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IES865
September 2021

Tesla in the 2020s: Moment of Truth for the

“Master Plan”
Pascual Berrone
Adrián Caldart
Joan Enric Ricart
Isaac Sastre Boquet

The smooth lines of dozens of Tesla Model 3 electric cars filled the parking area outside Tesla’s
factory in Freemont, California, where they waited to be delivered to customers. Tesla had just
announced it had sold over 180,000 cars throughout the first quarter of 2021, a 109% increase
over the same period in 2020.1
Founded in 2003 and headed by Elon Musk, who was as admired as he was controversial, in less
than 20 years Tesla had gone from selling just a few hundred electric cars—contracting out the
majority of the manufacturing work—to selling over half a million in 2020,2 and boasting
manufacturing capacity on three continents. Tesla was now the undisputed leader of the electric
vehicle (EV) market, surpassing automotive giants like Volkswagen, Ford, Toyota and Daimler.
Moreover, in January 2021, Tesla achieved a market cap of $800 billion, turning it into the most
valuable automotive company in the world, even though its total sales were much lower than
the competition.3 Was this investor confidence fully warranted?
Now, however, Tesla was facing a rocky road. Xiaomi, the Chinese consumer electronics giant, had
just announced an investment of $10 billion in developing low-cost electric cars, with the goal of
launching its first model in 20234. Xiaomi was joining a growing list of competitors: the big OEMsa,
which were trying to make up for lost ground with Musk’s company; tech companies like Apple
and Google, which were trying to enter an automotive market that was becoming more and more
digitalized; and new startups like Nio and Lucid, which were trying to follow Tesla’s road to success.

aOriginal Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), was a manufacturer that sold automobiles under its own brand (i.e. Ford,
Volkswagen, Toyota).

This case was prepared by Professors Pascual Berrone, Adrián Caldart and Joan Enric Ricart, and Isaac Sastre Boquet, case
writer. September 2021.
IESE cases are designed to promote class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective management of a given
situation.

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SM-1707-E Tesla in the 2020s

Moreover, this competition threatened to aggravate existing supply issues. Key parts like
batteries or semiconductors were increasingly becoming harder to procure, as manufacturers
rushed to launch cars with better performance and advanced features. Tesla was also facing new
technological challenges, like those derived from developing autonomous cars. There, Tesla’s
advantage was still unclear.
In 2006, Musk had published what he had called “the master plan” (revised in 2016), the business
strategy that intended to make Tesla the leader in sustainable mobility and energy generation.
Until now, Tesla had reached all the milestones. Would Tesla be able to bring the plan to fruition
during the decade that had just started? Or was it necessary to revise the strategy?

The Automotive Industry

The Industry in the 2020s
In 2020, the automotive industry manufactured 77 million vehicles, a 15% drop versus 2019.
This decrease was in large part caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which had severely impacted
both demand and manufacturing capacity. This impact, however, had been geographically
uneven (see Table 1). Nonetheless, the automotive market had been stagnant during the
previous years, even dropping slightly from its 2017 peak. That year, 97 million motor vehicles
had been produced all over the world.
Table 1
Motor Vehicle Production (2019-2020)

Region 2020 2019

Europe 16,921,311 21,579,464
-21.6%
America 15,690,215 20,148,849
-22.1%
Asia-Pacific 44,289,900 49,333,841
-10.2%
Africa 720,156 1,113,651
-35.3%
Total 77,621,582 92,175,805
-15.8%

Source: Prepared by the authors based on OICA. “Overview | Www.oica.net.” Www.oica.net. Accessed May 28, 2021.
https://www.oica.net/production-statistics/.

The crisis generated by the pandemic had hit an industry that had already been transformed in
the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008. Between 2007 and 2009, global automotive
production fell about 15% and nearly 50% in the US market.5 This drop put several historic
manufacturers (like the US “Big Three”—Ford, GM and Chrysler) on the verge of bankruptcy,
forcing a concentration of the industry and a search for lower costs. For example, Fiat merged with
Chrysler to create FCA in 2014, followed by a 50/50 merger with the French giant PSA in 2019
(completed at the beginning of 2021).6 Meanwhile, China became the world’s largest automobile
manufacturer in 2009,7 thanks to its low costs but also to a burgeoning internal market.

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Tesla in the 2020s SM-1707-E

The Players
The main players of the automotive industry were the OEMs, which manufactured and sold
motor vehicles under their own brands. In 2020, Japanese manufacturer Toyota became the
world’s top OEM per units sold, pushing German automaker Volkswagen to second place
(see Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 for a list of the world’s largest OEMs at the end of 2020.)
Automobile manufacturing was a complex activity, requiring large capital investments. Building
a large modern automotive factory could cost around $1-1.5 billion.8 With the passing of the
years, automobiles had become more and more sophisticated, adding new features in safety
(like ABS brakes and airbags), comfort (like onboard entertainment systems and ADAS), and
performance (like electronic fuel injection systems). Thus, a modern automobile could be made
up of 30,000 different parts,9 many of them highly sophisticated. Accordingly, in addition to
capital, manufacturers required access to very specialized know-how, and substantial logistics
and organizational capabilities. Efficient manufacturing methodologies such as Just-in-Timeb
(JIT) required close coordination between all the participants in the production chain.
Historically, manufacturers had progressively contracted out the manufacturing of more parts
of the automobile, creating complex supply chains. Generally, the OEM only retained the general
design of the vehicle, its final assembly and the manufacturing of some key components like the
engine. Meanwhile, the remaining parts were supplied by external manufacturers. Those could
be either Tier 1, which provided finished parts to the OEM; Tier 2, which provided Tier 1s with
parts and subassemblies; and Tier 3, which supplied processed raw materials. Automotive
suppliers were not just expected to manufacture parts, but were also responsible for designing
and servicing them. At the beginning of the 2020s, the growing demand for features tied to
information technologies and the “connected car,” was adding pressure to both OEMs and
suppliers to acquire new capabilities in this field.
Given the large capital investments required, scale was of utmost importance. For example, it was
estimated that an automotive factory built in China (a low-cost country) had to produce
200,000 vehicles/year in order to be profitable.10 Thus, automobiles with short production runs
were difficult to make profitable. Even luxury brands—which had larger margins—had often been
acquired by large automotive groups. The 2008 recession had accelerated the globalization of the
industry, searching for even larger economies of scale. Car models were now being designed
around “platforms” manufactured at a global level, that were in turn customized to the tastes of
each local market. This meant that supply lines had to have a global reach, and geographically
limited players—either OEMs or suppliers—were in danger of being displaced by global players.
Concerning sales, automobiles had traditionally been sold through specialized dealers, which
often had exclusive contracts with a single OEM. These dealers often also provided after-sales
service, and other customer services such as facilitating loans to finance the purchase.
After-sales service and repair were performed either by the OEMs and their partners, or by
third parties—the latter often at a lower cost. The maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
usually carried higher margins than manufacturing, and the competition for that business could
be very strong.

b JIT was a manufacturing methodology developed by Toyota during the 1970s. It required that all products entering or

leaving a factory made it “just in time”, that is, just as they were needed and only in the required quantities. This reduced
costs, since it eliminated the need to maintain large inventories of both parts and finished products inside a factory.

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SM-1707-E Tesla in the 2020s

Other actors carried out important ancillary roles in the industry. One of them was the Oil & Gas
industry, which produced and sold motor fuel using extensive networks of service stations
(for example, in 2019 the EU had over 138,000 in its territory).11 Another important player was
the various public administrations. Their regulatory role had a very important impact in the
industry, and the economic weight of the automotive industry (which some estimated at around
4% of the world’s GNP),12 made it a big part of the economic and trade policy of national and
supra-national governments.
Lastly, the insurance sector played a key part in the automotive industry. It was common for
public administrations to make purchase of insurance mandatory before a motor vehicle could
be driven on public roads. Many drivers also bought additional coverage, given the substantial
damage—both to the vehicle and to people—that an automobile crash could inflict. Thus, in
2019, the automotive insurance business was estimated at $739 billion globally.13

The Electric Car

While automobile sales dropped, there was a very notable exception: in 2020 the sales of EVs
(either plug-in hybrids or all-electrics) grew 43%, surpassing 3 million vehicles.14 The most
popular model was the Tesla Model 3,15 with 365,000 vehicles sold. Electric car sales were still a
very small percentage of total motor vehicle sales (around 4.2% of the global market), but they
were growing at a frantic pace: just four years before, in 2016, sales had been below 1 million.
There were several reasons for this growth, such as technical improvements and growing
consumer interest in “green” technologies. Another reason was that public administrations all
over the globe were beginning to implement strict regulations for internal combustion engine
(ICE) vehicles. The EU, for example, had announced a plan to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050,
and it was rumored that it would ban the sale of ICE vehicles during the 2030s16. The UK had
already announced this ban for 2030, and in the US, the state of California for 203517. These
restrictions were often followed by subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles.
What were the advantages and disadvantages of EVs versus combustion vehicles? Table 2
compares the costs and performance of the Tesla Model 3 with the most popular ICE car, the
Toyota Corolla. In addition, see Exhibit 4 for a list of variants of electric and hybrid cars.
Table 2
Tesla Model 3 vs. Toyota Corolla 1.8 Auto (2020 Models)

Maintenance
Base pricea Range Fuel costsb costsb Emissionsc
Tesla Model 3 $37,790 263 miles $27.8/month $63.5/month 161.8 gCO2eq
Toyota Corolla $20,025 436 miles $90/month $82/month 360.1 gCO2eq

a List price for the US market, before promotions, subsidies, add-ons and taxes.
b Calculated assuming 12,000 miles/year.
c1 gCO2eq = emissions equivalent to 1 gram of CO2

Source: Prepared by the authors based on Miotti, M., & Trancik, J. E. (n.d.). Carboncounter.com | Cars evaluated against
climate targets. https://www.carboncounter.com/ and product webpages of Tesla (Tesla. “Electric Cars, Solar & Clean Energy.”
Tesla. Last modified 2021. https://www.tesla.com/en_eu?redirect=no.) and Toyota (Toyota. “Toyota.” Toyota Motor Europe.
Last modified April 5, 2021. https://www.toyota-europe.com/).

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In general terms, the most relevant differences—both technological and economic—between

both power systems could be summed up as follows:
 Electric powertrains were mechanically much simpler than the ones in ICE vehicles,
which facilitated both manufacturing and maintenance. A large reason for this simplicity
was that electric engines were more elastic, meaning they were able to deliver the same
amount of power at both high and low speeds. This made gearboxes unnecessary.
 Electric engines were more efficient when converting energy into motion, and the cost
of electricity was—in most cases—lower than that of fossil fuels. This resulted in less
cost per mile traveled. On the other hand, fossil fuels were easier to store and contained
more energy per volume when compared with existing battery technology. This resulted
in longer ranges for combustion cars. An issue was the decay of battery packs, which had
to be replaced after several years of operation (most manufacturers, including Tesla,
provided 8 years of warranty). Since these packs contained potentially hazardous
materials, this disposal could be costly.
 In general, EVs had higher prices than combustion vehicles of a similar product range.
Many public administrations were offering subsidies (through direct cash grants or tax
rebates), which reduced that cost advantage.
 Refueling stations were also much more readily available for ICE vehicles than for EVs in
most markets. Furthermore, the refueling (recharge) of an EV was a much slower process
than just filling the tank of a gasoline car. For example, a Tesla 3 needed 20 minutes to
charge its batteries enough to drive 150 miles using Tesla’s own Supercharger stations,
and considerably more if other charging systems were employed.18
An important variant of EVs were hybrid cars (HEV). These were vehicles that had both an electric
and a combustion engine, which could be used separately or supporting each other depending on
the driving situation. Overall, they yielded a reduction in fuel costs and emissions that was smaller
than the one provided by all-electrics, but had a larger range. Hybrids were a popular alternative,
and in 2019 sales of vehicles with this technology reached 5 million vehicles.19

Tesla, Inc.
The “Master Plan”
Tesla was founded in 2003 by entrepreneurs Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning. That same
year, General Motors had withdrawn the EV1 from the market, marking the failure of the first
attempt by a large OEM to launch an all-electric car aimed at the general public. At the time, GM
argued that there was no market for it.20 Elon Musk, co-founder of PayPal, invested $30 million in
Tesla in 2004, becoming chairman of the board.21 Musk had become interested in EVs after testing
the tzero, a sports car built—nearly handmade—by the Californian company AC Propulsion.22
Three years later, in July 2006, Tesla showcased to the general public what would become its
first product: the Tesla Roadster. Using a body from Lotus and technology from AC Propulsion,
the Roadster was an all-electric sports car, capable of going 130 mph and accelerating from 0 to
60 in 4 seconds. Features like regenerative braking used friction to recharge the battery,
contributing to a range of 250 miles. List price was set at between $80,000 and $120,000.23

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SM-1707-E Tesla in the 2020s

Two weeks after unveiling the new car, Musk published his “master plan” for the company, and
the part the Roadster was going to play in it:
Almost any new technology initially has high unit cost before it can be optimized and this is
no less true for electric cars. The strategy of Tesla is to enter at the high end of the market,
where customers are prepared to pay a premium, and then drive down market as fast as
possible to higher unit volume and lower prices with each successive model.24
And he summed up the company’s strategy in the following steps:
Build sports car.
Use that money to build an affordable car.
Use that money to build an even more affordable car.
While doing above, also provide zero emission electric power generation options.25
However, the development process of the Roadster before it reached production status was
troublesome. Both the chassis and the electric powertrain had to be heavily redesigned by Tesla.
Some of the biggest issues were that AC Propulsion’s technology wasn’t designed with
serial production in mind, while the chassis of the Lotus Elisse—which was the basis for the
Roadster—was too small to accommodate large enough batteries to provide a good range.26 Amidst
the struggle to move the Roadster forward, Tarpenning resigned as CEO of the company, and both
he and Eberhard left Tesla before its first production car rolled out of the assembly line. Later, they
both accused Musk of forcing them out, and of unfairly blaming them for the Roadster’s delays.27
Finally, the first Tesla car was delivered in February 2008. Musk became CEO in October of that year.
The car was assembled in the Lotus facilities in Hethel (UK). For cars destined to the US market,
the chassis without the engine was sent to Tesla’s workshop in Menlo Park, California, where the
engine and the powertrain were installed. In total, 2,400 Roadsters were produced throughout
2008-2012, the amount accorded in the deal between Tesla and Lotus.28

The Fremont Factory

While Tesla built the Roadsters—at a pace of barely 100 each month29—the company was
already preparing its next move. In May 2010, Tesla acquired the old NUMMI factory (a joint
venture between Toyota and GM) in Fremont, California. Given GM’s financial struggles after
the recession of 2008, Tesla was able to secure the facility for just $42 million.30 The factory
covered 5 million square feet (about 100 football fields), and in its heyday produced
500,000 vehicles every year. One month after announcing NUMMI’s purchase, Tesla’s IPO was
at an offering price of $17 per share, raising $226 million, which added to $456 million from a
loan granted by the US Department of Energy at the beginning of the year.31 Tesla became the
first American car manufacturer to go public since Ford in 1956.
The Fremont factory was going to manufacture the Model S, a family sedan with a base price of
$57,000 and a range of 300 miles per charge.32 Unlike the Roadster, the Model S was designed
from scratch, using Tesla’s own technology. The company would carry out the manufacturing of
the chassis and the engine, painting, and final assembly, all at Fremont. The first Model S deliveries
started in January 2012, with an output equivalent to 20,000 cars/year.33 The car was an
immediate success, and it became the first car completely designed by a new manufacturer to be
awarded “Car of the Year” by the influential magazine MotorTrend. In 2019, the same magazine
stated that the Model S was the car with the largest impact on the industry in the past 70 years.34

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After starting deliveries of Model S, Tesla announced the deployment of a network of recharging
stations, the Tesla Superchargers. Initially, only six of such stations were available, built outside
of urban areas in the states of California, Nevada and Arizona, but in spring of 2021 this figure
had grown to 2,695 stations in America, Asia, and Europe, with stations now also inside towns
and cities.35,36
The Model S was followed by the Model X. The X was a Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV), a type of
vehicle that had become popular in the US market. The car had a base price of $80,000 and a
range of 220 miles.37 The Model X was also manufactured in Fremont and in 2016, the first full
year of sales, the factory produced 80,000 Model Xs.38

From Tesla Motors to Tesla

On February 1, 2017, Tesla Motors officially changed its name to simply Tesla.39 With this move,
Musk sought to convey a change of focus, taking Tesla from being just a car manufacturer to a
vertically-integrated sustainability company.
Two months before the announcement, Tesla had bought SolarCity (of which Musk was also
chairman) for $2.6 billion in stock.40 SolarCity was a manufacturer of solar panels, and this
activity would be added to Tesla’s existing energy business, consisting of sales of scalable
batteries (the PowerPack line for industrial applications and PowerWall for domestic use), which
Tesla had started in 2015. Some analysts were questioning the acquisition, since this was a
segment that required large investments at a point when Tesla was already undertaking an
ambitious growth plan for its automotive business. They also pointed out that the acquisition
meant that Tesla would take on Solarcity’s $3 billion debt.41 Moreover, the solar panel market
was becoming increasingly competitive, and US manufacturers like SolarCity were still very small
compared to Chinese or Korean producers. The 10 largest solar panel manufacturers had a
combined 65% share of the global market, and none of them was from the US.42
A few months later, in July 2016, Musk explained the reasoning behind this acquisition when he
published the second part of his “master plan”: “The point of all this was, and remains,
accelerating the advent of sustainable energy.”
And he then set forth the main lines of Tesla’s strategy:
Integrate Energy Generation and Storage: create a smoothly integrated and beautiful solar-roof-
with-battery product that just works, empowering the individual as their own utility, and then
scale that throughout the world.
Expand to Cover the Major Forms of Terrestrial Transport: today, Tesla addresses two relatively
small segments of premium sedans and SUVs. With the Model 3, a future compact SUV and a new
kind of pickup truck, we plan to address most of the consumer market. A lower cost vehicle than
the Model 3 is unlikely to be necessary, because of the third part of the plan described below.
Autonomy: as the technology matures, all Tesla vehicles will have the hardware necessary to
be fully self-driving with fail-operational capability, meaning that any given system in the car
could break and your car will still drive itself safely. It is important to emphasize that refinement
and validation of the software will take much longer than putting in place the cameras, radar,
sonar and computing hardware.
Sharing: when true self-driving is approved by regulators, it will mean that you will be able to
summon your Tesla from pretty much anywhere. Once it picks you up, you will be able
to sleep, read or do anything else en route to your destination. You will also be able to add

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your car to the Tesla shared fleet just by tapping a button on the Tesla phone app and have
it generate income for you while you're at work or on vacation, significantly offsetting and at
times potentially exceeding the monthly loan or lease cost.

Model 3 and the Gigafactories

One of the key pieces of this strategy was the Model 3, the first mass-market Tesla car.
Showcased in March 2016 with a base price of $35,000, it drew 200,000 pre-orders in 24 hours.43
Part of the production chain of the Model 3 would be housed in the Gigafactory, a large battery
plant that Tesla was building in Nevada. With an estimated cost of $5 billion, once at full capacity
it would be able to produce enough batteries to equip 1.5 million cars every year. It was
expected that Giga Nevada would also help reduce the costs of this key component for EVs and
secure its supply. Panasonic, one of Tesla’s suppliers of batteries, would have its own production
lines housed inside the facility.44
However, the manufacturing of Model 3 was becoming problematic. The first finished cars were
delivered to customers in July 2017,45 but Tesla struggled to scale the production. Of the
100,000-200,000 vehicles that had been projected for 2017, less than 3,000 left Fremont’s
assembly lines.46 Moreover, the first cars displayed several production issues, like thinning paint
or inconsistent panel gaps.47 Furthermore, Tesla was unable to bring to market the promised
$35,000 version of the Model 3 until February 2019, nearly two years after the model started
production. That version had also a short retail life, since it was withdrawn by the end of 2020.48
The cheapest Model 3 available was now priced at $39,490.
Model 3’s issues weren’t limited to manufacturing: logistics also created important bottlenecks.
With Model 3, Tesla had changed its production system. Instead of manufacturing cars to order—
like it did for the short runs of the Roadster, Model S, and Model X—Model 3 was manufactured to
create inventory, following the usual practice of a traditional OEM. This meant that Tesla now had
to manage and turn an inventory—something the company didn’t have experience in—all without
the support of external dealers, since Tesla managed its own dealer network. Furthermore, since
Tesla sold directly to consumers, the company also had to manage delivery to the final customer.
The result was that the finished Model 3s piled up in the parking areas outside Fremont, while
customers were still waiting for their car to arrive.49
Moreover, Musk kept the company wrapped up in controversy. In August 2018, he announced
on Twitter that he had secured funding to take Tesla private. During the ensuing hours, Tesla
stock rose 6%, but Musk’s claim ended up being false. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), fined both Musk and Tesla with $20 million each, and forced Musk to step down as
chairman of Tesla (although he retained his position as CEO).50
Despite all these issues—Musk would later claim that Tesla was just one month away from
bankruptcy—the Model 3 was a success, becoming the top-selling EV in history, with
450,000 accumulated sales at the beginning of 2019. The previous leader, the Nissan Leaf,
needed 10 years to achieve that figure.51
After the Model 3’s success, Tesla kept expanding its product line. Sales of Model Y started in
2020, this was a compact SUV which was more affordable than Model X. Tesla had also
announced a light truck (Tesla Cybertruck), a semi-trailer truck (Tesla Semi) and a new edition
of the Roadster (see Exhibit 5, Tesla’s product line at the beginning of 2021).

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Tesla also carried out a large expansion of its manufacturing capacity and geographical reach.
Giga Buffalo was opened in 2017 in New York state, tasked with building solar panels for
SolarCity. Giga Shanghai was opened in 2020, to manufacture and sell Tesla cars in China. Telsa
was also building Giga Berlin, to produce cars for the European market, and Giga Texas, which
would focus on manufacturing Tesla’s heavier vehicles (like the Cybertruck and the Semi),
alongside building other models for the eastern United States markets.52

The Electric Car in the 2020s

Tesla in 2020
In 2020, Tesla posted a net profit of $862 million. This was the first profitable year in all of Tesla’s
history, which until then had been marked by constant losses (see Exhibits 6 and 7, Tesla’s
historical financial data). The company’s largest market was the US, although the Chinese market
was becoming important (see Table 3).
Despite the positive results, some analysts pointed to the significance that subsidies had in
the company’s results: in 2020, Tesla had received $1.6 billion for the sale of Zero Emission
Credits (ZEC). Those were credits that OEMs that didn’t meet state requirements of sales of zero-
emission vehicles had to purchase from manufacturers that did—like Tesla. During the 2017-2020
period Tesla had received $3.3 billion from ZEC sales.53 Nonetheless, investors seemed to trust
Tesla, and its stock had vastly outperformed the automotive industry’s average (see Exhibit 8).
The 500,000 cars sold in 2020 gave Tesla a global market share of just 0.6%, but it was the market
leader in plug-in electrics (hybrid or all-electric), with an estimated share of 16%, and of 23% for
all-electrics.54 The most important markets were the U.S. and China. While its position in Europe
was still weak, it was expected that it would improve once Giga Berlin started operations.55
When launching new models, Tesla always first introduced the most expensive versions, while
adding more affordable variants later. According to Musk, this strategy helped pay back
the investment in the new production lines.56 Tesla was far more vertically integrated than
traditional OEMs, designing and manufacturing many parts internally. Musk believed that this
enabled Tesla to be more innovative, comparing it to the “catalog engineering” practiced by its
competitors, which contracted out most parts that made up their vehicles.57
This vertical integration extended to distribution. Tesla sold directly to consumers, either
through its website or its network or proprietary dealerships (the Tesla Stores or Tesla Galleries).
These dealerships had a small inventory, and in many of them the buyer was encouraged to
order its car online. In the Galleries, it was not even possible to buy a car, and they functioned
merely as showrooms. In 2019, the company announced it intended to close the majority of
dealerships and focus on the Internet channel, but this decision was ultimately reversed.58
Warranty service for Tesla cars was also provided exclusively in Tesla-owned shops, the Tesla
Service Centers. By the end of 2020 there were 466 such centers all over the world. The network
had grown 12% since the previous year, while during the same period the number of Tesla cars on
the streets was now 50% larger. For example, in Spain, Teslas could only be repaired in Madrid,
Barcelona and Valencia. Several US states (such as Indiana, Louisiana, Idaho or Mississippi) only
had one center to service the entire state. Tesla had stated that it would open around 50 new
centers in 2021.59

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SM-1707-E Tesla in the 2020s

Tesla had also started an insurance company—Tesla Insurance—to offer coverage for the
company’s cars, promising fees 20-30% lower than the competition. Tesla Insurance collected
driving data from the vehicles to assess risk more accurately. In 2021, it was only available in
California, although it had requested authorization to operate in three more states. Musk believed
that insurance could eventually grow to become 30-40% of Tesla’s automotive business.60
In the energy segment, in 2020 Tesla installed solar panels with a total power of 205 MW, which
was an 18% year-on-year increase. In storage, it sold 3 GWh worth of batteries, an 86% growth
as compared with 2019. The largest part of this growth was due to sales to industrial customers
and utilities.61 Despite these figures, the energy business still posted an operating loss.
Finally, Tesla surprised many in early 2021 when it announced a $1 billion investment in the
cryptocurrency bitcoin. Tesla’s goal—according to Musk—was to show that bitcoin was a viable
and reliable alternative to just holding cash on the balance sheet. A few months later, Tesla sold
10% of its bitcoin generating $101 million in capital gains.62
Table 3
Tesla at the End of 2020

Sales ($ million) 31,536

US 15,207
China 6,662
Others 9,667
Installed manufacturing capacity:  Fremont (US): 600,000 vehicles/year
 Shanghai (China): 450,000 vehicles/year
 Berlin (Germany): 500,000 vehicles/year
(in construction)
 Texas (US): N/A (in construction)
Points of contact with the customer:
Tesla Store/Gallery 378a
Tesla Service Center 466
Tesla SuperCharger 2,695
a Figure corresponding to FY2019.
Sources: Prepared by the authors based on Tesla, Inc. annual reports Tesla. “Electric Cars, Solar & Clean Energy.” Tesla. Last
modified 2021. https://www.tesla.com/en_eu?redirect=no and data from Tesla. “Annual Reports.” Tesla, Inc. Last modified
2021. https://ir.tesla.com.

The Competition
Throughout the 2000s, traditional OEMs had mainly bet on non-plug-in hybrids to introduce
themselves in the segment of low emission cars. The first major success was the Toyota Prius,
launched in 1997, which was still the most popular low emission car in history thanks to
accumulated sales of 6 million vehicles.63 Other automakers had launched hybrid versions of
existing models, like the Honda Civic Hybrid (2002) and the Ford Fusion Hybrid (2004). Toyota
also launched in 2002 a hybrid version of its popular Camry, which was cheaper than the Prius.
Thus, traditional OEMs didn’t attempt to enter the plug-in market until the 2010s. The first
models were small cars, designed with urban mobility in mind, like the Nissan Leaf, the BMW i3
or the Renault Zoé. They had a small range (for example the Nissan Leaf model 2011 had a range
of 73 miles64), and thus they didn’t compete with Tesla’s large, high-performance, premium
sedans. Those cars were, however, much more affordable than the Model S or X. The Leaf was

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launched with a base price of $32,78065, and became the best-selling all-electric until the
introduction of the Model 3.
Tesla had enjoyed some initial advantage thanks to the “blank slate” that EV technology brought.
OEMs had to develop completely new knowledge, production lines, parts and supply lines.
In consequence, they lost a great deal of the advantage given to them by their substantial
existing capacities.
But OEMs were ready to make up the lost ground. It was estimated that the automotive industry
would invest $300 billion in vehicle electrification throughout the 2019-2029 period.66 Toyota
and Volkswagen, the world’s largest automotive manufacturers, had both announced ambitious
plans. Volkswagen had pledged $91 billion in investments with the goal of achieving a product
line with 70% EVs. Toyota had unveiled a product line with models in nearly every segment
(including its Lexus luxury brand), and was even experimenting with new technologies, like
electric cars with hydrogen fuel cells.67 This fuel cell could store larger amounts of energy per
volume than a conventional electric battery, giving the car more power and a larger range.
Hydrogen, being a liquid fuel, was also easier to transport and store than electric power.
However, its distribution network was nearly nonexistent, and it was still expensive to produce.
GM aspired to sell only electric cars by 2035, even though in 2021 the only EV in its product
lineup was the Chevy Volt. To that end, it had started building two large battery factories in a
joint venture with LG.68. Stellantis was developing four platforms that would be used by several
of its brands (Alfa Romeo, Fiat, Opel, Peugeot, Jeep) to launch electric cars in several segments.69
Ford was preparing electric versions of its most popular car models, and had also invested over
$500 million in Rivian, an automotive startup that would work on larger-sized vehicles (like light
trucks and SUV).70 Rivian had also secured a deal with Amazon—another investor in the
company—to provide 100,000 electric delivery vans.71
Tesla’s new competition, however, wasn’t restricted to traditional OEMs. A larger number of
companies from other industries saw electrification as an opportunity to enter the automotive
industry. An example was Xiaomi, the consumer electronics giant ($37.4 billion revenue in 2020),
which had announced an investment of $10 billion in 10 years to develop electric cars. Xiaomi’s
goal was to launch a sedan and an SUV, priced between $15,000 and $45,000.72
Tesla had shown that creating an automaker from scratch was viable, and several new
automotive startups were attempting to follow that road. One of them was Lucid Motors, which
in 2021 closed an investment round of $4.6 billion, with a valuation of $24 billion. Lucid was
developing the Lucid Air, a luxury electric sedan, which would be manufactured in the company’s
own facilities in California. These had a capacity of 34,000 cars/year, with expansion plans to
take them to 365,000 cars/year.73 Lucid’s CEO was Peter Rawlinson, who had been chief
engineer of the Tesla Model S.74 Another example was Nio, a Chinese automaker that was
preparing to introduce its EVs in the European market in 2021. The first car to arrive was going
to be the S8, a SUV, followed by the ET7, a luxury sedan. Nio was also developing the Battery-
as-a-Service concept, which would allow drivers to quickly replace their batteries with fully
charged ones at the company’s service points.75
In November 2020, Musk’s company got its first wake-up call: Tesla had lost the market share
lead in Western Europe, surpassed by Volkswagen, Nissan-Renault and Hyundai. Although
Tesla’s struggles to market vehicles in Europe could be in part explained by the Covid-19
pandemic and Tesla’s lack of production capacity on that continent, it was clear that Tesla was
no longer alone in the EV market.76

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Furthermore, a new variable was adding a new competitive vector, with the potential of not just
altering the market but changing the very way motor vehicles were marketed and used: the
autonomous car.

The Autonomous Car

The Technology
The idea of developing cars that drove themselves started gaining traction in the 1980s, often
with backing from the defense industry. However, it wasn’t until the 2010s when the idea started
to become a reality, thanks to advances in sensors, software, and processing power.
SAE International—an organization that set standards for the transportation industry—had
delineated six levels of autonomy:77
 Level 0: these systems provided warnings and momentary assistance to the driver. They
were not able to take over the vehicle for a prolonged amount of time. Examples were
automatic braking systems, lane departure warnings and proximity alarms.
 Level 1: these features provided either steering support or braking/acceleration support
(but not both at the same time), sharing control of the car with the driver. Examples
were adaptive cruise control or automated parking systems.
 Level 2: these vehicles were able to take over both steering and braking/acceleration
simultaneously, but not during a prolonged amount of time. The driver had to constantly
supervise these systems (with his/her hands on the steering wheel).
 Level 3: the vehicle was completely autonomous in certain driving conditions (for example,
low-traffic highways), but the driver had to be on alert and take over driving if required.
 Level 4: same as level 3, but a human driver was not required under predetermined
driving conditions.
 Level 5: the vehicle was fully autonomous in any situation, without any need for human
drivers.
Autonomous cars could potentially create completely new business models. For example, a car
able to drive itself opened new possibilities in the field of Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS), as
opposed to the traditional model where a car was purchased and driven by its owner.
At any rate, at the beginning of 2020 there was no commercially available car with level 5
features. Moreover, up to that point public authorities had only approved some level 3 vehicles,
and only in some countries and under certain conditions. This was the case of the Honda Legend,
a luxury sedan equipped with the Traffic Jam Pilot system, which had been approved by Japan's
Ministry of Transport to take over a vehicle when driving at less than 30 mph in expressways.78
The model would be built in a short run of 100 units.
Developing level five autonomous cars was a task that Alex Hitzinger, Volkswagen’s head of self-
driving programs, compared to “going to Mars,” adding that “maybe it will never happen.”79
Software development, rather than sensor technology, was the biggest hurdle that had to be
cleared. Creating an AI system capable of analyzing any driving situation and making the best
decision required of the development of neural networks (one of the most complex AI algorithms),
which had to be “trained” with vast amounts of data reflecting every driving situation possible.

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There were also ethical concerns that had to be addressed, like how should an AI weigh the lives
of occupants, passers-by and occupants of other vehicles when deciding on how to minimize injury
in the event of a crash.

Tesla’s Bet
Since 2016 all Tesla cars came equipped with a radar, 8 cameras and 12 ultrasonic sensors, giving
to the entire Tesla fleet the capability to add future advanced driving features and autonomous
driving.80
The basic driving assistance package was called Autopilot, and it provided level two capabilities.
It allowed, for example, to automatically steer into lanes in a highway, make turns while staying
in lane, navigate traffic lights, or park/unpark autonomously.
With an additional payment of $10,000 the next package could be accessed, called Full Self-
Driving (FSD). Musk claimed that this feature—still in development—would offer level 5
capabilities by the end of 2021.81
Tesla used data collected from its deployed fleet to train and improve its driving AI. Each
“encounter” of a driver with a traffic event (for example, a crossroads or a traffic sign) generated
10,000 pictures that were sent to Tesla, recreating a 360o view of everything that surrounded
the car, and the driver’s actions.82 It was estimated that thanks to the growing number of Tesla
cars throughout the world, Tesla had collected data corresponding to 3 billion driven miles.83
But despite that, when FSD started beta-testing at the start of 2021, many users were
disappointed when they realized the software only provided level 2 features, barely above what
Autopilot already provided.84 Musk’s promise of a fully autonomous car by the end of the year
looked impossible to fulfill.
Moreover, the large-scale deployment of Autopilot had exposed Tesla to unwanted publicity: in
March 2020, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) was investigating
13 crashes in the US—some of them fatal—involving Tesla vehicles that might have been using
Autopilot.85
Some experts were also casting doubts on the technical option chosen by Tesla, which was
different than the one adopted by most of the competition. Tesla cars were not equipped with
Lidar, a system that determined the distance between the vehicle and surrounding objects using
laser. This system was so precise that it could create highly-detailed maps that could be
navigated by the car. Instead, Tesla relied on using computer analysis to process the pictures
taken by the car’s cameras. Even though the company recognized that this option was harder to
develop, it believed it would be easier to scale in the future, since it could be used to navigate
environments that had not been mapped previously.86

The Competition
Waymo was a subsidiary of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, founded in 2016. In 2018, it
had launched Waymo One, a robotaxi service in Chandler (Arizona) which carried passengers in
driverless vehicles.87 Waymo was also testing its driving systems on US roads, accumulating
20 million miles.88 This figure was much lower than Tesla’s, but Waymo supplemented them
with virtual testing in a simulated environment where it recreated and iterated every possible

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driving situation using data collected from real vehicles. In 2018, Waymo cars had already logged
5 billion miles in that virtual environment.89
In June 2020, the company announced a deal with Volvo to integrate its driving systems, and
had obtained $3 billion in its first external investment round.90
Waymo and Volvo’s project wasn’t the only one. Apple was another tech company looking to
enter the automotive industry. Back in 2014, it had announced Project Titan, an internally
developed car. Even though progress had been slow, Apple hoped to launch its first autonomous
passenger car in 2024. The company had held talks with companies such as Hyundai and Magna
(one of the largest Tier 1 suppliers in the industry) to manufacture the car.91
Other OEMs were also maneuvering to position themselves in the autonomous vehicle segment,
and they often looked for partners outside the industry, creating complex ecosystems.c
For example, GM, Honda and Microsoft—alongside other institutional investors—had invested
$6 billion in the startup Cruise.92 Cruise had recently started testing its driverless vehicles in San
Francisco. Microsoft provided its cloud-computing platform Azure, which in the future would
allow the remote management of a fleet of autonomous cars and develop connected vehicle
applications. In that regard, Microsoft had also partnered with Volkswagen and Nissan.
Ford and Volkswagen were also collaborating in the development of autonomous car features:
both had partnered in acquiring another startup, Argo AI, with a $2.6 billion investment. Ford
had announced that in 2021 it would begin testing level 4 autonomous cars, with the goal of
bringing them to market in 2022.93 Furthermore, Toyota had bought the startup Aurora,94 and
had partnered with Uber to develop the technology to operate fleets of autonomous taxis,
through the joint-venture Advanced Technologies Group.

Moment of Truth for the Master Plan

“There’s always a lot of drama with Tesla, but they have spurred the auto industry on to embrace
electrification as key to the future of mobility.” These were the words of Tony Posawatz, former
head of GM’s hybrid car program.95 And it was true that, despite the uncertainties and the
periods of adversity, Tesla’s history had been one of success, and it had become accustomed to
acting as the pioneer in every segment it entered.
But was this about to change? What kind future awaited Tesla? With all the large OEMs finally
mobilizing their vast resources in order to take the fight to Tesla, could Musk’s company resist
those challenges, when it still struggled to be profitable? Musk’s prediction, saying that OEMs
were held up by their traditional ways, too large and ossified to act quickly, would soon be put
to the test. As would be his “master plan,” the strategy that Tesla had followed scrupulously to
obtain its advantage. Was it time to change the plan?

c A visual reference of all the companies working on different elements of autonomous cars can be seen at: Orsay Consulting.
“Orsay Consulting | Resources.” Orsay-consulting. Last modified 2021. https://www.orsayconsulting.net/mobility-resources-en.
Additionally, a depiction of the investments in automotive carried out by Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon can be seen at:
“How Big Tech Is Tackling Auto & Mobility.” CB Insights Research. Last modified March 10, 2021.
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/facebook-amazon-microsoft-google-apple-auto-mobility/

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Exhibit 1
Global Vehicle Sales, Per Manufacturer (Units)

Manufacturer 2020 2019

1 Toyota 9,528,438 10,742,320
-11.3%
2 Volkswagen 9,305,372 10,975,297
-15.2%
3 General Motors 6,830,000 7,720,000
-11.9%
4 Stellantisa 6,206,000 7,907,000
-22%
5 Honda 4,790,000 5,323,000
-10%
6 Ford 4,187,000 5,386,000
-22%
7 Nissan 4,029,166 5,176,209
-22.2%
8 Hyundai 3,743,514 4,425,528
-6.4%
9 Daimler 2,530,000 3,345,000
-24.4%
10 Suzuki 2,450,000 3,007,000
-18,6%
-- Tesla 499,550 367,500
+35.9%
a FY2019sales figures for Stellantis are the sum of Fiat-Chrysler Automobiles and Groupe PSA’s sales. Stellantis was formed
by the merger of FCA and PSA in January 2021.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on companies annual reports.

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Exhibit 2
Largest Automobile Manufacturers in 2020, by Turnover ($Billion)

300

250

200

150

100

50

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0
Toyota Volkswagen Daimler Stellantis Honda Ford General Hyundai Nissan Tesla
Motors

Stellantis Turnover figure is for FY2019. Fiscal years ending in December, except for Nissan, Honda and Toyota, ending in March.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on companies annual reports.

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Exhibit 3
Largest Automobile Manufacturers in 2020, by Market Cap ($Billion)

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

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0
Tesla Toyota Volkswagen BYD NIO Daimler GM BMW Stellantis

Data from January 15, 2021.

Source: I. Ghosh. “Race To $1T: The World’s Top Car Manufacturers by Market Cap.” Visual Capitalist. January 21, 2021.
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-top-car-manufacturer-by-market-cap/

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Exhibit 4
Types of Low Emission Motor Vehicles

Hybrid-Electric Vehicle (HEV): these vehicles combined a combustion engine and an electric one
supporting each other depending on the driving situation, to achieve better fuel economy. The
electric battery was charged by the combustion engine. These vehicles could either be Full Hybrids,
which meant that they could potentially run on their electric engine alone, or Mild Hybrids, in which
case the electric drivetrain wasn’t powerful enough to allow electric-only operation.
Plug-In Hybrid-Electric Vehicle (PHEV): Similar to HEVs, the electric engine in a PHEV was powerful
enough to drive the vehicle on its own and could also be charged externally, so they could
potentially function exclusively on electric power.
Battery-electric Vehicle (BEV): also known as “all-electrics” these vehicles were powered only by
one (or several) electric engines, drawing power from an electric battery.
Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV): this was an electric vehicle whose engine was powered by a fuel
cell using hydrogen as combustible, generating electricity through an oxidation process. The car
had no emissions since the process only generated water vapor as residue.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

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Tesla in the 2020s SM-1707-E

Exhibit 5
Tesla Product Line (2020)

Base pricea Range 2020 salesb

Model Launch year Type ($) (miles) (units)
Model S 2012 Sedan 79,990 412 57,000
Model X 2015 SUV 89,990 360
Model 3 2018 Sedan 38,490 263 499,550
Model Y 2020 SUV 50,490 326
Cybertruck 2021 Light commercial 39,900 Over 250 N/A
(announced) vehicle
Semi 2021 Semi-trailer truck 150,000 300 N/A
(announced)
Roadster II 2022 Sports 200,000 620 N/A
(announced)

a List price for the US market, before promotions, addons, subsidies, and taxes.
b Tesla gave combined sales figures for its models S and X, as well as for 3 and Y.

Source: Tesla. “Electric Cars, Solar & Clean Energy.” Tesla. Last modified 2021. https://www.tesla.com/en_eu?redirect=no.
and Tesla. “Tesla Q4 2020 Vehicle Production & Deliveries | Tesla Investor Relations.” Tesla. Last modified January 2, 2021.
https://ir.tesla.com/press-release/tesla-q4-2020-vehicle-production-deliveries.

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Exhibit 6
Tesla Motors/Tesla, Inc. Financial Results ($Millions)
2020 2018 2016 2014 2012 2010
Total sales 31,536 21,461 7,000 3,198 413 117
Automotive 27,236 18,515 6,351 3,193 386 97
(of which: sales of regulatory credits) (1,580) (419) (302)

Energy 1,994 1,555 181 -- -- --

Services and othersa 2,306 1,391 468 5 37 20

Cost of sales -24,906 -17,419 -5,401 -2,317 -383 -86

Automotive -20,259 -14,174 -4,750 -2,310 -372 -80
Energy -1,976 -1,365 -178 -- -- --
Services and othersa -2,671 -1,880 -473 -6

Gross profit 6,630 4,042 1,599 882 30 31

Operating expenses -4,636 -4,430 -2,267 -1,068 -424 -178

R+D -1,491 -1,460 -835 -465 -274 -93
General, sales, and administrative -3,145 - 2,835 -1,432 -603 -150 -85
Restructuring and others -- - 135 -- -- --

Operating profit 1,994 -388 -667 -187 -394 -147

Financial result -840 -617 -79 -98 -2 -7

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Taxes -292 -58 -27 -9 0 0

Net Profit 862 -1,063 -773 -294 -396 -154

a Includes out-of-warranty servicing for automobiles, used vehicle sales, merchandise and accessory sales, sales through subsidiaries, and car insurance.

Source: Tesla. "Annual Reports." Tesla, Inc. Last modified 2021. https://ir.tesla.com.

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Exhibit 7
Tesla, Inc. Balance Sheet ($Millions)

2020 2019
Cash and cash equivalents 19,384 6,268
Accounts receivable, net 1,886 1,324
Inventory 4,101 3,552
Other current assets 1,346 959
Total current assets 26,717 12,103
Operating lease vehicles, net 3,091 2,447
Property, plant, and equipment, net 12,747 10,396
Solar energy systems, net 5,979 6,138
Operating lease right-of-use assets 1,558 1,218
Intangible assets, net 313 339
Goodwill 207 198
Other assets 1,536 1,470
Total non-current assets 25,431 22,206
TOTAL ASSETS 52,148 34,309
Accounts payable 6,051 3,771
Accrued liabilities and other 3,855 3,222
Deferred revenue 1,458 1,163
Customer deposits 752 726
Current portion of debt and finance leases 2,132 1,785
Total current liabilities 14,248 10,667
Debt and finance leases, net of current portion 9,556 11,634
Deferred revenue, net of current portion 1,284 1,207
Other long term liabilities 3,330 2,691
Total long-term liabilities 14,170 15,532
Redeemable noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries 604 643
Convertible senior notes 51 --
Total stockholder’s equity 22,225 6,618
Noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries 850 849
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 52,148 34,309

Note: Tesla raised $12b in 2020 via stock offerings.

Source: Tesla. “Annual Reports.” Tesla, Inc. Last modified 2021. https://ir.tesla.com.

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Exhibit 8
Return of Investment on Tesla Stock vs. NASDAQ and Industry Average*

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*Return of a $100 investment made on January 1, 2016, reinvesting dividends (Tesla had not paid dividends during this period).

Source: Tesla. “2020 Annual Report.” Tesla, Inc. Last modified 2021. https://ir.tesla.com/, p. 29.

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Endnotes
1 M.Kane, “Tesla Q1 2021 Final EV Delivery Numbers and Outlook,” InsideEVs, April 27, 2021,
https://insideevs.com/news/503794/tesla-2021q1-final-deliveries-outlook/
2“Q4 2020 Vehicle Production & Deliveries”, Tesla Inc., January 2, 2021, https://ir.tesla.com/press-
release/tesla-q4-2020-vehicle-production-deliveries
3“Tesla Market Value Crosses $800 Billion For the First Time,” Reuters, January 8, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/article/tesla-stocks-idINKBN29D1VJ
4“Xiaomi entra en el negocio del coche eléctrico con una inversión de 10.000 millones de dólares,”
Expansión, March 30, 2021, https://www.expansion.com/economia-
digital/companias/2021/03/30/606302b3e5fdeab37d8b462f.html
5 International
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), Production Statistics, available at:
http://www.oica.net/production-statistics/, accessed March 2020.
6 Motavalli,
J. “Stellantis: Fiat Chrysler Merges With PSA, Becoming World’s Fourth-Largest Automaker.”
Forbes Wheels. January 28, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/stellantis-fiat-chrysler-merges-
with-psa-becoming-worlds-fourth-largest-automaker/
7International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), Production Statistics, available at:
http://www.oica.net/production-statistics/, accessed March 2020.
8 N. Bomey, “Toyota, Mazda to Build $1.6B, 4,000-job U.S. Automotive Assembly Plant.” USA Today. August 3,

2017. https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/08/03/toyota-mazda-us-plant/538744001/
9 N.
Kareta, “The Automotive Supply Chain: Tier Suppliers Explained.” MES-insights.com. (September 30,
2020). https://www.mes-insights.com/the-automotive-supply-chain-tier-suppliers-explained-a-966964/
10 J.F. Francois, “Regulated Efficiency, World Trade Organization Accession, and the Motor Vehicle Sector in

China.” The World Bank Economic Review 18, no. 1, 85-104 (2004). doi:10.1093/wber/lhh034
11“Number of Petrol Stations in Europe, End Of 2019,” FuelsEurope, June 26, 2020. Available at:
https://www.fuelseurope.eu/statistics/
12Automotive Industry Analysis & Worldwide Forecast 2020. Crescendo Worldwide, (n.d.).
https://crescendoworldwide.org/automotive-industry-analysis-automotive-industry-overview/
13 AutoInsurance Market Size, Share | Industry Trends and Analysis – 2027 (n.d.) Allied Market Research.
Accessed May 6, 2021. https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/auto-insurance-market
14“Global Sales of Electric Cars Accelerate Fast In 2020 Despite Pandemic.” The Guardian. January 20, 2021.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/19/global-sales-of-electric-cars-accelerate-fast-in-
2020-despite-covid-pandemic
15 Global Electric Vehicle Top 20 — EV Sales Report. CleanTechnica, March 21, 2021.
https://cleantechnica.com/2021/02/04/global-electric-vehicle-top-20-ev-sales-report/
16“EU Pressed to Set Phase-Out Date For Combustion Engine Cars,” Automotive News Europe, March 10,
2021. https://europe.autonews.com/environmentemissions/eu-pressed-set-phase-out-date-combustion-
engine-cars
17 A. J. Hawkins, “California Will Ban New Combustion-Engine Vehicles Starting in 2035,” The Verge,

September 23, 2020. https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/23/21452825/california-ban-combustion-gas-

vehicles-cars-2035
18 TeslaCharging - Information & Answers About Charging a Tesla. (n.d.). EVANNEX.
https://evannex.com/pages/tesla-charging-information-and-answers
19 R.Davis, “Hybrids Are Quietly Selling Faster Than Fully Electric Cars,” Bloomberg, December 7,
2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-07/hybrids-are-quietly-selling-faster-than-fully-
electric-cars

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SM-1707-E Tesla in the 2020s

20 G.Schneider and K. Edds, “Fans of GM Electric Car Fight the Crusher,” The Washington Post, March 10,
2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/03/10/fans-of-gm-electric-car-fight-the-
crusher/a03aa8e7-9107-4829-b5d1-e1889c79539a/
21 EricReed, “History of Tesla: Timeline and Facts,” TheStreet, February 4, 2020.
https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-of-tesla-15088992
22 T.
Oliver, “The Invention of Tesla's Model S,” Embedded Computing Design, August 7,
2020. https://www.embeddedcomputing.com/application/automotive/electric-vehicles-powertrain/trial-
error-the-road-to-the-invention-of-tesla-s-model-s
23S. Blanco, “Tesla Roadster Unveiled in Santa Monica,” Autoblog, July 20, 2006.
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