Thai Foreign Policy Seeking Influence

THAI FOREIGN POLICY
Seeking Influence
John Funston
Thailand was the centre of international attention in 1997. No longer was it

confused with Taiwan, or completely unrecognized, by journalists at interna-
tional fora.1 Unfortunately this was not a triumph of foreign policy, but a
tragedy of financial mismanagement. Economic problems that led to the float-
ing of the baht in July triggered attacks on currencies and stock markets
throughout much of Southeast Asia, then spread to East Asia and impacted on
much of the world.
This was not the type of recognition Thai leaders had sought. Early in his
rule, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh lamented that Thailand no longer
played a leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and pledged to correct this.2 After Chuan Leekpai became prime minister, the
Nation newspaper declared that Thailand was “resuming its long-lost leading
role in ASEAN affairs”.3 New Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan asserted confi-
dently that Thailand had become the architect preparing ASEAN to meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
These views all reflect a deep conviction among Thai leaders and foreign
policy analysts that in the 1980s Thailand enjoyed a golden age of foreign
policy when the rest of ASEAN followed its lead. In the 1990s others have
taken the initiative.
The following account argues that in a broad sense this characterization is
correct. However, claims of foreign policy leadership in the 1980s need some
qualification. And the 1990s has not been the foreign policy disaster many
perceive it to be. Chavalit helped strengthen ties with regional neighbours.
Chuan, forced to look to the United States for assistance in addressing the
country’s financial problems, has returned Thailand to a more traditional
balancing of regional and great power interests.
1980s — A Mixed Record

Thailand’s pre-eminence within ASEAN during the 1980s derived from its
being the “front-line” state to Cambodia. It did, nonetheless, frequently have
difficulty getting others to support its firm opposition to Vietnam’s invasion.
JOHN FUNSTON is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
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© 1998 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence 293
From the time of the “Kuantan formula” in 1980 Indonesia and Malaysia
sought a more accommodating policy towards Vietnam. Thailand was often
forced to compromise, but whenever it pressed hard the others would acqui-
esce. Siddhi Sawetsila, who held the foreign ministry portfolio for the entire
decade, earned the respect of his ASEAN counterparts, and his views were
always taken into account.
The 1980s might also be viewed as a golden age for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA).4 Prior to this the MFA had been very much in the shadow of
the Thai military, apart from the democratic period between 1973 and 1976,
when the two sides contested influence. Siddhi — Air Chief Marshal (Ret.) —
came to the portfolio in March 1980 after a military career in international
relations intelligence, as secretary-general of the influential National Security
Council (NSC) from 1975. He combined an understanding of foreign affairs
with strong military and civilian credentials — later becoming an elected
Member of Parliament and party leader — and a desire to enhance the role
of the MFA. He had the complete trust of Prime Minister Prem, a former
school mate, and was given a free hand. One of Siddhi’s main accomplishments
was to contain the rivalry between the military and the MFA, by appointing a
high-ranking military officer to a new position as Military-Political Co-ordinator
responsible for liaising between the two sides, and by organizing frequent
meetings between the MFA and institutions such as the army, the NSC, and
National Intelligence Agency.
Siddhi also solicited input from the public, and took the MFA out of the
“twilight zone” by defending policies before journalists, academics, and others.
Ministry officials welcomed these changes, and improved morale quickly became
evident. Thailand also began to play on a larger diplomatic stage, expanding
diplomatic relations with Third World countries and gaining election as a non-
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in 1984.
But this golden age ended abruptly when Chatichai Choonhavan became
prime minister in 1988. Chatichai brought with him his own foreign policy
advisers, including the most outspoken critic of the MFA, academician MR
Sukhumbhand Paribatra. The advisers and the MFA clashed over how quickly
Thailand should move to accommodate Vietnam, with Chatichai’s willingness
to move swiftly reflected in his famous phrase of transforming Indochina from
a war zone to a market-place. Policy towards Cambodia lost all coherence.
Siddhi stayed around just long enough to ensure his major goals in Cambodia
were achieved, then quit in August 1990. Complicating matters even further,
armed forces chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh began to take initiatives on
his own, siding more often with Chatichai than Siddhi, injecting a further
element of uncertainty into the foreign policy process.
1990s — Political Turbulence and End of the Cold War

Siddhi’s exit did not pave the way for more effective foreign policy-making. In
just over eight years since then, Thailand has had no less than eleven different
294 John Funston
foreign ministers — surely one of the highest turnovers in the world. That of
course reflects the rapid change of governments over a period that saw seven
different prime ministers. Worse still, the foreign ministry came to be re-
garded as one of the least desirable portfolios, and was in most cases filled by
politicians who saw their future elsewhere. Apart from short periods when
former diplomats held the post, incumbents sought to use the position for
promoting their domestic political future, and had little interest in either
foreign policy or the MFA.5
The frequency with which governments and foreign ministers changed in
the 1990s precluded Thai leaders from developing a close rapport with their
ASEAN counterparts. This in turn weakened Thailand’s position within ASEAN,
as the development of close personal relations with regional counterparts is
crucial to the exercise of influence within this organization. A telling case was
Malaysia’s leadership on ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Co-operation,
including hosting the first meeting on this in June 1996, notwithstanding
Thailand’s much greater direct interest in the Mekong Basin.
Political turbulence also took its toll on morale in the foreign ministry. For
many diplomats this went beyond the difficulties of accommodating a rapid
turnover of ministers, to unease over the progress of Thailand’s political evo-
lution more generally. MFA personnel were drawn from the middle class —
the group which has been most supportive of democracy in Thailand — and
were dismayed by democratic shortcomings in successive governments. At the
height of conflict between the Suchinda government and demonstrators in
May 1992, four hundred staff members presented a letter of protest to the
foreign minister, condemning the barbaric suppression of those demonstrating
for democracy.6 With Thailand’s economic boom then in full swing, many top
diplomats left for the private sector, and even recruitment of new staff became
more difficult.
The winding down of the conflict in Cambodia, and the end of the Cold
War, introduced a further complexity. Economic issues assumed a much higher
priority in foreign policy, and the MFA was not well-equipped to handle this.
The commerce ministry, for instance, became the lead ministry on issues re-
lating to APEC and other areas of economic co-operation.
The new focus on economic issues did, however, also have beneficial con-
sequences. Neighbouring countries, particularly those in Indochina and
Myanmar, gave a similar priority to economic co-operation, and this provided
opportunities for improved Thai relations with these countries — notwith-
standing the exploitative behaviour of Thai private companies in some areas,
notably logging in Myanmar.
Strengthening a Regional Focus

Thailand was not entirely without regional influence in the early 1990s. The
important proposal for an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was an initiative of
Anand Panyarachun — a former top diplomat — appointed prime minister
twice during the years 1991–92. This proposal looked south to traditional allies
in ASEAN. At the same time Anand looked north, inviting Myanmar and
China to join in a Greater Mekong Co-operation (GMC) scheme. Yet another
Anand innovation was to make development aid an important component of
Thai foreign policy, and to focus this on Indochina countries and Myanmar.
From 1992 annual aid to these countries exceeded US$6 million, rising to
US$10 million by 1995.
Chuan’s government (1992–95) continued such policies, giving particular
emphasis to a sub-section of the GMC involving China, Myanmar, and Laos,
dubbed an Economic Growth Quadrangle. Chuan also proposed a grouping
of Thailand with Myanmar and South Asian countries — a “look West” policy
— though at this time little support was forthcoming from Myanmar and
Bangladesh.
Other economic alliances were formed over more specific issues. Conscious
of a looming energy shortage, Thailand signed memorandums of understand-
ing (MOUs) with Laos in 1993 and 1996 on electricity supply (mainly from
hydro sources), and signed to purchase gas from Myanmar in 1995. Other
negotiations were held with China for the supply of electricity, and Malaysia
and Indonesia for gas. With Vietnam, Thailand established a joint committee
on fisheries and law and order at sea in 1992. And to help overcome a labour
shortage, Thailand decided in June 1996 to legalize the presence of an esti-
mated one million illegal workers, mainly from Myanmar, allowing them to
stay a further two years after registration.
Addressing both economic and broader political co-operation, ministerial
level joint commissions, hosted by the MFA and its counterparts, were estab-
lished with all Southeast Asian neighbours.
On other political and security fronts Thailand’s activities were low-key, but
not insignificant. MFA officials were among the first to encourage ASEAN to
reach out to Indochina countries and Myanmar, proposing an interim estab-
lishment of a Southeast Asian Ten group that would exist side-by-side with
ASEAN. This proposal was eventually set aside in favour of moving directly to
an ASEAN-10, but helped movement in this direction. Foreign Minister Arsa
Sarasin coined the term “constructive engagement” for relations with Myanmar
in August 1991,7 and this became the official ASEAN approach as well.
Some members of the MFA also played a role in organizing “second track”
diplomacy on regional security issues, a development that led eventually to the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Sarasin Viraphol, ambassador to the Philip-
pines in the early 1990s, was a prominent player, helping organize conferences
in both Bangkok and Manila. Bangkok hosted the inaugural meeting of the
ARF in 1994.
While regional ties grew, relations between Thailand and its erstwhile main
ally, the United States, continued to decline. A number of factors contributed
to this. The two sides clashed repeatedly on economic issues, particularly in
relation to U.S. protection of its intellectual property. Several Thai politicians
296 John Funston
were banned from entering the United States for suspected involvement in
narcotics trafficking, including a leading prime ministerial aspirant after the
1992 elections. Increasing U.S. focus on human rights issues, both in relation
to Thailand and Myanmar created tensions, particularly over Thai policy to-
wards tens of thousands of ethnic Karen refugees from Myanmar. Above all,
Thai-U.S. relations were set back in October 1994 when the Chuan govern-
ment rejected a U.S. request to pre-position military supplies on ships an-
chored off the Thai coast. Subsequent reaffirmations of the U.S.-Thailand
security alliance, and a short visit by President Clinton in late 1996, did little
to improve ties. Relations with the European Union (EU) countries were also
stagnant, notwithstanding Bangkok’s hosting of the first summit-level Asia-
Europe Meeting in 1996.
Chavalit’s Regionalism
Chavalit came to office in December 1996 with several foreign policy advan-
tages. As a former military supremo he had an entrée in countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines, and indeed other ASEAN countries are often
more at ease with Thai leaders from a military background. He also had
extensive practical involvement in regional relationships going back to the
early 1980s. This was not entirely error-free — he had to retreat on a proposal
for a Thailand-based Chinese arms stockpile in the late 1980s, and did not
pursue his 1989 suggestion for the creation of a suwannaphume (golden land)
because neighbouring states saw connotations of Thai hegemonism. But gen-
erally, Chavalit managed to be all things to all people, establishing influential
ties in Beijing, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Yangon.
Chavalit’s foreign minister was Prachuab Chaiyasarn, a political veteran with
broad ministerial experience. Unlike many of his predecessors he had an
interest in foreign policy, and previous ministerial appointments in portfolios
such as commerce had given him experience in international affairs. Although
they were not from the same political party, the two worked together co-
operatively.
Chavalit’s declared plans to restore Thailand’s former international influ-
ence rested mainly on improving relations with neighbouring countries. At
one level this was addressed in a multilateral framework. The major issue
before ASEAN at the beginning of 1997 was the question of when to include
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (CLM), following agreement at the 1996 infor-
mal summit that all three should be admitted concurrently. Thailand moved
cautiously, worried by the possibility of a negative reaction from countries such
as the United States and members of the EU. When Philippines’ President
Ramos issued a statement after meeting Chavalit in January, giving a positive
slant to CLM membership, Prachuab later clarified that ASEAN did not have
a definite blueprint for membership by the three countries. Thailand’s con-
tinuing uncertainty prevented any agreement at an informal ASEAN foreign
ministers’ meeting held during the New Dehli Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
meeting in early April. But later that month Prachuab hosted a meeting of
CLM counterparts in Bangkok. Called ostensibly to discuss road transport
links in the GMC, the meeting clearly signalled Thai support for the three
countries’ early membership of ASEAN, and helped secure agreement on this
at a special ASEAN meeting held in May.
Thailand returned to a cautious mode after the July Hun Sen coup in
Cambodia, and its reservations influenced ASEAN’s decision to defer Cambo-
dian membership. Prachuab’s subsequent appointment, along with Indone-
sian and Philippine foreign ministers, to a task force charged with helping
facilitate a resolution of Cambodia’s problems, again demonstrated Thailand’s
continuing importance within ASEAN circles on matters related to Cambodia.
Thailand was an active participant in a range of ASEAN economic activities.
It gave special attention to road transportation links, heading an ASEAN working
group on this topic. Road links were also the main focus of Thai activities in
relation to the GMC, and various other initiatives. In February, for example,
Deputy Foreign Minister Pitak Intrawityanunt led a 100-strong delegation drawn
from both the public and private sectors on an overland visit to Laos and
Vietnam, a trip directed specifically at gaining support for a road network
linking the three countries.
Thailand also played a central role in ASEAN deliberations on regional
financial problems in the second half of 1997. The collective ASEAN response
included several elements: support for greater transparency or regulation of
international currency movements; support for strengthening the capacity of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to address financial crises; gaining the
co-operation of major economic powers to shore up support in affected Asian
economies; and assurances that ASEAN countries would put their own individual
houses in order. While Thailand left the running on currency movements to
Malaysia it was a strong supporter of other elements in this package. Finance
Minister Thanong also sought ASEAN support for an “Asian Fund”, whereby
Japan would become a pillar of economic stability in the region comparable
to the United States and Europe in their own continents.8 That proposal quickly
ran into opposition, particularly from the United States, which saw it as a
potential means of bypassing the IMF. A Manila meeting of senior finance and
central bank officials from ASEAN countries, the United States, Japan, and
others in November did agree to co-operative financing arrangements that
would supplement the IMF, but the attempt to seek an Asian solution to
financial problems was not pursued.
Thailand achieved a breakthrough in attempts to enhance economic co-
operation with South Asia when agreement on a new organization was reached
in the margins of the NAM. Bist-ec — an abbreviation for Bangladesh, India,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Co-operation — was inaugurated in June
in Bangkok, on the same desk and in the same room as ASEAN was launched
in 1967. Myanmar attended the first meeting as an observer, and gained full
membership in December, changing the acronym to Bimst-ec.
298 John Funston
Nonetheless the main thrust of diplomacy under Chavalit was not through
multilateral institutions, but bilateral contacts. All Thai prime ministers must
give priority to neighbouring countries in early travel, but Chavalit did even
more than his predecessors. He began the mandatory tour of ASEAN coun-
tries in Jakarta in January, and completed the round in Hanoi late March. Two
days later he journeyed to Beijing. He went on to Myanmar in mid-May, Cam-
bodia and Laos in late June, then Japan in October. Visits to the United States,
Europe, and Australia were all planned, but could not be implemented before
Chavalit’s term ended. Prachuab and deputy Pitak were also inveterate travel-
lers, particularly within the Asian region.
With traditional ASEAN colleagues, relations were in the main business as
usual. Relations with Malaysia, however, went through one of their cyclical
rough patches. From late 1996 Thailand was concerned by what it saw as
Malaysian succour to terrorist suspects from southern Thailand, and relations
were strained by thousands of illegal South Asian labourers seeking to enter
Malaysia from Thailand. Attempts to finalize demarcation of the land boundary
— started in the 1970s — failed to meet an April deadline, and a cartoon in
the New Sunday Times in May depicting Thailand as a land of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) provoked an outcry in Bangkok. A special report
entitled “Vision 2030” by 100 senior defence officials, reached the somewhat
surprising conclusion that Malaysia was Thailand’s main strategic competitor.9
Relations with Singapore, by contrast, received a considerable boost. Prime
Minister Goh led a 100-strong delegation (seventy from the private sector) to
Thailand in mid-June, and announced plans for investments of S$1 billion in
establishing a new industrial park. Another high-level private-sector delegation
visited Bangkok in August, and discussed investment opportunities over a game
of golf with Chavalit and other top Thai leaders. Besides business, Goh and
Chavalit also agreed on closer civil service relations, including annual meet-
ings between top public servants aimed at developing a common vision and
long-term framework for partnership.
The main regional focus of Chavalit, however, was on the countries of
Indochina and Myanmar. A myriad of difficulties have frustrated relations with
these countries in the past, and these could not be set aside overnight. But the
positive trend established under earlier governments was continued by Chavalit.
Vietnam
Vietnam was a focus of considerable Thai attention in early 1997, with visits by
Pitak (in February and again in May), Prachuab, and Commerce Minister
Narongchai (in March), and Chavalit (in April). The main agenda items were
commercial ties — particularly opportunities for Thai investment, which had
grown from almost nothing in 1992 to US$1 billion by 1997 — road communi-
cations and sea boundaries. Dispute over delineation of maritime boundaries
covering some 6,500 square kilometres was indeed the main bilateral problem
between the two countries, which seven rounds of technical discussions since
1992 had failed to resolve. Although ministerial visits appeared to make no

headway, in July an agreement was announced, and ministers subsequently
signed on to this. In November and December the two countries carried out
their first joint maritime survey, seen as a precursor to greater co-operation in
areas such as fishing. Joint naval patrols were scheduled to begin early 1998.
A telling indicator of the comfortable state of relations was the relaxed
position of both sides over the small Vietnamese ethnic minority in Thailand’s
northeastern region — a traditional bell-wether of difficulties between the two
sides. Implementation of a 1993 decision to grant citizenship to the children
of Vietnamese refugees who entered Thailand in the 1940s and 1950s made
slow progress (by early 1997 only 9,000 of 34,000 had been processed)10 but
this never became an issue between the two countries.
Cambodia
Chavalit focused on Cambodia early in his government when Second Prime
Minister Hun Sen visited Bangkok at the beginning of February. The meeting
yielded no surprises, but the atmospherics were notably positive. Chavalit prom-
ised to co-operate in providing electricity to Cambodia, and Hun Sen agreed
to open more border crossing points. Showing none of the reticence apparent
vis-à-vis Myanmar, Chavalit reaffirmed Thailand’s support for Cambodia be-
coming a full member of ASEAN.
In other respects the Hun Sen visit, then a ministerial-level Joint Commis-
sion in March and a Joint Border Committee meeting in April (both held in
Thailand), addressed a similar range of issues: a dispute over the maritime
boundary; co-operation on economic, social, and criminal activities in the
vicinity of the border; and measures to control illegal Cambodian workers in
Thailand (numbering some 20,000, according to Thailand’s Ministry of Inte-
rior, 70,000 according to the MFA). While no progress was evident on the
maritime boundary, both sides professed good-will on the other issues, and
Cambodia’s Foreign Minister came to the Commission with a ratified invest-
ment and promotion agreement originally signed in 1995. Chavalit’s visit to
Phnom Penh in late June appeared to advance the bilateral relationship fur-
ther, with the signing of an agreement on new border-crossing arrangements,
the setting up of a joint committee to demarcate the 800-kilometre land border,
and the establishment of a technical group to examine overlapping sea claims.
But bilateral relations was not the only focus of Chavalit’s visit, which took
place at a time of high tension in Phnom Penh after fighting in the streets
between forces loyal to Hun Sen and First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh.
Chavalit’s decision to continue was in itself a considered act of support for the
fragile coalition government. He sought to build on that to gain a commitment
from the rival parties to work together in the future. Drawing on his long
association with Cambodia, and his skills as a Khmer speaker, Chavalit met
privately with the two prime ministers, then announced that he had gained
their commitment to co-operate for the benefit of the country. While Chavalit
300 John Funston
could not be blamed for subsequent events, his brokerage came unstuck just
a few days later when Hun Sen launched his power grab on 5 July.
Thailand responded cautiously to this new development in Cambodia. As
noted, it sided with those in ASEAN who opposed Cambodia’s admission later
that month. At the same time Chavalit was anxious to avoid giving offence to
Hun Sen, declining to describe events in Phnom Penh as a “coup”. Ranariddh
was allowed to rally supporters in Bangkok, but not allowed to visit the 45,000
who encamped along the border after escaping armed clashes between the
two factions. Foreign Minister Prachuab travelled widely with the three-minis-
ter ASEAN task force but, like his colleagues, took care not reveal support for
one faction or the other.
Bilateral relations with Cambodia were largely put on hold after the outbreak
of hostilities. Trade across the border plummeted, with all new arrangements
requiring MFA approval. Most bilateral and multilateral meetings involving
Cambodia were postponed.
Laos
Relations with Laos had many turbulent moments in 1997.11 There were set-
backs in April when inmates raped three Lao women being held in custody,
and again in October in a bizarre case where Thai officials intercepted Lao
boats apparently smuggling out-of-date beer. The long-standing issue of some
12,000 Lao refugees in Thailand — remnants of the anti-communist Hmong
opposition — continued to cause difficulties. Assurances by Thai leaders that
the refugees would not be allowed to intervene in Laos’ internal affairs failed
to convince Lao leaders. Notwithstanding such problems, overall relations
remained on an upward trend.
A number of developments in April addressed practical issues related to
communications, border issues, and economic co-operation. The two coun-
tries convened an inaugural meeting of provincial governors from border
provinces, eleven on the Thai side and eight from Laos. Transport ministers
signed an agreement to link Thailand by rail across the Thai–Lao friendship
bridge, and construction started shortly after. The same ministers also signed
an accord on building a second bridge across the Mekong, linking the Thai
province of Mukdahan with Savannakhet in Laos and facilitating overland
traffic between Thailand and Vietnam. The bridge is scheduled for comple-
tion in 2000, but may be delayed as Thailand is now seeking to re-negotiate
the terms of a loan provided by Japan to finance its half of the costs.
One of the most important developments was the beginning of a demarca-
tion exercise, agreed on in 1996, along the 1,830 kilometre border. The exer-
cise began in May, getting off to an inauspicious start when Thai villagers
blocked the attempted placement of the first marker, claiming that it was 80
metres inside Thailand. The 700 kilometres of land border will be addressed
first, with a view to completing all undisputed areas within three years. No
time limit has been set over delineating territory involving some 19 square
kilometres in the Three Villages area (Ban Mai, Ban Klang, and Ban Sawang)
or 80 square kilometres around Ban Rom Klao, the scenes of military clashes
in 1984 and 1987, respectively. However, the basis for examining the river
boundary still appears to be a matter of dispute. Thailand would like to change
it to the mid-point of the river or the deepest water channel, rather than the
water channel closest to Thailand as set down by “unfair treaties” concluded
with France; Laos sees the purpose of demarcation as clarification of ill-defined
areas, not a redefinition of the border.12
Chavalit’s visit in late June produced an agreement to deepen economic co-
operation by setting up working groups under the Joint Commission on energy,
industry, and irrigation. The two sides gave further substance to this by signing
a double taxation agreement.
Myanmar
Relations with Myanmar remained the most difficult of all Thailand’s links
with neighbouring countries. Actions by the Myanmar military spilled across
the border on several occasions, directed particularly at some 100,000 ethnic
Karen refugees encamped just inside Thailand. The two sides had constant
spats over border demarcation, related particularly to the changing course of
rivers marking the border. On Thailand’s side, relations were complicated by
strong human rights and environmental groups opposed, respectively, to
Myanmar’s suppression of political freedom, and the building of a pipeline
through pristine Thai forests to connect Thailand with the Yadana gas field.
As Thailand’s financial problems mounted, the presence of around a million
Myanmar labourers in Thailand also became increasingly problematic.
Nonetheless, Thailand was one of Myanmar’s staunchest supporters in the
region once it had decided — some time in April — to back the country’s
immediate entry into ASEAN. Chavalit repeatedly defended his “close friends”
in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) leadership. Thai-
land courted Myanmar’s membership of Bimst-ec, and led ASEAN’s attempt to
include Myanmar in future meetings between the organization and the EU, an
endeavour that has so far proved unsuccessful.
Bilateral relations improved, in part because of Thai support for Myanmar
on international issues, but also because of Chavalit’s handling of the relation-
ship on a “military-to-military” basis. He did this mainly through army head
General Chettha Thanajaro, who was often called on to troubleshoot, and met
with senior SLORC leaders on no less than five occasions during the year.
Chavalit’s own visit to Yangon in May was short on substance, but was a con-
siderable public relations success when Myanmar agreed to extradite a drug
trafficker wanted in the United States who had jumped bail in Thailand.
Some progress was made on difficult border issues during the year. Follow-
ing General Chettha’s intervention, the construction of a “friendship bridge”
that had been stopped three months short of completion in June 1995 was
resumed in March and opened in August — an important symbolic example
302 John Funston
of improved relations between the two countries. The Joint Border Committee
met in June for the first time since 1995, and agreed to open up three points
for cross-border travel.
A minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office also visited Yangon in
June, and reportedly gained SLORC support for a special economic zone in
Myawaddy, just across the border in the vicinity of the friendship bridge. This
was a project much discussed in Thailand, seen as an opportunity for Thai
entrepreneurs to take advantage of cheaper labour costs, and as providing an
alternative form of employment for illegal Myanmar labourers in Thailand. In
numerous discussions on these labourers Myanmar expressed its sympathy, but
emphasized that it would have to verify citizenship (often an impossibility)
before it could accept any repatriation.
General Chettha made his last visit in November, just as Chavalit was handing
over to Chuan, and gained agreement on the release of ninety-seven fisher-
men imprisoned in Yangon (eighty-six remained). The release seemed to be
a calculated gesture on Yangon’s part to indicate their support for the con-
tinuation of military-to-military ties — Prachuab had visited a week earlier and
returned empty-handed.
Chavalit and Great Powers

Outside the Southeast Asian region Japan and China were the main focus of
Chavalit’s diplomatic attention. Relations with Japan became a priority in
December 1996 when angry employees torched a Sanyo warehouse following
a reduction in their annual bonus, causing $20 million worth of damages.
Former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, head of Chavalit’s advisory
board for economics and foreign affairs, was despatched in February to reas-
sure Tokyo that Thailand would retain a favourable foreign investment climate
for Japanese firms, and to seek financial support for Thai investment in
Indochina, including the second Lao bridge. As Thailand’s economic crisis
worsened, Finance Minister Thanong flew to Tokyo seeking assurances of
continued Japanese investment in Thailand, agreement from Japanese banks
— which accounted for around half foreign loans — to roll over existing
loans, and any additional Japanese support that might be available. Chavalit,
with a forty-three strong cast of senior ministers, public servants, and business
leaders in tow, joined the supplicants in October. Japan and its corporate
sector, though facing some financial difficulties of their own, were generally
forthcoming. Japan contributed the largest sum to the IMF package ($4 bil-
lion) and provided extra assistance such as credit for Thai exporters and trade
insurance, while banks promised loans would be rolled over.
China, another country with which Chavalit claimed a special friendship,
hosted a prime ministerial visit in April. Chavalit was accompanied by a 120-
strong delegation, which addressed a wide range of issues and concluded
MOUs or letters of intent in areas such as trade, economic and technical co-
operation, agriculture, irrigation, and commercial shipping. But the visit was
perhaps most notable for its military dimension, provocatively so in the eyes
of Chavalit’s critics. For the first time ever, all Thailand’s top military leader-
ship went together on an overseas visit. On return to Bangkok military leaders
spoke fulsomely about their reception, highlighting China’s willingness and
capability to provide military hardware on highly favourable terms — buy now
pay ten years later. Chavalit, however, played down possible purchases, and
although military leaders revisited Beijing in July and November, no deals
were reported. Financial problems may have got in the way, though China’s
low costs make it more attractive as an armaments provider in straitened cir-
cumstances.
Thailand’s strained relations with the United States continued under Chavalit.
At the beginning of the year a state department report assigned Thailand low
marks for its human rights record, and the Bangkok embassy’s release of the
document under its own imprimatur was considered “tantamount to letting
foreign embassies criticise us in our own country”.13 U.S. claims that Thailand
was forcing Karen refugees back over the border were strongly denied. Subse-
quent U.S. moves to place an economic embargo on Myanmar and delay its
participation in ASEAN also complicated the relationship, along with political
asylum granted a Thai monk at the centre of a sex scandal, and investigations
into Thais alleged to have provided illicit contributions to President Clinton
for Democrat Party funds.
Relations with the EU went through similar strains. The EU focus on human
rights in its foreign policy, particularly in relation to Myanmar, had a predictable
impact. Thailand, as noted earlier, led the ASEAN efforts to include Myanmar
in future EU-ASEAN meetings. Thailand also sought the EU’s support to defer
its graduation from the Generalized System of Preferences at the end of 1998,
but without success.
Change under Chuan

The Chuan government took power in November with a new rhetoric of pro-
moting democracy and making a difference within ASEAN. Some of this was
exaggerated. For instance, the claim for shaping ASEAN policy at the December
informal summit rested on inclusion of a rather vague reference to establish-
ing “open societies” in ASEAN’s 2020 Vision — a proposal which officials had
pursued while Chavalit was still in office. The seven-point foreign policy state-
ment by the Chuan government was uncannily similar to Chavalit’s seven-point
policy.
There were, however, important differences between the two governments.
Chuan accorded foreign policy a higher priority than Chavalit — or indeed
Chuan in his previous term — by giving the portfolio to a member of his own
party. The Democrats’ commitment to “protecting and promoting democracy
and human rights” is new, and will face its major test in relation to Myanmar.
The government has declared a clear policy of engaging Myanmar on human
rights issues, and maintaining contact with Myanmar’s opposition. Such a policy
304 John Funston
has the backing of former SLORC critic and now Deputy Foreign Minister MR
Sukhumbhand Paribatra — though he has moderated his views and promised
to try and win the acceptance of European nations for Myanmar as the “ninth
Asean friend”.14 With Chuan personally taking over the defence portfolio (only
the second time a civilian has held the office) the potential for conflict between
the military and the MFA has been much reduced.
A notable early achievement for the new government has been improved
relations with Malaysia, particularly with regard to co-operating on Muslim
separatist activities in southern Thailand.15 The fact that new minister Surin is
a Muslim — Thailand’s first Muslim foreign minister — may have helped,
though Malaysian willingness to close ranks in response to regional financial
difficulties was probably more important. Surin has given policy a more Islamic
orientation with efforts to join the Organization of Islamic Conference as an
observer.
Thailand’s capacity for foreign policy initiatives has, of course, been greatly
reduced by its financial crisis. Policies of making Bangkok a regional hub for
companies dealing with Indochina, and developing Thailand as a regional
finance centre, have been severely set back. Economic integration with neigh-
bouring states will also slow down, and this will affect Thai standing in the
region. Estimates of future electricity purchases from Laos, for example, were
being drastically reduced by year’s end. Prospects of growing unemployment
put pressure on Thailand to resolve quickly the status of labourers, both legal
and illegal, from neighbouring countries. Foreign aid will also be cut, though
MFA officials have maintained so far that only distant countries will be affected,
not neighbours.
Financial problems will also have a more direct impact on foreign policy.
Chuan decided to forego the traditional introductory bilateral visits to all
ASEAN countries, making do with meetings at APEC and ASEAN summits in
November and December. The MFA budget has been cut drastically. Embassies
will not be closed, but none of the seventy-three staff returning from postings
in 1998 will be replaced. Other departments that post staff overseas, including
the military, will also be affected.
But the crisis has not reduced the importance of economic diplomacy. Like
many of his predecessors Foreign Minister Surin has promised that the MFA
will become more business-focused. To counteract the negative sentiment that
has played such a key role in driving the currency and stock markets down,
Thailand needs endorsement from influential countries and corporations, and
it needs foreign credits and investment. Surin joined other ministers in ad-
dressing these issues in numerous international fora — such as meetings or-
ganized by the IMF, ASEAN, APEC, and ASEM — and in bilateral visits, includ-
ing economic “road shows”, directed at key countries.
Economic problems have also forced Thailand to adjust its policy focus. The
initial inclination was to look for support from ASEAN countries and East Asia,
particularly Japan. But financial problems were not amenable to such a regional
solution, and increasingly attention was given to gaining the support of the
United States. At the APEC Summit in November, Chuan made a strong pitch
for U.S. support, but came away with nothing more than an apology from
President Clinton for the slow U.S. response to Thai problems. Both the fi-
nance minister and the commerce minister criticized U.S. inaction in strong
statements during December. Perhaps partly in response to this, though more
probably because of the escalating crisis in Indonesia, several American ad-
ministration and congressional leaders visited Thailand and Southeast Asia in
January, providing the moral support Thailand was seeking with strong state-
ments of confidence in the financial policies of the Thai Government. Later
in the month the finance minister met with Clinton on a visit to Washington,
and received a presidential invitation for Chuan to visit in March. Chuan also
made a strong appeal for support from the European Union when he ad-
dressed the annual Davos World Economic Forum in late January.
Balance Sheet
In retrospect, Thai foreign policy in the early 1990s might be seen as accom-
panied by extraordinary good fortune. Political turbulence weakened the
country’s influence in regional and international fora, and caused a marked
deterioration of morale in the foreign ministry. But the Anand and Chuan
governments provided moments of inspired leadership, and the new post–
Cold War circumstances were conducive to Thailand strengthening economic
ties with both traditional ASEAN allies and countries of Indochina and Myanmar.
The MFA retained sufficient professionalism to ensure that Thailand was not
completely ignored on political and security issues. Regionalism, centred on
Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent East Asia, became the primary focus of
foreign policy, as relations with the former major ally, the United States, and
the EU, deteriorated in the face of disputes over economic issues and human
rights.
Chavalit built on these largely favourable circumstances. He was able to use
personal relationships with neighbouring leaders to strengthen bilateral rela-
tions, and had the support of a committed and activist foreign minister. In
particular, Chavalit’s government improved relations with neighbouring
Indochina countries and Myanmar, through important though unspectacular
initiatives in areas such as communications, border demarcation, and enhanced
economic co-operation.
Still, Chavalit’s foreign policy making was not without shortcomings. His
main successes were in the first half of his term. From the floating of the baht
in July, Thailand’s economic crisis — and Chavalit’s efforts to hold his govern-
ment together in the face of this — came to dominate all else. Foreign policy
once again fell hostage to political instability. Friction between the military
and the MFA was also an element of policy-making throughout Chavalit’s ten-
ure, particularly in relation to the prominent role accorded the military in
Thailand’s relations with Myanmar. MFA views on this were made clear by a
306 John Funston
“senior official” after Chavalit’s resignation. That official reportedly urged that
the ministry take over the lead role in dealing with Myanmar, and that it
should be one of truly “constructive” engagement.16
Chavalit was replaced by Chuan at the height of Thailand’s financial diffi-
culties in November 1997. Foreign policy assumed a higher priority, with the
new foreign minister coming from the prime minister’s own party. Chuan’s
concurrent holding of the defence portfolio should also limit the potential
for foreign policy differences between the military and the MFA. Chuan has
highlighted a new commitment to democracy and human rights, but in other
respects policies remain much the same. Financial problems, however, have
weakened Thailand’s ability to play an influential regional role, and forced it
to look again for support from the United States, as it has many times in the
past. Foreign policy has, in effect, returned to a more traditional path of
balancing regional interests and the great powers.
Despite enormous difficulties Chuan has begun well — on both the domes-
tic and foreign policy fronts — perhaps demonstrating once more Thailand’s
vaunted capacity for adapting to difficult changes in its environment. To make
further progress, Chuan needs to address economic problems successfully, and
entrench his position in government. That is a tall order, but significant im-
provement in foreign policy influence depends on it.
NOTES
1. Nation, 20 November 1997.
2. Bangkok Post and Nation, 17 March 1997.
3. Nation, 16 December 1997.
4. See J. Funston, “The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Thailand: Some
Preliminary Observations”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, no 3 (December 1987):
especially pp. 238–39.
5. See, for example, the article by Phana Chanwirot and Kunlachada Chaiphipat,
“Foreign Ministry Yearns for a Technocrat: Will the Good Times Ever Return to
Saranrom Palace”, Nation, 22 May 1995.
6. Daily News, 23 May 1992, reported in Joint Publications Research Service-sea-92-013, 30
June 1992.
7. Bangkok Post, 13 August 1991.
8. Ibid., 20 September 1997. The Asian Fund is frequently described as a Japanese
initiative, but was first proposed by Thailand.
9. Nation, 12 June 1997.
10. Bangkok Post, 11 March 1997.
11. On Thai-Lao relations, see also Nick Freeman, “Laos: No Safe Haven from the
Regional Tumult”, in this volume.
12. Bangkok Post, 31 March 1997.
13. Ibid., 11 November 1997.
14. Ibid., 2 December 1997.
15. Ibid., 22 December 1997.
16. The arrest of three Muslim separatist leaders in January, and others subsequently,
was with (unacknowledged) Malaysian assistance. See, for instance, Nation, 30
January 1998.

Thai Foreign Policy Seeking Influence

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THAI FOREIGN POLICY

Thailand was the centre of international attention in 1997. No longer was it

1980s — A Mixed Record

JOHN FUNSTON is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

1990s — Political Turbulence and End of the Cold War

Strengthening a Regional Focus

1992 had failed to resolve. Although ministerial visits appeared to make no

Chavalit and Great Powers

Change under Chuan

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