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Tiananmen incident and the third stage of Chinese aid

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Friedrich Jakob Wu
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Tiananmen incident and the third stage of Chinese aid

How Chinese aid is informed by the national identity of China

Introduction

A number of empirical studies seek to debunk the myths surrounding Chinese aid. As some

examples, by examining Chinese aid in different eras since 1949, Varrall (2012) argues that Chinese

aid nowadays is no longer a tool of soft power as in the early ages of the People’s Republic. Brant

(2013) disproves that Chinese aid provision was explicitly meant to serve the quest for natural

resources. More recently, Rajah, Dayant & Pryke (2019) demonstrate that data do not support the

accusation against China of setting up debt traps for the recipient countries of its aid. This research

utilises the findings of Varrall (2012, p. 156) that the national identities of China in different eras

inform the responses of national leaders to external factors, which in turn determine the foreign aid

policies of China. The main argument of this article is that the simplistic and primordialist

accusations against Chinese aid, such as Chinese aid always serves some certain purposes (e.g.

exerting soft power or debt traps), are doomed to be debunked easily. Rather, the motivations

behind Chinese aid in a certain period must be examined in relation to the contemporary national

identity* of China.

Background: Early stages of Chinese aid

The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially categorises Chinese aid

provision into three stages (Ministry of Commerce in Brant 2013, p. 160). The first stage was

during the ‘ideological era’ from 1949/50 to 1978 (Brant 2013, p. 160; Varrall 2012, p. 142). At this

stage, China was a new communist state that had recently defeated the nationalist regime backed by

the United States (US) and underwent ‘an ideological debate’ with the Soviet Union on the

leadership of global communist struggle (Varrall 2012, p. 142). China was therefore ‘excluded from

* In this article, ‘national identity’ means the identity of a state given by local elites or aid policymakers.
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world affairs’ and the reconstruction of ‘international system’ after the Second World War (ibid., p.

142). Both the newly acquired identity of the PRC as ‘an international revolutionary state’ and the

external distrust and isolation determined that Chinese aid activities at this stage concentrated on the

‘sponsorship of Third World socialism’, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa (ibid., p. 142, 143).

Such activities allow China to advance ‘the Chinese model of socialism’ and its foreign aid

principles in between the two blocs of the Cold War, and foster its acceptability in international

politics (ibid., p. 142, 143).

Chinese aid had entered its second stage since 1978, the beginning of the era of reform and

opening up (gaige kaifang), and ended in 1995 when the goal of gaige kaifang has been redefined in

the wake of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Fewsmith 2008, p. 72; Varrall 2012, p. 145-147). As

the legitimacy of the Chinese communist regime has been increasingly accepted internationally and

particularly by the United Nations (UN) and the US from the 1970s onwards, and as the

revolutionary zeal has gradually faded since the death of Mao Zedong, the core identity of the PRC,

given by Deng Xiaoping the ‘“paramount” leader’ and other elites in post-Mao China, transformed

from ‘a symbolic champion of the Third World revolutionary cause’ into ‘a post-revolutionary

developmental state’ (Varrall 2012, p. 145). Aid policies and activities at this stage served the

fundamental quest for ‘an international environment that supported China’s economic growth’ and

domestic development (ibid., p. 146). However, as a new player in the global market and economic

development, the PRC was challenged by the uncertainty induced by the reform and the process of

making adjustments to its new identity, which repeatedly disrupted its aid policies and activities

(ibid., p. 147). Notably, the sanction from the developed world in the succeeding years of the

Tiananmen incident prompted China to reconnect with ‘the “Third World club”’ through aid

provision particularly in Africa, and the Gulf War in the early 1990s drew the attention of Chinese

aid policymakers to the African continent as a means of resource security (ibid., p. 147).

 Wu, F J 2021

The third stage: Chinese aid in post-Tiananmen era

Initially, Deng wished China to go down ‘a middle path’ between ‘bourgeois liberalization’

and Marxist planned economy, throughout the process of reform and opening up (Fewsmith 2008,

p. 28, 29). However, the social changes generated by gaige kaifang during its early years induced

the uncertainty of whether the reform should be continued or continued in accordance with the

content defined by Deng, and the need of redefining the reform had become immense in the wake of

the violent Tiananmen incident on June 4, 1989 (ibid., p. 21, 22). Domestically, the incident

signalled ‘the political failure of reform in the 1980s’, thus giving the conservatives (Chinese elites

advocating orthodox Marxism and planned economy) a powerful weapon to shake the leadership of

the reformists, particularly of Zhao Ziyang and even his ‘patron, senior leader Deng’ himself (ibid.,

p. 21, 22, 29, 83). To ensure that gaige kaifang would go down his middle path even after his death,

Deng declared ‘one center’ which was ‘economic development’ and ‘two basic points’ (‘reform and

opening up on the one hand and opposition to “bourgeois liberalization” on the other’) few days

after the incident, and installed Jiang Zemin as the ‘core’ of the next generation of party/state

leadership, who was less sympathetic to Tiananmen protesters than Zhao but more openminded

towards market economy than the conservatives such as Li Peng and Yao Yilin (ibid., p. 23, 24).

Internationally, Tiananmen incident and its aftermath informed Chinese elites of the significance of

‘the international macroclimate’ to the domestic politics and economic development of China

(Fewsmith 2008, p. 22, 46; Varrall 2012, p. 148). The supposed willingness of the ‘imperialist

Western world’ or ‘international reactionary forces’ to ‘overthrow the socialist system’, perceived

by both reformist and conservative elites, has somewhat revived the national identity of the PRC as

a socialist revolutionary state (Fewsmith 2008, p. 5, 6, 46). However, multiple factors in post-

Tiananmen era, including the reformists’ focus on economic development, the conservatives’

insistence on reconnecting with the socialist countries and the Third World, the wide acceptance of

‘new authoritarianism’ (authoritarianism is required for the protection of individual freedom at the
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intermediate stage before a final ‘stage of freedom and democracy’) amongst both elites and

intellectuals, and the end of the Cold War between capitalist and socialist blocs, have jointly

prevented China from returning to a Maoist ideological era (ibid., p. 23, 46, 79, 83, 84). Rather,

post-Tiananmen elites have gradually reconciled socialism (or planned economy) with market

economy and Chinese nationality, and managed to manipulate private and foreign business, by

means like accepting entrepreneurs into the communist party and fostering the influence of Party

branches on private and foreign companies (Fewsmith 2008, p. 5, 49, 57, 79; Tsai 2019, p. 237).

Chinese aid policies and activities at the third stage since 1995 have evidently been

reflecting these post-Tiananmen changes. Firstly, Chinese aid focuses on amending the international

image of the PRC, and China becomes increasingly active on conventional, rather than

revolutionary, international platforms, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) (Varrall 2012, p. 151).

Meanwhile, slogans such as ‘win-win’, ‘South-South Cooperation’ and ‘co-development’ are

commonly used by Chinese aid providers to label their projects, thus fostering an image of China as

not just a peaceful and responsible ‘big country’, but also a untraditional aid provider which itself is

a Third World country, interested in collaborating with fellow Third World countries in development

(Brant 2013, p. 161; Driessen 2015, p. 3; Varrall 2012, p. 148, 149). Secondly, however, Chinese aid

practices at this stage serve a range of needs of the People’s Republic itself, including reducing the

diplomatic influence of the Republic of China (Taiwan), promoting its own interpretation of

Chinese culture and language, and securing natural and commercial resources for its own domestic

development (Brant 2013; Eisenman & Kurlantzick 2006, p. 219-221). This characteristic shows a

high level of ‘similarities between Chinese and Western approaches to … development’, but these

similarities are obscured by labels like ‘co-development’ and the diversity and complexity of

Chinese aid projects across recipient countries and regions (Brant 2013; Eisenman & Kurlantzick

2006; Driessen 2015, p. 7; Varrall 2012, p. 151). Finally, private companies play an increasingly

greater role in foreign aid provision (Varrall 2012, p. 151). Although it is unclear whether the
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increasing significance of private actors is desired by Chinese elites, post-Tiananmen private actors

have been showing a greater level of obedience to or influence of Chinese government (Brant 2013,

p. 159; Driessen 2015, p. 7).

Conclusion

This essay has demonstrated the dynamics of Chinese aid policies and activities in relation

to the national identities of China. The national identity can in turned be determined by major

political events such as the establishment of the communist Chinese republic, the beginning of

gaige kaifang following the death of Mao Zedong, and the adjustment of the reform in the wake of

Tiananmen incident. Similar aid activities (e.g. concentrating aids on African continent) may carry

different meanings (e.g. forming alliance, exerting soft power or securing certain resources) across

different eras of the PRC, as determined by the contemporary national identities, through the

manner in which Chinese elites and aid policymakers interpret international politics. Additionally,

as national identity of the PRC transforms from a revolutionary state to a conventional state, the

functions of this state have been diversifying, which also diversifies its aid activities. Within post-

Tiananmen era alone, Chinese aid serves different needs of China in different recipient countries or

regions (e.g. promoting ‘one China’ principle and securing natural resources in Africa but securing

commercial resources in the Pacific) (Brant 2013; Eisenman & Kurlantzick 2006, p. 219, 220).

Therefore, this essay suggests that the impact of the latest major political events in China on its

national identity must be first examined and treated as the context in which Chinese aid policies and

activities can be evaluated.

 Wu, F J 2021

References

Brant, P 2013, ‘Chinese aid in the South Pacific: Linked to resources?’, Asian Studies Review, vol.

37, no. 2, pp. 158-177.

Driessen, M 2015, ‘The African bill: Chinese struggles with development assistance’, Anthropology

Today, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 3-7.

Eisenman, J & Kurlantzick, J 2006, ‘China's Africa strategy’, Current History, vol. 105, no. 691,

pp. 219-224.

Fewsmith, J 2008, China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Cambridge

University Press.

Rajah, R, Dayant, A & Pryke, J 2019, Ocean of debt? Belt and Road and debt diplomacy in the

Pacific, Lowy Institute.

Tsai, M H-J 2019, ‘The Chinese Dream: Chinese capitalism and identity politics’, Asian Survey,

vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 223-245.

Varrall, M 2012, ‘Debunking the myth of China’s soft power: Changes in China’s use of foreign

assistance from 1949 to the present’, in H Lai & Y Lu (ed.), China’s soft power and international

relations, Routledge, pp. 138-169.

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