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The Monitor Model and Neurofunctional Theory: An Integrated View

Article  in  Studies in Second Language Acquisition · September 1983

DOI: 10.1017/S0272263100000267

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The Monitor Model and
Neutofunctional Theory: An Integrated
View

James W. Tollefson, Bob Jacobs, and Elaine J. Selipsky

University of Washington

The acquisition-learning distinction is the foundation for much current research in second
language acquisition (SLA), yet we lack an analysis of the applicability of this distinction
to the whole of the SLA process, including input, storage, retrieval, and performance. This
article details the meaning of the acquisition-learning distinction in the Monitor Model
and Neurofunctional Theory. It is argued that the two models provide complementary
accounts of different components of the SLA process, with the Monitor Model employing
the acquisition-learning distinction in an analysis of input and performance, and Neuro-
functional Theory using the distinction to describe the formation of linguistic knowledge.
Thus an integrated SLA model is proposed that carries the acquisition-learning distinction
to all components of the SLA process and that incorporates the main elements of the Monitor
Model and Neurofunctional Theory.

In recent years it has become commonplace in second language acquisition (SLA)

research to distinguish between acquisition and learning. This distinction, orig-
inally elaborated by Krashen (1976, 1978a, 1981), is perhaps the most important
conceptualization in the field and has made possible the most productive models
of SLA yet developed. Indeed, it is safe to say that no serious SLA research today
can ignore this fundamental distinction and that any proposed acquisition model
must accommodate in some way these crucial concepts.

For these reasons, it is essential that SLA researchers know precisely what they
mean by acquisition and learning. This is more difficult than it seems, because
there are currently different SLA models in which these terms are central. There-
fore we believe it would be useful to closely examine the role of this distinction
in two major models: the Monitor Model and Neurofunctional Theory. By doing
so, we hope to demonstrate that Monitor and Neurofunctional theories are com-
plementary and together provide a more complete account of SLA than is possible
with either separately.

The three most important researchers working within these areas are Krashen
and Bialystok, who are responsible for elaboration of the Monitor Model, and
Lamendella, responsible for the most detailed elaboration of Neurofunctional
Theory. Other models (such as Stevick's Levertov Machine, Schumann, Andersen,
and Stauble's Acculturation Model, efforts by Larsen-Freeman and Evelyn Hatch
and her colleagues to develop a model of discourse and acquisition, and socio-
linguistic analysis by Richards, Corder, Cooper and others) are excluded because
 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

they have not been sufficiently elaborated and because either the acquisition-
learning distinction is not central or the distinction made in each case is identical
to those of Krashen, Lamendella, or Bialystok.

The Issues: Input-Storage-Retrieval-Performance

Learned System
I

I
Acquired System • Utterance

Figure 1: The Monitor Model (Krashen 1978a, 1981)

The full title for this diagram is 'The Monitor Model for Adult Second Language
Performance.' It is peculiarly significant that Krashen- describes the schematic
representation of his model in these terms, stressing performance. Yet his elab-
oration of the model includes a depiction of what 'went in' before the acquirer
produced any output (see figure 2).

Input Language acquisition device

Cognitive organizers Acquired competence
u

Figure 2: The Relationship between Input, Affective Factors, and Acquisition

(Krashen 1981)

Although obviously performance is the only overt indication of what a learner

does, the Monitor Model must be examined from the point of view of learning
theory in general. In other words, any analysis of monitor use and utterance
initiation necessarily includes questions of memory (the immediate strategic or
retrieval source of performance) and of input (the ultimate source). The question
for the Monitor Model, therefore, as well as for all models of SLA, is the following:
Is the distinction between acquisition and learning carried systematically through
the entire acquisition process of input, storage (memory), and retrieval, as well
as performance? Our evaluation of the usefulness of the acquisition-learning dis-
tinction thus depends upon whether it sheds light on SLA phenomena at all stages
of this complex process.1 We will therefore examine the work of Krashen, Bi-
alystok, and Lamendella in light of this fundamental question.
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al.

Issue 1: Learner's Analysis of Input

When a learner corrects an error or makes a grammatical judgement, one can ask
'How did you know that?' (i.e. 'What process in your mind gave you that infor-
mation?') and the reply may be 'I remembered the rule' or 'I just felt it,' depending
on whether learned or acquired knowledge provided the cue.2 The point is that
this is performance, the product of retrieval of information. It can be either un-
conscious/implicit/automatic or conscious/explicit/controlled (see discussion of
these terms below). That we sometimes think about language consciously is not
in question. But one might also then ask the learner 'How did you learn that?'
The answer to that question might be 'It just came to me . . . I don't know how'
or 'I remember studying it.' This is a matter of different types of memory and
retrieval. But from where do these different types evolve? What differences in
exposure to the language lead to apparently quite different forms of knowledge?
This question is the issue of input/intake.

There are different ways to characterize intake. Bialystok's early version of her
model (Bialystok and Frohlich 1977) contained two input boxes: formal instruc-
tion and functional exposure to language. Later (1978) she outlined the more
general language exposure box. This modification incorporates the important
insight that the type of setting (classroom, naturalistic environment) will not
necessarily lead to a particular kind of linguistic knowledge. Students in a formal
classroom might develop a 'feel' for the language that is just as 'natural' as learners
in a natural environment. The question therefore is not simply what kind of input
is being offered to the learner, but rather what the learner does with it (see figure
3).

Language
INPUT Exposure

1 ^ s . ^ ^ Functional practicing

'Formal ^ N ^
(practicing ^^ s^

Explicit practicing Implicit

Other Inferencing
linguistic linguistic
knowledge knowledge knowledge
Inferencing
KNOWLEDGE ti
i
i
i
1 Inferencing .
Response
1 Type I

- -1
OUTPUT
Monitorine 1
Pr 3cess

Strategies
1 -1 Typen

Figure 3: Bialystok's Model of Second Language Learning (Bialystok 1978)

 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

Krashen points out that 'the fundamental claim of Monitor Theory is that con-
scious learning is available to the performer only as a Monitor' (1981:2; also
1979b: 164). Yet both forms of knowledge (conscious, learned knowledge and un-
conscious, acquired knowledge) come from the same origin, namely input.3 Both
acquired and learned knowledge are subject to the same initial constraints: coming
from input, they must 'pass through' the affective filter (cf. Dulay and Burt 1977).
Those elements successfully passing through the filter become intake, or that
which is directly useful to the learner for acquisition. The implication here is
twofold: (1) Content (the essential element for acquisition) and form (upon which
learned knowledge explicitly operates) are initially inseparable; one without the
other is nonsensical and probably of no value to the learner. (2) Krashen asserts
that, when the learner is actively involved with content, the result is intake and
growth of the acquired system. But it seems equally likely that the learned system
of anyone beyond the absolute beginning level may become actively involved
also, concentrating on form in order to develop further the learned system, or to
aid in comprehension. If we accept this view, then it would seem that both the
learned system and the acquired system may be simultaneously involved in the
analysis of input, simultaneously aiding in comprehension. Krashen hints indi-
rectly at this possibility when he says that 'With comprehension, my model
predicts, acquisition of syntax will come' (1981:109). We will have more to say
about the relationship between learning and acquisition below.

Bialystok's account of input notes that language exposure can be perceived by a

learner either consciously, in which case it will lead directly into the explicit
linguistic knowledge cell in storage (the criterion for admission being the learner's
ability to articulate a rule), or unconsciously, in which case the information is
directed into the implicit knowledge cell containing whatever is used sponta-
neously and automatically. (The third cell of the knowledge/storage level, 'other
knowledge,' is not relevant here.) Bialystok's model thus provides for two different
ways of dealing with input, leading to two different kinds of linguistic knowledge,
a view quite in line with Krashen's. Bialystok, unlike Krashen, does not speculate
on what happens to input that leads into implicit knowledge. Where he relies on
the creative construction hypothesis, she is silent, though she does say that 'it
will be of crucial importance to understand how various knowledge sources are
built up' (Bialystok and Frohlich 1977:23). This remains a major gap in her model,
though it does not contradict anything she has suggested. Where her model differs
from Krashen's, however, is in its proposal of two strategies, formal practice and
inference, that will take stored data from the explicit knowledge cell to the
implicit knowledge cell and vice versa. This leads us to the second area, the
storage of acquired knowledge and learned knowledge.

Issue 2: Memory
Krashen's view of the essentially dichotomous nature of how humans develop
linguistic knowledge is well known, though not always well understood (e.g.
McLaughlin 1978). Briefly, Krashen argues that adults have two means for inter-
nalizing linguistic rules: acquisition, which is not conscious and which is similar
to, perhaps the same as primary language acquisition by children, and learning,
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al.

which is conscious and involves the ability to state rules about the language. This
distinction refers to the processes by which learners analyze input and produce
output, not to the nature of stored knowledge. Obviously one would hope that
the two processes would correlate with two kinds of storage, but Krashen's model
does not make any claims in this regard. Thus he does not distinguish (1) the
conscious (pre-)selection of a word or structure and (2) correction. He uses the
term 'monitor' to indicate both one type of correcting mechanism (figure 1) and
conscious preselection (e.g. as in 'performance without acquired competence,'
1979b).
Performance requires retrieval of information from memory. Assuming that a
new word or structure has entered a learner's knowledge through conscious learn-
ing, such as the conjugation of avoir, there may come a time when the learner
has practiced some forms of it sufficiently never to notice using them, while
other forms may require a conscious search. Either we must say that the whole
of avoir is retrieved from learned knowledge, even though some retrievals seem
to be automatic and others labored and deliberate, or there must be a way for
learned knowledge to be transformed into acquired knowledge. Krashen considers
this to be rare, if it happens at all:
It often 'looks like' learning causes acquisition. This occurs when a second
language acquirer has learned a rule before actually acquiring it, and then sub-
sequently does succeed in acquiring the rule. It may appear as if the learning
led to the acquisition. I am claiming that this is not the way the acquisition
really occurred (1981:117).
Stevick (1980) argues that 'seepage' from the learned source to the acquired source
may occur. In this view, acquisition would have two sources: direct (intake and
the acquisition process) and indirect (the formal source through practice of learned
items). Krashen himself verges on this suggestion (1979a) but backs away from
it: 'conscious learning does not contribute directly to acquisition.' Could it then
contribute indirectly?
Differences between learning and acquisition as processes leading to linguistic
knowledge cannot be denied. But the question remains how these processes lead
to two quite different systems of stored knowledge. Clearly monitor theory re-
quires two stored systems, since, as a performance model, it depicts the moment
of utterance initiation (retrieval) and the relationship between 'acquisition' and
'learning' at that moment. One possibility is that the two forms of knowledge
are differentiated by 'cognitive organizers' (Dulay and Burt 1977; Krashen 1978b).
Krashen includes cognitive organizers along with the language acquisition device
(LAD) in a single processor which uses intake (i.e. input that has passed through
the affective filter) in order to develop acquired competence. It may be the case,
however, that cognitive organizers and the LAD are distinct. Then we would have
two possibilities: (1) Input which does not pass through the affective filter is
subject to cognitive organizers, which have the effect of developing learned knowl-
edge. The LAD is thus reserved exclusively for the processing of unconscious
linguistic information and the development of acquired knowledge. This view
permits us to argue that SLA is similar to primary language acquisition by chil-
dren, since the more highly developed cognitive abilities of adults serve to develop
 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

the learned knowledge system only, while acquired knowledge develops directly
from the LAD (see figure 4). (2) The second possibility is that intake passes through
the language acquisition device and that information which cannot be processed
efficiently is then referred to cognitive organizers. There is, perhaps, some indirect
evidence for this view in Bialystok's finding (1981) that the learned system op-
erates only after the acquired system has made an initial judgement that an
utterance is ungrammatical. Bialystok's work, however, which is discussed below,
does not aim at investigating directly whether cognitive organizers operate on
data 'rejected' by the LAD.

Cognitive Learned
Organizers Knowledge

Intake Acquired
Input > LAD Competence

Affective
Filter
Figure 4: One Possible Relationship between Language Processing and Two Forms
of Linguistic Knowledge

The point, in any case, is that (1) Krashen is clearly correct in saying that learning
a rule and then later acquiring it does not necessarily mean that the learned rule
led to the acquired one; (2) Krashen may or may not be correct in arguing for the
virtually complete separation of the learning process and the acquisition process;
(3) but neither (1) nor (2) tells us anything about the mechanisms by which the
two knowledge systems are created. It is here that Lamendella's Neurofunctional
Theory makes its contribution.

We will deal with this question when we turn to issue #3 below, but first it is
necessary to examine Bialystok's notions of implicit and explicit knowledge, since
they form a bridge to Lamendella's highly speculative framework for the creation
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al.

of linguistic knowledge. In a series of articles, Bialystok (1978, 1979, 1981) has

explored the integrity and interaction of two systems of knowledge, implicit and
explicit, which are respectively analogous to Krashen's acquired and learned sys-
tems. Bialystok refers to implicit knowledge (i.e. unanalyzed information about
language) and explicit knowledge (i.e. analyzed information which can be 'artic-
ulated, examined, and manipulated') as the 'two sources for the solution to a
particular language task.. .. The two sources, while independent in terms of their
operating specializations, are also mutually supportive, that is, interactive' (1981:72-
3). An important proposal regarding this interaction has been experimentally
tested and tentatively documented by Bialystok, namely the sequential use of
the two forms of knowledge, whereby implicit knowledge is 'consulted' before
explicit knowledge, a processing strategy permitting learners to 'receive language
input without constant analysis of its grammaticality' (Bialy-
stok, 1979:98). In addition, she suggests that explicit knowledge is retrieved only
when an intuitive judgment of ungrammaticality has been made by the implicit
knowledge system. This suggestion, confirmed by experimental results, supports
Krashen's assertion that acquired knowledge is the source of utterances. That is,
the monitor operates only when an intuitive judgement has been made that there
is a problem with the utterance. We are left, however, with the question of what
mechanism recognizes that such a judgment has been made and that the monitor
must therefore be 'turned on' (see discussion of the 'executive' below).

Bialystok's model and Krashen's monitor model may be compared in other areas
as well:
1. The existence of self-correction behavior is provided for by Bialystok (1978)
in two possible types of output. Type I: Responses are spontaneous and
immediate and are processed exclusively by implicit linguistic knowledge,
which includes an acquired self-correction mechanism. Type II: Responses
are deliberate and occur after a delay, and may be monitored directly by
explicit linguistic knowledge, or inferencing to the explicit system may
take place (a form of 'consultation').
2. According to Bialystok, monitoring may be used as a formal production
strategy and also as a means of bringing explicit knowledge to the com-
prehension task. In others words, explicit knowledge can operate on input
as well as output. In this regard, Bialystok differs from Krashen in that she
sees explicit knowledge as being equally valuable for both comprehension
and production.
3. Bialystok clearly allows for acquired knowledge to become conscious (1981),
whereas Krashen argues that learned and acquired systems may contain
the same rules but they will have developed independently (1978b).
4. Similarly, Bialystok's model permits learned knowledge to come under the
control of the acquired system. That is, explicit knowledge may become
automatized through practice and transferred to the implicit knowledge
system. In addition, it should be noted that Bialystok refers to explicit
knowledge as a 'buffer for new information about the language' (1978:72).
Through use, information in the explicit system may be transferred to
implicit linguistic knowledge. This notion of a language buffer is in some
way precursory to Lamendella (see below).
 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

It is useful at this point, before moving on to the third major issue, to summarize
the preceding analysis of Krashen's and Bialystok's similar views of the acqui-
sition-learning distinction as it applies to issues of input and storage. Bialystok
essentially accepts the major precepts of Krashen's Monitor Theory, but with
three main differences:
1. Only Bialystok notes that language may be directly acquired through cre-
ative construction or indirectly acquired through processes like practice
and repetition after conscious learning.
2. Krashen does not distinguish, as does Bialystok, the use of the monitor for
pre-selection and for editing or making grammaticality decisions. (Krashen
acknowledges that both kinds of monitoring exist, but seems to regard
them as identical in origin (1978a).)
3. Only Bialystok explicitly considers the use of the monitor for production
and for comprehension, whereas Krashen emphasizes the role of learned
knowledge in production.

Krashen and Bialystok have clearly made major contributions to SLA research.
Though their views are generally similar, the above differences are not minor
matters. Neither Krashen nor Bialystok, however, has attempted to elaborate what
is the major outstanding issue in their still evolving models, namely the mech-
anisms by which acquired (or implicit) knowledge and learned (or explicit) knowl-
edge are formed. Krashen relies on the LAD, creative construction, and cognitive
organizers without detailing their components. Bialystok perhaps begins to deal
with this issue with her proposals for formal and functional practicing and in-
ferencing, but these concepts make no claims about the cognitive processes in-
volved nor about the ultimate genetic or neuromaturational source of these
processes.4 For an analysis of these matters, we must turn to the neurofunctional
theory developed by Lamendella.

Issue 3: The Mechanisms of Knowledge-Building

If we accept the general view that retrieval of information from two knowledge
systems (acquired/implicit and learned/explicit) forms the immediate source of
utterances, and that these knowledge systems are 'built' by the learner 'acting
on' input, then we are faced with the question of what the nature of this ability
to 'act on' input might be. In other words, what strategies or skills or knowledge
or structures or cognitive capacities are available to the learner for the two dif-
ferent processes (acquisition and learning) which build the two different knowl-
edge systems? This question is identical to the question: What (strategies, skills,
knowledge, structures, or capacities) define the acquisition/learning processes and
the acquired/learned knowledge systems? Bialystok herself emphasizes the im-
portance of this question: 'It will be of crucial importance to understand how
various knowledge sources are built up' (1977:23). Lamendella's attempts to an-
swer this question (Lamendella 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b; Selinker and
Lamendella 1978, 1979) are based on a distinction between acquisition and learn-
ing that is generally compatible with the views of Krashen and Bialystok. Indeed,
we consider his work to complement theirs, and we believe that together the
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al.

three researchers provide the elements for a powerful theory of second language
acquisition.

It is not desirable to fully summarize Lamendella's theory here, but several points
should be highlighted in order to make clear our view of his approach. Lamendella
repeatedly emphasizes that his focus is on structures and mechanisms internal
to humans: 'It is necessary to reorient many notions away from overt behavior
toward the internal functional organization of the systems responsible for pro-
ducing overt behavior' (Lamendella 1977:155; also see Selinker and Lamendella
1979). Thus his set of theoretical constructs is an elaborate outline of these
characteristics. The foundation of this outline is the 'neurofunctional system,' a
general term referring to the result of the interaction of neural systems of the
brain and environmental conditions. As the neural systems of infants mature,
networks of knowledge (the forms of which are determined by innate guidiiig
principles) develop; these networks are conceptualized by Lamendella as vertical
hierarchies of neurofunctional systems. The two major hierarchies involved in
information processing are the communication hierarchy and the cognition hi-
erarchy (see figure 5).

COGNITION HIERARCHY COMMUNICATION HIERARCHY

Output Output

Phonological, syntactic Phonological, syntactic, and

and lexical systems for Translation lexical systems for "secondar V
"foreign languages" buffer languages"
>

Cognitive problem \ Phonological, syntactic

solving capacities and lexical systems for
"primary languages"
>

Executive
component

T
Input

Figure 5: The Communication and Cognition Hierarchies in Second Language

Acquisition and Learning (based on Lamendella 1977)

Operation and development of either hierarchy characterizes the two major proc-
esses of language learning: the communication hierarchy is involved in acqui-
sition (both 'primary language acquisition' and 'secondary language acquisition')
and the cognition hierarchy is involved in learning (termed 'foreign language
10 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

learning'). The individual acquires language in the form of 'infrasystems/ which

are more commonly termed 'developmental grammars' in PLA and 'interlanguage'
in SLA. A given set of infrasystems is in control of communicative functions
(within the communication hierarchy) until a new infrasystem is formed, that
is, until acquisition takes place. Newly acquired or learned infrasystems must
integrate into existing ones, thus forming a complex hierarchy of ever greater
complexity, growing as a vine on a trellis interweaves as it grows upward and
outward in all directions.5

The full range of differences between acquisition and learning, and between pri-
mary and secondary language acquisition, is summarized in Lamendella (1977)
and need not be restated here.6 What is relevant to the present discussion is the
interrelatedness and mutual development of different neurofunctional hierar-
chies. The cognition and communication hierarchies are highly integrated, shar-
ing subsystems and genetically-determined developmental sequences.
Environmental factors have a role, namely the triggering of proper ontogenetic
development of genetically regulated stages, but the neurofunctional basis for
those stages is within the learner.

Foreign language learning is essentially a problem-solving process, so that knowl-

edge developed through this process is integrated into the cognition hierarchy.
Components of the cognition hierarchy, including the foreign language translation
buffer, correspond roughly to Krashen's notion of cognitive organizers, which
become progressively noticeable with the onset of formal operations (Inhelder
and Piaget 1958). In contrast, the essential characteristic of the process of sec-
ondary language acquisition is that resulting knowledge is integrated at many
levels into the communication hierarchy, which developed originally during the
primary language acquisition process. In fact, secondary language infrasystems
are probably derived from and arranged horizontally along the same neurofunc-
tional systems as the primary language (Lamendella 1977:164-65). The similarities
between PLA and SLA (both as processes and as systems of knowledge) are nu-
merous, and this is not surprising since both serve internal coding functions and
facilitate sociocultural assimilation.

But while PLA and SLA have much in common, SLA and foreign language learning
(FLL) are very different primarily because different hierarchies are involved. Input
is directed to either the cognition or communication hierarchy by the 'executive
component,' which initially bears responsibility for deciding which hierarchy will
more appropriately handle the task at hand. The executive component essentially
has the job of determining whether the task is fundamentally communicative or
fundamentally some other sort of problem requiring operation of cognitive abil-
ities. Once information is directed to the cognition hierarchy, the executive com-
ponent cannot retrieve that information for use by the communication hierarchy.
This is the basis for Lamendella's argument that repetitious congitive tasks such
as pattern practice drills are not neurofunctionally related to communicative
language use, since the communication hierarchy rather than the cognition hi-
erarchy provides the optimal basis for acquired competence.
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al. 11

Thus far we have merely summarized the major points of Lamendella's Neuro-
functional Theory. That theory does not contradict anything in either Krashen's
or Bialystok's models. Rather, Lamendella's work elaborates precisely those areas
in which Monitor Theory is weakest: the internal neurofunctional capacities
responsible for the formation of acquired and learned knowledge.

But how does Neurofunctional Theory explain the creation of these two forms
of knowledge? The answer: by hypothesizing the innate (neuro-) abilities (func-
tions) that human beings must have to account for the knowledge systems as we
know them (as described by Monitor Theory). To put it simply: given what we
know about two processes that form two categories of knowledge, Lamendella
proposes a system of functional constructs to account for those processes and
forms of knowledge. Some of the most important constructs, along with their
functional basis, are the following:
I. The foreign language translation buffer. Both Krashen and Bialystok note that
learned knowledge is retrieved more slowly than acquired knowledge. The trans-
lation buffer accounts for this fact by positing an additional step in speech op-
erating with learned knowledge, namely a short-term holding cell within which
knowledge is manipulated prior to production or to comprehension. The holding
operation is manifest as labored speech or slow comprehension.
1. The executive component. This construct accounts for at least three issues
also discussed in Monitor Theory: (a) that learned knowledge does not seem to
be automatically available for utterance initiation (because executive decisions
cannot easily be reversed); (b) that the PL non-verbal system, part of the com-
munication hierarchy, persists throughout FLL; (c) that there is a general though
not fixed relationship between the nature of input (see Krashen's discussion of
formal and informal environments in Krashen 1976) and whether acquired or
learned knowledge results. According to Lamendella, the reason for this rela-
tionship between environment and knowledge is that one important function of
the executive is to recognize similarities between tasks and to consistently re-
spond in the most efficient manner.
3. Regression, which involves reaccessing knowledge at a lower level within the
communication hierarchy. We see evidence of this phenomenon when learners
in situations with unusually strong affective content (e.g. emergencies) suddenly
'lore' much of their acquired knowledge and rely on lower levels of proficiency,
perhaps even on gestures or one word utterances.
4. Backsliding, which involves reaccessing superceded knowledge at the same
level within the communication hierarchy. The most common manifestation of
backsliding is learners who, for reasons that often are not clear, suddenly make
more errors in areas which they previously had mastered.
5. Both regression and backsliding are evidence of a more general hypothesized
process, namely that superceded infrasystems are not lost, though they may move
out of the main 'flow' of the communication hierarchy. This principle accounts
not only for regression and backsliding, but also for (a) selective loss of language
abilities in aphasia; (b) selective recovery in aphasia; (c) lowered proficiency among
learners who do not use their acquired knowledge for long periods of time; (d)
12 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

difficulty in acquiring different registers, due to the fact that superceded systems
are located on the hierarchy where registers belong (thus backsliding characterizes
the speech of non-natives, while register variation characterizes the speech of
natives);7 (e) reliance on lower level limbic communication when trauma or dis-
ease disrupts neocortical speech.
6. Levels of the communication and cognition hierarchies. The concept of levels
accounts for developmental stages in PLA and in SLA. In general, during PLA,
systems at higher levels develop later than systems at lower levels, which ac-
counts for similarities among developmental stages of children acquiring primary
languages. In SLA (as opposed to FLL), infrasystems are constructed by adaptation
of existing PLA infrasystems, which implies general similarities in stages of in-
terlanguage among all learners. In addition, however, higher levels are more flex-
ible than lower levels, so that individual variation in interlanguage development
(a) is generally to be expected, (b) is likely to be greater at more advanced profi-
ciency levels, and (c) is likely to be greater in linguistic behavior than in para-
linguistic (limbically-controlled) behavior.
Feedback on the efficiency of and adaptation of existing infrasystems. If existing
knowledge cannot fulfill the demands of a new task, then a new system must be
created. This takes place, to the extent possible, by adapting existing systems,
that is, by maintaining as much as possible existing knowledge. Such 'conserv-
ative' adaptation is an efficient learning device, but occasionally leads to inap-
propriate adaptations. These are often manifest as interference. In addition, feedback
and the building of new infrasystems take time; meanwhile, old systems tend to
remain in place. The resulting period of uncertainty, of competing knowledge
systems, is manifest as transitional stages, in which learners may give evidence
of both 'knowing' and 'not knowing' a given structure, vocabulary item, com-
municative skill, etc.

Other functional constructs are relevant also, such as information frames and
skill schemata, afferent and efferent tracks, and categorical and token memory
structure (Lamendella 1977), but space does not permit a detailed examination
of these concepts. Nevertheless we believe it is evident that Neurofunctional
Theory attempts to account for the processes of acquisition and learning and the
two types of knowledge which result by describing the neurofunctional capacities
that underlie those processes and knowledge. Much work remains to explore the
relationship between Neurofunctional Theory and the Monitor Model. But we
wish to depict generally the relationship as we see it presently and as described
above.8

Several features of figure 6 require comment. First, a static figure cannot show
the dynamic nature of the building of knowledge (infrasystems) within the two
hierarchies. Nor can a static model illustrate the interrelatedness of the hierar-
chies. Second, a two dimensional figure cannot reveal the multi-level nature of
the hierarchies (e.g. the lower level limbic system of the communication hier-
archy). Third, for the sake of simplicity we have not tried to depict the relationship
between formal and informal environmental factors and input/intake. Fourth, the
figure does not include Bialystok's 'other knowledge' cell. The effect of knowledge
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al. 13

Figure 6: The Monitor Model and Neurofunctional Theory: An Integrated View

of Adult SLA

of the world seems to be so pervasive that no single element of a diagram can

accurately portray it. Nevertheless a complete elaboration of the model must
include a sociolinguistic 'layer' (e.g. the effect of context on decisions of the
executive). Finally, the figure does not suggest that all utterances are of the same
type.

Despite these shortcomings, figure 6 depicts the full range of the SLA process:
input-storage-retrieval-performance, along with components responsible for var-
ious forms of feedback and for actual knowledge-building. In addition, the figure
incorporates the acquisition-learning distinction in all stages of SLA, and thus
combines the main elements of the Monitor Model and Neurofunctional Theory
in an attempt to outline their complementary roles in a complete model of second
language acquisition.
14 Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 6, No. 1, 1983

Conclusion
Second language acquisition research has made enormous theoretical advances
in recent years. To a great extent, these advances have been due to the devel-
opment of Monitor Theory and its rich set of predictions, and to a lesser extent
perhaps to initial efforts at neurofunctional analysis. Now that these models exist,
based upon similar conceptions of the acquisition-learning distinction, SLA re-
searchers should begin to seek ways to form a more powerful synthesis. Such a
synthesis should reflect the predictive capacity and the solid foundation of data-
based research which characterize Monitor Theory, and the searching, more highly
speculative attempt by Neurofunctional Theory to uncover the inner workings
of human consciousness. Thus Chomsky's comments of fifteen years ago on the
value of linguistic theory may become equally applicable to SLA research:
The study of language may very well. . . provide a remarkably favorable per-
spective for the study of human mental processes . . . By pursuing the kinds of
research that now seem feasible and by focusing attention on certain problems
that are now accessible to study, we may be able to spell out in some detail
the elaborate and abstract computations that determine, in part, the nature of
percepts and the character of the knowledge that we can acquire—the highly
specific ways of interpreting phenomena that are, in large measure, beyond our
consciousness and control and that may be unique to man. (Chomsky
1968:84-5).

Notes
1. This point is not new. Krashen (1979b) himself has emphasized that his model includes
a set of hypotheses: the acquisition-learning hypothesis, the natural order hypothesis,
the monitor hypothesis, the input hypothesis, the attitude-acquisition hypothesis, the
aptitude-learning hypothesis, and the LI hypothesis. Krashen emphasizes that an ad-
equate model of SLA must incorporate data throughout the input-storage-retrieval-
performance process.
2. This is not always a simple matter, and monitoring may complicate it further. Formal
learning will of course provide many instances of monitoring. Who has not been through
this kind of mental fumbling: 'Strawberry—framboises—no it wasn't such a long word—
frambles—no—fraises'? The use of 'wasn't' rather than isn't may indicate a memory
review much like a search through the pages of the dictionary where the word was first
encountered. Phonological examples are not so easily characterized. Imagine a native
speaker of South African English living in the U.S. Does her dawning consciousness of
the discrepancy between her pronunciation of aluminum and process and that of most
Americans indicate formal learning? Probably not. To put it another way: When con-
sciousness intrudes, the process may still be acquisition rather than learning. It may
be possible, too, to use the monitor without being aware of it, so that if someone remarks
on our having corrected a slip, we are surprised. Krashen acknowledges (1977) that
acquisition may serve as a monitor for native speakers. Thus it is not accurate to speak
of 'learning, the Monitor' (1977), since both learned and acquired knowledge may provide
the relevant information.
3. Many researchers, in particular McLaughlin (1978) have criticized the distinction be-
tween conscious and unconscious knowledge as simplistic. Elaboration of the nature
of knowledge is an important area for research on monitor theory.
4. We do not consider these comments to be criticisms of Krashen's and Bialystok's models.
The value of their work consists, in part, in their constant concern for experimental
and other data-based support for their views. Krashen in particular has outlined (1979b)
The Monitor Model I Tollefson et al. 15

his view of the importance of careful empirical research, and we believe that the shift
to such research in recent years has made possible the important theoretical advances
in the field. It seems essential, in a sense, that the more highly speculative work on
the mechanisms of knowledge-building be carried out by someone other than those
individuals responsible for the major empirically-based models. The 'tension' between
these approaches may be necessary to (1) provide a sounder empirical foundation for
neuromaturational and neurofunctional research, and (2) stimulate researchers within
the monitor paradigm to elaborate their view of the LAD, cognitive organizers, and
other mechanisms of knowledge-building.
5. We are grateful to Jo Ann Hornsten for this description of Lamendella's terminology.
6. Lamendella summarizes the differences between PLA, SLA, and FLL in the following
way (Lamendella, 1979, adapted from 1977):
I. Primary Language Acquisition
The child's acquisition of one or more native languages, taking place from ap-
proximately 2-5 years of age in the context of the progressive maturation of the
hierarchically organized neural systems responsible for the development and use
of language. Primary language acquisition is characterized by a biologically based
series of developmental stages and becomes difficult to achieve outside of a
critical period which ends at approximately 9-13 years of age.
II. Nonprimary Language Acquisition
The older child or the adult's acquisition of a normative language after the period
of primary language acquisition, when the relevant neural systems have already
become operational and are engaged in primary language communication. Non-
primary language acquisition is characterized by a progression of interlanguages
and becomes more difficult to achieve outside of a sensitive period which ends
at approximately 13 years of age.
There are two main subtypes of nonprimary language acquisition:
A. Foreign Language Learning
The typical result of traditional methods of language instruction in a formal
classroom setting. Foreign language learning leads to target language com-
munication skills marked by: 1) the application by the learner of the cognition
hierarchy of neurofunctional systems as the basis for learning and speech
performance: 2) frequent conscious direction of target language speech per-
formance; and 3) the use of translation buffers to map between the native
language and the interlanguage.
B. Secondary Language Acquisition
The more typical result of nonprimary language acquisition in real-word
'naturalistic' settings in which target language communication skills are
marked by: 1) the application by the learner of the communication hierarchy
of neurofunctional systems as the basis of learning and speech performance;
2) the use of the interlanguage for internal representational coding functions;
3) the absence of translation buffers,- and 4) automatic access to interlanguage
grammatical and semantic knowledge without the need for conscious direc-
tion.
7. See Lamendella (1977:189) for a fascinating discussion of the relationship between
register variation in native speakers and backsliding in normative speakers. In neuro-
functional terms, they are similar, holding the same 'place' in the communication
hierarchy.
8. Many elements of Neurofunctional Theory, such as regression and backsliding, cannot
be included in a single figure.

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