree to a political settlement? There is no easy and
universally valid answer to this question. Yet drawing on
some successful examples of political settlement of ethnic or
sectarian violence the discipline of “conflict resolution” comes
up with models of ending violence and guidance for “peace
processes.”
In this context it is often argued that in order to develop a
model and a roadmap to address the Kurdish question we can
learn from the experiences of “conflict resolution” attempts
pursued in other parts of the world. Here the cases of the IRA
in Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque region of Spain and
the ANC in South Africa and how they negotiated a political
settlement with central governments come up as relevant to
the task of addressing the Kurdish question in Turkey.
131

Kurdish Peace: Pax‐Ottomana for the Kurds

They may certainly provide Turkish government with
some important insights on the way in which to conduct the
peace process, communicate the process with the public and
implement the agreement in practice.
Yet, I am not sure to what extent the Turkish government
is taking these experiences into account in its attempt to
negotiate a settlement with Abdullah Öcalan. My observation
is that “Turkeyʹs way” of tackling the issue has now become
unique.
After the failure in recent years of “other ways” of

addressing the question, the Turkish government has
adopted an “Oriental approach,” which is a method that
makes peace with the “leader” of the antagonist.
In this countryʹs culture to cease the hostility and stop the
blood feud you should deal with the head of the family and of
the tribe not “useless others.”
So what characterizes the current “peace process” is that
it relies on Öcalan as the peacemaker. He is the only
counterpart of the government. It is Öcalan to negotiate and
make peace with, and it is through Öcalan that the peace
would be dictated on the Kurdistan Workersʹ Party (PKK)
network from the grassroots to the top of the organization and
Kurdish political actors like the Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP) as well as Kurdish people at large.
Öcalan is the founder and the leader of the PKK. Even in
prison since 1999 he has been capable of maintaining his
132


leadership within the PKK as well as among the Kurdish
populace of Turkey. Many believe that if he is persuaded he
can stop the violence, pull the PKK out of Turkey and have
PKK members lay down their weapons. The government was
probably long aware of Öcalanʹs potential as a “peace dealer,”
but the fact that he used to be under the control and influence
of the “deep state” and that the public was furious with him
prevented the government from “instrumentalizing” Öcalan
for a settlement. The government did not trust him. Now he is
under full control of the government. Moreover, with his role
in ending the hunger strikes a few months back, Öcalan
gained the trust of the government. What is also important
from Öcalanʹs point of view is that after beating the deep state
the AKP government has now become a real, powerful
counterpart to make a deal with.
The essence of the current Imrali process is to make peace

with Öcalan whom in turn would persuade his own
constituency.
As such it differs from the earlier initiatives like the one
in 2009. The government then took a political path of
introducing reforms without negotiating the content and the
process of reforms with anyone from the Kurdish political
movement. There were obviously contacts with the Kurdish
side including PKK elements in the Kandil Mountain and in
Europe. Yet it was a process conducted before the “public”
without success.
133


Then the government via the National Intelligence
Organization (MİT) tried to negotiate with the wings of the
PKK based in Iraqi Kurdistan and Europe. The meetings were
disclosed and halted on the way to the 2011 general elections
after which the PKK accused the government of betraying the
talks and increased its assaults. The result was that 2012
turned out to be the worst year in terms of violence in a
decade.
All these led the ruling party to a final formula: strike a
deal with the “leader” instead of trying to approach the
warlords of the PKK ‐‐ each representing different interests ‐‐
and initiating a complicated political process with many
stakeholders on the ground that at the end may not result in
disarming the PKK. Öcalan is now treated as the shortcut to
get rid of the problem. This is the logic of the current “peace
model” that has its roots in the soil of this country, which I call
the oriental way to resolve the Kurdish question. 03.03.2013
Pax‐Ottomana for the Kurds, ‘greater Turkey’ for the Turks
The ultimate fear of the Turks about the Kurdish demands is
that they will eventually lead to the division of the country
and an independent Kurdistan will be carved out of Turkey.
This fear that prevails among the Turks is an important
stumbling block for the current peace process. To overcome
this, new language that constructs a common future for the
Turks and the Kurds within a “greater Turkey” has been
134


formulated and spoken by both Kurdistan Workersʹ Party
(PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish government.
Letʹs first explore the roots of the fear and then address
the new “remedy” that is expected to overcome this psycho‐
historical resistance to the peace negotiations with the Kurds.
“Division” of the country is a historically deep‐rooted

fear. The Turkish national psyche is shaped by the history of
dismantling of the late Ottoman Empire along the ethnic lines
in its last decades and of the rise of the new Turkish state with
the war of independence. The war of independence waged at
the end of WW II was a resistance to an
international/imperialist plot to deprive the Turks of a state
within Anatolia. The war halted further disintegration and a
new state was established by the Turks as their homeland.
Thus, the traumatizing experience of the wars for

statehood in the last century constituted an important part of
national memory. Further division of the country, any kind of
partition of Turkey is anathema to the Turks. It is important to
note that this is not only the attitude of the ultra‐nationalist
Turks, but also rather a common position.
For the last decade or so, we usually attributed the Sevr
syndrome (the fear that Turkey will be partitioned by
imperialist Western powers) to the Kemalist nationalists. In
fact, the fear is more widespread and deeper in the psyche of
Turks, including the conservatives and Islamist groups.
135


As a result, many Turks believe that the Kurdish question
is the creation of foreign powers that wish for Turkey to be
divided. Any political settlement first needs to reverse such
perceptions.
In order to “sell” any peace model to the Turkish people,
the government must persuade the people that a solution will
not be the beginning of a disintegration process for Turkey.
Yet this is obviously difficult, given the culture of fear and
sense of insecurity that affects the attitude of the Turkish
people.
To overcome this difficulty, the government and Öcalan

seem to have developed a new approach, an approach that
visualized a common future for the Kurds and the Turks
within a “greater Turkey.”
In order to overcome the fear of partition both the

government and the PKK hint that a solution to the Kurdish
question may indeed result in a greater Turkey, a Turkey
expanded to the Middle East.
This may not be an expansion of Turkey with the Kurds
in it territorially. It is, for the moment, a neo‐Ottoman geo‐
strategic dream in which Turkish influence would expand into
the Middle East via the Kurdish presence in the region and the
Kurds would claim ownership over the “greater Turkey”
through the new partnership.
This is what Öcalan implies when he refers to a union of
the Anatolian and Mesopotamian people. That Öcalan and the
136


Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) leaders talk of re‐opening
the National Pact (Misak‐ı Milli) debate is a clear hint that a
Kurdish settlement would not divide Turkey up but it will
expand its boundaries. All of these somehow correspond to
the AKP’s vision of a greater Turkey and the role it should
play in the neighborhood.
Neo-Ottoman strategic dream within a pax-Ottomana

appears to be the wider framework for a political settlement
between the government and Öcalan.
A neo‐Ottoman geopolitical vision that imagines a

partnership between the Turks and the Kurds, just like in the
years of the War of Independence, seems to be the ground on
which the government and Öcalan are trying to build a peace.
Besides, a pax‐Ottomana with its multi‐ethnic structure and
autonomous regions is expected to resolve the identity claims
of the Kurds. And this is believed to be a “sellable” good to
the Turkish people. April 07, 2013
No, a pax‐Ottomana for the Kurds is not my proposal for
resolving the Kurdish question in Turkey. Rather, it appears to
be the idea around which Abdullah Öcalan expects a solution
for the Kurdish question. I infer this from his message read
out in Diyarbakır at Newroz and from the statement from
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Co‐chairperson Selahattin
Demirtaş about his meeting with Öcalan on İmralı.
In this context a pax‐Ottomana, a political experience

believed to be fair to all different ethnic and religious groups
137


under its control with a non‐assimilating policy, may offer
some help. For its proponents, pax‐Ottomana provided
security, freedom and autonomy to diverse ethnic and
religious groups within the empire with its tradition of ethnic,
linguistic and religious pluralities.
At a time when the Ottoman past has become a source of
pride and aspiration, why should it not offer a post‐national
paradigm to address the Kurdish demands under the debris of
the Kemalist republic, whose secular as well as national idea
has collapsed? I think this is the thinking of Öcalan as well as
the leaders the ruling party.
In Öcalanʹs letter and Demirtaşʹs summary of his meeting
with Öcalan I can see references to an “Ottoman peace.” In a
way they are right.
The Kurdish question can only be resolved with a post-

national view that leaves a homogenizing notion of nation-
state behind.
As such, the republican image of Turkey as the state of a
single ethnicity, the Turks, has to be abandoned.
In an interview Demirtaş gave after visiting Öcalan he

reports that “Öcalan constantly refers to the Ottoman heritage
during the early formative years of the republic, to the
commonwealth of Ottoman cultures.” In response to a
question of what this heritage is, Demirtaş explains: “You
know, under the Ottoman Empire different nations, people
with different religions were able to live in the same country.
138


Especially in the Kurdistan region, people with different belief
systems and different ethnic identities enjoyed partial
autonomy vis‐à‐vis the Ottoman palace. Öcalan finds this
historical experience very important. He states that in the
Middle East a notion of singular nationhood does not fit into
any state, that emancipation of the people depends on states
abandoning this notion of singular nationhood. Öcalan also
insists that the model to replace the notion of singular
nationhood cannot be a nation state but a Middle Eastern
confederation where different identities and beliefs live in
peace without necessarily changing official boundaries. He
regards the current initiative as an opportunity to create a new
model in the Middle East, not merely an opportunity for the
salvation of the Kurds.”
Öcalan takes up the same theme in his letter of
developing a new model in the Middle East. He talks of a
“new Turkey” and the possibility of a “new Middle East.”
While challenging capitalist modernity he refers to the
possibility of a new model emerging out of the historical
experiences of the Anatolian and Mesopotamian peoples. It is
expected to be a post nation‐state that is civilizationally
grounded in this land.
What Öcalan expects is that a reorganization of the state
along a multiplicity of ethnicity, language and religion along
the Ottoman model will resolve the demands of the Kurds for
freedom and autonomy ‐‐ a pax‐Ottomana under republican
clothing.
139


Öcalan seems to have adopted a civilizational discourse.
The civilizational reference in Öcalanʹs letter not only reflects
his search for an alternative to “capitalist modernity” but also
expresses Öcalanʹs wish to build a new Turkey and a new
Middle East together with the AKP, conveying the message
that he understands the vision of the ruling party in Turkey
and in the broader region. 24.03.2013
Kurdish peace initiatives compared: any difference?
Raised hopes and bitter disappointments have been the
recurrent experiences of those who wish to see an end to the
Kurdish question. Most recently, in 2009 the ruling AKP took
a bold initiative to address the Kurdish question and many at
the time expected a breakthrough in the conflict. Yet the
initiative encountered fierce resistance from almost all
quarters: the PKK and its political representatives, opposition
parties, the deep state, the military and even the media.
The hope is that this time it may be different. Now
Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, is the direct
interlocutor of the government, and this is declared to be so to
the public. Such a strategy certainly empowers Öcalan and
constructs legitimacy for him. A powerful and legitimized
Öcalan, in return, will be needed to implement the agreement
once such an agreement is made. In comparison to these bold
steps, the 2009 initiative seems more like a public relations and
public education endeavor.
140


Another important difference is about the PKK and
Öcalanʹs perception of their negotiating counterpart; that is to
say, the question of whom to make a deal with. The PKK in
2009 was of the opinion that it was not the government but the
state, i.e., the military, with whom they should negotiate. The
idea was that one should make peace with whomever one is at
war with. For the PKK, that was the military/the state. The
ruling AKP was regarded as something temporary, while the
state/the military was seen as permanent. So the government
initiative then was not taken very seriously.
Now the PKK and Öcalan see that the military is no
longer the ultimate decision maker, the patron, to make a deal
with, but it is the AKP that has become the state. With the
removal of the tutelage system through constitutional
amendments in 2010 and the judicial scrutiny of military
officers who are involved with deep state activities, the
militaryʹs autonomy and authority in the system have been
significantly lessened, thus empowering the government as
the ultimate decision maker.
The result is that the PKK and Öcalan now know that if
there is to be a peace agreement, it should be reached with the
government. On the other hand, the government seems to
have realized that Öcalan is an asset and the Peace and
Democracy Party will be instrumental in carrying out the will
of Öcalan to implement a future deal. Öcalan is an aging man
and in an era of post‐Öcalan Kurdish politics it will be
141


impossible to find or create a leader like him to make peace
with.
The engagement of the BDP in this process may also
make an important difference. After all, the representative
power of the BDP cannot be underestimated. If a solution is to
integrate the PKK and its social base into Turkeyʹs politics, it
will be through the BDP. Its engagement in the process will
empower the BDP among the Kurdish constituency and its
armed wing. Moreover, the ruling party now has a vision to
rule the country through 2023, the centenary of the republic. If
they are serious about this vision, then they cannot really
afford not to resolve the Kurdish question and disarm the
PKK, and thus remove the constant threat of destabilization
through violence. The PKK has proved that it is capable of
hurting the AKP government and hampering its regional and
global vision.
Moreover, there is an Iraqi Kurdistan dimension to this

equilibrium. In 2009, when the first Kurdish initiative was
initiated, the relationship with Arbil and Jalal Talabani in
Baghdad was not as stable as it is now. Over the years,
relations between the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey have
improved significantly. For Iraqi Kurds, given the growing
tension with the central Iraqi government, Turkey has
emerged as the only regional ally and balancer vis‐à‐vis
Baghdad.
For Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan is both a valuable market for
its products and now is a likely provider of its energy needs. It
142


has also become a strategic partner due to worsening relations
with the central Iraqi government and the Bashar al‐Assad
regime in Syria. Thus, mutual strategic and economic interests
make it ever more likely for the Iraqi Kurds to act as
facilitators in the new Kurdish initiative of Turkey.
The government now regards Öcalan an asset. He has

been in prison for more than 10 years, is not in good health
and is aging. Under such conditions it is assumed that he will
be willing to cooperate with the state to ease his personal life.
Moreover, as the leader of the movement, it is thought that he
is eager to break the deadlock on the ground and open up a
new path for his followers, fighters and sympathizers alike.
There is a belief among some official circles that Öcalan is

the most reasonable person in the PKK to negotiate with.
All of these make Öcalan a proper “counterpart” for the

government to talk to, yet there is an important detail. Though
Öcalan commands the support of the Kurds in the street who
are sympathetic to the PKK, it is doubtful that he is capable of
controlling the PKK itself after years spent in prison. This
raises questions about the prospects of the PKK laying down
arms even after an agreement between the government and
Öcalan. In that case, the PKK might remain an active terrorist
organization but be uprooted from the Kurdish political
movement. Thus, a PKK without Öcalanʹs blessing cannot
survive for the long term but would turn into a “professional”
terrorist organization without any significant popular support
143


among Kurds. Yet Öcalan cannot abandon the PKK and its
fighters in the mountains and in prisons. So any agreement
between the state and Öcalan should include an arrangement
about the members of the PKK, pardoning those in prison and
welcoming those still in the mountains.
Another question concerns the “Turkish reaction” to such
arrangements and agreements. For years Öcalan has been
demonized. His “official” nickname was “baby murderer.” For
many Turks he is responsible for the deaths of thousands of
soldiers and innocent civilians. It was Erdoğan who
repeatedly said that if he were in power in 1999 when Öcalan
was captured, his government would have hanged him.
Fueled with such jingoistic fever, it will not be easy to
persuade the Turkish public overnight of the wisdom of
negotiating with Öcalan. They will react, and their reactions
will be manipulated by some ultranationalist forces.
So if the Turkish public swings against the government

initiative of seeking an agreement with Öcalan, it will be very
difficult for Erdoğan to persist with. 06.01.2013; 20.01.2013
Erdogan will not risk his political future to find a solution to

the Kurdish question. So if he thinks talking to Öcalan
threatens his political survival, he will not hesitate to make a
turn.
AKP and PKK: Different priorities
The messages coming from both the government and the
Kurdistan Workersʹ Party (PKK) point to a serious crisis in the
144


peace process, which involves negotiations between the
Turkish government and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, to find
a political solution to the Kurdish question.
The government cannot address the PKKʹs demands in a
meaningful way as it is unlikely to take any politically risky
decisions on the Kurdish question. Erdoğan does not want to
appear to be striking a political deal with the PKK. This is not
because he is uninterested in resolving the Kurdish question
but because his basic instinct is political survival, and he
believes that a deal with the PKK will damage his popularity
among Turkish voters.
Talking to Öcalan was acceptable because a majority of

Turks agreed with the idea of engaging with him as long as
this would “disarm the PKK and end the PKKʹs terrorist
activities.” This plan to “stop the bloodshed” was
unproblematic for the people and politically affordable for the
government.
But responding to the PKKʹs political demands is a vastly
different story, with serious political risks for a government
facing a nationalistic public. Thus, it will not and cannot
continue to address the PKKʹs demands. In contrast, if the
PKK insists, threatening the government with violence and
recommencing operations in Turkey, the government will
have an excuse to halt the political peace process and present
itself as a force of resistance against the PKK. In this way, a
break in the process might be used to the governmentʹs
political advantage.
145


But is the PKK able to restart its armed attacks, even if the
government does not respond to its demands?
I believe not. They may want to demonstrate their

strength with some kind of violent display, but my guess is
that at the moment the PKK would not restart an armed
struggle in Turkey. The reason is that the PKKʹs priority lies in
Syria, where it now has a historic opportunity to form an
autonomous political unit. “Victory” is closer in Syria than in
Turkey, so the PKK will concentrate its forces in Rojava
instead of restarting an unpopular war against Turkey.
The Kurdsʹ armed struggle, as Öcalan declared in

Nevruz, has indeed ended. They now have the organization,
personnel, active social base and, above all, a high level of
regional and international legitimacy to pursue a political
strategy in Turkey, independent of the governmentʹs decisions
on political reform for the Kurds.
In short, while the AKP is busy with the elections, the
PKK will seek semi‐statehood in Rojava and begin a long‐term
non‐violent political strategy in its Turkish campaign. 08.09.2013
The PKK’s ultimate gain: Legitimacy
Öcalan declared the end of “armed struggle” and the
Kurdistan Workersʹ Party (PKK) announced the beginning of
the withdrawal of its forces from Turkey and into Iraqi
Kurdistan. These events mark a new era for Turkey and the
Kurdish political movement as the process of settlement for
the Kurdish question continues.
146


For years, sensible people at home and abroad called on
the PKK to abandon violence as a means for political struggle.
Now it seems that Öcalan and the PKK have understood the
wisdom of “abandoning violence to achieve political
objectives.” While celebrating this, the government and
Turkish public should not forget that the PKK has not
abandoned its political objectives; thus, they should be ready
to respond and meet at least some of their demands.
It is an understandable public opinion strategy to sell the
idea of negotiations with Öcalan and the PKK as aiming to
silence weapons and the tears of mothers. But it would be a
grave mistake to assume and present the PKKʹs
denouncement of violence as establishing peace. Peace
requires more. The end of the PKKʹs violent activities may
certainly ease taking political reforms that address the
Kurdish demands, but creating a perception in public opinion
that the “question has already been resolved with the end of
violence” may equally block the process of political reforms.
The government and Turkish public should better

understand that the end of violence does not resolve the
Kurdish question. On the contrary, the Kurdish demands will
be put forward with greater force from now on because they
will be voiced by legitimate means and legitimate actors. Once
Kurdish demands are solely voiced by political actors, it will
be more difficult to resist them. Are the government and
Turkish public ready for a period of intense political struggle
by legitimate Kurdish political actors?
147


Besides, it should be noted that the PKKʹs denouncement
of violence and withdrawal from Turkey will be strengthening
the Kurdish political movement and legitimizing its demands.
Which PKK is easier to deal with for Turkey: a PKK that uses
violence and is known as a terrorist organization or the one
that uses legitimate political methods and is thus regarded as
a legitimate political actor?
The greatest asset in politics is legitimacy. The PKK, by

denouncing violence and withdrawing from Turkey, has
gained legitimacy both at home and abroad.
This is the greatest gain of the PKK out of the process.
In this new era of peace making, it will be very difficult to
deny the Kurds democratic rights and demands. This is the
central short‐term outcome of the peace process that should be
understood and responded to by the government.
The PKK has never been this powerful in its entire history
because it has never enjoyed this much legitimacy. The new
PKK that uses legitimate political methods to put forward the
demands of the Kurds will be more powerful and effective.
Thus, the challenge is that, in this new era, the government
and Turkish public need to be more receptive to the Kurdish
demands instead of treating the Kurdish question as a matter
resolved with the end of the PKKʹs violent activities.
Since the process of political settlement has started, it

must be noted that the process should go on until the end.
Otherwise, we must be prepared for the worst. If Turkey is a
148


democracy, it cannot resist the demands of democratic rights
for the Kurds. As the guns go silent it is imperative to meet the
democratic demands of the Kurdish political movement.
The process is bound to lead Turkey toward greater

democracy. It would be a mistake to assume that peace can be
built with less democracy. 28.04.2013
Are Turkish people ready for Kurdish peace?
Hopes for a solution to the Kurdish question are high. People
are tired of the conflict. The question is to find a formula that
will satisfy and be acceptable to Kurds. Not an impossible
task, but not an easy one either.
The government's priority is to secure the withdrawal of

PKK militants out of Turkey and their eventual disarmament.
Does this overlap with the expectations and demands of the
Kurds?
Anyhow, this will first mean a cease‐fire and then a

liquidating of the PKK. No one would object to this on the
Turkish end. But among Kurdish nationalists, an armed and
mobilized PKK stands as a guarantor of their life, rights and
liberties. We should not forget that the governmentʹs 2009
initiative to resolve the Kurdish question had resulted in great
anxiety among Kurdish nationalists who feared that the
governmentʹs solution would liquidate the PKK.
How can the government address this concern of the

PKK? In the past the PKK declared various cease‐fires and
149


implemented them. This time, one can also expect a cease‐fire
from the PKK. Meanwhile, the government is preparing the
legal grounds to release thousands of Kurdistan Communities
Union (KCK) members who are currently under arrest and
being tried. The next step should be an amnesty that would
enable PKK members to return to their homes and engage in
political activities.
All these can be done. Erdoğan and Öcalan can find a
solution to the problem. But the concern is that Erdoğan may
make a last‐minute maneuver if he sees his support dropping
among Turks.
This is in fact a problem not without reason. Talking to
Öcalan and making a “deal” with him is not popular among
Turks. Yes, they are tired of the problem and violence but
“giving in” to the demands of Öcalan is likely to wound their
Turkish pride. This might be the greatest challenge for a
solution. Can a solution be found without injuring the
“Turkish pride” that has been applauded by politicians of all
kinds?
Therefore one of the most tricky problems of the peace is
to convince the Turkish majority, which I call the greatest
obstacle to peace. The publicʹs opinion matters. In every
democracy political leaders know that it is the people who will
ultimately decide and thus they calculate how the public will
react to policies that they pursue. Relying on their charisma
and the trust that they have generated, political leaders also
try to change the opinion of the people. But generally, what
150


the people think or what would be acceptable to the people
delineates the boundaries of their policies.
This is not different in Turkey. Though Prime Minister

Tayyip Erdoğan declared that he would drink poison to
resolve the Kurdish question, it is not realistic to expect him to
risk his political career for the Kurdish question. In late 2009,
in response to public opinion which was against the
“democratic initiative,” he abandoned the process.
Thus, in the current peace process, I do not expect the
government to take a step that will go well beyond what the
public finds acceptable. Do they want to see the end of
Kurdistan Workerʹs Party (PKK) violence? Do they want the
PKK to lay down its arms? Do they want Kurds to accept
living within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey?
And in return, are they ready to accept the demands of
the Kurdish political movement? Are they prepared to see the
PKK, or an offshoot organization, as a legitimate political
actor? Would they accept amnesty for PKK militants? Are they
willing to amend the definition of citizenship in the
constitution which is currently based on Turkish ethnicity?
Will they agree to change the prison term of PKK leader
Abdullah Öcalan?
These are hard questions to answer for “Turks” to whom
these questions are in fact addressed. In a way, this is to say
that the Kurdish question is also a question for the Turkish
majority.
151


Despite the decades‐old violence, Turks, in general, have
managed to get on well with Kurds in their social and
economic interactions. So far we have not seen a serious social
conflict between Turks and Kurds despite severe violence over
the years. This is really positive. But I think it is now time for
the Turkish majority to make a decision about their fate and
that of Kurds. Do they really want to live together with Kurds
as equal citizens of Turkey? If so, they should not give the
government any excuse to abandon the new peace process.
The responsibility lies with the Turkish majority; will they
encourage the government to make a peace with the PKK or
punish it for trying to make peace with Kurds?
For decades the Kurdish question was created by the

state whose elite engaged in a homogenizing nation‐building
policy at the expense of the Kurdish identity. It was the state
that pursued assimilationist policies, imposed oppressive
mechanisms and silenced Kurds.
Now the state has started a process of making peace with
Kurds and it is the people, the Turkish majority, who will
decide whether they will support the new peace initiative or
punish the initiators of peace. 01.04.2013
The ‘great game’ in Kurdistan
Kurdish national movements from Iraq to Syria and Turkey
are on the rise in terms of power and popularity. In Iraq a
semi‐independent state has emerged after a decades‐long
struggle in the aftermath of the Saddam Hussein regime.
152


In Turkey the Kurdistan Workersʹ Party (PKK) and its
leader, Abdullah Öcalan, are talking to the Turkish
government to reach a political settlement. In Syria, seizing an
opportunity in the crisis, an autonomous Kurdish entity under
the political leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)
is on the way.
Remembering the completely unenviable situation of Kurds

in Turkey, Iran and Syria a decade or so ago, one can
describe the current state as the golden age of the Kurds.
In this, the role of Kurdish leaders like Massoud Barzani,
Jalal Talabani and Öcalan should be acknowledged. Among
the Kurdish actors, Barzani is the only one with semi‐state
authority as the president of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). After decades of struggle, the current
status of Kurds in Iraq is no doubt a big achievement. Barzani
is very much aware of this and thus his priority is to
consolidate the gains that Kurds and his party, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), now enjoy. He is a realist who is
trying to lay the political and economic foundations for
Kurdish self‐rule in Kurdistan within or outside the state of
Iraq.
What Barzani wants least is to be pulled into the Kurdish
struggles in Syria, Turkey and Iran. He supports the peace
process between the PKK, whose main military strength is
stationed within the boundaries of the KRG, and Turkey,
153


which is a vital trading partner as well as an indispensable
route for oil and gas exports from the KRG.
Peace in Turkey is expected to eliminate a constant source
of tension between Turkey and the KRG ‐‐ i.e., the presence of
the PKK in the Kandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. The
withdrawal of the PKKʹs military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan
would increase the KRGʹs authority within its borders, thus
enhancing its state‐building process and enabling it to deepen
economic and political cooperation with Turkey, its emerging
partner in the region.
While the peace process in Turkey is welcomed by

Barzani, the PYDʹs rising power and aspirations in Syria are
equally worrisome. The KRG do not respond to the PYDʹs cry
for help in its fight against al‐Qaeda and closed its borders
when help was most needed.
It appears that the rise of Kurdish politics in the region
has revived intra‐Kurdish rivalry. Just think of this web of
relationships that Kurdish politics are now in: The PKK has
abandoned its armed struggle in Turkey and is conducting
peace talks with the Turkish government. The PYD, an
offspring of the PKK, now controls Kurdish regions in Syria
(Rojava) where it is preparing to declare self‐rule. Some strong
elements within the PKK do not want to give up the gains of
the PYD in Syria in return for an uncertain peace process in
Turkey.
In turn, Ankara is extremely annoyed by the PYDʹs

control of territories on its southern border. The PYD claims
154


that al‐Qaeda‐affiliated militias backed by Turkey are fighting
a proxy war against the Kurdish forces in Rojava. Barzani
supports the peace process in Turkey and appears to be
mediating between the Turkish government and the PKK. But
angry that the PYD (the Syrian wing of the PKK) is
dominating the ground and not allowing pro‐Barzani Kurdish
parties to be effective in Rojava, Barzani, under the pressure of
Turkey, belittles the gains of the PYD and accuses it of
collaborating with Bashar al‐Assad.
Salih Muslim, the leader of the PYD, is looking for ways
to cooperate with the Iraki. And finally, visiting Diyarbakir
and meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Barzani agrees that the PYD should not seek an
autonomous Rojava.
In the last decade we have witnessed the rise of Kurdish
political actors in the Middle East asserting themselves and
making significant gains. Now we might see cracks and even
tension between the Kurdish movements in the region as the
priorities of each actor not only differ but clash with each
other. 17.11.2013
155


From European Union to
Eurasianism
Turkey and the EU: Deception and Unfaithfulness
IN 2002, WHEN TURKEYʹS MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU WAS DEBATED
intensively both in Europe and Turkey, Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi of Italy asked his Turkish counterpart in Rome:
Does Turkey want to have a marriage of convenience or love
with Europe?
The Turkish prime ministerʹs response was just

remarkable, reflecting the spirit of the time: We wish to have a
Catholic marriage, an everlasting one.
It has now been more than 10 years since then, and the
Turkish side seems to no longer care about the prospect of any
kind of engagement with Europe.
Why? Because the “union with the EU” was then

conceived as a way to get rid of a bullying lover at home, i.e.,
the Kemalists‐secularists who had laid claim on Turkey to
rule.
Let me explain in detail why the ruling party has lost
interest in EU membership. Remembering the fact that even in
157

From European Union to Eurasianism

those days we were all championing EU membership, we
often referred to the membership as not an end in itself ‐‐ that
would bring Turkey European values and institutions as well
as get into a zone of welfare ‐‐ but as an instrument to settle
some domestic political accounts. What I mean is that even the
ardent supporters of the EU project, including myself, and not
only the AKP government, regarded the EU as a proper
instrument to transform the regime in Turkey into a more
democratic one and eliminate the Kemalist‐secularist power
elites. As the EU membership required a fully functioning
democracy, a rule of law regime and a working market
economy, the steps to be taken by Turkey in this direction
meant the end of the Kemalist tutelage regime under the
protection of the military.
Even for me, the EU membership was part of this process
of eliminating the Kemalist‐secularist tutelage regime in which
the military, the judiciary and their civilian allies enjoyed
extra‐political power and privileges within the system.
Neither the regime nor its Kemalist‐secularist elite were
democratic: to beat them politically the requirements of EU
membership were a perfect prescription.
This logic worked particularly among the Islamists. They
were the primary victims of the tutelage regime in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Remember, their political parties were
closed down in 1998 and 2001, civilian networks were
repressed and even economic agencies were under serious
158


pressure. The EU membership process was a refuge for them
against the excessiveness of the Kemalist establishment.
The EU wanted Turkey to respect human rights, while

the Islamists were suffering from a lack of respect for human
rights in Turkey. The EU wanted Turkey to establish a
working democratic regime, while the Islamists who were
winning elections at the ballot box were denied rule of the
country and were forced to quit government. The EU wanted
Turkey to stop closing down political parties, when the
Islamistsʹ political parties (the Welfare Party and the Virtue
Party) were closed down by the Constitutional Court. The EU
wanted Turkey to establish a civilian supremacy over the
military, while in Turkey the military was mobilizing the
judiciary and media against the Islamists.
So the EU was a domestic policy issue for the government
and for many liberal democrats as well.
The EU membership process was instrumentalized to

transform the power relationship at home at the expense of
the Kemalists-secularists.
And, it worked. The very success of this strategy has
rendered it obsolete. If it worked then, it is only natural that
there is no longer a need for it.
Yes, the process has been slowed down by the negative
attitudes of Germany and France, and blocked by the excuse
of the Cyprus question. Such resistance on the part of the
Europeans has disappointed the Turks and reduced their
159


support for EU membership. All these are true. But I think the
underlying factor for the current deadlock and disinterest on
the part of the Turkish side is that we never regarded the EU
membership as an ultimate objective that we really strived for.
For us, it was just an instrument to push around our
opponents. Now, we do not need such an instrument. The
“opponents” have been weakened and even eliminated.
The EU‐Turkey relationship is not a love affair leading to
a Catholic marriage, but a case of deception and
unfaithfulness.
A person who becomes more authoritarian each day cannot

seriously talk of Turkey's accession to the EU, whose
membership requires democracy and the rule of law as
preconditions.
As such, the ruling AKP has become a disappointment

for many, both in Turkey and abroad. A party that started its
political journey with stated goals of greater democratization
and EU membership has turned out to be an authoritarian
power that instead seeks some kind of Eurasian union.
Why? What happened to the AKP that it abandoned these
twin objectives of democratization and EU membership?
These objectives were formulated and pursued when the
AKP, as a party with Islamist roots, was confronted with a
powerful military and bureaucracy even after winning the
elections and forming a government. The EU membership
process was a refuge for the ex‐Islamists who formed the AKP
160


against the excessiveness of the Kemalist establishment
represented by the military.
EU membership required democratic reforms that were

supposed to weaken the position of the military, thus opening
up breathing space for the AKP. Moreover, through the EU
membership objective, the party was able to reach out to
secular but liberal democratic social segments of society,
increasing its legitimacy both at home and abroad.
So, for the AKP, the EU was an instrument to protect
itself from the military, to form a broader social coalition with
pro‐EU secular groups and to legitimize the transfer of power
from the military to the government in the name of
democratization, as required by the accession process. And
this instrument worked. Yet its very success rendered the
objectives obsolete.
When the AKP felt strong enough after eliminating its

archenemies, it no longer needed the EU as a shelter,
legitimizer and coalition builder.
It was in this context that the old formula resurfaced:
Whoever controls Ankara and is enjoying ruling the country
singlehandedly does not want EU membership. This was valid
10 years ago for the Kemalist military and bureaucracy, and it
is true now for the AKP.
161


EU membership is the demand of the people who seek
democracy and social welfare. But for those who walk
Ankaraʹs corridors of power, neither democracy nor the
welfare of the people matters. For previous pro‐status quo
forces, EU membership was not desirable, as it required
change. This is what has happened to the AKP, too. The
formerly reformist party captured the state, installed its own
order in Ankara and now does not want a change in the new
status quo. To hold on to the status quo, the ruling party
seems prepared to reverse the reforms that it had introduced
on the way.
Moreover the AKPʹs Islamist roots were revived as the

core party leadership gained confidence in consecutive
electoral successes and faced challenges in the realms of social
opposition at home and the crisis of Islamism in the Middle
East. In response, anti‐Westernism inherited from the Islamist
past of the AKP leadership has made a comeback in recent
years; Islam is increasingly referred to as the “civilizational
property” of the “new Turkey.”
In the late 1990s it was some generals who argued that
Turkey should look to the East for an alternative to the EU.
Some of those generals were later prosecuted for plotting a
military coup against the AKP rule.
The irony is that it is now the leader of the party not the
generals who suggests abandoning the bid for EU
membership and becoming a member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), led by Russia and China.
162


This new proposed direction seems to be in harmony with the
domestic political orientation of the party towards
authoritarianism.
Erdoğanʹs party no longer needs European legitimization
vis‐à‐vis the military and its other Kemalist opponents.
Besides, Erdogan and the AKP leadership want to keep
Turkey independent from Brussels and rule it on their own,
just as the Turkish generals once preferred to do. 20.10.2013;
19.01.2014
It is obvious that an increasingly authoritarian political

leader would not wish to take Turkey into the EU, and a
Turkey under the leadership of such a leader would not be
admitted to the EU.
Turkey’s new quest: a Eurasian Union
In 2002, when Gen. Tuncer Kılınç pointed to a Eurasian
alternative to the European Union for Turkey, it became a
laughing matter. It was interpreted as an indication of where
the military ‐‐ in fear of reforms required for the EU
membership ‐‐ would take Turkey.
Later, due to extra‐military activities within the alleged

Ergenekon network, Gen. Kılınç was put in prison and tried
alongside many of his colleagues for plotting a military coup
against the AKP government.
A decade later, AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan is now

seriously suggesting abandoning the bid for EU membership
163


to become rather a member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), led by Russia and China.
Was General Kılınç a visionary or was he trying to divert
Turkeyʹs march towards the EU that, with its reform agenda,
was threatening the privileged position of the Turkish military
in the countryʹs politics, economy and society?
I have no doubt that he and his associates were trying to
stop the EU process that required democratic politics at home
and the exclusion of the military from politics and opted for a
Eurasian direction in foreign policy that did not set any
precondition for democracy.
Now, is it true to say the same for Erdoğan? He is a
pragmatist. Knowing that the process has gotten stuck,
Erdoğan thinks that abandoning the EU will not involve
political and economic risks: The Europeans are unwilling to
take Turkey in, Turkey is doing economically well without the
EU and Erdoğanʹs party no longer needs the European
legitimization vis‐à‐vis the military. Besides, Erdogan wants to
keep Turkey independent from Brussels and rule on his own,
just like the Turkish generals once preferred. This is in fact the
normal choice for those who are powerful in Ankara, be they
generals or politicians.
In fact, the attitudes of the Europeans are making it easier
for Erdoğan to express his search for an alternative to the EU,
so much so that for the first time he stated very seriously and
clearly that Turkey under his government is prepared to
abandon the EU altogether. Calling on the EU to stop stalling
164


the process, Erdoğan said: ʺWe have a strong economy. I told
Russian President Mr. [Vladimir] Putin, ‘You should include
us in the Shanghai Five and we will say farewell to the
European Union.ʹ The Shanghai Five is much better‐off
economically. It is much more powerful. We told them if you
say come, we will. Pakistan wants to join and so does India.
They have also made requests. We could all join together. In
terms of population and markets, this organization
significantly surpasses the European Union in every way.ʺ
These are very sincere words. He considers the Shanghai
organization as an alternative, in fact a powerful and better
alternative to the EU. Besides this, I think it is also seen as a
matter of “civilizational belonging.” The Turkish prime
minister increasingly emphasizes “our own civilization,”
referring to the Islamic one.
Detachment from the West/EU is expected to “revive” the

civilization Turkey represents and leads according to the
AKP leadership.
There is certainly a growing self confidence that Turkey

can and should remain independent to lead instead of tied up
with the EU. The SCO is such a network that will give Turkey
a civilizational distinction, economic capacity and a free hand
to conduct its foreign affairs to fulfill leadership aspirations.
Besides, there has been a structural transformation in

Turkeyʹs engagement with the EU, i.e., the economy. The flow
of EU investment funds has decreased in recent years. Equally
165


important is that the share of EU countries in Turkish trade
has dropped steadily over the last decade. In 2003, more than
55 percent of Turkeyʹs trade was with EU countries. This
figure is now around 40 percent.
In short, the EU is losing Turkey. That is to say, the
Turkish government, the Turkish people and the Turkish
economy are all drifting away from the EU. And let me say,
this process is almost irreversible. Those who care about
Turkeyʹs presence in Europe should do something about it
before it is too late. 27.01.2013
Is Turkey immune from international criticism?
No country is immune to the international criticism that comes
from other governments, international organizations or NGOs.
ʺWe are an independent and sovereign country, and

foreigners cannot poke their noses into our internal affairs.” I
have heard such remarks thousands of times. In fact, this has
become the motto of nation‐states that have something to hide
from the international community.
The point is that when it comes to the matters of human
rights and fundamental freedoms especially, there can be no
sacred space called “internal affairs” that is spared from
international norms and regulations or immune to cross‐
border moral judgments.
In the past, Turkish officials too frequently used such

language as “autonomy” from “international interference,”
166


based on a notion of “national sovereignty,” whenever they
encountered unpleasant criticism raised by international
circles about the human rights situation at home.
Once Turkey, in its EU accession bid, started to take
“international standards” seriously and tried to comply with
them domestically, its tune regarding international criticism
on this issue had changed. Governments then introduced
reforms to comply with international standards and in
response to democratization demands at home.
It now seems that being “independent” of international

standards and constraints has tempted Turkey's rulers once
again.
We witnessed this just this when the EU progress report
on Turkey came out. Once again, the Turkish government has
resorted to the old “domestic affairs” argument over the
critical remarks made by US envoy to Ankara Francis
Ricciardone, in which he noted the long detention practices
and treatment of high‐ranking generals and bureaucrats in the
Ergenekon case.
The accuracy of the ambassadorʹs criticisms can certainly
be debated, but so can the wording and logic of the Turkish
response. The prime minister said: “No one should
misinterpret our patience, tolerance and friendliness. Turkey
is not anybodyʹs scapegoat. Turkey is not a country in whose
internal issues or executive, legislative and judicial systems
can be meddled.”
167


On matters of human rights, an objection to criticism
based on “internal affairs” or “domestic jurisdiction” is
indefensible. Violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms taking place in a “sovereign” state concern other
states, nations and international and nongovernmental
organizations out of legal, political and moral considerations.
Westphalian sovereignty and a principle of

nonintervention are no longer the only guiding, normative
frameworks in place to determine the conduct of international
relations. The emergence of human rights as an international
issue has played a significant role in bringing the conventional
norms and principles of inter‐state relations to debate.
One can argue that the rights of states are derived from
individual rights and therefore have no autonomous standing.
If the ultimate justification for the existence of states is the
protection of the rights of citizens, a government that
systematically and persistently violates the human rights of its
citizens betrays the purpose for which it exists.
Elements of contemporary international society entail a

loosening of the absolutist conception of state sovereignty so
that human rights are included in the discourse of
international and inter‐state relations. Developments of a
normative order of international relations, economic
interdependencies and the increasing levels and importance of
transnational relations have transformed the world.
Economic interdependencies, transnational movements

and legal obligations undertaken by states themselves have
168


challenged the traditional view of state sovereignty and the
principle of non‐intervention. Growing global awareness for
protecting the rights of individuals through transnational
norms, institutions and processes, limits the sovereign rights
of states at national and international levels. No government
has the absolute right to behave toward its citizens as it
wishes, without taking into account international standards
and moral norms.
In short, if the Turkish government claims to be pursuing
a value‐based foreign policy with regards to Syria, other
governments may argue the same about their policies towards
Turkey. It is futile to swim against the current in international
waters. 15.09.2013
169


Foreign Policy: From Soft Power
to Neo‐Ottomanism
From Nasser to Erdoğan: Unfulfilled Promises
THE GAP BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND WHAT HAS ACTUALLY
been delivered results in disappointments and constitutes a
blow to the credibility of a country.
This is the story of Turkey in recent years. We conceived
Turkey as a “regional superpower” capable of determining the
course of events in the region in order to bring justice, welfare
and peace to the people who live in the neighborhood.
Whatever we did in regional politics was for the sake of the
people of the region and as such, had nothing to do with the
interests of Turkey. It was only we who pursued “moral
politics” without selfish interest calculations because our
civilizational values dictated to us that we do so.
We always do the “right” thing. In Syria, Palestine, Libya,
Egypt, Iraq and Israel, we always sided with the people and
their rightful demands. A Robin Hood in Africa, in Asia, in the
Middle East… Turkey as the self‐righteous regional
superpower. How does it sound? I think moral self‐
171

From Soft Power to Neo–Ottomanism

righteousness, not rational calculations, marks the essence of
the current foreign policy of Turkey.
Thus the government has raised expectations, both at

home and abroad, about what it can deliver in its foreign
policy without thinking much about its capabilities. The result
is a gap between the expectations and the reality.
Turkish foreign policy in recent years suffers from its

inability to meet the raised expectations in regional and
global politics.
Turkey was supposed to be a “central” power, a “game

setter” and an “order building” country, according to the
Turkish government. Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, you name it ‐‐ the
region as a whole was viewed as Turkeyʹs “backyard” where
nothing would be allowed to take place without the consent of
Turkey. The government was not only responsible for the
well‐being of its citizens but also of the Palestinians, the
Lebanese, the Iraqis, etc. A regional mission was sought, a
regional leadership was claimed.
Most recently Erdoğan has even raised expectations

higher by calling for a revision of the “international order.” In
his recent speeches he heavily criticized the UNʹs system, the
structure of the Security Council and the overall distribution
of power that reflects the past ‐‐ the Cold War conditions. It
has been increasingly stated by the Turkish government that
the current international system is not just and thus is in need
of a revision. I think criticisms directed at the foundations of
172


international systems are right but the risk is that such a stand
makes Turkey appear as a “revisionist,” and thus a marginal
power. Calling for justice is fine but it likens Erdoğan to Hugo
Chaves and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Revisionists are the ones who increase expectations about
the possibility of change but generally fail in delivering them.
Once expectations are not met, a deep disappointment unfolds
and credibility is questioned. This characterizes Turkish
foreign policy in recent times.
Promises have overwhelmed capabilities. The Syrian case
is an extreme example of failing to keep the promises given to
the international community, the opposition groups and the
people on the ground. Turkey could not persuade Bashar al‐
Assad to step down and then force him to leave. The Turkish
government also could not arm the opposition to the degree of
changing the balance of power on the ground and now are
also unable to settle all the Syrians who were uprooted from
their homes.
A similar pattern applies to the Palestinians in Gaza who
are being killed by Israeli forces.
Did Erdoğan deliver what he promised to the people of
Gaza? In the footprints of Gamal Abdel Nasser he should
understand the reasons for his downfall: unfulfilled promises.
18.11.2012
173


Is Turkey going revisionist?
For some time now Turkish foreign policy has been criticized
for not being able to fulfill what it promised. Deep down this
is related to the gap between the governmentʹs aspirations and
Turkeyʹs capabilities. An exaggerated self‐image has led
foreign policymakers to set the objectives so high that they are
impossible to reach. This has resulted in a credibility problem
for Turkey as well as the questioning of the accuracy of its
analyses, the ability of its diplomatic team and the wisdom of
its policymakers. As a result Turkish foreign policy appears
weak, out of tune with regional and global developments,
inaccurate and ineffective.
At times it even sounds revisionist. Challenging the basic
norms and institutions of the international system has been
the position of many academic, civil society networks and
even states. No doubt the UN system is not founded on a
notion of equity and equality among nations. The Turkish
prime minister has been criticizing the UN system for a long
time, especially over its inaction against the Bashar al‐Assad
regime in Syria and the coup in Egypt. He also directly
questions the UN Security Council and targets its five
permanent members.
He is right to question the veto system within the
Security Council. It reflects the power relationship in the post‐
World War II era and has now become obsolete. Turkeyʹs
government sees itself as a rising power in global politics and
wishes to change the status quo and occupy a more favorable
174


place in the new one. So it is not only a question of justice but
also recognition and power.
Moreover, the AKP leadership calculates that a

“challenging” position taken against what Erdoğan calls the
“hegemonic powers” will strengthen Turkeyʹs leadership
claims and increase his popularity among the people both at
home and in the region. But this does not mean a greater share
of power in global affairs. Confrontation with the world is also
likely to give birth to authoritarian leadership at home, a
leadership challenging the world would ask full support,
obedience and discipline at home.
It is true that “rising powers” in international relations

tend to turn revisionists as they are not happy with the
established power distribution and wish to change it. But we
know that “change” in the international system does not come
through rhetorical demands but through actual displays of
power mainly in warfare (or capability of warfare) and partly
in economic performances that unsettle the already
established power relationship. But the risk is that the “rising
powers” that call for change might be held back by the
established powers if they are not really capable of standing
behind their claims.
It is not only the UN, the Turkish government is also not
happy with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
and its member states.
When a military coup overthrew Mohammed Morsi, the

elected president in Egypt, the Turkish government strongly
175


condemned the coup and withdrew its ambassador from
Cairo. The Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government was the one
and only country in the Islamic world who severed relations
with the new regime in Cairo. No other Islamic country
followed the Turkish line. Almost all governments in the
region supported the military regime.
While the West was heavily targeted for supporting and

even masterminding the coup in Egypt, Islamic countries and
organizations were also subjected to criticism for failing to
stand against the coup. Turkey, in its opposition of the coup in
Egypt, appeared alone.
The Turkish government felt isolated by the West and

abandoned by its Muslim brothers in the region.
The Turkish leaders should understand that revisionism

does not have positive connotations in international relations.
It reminds one of radical states and leaders of the 20th century
that led the world to wars, chaos and suffering. Therefore, the
perception of Turkey as an anti‐systemic country will damage
its image, prestige and power.
To swing from a pro-status quo middle power to a

revisionist ambitious power is likely to bring political and
economic risks for Turkey.
Angry with Islamic countries, some government

members openly humiliated the secretary‐general of the OIC,
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, whose election as secretary‐general
176


used to be a matter of pride by the ruling AKP. Encountering
severe criticism for not taking a stand and mobilizing the OIC
against the coup in Egypt, İhsanoğlu revealed that the Turkish
government did not ask the OIC to hold an emergency
meeting over the coup and its atrocities in Egypt. This was
because the government feared that it would not find
supportive voices within the OIC.
All these indicate that the Turkish governmentʹs rhetoric
does not match its capabilities and influence in the region.
What is worse is that its strong rhetoric that challenges the
global order and regional power relationship makes Turkey
appear as a revisionist country. Sentimentalism and
ideological blindness obscure the governmentʹs vision of
regional and global affairs.
The Turkish government strongly questions the very

existence of the UN Security Council but on the other, it asks
them to act on Syria and Egypt. The West is accused of being
the mother of all evils in the Middle East, but it is also called
on to interfere in Syria.
Turkish leaders, on one hand, challenge the international

order and demand a greater share of power in the system,
but on the other ask NATO to protect its borders against
possible missile attacks coming from Syria.
If you do not have the capabilities to defend yourself
against a country like Syria and need the help of NATO, the
most established institution of the current international order,
177


then your call for a revision in the distribution of power is
baseless, or at least premature.
These reflect an utter confusion in Turkeyʹs foreign

policy. But on one account the government knows what it is
doing. A revisionist and anti‐Western‐looking foreign policy
blended with a notion of Islamic solidarity and presented as a
continuation of its glorious Ottoman past is an asset to
mobilizing the masses behind the government. A populist
foreign policy whose main target is not the world but its home
audience is likely to continue under the AKP rule. 25.08.2013
Turkish foreign policy: Time for a re‐evaluation
The foreign policy of a country is not singularly directed
abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes.
Even if it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics
its repercussion on domestic politics is inevitable.
Foreign policy perceptions, choices and orientations may
strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades,
Turkish foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a
“siege mentality” that portrayed its neighbors as enemies with
territorial ambitions on Turkey. This created a tense
relationship with neighbors with who not only the state but
the people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.
Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense

especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from
the region justified the authoritarian power structure inside.
Thus people at home had to be united against immediate
178


threats in the region and be even aware of their internal
extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea
of a fully functioning liberal democracy, human rights and
pluralism were regarded as a luxury and even risky. The
politics of survival laid the ground for an authoritarian politics
supervised by the military, denial of the existence of the Kurds
and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and
widespread‐cross ideological nationalism. Survival and the
security of the state were used as justification for authoritarian
state formation.
In short, the threat perception that was exemplified

through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down
social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in
Turkish politics. This mechanism started to change after the
1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country for EU
membership. As democratization, economic development and
good neighborly relations were required to be a full member
in the EU the Turkish governments as well as social forces
pushed hard to change this mechanism of foreign policy that
served to securitization of Turkish political and social spaces.
As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish foreign
policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the
securitization of Turkish politics.
A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to a
liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region
not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation
over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying.
179


This opened the avenues of mutual understanding, trust and
cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country of
mediation, engagement and multilateralism. Out of this new
paradigm of cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal
organizations, think tanks, individuals entered into a deep
interaction in the neighborhood. Later these social and
economic actors acted as driving forces for a continued
political dialogue and good relationship in the region.
When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected

Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue based soft power approach
would continue. But the resistance of the Syrian regime to
change last year and Turkey’s inability to persuade Syrian
President Bashir al‐Assad to introduce reforms has displayed
the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria
on which the Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage.
Realizing that their very image in the “neighborhood” as a

capable country is at stake the Turkish leaders moved from
persuasion to coercion against Syria.
Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in Iraq,
the central government under Nouri al‐Maliki backed by Iran
and driven by the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While
Turkish business in Baghdad suffered from this change of
wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara
realized again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to
mend the damage.
180


The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey
as a model” added to the overconfidence of Turkish political
actors. Ahmet Davutoglu, then the Turkish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, started to talk about “constructing a new
order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of
Turkey. This new language obviously went beyond the liberal
premises of the AKP’s earlier stand of cooperation,
engagement and dialogue. It appeared that Turkey abandoned
“zero problem policy” and its “soft power” approach, and
embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination
under the cloth of Islamic solidarity and neo‐Ottomanism.
This presents yet another paradigm shift in Turkish foreign
policy: search for cooperation is replaced by quest for
domination and a pro‐status quo position by a revisionist
stand. 27.05.2012
Syrian Crisis: An opportunity or curse for Turkey?
Turks love to describe their country as “the leader country,”
“the regional power,” “the great Turkey,” etc. This may be a
longing for the long‐lost imperial days during the reign of the
Ottoman Empire. This social and psychological longing has
been voiced by the Turkish government as well in recent years.
I think the Syrian crisis testing Turkeyʹs capabilities in its
“backyard” is an opportunity for the Turks to come to terms
with the romantic nature of their ambitions and the hard
realities on the ground.
181


The fight against Bashar al‐Assad has been going on
without any success. The presence of a strong war machine at
the hands of the regime and the use of it against its own
citizens without mercy have contributed to the longevity of
the regime. Besides the social base of the regime, a weak and
disorganized opposition has strengthened the position of the
Assad regime. Add the concerns of the locals and international
community about “what will be next” and an expectation of
continued bloodshed under the rule of the opposition forces ‐‐
worsened daily by the reports of the atrocities committed by
the opposition forces ‐‐ then you will understand the reasons
for the current state of affairs in Syria.
What is worse is that no regional or global power seems
interested in the fate of the Syrians. The powers, including
Turkey, that encouraged opposition against Assad have not
provided what they promised, leaving the opposition fighters
on their own without much equipment to topple a strongly
armed central government.
Through cross‐border shelling and terrorist acts the

situation in the region has turned to be a destabilizing factor in
Turkey. It has been understood that Assad may survive longer
than expected and thus it may be better not to put his
departure as a test case for Turkeyʹs foreign policy
achievement.
It is known that within the US administration there is a
clash of views among those who propose a harder stance
against Assad and a non‐committed position. But it is
182


important to note that even those who advise a tough line do
not propose an active engagement amounting to a direct
military intervention in Syria. It is becoming very clear that
the US will not militarily engage against the Syrian regime,
apart from providing military intelligence to the opposition
forces.
Will Assad go eventually? It is becoming very clear that
international direct military help is not forthcoming for the
opposition forces. Can they overthrow the regime on their
own? I am not sure, rather unlikely.
Then, what to do in Syria? There is really no simple
answer. Many people are confused. Should diplomacy
continue trying to convince the sides to find a political
settlement? Or should military intervention be employed to
compel them to come to an agreement to stop the bloodshed?
If either diplomacy or intervention stops the violence in

Syria, it will be greeted as a miracle. We, the people of the
Middle East, believe in miracles; but will we see one that
brings peace to Syria? I doubt it.
On humanitarian grounds it is impossible not to do

anything. More than 200,000 people have been killed so far.
Tanks, warplanes, artillery and even chemical weapons were
used in the killing of these thousands. Cities were destroyed.
The infrastructure of Syria was ruined. Around 4 million
people have fled, now living in miserable conditions in
neighboring countries.
183


I wonder if Syria will ever overcome this destruction or
the Syrians will ever be able to live in harmony again either
through diplomacy or intervention.
Peace will be a miracle in Syria.
The fact that no international action has come out of
diplomatic negotiations left Turkey in an awkward position
because it has based its Syrian policy on regime change. Now
it is clear that it will not come, either through a military
operation or diplomatic means.
Expecting the swift fall of the Assad regime, to be replaced

by an ideologically friendly Muslim Brotherhood government,
Turkey today faces difficult choices.
The Syrian crisis might be a good lesson for Turkish

government about the cost of pursuing an “imperial policy in
Turkeyʹs backyard.”
Blind violence against innocent people mostly associated
with Middle East politics hit Turkey on an unprecedented
scale. Explosions in Reyhanlı killed 46 people brining Turkey
ever closer to the Middle East. Seeking to be a regional
superpower, Turkey experienced the likely costs of its regional
ambitions in the Middle East, where rivalry does not
recognize moral boundaries.
But for those who know the Middle East, this is the rule
of the game in this part of the world, where politics are
184


conducted with all available means, including sheer violence
against people.
When the Syrian crisis erupted in March 2011, it was
expected to end with the fall of Bashar al‐Assad in a few
months.
As Turkey sided with the people of Syria and supported
the opposition, thus accelerating the process of change in the
region, it would emerge as one of the architects of the “new
Syria,” proudly and powerfully demonstrating its regional
role as the “game setter.” The Turkish governmentʹs policy
was bound to be successful, because Assad would certainly go
the way of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and
Muammar Gaddafi, and a “new Middle East” would be on the
horizon under the leadership of the “new Turkey.”
Now that the crisis in Syria has raged on for many years,
Turkey has been left with disappointment and a series of
domestic and foreign policy problems. In fact, in many ways
the Syrian problem has become Turkeyʹs problem.
The Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey from the

atrocities of the Assad regime have become a formidable
problem for Turkey, with long‐term repercussions on its
demographic structure as well as sectarian and inter‐
community relations.
The number of refugees, according to official figures, has
reached 1.5 million, but unofficially it is estimated to be close
to 2 millions. This is an extremely high number to deal with
185


not only in terms of housing, healthcare and other services,
but also in terms of integrating them peacefully into society.
How can Turkey provide for the needs and address the
problems of these refugees? It appears that they are not short‐
term guests, as we do not see an end to the crisis in Syria in
the near future. Some of them are provided shelter and food in
the camps, but the conditions there are not enviable. Those
who have chosen to earn a living outside the camps, which is
the majority, face even greater hardships, poverty and now
animosity. In many parts of Turkey where Syrian refugees are
present the locals already appear to be resentful. As expected
in any refugee‐receiving country, the refugees are portrayed
as the cause of scarce jobs, high rents and a rising crime rate. Is
Turkey prepared to manage with over 2 million permanent
Syrian refugees?
Another serious problem linked to Syria is al‐Qaeda.

How can Turkey stop al‐Qaeda‐affiliated groups in Syria from
infiltrating and attacking targets in Turkey? The security
threat is urgent. Furthermore, Turkey has been accused in
recent months of supporting al‐Qaeda to fight the Assad
regime and Democratic Union Party (PYD) forces in the north.
Such reports seriously damage Turkeyʹs image in the world
and will certainly cause difficulties in the future when Turkey
asks for international cooperation in the fight against
terrorism.
186


The Syrian crisis is pushing Turkey's Alevi question to the
surface with a new dimension deepening Turkey's own
sectarian division.
While the Alevis of Turkey accuse the government of

pursuing a Sunni‐biased policy towards Syria, the Sunni
majority views the Alevis with a suspicion that they support
the Assad regime. The end result is that the Syrian crisis is
deepening Turkeyʹs sectarian division.
Turkeyʹs Kurdish question has also become more

complicated as a result of the Syrian crisis. The emergence of a
strong Kurdish presence in the north of Syria has revived
Turkeyʹs sense of insecurity regarding the Kurds and
disrupted its “peace process” with the Kurdistan Workersʹ
Party (PKK). In short, the Syrian crisis has revealed the
vulnerabilities of Turkish domestic politics and displayed the
limits of its power in influencing regional developments.
In short the Syria crisis is turning into a nightmare for
Turkey. As the effects of the spillover of events taking place
across its borders cannot be contained, Turkey has to bear a
considerable cost.
I do not mean just a financial cost but also political and
social risks that have emerged as a result of the Syrian crisis.
What the Syrians have encountered is a human tragedy, a
massive humanitarian crisis. As such, it is impossible to
remain indifferent to their suffering. I strongly believe that
Turkey and the international community should use whatever
187


means are at their disposal to relieve the suffering of the
refugees.
But this should not prevent us from identifying problems
related to the crisis and taking measures to resolve them. This
is necessary for Turkey because the risks from the Syrian crisis
pose serious challenges.
So far around 2 million Syrians have sought refuge in

Turkey. This is an enormous number of people for Turkey to
look after financially and to accommodate socially.
It is reported that the Turkish government has spent $5.5
billion providing for refugees alone. The financial cost of
Turkeyʹs support to the opposition forces is neither known nor
demanded from the government. As one of the main sponsors
of the opposition forces, it is likely not insignificant. Another
couple of billions? Maybe.
In the beginning, the refugees were accommodated in

camps, but as the population unexpectedly increased, it
became impossible to house them all in the camps. So from
Mardin to Mersin, the Syrian refugees are scattered
throughout the towns of the region. Now you can find them
everywhere in Turkey including İstanbul and İzmir.
Forget about the finances, this is a serious demographic

change that is likely to prompt social, economic and political
troubles for Turkey. These are not unknown. From Latin
America to Asia, “host countries” have encountered these
188


difficulties. Massive cross‐border population movements
bring problems with them; it is better not to shut our eyes.
Turkeyʹs longest border, the border with Syria, has

become a highway. Sufficient border control is no longer
possible. People and goods go almost unchecked. This creates
very serious security problems. Smuggling, a customary
practice in the region, is now carried out en masse. Up to 5,000
smugglers cross the borders on horseback and clash with the
Turkish soldiers who guard the border. This is not simple
smuggling any more, but a black market economy of the war
lords that Turkey cannot, and probably would not, stop as
part of its policy of supporting the opposition groups in Syria.
As a result of the ongoing crisis in Syria, Turkish citizens
face greater security risks. Dozens of Turkish citizens in
southeast Turkey have been killed as a result of artillery or
gun fire from across the Syrian border. Worse, an explosion in
Reyhanlı killed 52 Turkish citizens. As a result of the Syrian
crisis, it is clear that Turkey has become a target of terrorist
attacks, strangely, of both al‐Qaeda and Hezbollah. Now, it is
not rare to read news of the seizure of explosives by Turkish
police on the border. Turkey has become more insecure as a
result of the Syrian crisis and that condition may escalate in
parallel with events occurring inside Syria.
The heaviest cost for Turkey, however, is the impact of
the crisis on sectarian relations in Turkey. The sectarian
dimension of the war in Syria is poisoning Alevi‐Sunni
relations in Turkey, too. The Alevis, particularly those in the
189


border province of Hatay, show solidarity with the regime of
Syrian President Bashar al‐Assad and are critical of the
Turkish government that supports the opposition. In addition,
but related to the issue of Syria, the Alevis regard themselves
as the victims of government violence in Turkey, since five
members of the Alevi community were killed during and after
the Gezi Park protests, three of them from Hatay.
The risk is now that social unrest among the Alevis may
evolve into an Alevi‐Sunni conflict. This is the most explosive
social issue in Turkey and it is fueled by the Syrian crisis.
Turkey bears a great burden. 17.02.2013; 02.09.2013; 15.09.2013;
03.11.2013
From ’Turkish model’ to ’Tunisian model’
Once the world was talking about a Turkish model for the
post‐Arab Spring Middle East. Under the AKP rule, Turkey
was regarded as a success story with its advancing democracy
and growing economy. The AKP, with its “conservative”
social and cultural outlook but “liberal” political and
economic program, seemed to represent the compatibility of
Islam and democracy.
Aspiring democrats, including Islamists in the Middle

East, looked to Turkeyʹs AKP, which combined an Islamic
identity with democracy, marched towards the European
Union, initiated programs for democratization, attracted
foreign capital, pursued a peaceful regional policy based on
soft power and achieved impressive economic growth.
190


Then we started to see a “new Turkey,” where the soft
power approach in foreign policy was replaced with a
hegemonic regional aspiration, democratization policies were
reversed, Islamism was revived, authoritarianism reappeared
and civil society groups, including Islamic ones, were
subjected to assaults from the state.
Naturally, such a Turkey came into conflict with major

actors in the Middle East and lost its appeal for the remaining
democrats, including those who strive to demonstrate the
compatibility of an Islamic identity with democracy. For them,
the Turkish model of the AKP has turned into a failure.
Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, is now

emerging as a new model and setting an example of how to
transition to democracy through consensus politics.
The National Constituent Assembly (NCA) of Tunisia

approved the new democratic constitution almost
unanimously in January 2014. All major political parties in
parliament celebrated the new constitution together and
hailed it as a “consensus constitution.” Meherzia Labidi
Maiza, deputy speaker of the assembly and a representative of
Ennahda, said on the occasion: “In spite of all differences,
quarrels, conflicts, discussion, we have united around…
around peace, democracy, pluralism and justice. This is very
important, not only for Tunisians, but for the whole Arab‐
Muslim world. Islam and democracy can be reconciled. The
Arab world and democracy and pluralism and peace and
191


living together ‐‐ all this is possible. We are a model, we are an
example.”
Tunisians learning from the failure of democratic

experimentation in Egypt and the reversal of
democratization in Turkey under AKP rule have wisely held
on to the politics of consensus-building that elevated Tunisia
as a potential model for democratic transition in the Middle
East.
The leader of Ennahda, Rashid Ghannoushi, on various

occasions declared Turkey under the AKP as a model for
them. Would he repeat this now? I doubt it. Now they are
talking about a Tunisian model. Well, they have a point.
In a recent interview with The Washington Post, he

explained: “We could have written the constitution on our
own, but we didnʹt do this because we wanted the constitution
to be written not just by Islamists but by everyone. After the
elections, we chose to form a coalition government not with
other Islamists but with other secular parties because we
wanted to send a message that the country is for everyone.”
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos,

Ghannoushi emphasized the importance of consensus
building and pluralism in the transitional process: “A
democracy of 51 percent [a majoritarian democracy] is not
enough in a plural society like Tunisia. In a transitional
democracy all ideas have to be represented… [The] biggest
danger is the comeback of dictatorship in whatever forms it
192


would be. [The] Tunisian model is based on the principle of
consensus, not normal majority, and on an alliance between
Islamists and seculars reaffirming local governance and
distribution of power at the widest level. In a normal
democracy normally 51 percent is enough to govern. But in a
democracy at [the] transition phase 51 percent is not enough,
even 60 percent acquired by one party will not be enough to
govern. We want a coalition, an alliance between Islamists and
seculars. We want to put an end to what is called the Arab
exception. The Arabs, like others, are capable of enjoying
democracy. Tunisia is a small country, but it could offer the
world this culture of peaceful democratic transition.”
Compare this understanding of “consensus politics” with
the majoritarian mindset and authoritarian tendencies of
Turkeyʹs ruling party. 02.02.2014
The “new AKP” is not only increasingly criticized in the West

but has also been abandoned as a model by its Islamist
brothers in the Middle East.
Military not democratize but may Islamize: Egypt and Turkey
The coup in Egypt raised rather a shy argument that
democracy can be nurtured by military in transitional
societies. It is assumed that military as an institution can play
the role of a neutral arbiter in politics to distribute power,
limit the excessiveness of majorities and implant a culture of
negotiation and power‐sharing. As such military is viewed as
a check and balance mechanism as well as an institution
193


builder that would strengthen democracy in long term. Once
the society is mature and institutions are strong enough the
military, it is expected, would withdraw to its barracks.
Turkish military is cited as an example par excellence for
such a role model. No doubt, for a long period, military in
Turkey played a central role in setting the rules, installing
institutions and regulating politics. But it is hard to argue that
military interventions and supervision nurtured Turkish
democracy. On the contrary it interrupted and significantly
delayed the process of democratization.
Regarding Turkish military as a “democratizing” power

is a fundamental misconception simply because it is an
institution that staged four coups against democratically
elected governments starting with 1960. Since then Turkey’s
constitutions were written by the military controlled
assemblies, and to day Turkey has been unable to make a
civilians‐made constitution. These constituted major blows to
the process of Turkey’s democratization, which is a history of
limiting the power and autonomy of the military vis‐à‐vis
civilian governmental actors.
The military thus did not serve as a facilitator of

democratization but acted as a harbinger: it made
constitutions and built institutions that were hardy compatible
with a modern liberal democracy. Sequence of coup destroyed
the autonomy of political parties and suppressed internal
dynamics of social actors.
194


In each military coup a speedy restoration of democracy
was promised. These promises were met if not speedily, but
what was restored was not democracy as we know it but
always a “tutelary democracy” in which the military set the
limits to political activities and positioned itself above the
government with supervisory functions in formal and
informal ways.
A political system shaped by the repeated military

interventions lost its ability to resolve political problems
among the political actors, and centre political parties unable
to act independently of the military increasingly appeared
week and inefficient that gave way to the rise of radical
political movements including the Islamists.
If Egypt is settled for such kind of “tutelary democracy”
the Turkish path might be relevant. This may be preferred by
some who dare not to take the “risk of democracy” in Egypt
where electorates have chosen an Islamist president in July
2012. But the problem for this thinking is that the Islamists
suppressed by the military are likely win the sympathy of the
people, improve their political strategy and make a stronger
come back if once again the ballot box is offered.
The portrayal of the Turkish military by some Western

analysts as a model for the Egyptian military is relevant in this
context of keeping an eye on the Islamists building a secular
order and pursing a pro‐Western foreign policy.
Turkish military is regarded as the guardian of

secularism and a balancer vis‐à‐vis the Islamists. One can
195


hardy argue that the Egyptian army is anyhow inclined to
secularism. As for the Turkish military, yes secularism has
always been part of its institutional culture as well as
individual way of life of its officers but this has not prevented
the domination of Turkey for last ten years by a reformed
Islamist party, the AKP.
The interventionist activities of the military to prevent the

rise of Islamists movements in the name of secularism
produced quite an opposite result.
When the pro‐Islamic Welfare Party won local elections

in Istanbul and Ankara in 1994, and a year later came first in
the general elections forming a government under the
premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, the veteran Islamist
politician, the military responded in undemocratic ways as the
“tutelary guardian” of the system. It declared political Islam as
the number 1 enemy, mobilized the media and civil society to
isolate the Islamists and push the Islamist‐led government to
step down, briefed the judges and public prosecutors about
the activities of Islamic groups etc. All extra‐legal and anti‐
democratic activities that resulted in resignation of Prime
Minister Erbakan and the closure of the Welfare Party by the
constitutional court but it sow the seeds of anger, discontent
and democratic reaction.
After the crisis of the Islamist politics the reformers

within the movement took a different course by establishing a
new party, the AKP in 2001. The new party transformed itself
196


from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party
in search of security against the assaults of the military‐led
secularists. In doing this AKP developed a three‐layered
strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and
democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular
support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a
“democratic coalition” with modern/secular sectors at home
and abroad that recognize the AKP as a legitimate political
actor. By gaining a discursive supremacy over its opponents
and building a broader social and political front, it has
managed to outmaneuver its secularist opponents.
Before the military intervention the pro‐Islamic WP’s

highest share of vote in Turkish politics was 21 % it received
in the 1995 election. Tayyip Erdogan had been elected as the
mayor of Istanbul in 1994 with 25 % vote with a Welfare Party
ticket. After the military intervention of 1997 in which the WP
was forced to step down from the government and later closed
down the reformists established the AKP that won 34 % votes
in 2002 elections. The AKP was certainly a political party that
included non‐Islamists actors and attracted non‐Islamist votes.
As a result its votes gradually increased for last ten years
reaching 50 % in 2011 general elections.
The Turkish case demonstrates that an Islamist party,

radical or reformed, once suppressed by the military in
undemocratic ways would re‐emerge stronger. Thus military
in Turkey did not only harm democracy by keeping and using
undemocratic power vis‐à‐vis the Islamists political
197


movements but also provoked them to make an even stronger
come back that again put democracy under stress. This should
be reminded to the leaders of the military coup in Egypt and
its supporters at home and abroad. July 2013
198

What Went Wrong in Turkey? From Muslim Democracy To Illiberal Democracy

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Went Wrong in Turkey? From Muslim Democracy To Illiberal Democracy

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What

A post‐Kemalist state has turned to be disillusionment

Thus, the post‐Kemalist Turkey is still not a liberal

When these references fall short, the AKP does not

Especially since the Gezi protests, the AKP regards

In terms of its ideology and leadership, this is a post-

It seems that the political conservatives have never

Political conservatives, too, believe in the possibility of

The marriage of conservatives and the state under the AKP

Some may describe this as “bringing the conservative

I have always thought this an irrelevant and even a

Radical Islamists object to any association of Islam with

This had been the model of revolutionary Islamists who

An Islamist‐dominated state with “elementary

I call this tendency of the Islamists “postmodern

It is more than “illiberal democracy” because Islamists

The concept of postmodern authoritarianism explains a

Out of all these the Islamists have learned something simple:

This is not merely an “illiberal democracy.” It goes

Once a majoritarian notion of democracy is

Where do Turkey and the ruling Justice and

We are increasingly witnessing within the AKP a tendency

ʺSo if the Kemalist conducted and achieved a social

The attitude and policy of the ruling party presumes a

In such a postmodern authoritarianism Islamically

Postmodern authoritarianism assumes the normalcy of

This derives from the belief that a new society, as

How has Turkey ended up in such a situation while

Against the secular authoritarianism of the Kemalists,

Instead, the Kemalist order was crushed without the

In the absence of a viable political alternative, the AKP

It appears that, with a combination of “democratic”

The idea of creating a “new society” through state

What we face is neither authoritarianism nor democracy,

Erdoğan seems to believe that the enactment of Islamʹs

The AKP's “postmodern authoritarianism” combines

Turkey has never experienced such a concentration and

Domestic social peace is extremely difficult to maintain

Moreover, the EU objective was instrumental in keeping

Such a composition of political sides compelled the

In earlier years, the “democratic identity” of the AKP was

Once its opponents had abandoned their hope of

In short, the AKP that struggled against “military

As a result, the government, instead of deepening

Now the party has established itself within the system

By coercive means and through the ideological instruments

As a result the governing AKP has increasingly been

These tendencies can be discerned in the government’s

The government’s Interior Minister went further by

The most recent debate about abortion reveals another

The AKP uses public sources and coercive capacity of the

Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the

Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two

The attempt at social engineering by the state continues

It is futile to construct “identities” through state

If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society

Besides, such a state would not only be dictating

Using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a

Conservative social forces will not be better off under

Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at

No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own

From its inception, the AKP posed as a centrist party,