Supawich Ponpun 6240050124 (week 10-11)

Local participatory democracy: A way for balancing legislative accountability

Because of the number of citizens, the use of representative institutions is usual in modern

democracy. Representative institutions seem to be tools used to guarantee political participation

of mass citizen by voting their representatives to work for them in political field. So, it has a unique

career in modern democracy called politicians. Politicians represents themselves to be

representatives of the people working in representative institutions. To win an election, politicians

with their parties have to run their political campaigns and make policies that can mobilize people

to vote for them. According to John M. Cary’s book “Legislative voting and accountability”,

politicians turning to be legislators after wining an election have 2 types of accountabilities that

need to be achieved, collective and individual accountabilities.1 To balance these accountabilities

is quite a tough work for legislators. The unbalancing of these accountabilities can cause problems

like pork barrel, and populism. So, my point is that the problems of unbalanced accountabilities

can be resolved by improving local participatory democracy. To support my point of view, this

essay is divided into 3 parts. The first part is about the problems of a strong centralization of power

which can cause the problems of unbalanced accountabilities. In the second part, I will talk about

how local participatory democracy can resolve the problems of unbalanced accountabilities. The

last part is a conclusion of this essay.

Firstly, a strong centralization of power might be good at some period of times, especially

in nation-state building period, and in some places such as in small states. However, centralization

of power can bring some problems when it is not to be in the right place at the right time. Just like

John M. Cary said on his book “Legislative voting and accountability”, the system of governance

1
John M. Carey, Legislative Voting and Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 Supawich Ponpun 6240050124 (week 10-11)

can determine legislator and electorate behaviors, especially behaviors of legislators on legislative

accountability. It is called institutional determinism.2 Centralization of power is also the system

that can affect legislator and electorate behaviors. It can be considered as a root cause of the

problems of unbalanced accountabilities such as pork barrel, and populism. When we see the states

which use a strong centralization of power, we can imply that local people in that state have low

power to resolve local issues in the way that they want. In a strong centralized state, almost all of

the policies and budgets come from central administration. So, some policies and some

infrastructures created to resolve some issues in some local communities may not fit the needs of

the people. Some politicians take advantage from this problem to mobilize the people to vote for

them by making policies that sound interesting to the people and tend to resolve chronic issues,

aka populism policies. Populism policies can also come up with pork barrel politics. it is a

correlation between populism and pork barrel. As we can see in Thai case, the political

administration is considered to be a highly centralized state which central government official have

a major role on local politics by being a boss of governance.3 Local government officials,

provincial administrative organizations, elected by local people are watched by appointed central

government officials, provincial governors. The locals can’t determine their destiny. So, that is

why we do not see a major improvement in Thai locals. To fulfill the local needs and to mobilize

the people to vote for them in the next elections, some politicians make populism policies and

make pork barrel politics in the name of development projects, especially in Suphanburi by Banhan

Sinlapa-acha, and in Buriram by Newin Chidchob.4 This type of politics is nothing more than a

2
Ibid.
3
“Centralization รัฐราชการรวมศูนย์ขนานแท้,” สยามรัฐ, 10 ธันวาคม 2564, https://siamrath.co.th/n/304650.
4
“เจาะขบวนการทุจริตงบประมาณแบบบูรณาการ (3): ‘Pork Barrel’ นักการเมือง ‘ผันงบประมาณ’ ให้พวกพ้อง - ThaiPublica,”
thaipublica.org, 7 มกราคม 2556, https://thaipublica.org/2013/01/corrupt-budgeting-pork-barrel-
politics-3/.
 Supawich Ponpun 6240050124 (week 10-11)

personal politics that can only bring a short-term local improvement. If we want to avoid that kind

of politics, we need to improve local autonomy by creating a decentralized administration in terms

of political decisions and budget control.

Secondly, I will discuss how a decentralized administration that tends to develop local

participatory democracy can resolve the problems of unbalanced accountabilities, such as

populism and pork barrel politics. For me, a decentralized administration means that a central

government authorizes local governments to determine their future. Locals must free to

administrate by their own choices, such as policy making, finance, and recruitment. A high level

of autonomy can make locals to make policies which able to fix local issues precisely. When locals

have policies and infrastructures serving local needs in the right way, they do not have to focus on

a basic need anymore. Locals can focus more on national issues. It is also can prevent some

politicians to take advantage from local chronic issues about basic needs by using personal politics,

populism and pork barrel, to mobilize the local people to vote for them. The long-term

development will occur. Moreover, decentralization of power can also improve participation of

the local people by using deliberative democracy. It is will give more participation of the local

people than just only in election day. Gathering local people can be occur in form of town meeting

which give a space for local people to discuss on their issue. In this state of participation, a high

level of local participatory democracy can occur. It is just like an Athenian direct democracy.5

Local participatory democracy can eventually improve a democracy value in national level. In

Japanese case, it has a municipality first principle which gives locals to have high autonomy on

tackling local issues. Not the same as Thailand, Governors in Japan appointed by central

5
ชานาญ จันทร์เรือง, “ประชาธิปไตยแบบปรึกษาหารือ (Deliberative Democracy) คือทางออกประเทศไทย,”
prachatai.com, 6 ตุลาคม 2553, https://prachatai.com/journal/2010/10/31378.
 Supawich Ponpun 6240050124 (week 10-11)

government are just only a watchman or a counselor. So, that can be the reason why a democracy

value in Japan is quite strong with a low rate of corruption and a high rate of freedom.6 In Thailand,

if we want to fix the problem coming from unbalanced accountabilities, such as populism and pork

barrel which can lead to corruption and decline of democracy value, we need to change the system

of administration from a strong centralization to a strong decentralization that supports Local

participatory democracy.

To conclude, I think that local participatory democracy or a decentralization of power can

resolve the problem coming from unbalanced accountabilities. In modern democracy,

representative institutions are common. So, it has a unique career in modern democracy called

politicians. Politicians represents themselves to be representatives of the people working in

representative institutions. When they win an election, they become legislators which have to

fulfill 2 types of accountabilities, collective and individual accountabilities. unbalanced

accountabilities can cause some problem such as populism and pork barrel. To prevent personal

politics, we need to improve local participatory democracy which give the locals a power to decide

on their needs. A high level of autonomy of local government will eventually can improve a long-

term development of country.

6
ชานาญ จันทร์เรือง, “มองญี่ป่ นุ มองไทย (2020) ‘ท้องถิน่ ที่เข้มแข็ง’ สร้างความเจริญก้าวหน้าให้ประเทศ,” คณะก้าวหน้า, 7 พฤษาคม
2563, https://progressivemovement.in.th/article/progressive/chamnan/642/., Freedom House,
“Japan: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2021., Transparency International,
“2021 Corruptions Perceptions Index,” Transparency.org, 2021,
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021.
 Supawich Ponpun 6240050124 (week 10-11)

Bibliography

Carey, John M. Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Freedom House. “Japan: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2021.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2021.

thaipublica.org. “เจาะขบวนการทุจริ ตงบประมาณแบบบูรณาการ (3): ‘Pork Barrel’ นักการเมือง ‘ผันงบประมาณ’ ให้พวกพ้อง

- ThaiPublica,” 7 มกราคม 2556. https://thaipublica.org/2013/01/corrupt-budgeting-pork-

barrel-politics-3/.

Transparency International. “2021 Corruptions Perceptions Index.” Transparency.org, 2021.

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021.

ชานาญ จันทร์เรื อง. “ประชาธิปไตยแบบปรึ กษาหารื อ (Deliberative Democracy) คือทางออกประเทศไทย.” prachatai.com,

6 ตุลาคม 2553. https://prachatai.com/journal/2010/10/31378.

ชานาญ จันทร์เรื อง. “มองญี่ป่ นุ มองไทย (2020) ‘ท้องถิน่ ที่เข้มแข็ง’ สร้างความเจริ ญก้าวหน้าให้ประเทศ.” คณะก้าวหน้า, 7 พฤษภาคม

2563. https://progressivemovement.in.th/article/progressive/chamnan/642/.

สยามรัฐ. “Centralization รัฐราชการรวมศูนย์ขนานแท้,” 10 ธันวาคม 2564. https://siamrath.co.th/n/304650.