Territory, Politics, Governance

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtep20

Euroregions as political actors: managing

border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish
borderlands

Wojciech Opioła & Hynek Böhm

To cite this article: Wojciech Opioła & Hynek Böhm (2022): Euroregions as political actors:
managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands, Territory, Politics,
Governance, DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2021.2017339

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.2017339

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TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.2017339

Euroregions as political actors: managing border

policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands
a b
Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

ABSTRACT
The article examines the role of the Euroregions in the first Covid-19 pandemic wave in Europe. The
beginning of the pandemic in the spring of 2020 led to the closures of state borders. This complicated
the situation of Polish cross-border commuters working in Germany and the Czech Republic. The border
closure also showed the strength of Euroregions, able to react and transmit the demands of
borderlanders to the Polish government. To analyse this question, we adapt the deliberative system
theory. The actions taken by Euroregions, as institutions of public space, were considered as deliberative
consequences of non-deliberative actions of government.
KEYWORDS
Euroregion; Covid-19; cross-border commuting; deliberative system theory; Poland

HISTORY Received 11 June 2021; in revised form 19 November 2021

INTRODUCTION

The freedom of movement of European Union (EU) citizens across borders in Europe is a cor-
nerstone of the EU. Free border crossing and developed cross-border cooperation (CBC) became
one of the principal EU narratives (Scott, 2016). In the Schengen space, about 2 million people
cross national borders on a daily or weekly basis for work or education (European Observation
Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ESPON), 2018). Multilevel governance
(Blatter, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2003), EU regional cohesion policies and an increase of para-
diplomatic activities of sub-nation-state authorities supported a consensus on rescaling Europe
with an increasing influence of regional and local actors from a cross-border perspective (e.g.,
Keating, 1998; Klatt, 2019; Scott, 1999; Telò, 2013; Warleigh-Lack et al., 2011). Cross-border
regions, organized in Euroregions or European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC),
are of key importance among the priorities of European funding programmes.
Currently, it seems that the further prosperous development of border regions has been chal-
lenged by the Covid-19 outbreak. The epidemic danger caused the closure of almost all Schengen
space in March 2020 and imposed physical barriers on EU internal borders. This made cross-

CONTACT
a
(Corresponding author) wopiola@uni.opole.pl
Department of Regional Studies, University of Opole, Opole, Poland.
b
Department of Regional Studies, University of Opole, Opole, Poland; and Department of Geography, Technical University of
Liberec, Liberec, Czech Republic.

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the orig-
inal work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

border flows of people physically impossible, or at least very difficult to implement. The daily
lives of cross-border commuters in the whole EU were changed. Many of them lost their jobs,
be it a consequence of the forced quarantine or the closed border. Many companies dependent
on cross-border flows close or significantly restrain – either temporarily or definitively – their
operations. We might experience a sort of pandemic adjustment, with different consequences
for European citizens. It seems borders are making a temporary comeback affecting everyone
directly, yet not equally (Calzada, 2020). This is evident also in the moment of finishing this
paper (May 2021) when the third pandemic wave still imposed limitations on the free movement
of people. The only exception is the Dutch–German border, which remained open during the
first and the second waves of the pandemic (van der Velde et al., 2021).
The preliminary reactions of scholars observed massive re-bordering tendencies because most
of the applied measures based on social distancing were done on a strictly national basis and con-
tradicted steps desired by the European institutions or the World Health Organization (WHO)
(Brunet-Jailly & Vallet, 2020; Klatt, 2020a; Lee et al., 2020; Unfried, 2020; Wassenberg, 2020).
These border closures, for which Medeiros et al. (2020) proposed the term covidfencing, occurred
with the support of public opinion in EU member states (Calzada, 2020; Opiłowska, 2021),
which have accepted the necessity to close their borders due to public health reasons, even if
the WHO recommended no trade or travel restrictions.
The border closure was also the case regarding the Czech–Polish and German–Polish borders.
At the beginning of introducing social distancing guidelines, Poland based its anti-pandemic
strategy on almost immediate border closures and massive restrictions of the free movement of
people, including the inhabitants of border areas. It affected over 160,000 Polish cross-border
commuters working in the Czech Republic and Germany. In the case of the Polish–German bor-
der, closure also affected students visiting schools in a neighbouring country (Wanat & Mischke,
2020). Simultaneously, there were no restrictions introduced in traveling within the country. In
the case of Germany and the Czech Republic, border regimes were different than they were in
Poland, which made crossing the border asymmetric (e.g., following the measures, it was easier
for Poles to enter the Czech Republic than leave Poland). The cross-border commuters do not
have their political or trade unions representation. They are diffused on the territory of border
areas, as well as among the branches of industry and services. There is one type of institution
that could be able to react and advocate effectively for their employee rights: Euroregions.

THEORY

We adopt a theoretical framework of a deliberative system theory (deliberative systemic

approach, discursive institutionalism; Dryzek, 2009; Dryzek & Stephenson, 2012; Mansbridge
et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2010). In this approach – applied mainly to the analyses of deliberative
democracies – deliberation and the legitimacy of the decision-making process is seen as an inter-
action of entities from the private, public and empowered space in the complex system as a whole
(Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 2). In our case, we perceive actors interested in changes in border
policy (Polish government, local self-governments, Euroregions, cross-border commuters and
their relatives, local and regional media) as units of the deliberative system, where conflicts
and problems are being solved rather by the means of argumentation, consultation, and persua-
sion than oppression. Euroregions are analysed as units of public space, able to transmit the
demands of cross-border workers and students (private space) to the empowered space (Polish
government, especially the prime minister and Ministry of Health). This framework is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Given that the overall quality of democracy in the Czech Republic and Poland is declining as
a result of illiberal tendencies of ruling parties (Stanley, 2019), we assume that deliberative
democracy is working well at the level of local self-governments (Carson & Gerwin, 2018),

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 3

Figure 1. Deliberative system framework in the case of Covid-19 cross-border commuting outbreak.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

whereas at the state level it is rather seen as a possible ‘prescription’ for illiberal and populist ten-
dencies (Suteu, 2019). Nevertheless, the deliberative system approach enables the analysis of the
chosen case, bearing in mind that the motivation of political leaders could be a fear of political
instability or time pressure in the time of Covid-19 pandemic. Measuring the quality of democ-
racy in Poland is not our goal because an application of deliberative system theory is possible also
in illiberal democracies, as well as in authoritarian regimes (Dryzek, 2009; Mansbridge et al.,
2012, p. 8). Thus, in our case, it is rather the analysis of deliberative consequences of non-delib-
erative actions taken by empowered space agents at central levels and changing the regulations as
a result of post-factum deliberation. Our case is also a good exemplification of the centre–periph-
ery principle, formulated and developed within the deliberative democracy theory by Habermas
(1991) and Peters (1993/2008).
The reason why we adopted this framework is its explanatory potential of processes (dynamic
approach) rather than static criteria. Deliberative system theory could be also seen as the frame-
work for explaining the concept of governance and multilevel governance (Dryzek, 2016), which
serve as main explanatory terms in the analyses of cross-border dynamics (Hamedinger, 2011;
Plangger, 2019). Even then, there is a lack of scholarship on the analyses of political decision-
making on borders and cross-border regions, using the deliberative system approach so far.
The ‘multilevel governance’-oriented researches are focused more on the structures and patterns
of interactions, not on the actions as such. This article analyses the potential of cross-border
institutions (Euroregions) in the political decision-making process.

METHOD

The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of Euroregions as public space agents, which could be
effective in lobbying for the cross-border labour market and delivering the expertise for

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

4 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

knowledge-based decision making. Our assumption is, that even if Euroregions are not designed
for advocating and lobbying (they usually do not have these kinds of tasks in their statutes and
there is also no financial support from EU Interreg funds for this kind actions), in the time of
Covid-19 outbreak, they could use their assets: a network of professionals and insider knowledge
about cross-border flows; and became first-person agents of public space, able to make an impact
on state authorities. We also assume that the impact of Euroregions depends on two variables:
density and intensity of cross-border flows in the specific regions and strength of private
cross-border ties. Thus, the main research question we would like to introduce is what was
the role of Euroregions in the Polish border areas in the process of adopting the anti-Covid-
19 measures to the demands of cross-border labour market flows? Should we consider it more
like political institution (empowered space) or public space unit?
To meet these already discussed aims, we collected the data using the method of content
analysis. We investigated official documents of Euroregions and public authorities, Facebook
profiles of the Euroregions, the Facebook pages gathering cross-border commuters (Głos Pra-
cowników Transgranicznych ‘Czechy’ and Pracownicy Transgraniczni Razem [Wszystkie
kraje]) the page of the Polish minority living in the Czech Republic (Zwrot) and pages of the
Czech–Polish and German–Polish Euroregions. We also used and interpreted regional media
in Poland, Czechia and Germany. Finally, we conducted seven individual semi-structured inter-
views with local stakeholders: representatives of Euroregions, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), dealt with cross-border initiatives, and representatives of local authorities in the border
areas (see Appendix 1 in the supplemental data online). All interviews were conducted in July
2021 on the Czech–Polish borderland (three on the Czech and four on the Polish side).
We choose Poland and its border with the Czech Republic and Germany as our case
because the largest number of cross-border workers in the whole EU are the Poles working
in Germany (according to Eurostat data from 2019).1 The number of Polish cross-border
commuters working in the Czech Republic is also relevant and has experienced a rise during
last 10 years. All the Germany–Poland and Czech Republic–Poland border areas are also cov-
ered by the Euroregions, which allows for a comparison of actions taken by different Eurore-
gions, according to our goals.

ANALYSIS

System of cross-border commuting and its agents

The EU’s territory is up to 40% made by border regions. About 30% of the EU population
lives in areas along the 40 land borders between the EU and European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) member states. The border regions are often among the less advanced regions in their
national context, implying, for example, relatively large distance to regional centres or other
disadvantages for regional development (Beck, 2019). These areas tend to be economically
weaker and have more underdeveloped infrastructure in comparison with more central regions
(Böhm & Drápela, 2017). The unemployment rate tends to be higher too. Therefore, support-
ing cross-border flows is one means to improve the perspectives of border regions (Böhm &
Kurowska-Pysz, 2019). The cross-border labour market is one of the important examples of
these cross-border flows.
Although the European integration process has achieved considerable results, many
obstacles based on differing legal and administrative backgrounds of member states have
remained (e.g., Sohn & Reitel, 2013). Current internal borders are principally open to the
free movement of persons, goods, capital and services – at least in non-pandemic times. Border
region residents have been encouraged to exploit the free movement and actively engage in
creating cross-border living spaces, where daily life activities such as residence, work,

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 5

education, shopping and other leisure activities cross the borders (Beck, 2019; Decoville et al.,
2013; Klatt, 2019).

Private space: cross-border commuters

The number of cross-border commuters in the EU has been on a steady rise since the introduc-
tion of the European single market (Cavallaro & Dianin, 2019), but generally labour mobility
between EU member states – transnational migration and cross-border commuting – has histori-
cally remained rather low. According to the data of the European Central Bank (ECB), in 2000,
0.4% of the EU working population was known to commute across borders to work (Heinz &
Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). It has only been very recently that cross-border commuting has
increased significantly (Böhm & Opioła, 2019). In 2018, 9.7 million employed persons worked
outside their home country, which is about 4.1% of all employed people within the EU (Eurostat,
2019). A total of 1.5 million of them (0.7% share of total EU labour force) were cross-border
commuters, traveling to the neighbouring country on a daily basis (Cavallaro & Dianin, 2019;
Eurostat, 2019).
Since 2004, the rise of cross-border commuting has taken place especially in the border
regions of new EU members. The general pattern is commuting across the former Iron Curtain:
from Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary to Austria, from the Czech Republic to Austria and
Germany, and from Poland to Germany (Cavallaro & Dianin, 2019). The more massive
cross-border commuting growth of Poles in Germany occurred in the 1990s. According to Euro-
stat (2019), in 2018, 206,000 Poles work in one of the neighbouring countries having a residence
in Poland, from which 124,000 work in Germany and 8000 in the Czech Republic (Eurostat,
2019; Lang, 2012; Miera, 2008). However, this low number of Poles employed in the Czech
Republic in 2018 seems to be underestimated in the light of the figures revealed by the pandemic.
Moreover, it calls for more reliable cross-border data.
Apart from the official data, new calculations were highlighted because of lockdown. In 2020
on the German–Polish border, there were about 125,000 commuters, mainly Poles working in
Germany in construction and services or Poles living in Germany and working in Poland because
many of them, although employed in Poland, bought houses on the German side (Jańczak, 2020;
Opiłowska, 2021). In the last years, a number of Poles commuting to the Czech Republic sig-
nificantly increased. According to Polish-based data from 2020, there were more than 47,000
Poles employed in Czechia, and about 42,000 of them benefitted from cross-border commuting.
Roughly 25% of them worked in the Moravian–Silesian Region (Kasperek & Olszewski, 2020).
This number grew dynamically in 2014–20, as the annual increase was around 30%. In the Czech
Republic, Poles are hired mostly in the steel, mining and automotive industries, which is a kind of
solution for the structural unemployment problem in Polish border regions (Kasperek & Ols-
zewski, 2020) (interview 1).

Public space: Euroregions

Euroregions are a specific form of spatial organization and a way to channel people’s activities.
These entities facilitate an institutional dimension of CBC, that is, cooperation of public actors
at local or regional level in border regions. Because Euroregions operate in two or more countries,
they have specific structures. They are composed of the representatives of local and regional self-
government from both sides of the border. Their everyday activity is secured by professional
employees who are employed in both/all of the secretariats of the Euroregion. Normally, each
secretariat employs up to 10 full-time staff members. The work of secretariats is controlled by
the nominees of the members of self-governments who create Euroregional assemblies. The sec-
retariats of Polish Euroregions are gathered into the Federation of Polish Euroregions.
As such, the Euroregions mostly do not have their own single legal personality because
they consist of loosely cooperating twin structures in each engaged state (Medeiros, 2011).

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

6 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

In this way, cross-CBC can be implemented without introducing special legal conditions.
Although this form seems complicated, the activity of Euroregions can be deemed as one
of the major successes of the idea of European integration. Currently, there are over 150
Euroregions in Europe (not only within the EU; Durà Guimerà et al., 2018). On the Ger-
man–Polish and Czech–Polish borders, there are nine Euroregions that covered all the border
territory of the Germany–Poland and Czech Republic–Poland borders (Figure 2). Even if
cross-border commuting is an important problem of the German–Polish and Czech–Polish
border areas, none of the Euroregions deals with this topic in the official documents (statutes
and founding agreements). Also, the cooperation objectives such as support to the regional
job market or lobbying in the interest of the local community are declared to a limited extent
(Table 1).

Figure 2. Overview of cross-border commuting on the Czech Republic–Poland and Germany–Poland

border.
Note: Not depicted is the trilateral Polish–Czech–Slovak Euroregion Beskidy/Beskydy, because it does
not involve territory with an immediate Polish–Czech border.Sources: Authors’ own estimation
based on interviews; and European Union and national data.

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 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 7

Table 1. Goals of cross-border policies in the documents of the Czech Republic–Poland and Germany–
Poland Euroregions.
Explicitly described cooperation goal of:
Lobbying to the
Supporting Supporting the national authorities Supporting
cross-border regional job in the interests of cross-border
Euroregion commuting market the local community integration

Pomerania + +
(Germany–
Poland)
Pro Europa +
Viadrina
(Germany–
Poland)
Sprewa–Nysa– + +
Bóbr (Germany–
Poland)
Nysa (Czech +
Republic–
Germany–Poland)
Glacensis (Czech + +
Republic–Poland)
Pradziad (Czech
Republic–Poland)
Silesia (Czech + +
Republic–Poland)
Ślas̨ k Cieszyński + + +
(Czech Republic–
Poland)
Beskidy (Czech + +
Republic–Poland–
Slovakia)
Source: own study based on content analysis of the statutes of Polish units of Euroregions and of agreements on the estab-
lishment of Euroregions.

Empowered space: government

We understand all the political bodies as an empowered space in the system of cross-border com-
muting responsible for border policies and labour market policies. First, we would like to employ
a distinction between the ‘normal times’ and the times of crisis, in which this second case is our
scope of analysis. During the normal times, free border crossing and free movement of workers
are guaranteed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of
European Union (TFEU) and the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen area, founded in
1985, comprises 26 European countries (22 from the EU and four non-EU countries) and con-
stitutes the open borders area. Countries of the Schengen area officially abolished passport

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

8 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

controls and other forms of border control on the mutual, internal borders of the Schengen area.
They also introduced a common visa policy.
During times of crisis, the EU member state can refuse the right of entry or residence of EU
citizens on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health, which was the basis of
the 2020 ‘covidfencing’ policy. In the case of Poland, border controls could be reintroduced under
the decree of the Minister of Interior. Additional measures, such as 14-day quarantine, can be
introduced by the Council of Ministries of the Republic of Poland. Similar procedures are to
be found in the Czech Republic. Both countries are unitary states, and the political power is cen-
tralized. In the case of Germany (federal state), some special measures (e.g., compulsory testing
or quarantine for third-party nationals) could be introduced by the Länder (federal states).

RESULTS

Delivering new policy: covidfencing

In 2006, in the Schengen Borders Code, members agreed for a possibility of temporary reintro-
ducing border control between Schengen countries, as an instrument of last resort, in the case of a
threat to public security or internal security (Regulation EC No. 562/2006). Since then, till 1
June 2020, Schengen countries have used this possibility 206, 85 times because of Covid-19.2
In the case of analysed countries, Poland reintroduced border control at all internal Schengen
land borders, air and sea borders, from 15 March to 12 June 2020. Germany did the same at land
borders with Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland and Austria from 16 March to 15 June
2020; air borders with Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Italy and Spain,
and sea borders with Denmark from 19 March to 15 June 2020. The Czech Republic reintro-
duced border control at its land borders with Germany and Austria and air borders from 14
March to 13 June 2020.3
In Poland, border controls were reintroduced by the decree of 13 March 2020. In the decree,
all the open border crossings were listed (Dz.U. 2020/434).4 On the same day, the second decree
was published, where categories of people entitled to cross the border were mentioned:

. Polish citizens.
. Foreigners: spouses and children of Polish citizens and foreigners with a work or residence
permit.
. Members of diplomatic corps and their families.
. Foreigners with Karta Polaka (Polish Card, a document confirming belonging to the Polish
nation, mostly used by Ukrainian state citizens).
. Foreigners with a special permit of the Commander of Polish Border Guard (Dz.U. 2020/
435).5

Additionally, the international train connections were suspended on 31 March. In the same
decree (Dz. U. 2020/566),6 an obligatory 14-day quarantine was introduced for all people cross-
ing the Polish border. It was also valid for cross-border commuters and students crossing the bor-
der on a daily basis. This quarantine obligation for cross-border commuters and students was
abolished on 4 May 2020, except for cross-border physicians, nurses and workers of nursing
homes.
In the Czech Republic, the country landlocked by the internal Schengen border, the first gov-
ernment decrees responding to the first wave of the Covid-19 crisis restricted the free movement,
introduced an emergency state (2020/194),7 and reintroduced the border controls with Austria,
Germany and in the airports (2020/197)8 as of 14 March 2020. Moreover, as Slovakia and Poland
ceased the entrance of foreigners to their territory, there was no factual need to ‘close’ the border by
the Czech government. The governmental decree (2020/198)9 prohibited the entrance of

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 9

foreigners from ‘risk countries’ and a further decree (2020/200)10 de facto stopped international
transport, except for flights from Prague. Finally, the government decree (2020/203)11 of
13 March 2020 prohibited the entrance into the Czech Republic of all foreigners without a resi-
dence permit or working permission, and decree 2020/22112 decided upon temporary reintroduc-
tion of border controls on all Czech borders from 15 March for a preliminary period of four weeks.
However, the strictness of these rules was softened by the fact that the vague formulation allowed
for the ‘entrance of foreigners, who are beneficial for the Czech Republic’.
Germany closed its own border as the last country of three relevant for this research. As Poles
and Czechs de facto closed their borders with Germany, the Germans did not have to introduce
such measures. Germany closed its borders – while accepting cross-border commuters – with
Austria, France, Denmark, Luxembourg and Switzerland on 16 March. Moreover, Poland
(and the Czech Republic too) introduced an obligatory quarantine for cross-border commuters
for a certain period during the pandemic crisis. Some German (and to a lesser extent also Czech)
employers of Polish cross-border commuters even offered to pay for their accommodation.
Generally, the incoming cross-border commuters could have worked in Germany and the
Czech Republic also during the pandemic, but the Polish regulation on obligatory quarantine com-
plicated that substantially. It is worth mentioning that these regulations were introduced without
further deliberations. It was not only the characteristic of Central European border policies but also
a worldwide phenomenon (Medeiros et al., 2020). But in the case of Poland (and to our knowledge,
it was only the Polish specific), there were no exceptions applied for cross-border commuters. This
first reaction of empowered space could be exemplified by the opinion of German Interior Minister
Horst Seehofer: ‘As long as there’s no European solution, you must act in the interest of your own
population. … Those who don’t act are guilty’ (Hernandez-Morales, 2020).
The covidfencing decision was taken on the very level of the central Polish government,
which acted unilaterally without major coordination with its neighbours, the European Commis-
sion, regional and local levels of public administration, or other social partners such as entrepre-
neurs, who employ cross-border commuters. Saxon and Brandenburg prime ministers questioned
the adequacy of those measures undertaken by the Polish government (Opiłowska, 2021) and
stressed the negative impact of those measures on the everyday lives of cross-border region resi-
dents. The specificities of border regions were not taken into consideration. Therefore, the local
authorities – mostly Euroregions – reacted to these unilaterally taken decisions influencing their
(public) space.

Demands of cross-border commuters

Mutual limitations caused several problems. First, although at the beginning of the Covid-19
pandemic entries into Czech and German territories were not prohibited for Poles, closure of
local border crossings on the Poland–Germany and Poland–Czech Republic borders forced Pol-
ish commuters to travel indirectly. In several cases, for example, of Denso plant in Czech Liberec
(the nearest border crossing with Poland in Zawidów was closed) and PF Plasty in Chuchelná (an
analogical case), the road that Polish commuters had to take to get to work has increased from
less than 1 km to 65 km, as reported in local and regional media (Gadomska, 2020; Karban et al.,
2020). Second, introducing the obligatory quarantine for Poles returning home from abroad
forced cross-border commuters to adapt to the new conditions from 27 March. This led them
towards two types of reactions: some groups of Polish cross-border commuters who decided
to stay at work in Germany or the Czech Republic found accommodation there, and were sep-
arated from their families. The other group of these commuters decided to stay home and depend
in whole or in part on their income, which caused significant difficulties for their German or
Czech employers (Kasperek & Olszewski, 2020; Medeiros et al., 2020). Most of these cross-bor-
der commuters are the sole breadwinners in their families.

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10 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

It took only two days for cross-border commuters to begin to act publicly and express their
demands of conveniences. On 29 March, the Facebook page ‘Głos pracowników transgranicz-
nych (Czechy)’ (The voice of cross-border commuters [Czech Republic]) was set up by a Pole
working in a Czech-based automotive plant. The aim of this page was the networking of private
persons to jointly express the demands. The basic need of the group members was to abolish the
14-day quarantine for those who travel on daily basis and to introduce the ‘Karta pracownika
transgranicznego’ (cross-border commuter’s card). The proposed measures were identical to
those already introduced on the Czech side because the initiative was supported mainly by Polish
workers in the Czech Republic. The second Facebook page ‘Pracownicy transgraniczni razem
(wszystkie kraje)’ (cross-border commuters altogether [all countries]) was set up on 17 April
by the Szczecin-based workers (Poland–Germany border). The discussion on the Facebook
page commented on the regulations imposed by the Czech authorities. It highlighted the
non-coordination between both governments and underlined the concerns of Polish cross-border
commuters that the decisions of the Polish authorities could contradict the Czech ones.
It seems that Facebook became the main source of information and networking in most of the
European borderlands during the first lockdown. Many researchers who studied border closures
during a pandemic pointed this out (Böhm, 2021; Horobets & Shaban, 2020; Klatt, 2020b).

Accountability measures
As documented in the Polish–German borderland, the media have worked with the narrative of
an open border as a norm (Opiłowska, 2021) – and it was the case in the Czech–Polish border-
land too, where the same narrative was applied – with a special role of the Polish minority media
serving the Polish-speaking minority in the Czech Republic (e.g., Brandys, 2020). Media cover-
age focused mainly on the complications for the cross-border commuters, but they have also not
omitted the ‘softer’ dimension of the consequences of border closures: the posters declaring
mutual sympathies placed on the banks of both rivers dividing neighbours – Oder/Odra in the
Polish–German and Olza in the Czech–Polish border regions cases – attracted the attention
of the media with national coverage, which mostly tend to overlook the periphery.
The restrictions also caused protests of the concerned cross-border commuters, which took
place in both studied cases. These protests were visible mainly in the divided cities Frankfurt/
Oder/Slubice and Cieszyn/Český Těšín, where protesters reclaimed ‘comeback to normality
[of the open border]’ with the slogans such as ‘Don’t separate families’, ‘We want to work and
live with dignity’, ‘Let us go to work’ and ‘Let us go home’ (Opiłowska, 2021). These protests
were led by cross-border commuters and their families. The common scheme of those protests
was a protesting (Polish) breadwinner, who decided to avoid quarantine obligations and contin-
ued working and who remained on the German or the Czech sides of the river, whereas his (in
most, yet not all, observed cases the men worked in the neighbouring country and the women
stayed with their children in the home country) family protested on the Polish side of the river.
The border closures and related border-crossing restrictions pointed to the existence of a cross-
border civil society in both studied areas. In Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia, the banners ‘I miss you, neigh-
bour’, which the activists placed on railings on their side of the border river, attracted substantial
media attention, not only from the Czech Republic and Poland. Stefan Mańka, co-author of the
Polish banner ‘I miss you, Czech’, explained that he felt an urgent need to deliver a positive message
to lift the mood of the locals (interviews 4 and 6). A similar positive message was conveyed also in
the Frankurt/Słubice context, wishing ‘good health to the neighbours’ (Opiłowska, 2021). There
were also dark sides to the local public discourses. Local authorities of Słubice in Poland have asked
the government in an official letter, signed by the mayor and head of the council, to (unilaterally)
close the border. In Cieszyn/Český Těšín the banners appeared and warned of entering Poland
because the first infection in this divided border city appeared on the Polish side (interview 7).

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 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 11

Transmission of demands: Euroregions and local authorities

The individual regions, where cross-border commuting has been strongly present, started to develop
– with the support of Euroregions – concentrated and partly coordinated efforts to lift the quarantine
obligation. This was made by means of letters to the Polish prime minister, which was supported by
the analytical evidence providing further reasoning to lift the quarantine obligations (Table 2). The
first actions of border communities started in the last decade of March 2020. In late April, the Polish
part of Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia reported that the coalition of all Poland–Czech Republic
Euroregions was established (Tyrna, 2020). These initiatives were also supported by the collective
letters of all Polish Euroregions in which their representatives asked for easing the adopted measures.
Open letters were the most common measure at this stage of cooperation.
Local authorities and public actors expressed their support for border region residents by
referring to catchphrases such as ‘united Europe’, ‘two banks–one city’, and ‘transnational life

Table 2. Timeline of actions taken by selected public space institutions on cross-border commuting.
Date in
2020 Action Actor

26 March Letter to the Polish prime minister demanding the abolition of Municipalities of Cieszyn District
14-day quarantine for Polish cross-border commuters
11April Launching the online questionnaire for Polish cross-border Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia
commuters
17 April Second Letter to the Polish prime minister on the abolition of Polish Office of Euroregion Těšín/
14-day quarantine for Polish cross-border commuters Cieszyn Silesia

Petition to the Polish prime minister on the abolition of 14-day Federation of Polish Euroregions
quarantine for cross-border commuters

Letter to the Polish prime minister demanding the abolition of Euroregion Pomerania
14-day quarantine for cross-border workers
18 April Publication of the report Social-Economic Consequences of Polish Office of Euroregion Těšín/
Closure the Poland–Czech Republic Border for Cross-Border Cieszyn Silesia
Commuters (Kasperek & Olszewski, 2020)
21 April Letter to the Polish prime minister demanding the abolition of Euroregion Glacensis
the 14-day quarantine for Polish cross-border workers
24 April Letter to the Polish prime minister ‘Głos Ziemi Cieszyńskiej’ local
weekly

Position of German presidents of German–Polish Euroregions on Four Polish–German Euroregions

the Covid-19 border closure
30 April Open petter to the Polish prime minister on cross-border Jerzy Samiec, Bishop of the
workers Evangelical Church in Poland

Online conference of Polish border districts administrators with Polish districts and central
the prime minister government
Source: own study based on: Fiedorowicz, 2020; indi, 2020; Olza, 2020; Redakcja, 2020; Samiec, 2020; ‘Wspólne stano-
wisko’, 2020.

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12 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

of borderlanders’ (Opiłowska, 2021). They criticized the ‘top-down imposed’ restrictions and
demanded the opening of the border for local traffic. The ‘hard’ economic argumentation was
also applied by the local politicians. Anna Hetman, mayor of Jastrzebie-Zdrój and member of
the Euroregion Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia board, protested the imposed measures using the letter
to the Polish prime minister. Inter alia, she argued:

Hundreds of residents of Jastrzębie-Zdrój, who commuted daily to work in industrial plants and mines
in neighbouring Czech towns, lost the opportunity to commute to work overnight, and lost thus the
possibility of earning, often the only family income. I fully understand the extraordinary and unprece-
dented situation in which we find ourselves and the resulting concern for the best security of our
country. However, it must not be at the expense of cross-border commuters, who have to choose
between a job in the Czech Republic without a chance to live a normal family life or losing the
only family income. Leaving them only one day to make such an important decision is not acceptable.
Moreover, in comparison to the locals employed in Poland, who receive social benefits while being on
the forced quarantine, those employed in the Czech Republic are left without any financial support.
(TVN, 2020)

Based on an analysis of the activities of public space units, we can assume that the culture
of deliberation was weak (low). It was rather one-way communication from regions to the
centre-based authorities, with very limited feedback. The number of centre-based politicians
involved in the deliberation was exceptionally low, too. During the analysed period, it is poss-
ible to extract two different periods of time. The first – before actions had been taken by
Euroregions – is characterized by extremely limited engagement of centre-based politicians.
After Euroregion initiatives from 17 to 21 April: publication of a technical report on conse-
quences of border closures, open letters to the Polish government and making public the plans
of organizing the protests on 25 April (not organized, but supported by Euroregions’ officials),
the number of parliament and government actions have grown rapidly (Figure 3). Primarily, it
took the form of interpellations of members of the Polish parliament to the government (nine
personal or group interpellations) and statements of presidential candidates.13 All these

Figure 3. Timeline of actions taken by agents of public and empowered space (16 March–4 May
2020; seven-day moving average).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on media analysis.

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 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 13

actions, as well as the statement of the Polish ombudsman and open letters of minister-pre-
sidents of two German federal states, we can include as accountability measures (Table 3). The
dialogic deliberation with the government officials was very limited in this period too. There

Table 3. Timeline of actions taken by centre-based politicians on cross-border commuting.

Date in
2020 Action Actor

18 March Interpellation of an opposition MP from the border Gabriela Lenartowicz (MP)

district Bielsko Biała
25 March Interpellation of an opposition MP from the border Gabriela Lenartowicz (MP)
district Bielsko Biała
10 April Letter to the Polish prime minister Łukasz Kohut (MEP)
21 April Interpellation of an opposition MP from the border Gabriela Lenartowicz (MP)
district Bielsko Biała
Question and answer video transmission on Facebook Mateusz Morawiecki (Polish Prime Minister)
Interpellation of an opposition MP from the border ̨ ek (MP)
Małgorzata Pep
district Bielsko Biała
22 April Video on Facebook Szymon Hołownia (presidential candidate)
23 April Video of an opposition MP on You Tube Grzegorz Braun (MP)
Press conference in the border town of Cieszyn Krzysztof Bosak (MP and presidential
candidate)
24 April Interpellation of opposition MPs Seven MPs from two opposition parties, mostly
from the border region Zielona Góra
25 April Interpellation of an opposition MP Stanisław Ż uk (MP)
Official information of the Polish government Piotr Muller (government spokesman)
Call demanded by the Polish government to open the Dietmar Woidke (Minister President of
borders for cross-border commuters Brandenburg federal state)
26 April Call criticized the Polish government for closing the Michael Kretschmer (Minister President of
borders for cross-border commuters Saxony federal state)
27 April Interpellation of an opposition MP Waldemar Sługocki (MP)
28 April Statement of the Polish ombudsman criticized the Adam Bodnar (Ombudsman)
border closure for cross-border commuters
29 April Interpellation of an opposition MP from the border Monika Wielichowska (MP)
district Wałbrzych
̨ (Minister of Labor)
Parliamentary debate on the consequences of border 23 MPs and Marlena Malag
closures for cross-border commuters
30 April Interpellation of two opposition MPs 2 MPs
Online conference Mateusz Morawiecki (Polish Prime Minister),
district administrators from border regions
Facebook post with official information about the Mateusz Morawiecki (Polish Prime Minister)
reopening borders for cross-border commuters since
2 May
Source: own study based on: Hypki, 2020; ‘Interpelacje’, 2020; Jar, 2020; RPO, 2020; Zygiel, 2020.

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14 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

was one parliamentary debate, 66 minutes long, organized on 29 April, with an introduction
of the Minister of Labor, Marlena Maląg; five-minute statements of representatives of parlia-
mentary groups, and a short discussion.14 One day after, the Polish prime minister organized a
teleconference with border district administrators. There is no record of this event, but after
hearing it, the prime minister stated that borders would be open for cross-border workers in
two days’ time. As one of our interviewees stated, all the actions taken by the Euroregion and
local and regional authorities were ignored by the Polish government. For example, the tech-
nical report on the consequences of border closures was read by the Ministry of Health, but
publicly no one referred to it (interview 7). Also, the involvement of Euroregion Cieszyn Sile-
sia was stronger than the involvement of the others because of previous experience of
cooperation and personal ties with voivodship authorities.
The initiatives coordinated by the Euroregions led to success as the Polish government
eased the measures and cancelled the obligatory quarantine for cross-border commuters
from 4 May 2020. This obligation was replaced by a compulsory negative Covid-19 test
once a month. Despite the average price of this test being around €120 – paid by the com-
muters themselves, but often reimbursed by their employers – it was still a substantial burden,
as this decision reopened the way towards reconciling family and labour obligations. What was
also observed in analysed border contexts, and what was similar with findings (Unfried, 2020)
from the German–Belgium–Dutch border, was a lack of cross-border governance caused by
the dominance of the national states. Anti-Covid-19 measures, also in the border regions,
were introduced on a national basis and were different on both sides of the border. Here
we see a failure of Euroregions, unable to establish cross-border crisis management. This con-
firms our hypothesis that Euroregions are not empowered spaces but they are the public space
institutions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A functional CBC needs to be based upon a network of cooperating institutions, which have cre-
ated an atmosphere of mutual trust and advocate for meeting the common needs and planning
common objectives. This requires a relatively high standard of quality from the involved insti-
tutions of public space. The ‘institutional thickness’ concept belongs to a group of institutional
regional development theories (Amin & Thrift, 1995; Zukauskaite et al., 2017). This partial the-
ory states that institutions are able to create informal conventions, habits and networks of
relations that stabilize and stimulate the performance of regional economies, and which serve
as one of the layers of the structures of public deliberation (Peters, 1993/2008, 1997/2008).
The success of regions in the long-term horizon is then dependent on the ability of local actors
to create such institutions, which can create a good framework for regional, cross-border devel-
opment (Stoffelen & Vanneste, 2017). Euroregions are the most influential cross-border devel-
opment institutions out of all different forms of cross-border territorial organization in Europe
(Euroregions, working communities, the EGTC, etc.) on the Polish–German and Polish–Czech
borderlands (Dołzbłasz, 2015; Ulrich, 2020).
It should be recalled that Euroregions are usually formed as bottom-up initiatives. These
initiatives mostly contained the word ‘region’ in various variations in their names: euregions (eur-
egios), Euroregions or cross-border regions (Perkmann, 2003). There are two opposing under-
standings of their political role: the first is to understand the role of Euroregions as entities for
functional integration of cross-border areas, mainly in the fields of transport, tourism, economy
and environmental protection, without ‘political’ aspirations (Frątczak-Müller & Mielczarek-
Żejmo, 2020; Kramsch & Hooper, 2004; Szmigiel-Rawska & Dołzbłasz, 2012). The second
approach perceives Euroregions as new European policy actors capable of mobilizing local and
regional elites around the idea of integration at the subnational level, and in the long run perhaps

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 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 15

to create a new (Euro)regional identity (Boman & Berg, 2007; Durà Guimerà et al., 2018; Engl
& Wisthaler, 2020; Medve-Bálint & Svensson, 2013; Perkmann, 2002, 2003).
Even if the causal relations between actions of Euroregions and governmental policy chan-
ging towards the border closures are not clearly evident, the actions of Euroregions are linked
to the reopening of the border for cross-border commuters. Following the concept of insti-
tutional thickness, we should point out that the role of Euroregions in the regional development
of the cross-border area is multilayered. These institutions have established cross-border net-
works of professionals and links to MPs, regional small and medium-sized enterprises, local
and regional authorities, and education and scientific institutions. It is also the effect of logics
of creation of Euroregions, while their boards are composed mainly of local stakeholders from
public bodies: mayors, communal board members, teachers, etc. The role of the Euroregion
should be understood more as facilitating and enhancing of, than ‘merely’ work with, the
CBC (Javakhishvili-Larsen et al., 2018). Thus, our findings are similar to those of Engl and
Wisthaler (2020) who investigated the role of Euroregion Tyrol–South Tyrol–Trentino during
the 2015–16 refugee crisis in Europe. The authors observed limitations of Euroregion policy-
making, explaining them, among others, by the divergence in political discourse and positions
on refugees and asylum seekers at the national and Euroregional levels. At the same time,
they perceived the Euroregion as an important unit in ‘serving as an alternative political space
between the Austrian and Italian state, and thus its potential capability to mediate between
two political spaces’ (Engl & Wisthaler, 2020, p. 481). As Sara Svensson stated in her recent
article on the research of actions of Euroregions towards refugee crisis (Svensson, 2020), these
institutions are rather weakly active in the refugee and migrant inclusion policies, even if it affects
their territories. What interested Euroregions were the matters of local communities, like the
traffic situation. We see a lot of similarities with our findings, as the efforts of Euroregions con-
centrated on the needs of commuters only, with no broader proposals for anti-Covid-19 border
measures. The first pandemic wave, which took place in the first half of 2020, brought along
many new and unexpected restrictions. The border closures belonged among those restrictions,
which complicated the daily lives of many inhabitants in border regions, who benefit from a con-
cept of borders as an opportunity (Decoville et al., 2013) and cross-border complementarities.
The present authors of this text analysed the Czech–Polish cross-border labour market only
two years before the pandemic, yet in a very different situation. We concluded that the joint
cross-border labour market is rather low and only unidirectional – driven mainly by the Czech
automotive and mining sector attracting the Polish workforce. We also stated that most CBC
stakeholders do not prioritize cooperation in the field of labour market, though exceptions exist.
These previous conclusions were challenged by Covid-19-related developments: despite the
fact that number of Poles commuting to work in the Czech Republic cannot be compared with
the numbers of those commuting to Germany, it is important for certain sectors of mainly low-
qualified workforce and some parts of both borderlands. The pandemic showed that Euroregions
have the cooperation in the field of the cross-border labour market as an important point of their
agenda (even if it is not clearly stated in their statutes and agreements), despite them lacking
direct competencies in this area. The study shows the substantial potential of Euroregions to
act efficiently by the means of networking. It took less than a month when Euroregions’ repre-
sentatives established the network of all Polish-based CBC units to advocate in one case. They
helped to gather argumentation for softening the border regime for cross-border commuters.
They applied several means to do so, starting from collecting the analytical evidence (Kasperek
& Olszewski, 2020), voicing their interest vis-à-vis the central authorities by the means of official
letters, and supporting the demonstrations and acts of mutual solidarity of the cross-border civil
society. The strength of joint collective action, supported by the Federation of Polish Eurore-
gions, contributed to the successful deliberation process and knowledge-based decision-making.

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16 Wojciech Opioła and Hynek Böhm

One more point needs to be made. Comparing the role of Polish Euroregions with other ana-
lysed cases from Germany, Italy, Austria (both from the times of migration crisis or Covid-19),
we can observe a marginal role of the Euroregion as an institution in the system of political
decision-making in Poland. Even if Euroregions were the most active actors, their activities
remained neglected to the end of the reopening process. One of the Euroregional stakeholders,
engaged actively in the process of border opening, said in the interview that Euroregional auth-
orities were informed about the further steps of the Polish government, but unofficially. The
representatives of Euroregions were not invited to the online meet-up with the Polish prime
minister, which was focused only on the problem of cross-border commuters (interview 7).
Another of our interviewees pointed out that the success of Euroregional advocacy was the suc-
cess of one person: the manager of the Polish secretary of Euroregion Śląsk Cieszyński/Tesinskie
Slezsko, who appeared to be very determined and forceful in his actions (interviews 3 and 6). The
first pandemic wave also showed that free-border crossing is considered to be a norm in both
studied border contexts. It also clearly showed that the market forces are crucial drivers in creat-
ing the cross-border reality as well as (neo)functional links operating as cross-border fibres link-
ing both sides, which should be appreciated as an achievement (Jańczak, 2020). The joint labour
market creates the very engine of cross-border flows. It is also true that in some border regions
special policies for cross-border commuters were introduced since the beginning of lockdown,
such as on the Danish–German or Spanish–Portuguese borders (Klatt, 2020b; Pires, 2020).
The eventual adoption of the European Cross-Border Mechanism (ECBM) – unsuccessfully
proposed by the European Commission with the ambition to ease the lives in borderlands as part
of the 2021–27 Cohesion Pack – would probably have helped to mitigate the impacts of the bor-
der closures. This instrument was proposed to allow one member state to apply the law of a
neighbouring member state to facilitate cross-border solutions and projects (Evrard & Engl,
2018; Sielker, 2020) and to cope with a ‘border-blind’ national legislation. As mentioned, the
ECBM proposal was refused. However, the pandemic-related re-bordering underlined that
eventual adoption of the ECBM could have substantially eased the management of border clo-
sures also in the studied border contexts. As the ECBM cannot be applied in coping with the
border closures, the CBC stakeholders must make use of other instruments. It is quite likely
that the INTERREG 2021–2027 programmes – the same as in the case during the last years
of implementation of the 2014–20 generation – will work with the special calls aimed at improv-
ing the capacities of Euroregions (and another cross-border entities) to deal with the tangible
consequences of re-bordering.

NOTES

1. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/digpub/eumove/bloc-2c.html?lang=en.
2. See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/scheng
en/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf, https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02006R0562-20131126.
3. See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/scheng
en/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf.
4. See http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20200000434/O/D20200434.pdf.
5. See https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/D2020000043501.pdf.
6. See https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20200000566/O/D20200566.pdf.
7. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMNHPBSV.
8. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMNHPHXW.
9. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMNHPMSG.
10. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMNHPRJX.
11. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMNLVUVR.

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 Euroregion as political actor: managing border policies in the time of Covid-19 in Polish borderlands 17

12. See https://apps.odok.cz/attachment/-/down/IHOABMQVWNX8.

13. On 10 May 2020, presidential elections in Poland were planned and the campaign had started at the time of
writing. Finally, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the elections were postponed on 28 June.
14. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBa8MpeOLXM&t=16271s.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

FUNDING

The research was financially supported by the Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science
Centre) [grant number UMO-2020/37/B/HS5/02445].

ORCID

Wojciech Opioła http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2473-3375

Hynek Böhm http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0548-9645

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