B-GL-321-005/FP-001

ARMY

BATTLE GROUP IN OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)

(Supersedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001 dated 1989-03-01)

WARNING
Although not classified, this publication, or any part of it, may be exempt from disclosure to the public under the Access to
Information Act. All elements of information contained herein must be closely scrutinized to ascertain whether or not the
publication or any part of it may be released.

NOTICE
This documentation has been reviewed by the technical authority and does not contain controlled goods.
Disclosure notices and handling instructions originally received with the document shall continue to apply.

AVIS
Cette documentation a été révisée par l’autorité technique et ne contient pas de marchandises contrôlées. Les
avis de divulgation et les instructions de manutention reçues originalement doivent continuer de s’appliquer.

Published under the authority of the Commander Canadian Army

 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

ARMY

BATTLE GROUP IN OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)

(Supersedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001 dated 1989-03-01)

WARNING
Although not classified, this publication, or any part of it, may be exempt from disclosure to the public under the Access to
Information Act. All elements of information contained herein must be closely scrutinized to ascertain whether or not the
publication or any part of it may be released.

NOTICE
This documentation has been reviewed by the technical authority and does not contain controlled goods.
Disclosure notices and handling instructions originally received with the document shall continue to apply.

AVIS
Cette documentation a été révisée par l’autorité technique et ne contient pas de marchandises contrôlées. Les
avis de divulgation et les instructions de manutention reçues originalement doivent continuer de s’appliquer.

Published under the authority of the Commander Canadian Army

OPI: DAD ACT 2012-08-20

B-GL-321-005/FP-001
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Insert latest changed pages; dispose of superseded pages in accordance with applicable orders.
NOTE
The portion of the text or illustration affected by the latest change is indicated by a black vertical line
in the margin of the page. Changes to illustrations are indicated by miniature pointing hands
or black vertical lines.
Dates of issue for original and changed pages are as follows:
Original ................. 0 .................... 2012-08-20
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 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

FOREWORD

1. B-GL-321-005/FP-001 Battle Group in Operations, is issued on authority of the Commander

Canadian Army by the Director of Army Doctrine, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC)
Headquarters, Kingston, Ontario.

2. B-GL-321-005/FP-001 Battle Group in Operations is effective upon receipt and supersedes

B-GL-301-002/FP-001 The Battle Group in Operations dated 1989-03-01.

3. Cette publication est également disponible en français. The French version of this publication
is B-GL-321-005/FP-002 Le groupement tactique au cours des opérations.

4. Although not classified, this publication, or any part of it, may be exempt from disclosure to the
public under the Access to Information Act. All elements of information contained herein must be closely
scrutinized to ascertain whether or not the publication, or any part of it, may be released. The electronic
version of this publication can be found in the Army Electronic Library at http://lfdts.kingston.mil.ca/DAD/
AEL/Publications.aspx.

5. The Director of Army Doctrine (DAD) is responsible for the content of this manual. Inquiries or
suggestions for future inclusion/amendment are to be directed to the OPI at:

DWAN email: +DAD Common@LFDTS HQ@Kingston

or

Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre

Attn: Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) ACT
PO Box 17000 Station Forces
Kingston, ON
K7K 7B4

TO ENSURE YOU ARE USING THE MOST CURRENT VERSION OF THIS PUBLICATION
PLEASE VISIT THE ARMY ELECTRONIC LIBRARY WEBSITE AT
http://lfdts.kingston.mil.ca/DAD/AEL/Publications.aspx

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,

as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2012

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 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

PREFACE

AIM

1. The aim of this manual is to detail the tactical doctrine for conducting battle group (BG) operations.
It is a guide for operations and forms the basis for instruction and training of full-spectrum operations at
the tactical level.

SCOPE

2. This manual focuses upon combat, combat support and combat service support elements and their
employment within the context of a combined arms grouping, the BG specifically. The emphasis is on the
fundamental requirement for any tactical force to include a combined arms grouping centred on manoeuvre
elements: armour and infantry. The doctrine presented is adaptable and applicable across the continuum
of operations, with particular emphasis on high intensity combat. It is also applicable to any type of BG
organization including affiliated BGs.

DEFINITION OF A BG

3. The BG is defined as an ad hoc and temporary combined arms organization based on a manoeuvre
unit HQ and consisting of a combination of integral and attached infantry and armour subunits, with their
integral service support elements. It is optimized for missions and tasks requiring protected manoeuvre
and holding of ground. Support and additional service support elements may be attached as the superior
commander deems necessary.

LIST OF REFERENCES

4. Following is a list of references for this publication:

a. B-GA-441-001/FP-001 Tactical Level Aviation Doctrine

b. B-GG-005-004/AF-023 CFJP 9-0 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War

c. B-GG-005-027/AF-023 CFJP 1-2 Code of Conduct for CF Personnel

d. B-GG-302-002/FP-001 (CFP302(2) Part 1) Arctic and Sub-Arctic Operations (Note: superseded

by B-GL-323-003/FP-001 Operations in Cold Weather)

e. B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 CFJP 3-0.1 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels

f. B-GJ-005-307/FP-040 CFJP 3-4.1 Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations

g. B-GJ-005-311/FP-000 CF CBRN Defence Strategic Doctrine (Note: superseded by

B-GJ-005-380/FP-001 CFJP-3-8 CBRN Defence)

h. B-GJ-005-311/FP-010 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Operations

(Note: superseded by B-GJ-005-380/FP-101 CFJP 3-8.1 CBRN Defence Operations)

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B-GL-321-005/FP-001

i. B-GJ-005-311/FP-020 CF CBRN Defence Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

j. B-GJ-005-311/FP-021 CF CBRN Defence Tactics, Techniques and Procedures – Urban

k. B-GJ-005-311/FP-030 CF CBRN Defence Aide-Mémoire

l. B-GJ-005-311/FP-040 CF CBRN Defence Equipment

m. B-GJ-005-316/FP-001 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations

n. B-GJ-005-316/FP-002 CF Operating Procedure for the Conduct of Improvised Explosive

Device Disposal (IEDD) Operations

o. B-GJ-005-316/FP-010 CF Manual for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) Reports

p. B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 CFJP 3-10.2 Joint Public Affairs

q. B-GJ-005-404/FP-010 CFJP 4-1.3 Movement Support Sea

r. B-GJ-005-404/FP-020 CFJP 4-1.1 Movement Support Rail

s. B-GJ-005-404/FP-030 CFJP 4-1.4 Movement Support Road

t. B-GJ-005-404/FP-040 CFJP 4-1.2 Movement Support Air

u. B-GJ-005-410/FP-000 CFJP 4-10 Health Services Support to Operations

v. B-GJ-005-410/FP-010 Health Services Support in CBRN Environments (in development)

w. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CFJP 5.0 The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)

x. B-GJ-005-313/FP-001 CFJP 3-10.1 Psychological Operations

y. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations

z. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations

aa. B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Sustainment of Land Operations

ab. B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Fire Support in Land Operations

ac. B-GL-322-007/FP-001 Unique Operations – Urban

ad. B-GL-322-008/FP-001 Tactical Guide to Urban Operations

ae. B-GL-322-010/FP-001 Stability Activities and Tasks

iv
 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

af. B-GL-324-004/FP-001 Airborne Operations – Parachute

ag. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations

ah. B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations

ai. B-GL-332-010/FP-001 Insert – Aviation

aj. B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Land Operations

ak. B-GL-346-001/FP-000 The Chaplain’s Manual

al. B-GL-351-001/FP-001 Signals in Land Operations, Volume 1: Principles and Fundamentals

am. B-GL-351-003/FP-003 Signals in Land Operations, Volume 3: Tactical EW and SIGINT

an. B-GL-352-001/FP-001 ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance,

Volume 1 – The Enduring Doctrine

ao. B-GL-355-001/FP-001 Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

ap. B-GL-361-001/FP-001 Land Force Engineer Operations – Volume 1

aq. B-GL-361-117/FP-001 Mobility Support – Route and Area Clearance

ar. B-GL-365-021/FP-001 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device for Land Operations

as. B-GL-365-022/FP-001 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures (TTP)

at. B-GL-371-003/FP-001 Field Artillery Operational Procedures

au. B-GL-372-001/FP-001 Air Defence Artillery Doctrine

av. B-GL-394-002/FP-001 Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance

aw. B-OG-302-004/FP-001 Specific Operations,Volume 4 Part One – Jungle Operations

ax. B-OG-302-005/FP-001 Specific Operations Volume 5, Mountain Operations Part One – Tactics

ay. B-GJ-005-315/FP-001 CFJP 3-15 Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

az. B-OG-302-004/FP-002 CFP 302(14) Part 2 A Soldier’s Guide to the Jungle

ba. DCDS Instruction 2/98 Domestic Operations: Canadian Army Perspective

bb. DCDS Instruction 4/96 Screening Preparation and Training for Individuals for Peace
Support Operations

v
 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

bc. Defence Terminology Bank at http://terminology.mil.ca

bd. NATO AAP-39 (2007) Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions

be. NATO AJP-3(B) (2003) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations

bf. NATO AJP-3.15(A) (2011) Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)

bg. NATO AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

TERMINOLOGY

5. Terminology used within this publication is consistent with that found in the Defence Terminology
Bank (DTB), found online at http://terminology.mil.ca/.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF LAND COMBAT.............................................. 1-1

General....................................................................................................................................................1-1
Complex Environments............................................................................................................................1-1
The Operational Level of Warfare.......................................................................................................... 1-4
The Continuum of Operations................................................................................................................ 1-5
The Principles of War............................................................................................................................. 1-8

CHAPTER 2 – THE COMBINED ARMS GROUPING........................................................................... 2-1

General....................................................................................................................................................2-1
The Army Elements.................................................................................................................................2-1
Understanding Combat Power................................................................................................................2-1
Combined Arms Groupings.................................................................................................................... 2-2
The Battle Group.................................................................................................................................... 2-3

CHAPTER 3 – EMPLOYING THE BATTLE GROUP............................................................................ 3-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 3-1
The Battlespace..................................................................................................................................... 3-1
Applying Combat Power on Operations................................................................................................. 3-5
Integration of the BG’s Operations into the Higher Commander’s Intent................................................ 3-7

ANNEX A – MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS.................................................................................... 3A-1/3A-2

APPENDIX 1 – MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – ARMOUR.................................................................. 3A1-1

APPENDIX 2 – MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – INFANTRY ...............................................................3A2-1

APPENDIX 3 – MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE.........................3A3-1

ANNEX B – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS..........................................................................3B-1/3B-2

APPENDIX 1 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – CLOSE SUPPORT ARTILLERY.................... 3B1-1

APPENDIX 2 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE................3B2-1

APPENDIX 3 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – ENGINEERS............................................................ 3B3-1

APPENDIX 4 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – SIGNALS................................................................. 3B4-1

APPENDIX 5 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – ELECTRONIC WARFARE.............................3B5-1

APPENDIX 6 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – HUMAN INTELLIGENCE TEAMS.................3B6-1

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CONTENTS (Cont)

APPENDIX 7 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS TEAMS................................................................................................................. 3B7-1

APPENDIX 8 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAMS..........................................................................................3B8-1/3B8-2

APPENDIX 9 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – MILITARY POLICE (MP)................................3B9-1

APPENDIX 10 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – TACTICAL AVIATION (TAC AVN).............3B10-1

APPENDIX 11 – COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES............. 3B11-1

ANNEX C – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) ELEMENTS.............................................. 3C-1/3C-2

APPENDIX 1 – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SUBUNIT..............................................................3C1-1

APPENDIX 2 – MEDICAL....................................................................................................... 3C2-1/3C2-2

CHAPTER 4 – COMMANDING THE BATTLE GROUP ON OPERATIONS......................................... 4-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 4-1
Visualization........................................................................................................................................... 4-2
Commander’s Intent............................................................................................................................... 4-2
Command and Control........................................................................................................................... 4-4
The Battle Group Headquarters............................................................................................................. 4-8
BG Staff.................................................................................................................................................4-11
Tactical Level Planning for Operations..................................................................................................4-11

ANNEX A – ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING GUIDE.........................................................4A-1

ANNEX B – ENGINEER PLANNING, MOBILITY / COUNTER MOBILITY, C-IED................... 4B-1/4B-2

APPENDIX 1 – PLANNING ENGINEER SUPPORT TO BG OPERATIONS.................................... 4B1-1

APPENDIX 2 – MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY..................................................................4B2-1

APPENDIX 3 – COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.............................................................. 4B3-1

ANNEX C – FORCE PROTECTION....................................................................................................4C-1

ANNEX D – TERRAIN MANAGEMENT..............................................................................................4D-1

ANNEX E – ISTAR PLANNING.................................................................................................. 4E-1/4E-2

ANNEX F – PLANNING FOR BG CIMIC, PSYOPS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES................ 4F-1

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CONTENTS (Cont)

CHAPTER 5 – SUSTAINING THE BATTLE GROUP............................................................................ 5-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Terminology............................................................................................................................................ 5-1
CSS Principles....................................................................................................................................... 5-2
Echelon Structure................................................................................................................................... 5-2
CSS Capabilities within a BG ................................................................................................................5-4
BG Replenishment Cycle....................................................................................................................... 5-5
Casualty Evacuation within the BG......................................................................................................... 5-6

ANNEX A – LOCATION AND COMMAND OF THE BG’S CSS ECHELON ELEMENTS......... 5A-1/5A-2

ANNEX B – ROLES AND TASKS OF THE CSS SUBUNIT................................................................5B-1

ANNEX C – ROLE OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN THE BG......................................................... 5C-1/5C-2

CHAPTER 6 – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.......................................................................................... 6-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 6-1
Principles of War ................................................................................................................................... 6-1
Fundamentals of Offensive Operations.................................................................................................. 6-1
Forms of Manoeuvre.............................................................................................................................. 6-2
Types of Offensive Operations............................................................................................................... 6-9
The Attack............................................................................................................................................ 6-10
Conducting the Attack...........................................................................................................................6-11
The Raid............................................................................................................................................... 6-20
Reconnaissance in Force..................................................................................................................... 6-21
Exploitation........................................................................................................................................... 6-22
Pursuit.................................................................................................................................................. 6-23
Ambush................................................................................................................................................ 6-24
Breakout of Encircled Forces............................................................................................................... 6-24
Feint and Demonstration...................................................................................................................... 6-25

CHAPTER 7 – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS...........................................................................................7-1

General....................................................................................................................................................7-1
Key Principles of War in Defensive Operations.......................................................................................7-2
Fundamentals of Defensive Operations..................................................................................................7-2
Types of Defensive Actions.................................................................................................................... 7-3
Stages of the Defence............................................................................................................................ 7-6
Command and Control..........................................................................................................................7-19
CSS in Defensive Operations................................................................................................................7-19
The BG in the Delay..............................................................................................................................7-20

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CONTENTS (Cont)

CHAPTER 8 – STABILITY OPERATIONS............................................................................................ 8-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 8-1
Stability Operations – Tactical Activities................................................................................................. 8-2
The Conduct of Stability Activities and Tasks......................................................................................... 8-4

CHAPTER 9 – ENABLING OPERATIONS........................................................................................... 9-1

General................................................................................................................................................... 9-1
Reconnaissance Operations.................................................................................................................. 9-2
Security..................................................................................................................................................9-6
Advance to Contact................................................................................................................................ 9-8
Tactical Movement................................................................................................................................ 9-16
Meeting Engagement .......................................................................................................................... 9-21
Link-Up................................................................................................................................................. 9-23
Withdrawal............................................................................................................................................ 9-28
Retirement............................................................................................................................................ 9-38
Relief of Troops in Combat and Encircled Forces................................................................................ 9-38

CHAPTER 10 – SPECIFIC OPERATIONS AND UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS.................................... 10-1

General................................................................................................................................................. 10-1

ANNEX A – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE................ 10A-1

ANNEX B – OPERATIONS IN REDUCED VISIBILITY....................................................................10B-1

ANNEX C – DOMESTIC OPERATIONS...........................................................................................10C-1

GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................................ GL-1

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE

1-1 The Continuum of Operations: Linking a Campaign to Tactical Activities................... 1-5

1-2 The Spectrum of Conflict............................................................................................ 1-6
1-3 Linking Campaign Themes to Tactical-Level Operations............................................ 1-7
2-1 Possible BG Configuration.......................................................................................... 2-5
2-2 Possible BG Configuration within a Coalition Formation............................................. 2-6
3-1 Contiguous, Linear AO................................................................................................ 3-2
3-2 Contiguous, Non-linear AO......................................................................................... 3-2
3-3 Non-Contiguous, Linear AO........................................................................................ 3-2
3-4 Non-Contiguous, Non-Linear AO................................................................................ 3-3
3-5 Area of Interest, Influence and Operations................................................................. 3-3
3-6 Understanding the Relationship between the Battlespace and the (Complex)
Operating Environment...........................................................................................3-4
3-7 Applying Combat Power within the Battlespace ........................................................ 3-8
4-1 Control Measures........................................................................................................ 4-7
4A-1 Examples of How Close Support Artillery Fire May be Used in the Attack...............4A-3
4B2-1 Mobility Support Algorithm...................................................................................... 4B2-2
4B2-2 Mobility Support Tasks............................................................................................ 4B2-3
4B2-3 Breaching Organizational Elements, Fundamentals and Responsibilities..............4B2-6
4B2-4 Battle Group Assault as part of a Formation Attack against Deliberate Defence... 4B2-7
4B2-5 Battle Group Assault as Part of Formation Attack against a Light Defence............4B2-8
4B3-1 The IED Network.....................................................................................................4B3-2
4B3-2 (Sheet 1 of 2) The IED System – Key Nodes..........................................................4B3-3
4B3-2 (Sheet 2 of 2) The IED System – Key Nodes..........................................................4B3-4
4B3-3 Responsibilities for Combat Engineers, EOD Team and C-IED Team....................4B3-7
5-1 CSS Capabilities in a BG............................................................................................5-4
5-2 The Replenishment Cycle within a BG........................................................................5-6
5-3 Casualty Evacuation in a BG...................................................................................... 5-8
5A-1 Location and Command of the BG’s CSS Echelon Elements...........................5A-1/5A-2
6-1 Frontal ........................................................................................................................ 6-3
6-2 Envelopment...............................................................................................................6-4
6-3 Double Envelopment................................................................................................... 6-5
6-4 Turning Movement...................................................................................................... 6-6
6-5 Penetration..................................................................................................................6-8
6-6 Forms of Manoeuvre................................................................................................... 6-9
6-7 Coordinating an Attack.............................................................................................. 6-12
6-8 BG Deliberate Attack................................................................................................ 6-16
6-9 BG Hasty Attack.........................................................................................................6-17
6-10 Attack Control Measures........................................................................................... 6-19
7-1 Defensive Effects and Purpose....................................................................................7-1
7-2 Example of an Area Defence...................................................................................... 7-4
7-3 Area Defence.............................................................................................................. 7-5
7-4 Example of a Mobile Defence..................................................................................... 7-5
7-5 Mobile Defence........................................................................................................... 7-6
7-6 Defensive Layout.......................................................................................................7-13
7-7 BG Delaying on Successive Positions (Caterpillar)....................................................7-25

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LIST OF FIGURES (Cont)

FIGURE TITLE PAGE

7-8 BG Delaying on Alternate Positions (Leapfrog)..........................................................7-26

9-1 Likely Effects to be Achieved in the Advance to Contact.......................................... 9-10
9-2 Formation Advance to Contact – BG in the Advance Guard..................................... 9-14
9-3 Examples of Infantry-Heavy and Armour-Heavy Battle Groups Employed
in the Advance Guard........................................................................................... 9-15
9-4 Example of an Advance to Contact Using Multiple Routes........................................9-17
9-5 Column Formation with Security Forward and on both Flanks................................. 9-18
9-6 Line Formation with Security Forward...................................................................... 9-19
9-7 Echelon Right Formation with Security Forward....................................................... 9-19
9-8 Box Formation with Security Forward....................................................................... 9-20
9-9 Wedge Formation with Security Forward.................................................................. 9-20
9-10 V Formation with Security Forward .......................................................................... 9-21
9-11 Link-up of a Moving Force with a Stationary Force................................................... 9-26
9-12 Link-up of Two Moving Forces.................................................................................. 9-27
9-13 Battle Group Withdrawal Plan................................................................................... 9-34
9-14 BG Relief in Place in a Linear Contiguous AO.......................................................... 9-42
10A-1 Integral Support CBRN Defence Capabilities.........................................................10A-4
10C-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Staff Aide-memoire for Domestic Operations...................................10C-3
10C-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Staff Aide-memoire for Domestic Operations.................................. 10C-4

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CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF LAND COMBAT

Effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness
as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been
physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest
way home. To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponent’s balance
and thus increases his resisting power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the
opponent without loosening his foothold and upsetting his balance results in self-exhaustion,
increasing in disproportionate ratio to the effective strain put upon him.

—Liddell Hart

GENERAL

1. Land combat is by nature chaotic, violent and full of uncertainty. Successful operations within such
an environment require the ability to adapt and thrive within chaos and uncertainty, creating and exploiting
opportunities for success in order to maintain the initiative. Risk management and the experience garnered
from training and operational lessons allow battle group commanding officers (BG COs) to create those
opportunities and to reduce the effects of chance, while working to increase the same for the enemy.

2. While economic and political harmonization among western nations precludes warfare amongst
them, widespread global insecurity and the nature of failed and/or failing states have increased both
regional instability and threats to global security. Consequently, and in line with Canada’s role of
contributing to international peace and security, the likelihood of the Army1 being deployed on short notice
into an unanticipated area with unfamiliar terrain variations2 and a host of agencies operating with varying
and often competing interests is high. The combination of environmental, geographic and human factors
serves to complicate any future Army operating environment.

COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS

3. The mix of geographic, environmental and human factors creates what is termed a complex
environment.3 Those factors need to be considered by commanders when planning operations.

a. Human Factors. Human factors include the joint, interagency, multinational and public4 (JIMP)
environment, the local populace, friendly forces and the enemy threat. The ability to coordinate
activities and objectives within a JIMP environment will be key to mission success. Trust and
mutual understanding become very important and far more complicated with the JIMP
environment. Both are fostered by establishing liaison and building understanding through
integrated campaign planning, unity of effort, information sharing and maximizing training
opportunities as they present themselves.

1. The Army is also known as the Land Force. The terms can be considered interchangeable.
2. Terrain variations can include arctic, jungle, mountain, forests or heavily wooded areas, arid regions, urban or combinations thereof.
3.  complex environment is a battlespace with a mix of geographic, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of
A
operations (DTB, record 27425). As an example, environmental factors include those hazards present within the battlespace that have the potential to negatively affect
personnel, materiel, facilities or information. They include dangers arising from geography, weather, disease, flora and fauna, toxic industrial materials and unexploded
ordnance and mines. Hazards represent danger without intent, unlike threats that represent danger with intent.
4. 
JIMP refers to the framework of partners who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve, within a public environment, shared objectives.
See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for more detail.

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Lack of relevant and accurate information on the potential roles and tasks of other organizations…,
on their capabilities, procedures and working methods will lead to incorrect assessments and
inadequate decision-making. It will have a detrimental effect on mission planning and execution.

 (1) The local populace represents a significant planning factor for a BG CO, regardless of the
type of campaign or operation being undertaken. Winning and maintaining the support of
the local population is considered critical within a COIN (counter-insurgency) or peace
support campaign, but may be considered not as important during combat operations.5

 (2) A BG CO will balance the need to use restraint and the principle of proportionality against
the risk of harm to the local populace. Collateral damage must be minimized and avoided
in all situations. Examples of issues related to the local populace that should be considered
for their potential impact on tactical operations include:

 (a) cultural issues—defining key civilian areas by political, social, ethnic and/or religious
boundaries as well as identifying key leaders at the local and provincial levels,
significant local community organizations and their key issues (social, economic
and public administration related);

 (b) the presence of criminal elements and/or local gangs as well as smuggling routes;

 (c) key public, cultural, commercial and industrial infrastructure;

 (d) key multinational corporations and organizations including non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) present within the operating environment;

 (e) real or potential refugee and/or displaced persons routes and/or resettlement areas.

 (3) One of the most important human factors in the complex environment is the adversary.6
While nation states have traditionally held the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence,
failed or failing states often have state security and legal bodies that have either ceased
to exist altogether, are no longer able to operate effectively or are being used for purposes
that are contrary to their intended mandate and may in fact be considered illegitimate by
international legal standards. Too often, a state’s loss of the monopoly on power means
that the obligation to protect the state’s citizenry is not being met. The result is usually the
growth of irregular groups which may or may not have legitimate human rights claims, but
will usually resort to the use of violence to achieve their social aims. As a result, the
international community will find itself in the position of needing to become involved
to stabilize the conflict and reinforce the human rights of the citizenry within the
conflict zone.

5. It should be mentioned that populations should still be considered and not alienated as a major combat campaign will likely lead into some sort of peace support
campaign. Actions by United States (US) forces during 2003 were in part the root causes of discord in 2004 in Iraq.
6. An adversary is a malicious entity or person who offers opposition in the achievement of friendly goals. A local population that acts in support of an irregular group,
without taking up arms, can be more correctly termed an adversary rather than the enemy (DTB, record 22811, modified). The term enemy by contrast is usually
reserved for an armed adversary who is actively seeking our defeat.

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 (4) Intervening in a conflict within a failed or failing state carries the potential for Army
elements to be targeted by both irregular forces (using both regular and irregular tactics)
and by the failed or failing state’s security forces. Regular tactics are less likely to be
encountered in such an intervention than irregular tactics.

 (5) The adversarial threat within a failed or failing state is most likely from a regional
government’s standing army (or paramilitary force) that fights according to known rules of
engagement (ROEs) with known doctrine. It may have a limited chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capability. It is highly likely that such an enemy will have
observed and learned from past and ongoing operations, and be reluctant to concentrate
and become susceptible to the intervening coalition’s technical superiority. Instead, it will
seek to concentrate only at those times and places where coalition superiority could be
susceptible due to environment or human factors like poor weather, complex terrain
(urban centres in particular) or areas where the local population can be exploited.

 (6) At some stage, once the enemy finds that their tactics and training are not providing them
with the success they expect, the enemy will shift from the regular, linear poise, to
a model that includes the use of irregular tactics including terrorism. At the tactical level,
Army elements should expect to face any of the following tactics:

 (a) guerrilla tactics, including drive-by shootings, sniping attacks, roadside bombings,
ambushes, ground-to-air attacks and attacks employing a wide variety of
potential weapons;

 (b) terror tactics, including suicide attacks, attacks on civilian targets, assassination
and kidnapping;

 (c) attacks on vital infrastructure via sabotage.

 (7) The adversarial threat presents a significant challenge: any or all of the Army’s
organizational, tactical, doctrinal, morale, political, social and/or religious mores may be
targeted by the enemy. Further, deployed Army elements have the potential to be targeted
anywhere within the battlespace by enemies on both the physical and psychological
planes, using both lethal and/or non-lethal means up to and possibly including weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs). Therefore, Army tactics must continue to include the skills
required to counter threats across the spectrum of potential modes of attack, both regular
and irregular.

b. Environmental Factors. Environmental factors include climatic factors such as:

 (1) Extreme Heat or Cold. While the health issues related to working in extremes of heat or
cold are quickly apparent, the operational effects on tactical activities may be less so.
BG COs will need to consider tempering demands for a higher operational tempo to allow
for more monitoring of individuals and weapon systems and for greater servicing of key
equipment. Specialized training will be required and must be factored into any training
program. Infrastructure support requirements will also increase.

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 (2) Meteorological Conditions (including weather, temperature, humidity and wind

conditions). At the tactical level, the influence of these conditions can be significant and
must be considered within the planning process. For example, a heavy rain can lead to
swollen rivers and the requirement to factor in bridging assets to cross water obstacles
that normally would be passable without those assets.

 (3) Environmental Threats or Hazards. These can include both physical threats (from local
pollutants and the presence of toxic chemicals, for example) to biological threats (from an
unsafe water supply or the presence of disease-bearing rodents). As an example, in a
failed or failing state, regular garbage collection is likely to be greatly reduced or non-
existent. At the tactical level, a local commander will need to consider how to re-institute
this essential service or run the risk of disease outbreaks that could extend to the force.

c. Geographic Factors. Geographic factors are related to the nature of the terrain (urban,
wooded, swamp, etc.), and are covered in more detail in Chapter 10, “Specific Operations and
Unique Environments.”

4. Complex environments thus require multifaceted formations that are capable of adapting
to operations in a variety of operating environments. Those same formations must be adept at
coordinating their activities and objectives within the JIMP environment for operational success.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WARFARE

5. The Army operates at the operational and tactical levels of war. At the tactical level, battles and
engagements are planned and executed. Army tactical activities are undertaken to achieve operational
objectives. At the same time, an Army formation commander may be required to function at the operational
level as a result of a specific campaign or operation into which the formation is deployed. Further, the
nature of the JIMP environment has blurred the line between the operational and tactical levels to the
point where a seemingly minor tactical activity can take on significant strategic implications.

6. Hence, the operational level can be seen as the bridge between the tactical level of war and the
strategic level where Canada’s strategic objectives—diplomatic, defence, development and commercial—
are harmonized. Army operations, to have strategic relevance, are planned and conducted with an aim
of meeting the desired strategic end state. Operational level planning takes place within the framework
of the continuum of operations and within a comprehensive approach.

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THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

7. As shown in Figure 1-1, the continuum of operations provides the linkage between operational level
campaigns and the tactical activities undertaken as part of those campaigns.

Level of
Effort

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
STABILITY OPERATIONS

ENABLING OPERATIONS

Peacetime Military Peace Support COIN Major Combat

Engagement

Figure 1-1: The Continuum of Operations: Linking a Campaign to Tactical Activities

8. Within the continuum, there are four major concepts that are important to tactical operations:

a. Spectrum of Conflict. The Army must be able to effectively conduct a wide variety of operations
and activities throughout the spectrum of conflict shown in Figure 1-2. The spectrum of conflict
indicates the level and intensity of violence expected: successful operations can usually be
reflected by a move to lower levels of violence on the spectrum. It also reflects the need for
tactical units and formations to be prepared to escalate and de-escalate the level of violence
as necessary. The Army operates on the principle of proportionality in the use of force necessary.
Both the escalation/de-escalation of violence and the use of force are governed by the use
of ROEs.7

7. ROEs are orders that delineate the circumstances and limitations within which force may be applied to achieve a military objective. ROEs are part of the overall
concept of the Law of Armed Conflict that is outlined within B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels. A related concept is
that of the code of conduct for military personnel on operations and is outlined in B-GG-005-027/AF-023 Code of Conduct for CF Personnel.

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LIMITED INTERVENTION

MAJOR COMBAT

COUNTER-INSURGENCY

PEACE SUPPORT

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Peaceful Interacation SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT General War

Figure 1-2: The Spectrum of Conflict

The best core training for peace support operations is general purpose military training with
emphasis on basic combat and occupation skills.8

b. Campaign Themes. Campaign themes—broadly divided into major combat, COIN, peace
support, peacetime military engagement and limited intervention9—drive the approach adopted
by formation commanders and influence the force package required. The theme of the campaign
also has an influence on the tactical operations undertaken. For example, an attack to destroy
an insurgent stronghold located within an urban centre should be undertaken with the broader
COIN campaign objectives in mind. Use of indirect fire may lower the risk significantly to the
formation, but would in all probability increase the likelihood of civilian casualties and hence put
the COIN objectives in jeopardy.

c. Types of Operations. At the tactical level, operations conducted within a campaign are divided
into four types: offensive, defensive, stability and enabling. Each of these operations will be
described in more detail in Chapters 6 through 9. As shown in Figure 1-3, offensive, defensive,
enabling and stability operations are linked to the spectrum of operations.

 (1) Offensive operations are those tactical activities that seek out the enemy
and attack them.

 (2) Defensive operations are those tactical activities that resist enemy offensive operations.

 (3) Stability operations are those tactical activities that are conducted to maintain, restore
or establish a climate of order.

 (4) Enabling operations are those tactical activities that link, support or create the conditions
for other operations (offensive, defensive or stability).

8. NDHQ Instruction DCDS 4/96, Screening Preparation and Training for Individuals for Peace Support Operations.
9. Chapter 9 of B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 Peace Support Operations.

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Soft power—peacekeeping and values—is well and good. But without the capacity to deploy
effective, well-trained, well-led hard power when needed, no one will pay attention to Canada.10

STABILITY OPERATIONS DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Tactical Activity: Security & Control, Security Tactical Activity: Defence and Delay Tactical Activity: Attack, Raid, Pursuit, Feint,
Sector Reform, Demobilisation, Ambush, Recce in Force, etc.
Disarmament, Reintegration, Assistance to
Other Agencies Governance &
Reconstruction, etc.

Tactical Tasks: Framework Patrol, Observe/ Tactical Tasks: Block, Counter-Attack, Tactical Tasks: Support by Fire, Seize,
Monitor, Crowd Control, Vehicle Guard, Fix, etc. Destroy, etc.
Checkpoint, Training Teams, Cordon and
Search, etc.

Task: Person Search, Vehicle Search,

Building Search, etc.

Full Spectrum Operations

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Level of
Effort

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
STABILITY OPERATIONS

ENABLING OPERATIONS

Peacetime Military Engagement Peace Support COIN Major Combat

CAMPAIGN THEMES

ENABLING OPERATIONS
Tactical Activity: Withdrawal, Reconnaissance, Advance to Tactical Tasks: Route Search, Building Search, etc.
Contact, Tactical Movement, Tactical Search, etc.

Figure 1-3: Linking Campaign Themes to Tactical-Level Operations

10. J . L. Granatstein, “Making war to keep the peace,” Globe and Mail, 30 October 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/books/review‑a‑soldier‑first‑by‑rick‑hillier/
article1345304 (accessed 2 July 2010).

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d. Full-Spectrum Operations.11 Within a campaign, the simultaneous conduct of the four types of
operations—offensive, defensive, stability and enabling operations—may be necessary and is
known as full-spectrum operations (FSO). Implicit, but not stated in the definition of FSO, is the
requirement for a force capable of FSO to be able to transition between the various operations and
conduct each of them as required. A successful army force must have the elements necessary to
allow for the conduct of all activities across the entire spectrum of conflict.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

9. Within the framework of the continuum of operations, the Army generates, employs and sustains
forces that are strategically relevant and tactically decisive.12 Making effective use of that strategically
relevant and tactically decisive force requires guidance. These ten principles of war, developed through
a historical analysis of warfare, apply equally to all levels of command from platoon/troop through to the
formational level and higher, regardless of the level of conflict. Advances in technology and capabilities
have resulted in different ways to look at some of the principles. The principles have been adopted by the
Canadian Forces and while neither guarantees of success nor rules of conduct, these principles are
combat-tested guides that must always be considered:13

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. This “master” principle requires every plan or action
be executed in order to achieve the leader’s chosen aim. At the tactical level, activities must be
planned and conducted in harmony with the intent and operational objectives identified by the
higher level of command. Hence, whether at the subunit level or below, a leader must ensure
that the intent is expressed in a concise and clear manner to ensure subordinates understand
their role in furthering the aim.

b. Maintenance of Morale. Success on operations often depends more on morale than

on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for the lack
of courage, energy, skill and bold offensive spirit. Morale must be developed and maintained
for success.

c. Offensive Action. A leader must act, not react. Seizing and maintaining the initiative allows a
leader freedom of action and a distinct psychological advantage. An offensive and aggressive
spirit must be developed at all levels and in all types of operations.

d. Security. Throughout all operations, BG COs must ensure active security through
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, patrolling and movement. At that same time, BG
COs need to ensure the measures taken to protect friendly forces and to ensure freedom of
movement do not overemphasize that force protection at the cost of effective, aggressive
actions against an adversary.

e. Surprise. While surprise includes secrecy and concealment, it also includes the elements of
deception, originality, audacity and speed, all of which must be exploited by leaders to achieve
maximum benefit.

11. 
B -GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations and the DTB, record 37434 define FSO as the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict
(see Chapter 3 for further detail). The concept of the three-block war is considered synonymous with FSO.
12. Strategic relevance implies that tactical activities undertaken by the Army are tied to strategic policy and the desired end state. It also implies that a force, to be
considered strategically relevant, must be capable of being moved and sustained on strategic operations. Tactically decisive implies that a force must be trained and
equipped to undertake successful tactical activities throughout the full spectrum of operations and within a JIMP environment.
13. Depending upon the operation and/or campaign, certain principles will have more weight than others.

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f. Concentration of Force. Concentration does not necessarily mean the simple massing
of forces, but rather refers to the idea of having them so disposed as to be able to deliver
a crushing and decisive blow where and when required. Concentration is a more a matter
of time than of space—the massing of effects rather than simply massing of force.

g. Economy of Effort. This principle implies the balanced employment of forces and a judicious
use of resources consistent with achieving the leader’s aim. It sometimes requires balancing
the risk in some areas in order to achieve success in the main area of effort.

h. Flexibility. Flexibility of mind and the ability to make alterations to plans to take advantage
of opportunities as they present themselves within the battlespace is critical to a leader’s
success. Flexibility relies upon effective information gathering activities and disseminating that
information in a timely manner. Effective leaders are able to use that information for rapid,
logical decision making.

i. Cooperation. Cooperation must be built upon a common aim, team spirit, interoperability,
division of responsibility and coordination of all activities to ensure a synergistic effect
is achieved. Cooperation is also founded on trust—trust based upon effective training and
a desire to work together that is fostered at all levels.

j. Administration. Sound administration is making the best and most timely use of the resources
available to a BG CO. It often is the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation
or the practicality of a mission. Planning administration needs to emphasize freedom of action
for the BG CO.

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CHAPTER 2
THE COMBINED ARMS GROUPING

GENERAL

1. Building a combined arms grouping requires an understanding of combat power including combat
functions as well as how and why it is organized into such a grouping. The Army’s role—that of generating
and maintaining combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces to support strategic objectives—requires
a broad mix of military capabilities. While those capabilities have a wider utility across the spectrum
of conflict, the chief capability desired of the Army is the ability to conduct combat operations based
on manoeuvre.14

THE ARMY ELEMENTS

2. To form a cohesive and balanced force capable of land combat, the Army is broadly divided into
three different elements:

a. Combat elements15 are those elements that have an integrated ability to employ manoeuvre
to engage the enemy directly. Ground manoeuvre16 elements include armour, infantry and
other direct fire systems (DFS) like mobile antiarmour.

b. Combat support (CS) elements are those elements that provide fire support, operational
assistance and enablers to tactical activities conducted by manoeuvre elements. They include
fire support; air defence; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
(ISTAR); military engineering; intelligence; electronic warfare; command and control; military
police; and some aviation elements.

c. Combat service support (CSS) elements are those elements that provide administrative and
logistics support to tactical activities conducted by manoeuvre elements. CSS elements include
logistics, health support services, equipment maintenance and administration.

3. A specific land force will then include each of the three elements, in varying proportion depending
upon the operation and mission as well as the type of campaign being undertaken.

UNDERSTANDING COMBAT POWER

4. Combat power is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit
or formation can apply against an opponent at a given time. The disruptive aspect of this includes the
ability to attack the enemy on the psychological plane.

14. 
Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to
the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (Defence Terminology Bank, Record 4717)
15. 
Combat elements should not be confused with the term “combat arms,” which describes a non-doctrinal personnel management grouping that includes armour,
infantry, artillery and army engineers.
16. 
The term ground manoeuvre is employed to make a distinction from other manoeuvre elements like attack aviation which can move and fire, but cannot hold ground.

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5. Combat power is generated by integrating and synchronizing the operational functions of Command,
Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain within a force structure.17 That force structure is then organized within
a BG CO’s battlespace, based on desired effects and applied towards the achievement of the higher
commander’s intent through tactical operations and activities.

6. Because combat power is largely measurable, it is used to define a tactical force’s overall operational
capability.18 At the tactical level, operations are based upon the application of combat power through the
organization of the Army’s elements—combat, CS and CSS—into combined arms groupings to achieve
desired outcomes and end states.

COMBINED ARMS GROUPINGS

7. A combined arms grouping allows for the effective application of combat power on operations.
Groupings are created to allow for the synchronization of a broad array of capabilities from individual
arms or disparate weapon systems. A BG CO will organize the force into a balanced mix of capabilities
based upon the mission, integrate those capabilities through unified plan and then synchronize their
activities within the battlespace according to the higher commander’s intent.

8. A BG CO will create such groupings for two principle reasons:

a. First, the use of different arms and/or weapon systems on operations allows for the creation of
complementary and reinforcing effects. For example, tanks advancing into an urban centre
alone are vulnerable to attacks from their blind spots (the sides and rear in particular). Similarly,
infantry advancing into a city centre alone are vulnerable to long-range direct fire crew served
weapons like a fortified machine gun position. Sending in a combined infantry-armour force
allows both arms to complement and reinforce the other: the tanks by providing ranged direct
fire against enemy strong points that would otherwise hold up the infantry advance, and the
infantry by providing close support to the tanks to deal with their vulnerability to enemy close
range antitank attacks. Thus combining arms can be seen as not only aiding in a more effective
defeat of an enemy, it can also be seen to allowing BG COs to maximize survival of troops
under their command. Roles, tactics and techniques of disparate arms and systems should be
coordinated and harmonized to provide support from one to another. A combined arms grouping
capitalizes on individual arm strengths while minimizing respective limitations, thus providing
the flexibility to overmatch a less well-balanced opponent.19

b. Second, combined arms groupings bring a unified command structure to disparate arms and
systems and integrate them to successfully achieve a specific mission. The Army organizes
individual arms elements—combat, CS and CSS—into a combined arms grouping under a
single command to achieve not only an optimal balance of capabilities and roles related to the
assigned tasks, but perhaps more importantly unity of command and purpose. The exact
composition of a combined arms grouping will be a product of a BG CO’s estimate for a specific
operation or tasking.

17. See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for more detail on the operational functions.
18. 
Unlike combat power, fighting power is based in part on a number of intangible elements (broadly, doctrine and the human dimension), which preclude accurate
measurement. See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for a more complete delineation between fighting and combat power.
19. 
Common SOPs and combined regular training that allows for the practising of grouping and regrouping will enhance the capabilities of the combined arms grouping.

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9. While combined arms groupings are generally ad hoc and created for specific operational or tactical
missions, the Army does have a number of standard groupings at the tactical level that are modular and
scalable, and are used as building blocks for any deployed force.20 These basic groupings include:

a. Company Group.21 A company group is an ad hoc and temporarily combined arms grouping
based upon a subunit headquarters (HQ); it is task-tailored for specific tasks/activities within
the FSO.

b. Combat Team. A combat team is an ad hoc and temporarily combined arms organization
based on a manoeuvre subunit HQ; it consists of a combination of integral and attached infantry
and armour sub-subunits. It is best suited for missions and tasks that require protected
manoeuvre22 and will be holding ground. CS and additional CSS elements may be attached as
the superior commander deems necessary. A combat team is a specific type of company group.

c. Battalion Group (Bn Gp).23 A Bn Gp is an ad hoc and temporarily combined arms grouping
based on a unit HQ; it is task-tailored for specific tasks/activities within the FSO. They typically
include CS and CSS elements.

d. Battle Group (BG). The BG is an ad hoc and temporarily combined arms grouping based on
a manoeuvre unit HQ; it consists of a combination of integral and attached infantry and armour
subunits, with their integral CSS elements. It is best suited for missions and tasks that require
protected manoeuvre and will be holding ground. CS and additional CSS elements may be
attached as the superior commander deems necessary. The BG is a specific type of Bn Gp.

THE BATTLE GROUP

10. Role. The BG is the principal land tactical manoeuvre unit. It is normally part of a brigade, but may
be placed under the command of a higher formation for a specific mission (the divisional reserve as
an example).

11. Mission. The BG’s core missions are close combat and the destruction/disruption of the enemy
through manoeuvre. It is optimized24 for FSO because of its broad range of capabilities, the modular
nature of its structure and its scalability. It specializes in offensive and defensive operations, missions
which require manoeuvre and the holding of ground. Support and additional service support elements
may be attached as the superior commander deems necessary.

12. Characteristics. The BG has the following characteristics:

20. 
A combined arms grouping, to be considered task-tailorable for a specific organization, requires the ability to regroup easily by day and night. It also requires common
drills that allow for successful regrouping to occur as well as subsequent successful employment of the regrouped elements. The creation and employment
of permanent structures—force groupings that are not capable of adjustment—are to be avoided as they lack the flexibility to respond to changes both to the mission
and within the complex operating environment. The Army’s basic building block organizations are able to retain their flexibility because of their scalable and
modular nature.
21. 
Other arms subunits can also form groups.
22. 
Protected manoeuvre refers to the synergy achieved by having more than one manoeuvre arm within a combined arms grouping. Thus, for example, while the infantry
can manoeuvre on their own, the addition of armour support allows for a wider range of operations and greater probability of success on any mission.
23. 
As with a company group, a battalion group can also be formed with other arms from other groups.
24. 
Optimized is used to mean that the BG has been found to be the best compromise among various structural models. By contrast, specialized refers to a BG being
specifically designed and highly skilled at the conduct of certain special activities, in this case, offensive and defensive operations.

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a. Firepower. The BG’s direct fire assets (armour and other direct fire support) are significant and
precise in nature. When combined with better situational awareness (SA), the BG’s ability to
employ coalition fires adds considerably to its overall capability.25 This normally includes an
allocation of indirect fire elements.

b. Mobility. The modern battlespace is expected to be much larger than traditionally viewed. The
BG is mobile under all conditions and, consequently, is more flexible in its employment. It can
also be easily supported by alternate means of transportation, including tactical aviation, and
by mobility enhancement, like that provided by engineering assets.

c. Situational Awareness. As technology continues to evolve, so too does the BG. It is increasingly
network enabled and has the ability to leverage networking technologies and human intelligence
(HUMINT) to enhance SA both vertically and horizontally. This communications architecture
has enabled the centralized command and decentralized control that has long been a goal. The
BG will, with the implementation of successive command and control information system
capability releases, use evolving technology and battle management to increase the rapidity
with which it can plan and conduct operations.

d. Sustainability. Precision capabilities result in sustainment economies. In other words, lesser

amounts of ammunition will be needed to affect targets.

e. Modular and Scalable.26 The BG has four core components: the HQ, the integral CSS company
as well as the infantry and armoured elements. The number and type of manoeuvre subunits
can be adjusted to meet the conditions and mission. The remaining combat, CS and CSS
components are added to the BG to provide it with the optimum balance of operational functions
(ie, Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain) to allow it to effectively bridge the full range of
tactical tasks within FSO.

f. Flexibility. Networked, sensor enabled and highly mobile, the BG can see first, understand
quickly and execute rapidly. This, combined with training for FSO, will result in a highly
agile formation.

g. Decisive. The BG’s significant firepower, enhanced SA and tactical mobility will prove to be
tactically decisive against all but peer opponent heavy enemy forces.

13. Limitations. The BG has the following limitations:

a. Close Terrain. Mechanized forces have traditionally been constrained by close terrain,
particularly urban areas, and this remains the case for the BG.

b. Fires. As stated earlier, the firepower of the BG comes from its ability to access joint and
coalition fire. Because long-range precision direct and precision indirect assets necessary
to enable this tactical concept are not integral to the BG, this poses some limitations.

25. Interestingly, COIN experiences in Afghanistan suggest that the kinetic ability of the Canadian BG is resulting in fewer requirements for its actual employment. In other
words, more kinetic power on certain operations may result in less reliance upon its actual use.
26. M
 odularity refers to the concept of adding or removing elements from a unit or formation, without significantly changing that unit or formation’s capability to successfully
complete those tasks for which it is optimized. Scalability examines the ability of a unit or formation to handle complexity. That complexity could be the result of adding
non-core elements to a unit or formation or it could be the result of the operating environment—operations within the joint or multinational environment as an example.

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c. Strategic Mobility. To achieve strategic responsiveness, the BG structure may be tailored to a

less robust structure, resulting in the downgrading of some key capabilities. When a less robust
structure is decided, missions and tasks should reflect the nature of the structure.

14. Figure 2-1 shows a possible BG configuration, while a possible BG within a coalition formation is
illustrated in Figure 2-2.

Figure 2-1: Possible BG Configuration27

27. T
 his BG configuration is based upon an actual BG deployed into Afghanistan in 2007. Additional attachments will depend on the mission and theatre of operations.
For example, this could include information operations elements.

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Coalition

NCE

NSE

Canadian

NCE National Command Element

NSE National Support Element
CIMIC PSYOPS PA CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
Attached as required PA Public Affairs

Figure 2-2: Possible BG Configuration within a Coalition Formation

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CHAPTER 3
EMPLOYING THE BATTLE GROUP

GENERAL

1. Employing a combined arms grouping like the BG requires an understanding of the BG’s battlespace
and its relationship to the complex operating environment within which the BG CO will be required
to operate.

THE BATTLESPACE

2. The BG’s battlespace28 consists generally of three areas which delimit the BG’s arrangement of
its combat power, and command and control authority, on the ground:

a. Area of Operations (AO).29 A BG CO is allocated a defined geographic area by a superior

commander within which they can conduct operations, coordinate fires, control movement as
well as develop and maintain installations. It is a tangible area that must be large enough to
shield the force and accomplish its mission, but not so large that the force cannot operate. A
BG CO must gain and maintain an understanding of the AO and exercise effective command
over all the forces and resources within. Complex environments mean that many operations
will not allow for a linear and/or contiguous deployment.30 AOs will often be more non-contiguous
than contiguous and will be widely dispersed. Coordination, cooperation and mutual support
between elements will be more difficult. Mission command and commander initiative at all
levels become increasingly important under such circumstances. Figures 3-1 to Figure 3-4
display some of the AO possibilities.

28. A battlespace is the environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force or complete a mission
successfully. (Defence Terminology Bank, Record 35045) It includes the air, land and sea environments, and the forces within (friendly and enemy), plus factors like
terrain infrastructure and weather. See NATO AJP-3 (2003) for more detail.
29. A
 n AO is an operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. It differs somewhat from an area of responsibility
(AOR), which is a geographical area of ground, sea or air under the command of a commander who has the necessary authority and power to exercise it. For all intents
and purposes, an AO and AOR can be considered the same at the tactical level. See NATO AAP-39 (2007) for further detail.
30. Linear operations are the traditional form of combat against a conventional opponent in which there are clear front lines and manoeuvre units operate
in contiguous AOs. Non-linear operations are those in which manoeuvre units usually operate in non-contiguous areas throughout the AO. Even when operating
in contiguous AOs, manoeuvre forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. (Source: Section 3, Chapter 6 of
B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations)

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Cold War & Gulf War Bosnia–Afghanistan

X FSCL
X

FLOT

FEBA

XX
X

XX

Figure 3-1: Contiguous, Linear AO31 Figure 3-2: Contiguous, Non-linear AO

NATION B
Landing Force
Adversary

NATION A

NATION A

Adversary
OCEAN

Figure 3-3: Non-Contiguous, Linear AO

31. Note that these aspects (contiguous/non-contiguous, linear/non-linear) exist at different levels. A BG may be part of a brigade’s (bde’s) contiguous array of BGs,
but the BG may have divided its area in a non-contiguous fashion. Also, mention should be made that the superior commander is responsible for any region of their
AO not assigned to a subordinate subunit.

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b. Area of Influence (A of I). The A of I is a

geographic area wherein a BG CO is directly
capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre
or fire support systems normally under their
command or control. It is both fluid and dynamic. A
BG CO needs to consider both physical and
psychological effects within their A of I. As with the
AI, a BG CO also needs to consider and synchronize
the activities within the JIMP framework.

c. Area of Interest (AI). The AI is the area of

concern to a BG CO relative to the objectives of
the current or planned operations. It must be
understood that the AI will be expanded beyond
the immediate geographic and temporal concerns.
At the tactical level, the BG CO needs to include
JIMP activities within and adjacent to the AO as
part of the AI. An AI will expand and contract
according to changes in the operational situation.
Figure 3-4: Non-Contiguous, Non-Linear AO

d. These three areas of the battlespace and their interrelationships are shown in Figure 3-5.

Battlespace Illustrated

Area of Influence

Area of Interest

Area of Operations

Figure 3-5: Area of Interest, Influence and Operations

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3. Figure 3-6 demonstrates the complexity in the operating environment.

THE (COMPLEX) OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

N D E R’ S B AT
O MMA TLE
H EC SP
AC Human Factors
Geographic T
E • JIMP
Factors
F INFLUE • Local Populace
• Urban EA O NC
AR E • Enemy
• Wooded
• Littoral
• Mountains
• Desert LINEAR NON-LINEAR

• Arctic

AREA OF
OPERATIONS

NON-
CONTIGUOUS CONTIGUOUS

T
ARE ES
A OF INTER
Environmental
Factors
• Climatic Extremes
• Hazards
• CBRN

Figure 3-6: Understanding the Relationship between the Battlespace and the (Complex) Operating Environment

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Using Combat Power to help determine AOs

A 2009 DRDC-CORA32 study examined the inventory of a BG (its combat power) in the 2021
timeframe and derived a number of limiting factors that affected the BG’s ability to disperse.
Specifically, the study examined quantifiable data related to:

• indirect fire support;

• direct fire support;

• casualty evacuation;

• resupply;

• command, control and communications;

• reinforcement;

• surveillance capability for unassigned areas; and

• aggregation of forces and conduct of collective activities within prescribed timeframes.

Based solely upon these quantifiable measures of combat power, the study provided a number
of theoretical maximum sizes for BG AOs, based upon the type of AO:

• Contiguous/Linear—6 km frontage x 6 km depth

• Non-contiguous Linear—100 km frontage x 50 km depth

• Contiguous/Non-linear—Circle with 2.5 km radius

• Non-contiguous/Non-linear—Circle with 70 km radius

The determining factors in the AO layout are the enemy and the operational design. These theoretical
maximums are further subject to both JIMP factors and, of course, to a BG CO’s risk assessment.
Nonetheless, they are useful planning figures.

APPLYING COMBAT POWER ON OPERATIONS

4. At the BG level, combat power is manifested through tactical activities arranged within the
battlespace. Three dynamic core functions—find, fix and strike (with exploit as an implied function33)—
of all activities contribute to the achievement of the BG CO’s34 desired objective:

32. DRDC CORA Technical Report 2009-003 dated November 2009.

33. A BG CO may or may not choose to exploit as part of an operation, hence exploit is considered an implied function.
34. While the term commander is generic in nature and applies to all levels of command from section commander on up, the term “BG commander” could imply that the
BG is a formation, rather than a grouping. Inasmuch as the commander of the BG is a unit CO, the term “BG CO” is used instead. Note it also allows the BG CO to be
differentiated from the other unit COs who may be acting as their arms advisors.

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a. Find is a continuous function that occurs throughout the activity or operation. It includes not
only the identification, location, tracking and assessment of targets, but also the development
of cultural based understanding of the enemy and the operational environment. At the BG level,
the find function is largely carried out by ISTAR assets.

b. Fix is the function whereby an enemy is deprived of freedom of action, and therefore, the ability
to manoeuvre is denied. Conversely, to fix an enemy allows friendly forces freedom of action to
strike an enemy in a manner and place of their choosing. Deception and surprise are key to
fixing an enemy. Fixing usually involves combat action against an enemy but can take other
forms including, for example, presence patrols, roadblocks or vehicle checkpoints to fix an
irregular enemy. Fixing can also take place on the psychological plane, usually through the
conduct of information operations.

c. Strike is achieved by attack and other offensive actions against the enemy. Tactical activities
intended to strike at the enemy are normally carried out by manoeuvre elements, but may
encompass CS elements as well. As an example, a psychological operations (PSYOPS) activity
could be undertaken by a PSYOPS team to help shape an enemy’s reaction on the battlefield.

d. Exploit. Exploitation is achieved through the seizure of an opportunity to achieve a higher

commander’s objective or fulfil part of the intent directly. Exploitation relies upon effective recce,
offensive action, initiative and a comprehensive understanding of a higher commander’s intent.
At the same time, commanders must respect the constraints that have been placed upon them
when considering such opportunities. Lastly, opportunities to exploit can occur at any time
during finding, fixing or striking the enemy.

5. It is important to remember that the core functions can be executed by agencies other than the
Army. For example, on combined operations, agencies for reconstruction or development could undertake
activities to accomplish the fix function while the security forces provide the strike function. Commanders
at all levels must ensure that the core functions are not undertaken in isolation and, instead, are properly
coordinated within the JIMP environment.

6. The Rule of Four35 is a planning tool that suggests that a BG CO requires four elements to
successfully complete an operation:

a. a finding force;

b. a fixing force;

c. a striking force that is ready to also exploit; and

d. a mobile (Air or/and Land) reserve to deal with the unexpected.

35. Note that the Rule of Four planning tool is relevant at all levels of command to all commanders.

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7. If a BG CO has insufficient forces to complete all tasks or objectives, they have the following options
available to achieve the Rule of Four:

a. phasing the operation; or

b. within the JIMP environment,

 (1) a BG CO could employ those combined partners operational control (OPCON) to the
force to fulfil one of the four elements (find, fix, strike / exploit or reserve);

 (2) coordinate the operations with other JIMP entities within the battlespace. Certain stability
operations lend themselves to this latter option.

INTEGRATION OF THE BG’S OPERATIONS INTO THE HIGHER COMMANDER’S INTENT

8. The integration of the BG’s operations is reflected in the commander’s operational plan and the
scheme of manoeuvre based on the intent. How the combat power of the BG is organized, applied, linked
to effects and then operationally integrated into the higher commander’s intent allows for the BG’s combat
power to be maximized through the execution of successful tactical activities. Three key concepts assist
BG COs in achieving this integration of operational functions within time and space:

a. main effort;

b. synchronization; and

c. tempo.36

9. Specifying the tactical purpose of each activity promotes SA, allows each subordinate element to
visualize its role in the overall organizational framework and provides understanding of how the activities
are synchronized to achieve the commander’s intent. The tactical purpose of each activity is defined
as follows:

a. Decisive Actions. Those actions that will directly achieve the commander’s intent.

b. Shaping Actions. Those actions that favourably shape the enemy and battlespace for the
decisive action.

c. Sustaining Actions. Those actions that ensure that the formation has adequate resources
to retain combat power beyond the accomplishment of the decisive action.

36. Note that these tenets are not new nor are they redundant, but can be seen as derived from the Principles of War. Hence, the main effort concept can be seen
as derived from Selection and Maintenance of the Aim and Concentration of Effort in particular. Synchronization can be seen as derived mainly from Concentration
of Force, Cooperation and Flexibility. Tempo is derived from Offensive Action and Flexibility.

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10. Figure 3-7 illustrates the tactical actions that are oriented towards the higher commander’s
main effort.

Shaping Operation

Decisive
Action
Shaping Action

Sustaining Reserve
Shaping Action
FARP Action

Battlespace encompasses all things commanders must understand to apply combat power effectively.

Figure 3-7: Applying Combat Power within the Battlespace

11. Main Effort. Designation of a main effort provides a focus for subordinates’ activities. The
identification of the main effort encourages initiative while maintaining unity of effort. The main effort may
shift the resources required to support it. The main effort is also not a point on a map, but rather is the
activity designated by the BG CO to best achieve decisive effect. It is defined by time and space as well
as those forces directly involved (friendly, enemy and the local populace).

12. A BG CO’s decision on where to establish the main effort will depend upon the higher commander’s
intent, the mission and freedom of action, the relative strengths of the force and those of the enemy as
well as the intelligence available. A BG CO has a number of ways to affect the main effort and provide
it with more weight:37

a. by allocating additional combat power (fires and manoeuvre) to the main effort;

b. by narrowing the boundaries of the force grouping allocated to the main effort and accepting
an economy of force elsewhere;

37. 
Note that a main effort can change over time and may in fact differ at the various levels of command. Those activities not on the main effort are termed “supporting
efforts.” Usually, a BG CO will usually be placed at the main effort.

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c. by allocating the CS and/or CSS priority to the force grouping allocated to the main effort;
and/or

d. through the positioning of the follow-on forces and planning options for the reserve.

13. Synchronization. Synchronization allows a BG CO to focus the resources and activities to produce
the maximum combat power at the decisive time and place. The product of effective synchronization is
the use of every resource in a complementary manner when and where it will make the greatest contribution
to success. For example, a BG CO may launch an attack using fires from allocated artillery and attack
aircraft. The use of such fires, when synchronized with the manoeuvre of friendly forces, will force the
enemy into a position where they can neither manoeuvre to fight, nor can they withdraw to safety. When
viewed through the eyes of the enemy, such synchronization would have a devastating effect.

14. Careful coordination is required to produce synchronization, and the BG CO must first determine what
they wish to achieve and how the activities must be sequenced to produce this. It includes, but is not limited
to, the actual concentration of manoeuvre elements at the decisive point. There is also an important
requirement for information to be passed as quickly as possible across the levels of command to allow for
information to be processed and disseminated to enhance synchronization and dictate the tempo.

15. Tempo. The BG CO controls the tempo of the operation by speeding up, slowing down or changing
the type of activity. Tempo is the rate of military action. Tempo is based upon three elements: speed of
decision, speed of execution and speed of transition from one activity to another. For example, by
completing the decision-making cycle consistently faster than the enemy, the commander will make the
enemy’s actions progressively irrelevant. The ultimate goal is to panic and paralyze the enemy and cause
them to lose the cohesion necessary to continue the fight. Tempo can be increased by avoiding battle
until absolutely necessary, and by relying upon subordinate commanders’ ability to conduct independent
action guided by the superior commander’s intent.

16. Annexes A through C and their associated Appendices provide detail on the roles, tasks and
employment of the following:

a. Annex A – Manoeuvre Elements;

b. Annex B – Combat Support Elements; and

c. Annex C – Combat Service Support Elements.

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ANNEX A
MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS

GENERAL

1. The roles, tasks and employment of manoeuvre elements are discussed in Appendix 1 to Appendix 3:

a. Appendix 1 – Armour;

b. Appendix 2 – Infantry; and

c. Appendix 3 – Armoured Reconnaissance.

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APPENDIX 1
MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – ARMOUR

ROLE

1. The role of armour is to defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of accurate firepower and
battlefield mobility.

2. Canadian armoured groupings at the subunit level are either in the form of a pure tank squadron or,
less commonly, in a mixed grouping that could include other direct fire systems.38 Either subunit grouping
is responsible for completing the tasks below, including the provision of direct fire out to 4000 metres, and
both subunit groupings remain viable options for BG COs in any future threat environment.

TASKS

3. Specific armoured tasks are to:

a. participate in a covering force;

b. participate in the advance to contact;

c. assault and destroy the enemy;

d. exploit the effects of weapons of mass destruction;

e. penetrate, exploit and conduct pursuits; and

f. participate in defensive operations, primarily as part of manoeuvre forces for counter-attacks

and blocking actions.

4. Additional tasks include:

a. providing surveillance and fire into designated target areas;

b. destroying enemy armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs);

c. destroying enemy fortifications;

d. providing close and intimate support to the infantry;

e. supporting and attacking by fire;

f. participating in surveillance operations; and

g. participating in lines of communication (LOC) security and convoy protection.

38. 
Direct fire weapons in general refer to support weapons, including antiarmour weapons. This annex is specifically looking at the mobile, antiarmour weapons that are
available for grouping with an armoured squadron. (Reference: B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations)

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TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

5. It may be counter-intuitive, but armour (tanks) often represent a very cost-effective solution to a BG
CO’s requirements because of the tanks’ multirole capability and inherent flexibility when considering the
alternate capabilities and systems that must be deployed to take their place. The basic tactical armoured
subunit is the tank squadron. The smallest fire unit is the tank troop. While the squadron can be
decentralized down to the troop level, such dispersion needs to be carefully balanced against sustainment,
serviceability, recovery and breaching requirements.

6. Major considerations for employment of armour include:

a. Firepower. Tanks have large calibre guns capable of firing armour-defeating, high-explosive,
smoke and canister ammunition. Tank gunfire is accurate and lethal against stationary and
moving targets. During the assault, the tank provides intimate support for the infantry. The
abilities to redeploy quickly and to engage targets of opportunity rapidly make the tank
particularly lethal. The use of image intensification, thermal imagery and battlefield illumination
permit the tank to deliver accurate, aimed fire in limited visibility.

b. Protection. A tank cannot be designed to provide absolute protection against attack from all
ranges and angles and still provide good firepower and mobility. The result must be a
compromise that affords a good chance of survival at tank battle ranges. The tank is the most
effective fighting vehicle in nuclear operations and can operate much closer to ground zero
than any other. It also provides protection against biological and chemical attack. An attached
dozer blade gives the tank a digging and earth moving capability, which can contribute to its
protection. Tanks are vulnerable to antiarmour weapons, but supporting infantry can reduce
this threat. At close quarters, tanks are blind and vulnerable to enemy short-range antitank
weapons. In close country, built-up areas or during periods of reduced visibility good liaison
with supporting infantry is essential.

c. Mobility. Mobility springs as much from the attitude of mind of BG COs and crews as from the
performance of the tank. To derive full value from the tank, the crew must be trained to think
quickly and aggressively. The cross-country performance of tanks enables them to move
quickly from position to position and to avoid enemy ground observation and fire. This agility,
combined with speed, is vital in all types of operations. The concept of battlefield mobility also
embraces the characteristic of protection. Mine rollers and ploughs provide an improved
minefield breaching capability.39 Size and weight may affect tactical plans by ruling out certain
routes, and vehicle noise can preclude surprise. Skilful driving and the use of cover may reduce
these drawbacks.

d. Flexibility. Flexibility derives from a combination of the firepower, mobility and communications.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs), battle procedure and drills also contribute to flexibility,
by enabling BG COs to concentrate and disperse and to shift the point of attack quickly from
one place to another without detailed orders.

39. 
Tanks with rollers have been used on operations in a road clearance package, but it should be noted that a tank roller alone cannot clear a route. Rollers can be used
for confidence building, proofing and area reduction. See Annex D of B-GL-361-017/FP-001 Mobility Support – Route and Area Clearance for more detail on the use
of mine rollers.

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e. Inability to Hold Ground. Tanks can deny ground by the application of fire, but they cannot by
themselves hold ground against a determined dismounted enemy. This requires the presence
of infantry.

f. Size, Weight, Noise and Thermal Signature. The presence of tanks is hard to conceal.
Concealment is accomplished through effort, imagination and skilful driving.

g. Sustainment. A dedicated echelon system is required for successful armour operations. As

stated above, disrupting the integrity of the squadron should be balanced by the BG CO against
the strains that will be placed on sustainment and serviceability operations as well as the
dispersion of breaching assets integral to the squadron.

DIRECT FIRE SYSTEMS

7. Direct fire systems, while a form of armour, serve a different role than a tank and should not be
confused as being interchangeable.

8. DFS Role. The role of the DFS is to provide direct fire capability to the BG.

9. DFS Tasks. The main tasks assigned to DFS elements are to:

a. provide surveillance and fire into designated target areas;

b. destroy enemy AFVs;

c. destroy enemy fortifications;

d. provide close and intimate support to the infantry;

e. participate in covering force actions;

f. participate in the advance;

g. support and attack by fire;

h. participate in the pursuit;

i. participate in the defence, primarily as the manoeuvre force in counter-attack by fire and
blocking actions;

j. participate in surveillance operations; and

k. participate in LOC security and convoy protection.

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10. Tactical Employment Considerations for DFS. Important considerations in the employment of
DFS elements within the BG scenario are:

a. As stated, DFS elements do not replace the tank. They lack the protection, mobility and
shock action necessary to be successful in traditional tank roles.

b. DFS elements do not operate alone. Like tanks, they operate within the combined arms
context, usually in conjunction with other armour and infantry.

c. DFS movement should be supported by a firm firebase.

d. DFS elements will make best use of the ground for their protection.

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APPENDIX 2
MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – INFANTRY

ROLE

1. The role of infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy.

TASKS

2. The main tasks assigned to the infantry are to:

a. destroy the enemy in close combat through the use of firepower and manoeuvre;

b. hold ground;

c. form part of a covering force;

d. act as all or part of a reserve;

e. conduct airmobile and amphibious operations;

f. establish surveillance;

g. conduct patrols; and

h. conduct security tasks.

3. Tasks are assigned as deemed appropriate by a BG CO based upon the ground and other factors
influencing the situation.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

4. The basic tactical subunit of the infantry is the rifle company. It may be task-tailored to meet the
demands of the situation at hand, but the company organization provides the required command, control
and structural depth to meet the stated role and tasks. All infantry operates and fights mounted and
dismounted. Differences in the type of infantry (light, mechanized, etc.) are due to the assigned mission
and tasks; furthermore, infantry units are tailored to meet the BG CO’s intent and grouping. In many
tasks, infantry subunits and units will be employed with tanks, CS elements and CSS elements.

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5. Major considerations for employment of infantry include:

a. Firepower. In addition to personal weapons, a range of direct fire weapons in both dismounted
and mounted configurations supports the infantry forces. That support—whether intimate or
remote (eg, from a fire base) from vehicle mounted weapons provided to mechanized infantry
on the move to, during and following the dismount—immensely enhances the capabilities and
lethality of these forces. Infantry have limited integral direct fire weapons but will still exploit all
available support to conduct manoeuvre and tasks. Infantry are capable of seizing and holding
ground. Both at the subunit level and above, infantry are capable of integrating with and
commanding other supporting arms (ie, produce direct or indirect fires) to enhance their combat
power and employment options.

b. Protection and Security. Mechanized infantry are afforded some protection from direct and
indirect fire by virtue of their integral armoured vehicles and mounted weapons. Limitations still
exist. Vehicle armour upgrades are often required to defeat hand-held antiarmour weapons or
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Once forced to dismount, all infantry require intimate fire
support (often a combination of both direct and indirect) in order to close with the enemy. In
complex terrain, all infantry are vulnerable and must make the best use of the immediate
ground for protection. Moreover, in complex terrain the infantry must consider the intimate
protection afforded by vehicles capable of providing fire support. Overall security is enhanced
by using long-range day and night optics. Subunits and recce elements provide security and
protection using observation posts (OPs) and patrols.

c. Mobility. Mechanized infantry is considered highly mobile: their light armoured vehicles (LAVs)
provide transportation, sustainment, communications and firepower. Moreover, under certain
conditions, they can be separated from their LAVs for airmobile operations and operations in
complex environments. Infantry, although limited in integral mobility support, are optimized, by
virtue of training and equipment, for mobility in complex environments and airmobile operations.

d. Flexibility. Infantry remains a highly flexible element. In addition to its integral firepower and
forces as well as its ability to operate in all types of complex terrain, the infantry retain the
command and control capabilities to integrate with other direct and indirect fire systems. By
virtue of its training focus and equipment, infantry forces are optimized for dismounted missions,
normally in complex terrain. However, due to lack of integral direct fire support and armoured
protection, risk must be realized or mitigated through the attachment of other forces. Moreover,
flexibility is undermined when training is not directed at or practised in the widest variety of
tasking options. Flexibility is also degraded immensely when infantry forces are tasked below
the subunit level.

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APPENDIX 3
MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS – ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE

ROLE

1. The role of armoured reconnaissance (recce) is to obtain and relay accurate and timely information
about the enemy and ground; it also contributes to battlespace security.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2. An armoured reconnaissance squadron has the same command and control (C2) as that of a typical
unit, less some staff horsepower. It is structured to operate across vast distances, keep pace with rapid
manoeuvre and exercise C2 over a combined arms team. It is the only manoeuvre subunit in the Army
that includes a robust C2 element that is able to direct operations in a complex environment independent
of camp infrastructure for prolonged periods of time. The basic doctrinal components of a reconnaissance
headquarters are sufficiently balanced so as to enable the attachment of numerous complementary
attachments such as electronic warfare (EW), snipers, long-range reconnaissance teams and tactical air
control parties to name just a few. Although not corps vital ground, this component must be recognized
as a unique capability in the Army that can provide flexibility to a BG CO. This subunit, structured to
operate as it is, can do so both at the unit level within the ever-expanding task force (TF) areas of
operation and, as has been seen in operations around the world, at the formation level. This can potentially
enable Canada to have two seats at the coalition formation table (that of the TF and that of the
reconnaissance squadron) or for Canada to have one seat at that table whilst employing an organization
that is much smaller than that of a TF (strategic economy of force).

TASKS

3. Armoured recce tasks are grouped as:

a. Recce tasks that include:

 (1) route, area, point and zone recce;

 (2) recce-in-force (although this task may require significant augmentation depending upon
the adversary);

 (3) counter-recce (which again may require significant augmentation);

 (4) CBRN recce.

b. Surveillance tasks including screens (both mobile and static) and OPs;

c. Tactical Security tasks that include:

 (1) LOC security (non-linear);

 (2) presence and framework patrolling;

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 (3) guard;

 (4) flank security;

 (5) convoy or VIP escort;

 (6) movement control operations including roadblocks and checkpoints;

 (7) vital point and critical infrastructure security.

d. other tasks that include:

 (1) support to cordon and search operations;

 (2) support to assaults;

 (3) raids;

 (4) direct actions.

CHARACTERISTICS

4. The following are characteristics of armoured recce:

a. Battlefield Mobility. Reconnaissance elements have unique capabilities to access most types
of terrain by mounted, dismounted or airlifted means and, therefore, can often obtain close
verification information that other sophisticated sensor systems cannot. Vehicle-based
reconnaissance elements require both fast movement on roads (operational mobility) and
cross-country (tactical mobility).

b. Firepower. Reconnaissance elements (as a sensor system) conduct target acquisition (TA)
and reconnaissance operations and must be able to quickly bring fire on identified targets. This
“sensor-to-shooter” link is essential for the timely destruction of key enemy assets on the
battlefield by friendly long-range direct and indirect fire assets. It is normal to expect that
formation level reconnaissance units and subunits have forward observation officers (FOO)
attached to them to provide fire support advice, planning, coordination and execution. In terms
of their own self-protection, reconnaissance vehicles and personnel must have a capability in
self-defence to defeat enemy soft skin and lightly armoured vehicles. For counter-reconnaissance
tasks, designated vehicles and personnel must have the capability to defeat the enemy’s
reconnaissance and other ground ISTAR assets as applicable. Reconnaissance operations
must be able to quickly bring fire on identified targets. This sensor-to-shooter link is essential
for the timely destruction of key enemy assets on the battlefield by long-range direct and indirect
fire assets.

c. Protection. In conjunction with all other ISTAR systems, reconnaissance elements by their
very nature provide force protection, by providing surveillance and early warning to react to
unexpected threats. Reconnaissance elements are protected by use of stealth, armour, integral
and supporting firepower, integral and supporting mobility and counter-mobility assets, integral
sensor systems as well as access to other Army ISTAR systems’ information.

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d. Sensing. By definition, reconnaissance elements must be capable of conducting surveillance,

and after detection and identification, they must be able to direct fires by way of a sensor-to-
shooter capability and conduct reconnaissance tasks where other sensors cannot gain
information. Reconnaissance elements must also provide a preprocessed analysis of what
they are detecting. In short, like all other sensor systems within the ISTAR system, reconnaissance
elements must be capable of executing all major facets of ISTAR. Reconnaissance vehicles
possess both vehicle mounted and dismounted sensor systems capable of acquiring, tracking,
identifying and designating targets at ranges well beyond the limits of human vision.
Reconnaissance systems are capable of operating in conditions of low visibility, all weather
conditions and in most types of terrain. Reconnaissance elements are required to deploy, in
conjunction with other ISTAR assets, to ensure area coverage.

e. Flexibility. Reconnaissance elements provide BG COs with a unique system that can gather
information where others cannot. Although reconnaissance units require sophisticated sensors,
the ability to send skilled soldiers to “see and verify” is indispensable and is always a confirmation
option when other sensors are ineffective. Reconnaissance units are capable of operating in
depth, in close combat and in rear areas. Good communication and information systems (CIS)
capabilities are vital for reporting as well as for command and control. Effective CIS enables
reconnaissance commanders to switch emphasis from surveillance to target acquisition to
reconnaissance quickly and efficiently.

f. Sustainment. Normally, reconnaissance units are capable of extended operations for up to

96 hours without replenishment from formation or unit close support resources. Integral service
support is inherent in the A and B echelons of reconnaissance units at the formation level whilst
BG reconnaissance platoons or troops usually receive their service support from within their
parent BG’s echelon system. The provision of CSS to ensure the sustainment of a reconnaissance
organization can be challenging. With the high rate of manoeuvre, the requirement for
uncompromising stealth and the significant distances associated with reconnaissance
operations, careful planning and use of all available transport options will be needed to ensure
that this support is timely and effective. This allows the reconnaissance elements to maximize
their impact on the battlefield. Occasionally, reconnaissance units require specially tailored
support organizations to effect emergency battlefield sustainment within their area of operations.
Foresight and planning are vital to mission success. In particular, estimating the correct amount
of ammunition and the proper amounts of the other combat supplies are critical, given the
limited stowage space often associated with reconnaissance vehicles.

CAPABILITIES

5. Armoured reconnaissance incorporates five significant capabilities:

a. Mounted Reconnaissance. Mounted reconnaissance organizations are structured and trained

to operate independently for long periods over extended lines of communication, with or without
attachments. They shield friendly forces while providing situational awareness throughout the
battlespace and can (with the appropriate attachments) shape the enemy to the BG CO’s
needs. They conduct reconnaissance, provide security and perform direct fire tasks. They
employ mobile, fast and situationally aware tactics to keep the enemy off balance and allow the
detection, designation and destruction of enemy ISTAR and high value targets. In sum, they
enable BG COs to manoeuvre their force with enhanced security and provide situational
awareness to preserve combat power until it can be deployed decisively.

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b. Counter-Reconnaissance. Counter-reconnaissance is defined as the identification, targeting,

destruction and/or neutralization of enemy reconnaissance assets. This destruction or
neutralization assists in providing tactical security for the formation. It also enables BG COs to
surprise and disrupt the enemy on contact and force them to operate blindly inside the friendly
decision-action cycle. Although harder to achieve in offensive operations than in defensive or
delaying operations, success against opposing reconnaissance helps maintain the tactical
security of friendly movement, preparations and activities. It also assists in achieving surprise
in offensive action and allows for the retention of the integrity of fire support systems,
C2 facilities and logistics resources. The nature of employment of armoured reconnaissance
forces—their firepower, protection and mobility—puts them in the ideal position to effect
this task.

c. Surveillance. Surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of the battle area for the
purpose of providing timely information and combat intelligence. The purpose of surveillance is
to acquire information by maintaining a watch over the battlefield thereby contributing to the
production of intelligence and maintaining tactical security. This capability is arguably a subset
of reconnaissance, as it is undertaken throughout the spectrum of tasks associated with
reconnaissance and, in particular, during the screen, guard and flank security tasks.

d. Tactical Security. This is defined in operations as: the measures necessary to deny information
to the enemy and to ensure that a force retains its freedom of action and is warned or protected
against an unexpected encounter with the enemy or an attack. Armour reconnaissance
contributes to tactical security through the execution of the following tasks: screen, guard, flank
security, rear area security, traffic control, convoy escort and CBRN.

e. Direct Fire. This capability is equally valid for both the direct fire support unit and the
reconnaissance regiments. AFV crews must be technically and tactically proficient at the
employment of precision main gunfire, from a protected manoeuvrable platform, to achieve
point target destruction from close in to maximum range.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

6. Important considerations for the employment of armoured recce forces are:

a. The smallest manoeuvre element is the recce patrol.

b. Observe without being detected.

c. Make and maintain contact.

d. Report accurately and maintain communications.

e. Avoid decisive engagement.

f. Confirm enemy dispositions.

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ANNEX B
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS

GENERAL

1. The roles, tasks and employment of combat support elements are discussed in Appendix 1
to Appendix 11:

a. Appendix 1 – Close Support Artillery;

b. Appendix 2 – Ground-based Air Defence;

c. Appendix 3 – Engineers;

d. Appendix 4 – Signals;

e. Appendix 5 – Electronic Warfare;

f. Appendix 6 – Human Intelligence Teams;

g. Appendix 7 – Tactical Psychological Operations Teams;

h. Appendix 8 – Civil-Military Cooperation Tactical Support Teams;

i. Appendix 9 – Military Police;

j. Appendix 10 – Tactical Aviation; and

k. Appendix 11 – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

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APPENDIX 1
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – CLOSE SUPPORT ARTILLERY

ROLE

1. The role of close support (CS) artillery is to assist in the defeat of the enemy with indirect fire as part
of the all-arms battle. Indirect fire, either integrated with manoeuvre or employed independently, can be
used to destroy, neutralize, suppress and harass the enemy. As one of the principle means of generating
combat power, it can be used for both fixing and striking the enemy and can assist in attacking the enemy
on the moral as well as the physical plane. Ownership of the various firepower assets is irrelevant, and
the focus should be on coordinating available weapons platforms to produce the maximum effect on the
enemy as directed by the BG CO.

2. A gun battery is normally placed in direct support (DS) of a BG. The battery commander’s (BC’s)
party at the BG HQ and the FOO with the combat team are the most visible aspects of this support.

TASKS

3. At the BG level, the two key tasks are:

a. Close Support. CS artillery provides the firepower both to enable own forces to manoeuvre
and to prevent the enemy from manoeuvring by engaging them throughout their depth. CS will
usually include providing advice, observations, liaison and communications. Indirect fire
programmes in support of the BG may include:

 (1) fire plans in support of offensive operations;

 (2) defensive fire plans;

 (3) engagement of opportunity targets; and

 (4) provision of smoke and illumination.

b. Integration. The integration of all indirect fire support is a responsibility of the BC, which
is achieved via the fire support coordination centre (FSCC) within BG HQ.

4. As enablers to the above, CS artillery also conducts:

a. coordination; and

b. target acquisition.

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TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

5. Artillery fire support is one of the most powerful and flexible components in the battlespace, and it
is capable of delivering massive weights of fire throughout the AO. Artillery strives to concentrate the
available fire support at the time and place required, in such strength as to exert a decisive influence on
operations. In order to achieve this effect, the principles of concentration of force, economy of effort,
coordination and flexibility must be observed.

a. Concentration of Force. Artillery is commanded at the highest level and controlled at the
lowest. While movement of the guns is normally a formation responsibility, the fire of close
support artillery, mortars and other resources should be fully integrated and controlled by the
BC, with FOOs at the subunit level controlling that fire. In fire planning the principle of
concentration aims to ensure that the important targets are dealt with effectively; if necessary,
each target is engaged in turn rather than dispersing the available effort over so many targets
that none receives adequate fire.

b. Economy of Effort. If the principle of concentration is satisfied, the principle of economy of

effort will also be satisfied. Artillery fire must be coordinated with that of other attack resources
so that the full effect is enhanced. Economy of effort implies that the indirect fire effort should
not exceed that necessary to produce the results required by the BG. In particular, the availability
of ammunition is always a factor limiting the artillery’s ability to fulfil its tactical function, and any
unnecessary expenditure must, therefore, be avoided.

c. Coordination. Coordination includes the synchronization of all available fire support in concert
with the BG CO’s concept of operations. Close coordination is required to integrate the activities
of artillery and close air support (CAS) aircraft, and this is carried out in the BG FSCC with the
airspace coordination centre (ASCC). Successful cooperation is based on knowledge of
capabilities and limitations together with mutual trust developed through affiliation and training.
Cooperation between the close support artillery, air and aviation commanders (and between
FOOs, forward air controllers [FACs] and pilots) will ensure that targets are effectively engaged.
It is also imperative that the fire support and ISTAR plans are fully integrated through the
targeting process. By coordinating these plans, information on the enemy can be determined
at the appropriate time for the fire support system to strike.

d. Flexibility. Flexibility as a principle implies the ability to shift firepower rapidly over a wide
frontage in order to support the BG plan as dictated by the tactical situation. The artillery
system facilitates flexibility by providing rapid and reliable communications, permitting timely
C2. A second component of flexibility is the superimposition of artillery, which is the allotment
of extra fire units on a target, in order to provide an additional weight of fire, which may
subsequently be switched to another target without degrading the required intent on the original
target. It provides a concentration of all available firepower while retaining the flexibility
necessary to deal with the unforeseen. Fire planning must also be simple to ensure flexibility.

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6. Application of Firepower. The application of firepower should be covered once the BG CO has
determined the desired effect to achieve upon the enemy. In the BG, it will usually centre around indirect
fire, including air-delivered munitions40 as well as the firepower of the combat arms’ direct fire weapons.
Fires are usually employed as part of manoeuvre, to destroy, neutralize or suppress targets. The
appropriate mix of weapon systems in terms of volume, duration, lethality, precision and range of munitions
(both direct and indirect) should be chosen to achieve the desired effect. Non-lethal effects (information
operations, media operations, CIMIC activity, etc.) should also be integrated. Major considerations in the
employment of close support artillery at BG-level are:

a. Availability. FOOs and other observers will be located forward. They may be moved around
the battlefield, and between subunits, at the direction of the BC. Guns are never held in reserve
(although a stock of ammunition may be). The guns of a reserve formation will normally be
deployed in support of first echelon forces. It will often be necessary to move guns to be able
to give optimal support for phases of the battle, and there may be periods where a reduced
level of availability must be accepted to enable this movement. Air/aviation availability can
never be guaranteed.

b. Paucity of ISTAR Assets. It is likely that the force’s ISTAR assets will be in considerable
demand for information and intelligence gathering, target acquisition, the engagement of
targets and battle damage assessment (BDA). The BG CO will need to manage the BG’s own
scarce ISTAR assets in accordance with the manoeuvre plan, and the BC will be the major
executor of this function on the BG CO’s behalf.

c. Logistics. Delivering the correct munitions to the correct weapon system in sufficient
quantities to achieve the desired effect is a considerable logistical challenge and must be given
due consideration.

d. Protection and Mobility. The protection and mobility of assets delivering firepower must
be considered in order to ensure that these valuable assets are not needlessly exposed.

e. Collateral Effects. The effects of fire on the local population and host nation infrastructure
must be considered in order to minimize any long-term damage that would unnecessarily delay
post-conflict stabilization.

40. 
Although many air-delivered munitions are direct fire systems from the pilot’s point of view, for ground commanders and their troops, air-delivered munitions are,
for all practical purposes, similar to indirect fire.

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APPENDIX 2
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE

ROLE

1. The role of air defence (AD) artillery is to “prevent the enemy from interfering from the air with
friendly force operations on the ground.”41 This role encompasses many aspects, from planning and
advising on the air threat, protecting the force through passive measures (through primary observational
responsibility of the airspace and early warning) to deploying and using surface-to-air fires. One of the
enemy’s most effective means of destroying the cohesion and freedom of action of the BG is through
attack from the air, by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or other improvised
aerial devices.

2. Air defence is of vital importance to commanders at all levels. The BG CO must ensure that their
forces are protected by appropriate air defence assets, grouped where possible, under their command.
The systems available may range from ground-based air defence (GBAD) artillery, to the use of weapons
with an ad hoc AD role (eg, tank guns, LAV cannon, machine-guns [MGs]).

TASKS

3. The most likely tasks for GBAD in support of the BG are:

a. Vital Point (VP) Defence. Defence of VPs (such as BG HQ, reserve demolitions, concentrated
subunit locations and echelons) will for the most part be accomplished within area air defence
coverage. If the BG CO determines that an asset of particular importance, or the passive
measures in place, preclude the requirement of a wider GBAD defence a focused VP defence
will be conducted.

b. Area Defence. The protection task for the defence of the BG AO, main operating bases (MOBs) /
forward operating bases (FOBs), etc is termed area air defence. In addition to any attached
very-short-range air defence (VSHORAD) assets, the BG may also be under an area AD
umbrella. Area AD systems can provide coverage by following at least one bound behind the
BG’s leading elements and having an effectiveness envelope which extends forward over
them. Dependant upon the particular nature of the assigned GBAD assets, the type of equipment
will largely dictate the balance between the ability to achieve point or area defence.42

c. Route Defence. Where a route is at particular risk, and/or when passing through the AO
of another formation, GBAD may be deployed to protect the BG’s movement.

d. Situational Awareness / Early Warning. SA and early warning is provided by the GBAD
weapon system, other units, sensors and data links from joint and coalition force assets.
They are provided to the BG through the ASCC.

41. B -GL-372-001/FP-001 Air Defence Artillery Doctrine (1997).

42. 
The assigned troop may be a coalition asset, and its weapon system may be better suited to one type of defence, at the expense of the other.

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e. Airspace Coordination. The purposes of airspace coordination are to provide minimum risk
to friendly air assets, minimum restrictions to AD weapons and efficient operability in an
electronic warfare plan. These are accomplished by promoting the ability of air, land, special
operations and maritime forces to operate in an integrated manner, with minimum mutual
interference, restraint or risk to friendly forces and non-combatant airspace users. In the BG,
this function is carried out by the GBAD troop commander, the ASCC if the BG is independent
or by a liaison team from the formation’s ASCC. They coordinate the movement of all air users
within the BG’s airspace and deconflict them from BG fire effects.

4. With the withdrawal of ADATS (air defence anti-tank system), in April 2011, Canada no longer has
a GBAD capability. Dependant on the scenario, a BG may still receive a GBAD troop from US or coalition
forces, under OPCON or tactical control (TACON), to support it and to provide integral force protection. It
will consist of a number of fire units, which will be deployed to provide an integrated defence of the BG
CO’s AD priorities. It will most likely be employed for point defence of HQs or concentrated subunit
locations such as attack position, assembly areas or hides. The troop commander will establish a
command post (CP), usually as part of the BG FSCC, from which the local air picture (LAP) and eventually
the recognized air picture (RAP) will be generated. The CP is also a means of passing digital fire control
commands to each of the weapon detachments. The troop provides the BG with situational awareness
(and early warning) of their airspace. If the BG is working independently, an ASCC may be established to
provide GBAD advice and airspace coordination of BG assets for the BG CO. The ASCC will link-in with
the BG FSCC; tactical air control post (TACP); and the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance coordination centre (ISTARCC). The troop will have limited communications and
will likely be vulnerable to enemy ground attack, so the BG must provide it with force protection (FP)
when necessary.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

5. Key considerations for GBAD employment for the BG are:

a. Command and Control. Command of the GBAD will be external to the BG, usually at formation
level. At BG level, control will be exercised through the GBAD troop CP. GBAD will normally be
allocated to the BG as a complete troop, usually containing between four to six fire units (FUs),
dependant on weapon system. Centralized fire control procedures, in accordance with
applicable ROE, can be conducted by the troop CP using digital C2 means. Under certain
circumstances, the FUs will be expected to engage should the level of activity exceed the
capacity of centralized C2 to respond effectively; although, the final decision to engage any
target is vested in the detachment commander. Rapid communications is key to this type of
C2 arrangement.

b. Airspace Coordination. Integration with other AD assets and airspace coordination measures
may influence how GBAD weapons are employed. Consistently integrated, flexible and
responsive use of the airspace is required for success. To this end, the GBAD troop provides
the functional apparatus by which the BG CO’s priorities for use of the airspace are exercised.
This stems from the immediacy of communicating friendly air movement to FUs to prevent
fratricides and is perpetuated by the artillery’s need to deconflict fire delivery through airspace
(indirect fire trajectories and CAS). Guidance will be given by the GBAD troop commander
in coordination with the ASCC.

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c. Reaction Time. GBAD units must be responsive because of the rapidity of air attack and
the correspondingly short identification and engagement times available.

d. Priorities. There will rarely be enough GBAD resources to adequately protect all assets.
The BG CO must therefore set priorities for GBAD tasks according to their importance, and the
troop commander will provide analysis of these via their estimate process, with the result
passed to the BG operations staff for approval.

e. Terrain and Weather. Terrain may inhibit mobility and, also, FU siting. Weather may influence
the time available to identify and engage hostile aircraft. Bad weather, especially rain, can also
degrade the performance of radars and laser guidance systems.

f. Movement. Moving units are particularly vulnerable to detection and attack during periods of
good visibility. GBAD protection of units on the move is critical, and the troop commander must
decide whether FUs should be pre-positioned or accompany the BG during the move. It should
be noted that coverage is reduced or eliminated by moving FUs systems, but this decision
will be influenced by the air threat, the nature of the move, the type of GBAD system and
the terrain.

g. Electronic Warfare. EW can provide information to GBAD units to assist in defeating the
enemy’s jamming and deception effort. Friendly jamming assets can be employed to disrupt
enemy aircraft systems but must be coordinated with GBAD requirements. GBAD can contribute
to deception because their emitters have distinctive signatures.

h. Local Defence. GBAD detachments must coordinate their FP requirements with BG subunits
in their areas. This includes everything from integrating crew-served weapons coverage, to
movement support in convoys, casualty collection and evacuation. GBAD should be deployed
to permit the interception of enemy air as far forward as possible, with engagements continuing
through the point of weapon release and beyond. Early warning of enemy air attack is vital, and
GBAD deployments will frequently be as far forward as possible. Most infantry weapon systems,
particularly LAV cannon, are effective against enemy aircraft and can normally be used in
self-defence.

i. Sustainment. Sustainment of the GBAD troop is normally provided by the BG (or directly from
the GBAD battery echelon if not integrated into a BG replenishment system) and is often
augmented by the attachment of elements from the GBAD battery echelon. The GBAD battery
resupplies missiles in all situations. Limited maintenance support may be available from the
BG’s maintenance system; however, specialist support and technical assistance is provided by
the GBAD battery. GBAD assets can be resource intensive; maintenance is an issue that
requires detailed planning given the dispersed nature of the weapon locations and the need for
force protection of maintenance teams.

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APPENDIX 3
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – ENGINEERS

ROLE

1. The role of engineers is to assist the land force to live, move and fight within the battlespace and
to deny the same to the enemy. With limitations, engineers may also be employed as infantry
when required.43

2. Military engineering covers a great variety of subject areas and primarily undertakes to shape the
physical terrain for operations. This shaping ranges from manoeuvre support tasks to construction in rear
areas and encompasses structural, civil, mechanical and electrical engineering. Military engineers are
organized as:

a. Close Support. Combat engineer forces attached to a BG are organized and equipped to
allow manoeuvre with the BG F echelon and provide engineer advice to the BG CO. Tasks are
carried out to meet mobility, counter-mobility and survivability requirements of the manoeuvring
forces. Attached combat engineer forces will frequently include an echelon due to unique
logistic demands; or

b. General Support. All other military engineering forces are organized and equipped to support
the force as a whole. They can operate independently or reinforce close support forces.

TASKS

3. Engineer tasks are grouped into the following categories:

a. Mobility. This includes support to both manoeuvre and out-of-contact movement by overcoming
and/or reinforcing a multitude of existing obstacles under permissive and non-permissive
conditions. Mobility support may include countermine, counter-obstacle, gap crossing and
movement enhancement tasks.

b. Counter-mobility. These tasks shape enemy manoeuvre by modifying terrain features

and emplacing tactical obstacles. Effective shaping can only be achieved through combined
arms integration.

c. Survivability. Active and passive measures protect personnel, weapons and supplies from
detection, targeting and battle damage. While all arms are responsible for individual survivability,
engineers have technical knowledge, skills and equipment to assist at the collective level.

d. General Engineer Support. This involves providing engineer advice, technical expertise,
resources and work that does not reside within the previous three categories. Water supply;
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); provision and maintenance of main supply routes,
accommodations, utilities and services; and provision of landing facilities, bulk water and fuel
storage are but a few examples.

43. While engineers are not equipped or as capable as the infantry to conduct infantry tasks, they can nonetheless perform this secondary role.

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e. Geomatics. Key to mastering terrain is its visualization by tactical and engineer commanders.
Geo engineers support manoeuvre commanders with print and digital terrain products. They
also support planning by providing inputs to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
process at all levels.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

4. The normal attachment to a BG is the engineer squadron, task-tailored to the mission. The squadron
headquarters (SHQ) will be structured to support battle procedure and provide advice within the BG HQ,
while coordinating access to further engineer resources and support.44 Some engineer work is subject to
technical standards regulated outside the operational chain of command, and the engineer advisor will
support the BG CO in exercising their discretion on engineer tasks.

5. The following principles apply to the employment of engineers:

a. Centralized Coordination and Decentralized Execution. There will always be more work
than engineers to carry it out. Centralized coordination and decentralized execution allow
resources to be managed in order to accomplish as many of the tasks as possible in the time
available. It is, therefore, not unusual for attached engineers to be regrouped under—or tasked
by—a higher formation in order to support a higher main effort.

b. Allocation of Priorities. Tactical commanders must assign priorities to engineer work to

ensure that effort is focussed where it will best support achievement of their intent. Engineers
are not held in reserve, and priorities allow for reinforcement where needed.

c. Early Warning and Reconnaissance. Engineers seldom have all necessary resources on
hand for a task. BG COs and staff should ensure that engineers are given maximum possible
warning of future operations and likely tasks in order to allow recce to determine requirements
and necessary logistic coordination.

d. Continuity of Task. Once work begins on an engineer task, the same engineers should
complete it. Redeployment in mid-task induces delay and extra effort and should be avoided.

e. Communications. Engineers frequently execute tasks dispersed across the battlespace.

Exercise of adequate C2 requires good communications support.

44. 
See B-GL-361-001/FP-001 Land Force Engineer Operations ― Volume 1 for more detail.

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APPENDIX 4
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – SIGNALS

ROLE

1. The role of signals is to provide commanders and their staffs with the means to exercise command
and control through the exploitation of the military and global information environments while denying the
enemy’s use of the same.

COMMUNICATION TASKS

2. There are two major functions that support Army operations:

a. CIS, which include the tactical command, control and information system; tactical communication;
and electronic protection; and

b. EW, which includes both electronic support and attack.

3. When required the following functions also support Army operations:

a. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR);

b. counterspace;

c. information operations;

d. network warfare; and

e. cyberspace when required.

4. The communication tasks of signals at the BG level are no different from those at formation level,
save that the administrative support of the BG HQ and local defence are collective tasks of all members
of the HQ and not solely signals. Signal tasks at the BG level include:

a. planning, coordinating and controlling the use of all communication resources provided
by signal elements organic to or allotted in support of the BG;

b. providing all BG-level communication facilities necessary for the BG links to the higher
formation HQ;

c. providing radio communications;

d. providing terminals and interconnections for the Land Command Support System (LCSS)
for the BG staff;

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e. as part of the BG CO’s planning team, advising on all signal aspects of command and control
including the:

 (1) signal plan and the best use of available resources;

 (2) allocation of resources by priority;

 (3) siting and layout of BG HQ and HQ echelon;

 (4) employment of EW resources and the implications of EW operations;

 (5) training of users;

f. supervising all aspects of battlefield frequency spectrum management, including frequency

assignments and electromagnetic compatibility, to include:

 (1) allocating frequencies and monitoring all radio frequency emissions;

 (2) controlling and coordinating power outputs and types of antennas;

 (3) when required, registering frequencies and coordinating with allied or international forces,
national and civil agencies;

g. advising commanders and staffs on signal security (SIGSEC) and enforcing SIGSEC policy
among all users including the:

 (1) distribution and custody of all cryptographic stores and equipment within the formation;

 (2) operation of online and offline encryption systems and equipments;

 (3) implementation of electronic deception plans as ordered by higher HQ;

 (4) monitoring of all formation radio nets and reporting SIGSEC violations and interference
problems;

 (5) distribution of daily changing frequencies, call signs, net identification signs and address
groups;

 (6) notification of start/stop timings for voice codes and key settings for voice, telegraph and
data encryption equipment;

h. establishing liaison with civil and other military communication agencies, as required;

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i. providing maintenance and repair services for signal equipment as follows:

 (1) advice to the staff for the allocation of priorities for repair and maintenance of signal
equipment in the formation;

 (2) level one and two maintenance of signal equipment;

 (3) assistance and supervision of maintenance in other units organic to, or allotted to,
the formation;

j. holding a reserve of controlled signal stores in accordance with brigade or higher formation policy;

k. supervising and assisting in the provision of communications at all levels of command in the
formation as follows:

 (1) ensuring the best use of equipment;

 (2) developing training programmes for users and signallers;

 (3) providing technical advice and materiel assistance to meet special communication
requirements;

l. keeping and distributing official time; and

m. providing or coordinating communications for movement control.

ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

5. The administrative tasks of the BG signals include:

a. providing the operational and clerical sub-staffs needed for the operation of the BG HQ;

b. operating and maintaining the vehicles and equipment used by the HQ; and

c. providing first line CSS to all HQ elements.

PROTECTION TASKS

6. The protection tasks of the BG signals include:

a. providing early warning of enemy action, approach, intrusion or infiltration;

b. minimizing the effects of strafing, bombing, mining and CBRN; and

c. arranging the optimum use of available combat power to repel an actual attack.

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF SIGNALS

7. Important considerations in the tactical employment of signals in the BG are:

a. The BG signal officer (Sig O) is an integral part of the BG CO’s planning group. This includes
the development, generation, distribution and implementation of the BG’s signals plan or
system management plan in accordance with the BG CO’s intent. The Sig O must take into
consideration all possible services and transmission means required by a BG based on the
information management (IM) plan to allow the BG CO to exercise effective command and
control over the force and must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation will likely
evolve over time in light of changing circumstances.

b. Infantry battalion signal platoons and armoured regiment signal troops are small and have
limited manpower and resources. They may require augmentation from the formation to perform
functions such as the laying line and providing expanded dispatch rider (DR) services.

c. The signal troop/platoon, regardless of its size, must provide continuous and reliable communications.

d. While mobile BG operations normally rely on combat net radio as the primary means for
providing command and control, the BG CO must be prepared to use every means available to
minimize the use of combat net radio in conditions of EW. The use of detailed orders, briefings,
personal contact, liaison officers (LOs), DRs and line will be the preferred methods of
communications during some operations.

e. The BG Sig O must be included early in the planning of operations, especially if regrouping,
sustained operations or long communicating distances are involved. In these cases, the Sig O
will be required to plan for additional frequencies which are non-interfering, allocate and
distribute low level codes for attached units, coordinate with the gaining or losing unit signal
officer and formation signal squadron, coordinate special resupply procedures for low level
codes and deploy radio rebroadcast stations. The operation of war will also determine which
type of alternate communications should be used in place of combat net radio in an active
EW environment.

f. Formation headquarters will provide communications to the BG in the form of secure combat
net radio, DRs and line. Formation may also provide on an attached or in-location basis, line,
satellite or radio relay detachments to ensure communications to the BG. This will pose special
siting, positioning, resupply and maintenance problems which must be resolved by the BG.
Specialized signal elements such as EW detachments may also be in-location of the BG.
On these occasions, coordination must be affected with the BG HQ responsible for the area.

g. For signals’ commanders and staff to plan, direct and monitor activities for network operations
an IM plan from the operational commander and staff is required. The IM plan will allow signals
to anticipate and support the functions of situation awareness, battle management, battle
planning and sensor integration in the operational environment. The IM plan identifies how
relevant information is to be managed internally and externally. The IM plan assigns
IM responsibilities to specific staff, describes information requirements, provides guidance
to system management organizations on requirements for voice and data communication links
as well as information currency requirements and information protection needs.

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h. When it becomes necessary to deploy a repeater and rebroadcast station, the security and resupply
requirements of the detachment(s) must be taken into account in the operational environment.

i. Signals must take every opportunity to use local telecommunication services to meet operational
requirements; however, security and network vulnerability are important operational security
(OPSEC) considerations that will need to be considered. Both military and commercial
CIS play important roles in today’s BG operations.

j. The increasing dependence on CIS has created both increased capability but also increased
vulnerability. Computer systems and networks are vulnerable to attack at any time. Cyber
attacks provide the opportunity to wreak havoc on networked services and information that
may have impact on operations. These intrusions may be initiated at any time or any point in
operation. Accordingly, security measures and procedures must actively, as well as passively,
preserve the confidentiality, integrity and functionality of our networks. The BG information
systems security officer (ISSO) plays a critical role for the BG CO in managing the day-to-day
security of assigned CIS and for enforcing compliance with applicable security policies
and orders.

k. Interoperability is possible within the constraints of technical feasibility and the security policies
of coalition partners. Certain information exchange requirements may not be possible over the
LCSS and other methods will have to be considered.

l. EW assets may or may not be grouped under the BG; however, EW support will be available
through an EW LO, EW troop commander or detachment commander.

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APPENDIX 5
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ROLE

1. EW are those military actions taken to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the
search for, interception of and identification of electromagnetic emissions; the employment of
electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum; and the actions that ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

2. The role of EW elements is to provide the framework to carry out EW support (ES) and EW attack.45
EW elements also support defensive EW carried out by all arms/services.

TASKS

3. The following tasks can be carried out by tactical EW organizations for the BG:

a. provide immediate threat warning;

b. provide “single source” tactical signals intelligence in the form of EW summaries or tactical
reports, which supports current operations and future planning;

c. provide target acquisition of adversary electromagnetic emitters;

d. provide EW attack support to BG operations; and

e. provide electronic protection (EP)46 advise on the LCSS network.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4. The BG Sig O is an integral part of the BG CO’s planning group. This includes the development,
generation, distribution and implementation of the BG’s signals plan in accordance with the BG CO’s
intent. The Sig O must take into consideration all possible services and transmission means required by
a BG based on the IM plan to allow the BG CO to exercise effective command and control over the
force and must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation will likely evolve over time in light of
changing circumstances.

5. These communication means and services should be reflected in the operation plan’s signals annex.
The annex should also include the planning, coordination and execution of all related EW measures that
deny or disrupt the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This portion of the plan is coordinated
in conjunction with the EW / Sig intelligence (Int) LO or EW troop commander (Tp Comd) to ensure that

45. 
ES is the division of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, a commander to search for, intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of intentional
and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. EW attack is the division
of EW involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading,
neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability. An electronic attack is considered a form of fire. An electronic attack is considered a form of fire.
Source: B-GL-351-003/FP-003 Signals in Land Operations, Volume 3: Tactical EW and SIGINT.
46. 
EP is the division of EW involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment
of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability.

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it is harmonized with the overall plan. Signals planning is critical in support of BG mobile and static
operations, particularly if regrouping, during sustained operations or when long communicating distances
are involved.

6. EW assets may or may not be grouped under the BG; however, EW support will be available
through an EW LO or EW detachment commander.

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APPENDIX 6
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – HUMAN INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

ROLE

1. The role of HUMINT teams is to provide the BG with intelligence developed from human sources.

TASKS

2. HUMINT teams may conduct the following activities in support of BG operations:

a. debriefing and tactical questioning of a variety of groups, including displaced persons, refugees,
local civilians, NGOs, coalition and Canadian military as well as government and civilian
personnel within the BG AO;

b. military intelligence and enhanced reconnaissance;

c. handling of human sources with access to information of potential intelligence interest;

d. tactical counter-intelligence within the BG force protection plan;

e. interrogation to elicit information from non-consenting individuals within a carefully controlled

environment. Interrogation is a highly specialized and controlled activity both in terms of the
personnel who conduct it and the facilities wherein it is conducted. Interrogators require very
specific training in the techniques of elicitation. It is unlikely that interrogation will take place
within a BG area of operations, unless a special interrogation centre was established to support
a specific operation;

f. covert passive surveillance; and

g. agent handling of formally accredited, recruited and controlled human sources. Contact
handling is conducted on a routine basis by specifically trained field HUMINT teams.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3. While no two HUMINT operations are alike, a BG may be allocated HUMINT specialists under
OPCON from its higher formation. HUMINT personnel may either be a generalist staff, who conducts
debriefing, tactical questioning, and conventional military reconnaissance missions or specialists who
conduct source handling, counter-intelligence, enhanced reconnaissance and/or interrogation. HUMINT
specialists are also trained to operate in such a manner as to ensure the discrete collection of HUMINT
over a prolonged period of time. As part of all-source collection of HUMINT information, every soldier
in a BG is a contributor to the BG intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and collection
of essential elements of information.

4. Within the BG, the Intelligence Officer (IO) is accountable to the BG CO for planning and executing
HUMINT activities. Information from BG HUMINT operations are processed through the all source
intelligence centre (ASIC) by the HUMINT analyst and fused with other information/intelligence to form
the BG common operating picture.

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5. The BG intelligence section (Int Sect) may be provided with a HUMINT LO from higher formation.
The role of the HUMINT LO is to:

a. provide the BG Int Sect with timely HUMINT products with completed first-level analysis;

b. task HUMINT teams on behalf of the BG;

c. provide other source steerage to HUMINT teams;

d. assist in debriefing processes;

e. assist in integrating HUMINT products into all-source products at the BG level;

f. ensure HUMINT activities are deconflicted with other ISTAR activities; and

g. provide liaison with higher and flanking HUMINT activities.

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APPENDIX 7
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAMS

ROLE

1. The role of the tactical PSYOPS47 team (TPTs) is to support the BG through the conduct of combat
psychological operations (CPO).

TASKS

2. The major tasks for TPTs are to:

a. provide advice on the most effective means to influence the population and adversary force
emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour;

b. conduct activities aimed at discrediting adversary propaganda or misinformation;

c. coordinate BG PSYOPS activities with higher tactical and national HQ efforts;

d. conduct loudspeaker operations using approved themes and scripts;

e. disseminate approved printed material;

f. conduct face-to-face communication with local individuals and populations;

g. gather and assess information on target audience including influence activity measures
of effectiveness(s);

h. assess the effectiveness of friendly PSYOPS or hostile psychological activities;

i. acquire other PSYOPS-relevant information from local sources; and

j. exploit indigenous media to disseminate messages.

47. 
PSYOPS are planned psychological activities using methods of communications directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and
behaviour in order to affect the achievement of political and military objectives. Dissemination may be through any media including loudspeakers, print, radio,
television or Internet. PSYOPS will be conducted under the principles of truth, verifiability, credibility and unity of effort.

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TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3. PSYOPS capability will normally be allocated to the BG by the formation HQ in the form of one or
more TPTs.48 The TPT consists of a team leader, a second in command and a PSYOPS specialist. The
team leader supports BG planning activities through the provision of subject matter expertise to the HQ
planning team. PSYOPS support requirements will be identified and synchronized by the BG operations
staff as part of overarching information operations. Tactical control, or some other C2 relationship with
the TPT activities, will normally be delegated to the BG CO. Sustainment of the TPT will also be a
BG responsibility.49

48. 
Chapter 2 of B-GJ-005-313/FP-001 CFJP 3-10.1 Psychological Operations outlines the various PSYOPS units and groupings.
49. 
Note that the typical PSYOPS group in theatre would include a PSYOPS support company, which could provide the TPT with key communicators, camera crews,
sound crews, linguists, photographers, etc. Also, the TPT would likely have, through the PSYOPS group HQ, access to a reachback capability that could also provide
video, radio and Internet capabilities.

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APPENDIX 8
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAMS

ROLE

1. The role of a CIMIC tactical support team (TST) is to support the BG CO in achieving the formation
commander’s CIMIC end state. When provided to the BG, a CIMIC TST acts as a dedicated interface
between the BG and the civilian population and non-military organizations within the AO.

TASKS

2. The major tasks of assigned CIMIC forces are to:

a. provide specialist liaison to civilian organizations;

b. coordinate civil support to the BG;

c. coordinate BG support to civil organizations including providing advice on civil requirements

and priorities;

d. manage and assess information regarding the civil environment; and

e. coordinate BG CIMIC activities with higher tactical and national HQ efforts.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3. The BG may be provided with one or more CIMIC TSTs. TST leaders support BG planning activities
by providing subject matter expertise to the HQ planning team. CIMIC support requirements will be
identified and synchronized by the operations coordinator as part of overarching information operations.
Normally, day-to-day control of TST activities will be allocated to the operations coordinator. Sustainment
responsibility for assigned TSTs will be assigned to the supporting signals element.

4. The TST will maintain a limited capability to establish and maintain a civil-military cooperation centre
(the so-called CIMIC centre50) for short periods. This capability would normally require additional resources
from the BG to include communication and information systems, force protection and linguistic support.
The relationships established between the TSTs and key civilian personnel and organizations can be
leveraged to manage civil expectations. This is particularly important when the demand for military support
outstrips BG capacity.

50. 
The CIMIC centre, which is similar in function to the US CMOC, largely acts as a humanitarian assistance coordination centre. It provides information and coordinates
plans and joint projects with civil agencies, civil authorities, contractors and the local population. It will provide governmental and non-government organizations and
the civilian population with information on the prevailing operational situation as well as on plans and projects that are either planned or ongoing.

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APPENDIX 9
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – MILITARY POLICE (MP)

ROLE

1. Military police provide commanders with police capabilities that contribute to achieving objectives
across the spectrum of conflict. They have a dual role that draws upon their common police skill set:

a. Police the Force. MPs are employed to protect, regulate, investigate, where necessary enforce
discipline, and assure compliance with military orders, regulations and Canadian laws and
statutes. MPs perform law enforcement, security, force protection and custody activities to
protect the members of the military community, to guarantee their basic rights, to maintain
public confidence in the CF, and to ensure the CF is prepared and capable of carrying out its
assigned mission; and

b. Support Operations. MP provide a broad range of force protection, custody, search,

investigative, interviewing, patrolling, use of force, graduated response, liaison, mentoring and
training skills that support the commander in the successful completion of the operation
or mission.

TASKS

2. MP tasks can be grouped into six functional areas:

a. Law Enforcement Operations (LEO). LEO encompasses traditional policing and law
enforcement activities intended to maintain discipline in the force. Law Enforcement tasks
include traffic enforcement, investigation of criminal or service offences and liaison with host
nation (HN) or other coalition law enforcement agencies.

b. Security Operations. MP security operations support the application of Government Security

Policy (GSP) including corporate personnel, physical, and information security activities, and
contribute to the protection of operational security.

c. Custody Operations. MP custody operations include activities relating to the handling,

processing, holding, transferring and escorting of service detainees (CF members in service
custody), prisoners of war (captured members of enemy armed forces) and civilian detainees
(non-combatants and combatants not part of recognized enemy armed forces). Service custody
is a core element in maintenance of discipline. The taking and custody of prisoners of war and
civilian detainees are regulated by international treaties.

d. Force Protection Operations. MPs are contributors to force protection. In addition to the
common activities to which MPs contribute, such as local defence, convoys and escorts and
route and area security, MPs possess specialist force protection capabilities including close
protection, tactical aircraft security officer, establishment and vital point security, access control,
and force protection enforcement.

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e. Tactical Support Operations. MPs provide direct support to tactical operations through the
coordination of operations with HN law enforcement, specialist and forensic support to searches,
evidence collection and site exploitation, gathering of “white SA” particularly concerning
indigenous police forces and conduct of roadblocks and vehicle checkpoints.

f. Stability Operations. Military Police, because they combine professional police skills with
robust military capabilities and are experienced working with civilian partners, are ideally suited
for the conduct of stability activities within the larger Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public
(JIMP) framework. While MP will make their largest contribution in the field of Security Sector
Reform (SSR), principally developing and capacity building of indigenous police and law
enforcement agencies, they can also play significant roles in Demobilization Disarmament
Reintegration (DDR) activities as well as providing support to civilian infrastructure and
governance and assistance to other agencies.

LEVELS OF MP SUPPORT

3. The delivery of MP services to deployed operations is provided at four levels:

a. Close Support (CS). CS is provided at the formation level less policing; however, CS MPs
could end up operating within the BG AO. Typical tasks include SSR tasks such as indigenous
police capacity building, detainee evacuation, escorts and providing operational support to HN
law enforcement and indigenous security forces. CS MPs may be attached to the BG if the
BG’s IS MPs capabilities are overwhelmed. When operating in support of the BG, CS tasks are
similar to those of IS MP.

b. General Support (GS). GS MPs will primarily be involved with policing the force. While MP GS
sub-units will not normally be under command of the BG, they may operate within the BG AO.
Typical MP GS activities include detainee escorts, escalation of force investigations, criminal
or service investigations, security surveys, and liaison to host nation law enforcement.

c. National Support. National support is provided from those MP and/or national civilian police
capabilities resident back in Canada. Typical examples of national-level support include coroner
services, VIP close protection, and specialist investigative support such as polygraph, computer
forensic analysis and police surveillance. Should there be a need to deploy national support
elements forward into theatre, those elements would normally be grouped at the TF level.

d. Integral Support (IS). As of April 2006, there is no longer MP employed as integral support
to a BG. MP assigned to a BG shall be assigned under a specific command relationship, most
likely TACOM (less policing).

ORGANIZATION

4. The senior MP attached to the BG will act as both commander of the attached MP element, and as
the BG CO’s senior MP advisor. At the BG level operating within a formation, MP support will normally
take the form of an MP section 12 members strong, and commanded by an MP sergeant. However,
should the BG deploy independent of a formation, it could receive addition MP assets.

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TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF MP

5. Major considerations for the employment of MPs include:

a. MPs are provided to the BG principally to provide specialist support to the BG’s tactical
operations rather than to police the BG itself. However MP at all times retain their specially
appointed status, IAW Section 156 of the National Defence Act, and are subject the
Military Police Professional Code of Conduct, both of which require them to respond in
a policing capacity should the need arise. When engaged in LEO, security or service custody
activities, MP are under the authority of the TFPM.

b. MP elements attached to the BG are finite and limited in size, necessitating the prioritization of
MP tasks. They should remain centralized to facilitate greater flexibility, economy of effort and
concentration of resources. Commanders at all levels should be prepared to task additional
personnel to assist MP when necessary. For example, a BG detainee collection point may have
a section of infantry assigned to provide guards under the supervision of BG MPs.

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APPENDIX 10
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – TACTICAL AVIATION (TAC AVN)

ROLE

1. The role of Tac Avn aviation is to support the Army with aerial firepower, reconnaissance and mobility.

TASKS

2. The tasks that may be assigned to tac avn are:

a. recce and observation, including providing security on the flanks, front and rear of the BG;

b. direction and control of fires;

c. direct fire support;

d. tactical airlift of troops, equipment and supplies;

e. logistic airlift;

f. command and liaison;

g. aeromedical support; and

h. communications assistance.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3. Tac avn provides support both by day and night throughout the battlespace. While the BG CO
will determine how best to employ tac avn assets assigned to the BG, the tactical helicopter unit CO will
act as the aviation and air advisor. Important considerations in the employment of tactical aviation at the
BG level include:

a. BG planners should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of integral aviation (avn)
assets and should include these factors early in the planning process. An experienced avn
liaison officer (Avn LO) should be attached to the BG to assist with avn planning. The aviation
mission commander (AMC) should be involved as early as possible in the planning process to
ensure effective integration into BG operations.

b. When integrating avn into BG operations, the detailed coordination of airspace and fires plays a
vital role in maximizing capabilities and minimizing restrictions on the integration of those assets.

c. Avn assets are often multirole capable; therefore, the assignment of a given asset in one role
may not preclude its employment in another, provided the necessary clearance and command
relationship is established. A clear understanding by the AMC of assigned and implied tasks will
ensure that the supporting avn will be prepared for expected roles.

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d. Avn assets are capable of operating throughout the battlespace, given due regard to the threat
and its ability to counter it. In the recce and fire support roles, tasks should be selected which
make full use of avn’s inherent range and ability to move quickly over difficult terrain.

e. Medium- to heavy-lift helicopters are particularly useful for supporting logistic tasks and the
movement of troops and equipment; however, they are vulnerable when operating in forward
areas without an adequate escort to detect and engage threats and/or clear an alternate route.
Subsequent tasks, such as casualty evacuation, should be identified sufficiently early to make
use of aircraft returning from forward areas on completion of their primary tasks.

f. Aviation assets may be considered high value targets and are most vulnerable when on the
ground. Siting of aviation main and forward operating bases and forward arming and refuelling
points need to balance responsiveness with protection from attack.

g. Aircraft are susceptible to adverse weather. Any critical plans that rely heavily on aviation support
should be backed up with a ground option or include alternate planning for possible delays.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4. There will never be sufficient aviation resources to satisfy all of the various competing demands.
Therefore, tactical aviation assets will normally be controlled at the formation level in order to ensure that
sufficient aviation resources can be allocated to meet the BG CO’s priorities for support.

5. As a result, aviation resources will only be allocated to a BG in response to a specific requirement

or as an assigned enabler for a specific mission or for a specified period of time under a tactical command
(TACOM) or OPCON C2 relationship. BG planners must, therefore, understand the capabilities of
available aviation resources as well as the process to request aviation assets in order to maximize their
potential for obtaining the necessary support.

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APPENDIX 11
COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

ROLE

1. UAVs are designed to provide target acquisition, combat information/intelligence and direct fire
support (armed UAVs) beyond the line of sight of supported ground forces, while reducing the exposure
of manned aircraft to enemy fire. They provide targeting and deep operations staff with timely, high-
quality, real-time information and engagement capabilities. The targeting information considerably
enhances the effectiveness of artillery and other attack systems; it also contributes greatly to overall
situational awareness. Generally, UAVs perform three roles:

a. Surveillance. This role includes general surveillance of a formation’s area of influence and
interest to gain coarse-grained information. It also includes acquiring combat information on a
specific item or enemy course of action. UAVs are ideal for this surveillance role. Within this
role are included the many different reconnaissance tasks. It, therefore, may be employed in
point security, flank security and route security to name a few roles and may be used to trigger
reserve forces.

b. Target Acquisition. Target acquisition includes locating and identifying targets in order that
they can be engaged with the appropriate weapon system.

c. Target Engagement. Once targets have been accurately located, on-board sensors can be
used to attack or assist in attacking the target. Precise locations can be determined, and
cameras or sensors can be used to adjust indirect fire. Laser designators can direct precision-
guided weapons onto the target. Electronic warfare devices such as electronic countermeasures
(ECM) jammers may also be employed. Certain UAVs can be armed with various precision
munitions that can be directed by the UAV itself with its integral target designation systems.

TASKS

2. Likely tasks for UAVs can be grouped into four functional areas:

a. Artillery Tasks. This includes:

 (1) target acquisition and confirmation of suspected targets identified by other ISTAR systems;

 (2) cueing target engagement by attack systems;

 (3) adjustment of indirect fire weapons;

 (4) designation of targets for engagement by precision fires;

b. Surveillance Tasks. General tasks in support of the supported HQ, including:

 (1) route, area and object surveillance or reconnaissance;

 (2) battle damage assessment;

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 (3) tracking;

 (4) monitoring;

 (5) gathering evidence;

c. Contributing to Deception Plans; and

d. Support Tasks. These include:

 (1) direct support by detached UAV elements for directed operations;

 (2) fire support through the designation of targets for other weapon systems or its own
munitions if so armed;

 (3) general support for operations within a supported element’s AO.

PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

3. The following principles apply to UAV employment:

a. Foresight. Although the UAV has the unique capability to view objective areas from above, it
cannot look at everything everywhere. Tasking the system must take into account the area that
needs to be watched or reconnoitred, the anticipated time of coverage required and whether
route, area or object reconnaissance is to be conducted. Depending on the system and the
payload, wide area surveillance or area reconnaissance are inefficient uses of the system.
Object surveillance and route or object reconnaissance are generally much more effective.

b. Economy. There will be a finite limit to the supply of UAV resources (eg, equipment and
flight stores). Careful planning will be required to limit waste, loss and duplication, while
retaining flexibility.

c. Simplicity. A simple UAV plan will be more easily understood, more flexible and more easily
adapted should circumstances change. The use of SOPs (and standardized loads and
procedures) will help to achieve this.

d. Cooperation. As a sensor system, the UAV has a unique but limited view of the battlespace.
Cooperation between the UAV and other Sense capabilities is vital for creating effective
situational awareness. Further cooperation between the UAV and Act capabilities is vital
to ensure timely application of effects and that the Sense/Act link remains efficient.

e. Flexibility. Any UAV plan must be capable of reacting flexibly should a change occur in the
BG CO’s plan or unforeseen problems be encountered. The dispersion and variety of
UAV assets on the battlefield calls for considerable flexibility to ensure timely delivery of UAV-
borne information.

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ANNEX C
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) ELEMENTS

GENERAL

1. The roles, tasks and employment of combat service support elements are discussed in Appendix 1
and Appendix 2:

a. Appendix 1 – Combat Service Support Subunit; and

b. Appendix 2 – Medical.

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APPENDIX 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SUBUNIT51

ROLE

1. The role of the CSS subunit is to provide personnel, supplies and services in the right quantity,
in the right condition, at the required time and place.

TASKS

2. The BG’s first line CSS is designed to sustain the soldiers, weapons, equipment, and vehicles
essential for combat. The sustainment of the BG is provided through the echeloning of support from
second line, through the BG CSS organization, to the soldier in the F echelon. BG echelons are defined
and explained in Chapter 2 of B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Sustainment of Land Operations and in Chapter 5
of this manual. The major tasks of the BG CSS are to:

a. stock and distribute supplies, primarily water, rations, petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL)
and ammunition (combat supplies);

b. support the BG’s equipment fleet through level one repair and recovery;

c. provide role one medical treatment and evacuation;

d. provide personnel services; and

e. provide general transportation support.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3. The officer commanding (OC) CSS subunit is responsible for the sustainment activities within the
BG. The major considerations for the tactical employment of first line CSS are based upon the LOC, the
AO and the tactical situation. The CSS subunit must be combat capable and support vehicles must be
armed and armoured. CSS elements require the equipment to effect self-defence, command and control
as well as to maintain situational awareness similar to the BG that they are supporting. Augmented
protection (eg, convoy escorts) may be required should the threat dictate. Other considerations in the
tactical employment of the CSS subunit include:

a. Understanding of Capability. Task tailoring of forces will provide the BG with the assets to
meet the forecasted mission requirements. It is important to note that there is no limit to the
capabilities found at any echelon. Echelons can be task-tailored for an enhanced capability: to
carry additional supplies, to conduct levels of maintenance above first line or to have limited
role two medical capabilities attached.

b. Understanding of Requirements. Support requirements need to be forecasted and coordinated

by OC CSS subunit in order to have the right support in place when and where required.

51. 
Depending upon whether the BG is built around an infantry battalion or an armoured regiment, the CSS subunit will be either the battalion’s CSS company or the
regiment’s headquarters squadron.

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c. Situational Awareness. In the contemporary operating environment (COE), CSS elements

require communication and SA systems commensurate with the F echelon, particularly at the
BG level. The A echelon requires command, control and intelligence updates such that it can
plan and execute sustainment operations within the AO.

d. Protection. Unsecured LOC characterize many AOs. Soldiers in the BG echelons need to
be trained, manned and equipped to provide self-protection. Augmented protection may
be required should the threat dictate. If the threat is non-conventional, concentration may be
warranted such that the bulk of the CSS subunit may be collocated with an element of the BG.

e. Regrouping and Unique Support Requirements. Engineer plant and other equipment
require unique support, such as Class V (ammunition natures) and Class IX (repair parts). Task
tailoring of independently deployed BGs must ensure that the requisite elements are also
attached to the BG CSS subunit. Within a formation, the BG may be subject to regrouping. The
gaining unit will most likely receive, as an administrative relationship, other attached elements.
This simplifies the sustainment chain of command and makes use of logistic management
information systems that allow increased flexibility of support within the battlespace.

f. Interoperability. Interoperability has become increasingly important, as independent BGs will

not be able to operate in higher levels of conflict without coalition tactical capabilities. BG CSS
personnel must be familiar with coalition doctrine (such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO]) to include distribution concepts and materiel commonality.

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APPENDIX 2
MEDICAL

ROLE

1. The role of the BG medical element is to conserve the personnel strength of the BG52 through the
provision of role one medical support, that is locating and removing casualties from the place of injuring
or wounding, providing first aid and emergency medical care, providing trauma life support and conducting
routine medial examinations.

TASKS

2. Medical tasks include:

a. establishing a unit medical station (UMS) and casualty collecting posts (CCPs);

b. providing emergency medical and dental care for casualties and routine sick parade care
for the sick;

c. establishing an ambulance shuttle system to evacuate patients from companies to the UMS;

d. performing physical examinations, immunization and medical administration; and

e. providing advice on preventive medicine, first aid and other related subjects.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

3. The following are considerations for the tactical employment of medical assets:

a. Patients must not be evacuated further to the rear than their physical condition or the military
situations demands.

b. The sick rate is normally high during a prolonged defence, including the presence of a number
of psychiatric patients that may add considerably to the medical workload.

c. Medical resources must, from the outset, be so distributed that they can cover each component
of the force and be immediately available to provide support.

52. 
Conservation of personnel strength includes the rigorous prevention of illness and injury both medical and dental, the salvage of life and limb during combat, the rapid
return to duty of both sick and injured after combat and the evacuation if those who are not expected to return to duty within a reasonable amount of time.

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CHAPTER 4
COMMANDING THE BATTLE GROUP ON OPERATIONS

GENERAL

“Attrition is a not a strategy. It is, in fact, irrefutable proof of the absence of any strategy. A commander
who resorts to attrition admits his failure to conceive of an alternative. He rejects warfare as an art and
accepts it on the most non-professional terms imaginable. He uses blood in lieu of brains.”

—General David R. Palmer

1. Canadian military doctrine has adopted manoeuvre warfare as the basis for the conduct of operations.
That approach to operations, also called the manoeuvrist approach,53 is realized through the direction
of tactical activities against an enemy to achieve the following:

a. shaping understanding;

b. attacking and undermining will; and

c. shattering cohesion.

2. The focus of a BG CO’s activities is on the defeat of the threat by shattering its moral and physical
cohesion; that is, the enemy’s ability to fight as an effective and coordinated whole, rather than destroying
them physically through incremental attrition. In essence, a BG CO seeks to defeat the enemy by attacking
their critical capabilities through their vulnerabilities.

3. This focus is equally applicable in all types of activities across the full spectrum of operations. The
tactical leader needs to keep in mind that the tactical battle should not be viewed as an end in and of
itself, but rather as a building block within the framework of a larger campaign that is making use of
surprise, deception and manoeuvre to break an adversary’s will to fight, primarily through attacking their
moral and physical cohesion. The tactical-level commander’s actions must be clearly linked to well-
defined operational objectives.

4. Because the nature of the threat can either be regular or irregular, with the latter more likely when
an enemy is overmatched by coalition forces, the manoeuvrist approach to operations is guided by the
following principles:54

a. concentration on the enemy’s vulnerabilities;

b. mission-type orders;55

c. agility;

53. 
NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (ratification draft May 2007) defines the manoeuvrist approach as: “an approach
to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using
initiative and seeking originality, is combined with a resolute determination to succeed.”
54. 
See Section 542, Chapter 5 of B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for more detail.
55. 
Mission-type orders focus on the effects to be achieved. The BG CO must tell their subordinates what effect(s) they are to achieve by their tasks and the reason
why or purpose, which may be a second order effect or objective. Examples include: “seize in order to …” or “conduct security patrols in order to … .”

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d. focus on the main effort;

e. exploit tactical opportunities;

f. act boldly and decisively; and

g. command from a position to influence the main effort.

5. From these principles, it is clear that the manoeuvrist approach to operations requires flexibility
in combat and the exploitation of opportunities, both of which require a decentralized philosophy of
command. That philosophy is focussed within mission command,56 which is the command philosophy
followed within the Army and a key element of manoeuvre warfare.

VISUALIZATION

6. Visualization is the mental process of developing SA, determining the desired end state and then
envisioning the effects the force must achieve to realize that end state. That visualization is embodied in
the commander’s intent. A BG CO should deliver the intent, whenever possible, in person, to allow
subordinates an opportunity to clarify any specific points and to confirm mutual understanding. Intent
is critical to mission accomplishment, and visualization is critical to intent.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

7. The raison d’être of the BG is the mission for which it has been organized. The mission provides
purpose while the philosophy of mission command allows the flexibility to enable commanders throughout
the BG to exercise judgement and initiative in directing and completing tasks that meet the needs of the
mission. It is imperative that subordinates understand the higher-level objectives that must be obtained
and the influence, positive or negative, that their actions will have on the attainment of those objectives.

Example of a Commander’s Intent: Commander 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

intends to advance with two infantry BGs behind a covering force screen provided by Recce
Sqn LdSH(RC). 1 PPCLI will advance LEFT forward and 2 PPCLI RIGHT forward with 3 PPCLI
advancing centrally in depth, with a combat team (cbt tm) detached as the bde reserve. The
two lead BGs will destroy enemy within boundaries between lines SPARTAN FURY and
HOPLITE HAVOC seizing key terrain along the near bank of the River SAVA. The securing of
these positions will provide the in-place force to support the forward passage and deliberate
crossing of the 11 CIB bridgehead and subsequent breakout forces.

56. 
Mission command is a philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act and initiative to subordinate commanders. Mission command
has three enduring tenets: timely and effective decision making; the importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent; and a clear responsibility to fulfil that
intent. Commanders at every level in the BG must abide by these tenets. The estimate or the operational planning process helps a commander analyse a situation
that, when coupled with an analysis of risk, will enable timely and effective decision making. Mission command is explained in depth in B-GL-300-003/FP-001
Command in Land Operations.

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8. Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is the tool for understanding higher commanders’ intents. It is
a critical function that each commander must complete as it will lead to a visualization of what needs to
be done to achieve the end state, while developing one’s own commander’s intent that will help guide and
empower immediate subordinates. Articulation of intent is important at every level of command, as each
successive commander will reinforce the linkage to higher goals. Merely reiterating a higher commander’s
intent does not provide sufficient knowledge to enable effective preparation and execution, as each
command’s circumstances are unique.

9. The importance of every commander at every level completing a unique mission analysis cannot be
overstated as it will confirm the aim and purpose, contribute to battlefield visualization and enable
formulation of intent. Clearly articulating intent will lead to understanding of mission and task requirements
by subordinates through an appreciation of the freedom of action that they possess.

10. Trust and Cohesion. Trust and cohesion can be difficult to achieve in the current and future
operating environments given the reality of dispersed operations. Reachback elements under a command
relationship to the BG pose a challenge as regular face-to-face contact is denied, creating a less than
ideal climate for promoting trust and cohesion with the BG and its mission. Further compounding trust
and cohesion is the creation of ad hoc elements57 that are formed due to a unique requirement for the
conduct of the mission or operations. To ensure trust, it is important that communications be open and
responsive between the disparate elements and that activities are seen to be completed promptly and
effectively. Social interaction is encouraged, where possible, to reinforce the relationship with the BG.

11. With increasing visibility of the battlespace, a BG CO may decide to hold onto strike authority
personally out of fear of potential negative effects from a subordinate’s errors, including collateral damage
that results from the strike. Although within the BG CO’s prerogative, it can damage the relationship
between the BG CO and subordinates by conveying a perception of mistrust. The subordinate commander
on the ground will have greater awareness and understanding of the situation than the superior commander
who is viewing it through the limited field of vision provided by the unmanned/robotic system. Consequently,
the superior commander can draw false conclusions about what is actually happening. Certain directives
or orders will place the strike decision in the hands of a particular commander, but it is important to
respect the established or directed command relationship. BG COs must learn to support subordinate
commanders in making critical strike decisions and manage any crisis that develops through errors
or unanticipated collateral damage.

12. JIMP and the Need for Collaboration. Battle procedure is the planning, preparation and execution
of operations and tactical activities, along with the required assessment for each of these concurrent
and consecutive functions. Effective and efficient battle procedure is facilitated by collaboration
throughout the chain of command in the BG. Moreover, collaboration is essential in a JIMP environment
to achieve unity of purpose, if not unity of effort, in the planning, preparation and execution of
complementary activities.

13. Using collaborative command tools that enable information sharing, a common operating picture
(COP) can be created by tailoring relevant information from various sources. The COP can, in turn,
facilitate collaborative planning by enabling subordinate commands to access and understand available
information in the context of a current or forthcoming operation or tactical activity. Conversely, BG planning
can be aligned and reconciled using subordinate information that, depending upon the type of conflict and

57. 
Examples of ad hoc elements are a civil-military transition team (CIMITT) or an operational mentoring and liaison team (OMLT).

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geographic dispersion, may be more precise and accurate than that available to the planners in the BG
HQ and higher echelons.

14. Frequent warning orders (Wng O) and detailed collaborative planning based in large measure on
foresight should be used to facilitate parallel planning with subordinates. The main benefits of collaborative
planning come as much from engaging meaningfully in the process as from the product itself. While the
plan may convey the decision, participating conveys the context of the decision as well as understanding
the available options and the relationships among forces.

15. In a command-centric environment, the direction and guidance of the BG CO is critical in instituting
constructive and informed collaboration amongst the various subordinate elements of the BG, as well as
amongst the various JIMP elements operating within the BG’s area of operations. Personal contact from
the BG CO and subordinate commanders is encouraged to complement or enhance situational awareness
and to convey visualization and intent.

16. BG CO’s Location. The BG CO’s decision on where to be located during operations is not one to
be taken lightly. The BG CO can personally influence the outcome of tactical activities by their conspicuous
leadership. In battle, the BG CO should be with the tactical HQ near the critical point of the battle (ie,
where they can best influence the outcome). When the BG is not actively engaged, the BG CO should
work from the BG main HQ in order to be available to the staff and subordinate commanders. Given that
battle procedure at all levels is command-led, not staff-driven, it is critical that the BG CO be at BG main
HQ for critical battle procedure activities (eg, war gaming, mission rehearsals).

COMMAND AND CONTROL

17. Command and Control Relationships. BGs can be an independent task force or more likely will
be part of a Canadian, coalition or United Nations formation. Due to the changing complexity of the threat,
terrain and tasks within a specific operation, there is no one organization within the JIMP environment
that will meet the demands of the modern battlefield. Consequently, the implications of the established or
directed command relationship under which the BG operates or within which elements are attached to the
BG must be clearly understood, as they will provide the foundation for constraints and restraints imposed
upon the conduct of tactical activity. The following definitions provide an appreciation for each command
relationship; however, detailed understanding of command and control relationships can be gained by
referring to the table of command relationships found within B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land
Operations and B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Land Operations.

18. Full Command. Full Command is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue
orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration. This degree
of command cannot be delegated outside of our national chain of command (eg, delegated to a
NATO commander).

19. Operational Command (OPCOM). Operational Command is the authority granted to a commander
to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain
or delegate operational and/or tactical command and control as the commander deems necessary.

20. Tactical Command (TACOM). Tactical Command is the authority delegated to a commander
to assign tasks to assigned forces for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

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21. Operational Control (OPCON). Operational Control is defined as the authority delegated to a
commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign
operational or tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment
of components of the units concerned.

22. Tactical Control (TACON). Tactical Control is the detailed, and usually local, direction and control
of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

23. Command relationships do not include administrative responsibility for any relationship other than
full command. Administrative arrangements are established through the use of administrative relationships:

a. Attached for Administration. Attached for Administration means the gaining unit or formation
has full authority to direct, and responsibility for, all the logistics and personnel support matters
of the attached unit or element. In the event that the nature of the operations makes complete
administrative support impossible or uneconomical because of time, distance or resources, this
administrative arrangement can be modified to exclude administrative functions by stating
“attached for administration less...,” where the functions not provided are stated (eg, less
personnel administration).

b. Attached for Daily Maintenance is a relationship in which the gaining command has authority
to direct and responsibility for meeting the routine requirements for combat supplies of the
attached unit or element. Specifically, the gaining unit or formation is responsible for fuel and
lubricants, ammunition, rations and water with all other personnel and logistics support
remaining the responsibility of the parent unit. Where there is an addition or exclusion to the
normal combat supplies, this administrative relationships can be modified by adding the words
“less” or “plus.” For example, an attached tank squadron may be “attached for daily maintenance
less tank ammunition,” or an attached CIMIC element may be “attached for daily maintenance
plus spare parts and recovery.”

24. BG COs and subordinate commanders will encounter technical controls that will impose limitations
upon the conduct of tactical activity. Technical control is the control applied to technical procedures and
exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted
to control within certain specialized areas. Commanders may assume risk and override this type of
control if its application is seen to jeopardize the mission.

25. Standing Operating Procedures. Common procedures are necessary to ensure consistency within a
BG, particularly for attached elements. SOP are the most prescriptive level of tactical doctrine and contribute to
command and control by detailing processes and drills subordinates understand and apply in the conduct of
tactical activities or administration. SOP are standards; deviation from them is by exception.

26. There is a hierarchy of SOP in the Army. B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedures
(SOP) for Land Operations details the Army’s SOP. These ensure that all Army units operate at the lowest
levels in the same fashion. They allow rapid grouping and regrouping, dissemination of orders and clear
reporting and information flow. Below that, formations can and will produce specific SOPs that prescribe
the conduct of formation business. Below the formation, BG SOPs can be produced under the direction
and guidance of the BG CO. In each of these cases however, this should only occur when standard SOPs
do not exist or are insufficient. Throughout this hierarchy, it is important that subordinate SOPs remain
consistent with higher SOPs.

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27. Part 1 of B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Land Operations, provides
a location to insert and promulgate unit SOP. Specifically, SOP 101.03 to SOP 101.10 has been set aside
for unit use with a view to keeping all levels of SOP within one reference.

28. Control Measures. Control measures represent geo-referenced limitations on subordinate action.
While the mission command philosophy would imply that the limitations imposed upon subordinate
actions should be minimized, certain control measures are required at the BG level to allow for effective
battlespace management. Although an alphabetical listing of control measures can be found within
B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations,58 a number of control measures have been
included below for ease of reference:

a. Axis of Advance. The BG moves astride this line. The axis follows a route or a convenient
terrain feature. There is no requirement to clear enemy from the axis unless so ordered.

b. Bound. It is a single movement, usually from cover to cover, made by troops often under
enemy fire. A bound is completed on a tactical feature that a commander may use to control the
manoeuvre of their forces.

c. Phase Lines. These are easily recognizable terrain features. If they are also tactical features,
they can double as bounds, but this is of lesser importance since their purpose is to provide a
convenient means of controlling and coordinating movement. Phases lines should be at right
angles to an axis and be allotted nicknames. Units normally report crossing phase lines, but do
not halt unless specifically directed.

d. Report Lines. These are designated terrain features where on reaching it troops must report
to their command echelon. For simplicity, they can correspond to other control features
(ie, phase lines or bounds) and are allotted nicknames.

e. Boundaries. These define the area of responsibility for a unit or subunit.

f. Waiting Areas. These are selected areas along the axis/route used for dispersal, concealment
of vehicles and troops as well as for control of movement.

g. Harbour. It is an area that permits dispersal and concealment, used for rest, maintenance,
replenishment or other administrative activities.

h. Hide. It is the location occupied by troops prior to moving to battle positions.

i. Battle Position. It is the ground where a defending unit or subunit fights. It may be a
primary, alternate or a secondary position occupied by a headquarters, command post, unit
or weapon.

58. 
See Appendix 7 to Annex C – Control Measures, B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations.

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 (1) Primary Position. This is the best position available to carry out the primary task.

 (2) Secondary Position. This is the best position available to carry out a secondary task.

 (3) Alternate Position. This is a position adjacent to the primary or secondary one, from
where the primary or secondary task can continue to be fulfilled.

j. Kill Zones. Areas where the terrain, reinforced with artificial obstacles, allows the defender to
fix and destroy enemy forces that have been forced to concentrate. Equivalent to the NATO
term engagement area.

Hide Axis

Phase Line

Bound

(Report
Line)

Phase Line
(Report Line)
KZ1
KZ2

Waiting
Area

En Main Axis

En Secondary Axis

PRIMARY POSITION

ALTERNATE POSITION

SECONDARY POSITION

Figure 4-1: Control Measures

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THE BATTLE GROUP HEADQUARTERS

29. General. The complexity of operations within which a BG will operate has caused some fundamental
changes in the composition and organization of a BG HQ. Changes to the BG HQ include:

a. The JIMP environment has required the BG HQ to formalize a liaison organization that is not
only responsive to bordering manoeuvre commands but also to other government departments
(OGD), NGO and local, civilian authorities.

b. The demand for BG intelligence has prompted the need for an expanded intelligence staff that
can complete all steps of the intelligence cycle across all aspects of the environment, considering
more than just the enemy, but the elements of the civil populace as well. The staff must be
capable of directing, collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence.

c. There is a realization that ISTAR coordination at formation and unit level cannot be performed
by the attachment of reconnaissance elements. Nor can integral recce subunits or platoons
perform the staff function of ISTAR coordination. As such, the BG HQ establishment now
contains a permanent ISTAR coordination cell.

d. Information operations (info ops) disciplines, such as CIMIC and PSYOPS have formed
elements that can be attached to the BG. The organization of these elements does not allow
the creation of coordination centres to support coordination of CIMIC or PSYOPS activities
within the BG. As such, the BG HQ establishment now contains an info ops coordination cell to
provide the staff effort necessary to fully integrate info ops into the conduct of tactical activities.

e. Short-range planning has traditionally been performed by the operations officer (who is the
chief staff officer within the BG staff). Mid- and long-range planning has been traditionally
performed by the deputy commanding officer (DCO). The complexity of the operating
environment has placed a greater burden upon these two individuals due to the increased
number of factors affecting the conduct of a mission or operation. Consequently, a specific
plans cell in the BG HQ has been established and is led by the DCO to perform all levels and
horizons of planning.

30. Characteristics. The BG HQ is organized to execute four major functions:

a. coordinate current operations;

b. plan future operations;

c. develop intelligence; and

d. support decision making.

31. To perform these functions, the HQ has to possess certain characteristics:

a. Deployability. The BG HQ echelons are structured for rapid deployment to and within an area
of operations.

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b. Continuity of Command. The BG HQ enables the BG CO to maintain continuous control

of subordinate elements through staff and support personnel, infrastructure redundancy and
flexible CIS networks.

c. Survivability. Establishment of SOPs for physical and information protection measures

ensures the HQ continued viability against threats.

d. Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. The BG HQ is where all attached elements will come
together, either through physical establishment of coordination centres or as a central point
for coordination. This also holds true for those interagency or public organization with which
the BG may be operating. The layout, manning and staff procedures should accommodate the
varied demands placed upon the HQ by compliance with this characteristic.

e. Interoperability. The BG HQ must be capable of exchanging relevant information with higher,

flanking and subordinate elements as well as civilian organizations.

f. Size. The BG HQ must maintain a careful balance between minimum size and
maximum effectiveness.

g. Modularity. This provides flexibility for deployment and conduct of operations.

h. Capacity. The CIS network must provide sufficient capacity to manage the quantity
of information necessary to support decision making.

i. Range. The HQ communications system must provide sufficient range to provide voice
and data to higher, flanking and subordinate elements operating within the BG AO.

32. BG HQ Echelons. The BG CO commands and controls the BG through the main HQ and the
tactical HQ. By establishing an alternate HQ, the BG CO ensures continuity in the event that the main HQ
is not operating. Detailed descriptions of these echelons are found in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command
Support in Land Operations. Appointment of alternate HQ and succession of command may be the topic
of a BG SOP.

a. Main HQ. The BG main HQ is typically organized into four work environments: the command
information centre, the operations centre, the intelligence centre and the plans centre. Detailed
explanations of each work environment can be found in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command
Support in Land Operations and B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations.

b. The BG main HQ is established with sufficient staff to perform the various staff functions required
to support the BG CO’s decision making. The staff is established commensurate with the work
environments. The principal staff officer for the BG CO is the operations officer (Ops O),
whose main responsibility is to oversee the operation of each of the work environments. The
command information and operations centres are headed by the Ops O. The intelligence centre
is headed by the BG IO. The plans centre is headed by the BG Plans Officer (Plans O). Each
principal staff officer is responsible for the minute-to-minute coordination of the activities
conducted within each functional area of work environment. Staff functions and processes are
described in B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations.

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c. The main HQ, typically the operations centre, is augmented by established coordination centres
from attached subordinate elements. These coordination centres are part of the establishment
of the HQ of the attached element and perform a critical command and control function for it. In
addition, the coordination centre supports the BG battle procedure through continuous
coordination during the execution of decision-making functions. Typical coordination centres
include the FSCC and the engineer support coordination centre (ESCC); however, other
established coordination centres may be attached to the BG HQ. Functions that are integral to
the parent unit HQ, such as ISTAR coordination, are not performed exclusively by coordination
centres; however, coordination centre staff will support the BG HQ staff in performing necessary
decision-making functions, such as planning or targeting.59

d. When determining the appropriate layout for the main HQ, certain factors should be considered:
communications, including rapid set up and tear down of CIS networks; staff coordination
should be optimized; modular organization for plug-in of attached HQ elements; and support
facilities sited accordingly (support facilities include the signal centre, information post and
vehicle park, landing site, radio park and administrative areas).

e. Tactical HQ. The BG CO requires a small, highly mobile tactical command post for rapid
deployment within the BG AO in order to project direct influence over critical areas of the AO at
critical times. The core components of the tactical HQ include the BG CO and supporting staff,
a protective party and CIS support. The BG tactical HQ is augmented by the tactical HQ of
subordinate attached elements such as artillery, engineers or reconnaissance.

f. Alternate HQ. Establishment of an alternate HQ ensures continuity in the event that the main
HQ becomes inoperable for any period of time. To ensure that the alternate HQ is not subjected
to the cause of the main HQ’s inoperability, it should be separated by distance for the main HQ.
Generally, a subordinate HQ is designated as the alternate HQ, and it is provided the necessary
staff and CIS network to monitor the tactical situation and capture relevant information to ensure
prompt renewal of command and control effort. In certain circumstances, establishment of the
alternate HQ may be assigned as a “be prepared to” task.

33. Information Management. IM doctrine is introduced within B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command

Support in Land Operations and detailed within B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations.

34. The BG HQ has an information management officer (IMO) who works within the command information
centre directly for the Ops O.

35. Caution should be exercised in utilizing the IMO as the focal point for information exchange into and
out of the BG HQ. This practice could result in complex and cumbersome IM handling that could be best
enabled through conscientious and efficient IM practices by all staff. BG IM is a recommended subject for
BG SOP.

36. Movement of the BG HQ. Movement of the BG HQ is conducted quickly and may be necessary
either for maintaining communications and control of the battle or to avoid detection or attack. In either

59. N
 ote that the BG does not have a specific integral ISTARCC, although it may be allocated additional intelligence assets from its higher formation HQ if required. Also,
coordination of other aspects including CIMIC and PSYOPS, while also not having a specific coordination cell, are nonetheless planned, coordinated and supervised
by the BG HQ (ops) staff.

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case, the foremost consideration in the movement of the HQ must be to ensure that the BG CO has the
capability to maintain command of the BG at all times. The movement of the BG HQ is detailed within
Chapter 1, Section 5 of B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations.

BG STAFF

37. B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations also provides a breakdown of BG staff
terms of reference within the HQ.

TACTICAL LEVEL PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

38. Tactical level planning for operations is driven by the type of campaign being planned: major combat
operations will be relatively straightforward with a focus on a more conventional adversary, while peace
support and COIN operations will require more detailed and complicated planning with an emphasis on
an irregular adversary and the influence of local indigenous populations and their leaders. Additionally,
tactical level planning still needs to be coordinated with other agencies to reach enduring outcomes.
In this regard, the BG CO must be aware of the effects, both desired and undesired, created by their
activities and the possible impact on both operational and strategic objectives.

39. Detailed doctrine for tactical planning and functional area planning (eg, ISTAR) is contained within
B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations. This manual provides the detail regarding the
interaction between the BG CO and the BG staff necessary to develop plans and produce the required
command documents for implementation.

40. Phasing an Operation. A phase is a planning and execution tool available to a BG CO that allows
the operation to be divided by time (duration) or by type of activity. Phasing may be necessary as a result
of time and space, terrain changes or as the result of an event; it may also require a change in mission,
task organization or rules of engagement.

41. Phasing an operation also assists a BG CO in visualizing how the overall operation will unfold and
is the logical expression of their visualization in time. At the BG level, a useful tool for determining when
phasing an operation is necessary is the so-called “Rule of Four.”60

42. Regrouping. A BG CO will consider the task organization of every subunit for each mission.
Regrouping within and between BGs may occur before or during an operation.61 For example, a BG CO
may decide that regrouping is necessary to exploit success during an attack or they may need to conform
to a change in their higher commander’s main effort. That notwithstanding, regrouping should be kept to
a minimum.

43. In any case, successful completion of a regrouping requires simple, basic drills to be followed,
as well as some anticipation and pre-planning. Any force being regrouped must be provided with the
following information:

60. “Employing the Battle Group,” paragraph 6.

61. 
While regrouping is in principle a simple process, there are certain operations—forward passage of lines and the withdrawal as examples—when it is not recommended.

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a. the new command relationship;

b. specified, implied and essential future tasks;

c. key timings, including when the new command relationship comes into effect and when new
orders are scheduled;

d. key locations including orders locations, rendezvous (RV) points and hides/harbours;

e. new communications-electronic operating instructions; and

f. new arrangements for CSS.

44. Annexes A through F provide detail on the following planning areas:

a. Annex A – Artillery Fire Support Planning Guide;

b. Annex B – Engineer Planning, Mobility and Counter-mobility, and C-IED;

c. Annex C – Force Protection;

d. Annex D – Terrain Management;

e. Annex E – ISTAR Planning; and

f. Annex F – Planning for BG CIMIC, PSYOPS and Public Affairs Activities.

45. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations should be read for detail on the use of
the estimate and combat estimate for planning. The CF Joint Publication B-GJ-005-500/FP-000
The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP) should be read for detail on the operational
planning process.62

62. 
The estimate process is the main tool of the BG CO and their staff. At the formation level, a commander with a more extensive staff will make use of the operational
planning process (OPP).

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ANNEX A
ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING GUIDE

CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE

1. The most common classifications of fire employed during attacks are:

a. Preparatory Fire. Preparatory fire aims to weaken the enemy, to inflict casualties on personnel
and equipment as well as to destroy defence works and disrupt communications.

b. Covering Fire. Covering fire neutralizes enemy direct fire weapons and protects the assault
element when it is within range of direct enemy fire.

c. Defensive Fire (DF). Defensive fire assists and protects a unit engaged in a defensive action.
It may be employed in depth to disorganize enemy counter-attack preparations or close in to
engage and destroy enemy when an attack is launched.

d. Counter-Battery (CB). Although CB is the responsibility of higher formation, the artillery

advisor at BG level must ensure that the CB plans are effective in neutralizing enemy artillery
in direct support of the enemy in the objective.

FIRE PLANNING FOR THE HASTY ATTACK

2. The hasty attack is characterized by speed. Due to lack of preparation time, the fire plan may utilize
fewer guns and less ammunition than for a deliberate attack. It must be simple to initiate and to modify.
The following general characteristics apply:

a. To achieve speed, ammunition types are of the simplest natures. Complex drills such as linear
targets or deliberate smoke screens are not usually employed.

b. As ammunition quantities may be limited, indirect fire must be planned only when most critical.

c. Indirect fire does not stop as the assault element approaches the objective. It should shift from
the front of the objective to the depth or rear or to mutually-supporting flanking positions in an
attempt to isolate that part of the objective as selected by the BG CO.

d. If mortars are available, their fire is coordinated by the observers. Mortars are particularly
useful for providing illumination during night attacks.

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FIRE PLANNING FOR THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

3. The deliberate attack requires more detailed planning and preparation. It is normally supported by
more guns and ammunition. More time is spent in fire support planning, and artillery can thus be more
integrated into the attack and consolidation. It is more complex to organize; therefore, it is more complex
to modify. The following general characteristics apply:

a. More complex technical artillery drills such as linears and deliberate smoke screens may
be incorporated.

b. A portion of the artillery effort may be expended on preparatory fire instead of concentrating
solely on covering fire as in the hasty attack. High explosive (HE) and white phosphorous (WP)
remain the primary weapons selected for covering fire.

c. Timings must be as closely coordinated as for the hasty attack, and both fire units and
ammunition supplies will normally be more readily available. Although there may be more
resources, it is probable there will be more targets.

d. Offensive air support (CAS and close combat attack [CCA]) are coordinated by the BC via the
BG FSCC and FAC.

4. Examples of how CS artillery fire can be used in the attack (both hasty and deliberate) are provided
in Figure 4A-1.

FIRE PLANNING FOR THE DEFENCE

5. Artillery fire in defensive operations (defence and delay) slows or halts the enemy (and assists
friendly troops to disengage in delay). The full range of artillery munitions is used, to blind the enemy,
destroy their armour and guard approaches or flanks. Artillery is positioned and repositioned so that it can
provide continuous fire support. Any planned or hasty movement of artillery must be done so as to ensure
fire support is available through the repositioning. Fire units are unlikely to move simultaneously.

6. A defensive fire plan consists of targets to be engaged with specific weapons, usually on call.
The targets will be pre-registered as part of battle procedure. The aim is to ensure that the effective fire
of all available weapons is brought to bear on the assaulting enemy. There are two types of target:

a. Close DFs.63 Close DFs breaks up the enemy’s assault while forming up on the line of departure
or during the assault. These targets are selected on dangerous and likely enemy approaches.
As a general rule, close DF is within 600 metres of friendly troops, necessitating danger close
procedures by the observer. As a general rule, the total number of close DF targets should not
exceed three per combat team battle position.

b. DFs in Depth. Targets aimed at disrupting attack penetrations, striking reserves and command
and control systems are usually referred to as DF in depth. The formation commander selects
these targets.

63. 
Traditionally, one or more close DF targets may be designated by the BG CO as being so vital that immediate response is guaranteed, as the final protective fire (FPF).
However, this concept has been effectively superseded by modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) and ISTAR systems and the fact that the guns may well be in action constantly during a defensive phase.

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7. BG COs avoid the indiscriminate engagement of close DF targets as this may disclose friendly
positions unnecessarily. For this reason control of fire is retained by the BG CO.

PHASE OF ATTACK FIRE PLANNING GUIDE

MOUNTING 1. Artillery adjusts targets. Provide prepatory fire to assist direct fire weapons (tanks) in winning
the initial firefight.
2. Mortars adjust those targets they are required to engage during fire plan.

ASSAULT 1. Artillery neutralizes forward positions of objective (probably at slow rate).

2. Fire base engaging priority point targets: antiarmour weapons, tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs).
ASSAULT ELEMENTS
IN ATTACK POSITION 3. Tanks and APCs in assault element may or may not be able to engage from the attack position dependent
on ground and range (ideally attack position indead ground to objective).
CROSSING THE LINE 1. Artillery neutralizes forward portion of objective (probably at normal rate).
OF DEPARTURE 2. Mortars may be tasked to provide WP or illumination (ILLUM). If WP/ILLUM are not required, mortars may
assist in neutralizing forward portion of objective (at high rate).
BREAK-IN ADVANCE
TO OBJECTIVE 3. Fire base continues to engage priority hard targets and forward portion objective (individual trenches)
with high-explosive shape head (HESH) / high-explosive antitank (HEAT).
4. Tanks in assault element fire on move at hard targets and forward portion of objective.
DISMOUNT 1. Artillery and mortars shift to depth of objective or flank positions (at normal rate).
2. Fire base concentrates on forward position of objective with HESH/HEAT.
3. Tanks concentrate on forward positions of objective with main armament and coaxial MG.
4. Infantry APC, if equipped with stabilized MG, engage forward edge of objective at rapid rate.
FIGHTING THROUGH 1. Artillery shifts to depth or flank (at slow rate).
2. Fire base changes to targets of opportunity only, depending on ammunition situation.
3. Tanks engage targets of opportunity in depth of objective.
4. Tanks engage targets in support of and as directed by infantry.
5. APC continue to fire if good communications and visibility and on order of company/platoon commanders.
CONSOLIDATION 1. Artillery and mortar on DF or targets of opportunity.
2. Move of mortars may be necessary to cover next bound.
3. Tanks engage targets of opportunity and targets in support of infantry.
4. Fire base executes secondary tasks or moves to consolidate with the assaulting echelons.

Figure 4A-1: Examples of How Close Support Artillery Fire May be Used in the Attack

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ANNEX B
ENGINEER PLANNING, MOBILITY / COUNTER MOBILITY, C-IED

GENERAL

1. Engineer planning, mobility, counter-mobility and C-IED are discussed in Appendix 1 to Appendix 3:

a. Appendix 1 – Planning Engineer Support to BG Operations;

b. Appendix 2 – Mobility and Counter-mobility; and

c. Appendix 3 – C-IED.

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APPENDIX 1
PLANNING ENGINEER SUPPORT TO BG OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. The main task for the BG engineer (who is also the engineer squadron commander) is to clearly
understand the BG CO’s concept of operations and develop an engineer plan, complete with the necessary
resources, to support it. The BG engineer is collocated with the BG headquarters and is responsible for
planning operations, monitoring the current operation, coordinating all engineer matters with the BG staff,
providing the engineer input to the production of BG orders and providing engineer intelligence to the BG.

ENGINEER PLANNING

2. The planning guidance and direction necessary to conduct engineer planning will be stated in the
various operations orders (within the main body of the order and the engineer annexes). The responsibilities
of the BG engineer in support of the BG operations plan (op plan) include:

a. Understand the Concept. The BG engineer must understand the BG CO’s concepts of
operations and develop an engineer plan to support that mission. The BG engineer will then
issue orders to the engineer elements, execute the plan as required and be prepared to modify
the plan when and if required.

b. Prepare the Engineer Estimate. The BG engineer will complete the estimate to:

 (1) determine the engineer tasks and possible engineer courses of action (COAs) to support
the BG plan;

 (2) determine the engineer main effort and priorities;

 (3) determine assigned and implied engineer tasks including resource requirements;

 (4) assess engineer troops and assigned tasks to determine possible groupings and if more
regiment-level engineer support is required;

 (5) anticipate the necessary regrouping and resupply activities in support of the next operation.

c. Determine Priorities. As there are usually more engineer tasks to be completed than available
resources to finish them, the BG engineer will prioritize the work to be completed, in consultation
with the BG CO and in accordance with the operations plan (op plan). Engineers are not kept
in reserve, but neither are they to be wasted on low priority tasks.

d. Conduct Terrain Analysis. Geospatial terrain data will assist the BG CO in visualizing
the battlefield and predicting the effects of terrain and weather on military operations. The BG
engineer will assist in completing a detailed terrain analysis and will provide advice to the BG
CO on items such as:

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 (1) the general “going,” including any potential impediments to manoeuvre like creeks or
rivers and any canalizing ground;

 (2) potential locations for the emplacement of friendly obstacles and enhancement of natural
obstacles, including any requirements for mines;

 (3) the location of known enemy and friendly obstacles.

e. Develop Courses of Action. The BG engineer will provide expertise into COA development,
specifically looking at whether potential COAs are supportable from an engineering resource
point of view and what risks are involved in providing that support. Specific inputs could include,
for example, the use of reserved demolitions, the requirements for a bridging capability and
potential obstacle locations.

f. Prepare BG Orders. The BG engineer will produce the engineer paragraph of the BG operations
order as well as provide input into the grouping and tasks matrix. This will encompass the
general engineer concept of operation for the mission, including a general allocation of
resources, the expected concept of employment for those assets and the command relationship
envisioned for each engineering element.

g. Preparing Squadron Orders. In addition to providing input into the BG CO’s orders, the BG
engineer will prepare orders for the squadron. Said orders are aimed at the troop leader level
and provide guidance on the overall engineer concept and plan, what resources are available
and the vision for employing the engineering assets.

ENGINEER TASKS

3. General. In all operations, it will be essential for engineer staffs to calculate the manpower and
resource requirements to complete engineer tasks and to advise the staff accordingly. Through the
development of the engineer plan, it will be necessary to determine the optimum manner in which to
employ all engineer resources—either centralized under squadron (sqn) control or decentralized under
company / cbt tm control (or a combination). In either case, the command relationship must be established
to ensure flexibility to reassign resources to react to the changing situation. In the case of allocating
resources to a recce or covering force, the command relationship will typically be OPCOM. In all other
cases, such as a troop allocated to a cbt tm, OPCON or TACOM/TACON relationship will be used
depending on how the BG engineer envisions the resources being employed and the flexibility required
to recall them for commitments to higher engineer or BG priorities.

4. Offensive Operations. The engineer main effort for BG operations in the attack, will be on crossing
major water obstacles, breaching complex and minor obstacles and other mobility tasks (eg, temporary
route repair). Engineers must be grouped to ensure that they are capable of reacting quickly, with the
required resources for unforeseen obstacles and assaults onto objectives, which will likely be protected
by obstacles. An engineer troop, with armoured and heavy equipment assets as required, is typically the
minimum size of an organization that is grouped down to cbt tm level. If there is an expectation that
obstacles will be emplaced, proper authority through the barrier plan must be in place.

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5. Defensive Operations. In the defence, the main engineer effort will be constructing obstacles to
reinforce the terrain (by improving natural and man-made obstacles and emplacing craters, abatis, wire
obstacles, ditches, steps, obstructions and minefields), all with a view to impede enemy mobility or protect
friendly troops. At all times the emplacement of obstacles will be designed to support the BG CO’s plan,
and the engineer must ensure that the barrier plan has been coordinated with associated resources and
emplacement authorities. Consideration must also be given to requesting dumping programme for mines,
explosives and field defensive stores forward of a planned obstacle.

6. Urban Operations. Engineer resources will always be in short supply in urban operations. The BG
engineer will be required to provide advice on building construction, utilities, subways/sewers, etc. as part
of the terrain analysis. The BG engineer will group and assign the resources to the companies/platoons
in order to conduct the huge numbers of:

a. mobility tasks, including classifying bridges, clearing rubble, conducting explosive entries,
clearing IEDs and mines;

b. counter-mobility tasks, including constructing checkpoints, laying flank obstacles denying

sewers and rooftops;

c. survivability, including improving strong points; and

d. general support tasks, including firefighting as well as restoring utilities and water supply.

7. Survivability/General Support. Engineers are also responsible for survivability and force protection
tasks such as bunker construction and protective digging as well as general support such as the supply
of potable water. These are planning resource considerations in all phases of war.

ENGINEER STAFF FUNCTIONS

8. Engineer staff functions include the following:

a. Engineer Support Coordination Cell. The engineer sqn HQ at BG level will be manned with
an ESCC that will include the squadron Ops O and a small staff. The ESCC staff is responsible
for providing advice to the squadron OC, integrating engineer support into the BG CO’s plans
and assisting in controlling the engineer assets assigned to the BG. Specific staff duties
normally associated the BG ESCC are as follows:

 (1) maintain an engineer current situation overlay (published in the current situation
tactical binder);

 (2) in conjunction with the BG intelligence staff, integrate “mobility data/information (BROWN)”
to the BROWN current situation overlay in the current situation tactical binder in the
public workspace;

 (3) in conjunction with the IO, develop the engineer portion of the BROWN SA overlay;

 (4) subscribe to BLUE, RED and BROWN current situation overlays;

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 (5) track the current operations battle to include the expenditure of engineer resources;

 (6) receive and send engineer reports and returns;

 (7) ensure BG SA on safe routes, enemy obstacles, etc.

b. Targeting. At the BG level, engineer input into targeting is an essential aspect in order to:

 (1) identify crossing sites over existing bridges or rivers and hence ensure their exclusion
from the target list;

 (2) identify barrier restricted areas in support of manoeuvre;

 (3) recommend methods of attack on infrastructure (bridges, etc) to maximize destruction

and minimize time on target;

 (4) identify mobility support requirements for future operations.

c. Engineer Intelligence. Engineer forces contribute significant amounts and types of intelligence
to the overall intelligence programme, often through the ASIC at each level. Engineer recce
resources at the lowest level must be pushed forward with the other combat arms units and
formation-level recce organizations during the offence. Information gathered by engineer recce
is vital to confirm, on the ground, the intelligence assumptions and conclusions made from map
and aerial (including space) inputs.

d. Technical Data. Technical data regarding organization, engineer vehicles, equipment and
stores capabilities will be extracted from engineer publications.

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APPENDIX 2
MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY

GENERAL

1. Forces rely upon the ability to move rapidly and freely to effectively execute tasks. A BG CO will
develop a concept of operations with a supporting scheme of manoeuvre and desired effects. Accordingly,
the BG CO and staff will designate mobility corridors, routes or areas that are required in support of this
plan. Under combat conditions, forces combine a full range of effects including conventional fire and
movement to achieve the intended outcome and positional advantage over the enemy. Even in less
intensive stability operations, mobility is equally important, as it enables forces to project the necessary
presence and achieve the desired effects required to accomplish the mission.

2. The courses of action and manoeuvre options will be constrained by the inherent mobility limitations
of a BG’s vehicles, what the terrain and weather will permit, and what the enemy has done to restrict
movement. However, COAs need not be dictated and restricted, as mobility can be enhanced through
application of engineer capabilities in support of the BG.

3. The BG must deal with known and unforeseen restrictions to mobility. This includes overcoming
a multitude of existing and reinforced obstacles. The overall steps in providing mobility are:

a. Planning. As part of the OPP, the scheme of manoeuvre is developed. Terrain is analysed,
and the enemy’s counter-mobility (CMob) capabilities and intents are assessed. Mobility
support requirements are determined.

b. Detecting Restrictions to Mobility. Continuous intelligence gathering of the terrain will be

essential to ensure accurate environmental (eg, terrain and meteorological) situational
awareness (Brown SA), thus enabling a BG to conduct “in-stride” mobility assessment and
prepare for possible future tasks.

c. Maintaining Mobility. To prevent degradation of tempo and momentum, restrictions to mobility

are defeated as they are encountered. As well, existing mobility corridors and routes should be
improved and maintained.

MOBILITY

4. Most commonly, a BG will be deployed to an assigned AO within a Canadian or coalition formation.

The degree of cooperation and coordination between the formation and the BG will vary and must be
defined. Nevertheless, the BG with its supporting engineer sqn is ultimately responsible for its own
mobility requirements within its AO. Engineers must be prepared to conduct mobility support in either
a conventional or asymmetrical threat environment wherein the task site can be permissive or non-
permissive. The level of permissiveness and risk tolerance dictates the manner in which the mobility
support tasks will be executed (see Figure 4B2-1). Permissiveness is a relative term that conveys the
degree of the overt tactical threat, but it can also include the expedience in which a task must be completed
(time restriction). When encountering an obstacle, where possible, economy of effort dictates that
a bypass be found. However, if no bypass is possible or worthwhile, the obstacle must be defeated.

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MANOEUVRE

MOBILITY

OBSTACLE
Natural or man-made
restriction

BYPASS DEFEAT

PERMISSIVE NON-PERMISSIVE
• Clearance • Breach
• Reduction • Assault Crossing
• Support/Line of Communication Bridge • Assault Road
• Route construction/maintenance

Figure 4B2-1: Mobility Support Algorithm

5. Mobility support can be categorized into three main subtasks (see Figure 4B2-2): counter-obstacle
(which includes countermine and gap crossing), enhancing movement and inland underwater diving.
These tasks are often conducted concurrently, for example, to clear a composite obstacle with a minefield,
ditch and berm or to clear a crater group reinforced with mines. As stated above, the threat environment
influences the manner in which the mobility tasks are executed.

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MOBILITY SUBTASKS AND ACTIONS

NON-PERMISSIVE PERMISSIVE

COUNTER-OBSTACLE Obstacle reduction Breach

ENHANCING MOVEMENT Route construction and maintenance Assault road

INLAND UNDERWATER Clearance and recce Breach and recce

DIVING

Figure 4B2-2: Mobility Support Tasks

INTELLIGENCE

6. Intelligence gathering is perhaps the most important endeavour in enabling manoeuvre and
enhancing mobility support. Mobility corridors (routes) are examined to identify impending mobility support
tasks including reducing and reinforcing existing obstacles, improving existing LOC and establishing new
routes. Success is measured by how much intelligence gathering efforts can forewarn manoeuvre forces
as to impending obstacles, thus enabling proactive grouping of capability and planning counteractions.
Often, good intelligence gathering facilitates the difference between having to conduct deliberate vice
hasty operations.

7. Terrain analysis is the start point of the IPB process. That analysis is developed primarily through
the engineer geomatics support provided to the BG. The ESCC will work with the BG intelligence staff to
use that terrain analysis to assist in the development of possible COAs available to both the enemy and
friendly forces.

8. Terrain analysis is enabled through the ISTAR process. Engineers are active “clients” and must tap
into the web of available sensor resources. Engineer recce alone will not be enough. It is important that
ISTAR assets be tasked to seek terrain related information and that the named areas of interest (NAIs)
and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) reflect this requirement. For example, terrain information
garnered through routine patrol reports can help identify areas where further engineer recce is required.

9. Ultimately, the best and most conclusive method for gaining intelligence is through ground recce
supported by other intelligence gathering efforts. Recce assets “pull” manoeuvre forces forward by
reporting what they observe and by the deductions/interpretation (intelligence) that result. Ground recce
is not launched blindly but should be built upon or confirm earlier information/intelligence. Recce is an
arduous and risky affair and is always constrained by time; it is often characterized as not being available
in the quantities required because of its specialized skills. The tempo and momentum of recce is related
to the spectrum of conflict and the nature of the operation:

a. In offensive and defensive operations, recce is conducted under complex circumstances.

It is spurred on by a need to maintain momentum of forces, but is complicated by enemy
counter-recce efforts. “Swarming” recce assets forward, of various types and generated from
different levels and units, increases the probability of success. Momentum trumps caution;
consequently, risk tolerance is high for the recce elements so that follow-on forces use the
designated mobility corridors.

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b. In stability operations, recce is no less important; however, its activities are likely conducted
within a framework and within the static boundaries of defined AOs. Within static AOs, over
time the requirement for recce will be substituted by routine patrols. Nevertheless, efforts are
no less challenging wherein threats can be less evident. Risk tolerance, in general, is lower
and, therefore, recce or patrols may be constrained. Recce in permissive environments
is usually objective and conclusive.

10. Engineers are effective contributors to the overall recce effort and bring with them a technical
expertise specialized in gathering engineer-related information. Therefore, although part of the overall
ISTAR effort, engineer recce tasks should be focused at specific points where their expertise is needed.
Other sensors and analysis can be used to select and optimize the tasking of engineer recce.

11. Brown SA is the net result of all the terrain-related ISTAR information gathered and developed
as intelligence. Specifically, examples of information include:

a. bridge and defile locations;

b. river and gap details;

c. gaps and bypasses;

d. soil conditions; and

e. location, orientation and composition of obstacles.

PERMISSIVE VERSUS NON-PERMISSIVE

12. Although the intelligence gathering requirement remains the same, the procedures through which
an obstacle is defeated depends upon the type of the obstacle as well as the permissiveness—outlined
at Figure 4B2-1—of the task site. The procedures although different are nonetheless combined arms
efforts. As a rule, obstacles in permissive environments are overcome through deliberate action. This
is because the situation permits the time for optimal preparation, with minimizing risk becoming
more important.

BREACHING AND ASSAULTING THROUGH OBSTACLES (NON-PERMISSIVE)

13. General. When no bypass is feasible, the BG must be prepared to defeat any obstacle that will
impede mobility. Obstacle breaching, including assault crossings and roads, is perhaps the most difficult
combat task a force can encounter. A breach is a synchronized combined arms operation in direct support
of a manoeuvre commander conducted to create a lane through an obstacle under non-permissive
tactical conditions. A lane is formed through an obstacle to advance forces to the far side. A breach may
be hasty or deliberate, and in the case of a composite obstacle, several engineer capabilities may
be required.

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14. Breaching Fundamentals and Stages of the Attack. A BG may be required to conduct an attack
independently, as part of a greater formation effort or as a specified component force within a formation
attack. When breaching is conducted as part of an attack, the stages are:

a. Mounting Stage. Mounting includes locating, defining and picketing the enemy; preparing for
battle, fire support, protection and security; and forming a reserve. Preparing for battle includes
regrouping forces and allocating required specialized equipment such as breaching assets.

b. Assault Stage. The assault stage involves the break-in and fight through. It is during the
break-in that any breaching required is undertaken. A well-prepared defence by a peer
competitor may have a series of obstacles in place—both tactical and protective—whereas a
non-conventional enemy may resort to the use of only protective booby traps (or more likely,
may rely upon the existing terrain alone for protection). Regardless of the nature of obstacles,
for a breach to be successful the following fundamentals must be applied:

 (1) Suppress. Direct and indirect fires are used to suppress enemy forces to protect the
breach effort. Engineer breaching assets are deployed forward and remain very exposed
to enemy fires; hence, the importance to suppress effectively.

 (2) Obscure. As an added measure, obscuration hampers the enemy’s ability to observe
and acquire targets.

 (3) Secure. It may be necessary to secure the immediate area of the obstacle to prevent
enemy interference. This is particularly relevant in close and complex terrain where
suppressing and obscuration may be difficult and ineffective. This may involve sending
dismounted forces forward.

 (4) Reduce. The physical removal of the obstacle’s components helps to create usable and
marked lanes or established crossings.

 (5) Assault. BG manoeuvre elements pass through and continue with the fight through. This
involves the successive destruction of the enemy that could hinder continued passage of
BG elements through the obstacle. The size of the assault force and terrain layout
determines the number of lanes initially created.

c. Consolidation Stage. During consolidation, routes through the obstacle are further improved
and marked. Improvements may include the establishment of additional breached lanes. Traffic
control and the BG order of march are factors as to which elements need to pass forward to
continue the battle.

d. Exploitation. For successful exploitation, forces should be grouped with engineer assets to
maintain mobility.

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15. Organization. Effective organization is critical for the correct balance of capability. With timely and
accurate intelligence and good communications, issuing orders and regrouping can be completed well
before approaching an obstacle. This allows for an attempt at a hasty breach or crossing, otherwise,
there will be a need to pause before a deliberate attempt is made. In a formation attack, a BG could be
required to act as one of the forces, or if attacking independently, group itself accordingly. The three main
elements and related responsibilities in which forces are allocated are:

a. Force in Place (FIP). The FIP isolates the breach area and provides nearside security by
delivering direct and indirect fire support. The primary responsibility of this force is to negate
the enemy’s capacity to interfere with the breach and assault.

b. Bridgehead Force. The bridgehead force assists the passage of the assault force by creating
and marking a lane through the obstacle. In addition to engineer assets, it may contain combat
elements to provide additional suppression, obscuration and local security. The size of the
bridgehead force is predicated on the number of lanes required, the amount of engineering
equipment required and the size of the security element.

c. Breakout Force. The breakout force destroys or dislodges the enemy on the far side and thus
prevents direct fire on the opened lanes. It too may require engineer breach assets for
subsequent obstacles and for mobility support in depth. For ease of command, the bridgehead
force is often a subelement of the breakout force.

16. Figure 4B2-3 summarizes the three main breaching organizational elements, breaching
fundamentals and the related responsibilities that the forces are allocated.

BREACHING ORGANIZATIONAL BREACHING

RESPONSIBILITIES
ELEMENT FUNDAMENTALS

FORCE-IN PLACE Suppress Suppress direct fires covering an obstacle.

Obscure Control obscuring smoke.
Prevent the enemy from manoeuvring to prevent the breach.

BRIDGEHEAD FORCE Suppress Create lanes.

Secure Mark lanes in the obstacle.
Reduce Secure the nearside and far side of the obstacle.

BREAKOUT FORCE Assault Assist the FIP with suppression before the assault.
Suppress Destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle.

Figure 4B2-3: Breaching Organizational Elements, Fundamentals and Responsibilities

17. Mass. A breach attempt, hasty or deliberate, should have sufficient assets allocated or failure is
certain. An obstacle halts the momentum of a BG, but how long the BG is fixed depends upon how good
its drills are and the allocation of forces. Too many forces in the FIP may lead to failure at the breach or
not enough for the subsequent assault. Not enough forces in the FIP and suppression may be inadequate
thus leading to destruction of the bridgehead force. Likewise, the BG must pass enough force mass to
the far side of the obstacle to deal with the enemy; therefore, the appropriate number of lanes is required
(minimum two for a BG).

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18. Synchronization. The attack is staged and several force elements must be synchronized. The
synchronization must be flexible; for example, the suppressive fire plan may need to be extended if the
bridgehead force needs more time. Traffic control is another aspect wherein the breakout force must be
prepared to assault through designated lanes, which are not to be revealed until the breach is successful.
Synchronization is achieved by effective C2, clear and simple orders and rehearsed drills.

THE BG AS PART OF A FORMATION BREACH OPERATION

19. When confronted with a main defensive line that is well prepared on a significant obstacle (including
rivers) with mutually supporting positions, a BG would be unable to attack independently but would form
part of a formation effort. There are no changes to the breaching fundamentals, stages of the attack
or force composition within a formation break operation. The key difference is that the BG would most
likely be assigned to the task of either bridgehead or breakout force.

20. Examples are provided at Figures 4B2-4 and 4B2-5.

Support Force

Assault Force Breach Force

FORMATION ASSAULT ECHELON

Assault Stage

Example 1 (Figure 4B2-4)

A multi formation attack on a main defensive line could see a battle group (BG) form one of the units tasked to the
formation assault echelon (breach force and assault force) responsible to breach obstacle belts and assault primary
defensive positions.

Figure 4B2-4: Battle Group Assault as part of a Formation Attack against Deliberate Defence

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In-place Force

Assault Force Breach Force Breach Force Assault Force

MAIN BODY MAIN BODY

In-place Force
ASSAULT ECHELON

Assault Stage Build up/Consolidation Stage

Example 2 (Figure 4B2-5)

3
A formation attack across a lightly defended river that can be spanned by armoured vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs)
could see a battle group (BG) as part of the Bridgehead Force. The BG organization could be as follows:
Support Force - in this case not required because support would be provided by the in-place force;
Breach Force - establish crossings as Assault Echelon; and
Assault Force - responsible to move across the obstacle as a main body and develop a bridgehead.
bridgehead

Figure 4B2-5: Battle Group Assault as Part of Formation Attack against a Light Defence

CLEARANCE, REDUCTION AND CROSSING (PERMISSIVE)

21. General. When no bypass is feasible, the BG must be prepared to defeat all obstacles that will
impede mobility. Clearing, reducing or crossing obstacles may be required to allow a military operation to
continue with reduced risk along a route or within an area. This may involve the removal of mines and
other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Obstacle clearance and reduction drills are designed for use in a
tactically permissive environment and are inherently deliberate actions. Engineers may often execute
obstacle reduction independently (with administrative support) or as part of a combined arms element
tasked with “clearing” a route or area.

22. Fundamentals. As with breaching, clearance activities are apt to be more successful if conducted
under the following fundamentals:

a. Security. Although intelligence has assessed that the threat environment is permissive and
that a clearance (vice breach) can be conducted, the site should still be secured to allow
engineers to conduct clearance without interference and distractions.

b. Employing Appropriate Methods. Clearance methods are prescribed in accordance with the
complexity and hazards that obstacles present. At times, choice of methods is limited to those
resources available.

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c. Methodical. Unlike breaches (wherein speed is a virtue to minimize time exposed to enemy
targeting, thus resulting in a minimum standard for traffic use), clearance tasks are more
methodical, and the standard for traffic use is higher.

23. Organization. Effective organization is critical for the correct balance of capability. With timely and
accurate intelligence and good communications, the issuance of orders and regrouping can be completed
well before removing the obstacle. The three main elements and related responsibilities which forces are
allocated are:

a. Support Element. Support elements are required to support the clearance element and usually
consist of administrative support (including medical and CIMIC and translation services).

b. Clearance Element. Engineers are tasked to clear, reduce, cross and construct routes.

c. Security Element. Security is established to provide the freedom of action, which could consist
of infantry patrols, MPs for traffic control and even the local constabulary.

24. Mass. Clearance tasks are methodical and time consuming and, in the case of UXO clearance,
very fatiguing; consequently, the size of the organization must be proportional to the task.

25. Synchronization. The BG CO’s scheme of manoeuvre requires the prioritization of tasks as well
as the coordination of the necessary supporting elements.

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APPENDIX 3
COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

INTRODUCTION

1. Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised

manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to
destroy or incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from
non-military components.64

2. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED). C-IED is defined as “the collective efforts

at all levels to defeat the IED system by attacking the networks, defeating the device and preparing the
force.” 65 Countering IEDs should not be seen as an end in itself but as supporting activity within
an overall campaign.

3. IED Threat. IEDs can influence tactical, operational and strategic levels. At the tactical level, IEDs
are most typically used to kill, injure, incapacitate, harass or distract friendly forces. It allows insurgents
to achieve separation from BG elements while inflicting casualties. IEDs can cause numerous casualties
and restrict BG manoeuvre, thereby negating the BG’s conventional capability advantage. The main
physical effect of an IED may be produced by blast alone or it may be enhanced by the addition
of shrapnel-producing materials or even by CBRN material. When combined with an information campaign,
IEDs can have a disproportionate effect on the BG’s ability to conduct operations.

THE INSURGENT IED NETWORK

4. IED System. An IED system, shown in Figure 4B3-1, comprises personnel, resources and activities
and the linkages between them that are necessary to resource, plan, execute and exploit an IED attack.66

64. 
Defence Terminology Bank, record 4502.
65. 
AJP 3.15 Edition 2
66. 
Defence Terminology Bank, record 37289.

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EXECUTE
RESOURCE & PLAN
EXPLOIT

Financier & Recruiter

Supplier Exploiter

Transporter

Builder
EVENT
Planner

Emplacer

Triggerman

1 yr 2 mth 1 mth 1 wk 1d 1 hr 10 1 10 1 0
min min sec sec sec

TIMEFRAME

Figure 4B3-1: The IED Network67

5. Defining an IED Network. An IED network is not an organization permanently established to

emplace IEDs but a method for insurgent elements to organize to conduct IED operations. An IED network
contains a variety of members who specialize in different tasks because of their complexity. This typically
consists of local leaders/planners, bombmakers, couriers, emplacers, triggermen and exploiters.
Exploiters are insurgents who attempt to record, document and harass both the friendly forces involved
in an IED incident as well as the responders to identify and exploit vulnerabilities. Regardless of the type
of group that employs IEDs, these key functions, less exploiters, must be performed.

6. Networks are not usually limited by political boundaries of a province/state or district/region but
rather physical ones. The motivations of a network to actively engage in emplacing IEDs are often either
ideological or financially based. IEDs are a method to remain anonymous; consequently organizations
who employ IEDs do not share the same characteristics or centres of gravity as those found in a typical
state versus state conflict.

67. 
NATO AJP-3.15, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), Study Draft 4-8 Aug 08, p 1-4.

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7. The non-linear structure of an IED network makes networks independent and survivable. However,
critical personnel and resources can be identified as key nodes. Nodes are interconnected in many ways
such as the sharing of resources (ie, money and weapons) and personnel (ie, bombmaking specialists)
for operations. The importance of a particular individual will vary by the level, maturity, capability and
leadership of the network. Figure 4B3-2 provides an example of some key nodes or networks within an
IED system.

IED SYSTEM – KEY NODES

REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Regional Leadership. Regional leadership is in place to attempt to
provide a command and control mechanism to networks and interface
with senior leadership. The aim of regional leadership is to direct
operations delegated by the senior leadership group. The level of
authority of regional leadership over networks can vary significantly
and activities can range from active to passive. Active leadership may
be directive in target selection and may attempt to coordinate the
movement of key resources and technical support from other
networks. Passive activities may include negotiating for funds,
infrastructure, labour, equipment, etc.
Movement. Operationally, movement is the physical movement of devices,
key resources and personnel into and out of an area. Regional leadership
is often essential to supporting the movement of personnel and resources
through districts and across borders.
Technical Support. The availability of technical experts can be a
significant weakness of an insurgency unlike a professional military
that has established specialist capabilities. Regional leadership is often
essential to coordinating expert support from various networks. Expert
support may include support in the assembly of complex IEDs
(ie, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) and/or how to tactically
employ specific IEDs to maximize its effect. Technical support may be
called upon when devices repeatedly fail to yield the desired effects.

Target Selection and Planning. Targets may be selected by local

leadership/planners. However to achieve strategic effect an insurgency
may be deliberate in their target selection. Regional leadership may be
heavily involved in planning or supporting spectacular attacks.

Non-lethal Support. Regional leadership is often essential for providing

strategic messaging and negotiating support from leadership and power
brokers. Activities such as publicizing success, funding, recruiting and
infrastructure support are areas where regional leadership directly
influences the activities of a network. Recruiting is concerned with
the creation of a manpower base responsible for carrying out the
group’s campaign.

Figure 4B3-2: (Sheet 1 of 2) The IED System – Key Nodes

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LOCAL LEADERSHIP

Network Leadership. A network can also be made up of many small
splinter organizations carrying out specific orders of a specific local
leader or a more centralized coordination group. This level is defined
as an individual network.
Target Selection and Tactical Planning. The timing and selection
of specific targets is often determined by local leadership. To support
the planning of a task a surveillance team may be established.
Surveillance Team. Through reconnaissance and observation, the
network may collect and collate targeting data including information on
friendly force tactics, troop movement, timings, potential vulnerabilities
as well as areas of approach and escape. These observations, normally
conducted covertly, will provide the opponent leadership/planner with
essential intelligence such as ideal IED emplacement locations
(eg, high-traffic areas), concealment, observation points as
well as avenues of escape and reinforcement.

IED Builder. These are the persons involved in the design, assembly and
fabrication of an IED. An IED builder may simply be assembling the basic
components. These individuals are not usually associated with the
emplacement; however they do provide direction on how to arm and trigger
the device as well as how to emplace it to achieve the best effect. IED
builders range from the very sophisticated to the very inept.

Emplacers. Emplacement is the positioning of an IED for the purpose of

conducting an attack. An emplacer may be simply placing an IED by a road
or burying a large device at a specific location. Emplacers are generally
the lowest level in the network. For simple IEDs, this may include locals
paid or coerced into performing this task. When an IED is more complex
a tactical team may be formed. A small team may be required to emplace
the IED and to carry out the actual attack. The IED may require multiple
personnel to transport, dig in, monitor, arm, detonate and exploit the
IED event.

Exploiters. Exploitation in this context is the act, by the opponent,

of taking full advantage of the tactical success of an IED strike and
multiplying and broadening its effect by publicizing the event as part of
an information operations campaign. It also will drive future enemy tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs). Exploiters may be part of a tactical
team or a distinct group established to conduct a follow-on attack or simple
to film, observe, harass or spread information operations messaging.

Figure 4B3-2: (Sheet 2 of 2) The IED System – Key Nodes

8. Keys to IED Network Effectiveness. In addition to the non-linear structure of an IED network,
some keys to a network’s effectiveness are its small numbers, the independently organized cell structure,
its local knowledge and the availability of basic IED resources. These factors enable the IED network to
operate in isolation or as part of a larger insurgency or system. They also enable networks to rapidly
increase effectiveness, regenerate leadership and make effective and repeated use of ground. To be
effective a network must also be resourceful in leveraging local resources and regional capabilities as
well as influencing locals. IED networks are not inhibited by maintaining the moral high ground or by
being lawful in their activities, which enables them to be very successful in their information operations
and coercing locals. IED network members also have the ability to operate part time and blend back into
the civilian population when operations are completed.

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9. Measuring the Effectiveness of the Network. The effectiveness of an IED attack will depend
upon several factors including: the resources available to the network; the effectiveness of these
resources; and force protection of the coalition forces, terrain, etc. Understanding the skills of the networks
operating in the BG’s area of responsibility is critical to measuring their effectiveness and determining the
focus and amount of C-IED effort required. There are two significant factors pertaining to an IED network’s
effectiveness. The first is tactical effectiveness and the second is technical effectiveness. If a priority
needs to be assigned, the insurgent network that is more tactically effective is generally more dangerous.
When an IED network starts becoming both tactically and technically skilled, it poses extreme risk to
land forces and needs to be addressed.

10. Tactical Effectiveness. Tactical effectiveness is the IED network’s ability to maximize their use of
terrain and resources while understanding how to target the land forces’ freedom of action by exploiting
vehicle mobility limitations, tactics (ie, search TTPs, patrol layout) and ROE restrictions. Experience has
shown that IEDs are often simply constructed and easy to neutralize once located and identified; however,
the emplacement implies a skilled level of tactical knowledge shown by the adversary’s ability to get
in, emplace, initiate an IED and exit an area. Some indicators of tactically skilled emplacement include
the use of:

a. daisy chained main charges that span a patrol’s tactical deployment posture in a given area.
A well-placed device implies an understanding of patrol routes, posture (ie, section, platoon,
company) and knowledge of canalizing terrain;

b. secondary and tertiary devices. Employment of secondary devices is not new. However,
a tactically skilled insurgent understands to emplace the secondary at the most vulnerable
locations, such as the EOD control points or outer cordon locations;

c. time-initiated devices to correspond with quick reaction force timelines; and

d. emplacing techniques that counter our search TTPs, such as emplacing command wires
parallel to the road to counter a V search and IEDs emplaced forward of a vulnerable point
where land forces would be likely halt to begin searching.

11. Technical Effectiveness. The technical effectiveness of a network is the easier of the two factors
to measure. Broadly speaking, if a network is technically skilled, their IEDs will be well constructed and
their attacks will be focused, minimizing collateral damage. Identification and exploitation of devices
is critical to assessing technical complexity, for this reason IEDs should be exploited whenever possible.
Indicators of technically skilled networks include the following:

a. a Trojan Horse IED is one in which a secondary switch is located within the main charge. The
secondary switch could be antihandling, command, time, etc. Incorporation of such a switch
indicates an adversary’s understanding of friendly force render safe and exploitation processes
and seeks to directly target them;

b. come-on devices to target first responders and EOD operators. Come-on devices could employ
anti-pull, anti-lift devices, etc. Incorporation of such a switch indicates an adversary’s
understanding of friendly force render safe and exploitation processes and seeks to directly
target them;

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c. directional fragmentation focused charges and explosively formed penetrators of machine

shop quality;

d. radio-controlled (RC) armed victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs), enabling

the device to be armed at the desired time. A more technically skilled network would seek
to exploit our limitation in detecting VOIEDs of low metal content;

e. unique RC switches that are not covered by standard coalition force ECM; and

f. the presence of multiple means of initiation for a single device would indicate a technically
superior IED cell.

12. Other Indicators. Another indicator of an IED network’s effectiveness is the network’s early warning
system (EWS). A network’s EWS is difficult to quantify; however, it is often known intuitively by commanders.
Land forces will quickly learn when their movements have been identified. Simple insurgent tactics such
as employing kites, runners, lights and communication networks can be identified. Skilled networks have
the ability to disrupt land forces both on the ingress and egress from an operation.

C-IED FOR THE BG

13. BG C-IED Lines of Operation. The C-IED lines of operation (LOO) and principles outlined in the
CF joint and brigade group C-IED doctrine form the basis of BG C-IED doctrine. The basic C-IED LOO
remains for the BG to attack the network, defeat the device and prepare the force. These LOOs are
important to understand and frame C-IED principles, estimate factors and activities in support of
BG operations.

14. Attack the IED Network. The objective of attacking the network is two fold: increase the freedom
of action and have the insurgents change weapon systems and tactics to something with less operational
and strategic risk to the BG. Activities associated with attacking the network are to predict, prevent and
exploit. At the tactical level, attacking the network can be viewed from two perspectives: human and
resource. The human perspective seeks to identify key enemies (ie, key nodes—leadership, technical
experts, power brokers) and target them. Theoretically, the more key nodes neutralized; the more the
network has been disrupted. However, a risk with this approach is the BG can be quickly consumed by
chasing the next insurgent, which draws continual focus and resources away from the BG’s campaign.
The resource perspective seeks to seize the adversary’s limited resources, as this can have the same
tactical effect to targeting a key individual—fewer IEDs and/or less effective IEDs on the key routes
and manoeuvre corridors will improve BG’s freedom of action.

15. Defeating the Device. If IEDs are expected to be a weapon employed in the BG’s AOR, the BG
must have a plan to defeat the devices. Defeating the device implies conducting activities to protect,
detect, mitigate and neutralize. Unfortunately, attempting to attack the network alone is not likely to be
successful in stopping all IEDs. This is due to the effectiveness of IEDs as a weapon and the fact that
attacking the complete network is beyond the scope of the BG’s capacity. Only the neutralize tasks
should be limited to being conducted by technical experts. The technical experts are C-IED trained
personnel, EOD operators and combat engineers. EOD teams have specialized skills and equipment
to mitigate the IED threat. Given EOD teams may not be able to respond everywhere, combat engineers
should be looked to as secondary layer to neutralize devices as per Figure 4B3-3.

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COMBAT ENGINEER TACTICAL EXPLOITER

SERIAL INCIDENT TYPE EOD TEAM ACTIVITY
SECTION ACTIVITY ACTIVITY

1 Pre-IED detonation Search (intermediate and IED render safe Level 1 exploitation
advanced) procedures
(Permissive environment)
Level 1 exploitation

2 Pre-IED detonation Assault breach69 Capable to use most N/A

expedient procedures
(Non-permissive environment
(eg, hasty clearance70)
or Priority 1 casualty)

3 Post-IED Detonation Site Security Verify Area Safe (Primary) Level 1 Exploitation
(If secondary IED found, go to Serial 1 Search Assist
or 2) Verify Area Safe (Alternate)

Figure 4B3-3: Responsibilities for Combat Engineers, EOD Team and C-IED68Team69

16. Prepare the Forces. Prepare the force focuses both within the BG and supporting other friendly
forces (ie, HN military and police) that the BG can expect to operate with in its AOR. In-theatre continuation
training is required to ensure BG soldiers maintain knowledge of current IED threats and have adjusted
C-IED TTPs appropriately. Support to friendly force training is about increasing friendly force capacity
and effectiveness in the BG’s AOR. Where possible, the BG should facilitate C-IED training of HN military
and police in its AOR to ensure friendly forces that the BG is partnered with have the necessary
C-IED knowledge to conduct basic C-IED TTPs and know how to call for BG support, when required.
C-IED training is further discussed in B-GL-365-021/FP-001 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
For Land Operations and B-GJ-005-315/FP-001 CFJP 3-15 Countering Improvised Explosive Devices.

17. C-IED Principles. There are six principles that need to be understood and followed by the BG
in order to effectively counter the IED threat:

a. Full-Spectrum C-IED Knowledge within the BG. C-IED knowledge cannot be limited to a
staff officer or combat engineers. Without a basic knowledge of C-IED, BG COs will have
difficulty knowing how to exploit weaknesses of IEDs and IED networks, to mitigate IED threats
as well as where to accept to risk and to prioritize effort. At the soldier level, a basic knowledge
of C-IED allows soldiers, sections and platoons to be more deliberate in their C-IED approach,
whether it is to seek reachback for specialist support, bypass a potential threat or breach
through to achieve their objectives. All manoeuvre forces must be familiar with the appropriate
TTPs for detecting IEDs as well as how to task and operate with specialist enablers.

b. Understand the Complex Dynamics of the Insurgency, Including the Wider Environment
and the Threat. A broad understanding of the insurgency is required, otherwise IED events
will be viewed in isolation and not necessarily linked to a network and the larger
insurgency. Understanding the complex dynamic is critical for the BG to determine the
targets and intent of an IED attack. Specific IED threats vary from location to location.

68. Assault breach is an action that includes explosive entry and includes hasty clearance (Source: CEFCOM/JEngr).
69. Hasty clearance is the rapid destruction (counter charge main charge [CCMC]) of the main charge, with no regard for forensic evidence collection or collateral damage
(due to the tactical situation) (Source: CEFCOM/JEngr).

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IED networks are not necessarily well interconnected or equally resourced. A “big hand small
map” view of the IED threat should not be taken, as accepting risk and applying the appropriate
mitigation measures become virtually impossible if a uniform IED threat is assumed to
be present.

c. Attacking the Network. Countering IEDs requires an offensive mindset. Once IEDs are
emplaced the initiative is to an extent already lost, as the BG must now focus on defeating the
particular devices. Preventative activities can significantly reduce network effectiveness. BG
COs need to be deliberate in their decision to neutralize or follow emplacers. Diverting ISTAR
assets to concentrate on emplacers eliminates only the lowest member of the IED network.
Taking time to develop a target that neutralizes a network key node (ie, limited resource) has
far greater medium- and long-term effects. The BG does not operate in isolation, and coordination
with higher HQ should be conducted to determine appropriate targets.

d. Exploitation as a C-IED Principle. As with all operations, intelligence is essential to defeating

the insurgency. Exploitation is a significant technical and forensic intelligence source, as it can
help identify the network and specific individuals involved, their capabilities and TTPs as well
as provide information to discredit a network and the insurgency. IEDs are individually unique
and provide a detectable signature that will identify the bombmaker and potentially the network.
Captured IED resources provide insight into the IED network’s technical and tactical capabilities.
Exploitation enables the BG to effectively target networks with preventative activities.

e. Flexibility and Reserves. The abilities to effectively react to emerging IED threats and
high-confidence intelligence as well as to project influence require flexibility. BG COs need to
be deliberate in deciding the degree to which ground manoeuvre forces are tied to framework
operations and how much flexibility is retained for C-IED and other operations. Tasks that
monopolize ground manoeuvre assets must be considered carefully, as C-IED activities need
to be continuous in a high threat environment. Particular consideration should be applied to
the establishment of tactical infrastructure (TI). Although TI is an obvious way to expand
the “ink spot” and is necessary to force protect the BG, it absolutely limits the amount of
resources to support preventative tasks. ISTAR assets alone are insufficient to attack
the network. The challenge is to deliberately select targets likely to cause the best effect for the
campaign duration.

f. Surprise and Security. For C-IED preventative activities to successfully target a network
surprise and security are critical. Unfortunately, this can be challenging to achieve with locally
employed personnel (such as interpreters, cleaners and contractors) working in close proximity
to unit and subunit lines. BG COs must continually ensure that their plans remain secure and
that their operations are not predictable despite working with HN police or military. Creativity is
essential, whether through feinting movements, adjusting avenues of approach, duration of
operations, etc. BG COs must understand that the momentum of a mission can be quickly lost
due an IED attack, as the incident site can easily take a platoon to secure and several hours
to fully clear and exploit. When the insurgents have time to react, they regain the initiative.

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18. C-IED Tactical Activities. In support of the three C-IED LOOs, there are seven recommended
activities that must be command driven. The recommended activities are to predict, prevent, protect,
mitigate, detect, neutralize and exploit. The activities of predict, prevent and exploit focus on attacking the
network while detect, protect, neutralize and mitigate focus on defeating the devices. The intent of these
activities is to form a holistic and integrated C-IED approach. The scheme of manoeuvre in simple terms
is to predict the adversary’s actions, prevent the adversary from executing its plans, detect IED material
and devices, protect the soldiers, mitigate the likely threats and effects of the attack, neutralize emplaced
devices, and exploit IED:

a. Predict. The aim of successful prediction is to identify enemy threats in a timely manner in
order for the BG CO to take preventative, protective and mitigating measures more efficiently.
To predict the IED network’s activities requires identifying patterns associated with the
development and employment of IED threats. It includes identifying insurgent command and
control structures, critical resources and vulnerabilities. Predict is primarily an intelligence
function and should be supported by all deployed elements through detailed reports.

b. Prevent. Prevent activities are mainly offensive in nature and can be both lethal and non-lethal.
The aim of preventative activities are to proactively disrupt and interdict the IED networks’
ability and will to conduct IED operations at the earliest opportunity. Lethal activities include
operations to destroy, clear, neutralize or capture IED network key nodes (whether personnel,
resources or infrastructure) and to disrupt their supporting subsystems. Non-lethal activities
include messaging to deter attacks by condemning attacks, influencing HN public support,
establishing mechanisms to report IEDs as well as operations to collect legacy ordnance
and weapons.

c. Protect. Protect activities are mainly defensive and physical in nature. They are activities
in which the BG utilizes technology and simple tactics to reduce the effects of IEDs on
individuals, equipment and facilities. Activities associated with protect are disrupt, channel,
block, reduce exposure and redirect blast energy, projectiles and/or fragmentation. They also
include activities that stop the device from functioning altogether, excluding those neutralize
functions relating to EOD operations. Protect activities alone are insufficient to ensure the
safety of soldiers, as increased protective measures risks insurgents employing ever increasing
main charges. Examples of protect activities would include SOPs to ensure soldiers deploying
in an IED threat environment always wear ballistic eye wear, vehicles appropriately store spare
fuel, seatbelts are worn by non-air sentry personnel, equipment is properly stored and cargo
strapped, electronic countermeasure equipment is regularly serviced, etc.

d. Mitigate. Mitigate activities are short-term defensive activities that apply processes instead
of technology. They occur prior to a mission and after an IED event to avoid repeating mistakes,
maximize effectiveness and improve reaction to IED threats. They are activities in which the
BG utilizes tactical planning, lessons learned, SOPs, tactical aide-memoires, theatre TTPs and
risk assessments to execute tasks, conduct actions, and ensure the passage of information
to reduce the effects of IEDs on individuals, equipment and facilities. An example would be
to employ the appropriate search technique when conducting a vulnerable point search
depending on the threat such a box search or a V search.

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e. Detect. Detect includes all activities and technologies (eg, recce, UAVs) involved in identifying
and locating explosive devices, IED components, other weapons, related personnel and
infrastructure prior to IED assembly or initiation. It will serve as warning to allow the BG to
attempt to mitigate the threat by avoiding it, increasing protection, employing specialists, etc.
The overall aim of detection is to provide relevant (ie, accurate and timely) information for
subunit commanders to react appropriately. Detection involves a combination of operating
space awareness, ISR, tactical SOPs, technical resources, enablers (such as explosive
detection dogs and engineers) and well-trained soldiers. This also includes detection of CBRN
materials, if the threat exists.

f. Neutralize. Neutralize activities are reactive activities led by specialists. The aim is to eliminate
the IED hazard by rendering it safe at the time and place chosen by friendly forces and to
support exploitation of the incident. They employ EOD SOPs and technologies to disrupt,
disarm, render safe, dispose or destroy IEDs and their components. Contingency plans should
also be made for dealing with IEDs containing CBRN material if assessed to be a threat.
Neutralize activities are normally associated with EOD operators. When possible, it is preferable
to render a device safe than blow it in place to mitigate the risk of collateral damage and to
improve the results of exploitation.

g. Exploit. The overall aim of exploitation is to support the development of accurate intelligence
in order to effectively predict, prevent, protect, mitigate, detect and neutralize the IED threat.
Exploitation is defined as “taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for
tactical or strategic purposes.”70 It implies collecting and analysing recovered evidence. Exploit
is defined under attack the network because its main effort is to support targeting, through the
identification of key nodes. Although it is also used to develop new TTPs in support of neutralize.

19. Estimate Factors for Operations. When possible, BG staff should consider the following seven
factors when developing C-IED tactical plans in an IED-rich environment:

a. IED Threat. The nature of the IED threat must be determined prior to any focused operation.
IED threats vary from location to location. Assessing the IED threat needs to be done as part
of the IPB process to help determine the most likely and most dangerous insurgent COAs. The
two basic questions that should be asked are: what is the typical modus operandi of the
insurgent(s) in the particular area and how effective is the network EWS? Understanding the
answers to these two basic questions will allow the appropriate ingress, egress, search TTPs
and ECM coverage to be planned for.

b. Ground. The nature of the terrain is a significant factor for insurgents attempting to emplace
IEDs. Urban terrain generally offers insurgents significantly more avenues into or out of an IED
site, locations from which to observe or film BG actions and locations to cache key resources
or stage complex attacks. Paved routes are more difficult to emplace IEDs in than unpaved
routes; although, it remains possible for tactically skilled insurgents to dig in, under and beside
the routes to place IEDs. The presence of culverts, their size and accessibility must also be
factored in. Manoeuvre corridors in open terrain are critical to allow the BG to change paths,
employ stand off and detect possible threats with optics and ISTAR. Canalizing terrain makes
the BG an easier target for IEDs. Some methods of mitigation include dismounted operations,
airmobile operations, creating a bypasses or a combat road and employing breaching resources

70. 
Defence Terminology Bank, record 4217.

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(eg, tanks with rollers). Collateral damage needs to be managed because a short-term solution
of avoiding high-risk areas (such as canalizing ground) can cause long-term problems.
Allocating enablers to the subunit level must also be considered carefully, as plans that require
moving assets around the battlefield need to consider the IED threat and ground limitations.

c. Surprise and Security. As outlined under C-IED principles, surprise is essential for the BG to
pre-empt the enemy and maintain momentum. If the BG’s operations become templated by an
IED network, the BG’s freedom of movement and ability to disrupt the network can quickly
become compromised. Airmobile operations, dismounted operations and manoeuvring at night
are some tactics that can be employed in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 17, (C-IED
Principles). Extraction plans must also be developed with an equal amount of vigilance and
creativity. Both establishing a secure tunnel and employing a leapfrog withdrawal remain valid
COAs to ensure security of a withdrawal.

d. Flexibility. When operating in a high-threat IED environment, despite proper IPB, rehearsals,
surprise and enablers, a BG can become victim of an IED attack. The effects of an attack can
range from a temporary loss of vehicle mobility to a catastrophic strike. Flexibility is essential
to maintaining momentum on operations and ensuring the full effects of surprise are maintained.
Flexibility can imply the establishment of a reserve element as outlined in C-IED principles.
However, it also implies those second in command being able to effectively step into leadership
roles in the absence of their commanders. BG COs should also consider separating key
resources and leadership in different vehicles or on different approaches.

e. Medical. In an IED-rich environment medical coverage is critical and must be multilayered.

If there is no effective medical extraction capability to a role three medical facility a BG CO must
be very deliberate in deciding to proceed with a tactical operation. Even a small main charge
can create several priority casualties due to the effects of fragmentation. Mitigation measures
such as establishing qualified personnel integral within sections and platoons as well as medics
at the subunit level should only be considered in role one medical support.

f. Time. The available time for an operation in an IED-rich environment must be clearly defined
prior to an operation. To search a compound of interest, render safe an IED and exploit a find
or cache can take significant time. When resources are well concealed it may be necessary to
repeat the search of an area in more detail. For IED-specific threats, EOD operators are trained
to operate as quickly as possible and to adjust the level of detail of their exploitation depending
on the time available to gain maximum intelligence. However, improvised explosive device
disposal (IEDD) render safe procedures cannot be short-circuited without forcing the EOD
operator to accept additional personal risk. If sufficient time is not available, the IED(s) need to
be bypassed or breached, which generally means having them blown in place. This risks
additional collateral damage to an area and reduces the exploitation benefit.

g. Prioritization and Enablers. Synchronization of ground manoeuvre assets and enablers has
proven to be successful in mitigating IED threats and locating key IED resources. Enablers
critical to C-IED include ISTAR, combat engineers, C-IED, EOD, EW and info ops. When
possible, combat engineers, explosive detection dogs, C-IED and EOD resources should be
allocated to the subunit level for specific tactical operations. Retaining these capabilities
centrally at unit level for operations in a non-contiguous battlefield has proven to be ineffective
due to the IED threat and ground restrictions in complex terrain.

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ANNEX C
FORCE PROTECTION

GENERAL

1. Force protection comprises all measures taken to minimize the vulnerabilities of personnel, materiel
and facilities; operational threats; and occupational and environmental hazards. FP measures preserve
operational effectiveness and the commander’s freedom of action. FP measures are integral to every
dimension and level of military planning through the application of risk management methodology. FP
measures are best identified early in the operational planning process and in direct response to identified
threats and hazards. The level and extent of required FP measures will be a command decision.

2. Though enemy actions may be an obvious source of risk to our forces, environmental factors as well
as occupational hazards are of equal concern. In fact, during some operational deployments such factors
may constitute the primary source of threat. Disease, fratricide and weather have certain historical and
statistical relevance that have had tremendous impact on a force’s ability to prosecute operations.

FORCE PROTECTION, RISK AND MISSION SUCCESS

3. Some degree of unconstrained mobility is essential to mission success; however, to establish and
maintain the required mobility exposes friendly forces to hazards. FP can be compromised through active
targeting by the enemy or by indiscriminate hazards such as UXOs or IEDs. In combat operations, the
need to maintain tempo to defeat the enemy exposes friendly forces to increased dangers and casualties,
but the consequence of not achieving a mission objective, presumably, outweighs the discrete risks
encountered by individuals. In non-combat operations, the situation will seldom dictate that the tempo be
such that discrete risks be taken without employing a number of mitigating controls. Nonetheless, risks
associated with restricted mobility frequently outweigh those risks associated with improving mobility. BG
COs must decide if the risk and potential costs outweigh mission imperatives.

THREATS AND HAZARDS

4. FP planning is largely driven by the threats and hazards assessed to exist within any given AO.
The difference between a threat and a hazard is largely one of intent:

a. Operational Threats. Operational threats consist of those risks and dangers that result from
conscious choices made with the express intent to cause harm.

b. Occupational Hazards. In contrast to operational threats, occupational hazards consist of

those risks and dangers that result from conscious choices most often made without the intent
to cause harm. Given the inherently dangerous nature of military operations, occupational
hazards include those risks and dangers that friendly troops represent to themselves. Friendly
troops can include representatives from the JIMP effort. Occupational hazards can include the
risks posed by:

 (1) fratricide;

 (2) criminal acts and breaches of military discipline;

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 (3) poor security and safety practices;

 (4) complacency and negligence.

c. Environmental Hazards. Environmental hazards consist of those risks and dangers that
equally affect all parties present within the AO and whose effects are largely dependent upon
an element of chance. Environmental hazards can be natural or man-made. Natural
environmental hazards can include those posed by geography and climate, extremes of
weather, infectious or insect borne diseases as well as hazardous and/or venomous flora and
fauna. Man-made environmental hazards can include the residual side effects of armed conflict,
including the hazards of mines and unexploded ordnance or environmental contamination
resulting from the destruction of industrial complexes or civilian infrastructure.

FORCE PROTECTION PRIORITIES

5. The planning and implementation of FP measures must consider four priorities that vary in relative
importance according to the nature of the assessed threat or hazard to the operation. These priorities are:

a. Protection from Enemy and Threat Actions. This priority consists of the relative importance
placed on FP measures aimed at hardening friendly personnel, equipment and facilities against
enemy attack, with a view to deterring, detecting or mitigating the effects of any eventual attack.

b. Health and Safety. This priority consists of the relative importance placed on FP measures
designed to minimize or prevent the effects of wounds, injuries, disease, environmental and
occupational hazards as well as psychological stressors on BG effectiveness and morale.

c. Fratricide Prevention. This priority consists of the relative importance placed on FP measures
aimed at reducing the potential for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly forces
by so-called friendly fire.

d. Protection from Enemy Information and Intelligence Collection. This priority consists of
the relative importance placed on FP measures aimed at reducing the exposure of friendly
personnel, equipment and facilities to enemy intelligence collection sensors and assets.

GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6. The general FP concept of operations applicable to BG operations envisions a layered and scalable
approach consisting of an integrated and coordinated application of passive and active FP measures:

a. Passive FP Measures. Passive FP measures consist largely of non-specialist measures that

can be implemented at the individual or subunit level through orders, regulations and SOP
such as dress, weapons and vehicle states, security and safety awareness programs,
immunization and prophylaxis, information security (INFOSEC), communications security
(COMSEC) and OPSEC. Passive FP measures can also include static measures such as
camouflage and concealment, field fortifications as well as other physical security measures
designed to reduce critical vulnerabilities by hardening facilities and personnel against attack.

b. Active FP Measures. Active FP measures consist of measures specifically intended to either

interfere with or reduce an enemy’s capability to conduct operations against friendly forces.

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7. Passive and active FP measures are integrated into overlapping and mutually supportive layers
of protection and security consisting of the following elements:

a. Individual and Collective Security is comprised of the complete range of appropriate

FP measures employed by the individual or forces’ element for their own protection and
well-being.

b. Base Security and Defence is comprised of the complete range of appropriate FP measures
employed for the protection and defence of friendly bases, camps or facilities.

c. Nodal Security is comprised of the complete range of appropriate FP measures employed for
the protection and defence of nodes or facilities which (while not forming part of a military base,
camp or facility) are nonetheless critical to the success of friendly operations.

d. LOC Security is comprised of the complete range of appropriate FP measures employed for
the protection of LOC that are used for the conveyance or transit of personnel, equipment and
information within or between areas, base camps, facilities and vital points.

e. Area Security is comprised of the complete range of appropriate FP measures employed to

safeguard friendly freedom of action over an entire area of operation rather than a single point
or line lying between two points.

FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT TO FORCE PROTECTION

8. The planning and implementation of FP measures may involve a number of specialist capabilities
requiring staff coordination within the overall FP effort. While many of these capabilities may have a
tactical purpose seemingly unrelated to FP, each may contribute a positive collateral benefit, even if FP
is not the primary aim or purpose of the capability. Depending upon operational circumstances, each may
warrant consideration for inclusion in FP planning. The paragraphs below describe how the following
specialist capabilities may contribute to the overall FP plan:

a. intelligence and counter-intelligence;

b. sensitive site exploitation teams;

c. counter-intelligence investigations;

d. tactical questioning and interrogation;

e. engineers;

f. health service support (HSS);

g. military police;

h. CBRN;

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i. air defence;

j. civil-military cooperation; and

k. human intelligence.

9. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence. FP planning is heavily reliant on intelligence disciplines,

namely military intelligence, security intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), criminal intelligence,
medical intelligence and counter-intelligence (CI). Intelligence staffs make a direct contribution to FP
planning by collecting and processing information regarding the structure, capabilities and intentions of
the adversary and by providing indications and warning (I&W). The intelligence staff is responsible for
compiling the threat assessment (TA) employed as a basis for FP planning. CI is a specialized subset of
intelligence that specifically collects information regarding the adversary’s intelligence and information
gathering apparatus. Through its understanding of how the adversary collects and processes intelligence,
CI not only contributes to the compilation of the TA but is also capable of contributing to the completion
of a vulnerability assessment by evaluating friendly weaknesses and vulnerabilities through the eyes of
the enemy. A further particularity is that the scope of CI activity often expands after FP threat information
is reported; CI elements possess the capability of moving from collection activities to the implementation
of active countermeasures designed to either exploit or neutralize a FP threat. Consequently, CI elements
often exhibit the powers and functions of a “police” establishment, most notably with respect to conducting
security or CI investigations. Intelligence and CI can support FP planning and implementation through the
following activities:

a. Countersurveillance. Countersurveillance is an activity aimed at determining whether friendly

forces are the objects of hostile surveillance activity, and if so, identifying the persons or groups
conducting such surveillance. Countersurveillance operations may be conducted overtly (eg,
by mobile patrols, static OPs or recce elements), covertly, clandestinely or through a combination
of covert and clandestine means. Covertly refers to the operation being planned and executed
to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor, with the emphasis being
placed on concealing the identity of the sponsoring agency rather than concealing the actual
operation. Covert countersurveillance usually involves CI or special operations forces (SOF)
elements deploying throughout the AO in civilian pattern dress, grooming and vehicles.
Clandestine countersurveillance operations are conducted in such a way as to ensure secrecy
and concealment, with the emphasis being placed on concealment of the actual operation.
Clandestine countersurveillance is usually the domain of SOF or specialized recce elements.

b. Screening Operations. Screening operations are aimed at identifying persons of intelligence

or FP interest, with a view to either neutralizing a FP threat or collecting information of immediate
FP value. Screening operations are usually conducted by specialized CI elements employing
a variety of interview, debrief and elicitation techniques as well as polygraph examinations.
Screening operations are conducted to perform background security investigations of
prospective locally engaged civilians or to support BG elements in the conduct of checkpoints,
cordon and search operations, raids as well as sensitive site exploitation (SSE) teams.

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10. Sensitive Site Exploitation Teams. An SSE team is a task-tailored organization designed to
support BG elements in the capture and forcible entry of enemy sensitive sites in order to exploit their
contents and, as required, to neutralize any threat posed by a site or any materials located therein. Built
around a nucleus of intelligence personnel, the primary purpose of the SSE team is to exploit enemy
personnel, documents, electronic files and material captured at the site for information of intelligence or
FP value. While BG elements will normally isolate, seize and secure the sensitive site with assault,
security and combat support elements, the SSE team provides the requisite expertise for intelligence
and, as required, forensic exploitation of the site.

11. Counter-intelligence Investigations. A CI investigation is a duly authorized, detailed and

systematic examination aimed at uncovering and reporting the facts involved in a security incident or FP
issue. In marked contrast to the investigation of criminal or service offences, where the focus is placed on
developing a case for prosecution, CI investigations focus on identifying and exploiting information to
determine the nature and extent of the FP threat. In addition, CI investigations may be used to recommend
countermeasures to the assessed vulnerabilities or to assess the level of damage resulting from a security
breach or incident.

12. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation. Tactical questioning and interrogation involves the
conduct of screening operations with persons under control. Depending upon operational circumstances,
BG members may be confronted with the necessity to detain individuals further to the conduct of operations
or FP related incidents. Tactical questioning is the initial screening undergone by a detainee to identify
persons of intelligence or FP interest or to obtain information of immediate tactical value. Interrogation
involves the systematic, protracted questioning of a detainee to obtain information of intelligence or FP
value. Intelligence and CI elements provide the BG with personnel trained in approved police and/or
intelligence interview and interrogation techniques in order to process individuals detained in the course
of FP operations.

13. Engineers. Military engineers make a critical contribution to FP by conducting mobility, survivability
and general engineering support tasks. FP measures coordinated and/or implemented by engineers
include physical protection, dispersal, camouflage, concealment, fire protection and the removal of
hazards such as CBRN contamination, mines and other UXO including IEDs.

14. Health Service Support. HSS contributes to FP through the evacuation, treatment, recovery and
return to duty of sick, wounded and injured personnel and the prevention of casualties through prophylaxis
and preventive medicine. The overarching FP aim of HSS is to minimize preventable casualties and to
ensure that where casualties do occur, the appropriate resources are available to minimize losses. HSS
is also capable of providing critical input to the drafting of a TA, namely through the provision of medical
intelligence regarding a given AO.

15. Military Police. The law enforcement duties performed by MPs provide a capability to counter
occupational hazards as well as Level 1 (non-military) operational threats. Activities such as patrolling,
crime prevention, traffic regulation, criminal investigation and detention operations make a direct
contribution to FP objectives. MP criminal intelligence programs are also capable of making a significant
contribution to the drafting of the TA used as the basis for FP planning.

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16. CBRN. Effective chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence is an all-encompassing
capability that provides a force with an ability to mitigate the effects of CBRN and toxic industrial material
(TIM) hazards within the battlespace. These hazards may exist due to deliberate enemy actions, industrial
accidents, collateral damage or any number of pre-existing natural or man-made environmental conditions.
This CBRN capability is developed from effective command guidance, hazard detection, identification
and monitoring, hazard warning and reporting systems, physical protection, hazard management and
medical countermeasures.

17. Air Defence. While primarily aimed at achieving air superiority, AD controls and measures provide
a degree of FP through surveillance, early warning, detection, identification and destruction of hostile
aircraft, UAV and missiles. AD provides a reasonable level of confidence that manoeuvre can be conducted
without interference from the enemy’s air, missile or aerial surveillance capabilities.

18. Civil-Military Cooperation. CIMIC supports FP by fostering trust and confidence amongst the local
inhabitants of an AO. CIMIC also provides a useful instrument to gauge the mood and attitudes of local
inhabitants, effectively fostering SA regarding the civil environment and providing a capability to counter
enemy propaganda and disinformation campaigns. CIMIC also provides an important medium for enlisting
the assistance of civil authorities in FP tasks and operations.

19. Human Intelligence. Both general and specialist HUMINT teams are expected to advise on extant
and potential Level 1 (non-military) threats. HUMINT input into FP planning is synchronized with the
intelligence effort in order to ensure that a systems approach is taken to FP.

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ANNEX D
TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

GENERAL

1. In order to facilitate command and control during operations, certain control measures have been
developed. These measures will improve liaison and coordination between formations and units and
allow formations and task forces to react more rapidly to a situation.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

2. Coordination and control of the terrain within formation boundaries is a formation HQ responsibility,
although it may be delegated to a lower HQ. Note that although the terrain has been allocated to
a specific formation or task force, that does not preclude another formation or TF from using that terrain,
as long as it is approved in advance by the controlling operations staff.

3. Terrain is allocated to a unit or formation for tactical and administrative purposes. It does not imply
exclusive use, although it does have priority use. A BG will be allocated terrain from its parent formation
(division or brigade) HQ and in turn, the Ops O will allocate appropriate terrain to units or groupings
based on size, mission and role.

4. The formation HQ is responsible for:

a. providing terrain control of unallocated areas within its boundaries;

b. ensuring that an up-to-date list of occupied, reserved and controlled areas is distributed on
a regular basis; and

c. resolving any terrain conflicts, particularly those that may have a significant impact on
the mission.

5. Guidance on determining priority usage for terrain bids is:

a. manoeuvre elements, combat engineer and artillery units;

b. higher formation HQ;

c. communications installations including EW assets and surveillance equipment;

d. formation or TF HQ;

e. countermoves and reserve forces;

f. engineer units and equipment;

g. CSS elements, including units, installations and areas; and

h. other units.

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6. Section 17 of Chapter 3 to B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations provides a more
detailed description of battlespace management.

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ANNEX E
ISTAR PLANNING

GENERAL

1. ISTAR planning provides two deliverables to the BG CO:

a. an intelligence collection plan (ICP) which identifies collection requirements and provides
guidance on where information may be available. It incorporates higher HQ taskings, subordinate
HQ requests for information (RFIs) and targeting board information needs, including BDA; and

b. an ISTAR plan which allocates sensors to tasks, establishes reporting requirements and
manages the BG sensors on a minute-to-minute basis. The ISTAR plan is developed by the
ISTAR coordinator.

2. At the BG level, the unit IO is responsible for overseeing the HQ intelligence cycle to include
intelligence planning, collection, processing and dissemination. Additionally, any specialist components71
that are allocated to the BG would fall under the IO’s oversight (in accordance with the BG CO’s direction/
vision). ISTAR coordination is managed centrally within the ISTAR coordination cell.

3. Chapter 5 of B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations provides greater detail on
the ISTAR planning process at the bde and BG levels.

71. 
Specialist components could include any of the following: intelligence support team (IST), imagery intelligence (IMINT) team, criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) team,
intelligence liaison, HUMINT teams, deployed signals intelligence teams (DSST), document and equipment exploitation teams, intelligence systems (IS) support
teams or intelligence fusion centre.

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ANNEX F
PLANNING FOR BG CIMIC, PSYOPS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

GENERAL

1. At the tactical level, info ops are actions taken in support of political and military objectives which
influence decision makers by affecting others’ information while exploiting and protecting one’s own
information. While info ops includes an enormous range of disparate activities, many of them fall under
the general category of offensive (those that attack the command capabilities of an enemy) and defensive
(those that protect one own command and information systems) operations.

2. What requires special and specific consideration are those tactical-level activities that communicate
information and messages to specific audiences in support of tactical and operational objectives. CIMIC,
PSYOPS and public affairs (PA) activities play an important role in info ops and can be can be key to the
success of a mission at the tactical level and in support of larger operational objectives when integrated
into a commander’s mission planning.

3. At the BG level, info ops are normally coordinated by the operations staff. Planning for these activities
should be developed and executed within the BG CO’s planning framework. Info ops planners should be
working to integrate these activities into the BG CO’s OPP and estimate process as early as possible.

4. One of the key common goals of these activities is to control perceptions. The BG will seek
to undertake activities which influence the attitudes and behaviours of military, civilian and other interested
parties including government organizations, NGOs and other international organizations involved in the
conflict all in support of tactical and operations objectives.

PLANNING CIMIC ACTIVITIES72

5. General. CIMIC has two aspects: CIMIC operations and support to the civil administration which
has legal foundations that are generally beyond the scope of the tactical-level commander. CIMIC
operations within the BG AO are planned and conducted by a tactical support team, which is generally
OPCON to the BG CO.73

6. TST Role. The role of a TST is to provide the interface between military forces, local civil government
and agencies, the local population and those local and international relief and development agencies
operating within the BG’s battlespace.

7. TST Tasks. The TST has a number of tasks including:

a. assisting in the coordination of CIMIC cooperation and host-nation support (HNS);

b. coordinating and assisting in population and resources control operations;

c. coordinating and assisting in humanitarian operations;

72. 
This section should be read in conjunction with Chapter 3, Annex B, Appendix 8, “Civil-Military Cooperation Tactical Support Teams.”
73. 
Source: B-GG-005-004/AF-023 CFJP 9-0 Civil-Military Cooperations in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War.

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d. coordinating and assisting in military civic action operations. These are projects useful to the
local population in areas such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation,
communication, health, sanitation and others. Community assistance program (CAP) projects
(roads, schools, health clinic repairs, etc) fall in this category and contribute to social development
to improve the standing of the military with the local populace;

e. assessing, coordinating and conducting limited humanitarian / civic assistance projects. These
may include, for reasons of military necessity, providing life-sustaining services, maintaining
order or controlling distribution of food, goods and services;

f. coordinating and assisting in civil defence operations; and

g. maintaining liaison with other regional CIMIC elements, including those which may be located
close to the boundary separating two AOs.

8. Operation of the CIMIC Centre. At the BG level, a CIMIC Centre is usually established by the
TST based upon operational requirements.74 It has a number of key functions including:

a. point of contact, liaison and centre for requesting assistance and support;

b. source of area and economic assessments, including the CIMIC operational estimate;

c. information source to civil authorities, the local population and those relevant international
organizations within the BG AO;

d. source of local maps, including routes and minefields;

e. assisting local citizens in filing claims to the military; and

f. micro-business projects’ initiation until completion as well as macro-projects (shelters, electricity,

sewage, water, waste management, etc.) in coordination with international organizations,
through national funding and/or international funding.

9. Key Considerations in the Planning of TST Activities.75 There are three key considerations
when planning TST activities:

a. TST activities should be integrated into all aspects of FSO.

b. CIMIC activities may be the main effort, supported by manoeuvre. CIMIC activities will
be necessary following the conduct of manoeuvre to mitigate adverse reaction and
facilitate reparation.

c. All soldiers have the responsibility to identify potential CIMIC engagements consistent with
the CIMIC role and functions.

74. 
Note that if military forces enter an AO after the arrival of international organizations, there may already exist an international or national centre providing many of the
functions of a CIMIC centre. If possible, the military should then attempt to work through this centre or work towards establishing a replacement CIMIC centre if it does
not meet all parties requirements. Chapter 7 of B-GL-355-001/FP-001 CIMIC TTPs provides more detail on CIMIC Centres.
75. 
Source: SOP 109 – Information Operations, found within B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Land Operations.

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10. CIMIC Planning. CIMIC planning is outlined in detail within Chapter 3 of B-GL-355-001/FP-001
Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

PLANNING TACTICAL-LEVEL PSYOPS ACTIVITIES76

11. General. PSYOPS occur throughout FSO and are those planned psychological activities undertaken
pursuing methods of communications and other means that are directed to approved audiences in order
to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military
objectives. Military PSYOPS are part of a planned process that results in the conveyance of messages
targeted to specific groups to promote particular themes that result in desired attitudes and behaviours.
Those attitudes and behaviours, in turn, affect the achievement of political and military objectives.
PSYOPS then have three basic aims:

a. Weaken the will of the enemy or adversary by lowering morale and reducing the efficiency
of the force through the creation of doubt, dissidence and disaffection within the ranks.

b. Reinforce the positive or supportive attitudes of friendly target audiences.

c. Gain the support and cooperation of uncommitted or undecided audiences.77

12. PSYOPS controlled at the BG level are those planned psychological operations conducted against
approved target audiences in support of the BG CO as an integral part of combat operations and designed
to defeat the enemy by reducing or eliminating the will to continue aggression as well as to support the
operational freedom of the BG CO.

13. Examples of Tactical PSYOPS Activities. Tactical PSYOPS activities can include any of the following:

a. providing a PSYOPS area assessment;

b. creating a favourable image of Canadian and friendly forces in the local populace;

c. countering hostile propaganda;

d. publicizing civilian control measures;

e. assisting in the control of opponent and friendly civilians;

f. facilitating ground operations by communicating surrender instructions or other messages

designed to lower enemy morale and efficiency;

g. discouraging and/or disrupting opponent operations;

h. assisting in controlling civilians or opponent personnel;

i. assisting with cover and deception operations;

76. 
This portion of the annex should be read in conjunction with Chapter 3, Annex B, Appendix 7, “Tactical Psychological Operations Teams.” The TST is the most likely
element that will be attached to a BG for PSYOPS.
77. 
Source: B-GJ-005-313/FP-000 CFJP 3-10.1 Psychological Operations.

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j. helping shape the belief of the hostile soldier and population;

k. assisting in inducing the opponent to surrender in deep strikes;

l. supporting strategic/theatre PSYOPS;

m. discouraging and disrupting opponent operations;

n. creating a favourable image in the civilian populace to allied forces;

o. assisting in deception operations.

14. Key PSYOPS Planning Concepts. Planning for tactical PSYOPS should keep the following
concepts in mind:

a. Persuasive Communications. Tactical PSYOPS activities should be planned to ensure that

the information conveyed and the impressions created are coordinated with political, economic,
military and other info ops activities.

b. Command Disruption. Tactical PSYOPS activities should be planned to both interfere with the
enemy’s combat capabilities (including morale, cohesion, discipline and public support) and
with their decision-making cycle.

c. Information Denial. Tactical PSYOPS activities should seek to deny information to the enemy
that may be required to influence or justify decisions.

d. Intelligence Shaping. Tactical PSYOPS activities can, by denying information or by shaping

the information that flows to the enemy, cause an enemy to make incorrect judgements, which
in turn may influence the enemy’s intentions and/or actions.

15. Limitation on Tactical PSYOPS. Planning tactical PSYOPS must consider the following limitations:

a. Time and Planning Considerations. PSYOPS units need time to conduct a timely
pre-deployment notification to assemble experts and relevant materials. PSYOPS assets also
need to be included in the operation’s planning process. To ensure effective support, operations
officers and PSYOPS liaison personnel must maintain a sustained, ongoing dialogue.
Considering time and material available, it will be essential to monitor and adjust the PSYOPS
activity based on the results achieved.

b. Opponent Countermeasures. The opponent’s ability to use all available means and media
in effective countermeasures has the potential to limit PSYOPS effectiveness.

c. Incomplete Information. Intelligence agencies often do not include in their collection plans the
factors that influence the target audience. Such a lack of accurate and complete data restricts
the number of exploitable vulnerabilities. Clear direction, through PIRs, must be given by BG
COs to intelligence staff about factors influencing the target audience.

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d. Evaluation. Restrictions on news, public discussion and travel limit the information available
to evaluate PSYOPS vulnerabilities.

e. Coordination. Failure to coordinate between military PSYOPS units and civilian information
agencies may give opponents opportunities for effective counter-PSYOPS. Lack of coordination
may also limit a PSYOPS campaign’s or message’s effectiveness and possibly even have
a negative effect.

f. Qualified Personnel. Effective PSYOPS is dependent on there being a pool of imaginative,

qualified personnel who know the target audience to draw from. The creation of a PSYOPS
staff cannot be done on an ad hoc basis.

g. Cultural and Linguistic Knowledge. These personnel must also understand the political,
economic, cultural, social, linguistic and ideological subtleties of the target audience. Shortages
of qualified personnel or a failure to employ them properly will significantly detract from the
success of a PSYOPS campaign.

h. Accessibility of Potential Target Audiences. Target audiences may be beyond the limits of
military PSYOPS targeting due to physical or policy restrictions. In such cases, military PSYOPS
planners refer these targets to higher agencies.

16. The Tactical PSYOPS Planning Process. Chapter 3 of B-GJ-005-313/FP-001 CFJP 3-10.1
Psychological Operations outlines the PSYOPS planning process including the desired outputs.

PA PLANNING FOR BG OPERATIONS

17. General. The role of PA is to inform through four major activities: planning, media operations, internal
communications and through PA training.78 Operational experience has demonstrated repeatedly that
PA planning, a well-developed PA plan and properly tasked resources are important to mission success.

18. Planning PA Activities at the BG Level. Planning BG PA activities is the responsibility of the public
affairs officer (PAO) assigned to the BG. Tactical-level PA input into the BG CO’s planning process
is intended to provide both PA guidance for the mission and to assist BG staff with their planning activities.
That input is provided in the form of three products: the PA plan, PA inputs to the op plan and the
PA annex to the op plan.79

19. Note that PA must not be directly associated with PSYOPS activities. The PA function is to convey
the message through uncontrolled media and other forums to inform: PSYOPS seeks to influence
audiences using media controlled by its own forces.

20. Role of PAO. At the BG level, the PAO role is to provide the BG CO with PA advice and to coordinate
PA activities with the BG operations staff. The PAO is the link between the BG and its audiences,
interpreting the audience to the BG and the BG’s thinking to its audiences. The PAO has the
following responsibilities:

78. 
SOP 109 – Information Operations, found within B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Land Operations.
79. 
Source: B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 Joint Public Affairs.

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a. Provide Advice and Guidance. This includes:

 (1) analysing and interpreting target audiences;

 (2) monitoring domestic and foreign audiences;

 (3) providing PA lessons;

 (4) forecasting the possible impact of military operations on public information;

 (5) preparing the BG CO and key personnel to communicate with various audiences including
the media.

b. Enhance the Morale of Internal Audiences. The PAO is responsible for providing key
information to military personnel and their family members regarding their role on operations.

c. Foster Audience Trust and Support. This is largely through the provision of information
that allows the audience to understand the importance of the military’s role.

d. Provide Technical Support. The PAO will make use of collaboration with other members
of the PA team as well as a reachback capability through the PA network.

21. The PA Planning Process. Chapter 3 of B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 Joint Public Affairs provides
PA planning guidance.

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CHAPTER 5
SUSTAINING THE BATTLE GROUP

GENERAL

1. Historically, logistic elements and activities have been a prime target of enemy attack. Potential
adversaries have long-range precision and asymmetric capabilities that increase the vulnerability of
logistic elements. Sustainment must be carried out in linear contiguous as well as non-linear non-
contiguous AOs. The vulnerability of the LOC places an increased importance on the training of CSS
units in preparation for executing their tasks. Common Army and CSS battle task standards must be met.
CSS soldiers must have the combat skills, weapons, armoured CSS vehicles and communications to
successfully operate in combat. The BG CO must balance the requirement for combat capabilities against
the need to ensure that the sustainment of the force is not jeopardized.

2. The overall purpose of CSS operations within the BG is to sustain the combat power of the BG.
At the tactical level, the logistic estimate (part of the combat estimate and operational planning process)
takes into account the relevant factors of each specific operation in order to ensure the sustainment
of the BG. The logistic estimate will be as complete as time allows. B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Sustainment
of Land Operations provides more detail on the steps of the logistic estimate.

TERMINOLOGY

3. The following terminology is used within this chapter:

a. Combat Service Support (CSS).80 The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the
fields of administration and logistics.

b. Sustainment.81 The provision, maintenance and administration of personnel, materiel, health

services and infrastructure to maintain the combat power of a military force.

c. Basic Load.82 The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and which can be moved
by, a unit or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or
formation and maintained at the prescribed levels.

d. Maintenance Load.83 The quantity of second line stocks, held on wheels, required to sustain
a formation for a given period. Note that as with the basic load, the maintenance load can be
adjusted to suit the needs of the BG CO’s plan.

80. 
DTB, Record 409
81. 
DTB, Record 41394
82. 
DTB, Record 229
83. 
DTB, Record 7867

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CSS PRINCIPLES

4. The following are the principles of sustainment that are most relevant to BG operations:

a. Foresight. Foresight will minimize the support limitations to a BG CO’s plan. A suitable reserve
of support capacity must be available where and when required.

b. Economy. Economy means providing the most efficient support to accomplish the mission
without encumbering the BG with excessive resources.

c. Flexibility. Flexibility begins with flexibility of mind. The execution of a plan seldom goes as
predicted; therefore, imagination and flexibility is required to deal with changing circumstances.

d. Simplicity. Simplicity facilitates flexibility. Simple yet flexible plans will have a much greater
chance of success.

e. Self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency means that a BG initially has at its disposal the essential
resources for a mission or for a determined period of time.

f. Responsiveness. Responsiveness means providing the BG the right support in the right place
at the right time.

g. Survivability and FP. Survivability and force protection of personnel and assets, particularly
in complex terrain, are two of the critical factors in elaborating a support plan.

ECHELON STRUCTURE

5. The echelon system is a flexible and robust system that can be adjusted to meet any operational
circumstance. It has been repeatedly proven in operations that when CSS has not been properly structured
or utilized, operations have been seriously jeopardized and/or severely limited. Improper use of the
echelon system invites mission failure. However, in order to be effective the echelon system must be well
understood and well practised in training. Although many of its functions may appear simple, they must
be routinely discussed and practised in order to be executed smoothly and effectively.

6. The echelon system is based upon three lines of support in a theatre of operations:

a. First Line of Support. The first line of support comprises support capabilities that are organic
to the unit.

b. Second Line of Support. The second line of support is found at formation level and replenishes
and sustains first line resources.

c. Third Line of Support. The third line of support is found at theatre level and sustains
second line.

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7. The BG typically receives its second line support from a Canadian service battalion, a joint task
force support element (JTFSE),84 a coalition CSS battalion or a combination of all three. The length and
capacity of the LOC will dictate whether a forward support group (FSG) is constituted.

8. The sustainment concept for the BG is to link the F echelon to second line support through an
echelon system that provides for the moment-to-moment, hour-to-hour and day-to-day sustainment of
the BG. A BG is structured to be flexible and capable of employing a wide range of capabilities, depending
upon the type of mission. The BG echelon must be prepared to provide common support to its attachments
and to act as the conduit for other specialist support. For more details regarding the various elements of
the BG echelons see Annex A. Echelon terminology defined below are located in B-GL-300-004/FP-001
Sustainment of Land Operations:

a. F Echelon. These are the soldiers, weapons, equipment and vehicles essential for combat.

b. A Echelon. The A echelon includes those soldiers, equipment, services, vehicles and supplies
required for day-to-day sustainment, maintenance and administration of the unit or formation.
In the case of the BG, the A echelon is largely based upon the CSS subunit. (See Figure 5-1
for an overview of its structure and capabilities).85 The A echelon is further broken down
as follows:

 (1) A1 Echelon. This includes that portion of the echelon that provides the subunit commander
with moment-to-moment resupply and resources to accomplish the mission. This is
normally found one tactical bound behind the F echelon; and

 (2) A2 Echelon. Contains that portion of the A echelon required to provide the daily resupply
of the subunit.

c. B Echelon. In certain operations those elements not required for the hour-to-hour support
of the BG may be grouped as a B echelon which would be located in a forward support area
or base.

84. 
NATO uses the term national support element as a generic term for support groups, units and elements providing third line support to their national forces.
85. 
Note that while the BG A echelon is largely composed of the CSS subunit, the two are not synonymous. The A echelon will also include those integral CSS elements
of the other BG units/subunits. For example, the integral transport section of a rifle company would fall within the A echelon. The company quartermaster sergeant
(CQMS) for the rifle company would also be a part of the A2 echelon.

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BG CSS

HQ Transport Supply Maint Medical Force

Protection

CP POL Gen & Tech Repair UMS Convoy

Security

Site
Pers Sect Ammo Rations Recovery Ambulance Protection

Stores General TPT Spare Parts PMed

Postal

Chaplain

Figure 5-1: CSS Capabilities in a BG

CSS CAPABILITIES WITHIN A BG

9. Specific roles and tasks of the CSS subunit are detailed in Annex B. The BG’s CSS subunit provides
the following day-to-day sustainment of the unit:

a. food services (including kitchen trailers);

b. combat supplies—food, water, fuel and ammunition. This is part of the three-day basic load
of days of supply (DOS), one day carried by the F echelon, one day carried by the A1 echelon
and one day carried by the A2 echelon;

c. medical treatment role one and evacuation through ambulances to higher level (see Annex C
for description of medical roles of support);

d. first line repair and recovery;

e. personnel administration and resource management; and

f. general transportation, cargo and troop lift.

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10. The number of personnel, occupation and composition of the CSS subunit will be dependant on the
BG’s component units and subunits and its support needs. Within a formation, a BG will be subject to
regrouping. The CSS subunit is task-tailored based upon the demands of the operation and the specialist
equipment and capabilities of its attached subunits. A manoeuvre or CS element attached to the BG
normally brings the requisite equipment and personnel to augment the BG’s integral CSS subunit thereby
simplifying the BG sustainment. For example, an allocated engineer element requires specialized
maintenance support and equipment that are not normally found in the BG’s CSS subunit. Force protection
elements will be attached to the CSS subunit if required by the tactical situation and therefore would likely
bring an appropriate slice of its parent unit’s echelon.

11. Understanding CSS Capability. The method of task tailoring forces will provide the BG with the
CSS assets to meet the forecasted mission requirements. It is important to note that there is no limit
to the capabilities found at any echelon. Echelons can be task-tailored for enhanced capabilities such
as carrying additional supplies or conducting levels of maintenance above first line.

BG REPLENISHMENT CYCLE

12. Shown in Figure 5-2, the BG replenishment cycle consists of three stages. They can be bypassed
to speed replenishment, depending on circumstances. The stages of the replenishment cycle are
as follows:

a. Stage 1. The F echelon holds one day of combat supplies. The A1 echelon maintains close
contact and resupplies the F echelon on a moment-to-moment basis. The A1 echelon also
holds one day of combat supplies.

b. Stage 2. The A2 echelon resupplies the A1 echelon on a daily basis. The A2 echelon holds the
remaining one day of combat supplies of the BG basic load.

c. Stage 3. Second line replenishes the BG’s basic load through the A2 echelon. Second
line holds one DOS of combat supplies for the supported force. This DOS is called the
maintenance load.

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STAGE 1: 2nd Line to

STAGE 2: A2 to A1 Echelon STAGE 3: A1 to F Echelon
BG A2 Echelons

BG
A1 Ech F Ech
A2 Ech

2nd Line

Sub Unit A1 Ech F Ech

A2 Ech

Figure 5-2: The Replenishment Cycle within a BG

13. Replenishment can be achieved through a number of methods including, delivery points, supply
points, commodity points, direct delivery or any other delivery means. The BG sustainment cycle can be
applied to forward or rearward flow of materiel (eg, equipment backloading and salvage). BG sustainment
is heavily dependent on the use of ground convoys.

CASUALTY EVACUATION WITHIN THE BG

14. BGs require rapid clearing of casualties in order to maintain fighting effectiveness. This necessitates
a highly flexible evacuation system and competent sorting at the UMS. When soldiers become sick or
wounded they are treated initially by self-aid or buddy-aid (including soldiers qualified for tactical combat
casualty care). Thus, it is essential that all members of the unit be proficient in combat first aid procedures.

15. Experience has shown that speed in evacuation to a medical facility for comprehensive treatment
vastly improves a soldier’s chance of survival from serious wounding. This is known as the golden hour.
Even though there are several stages and components to the evacuation system, any stage can be
bypassed to speed evacuation if the tactical situation and resources permit. Thus, a casualty could be
airlifted right from the casualty collecting point directly to a role three hospital rather than be evacuated
through the UMS and a role two medical unit to a role three hospital.

16. Litter bearers, who are unit personnel, locate and remove casualties to a safe place. They check or
initiate first aid and transport the casualties or direct the walking wounded to the CCP. Soldiers at all
levels within a unit may be designated as litter bearers. Litter bearers are normally assigned to forward
platoons on a basis of two per rifle platoon, with four additional litter bearers employed at the UMS.

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17. Casualties may reach the CCP by a number of means, including:

a. under their own power if they are capable of walking unaided;

b. guided by members of their section;

c. transported in a vehicle or subunit ambulance; or

d. carried or aided by litter bearers.

18. At the CCP, the tasks of the medical technicians are to:

a. coordinate and direct the rescue and collection of patients in the company area;

b. sort patients into priorities for evacuation;

c. supervise and check the first aid already administered;

d. carry out the emergency medical care that their trade skills, the time available and the tactical
situation permits;

e. prepare patients for evacuation;

f. direct the walking wounded to the UMS and, as applicable, arrange for the evacuation to that
facility of the litter patients;

g. keep the BG CO and the unit medical officer advised regarding the location, numbers
and types of patients as well as the local medical situation; and

h. if time permits, initiate the field medical card (this could be important if the evacuation is to take
place from the company level by air).

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19. Figure 5-3 depicts casualty evacuation in a BG.

THEATRE FORMATION BATTLE GROUP

Air Medical Evacuation

cas

cas

CCP
Role 3 Role 2 Role 1
Hospital Medical Unit Medical Unit (UMS)
cas

CCP

Air Evacuation

Land Evacuation

Figure 5-3: Casualty Evacuation in a BG

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ANNEX A
LOCATION AND COMMAND OF THE BG’S CSS ECHELON ELEMENTS

SUBUNIT BG

A1 ECHELON A2 ECHELON A2 ECHELON B ECHELON

ARM Typically Location Typically Location Typically Location Typically Location

Commanded Commanded Commanded Commanded
By By By By

Coy second One or two OC CSS Coy BG AO Adjt Brigade /

in command tactical forward
INFANTRY (2IC) bounds support area
behind
F echelon

SSM One or two Sqn 2IC Collocated 2IC HQ Sqn BG AO QM Brigade /

tactical with BG forward
ARMOURED bounds A2 echelon support area
behind
F echelon

Battle Battery area BC HQ and Brigade Adjt Brigade /

ARTILLERY Captain (BK) Svcs Bty or forward forward
(NOTE 1) support area support area

Troop Grouped with Fd Sqn SSM, Grouped with

ENGINEERS Storeman supported SQMS or supported BG
(NOTE 2) subunit Troop A2 echelon
A1 echelon Storeman

Figure 5A-1: Location and Command of the BG’s CSS Echelon Elements

Notes:
1. For an independent artillery battery in support of a BG, any additional support from its regiment would be grouped with the battery A1 echelon.
2. For an engineer troop or field squadron attached to a BG.

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ANNEX B
ROLES AND TASKS OF THE CSS SUBUNIT

ROLE

1. The role of the CSS subunit within a BG is to provide first line support.

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON

2. The HQ platoon provides command and control of the CSS subunit and includes:

a. Command Section. A CSS major commands the CSS subunit. Tasks include:

 (1) advising the BG CO on CSS capabilities;

 (2) preparing the CSS plan for the BG in support of operations;

 (3) establishing and operating the CSS operations centre on a 24/7 basis;

 (4) coordinating the replenishment and maintenance programs for the BG;

 (5) maintaining technical liaison with second line support units and the LO to the BG HQ.

b. Personnel Section. The personnel section is commanded by the adjutant, a combat arms
officer usually at the rank of captain, and controlled by the chief clerk, a resource management
support clerk usually at the rank of warrant officer. The adjutant may be located with the
personnel section or may be located with the BG HQ. Tasks include:

 (1) maintaining personnel records and initiating record action as required;

 (2) receiving, collecting and collating subunit strength returns as well as maintaining statistics
on strengths and casualties;

 (3) receiving and disposing of the personal effects of killed, missing, wounded and evacuated
personnel;

 (4) providing postal services for the BG.

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c. Chaplain. The chaplain86 is non-denominational. The chaplain is usually at the rank of captain.
Tasks include:

 (1) providing religious services as required;

 (2) providing moral and spiritual advice on matters affecting the spiritual welfare of the troops;

 (3) providing counselling services and spiritual comfort;

 (4) conducting burial services.

MEDICAL PLATOON

3. The medical platoon is normally commanded by a medical officer at the rank of captain. The platoon
tasks include:

a. providing advice to the BG CO on medical matters;

b. exercising operational control of the medical elements;

c. providing medical treatment within capabilities and resources available;

d. supervising the collection, treatment, sorting and evacuation of patients;

e. controlling medical supplies and equipment;

f. ensuring medical support is provided to all subunits as required;

g. ensuring hygiene and sanitation is standardized; and

h. preparing a casualty evacuation plan.

MAINTENANCE PLATOON

4. The maintenance platoon is commanded by an electrical mechanical engineering officer usually

at the rank of captain. The platoon tasks include:

a. providing maintenance advice to the BG CO;

b. recovering vehicles to the formation equipment collection point;

c. providing first line maintenance to the BG;

d. providing technical advice and direction on maintenance matters affecting the reliability
and availability of equipment; and

e. maintaining equipment in a state of readiness for operations.

86. 
Refer to B-GL-346-001/FP-000 Army Chaplain Manual.
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SUPPLY PLATOON

5. The supply platoon is commanded by a logistics officer usually at the rank of captain. The platoon
tasks include:

a. providing logistic advice to the BG CO;

b. holding the BG scale of clothing, equipment, weapons and technical stores;

c. providing for fresh and/or combat rations as directed;

d. accounting for the BG holdings of ammunition;

e. providing limited local purchasing capabilities if required; and

f. providing input for the scaling of spare parts with maintenance elements.

TRANSPORT PLATOON

6. The transport platoon is commanded by a combat arms officer usually at the rank of captain/
lieutenant. The platoon tasks include:

a. providing a pool of cargo vehicles for miscellaneous tasks; and

b. carrying one day’s supply of ammunition and POL for the BG.

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ANNEX C
ROLE OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN THE BG

GENERAL

1. Medical support capabilities are classified into the following four roles:

a. Role One. This role includes locating and removing causalities, providing first aid, emergency
medical care and trauma life support and conducting routine medical examinations. The unit
medical station is a Role One facility.

b. Role Two. This role is generally associated with evacuating casualties from first line medical
facilities, providing en route sustaining care and holding/treating patients that require minimal
care. Emergency life saving resuscitative procedures can be performed.

c. Role Three. This role allows the medical facilities to be staffed and equipped to provide
resuscitation, initial wound surgery and post-operative/short-term inpatient care. Routine X-ray,
laboratory, limited-scope internal medicine and psychiatric services are available. Medical
resupply and patient evacuation from forward/supported units is provided.

d. Role Four. This role includes, in addition to medical resupply and evacuation, in-theatre
provision of definitive care, hospitalization and rehabilitation care for patients who can be
returned to duty within the theatre evacuation policy.

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CHAPTER 6
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. Offensive operations are undertaken to defeat an enemy though the use of violence. It is considered
the decisive operation of war and seeks to achieve that defeat through the breaking of an enemy’s
cohesion, through their physical destruction or through a combination of both. The aim is to destroy an
enemy’s capacity to resist, whether that capacity lies on the physical or psychological plane.

2. At the tactical level, land operations, activities and tasks must be planned within the operational
framework to achieve the higher commander’s desired operational objectives and ultimately the strategic
end state. Hence, tactical outcomes must be planned carefully to ensure they lead to the conditions for
strategic success.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

3. The following principles of war are important considerations during the planning and conduct
of offensive operations:

a. offensive action;

b. concentration of force;

c. surprise;

d. security; and

e. flexibility.

FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4. The fundamentals of offensive operations are:

a. Information Gathering. The BG CO seeks to develop their situational awareness by gathering

detailed knowledge of the enemy, the operating environment and their own forces before
committing to offensive operations.

b. Simplicity. The BG CO’s plan must be kept simple to ensure flexibility and responsiveness
during its execution. Complex manoeuvres and intricate arrangements lead to confusion and
misunderstanding. A clear concept of operations supported by a simple plan gives combat
team commanders an opportunity to apply their own judgement and initiative in response to
changes in the local situation.

c. Shock Action. Achieved through surprise, precision fires and rapid operational tempo coupled
to manoeuvre, speed and aggression, shock action will lead to shock and paralysis throughout
the enemy organization.

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d. Depth. The BG CO must organize their forces and select their objectives in order to shape
the enemy, in time and space, and to enable decisive operations. Securing enemy objectives
in depth allows a BG CO to break an enemy’s scheme of defence.

e. Balance. The initial grouping must ensure that combat power can be concentrated when
and where it is most needed.

f. Reserves. A reserve must be retained to deal with the unexpected and to exploit success.
Initially, it is an uncommitted force, often having been assigned a number of potential tasks to
be executed on order. Once committed, a new reserve must be constituted. Committing the
reserve in a timely manner is the most important decision a BG CO must make. Once the BG
has fought through the objective, the reserve remains the only way in which the BG CO can
influence the battle.

FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

Victory will go to the side which succeeds in blocking his enemy’s manoeuvre and carrying his own
through to its objective. The battle of wills therefore comes down to a struggle for freedom of action,
each side trying to preserve freedom of action for itself and denying it to the enemy.87

5. Offensive operations may be directed at the front, flank or rear of the enemy. Close combat operations
and activities require definition of the enemy position, a determination by the BG CO on whether to attack
and what form of manoeuvre to use. At divisional level and below, the forms of manoeuvre are frontal,
envelopment (which includes rear and flank attacks), turning movement, infiltration and penetration.
These forms of manoeuvre are amply described in the manual B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
Complicating what would seem like a simple decision is the irregular threat which, in a non-contiguous
battlespace, can lead to problems in defining the front, flank and/or rear of the enemy. It also puts more
emphasis on all-round security.

6. The forms of manoeuvre are:

a. Frontal. The main effort of this form of manoeuvre is directed against the front of an enemy
position. It can be effective against a weak, disorganized enemy, and it may be used to overrun,
destroy or to fix the enemy into position. Unless supported by a heavy weight of fire, it may not
be successful, and even if successful, it may result in an unnecessarily high number of
casualties. The BG CO must consider the disadvantages before executing a frontal attack. The
shaping of the enemy prior to attack is critical, especially in light of the vulnerability of our
equipment to antiarmour fire. An example of a frontal manoeuvre is provided in Figure 6-1.

87. Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, Londres, Faber & Faber, 1965, p. 34‑35.

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FIX STRIKE FIX

Reserve

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 6-1: Frontal

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B-GL-321-005/FP-001

b. Envelopment. The main effort in envelopment is made against the enemy’s rear or flank and
is often referred to as a flanking attack. Its aim is to seize objectives in the enemy’s rear,
making their tactical position untenable. It is preferable to a frontal attack because it avoids the
enemy’s prepared defensive positions and killing zones. Avoiding the enemy’s strength en
route to the objective, the main attack is conducted by striking the enemy from an unexpected
direction. The envelopment can take a number of forms: a flank attack, which is the preferred
method of attack at the BG level and below; the rear attack; or the double envelopment which
is often the prelude to encirclement and destruction of trapped forces. The BG conducting the
envelopment must achieve a balance between SA and the necessity for flank protection,
reserves and depth. Uncertainty about the enemy will drive the BG CO to conduct a risk
assessment, and consider allocating more combat power to the shaping actions necessary
to set the conditions for the decisive action. See Figures 6-2 and 6-3 for examples of these
two manoeuvres.

STRIKE

FIX FIX

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 6-2: Envelopment

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STRIKE STRIKE

FIX

Reserve

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 6-3: Double Envelopment

c. Turning Movement. A turning movement is a variation of the envelopment in which the

attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure
objectives deep in the enemy’s rear, to force the enemy to abandon their position or divert
major forces to meet the threat. The intent of a turning movement is to shape the enemy for the
decisive operation. See Figure 6-4 for an example of a turning manoeuvre.

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OBJECTIVE
In depth STRIKE

STRIKE

Reserve

Represents a combined arms grouping

1. Main body distracts the enemy from turning movement.

2. Turning movement launched deep into enemy rear to seize objective based upon enemy’s vital ground.
3. Enemy reacts to turning movement.
4. Main body attacks enemy.

Figure 6-4: Turning Movement

d. Infiltration. Infiltration is a form of manoeuvre in which a force moves as individuals or in small

groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection. Infiltrations are usually
conducted as shaping operations to disrupt the enemy’s C2 or sustaining operations in order
to set the conditions for the decisive operation. Major considerations in an infiltration
plan are:

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 (1) The force should be sufficiently strong while small enough to avoid detection.

 (2) Because heavy support weapons cannot be carried, all infiltration objectives should
be planned within indirect fire range. Additionally, BG COs should consider planning
for reinforcement/extraction of the infiltration force with manoeuvre forces, should the
element of surprise be lost.

 (3) All infiltration routes must be secured from enemy observation and fire. Small parties
using many routes are preferable to larger groups using one or two routes.

 (4) Patrols should be deployed to screen the advance and cover the flanks of the
infiltration force.

 (5) Any infiltration plan should include the use of both passive and active measures to assist
in achieving surprise. This includes the use of indirect fire, noise and light to distract or
confuse the enemy. In particular, the plan for such distracting activity should be planned
as a response to the infiltrating force being detected by the enemy.

 (6) The infiltrating force should be planned with sufficient stocks of ammunition, combat
supplies and medical support to allow it to function until link-up is achieved.

 (7) The infiltration plan should include the action to be taken if the infiltrating group makes
contact with the enemy or is discovered enroute, including a decision on whether
to attempt a bypass, withdrawal in contact and move to alternate routes or fight through
the enemy and sacrifice surprise.

 (8) Infiltrations may be supported by and enhanced through the use of deception. Often
something as simple as driving armour support around a flank will distract an enemy
force—particularly one not wholly equipped to deal with armour—and facilitate
an infiltration from another direction. Once the infiltrating force reaches its objective,
the infiltration is considered ended and the next activity commenced.

e. Penetration. A penetration seeks to break through the enemy’s forward positions and seize
objectives in the depth of their position. The main effort is made on a relatively narrow front.
Successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combat power at the precise
point selected for breaking into the enemy’s position. Successful penetrations create assailable
flanks and access to objectives in the depth of the position. Each penetrating force will normally
require at least two elements and will normally not be undertaken below formation level. The
leading element is tasked to penetrate to the objective or the limit of exploitation as rapidly as
possible, bypassing any opposition. The second element is tasked to follow the first in order
protect its flanks and rear. Subsequent elements are reserve or echelon forces. They
are tasked to destroy bypassed enemies, take over the lead of the advance or exploit beyond
the immediate objective. Penetration is unlikely to succeed against an enemy who is more
agile—that is, more mobile and flexible. Conversely, it has often succeeded against a more
numerous but less agile enemy.

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OBJECTIVE

STRIKE

FIX FIX
(Supporting (Supporting
Attack) Attack)

Reserve

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 6-5: Penetration

7. At BG level, the most common forms of manoeuvre are the frontal and envelopment (flanking)
attacks, shown in Figure 6-6.

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OBJECTIVE

Assault

Fire Support

Reserve

FRONTAL ATTACK FLANKING ATTACK

Figure 6-6: Forms of Manoeuvre

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8. The key offensive activity is the attack. There are also a number of other offensive activities that are
conducted for specific purposes but have the same general aim for the specific tactical situation at hand
and adhere to the common principles. From a planning and conduct point of view, these operations are
often supported through a number of enabling activities. For example, a breakout of encircled forces
operation is essentially a deliberate attack that is followed by a withdrawal operation (and can possibly
include a link-up operation if required). These activities include:

a. raid;

b. reconnaissance in force;

c. exploitation;

d. pursuit;

e. ambush;

f. breakout of encircled forces; and

g. feint and demonstration.

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THE ATTACK

9. General. An attack is an offensive operation designed to destroy an enemy’s capability to resist.

It seeks to disrupt an enemy’s activities, pre-empt their actions, dislocate their command and control
capability, destroy their physical forces and/or seize ground of tactical/operational importance. The time
available, BG CO’s intent, an assessment of the threat and the desired end state will drive the type
of attack undertaken by the BG. An attack may be undertaken as a separate operation, or it may
be undertaken in conjunction with other types of activities.

10. There are four types of attacks:

a. Hasty (or Quick) Attack. Preparation time is traded for speed and surprise to exploit
an opportunity.

b. Deliberate Attack. The deliberate attack is characterized by the need to regroup and redeploy
forces. It is usually undertaken when a hasty attack has failed or when the tactical situation
is considered too complex or too risky for resolution through a hasty attack.

c. Counter-attack and Spoiling Attacks. Both the counter-attack and spoiling attack are directed
towards the defeat of an enemy who has become vulnerable as a result of their own (usually
offensive) action. In the case of the former, the enemy has revealed their main effort or an
assailable flank during an offensive action. The counter-attack is more likely to be conducted
as part of a defensive operation by a reserve or lightly committed forward elements, and it
affords the defender the opportunity to create favourable conditions for committing combat
power and transitioning to offensive operations. The spoiling attack, on the other hand, is more
limited in scope and seeks to strike the enemy while they are most vulnerable or while they are
on the move organizing for an attack. A spoiling attack is pre-emptive in nature, as it disrupts
the enemy’s plan and, ultimately, their cohesion. If the situation permits and as with any other
attack, the results of either type of attack can be exploited by the BG CO.

d. Attack by Fire. The attack by fire—engaging an enemy with direct and indirect fires—seeks to
engage an enemy without closing with them and excludes assaulting or occupying an objective.
It is most often conducted as part of a larger tactical operation.

B Squadron [LdSH(RC)] was tasked initially to establish attack-by-fire positions in support of infantry
companies and form the nucleus of a BG countermoves force capable of responding throughout the
entire Canadian area of operations (AO). Many Taliban insurgents learned the hard way the
capabilities of the Leopard’s main gun during this period when attacking Canadian strong points
with rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and indirect fires. Leopard tank crews fired 105 mm rounds
that destroyed enemy ambush parties and mortar groups that had infiltrated the Zhari District.88

88. Major Trevor Cadieu, ‘‘Canadian Armour in Afganistan’’ The Canadian Army Journal, Volume 10.4 (Winter 2008), p. 8.

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CONDUCTING THE ATTACK

11. General. At its most basic, a BG attack involves isolating an objective through suppressive fires,
followed by the massing of the BG’s fighting power at a critical time and place. Once launched, flexibility
and speed are critical elements to success. Momentum must be maintained to keep an enemy off balance,
and delays in the attack to reconfigure or realign assault elements plan should be avoided. Few attack
plans develop as planned, and BG COs must be prepared to improvise and adapt as the situation unfolds.

12. Stages of the Attack. An attack, regardless of type (the exception, in many cases, being the attack
by fire), follows three stages:

a. Mounting. This includes preparations that occur before H-hour.

b. Assault. This begins as the assault element crosses the line of departure (LD), continues with
the break into the enemy defensive position and concludes with the fight through the objective.

c. Consolidation. This involves the preparations to meet the enemy counter-attack, finalization
of sustainment requirements and recommencement of battle procedure for the next task. Note
that the consolidation stage may be followed by the exploitation phase. It may also begin
before the fighting through the objective has finished.

13. Figure 6-7 provides an overview of activities during each phase of an attack.

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MOUNTING ASSAULT CONSOLIDATION

ENEMY: Locate Continue To: Define

Define Suppress Destroy Locate
Picket (If Nec) Suppress

COMDS: Battle Procedure

FIRE Adj Tgts Co–ord Dir & Indir Fires Sp Exploitation

SUPPORT: Prep Fire

INCLUDES: Arty, Mor, CAS Sp Break in Sp Fighting Through Sp Consolidation

Screen, Blind, Covering Fires Covering Fires Defensive Fires
Illum as Nec Depth or Adj Tgts

Break in: • Fighting through • Confirm obj clear

PREP FOR BATTLE:
Regroup if necessary • Isolate obj • Prep for continued
Preliminary moves • May include atk/adv
• Supress En
Ammo, Eqpt, Pers obstacles, barriers, - Assist follow on force
breaching • Breach obs if
necessary - Resup and reload
• Clear obj - Cas and PW
handling
• Cut off En withdrawl
- ReGp if necessary
FIREBASE (if possible) • Suppress EN • Isolate obj
• Suppress En
pt tgts

PROTECTION: AD & EW • Def against CATK

SECURE: Assy Area, Atk
Posn LD (Deception if possible)

RESERVES FLANKS

Figure 6-7: Coordinating an Attack

14. Each stage is detailed as follows:

a. Mounting Stage. The BG CO considers the following activities during the mounting stage:

 (1) Locating and Defining the Enemy. The importance of SA to the success of the attack
cannot be overstated. The BG CO uses own intelligence and recce resources and those
available at formation level. It is vital that recce of the enemy position begins as soon as
possible and continues throughout the assault. The BG CO responds to information
received after giving orders and is prepared to alter the plan if necessary. A great deal of
information may be provided by troops in place or by adjacent forces. The BG CO may
assign specific tasks to BG recce elements, engineer recce and/or any other intelligence
gathering assets that may be allocated.

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 (2) Preparation for Battle. Activities include rehearsals, improving routes, preparing for the
crossing or the breaching of obstacles, moving to assembly areas, regrouping,
replenishing, initiating the fire plan, deploying, conducting a forward passage of lines and/
or infiltrating. Adherence to SOPs, and things such as well-practised marrying-up drills,
permits a force to prepare more quickly than the enemy expects and may contribute to
achieving surprise. It is also important for the BG CO to plan sustainment requirements,
especially ammunition, to ensure that there are sufficient stocks available. Finally, it is
important for the BG CO and staff to remember that while they are planning the attack,
the elements of the BG are preparing for the attack and that those preparations are based
upon the time available. All BG COs should attempt to adhere to the “One Third, Two
Thirds” rule which ensures that subordinates have sufficient time to carry out their
preparations for battle.

 (3) Fire Support. Manoeuvre relies upon fire support to isolate the objective and neutralize
the enemy. A BG may be allocated either additional fire units or additional quantities and
types of ammunition to support an attack. As available, combined and joint fires are
incorporated into the fire plan. Fires assets could include close air support and attack
helicopters (AH). Particular attention must go to the defeat of the enemy’s antitank
capability to provide necessary protection to LAVs.

 (4) Firebase. A firebase provides direct fire support for the assault force. If the enemy
situation and groupings permit, the firebase is created during the mounting stage;
otherwise, it will be formed during a subsequent phase of the assault. It is sited to isolate
the objective, suppress the enemy, control obscuration of the approach routes used by
the assault force and destroy selected targets. All direct fire weapons can be employed in
a firebase. Once supporting fire is no longer effective or is masked by the assault element,
the firebase assumes its tasks in the next phase of the operation. It is preferable to site a
firebase at as close to a right angle to the direction of the attack, but this may not be
possible if the proposed firebase is enfilade to the enemy. If so, the firebase may be sited
so that its fire goes over the heads of the assault element, keeping in mind the possible
danger to our own dismounted infantry. If the enemy adopts a reverse slope position,
it may be difficult or impossible to establish a firebase. In this case, the assault force has
to provide a large degree of suppression using its own resources.

 (5) Attack Position.89 The approach from the assembly areas to the attack position
is characterized by the use of all available routes for speed and dispersion. Speed is
essential to achieve surprise, and as a result, the attack position is not an area in which
to linger. It is used to quickly shake out into assault formation and the subsequent attack
on the objective. Factors to consider regarding the attack position include:

 (a) Selection of the Attack Position. Ideally the route to the attack position should
follow a readily identifiable feature that allows the assault force to move without
exposing itself to enemy observation. The attack position should allow the assault
force sufficient room to shake out into assault formation and orient on the objective.

89. 
Attack position, also known as the forming-up point (FUP), is defined as the last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the start line / line of
departure (source: DTB, record 3571).

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 (b) Security and Marking of the Attack Position. Both the attack position and the
route to it may need to be secured prior to the assault. In this case, elements not
involved in the attack should, if possible, provide that security. During periods of
poor visibility, the attack position and the route to it may also need to be marked. BG
SOP should spell out the basic marking procedures to be used. Again, marking
should, if possible, be accomplished by elements not involved in the attack.

 (c) Passage of Lines. It may be necessary to attack through friendly forces already
in contact with the enemy. The attack position should be carefully chosen to avoid
masking the fire of those elements in contact too early.

 (d) Orientation of the Attack Position. As indicated above, the ideal attack position
will allow a straight approach march to an LD that is oriented 90 degrees to the
objective. There are a number of means available to a BG CO to maintain orientation
towards the objective during the move to the attack position including using tank
barrel orientation, firing of smoke or other illuminates, GPS and using a source
within the assault force or the firebase who can talk the assault force onto
the objective.

 (e) Use of Separate Approach Axes. It may be more advantageous for a BG CO

to have armour and infantry assault on separate axes. Very careful coordination and
timings are necessary to ensure that such an assault converging from two axes
does not fragment and lose the advantage of surprise and concentration.

 (6) Force Protection. The BG CO ensures the protection of the force throughout the attack.
This includes taking passive and active defence measures, such as camouflage, info ops
and EW. Some elements of the BG must be tasked to secure routes forward from the
assembly area and the LD and to protect the BG’s flanks. If a BG is conducting the
assault as part of a formation attack, it is likely that other units will be tasked to provide
flank protection, a firebase and a secure LD. This necessitates coordination during the
mounting stage and liaison throughout the assault.

 (7) Reserve. The BG CO assesses the requirement for a reserve in relation to the unit’s
combat power. For those situations where there is little information regarding the force,
where high risk exists or where unexpected situations may develop, the BG CO is best
to establish a relatively large reserve force. In other situations, the BG CO tasks
elements as reserve for a particular phase, even if they are committed in a previous or
subsequent phase.

b. Assault Stage. The assault does not normally take place until the objective has been
suppressed, the approach routes are secure and the obstacles have been reduced. In this
stage, the assault force leaves the attack position, crosses the LD, breaks into the enemy
position and fights through the objective.90 The BG can expect obstacles even when they are
not readily apparent. Therefore, the assault force must be organized to overcome protective

90. 
The LD is located on the forward edge of the attack position and is normally the last covered position. In some situations close terrain or obstacles may not allow
attacking troops to adopt their assault formation in the attack position before crossing the LD or would make control too difficult and slow. In such situations, the BG
CO may designate an assault line, which is closer to the enemy and more advantageous for adopting assault formations. Attacking troops would likely move from the
LD under tighter control and in a closer formation before breaking out into the desired assault formation at the assault line.

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obstacles on the objective as it fights through. The assault is carried out as quickly as possible
to take advantage of the shock action of direct fire weapon systems and aggressive infantry.
Movement is covered with fire, thus creating manoeuvre. It is during this stage that the isolation
of the objective and suppression of the enemy are most important. The BG CO chooses the
break-in point and concentrates the force to achieve the break-in. This is also the time when
the force is most exposed to the enemy’s direct and indirect fire:

 (1) Break-in. The break-in is aimed at securing, destroying, capturing or occupying the
weakest point within the enemy’s defence. The assault element may have to use fire and
movement from the LD to the break-in point. Any protective obstacles encountered must
be quickly breached or bypassed. The break-in element may consist of infantry and
engineers with FOOs, although the latter may be placed on a flank so as to see the
broader tactical situation. Infantry vehicle weapons can also contribute to the fire plan by
engaging suitable targets. The BG CO is then ready to exploit success and must keep
a reserve ready to reinforce stalled efforts.

 (2) Fighting Through. This describes the action by the infantry and their supporting elements
to seize the objective. It includes either killing/capturing the enemy or forcing their
withdrawal under contact and then controlling the area. During this stage of the battle,
direct fire weapons have four main tasks: support the infantry, suppress enemy infantry,
destroy enemy antitank systems and defeat counter-attacks.

c. Consolidation Stage. Consolidation may begin even if fighting through the objective is still in
progress. It is complete when the enemy within the objective area have been killed or captured,
a hasty defence has been achieved and the attacking force is ready to repel a counterattack or
to be assigned a new task. Consolidation is normally conducted beyond the objective area, but
the nature of the terrain and possible enemy reaction may cause the assault force to prepare
the objective position for defence.

d. Exploitation. This is not a stage of the operation; however, an attack frequently creates
opportunities to maintain pressure on the enemy and to maintain the initiative in keeping with
the BG CO’s plan. Exploitation disrupts enemy counter-attack preparations, hasty defence
preparations and/or its conduct of an orderly withdrawal. The BG CO must always plan to
exploit success, usually making it a phase of the assault stage. The force assigned to conduct
the exploitation must be properly balanced and have sufficient fire support.

15. The three stages of attack are illustrated in Figure 6-8 for a deliberate attack and Figure 6-9 for
a hasty attack.

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3
2

1
LD
Fire
Support

A B
Mors/arty neutralize C
posns 1 and 2, then lift
from 2 to 3 CO
LD
Attack Posn
PHASE 1 D

LD

B
Fire Sp

1
A
LD
2 LD

Fire Support

C
PHASE 2 LD

D A

CONSOLIDATION A1 ECH

Figure 6-8: BG Deliberate Attack

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Exploitation Troops

Cut off Troops

Flank Guard

Anti–armour

Recce

LD
Recce

CO

LD
Attack Posn

Fire Support

Main A1 Echelon

Figure 6-9: BG Hasty Attack

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16. Planning Considerations for an Attack. From the BG CO’s estimate, the following is decided:

a. Phasing. If there are more tasks than there are troops available to do them, the attack is
divided into phases. Amongst other considerations, availability of fire support may also
necessitate phasing.

b. Timing of the Assault. This may be given in the BG CO’s order. Notwithstanding such direction,
the BG CO must strike a balance between the time required for preparations and the time
allowed for the enemy to strengthen their defences. Since the assault is a platoon and section
commander’s fight, the time taken for higher-level battle procedure should be minimized to
allow more time for the lower level commanders to plan and coordinate their battle.

c. Form of Manoeuvre. The BG CO selects the form of manoeuvre by considering the mission,
enemy strength, disposition, terrain, weather, troops, resources available, time and space.
Once across the LD, the assaulting troops are vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire. A
flanking attack may come under enfilade fire from another mutually supporting enemy position.
The BG CO relies upon the effectiveness of the fire support—both direct and indirect—to
suppress the enemy in these supporting positions, so that flanking movements may be used
without suffering heavy casualties. To reduce vulnerability and take advantage of enhanced
SA, the BG CO may choose to disperse subunits, perhaps even sub-subunits, throughout
the battlespace.

d. Assault Formation. BGs normally do not assault in formation; rather, the objective is partitioned
with each assaulting element given a portion and responding to mission orders. The assaulting
element commander decides on the formation to be adopted after considering the mission,
enemy strength and disposition, their anticipated action, cover and space for manoeuvre,
troops available and their mobility. The assaulting troops should be strong enough to break-in
and seize the objective. Assaulting on a narrow front provides greater depth and concentration
and allows the BG CO to quickly shift the point of attack. It is easier to control, but this formation
reduces the weight of firepower that can be initially brought to bear, and it also enables the
enemy to concentrate fire against the assaulting troops.

e. Groupings and Tasks. The BG CO considers the following groupings and tasks when allocating
troops for the attack: assault force, including the composition of the break-in element and the
troops to fight through the objective; support force, including a firebase (if possible); and the
breach force. The BG CO balances the troops available with these tasks. Direct fire weapons
systems may be needed more in the assault than with the support force; alternatively, LAV
armaments may be used to supplement the support force. The BG CO judiciously assigns
troops to tasks. This has command and grouping implications. Infantry and direct fire cooperation
does not always mean creating subordinate command relationships for every tactical situation.
The BG CO may determine that the best way to achieve a certain task is with the combat team,
while another task may be better achieved using a company or squadron.

f. Fire Plan. The BG CO’s fire plan includes all available indirect fire weapons, close air support
and attack aviation. Chapter 4, Annex A, “Artillery Fire Support Planning Guide” should be
consulted for more detail.

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17. Command and Control. An assault is a dynamic, often confusing situation when battle is joined
and communications are usually difficult. Good training, well-understood drills and rehearsals greatly
enhance the abilities of commanders at all levels to command in these conditions.

18. Control Measures. Control measures are a key aspect to the planning, understanding, coordination
and synchronization of all aspects of the attack. Furthermore, they help reduce fratricide. Figure 6-10
illustrates common control measures:

Exploitation

ASLT LINE

Breach OBJ
LD ZULU
Consolidation Area
HAR
Protective Elms

OBJ
ASLT POSN

Dismount
Area
ATK
POSN OBJ
Limit of
Manoeuvre Exploitation
Objective Area
Force

LD

Fire Base

ASSY AREA

Figure 6-10: Attack Control Measures

19. Attacks in Urban Operations. The fundamentals of offensive operations apply equally to attacks
taking place within urban operations.

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20. CSS in Offensive Operations. The BG CSS plan must be flexible and simple if it is to meet each
challenge without causing delays in the transition between each stage of attack. Equipment and personnel
are most vulnerable during replenishment activities. Risk must be assessed prior to these activities to
ensure that adequate protective measures are in place. These stages are characterized by the following
CSS activities:

a. Mounting Stage. All BG operational deficiencies must be addressed to ensure the highest
level of combat effectiveness in terms of manning, equipment availability and combat supplies.

b. Assault Stage. During the assault stage large ammunition expenditures can be expected as
well as high personnel and equipment casualties. The CSS plan will need to consider the
requirement to replenish F echelon troops during battle as well as their own security requirements
under combat conditions. Casualty and equipment evacuation will also become a challenge
and needs to be specifically addressed during this stage.

c. Consolidation Stage. Reorganization will take place during this stage. This will involve
topping up all combat supplies as well as evacuating personnel casualties and backloading/
repairing equipment.

d. Exploitation. Exploitation will be characterized by rapid extension of LOCs. POL usage will be
high, and challenges in evacuating vehicle and personnel casualties can be expected. Air
resources should be used as much as possible for resupply and casualty evacuation. Resupply
convoys will be vulnerable to bypassed enemy elements.

THE RAID

21. A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure
information, confuse the enemy or destroy their installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon
completion of the assigned mission. The wider purpose of a raid is to disrupt the enemy usually through
destroying or capturing a vital asset or capability. It is based upon detailed intelligence, generally involves
swift movement into hostile territory and ends with a planned withdrawal. Because raids will often be
carried out over a short distance and time period, only a limited amount of supplies needs be carried;
furthermore, maintenance will be confined to minor crew repairs. Fire support systems are required to
support the raiding force so as to reduce the enemy’s ability to react. Armoured reconnaissance; airmobile,
airborne and amphibious forces; and dismounted infantry (particularly if supported by aviation fire support)
are well suited to this type of attack.

22. At the lower tactical levels, a raid is often conducted as an infantry fighting patrol. In certain
circumstances, it may be conducted by mounted mechanized forces, essentially as an advance to contact,
followed by a deliberate attack and concluded by a deliberate withdrawal. It may include penetrating into
an urban area and a nodal attack followed by a withdrawal. In such situations, additional forces may be
required to protect the access and withdrawal routes of the raiding forces.

23. Planning Considerations. Specific planning considerations for raids include:

a. Detailed recce is essential. If possible, the raid target should be put under constant surveillance
to ensure the enemy situation remains unchanged and within the capability of the raid force.

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b. Fires support planning must be based upon the initial penetration, activities at the raid objective
and responsive fires during the withdrawal.

c. The raid force must ensure proper, all-round security, as it is vulnerable to attack (from all
sides) during the entire operation.

d. Operational criteria for aborting the raid operation must be formulated. The criteria can be
based upon any combination of factors including loss of equipment or personnel, loss of
surprise and/or changes in the enemy situation.

e. Contingency planning should be completed to deal with likely enemy contact before and after
activities are concluded at the raid objective. Said planning should examine items such as RV
points, alternate routes for extraction and fires support planning to assist with force extraction.

f. Resupply of the raid force may be required, depending upon the distance to be covered by the
raid force, its composition and the plan upon reaching the raid objective. Additionally, casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC)/medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) planning will be required throughout
the operation.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

24. Reconnaissance in force is an offensive operation designed to discover and/or test the enemy’s
strength or to obtain other information. The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy
to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention of the force by making them respond to
offensive action. The enemy’s reaction may reveal weaknesses in their defensive system that can be
attacked or strengths that should be avoided. BG COs may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means
of keeping pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering enemy weaknesses. It may
assist in fixing enemy forces. Forces committed to reconnaissance in force must also be prepared to
seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.

25. A formation or unit may conduct its own reconnaissance in force, or do so at the direction of a higher
HQ. It must be conducted in enough strength to force the enemy to react, though it may be necessary to
place restrictions on commanders to avoid actions that may precipitate a decisive engagement. If the
force is still engaged once the actual reconnaissance is completed, it may be tasked to fix the enemy,
attack or withdraw as directed. Other follow-on tasks for the force may include screens, flank security
as well as security for attack positions and lines of departure.

26. A reconnaissance in force is similar to the advance to contact and is planned and conducted in
virtually the same manner.91 The key difference is that while an advance to contact normally transitions
into an attack, the recce in force is simply intended to provide BG CO with the information needed to
make better-informed decisions.

91. 
See Chapter 9, “Enabling Operations” for more detail on planning and conducting the advance to contact.

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EXPLOITATION

27. Exploitation is the seizure of an opportunity to directly achieve a higher commander’s objective or
to fulfil part of their intent. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given mission but in
keeping with the intents of higher commanders. To achieve the overall intent, therefore, it may be
necessary to supplant the task stated in orders. For example, an element/sub-element commander
ordered to neutralize an enemy covering the approaches to the BG CO’s objective may find an approach
that is not covered and simply move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time while
finding, fixing or striking.

28. Striking the enemy is intended to achieve the purpose of the mission. To turn success into a greater
achievement, one needs the audacity and determination to seize fleeting opportunities. Exploitation relies
upon offensive action, surprise and flexibility, along with an element/sub-element commander’s initiative
and understanding of the superior commander’s intent. It should be supported by the concept and
philosophy of mission command.

29. Recce is a key enabler for exploitation. Recce should be extensive, expansive and continuous
in order to find the opportunities for exploitation. Where recce forces are not strong enough to strike, they
fix the threat, limiting the enemy’s freedom of manoeuvre and permitting them to be struck by other
elements. Recce forces should be prepared to lead any exploitation.

30. During combat operations, indicators that would suggest the conditions are good for
exploitation include:

a. a significant increase in the number of prisoners of war (POWs) or detainees;

b. a significant increase in the amount of abandoned equipment or weapon systems;

c. friendly elements begin to report overrunning enemy artillery, command and control faculties
and/or logistics sites;

d. a major decrease in the amount of enemy resistance; and

e. an increase in enemy movement towards the rear, particularly of reserves and fire support
elements. A significant increase in vehicle columns that mix combat systems with CSS vehicles
can be a related indicator.

31. In seeking to tactically exploit a situation, commanders at all levels must keep in mind that tactical
exploitation may have to be delayed or even sacrificed in order to support the overall operational objective.
A BG CO must be aware of the higher commander’s intent and those limits that are placed on the ability
to exploit as a result.92 For example, forces may have to permit a fleeing enemy to escape in order to
secure an area or a populace affected by the recent engagement, thus supporting the operational
objective of safeguarding the populace, preventing lawlessness or securing vital sites.

92. 
A commander may choose to use limits of exploitation as a control measure.

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32. Exploitation may occur on the psychological plane through influence activities of information
operations. A successful attack against an enemy’s position may be exploited through PSYOPS and PA
messages that undermine the public image, capability and legitimacy of the enemy and their supporters.
Any such information operations messages must be carefully crafted so that they do not appear to be
gloating or exaggerated.

PURSUIT

33. A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape,
with the aim of destroying it. It also is conducted similarly to an advance to contact. It may commence
when the enemy force is demoralized and its units are beginning to disintegrate under pressure.
Alternatively, it may originate in an operation in which the enemy loses the ability to operate effectively
and attempts to disengage.

34. A pursuit should be approached with guarded optimism, as it represents both an opportunity and a
danger as the pursuing force runs the risk of becoming disorganized and less effective as resources are
expended faster than they can be replenished. By contrast, the enemy is usually falling back onto their
supply base (albeit in all likelihood in some disarray and considerable confusion) and potentially onto
fresh, uncommitted reserves that could change the tide of battle. Reasons for discontinuing a pursuit
include: the presence of fresh enemy troops, increased enemy resistance, fatigue on the part of friendly
troops, dwindling supply holdings and the need to bypass enemy units.

35. Planning Considerations. Normally, planning for a pursuit will be in the form of “be prepared” tasks
to an offensive operation. While a BG CO is not going to pre-organize the force specifically for a pursuit,
nonetheless, the force needs to employ the maximum number of available troops in the pursuit. Planning
is based upon the enemy’s potential COAs, the condition of the friendly troops available to the BG CO,
and the time available for planning the pursuit operation. Planning considerations should include:

a. an examination of potential routes that can be used by withdrawing enemy units;

b. identification of those ISTAR assets available to maintain contact with the enemy and acquire
targets in depth;

c. identification of potential schemes of manoeuvre for the potential pursuit;

d. identification and recce of potential pursuit routes and critical terrain;

e. the use of recce and security forces; and

f. availability of both CS and CSS assets to support the pursuit. This should include planning for
indirect fire and aviation support, engineer support for mobility/counter-mobility tasks and
logistical support in the form of maintenance and fuel to allow for the continuation of the pursuit.

36. Once a BG CO initiates a pursuit, it will continue until the formation commander orders its termination
for any of the following reasons:

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a. The pursuing force has captured or destroyed the enemy.

b. The enemy has been fixed by the pursuing force and follow-on forces are being manoeuvred
to strike and destroy the enemy.

c. The force has reached its limits and the pursuit needs to be broken off.

AMBUSH

37. An ambush is an operation aimed at destroying or capturing by surprise an enemy element in

movement. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the enemy while denying them an opportunity
to counter-attack, principally through surprise. It is often conducted in the same manner as a raid and
often within territory controlled by the enemy. Normally, the ambushing force lies in wait for the enemy
force. It is normally conducted as part of a fighting patrol. In campaigns such as a counter-insurgency or
peace enforcement, in which the operational main effort is security of a populated area, ambushes can
be a viable means to disrupt enemy movement and pre-empt tactical plans.

BREAKOUT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

38. A breakout occurs when an encircled force creates an opening in enemy lines and extricates itself
to join with friendly forces. In this operation, it is essential to maintain momentum while retaining the
integrity of the force. Normally, a superior commander orders a breakout. If no communications exist
between the superior commander and the commander of the encircled force, the latter makes the decision
to breakout based upon the superior commander’s intent.

39. A breakout is planned as a deliberate attack, followed by a deliberate withdrawal; the aim being to
avoid the enemy and rejoin friendly forces. Planning for a breakout should also consider those factors
that are relevant to the enabling operation, the link-up. Further, a breakout by stealth is conducted similarly
to an infiltration.

40. The breakout force is organized into the following elements:

a. an assault element to create and maintain the opening;

b. a security element to provide protection and deception on the perimeter; and

c. security elements to cover the front, flanks and rear of the main body while it is moving.

41. If it is not possible for the force to fight its way out, breakout by stealth (ie, exfiltration) is the only
remaining option. Usually in this situation, the force is organized into small elements that exfiltrate by
moving on separate routes to join with friendly forces.

42. The responsibility for planning a breakout rests with the commander of the encircled force. Any
activities by outside forces in support of the breakout must be in response to the encircled force
commander’s plan. Planning is similar to that for a deliberate attack. An encircled force commander must
plan the activities of regrouping, deception, assault and subsequent movement to join friendly forces and
conduct a link-up. The main body must move protected by advance and flank guards or screens as well
as a rearguard. The security elements on the perimeter disengage last and may be tasked as the
rearguard in the final stage.

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43. Specific Planning Considerations. The following considerations should be factored into the
encircled force commander’s planning:

a. Point of Breakout. The point of breakout must be selected in relation to the enemy’s disposition,
routes for subsequent movement, future link-up locations and forces as well as the force’s next
mission.

b. Breakout Routes. The most direct routes may not be the best. Enemy weaknesses must be
exploited. Furthermore, attempts must be made to avoid the enemy by using less direct routes,
difficult terrain and periods of reduced visibility. Advance and flank guards or screens provide
information on enemy locations. The number of routes used depends upon the terrain, location
of the enemy, size and composition of the force as well as fire support available. The number
of routes available to an armoured force is likely less than those for a non-armoured force. Use
of a single route simplifies C2 and provides depth for any subsequent attack, thereby maintaining
momentum. On the other hand, if the lead elements are stopped, there is a danger of the
following elements concentrating and presenting a large target with open flanks. Although the
use of more than one route may complicate C2, it offers protection through dispersion and
greater flexibility. If there are lateral routes, units can be shifted from blocked routes to maintain
momentum. Normally, it is preferable to have at least one alternative route. Like an urban
penetration or nodal attack, some forces may have to be allocated to protect the flanks at key
junctions while the main body moves.

c. Fire Support. There are times when organic fire support is limited due to movement, particularly
just after the breakout opening is established and the main body starts moving. There may be
a need for increased fire support, including CAS and tactical aviation support, from outside the
encircled force.

d. Engineer Support. Engineer support is required to breach enemy obstacles and to clear or
breach lanes in friendly obstacles. Some engineer resources should be in the rearguard to
carry out counter-mobility tasks. They can also assist in denying equipment and supplies
through their destruction.

e. Aviation Support. If helicopters cannot extract the entire force, any limited support available
may be used to position forces on key terrain along breakout routes to act as security forces.
Aviation fire support may be critical to support the initial attack at the breakout point, to provide
flank protection of the main body and to prevent enemy manoeuvre. Ideally, it will be placed
under the TACCOM of the encircled force.

f. CSS. CSS is grouped with combat and combat support elements within the main body for their
own protection and for immediate resupply as required.

FEINT AND DEMONSTRATION

44. General. Both feints and demonstrations are forms of deception. They are physical activities aimed
at distracting and possibly deceiving the enemy. Thus, while their initial effects occur on the psychological
plane, their secondary effects will be felt on the physical plane, in that they will persuade the enemy to
react in a desired fashion (eg, move a reserve). Both seek to shape an enemy force and may be supported
by other deceptive information operations.

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45. Feint. A feint seeks to distract the attention and action of an enemy force by seeking combat with it.
Its intent is often to support the development of the main effort elsewhere on the battlefield, normally by
fixing an element of the enemy. Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired
enemy reaction. It is most effective when it supports the enemy’s expectations, when it appears as a
definite advantage to the enemy or when there are several feasible courses of action open to the attacker.
Forces conducting a feint must not become decisively engaged, and the superior commander may direct
that it preserve a specific combat strength for future operations.

46. A feint is considered in many ways to be identical to other forms of the attack. The key difference
is that a feint is usually much more limited in scope and has an extremely specific objective. However,
for the element actually conducting the feint, the execution of the operation is just as violent and rapid as
in a main effort attack.

47. Demonstration. A demonstration seeks to distract the enemy’s attention without seeking combat.
It may be part of a broader deception plan. Demonstration forces use firepower, movement and other
methods to shape the enemy for deception purposes. It should also be aimed at a vital sector of the
enemy’s defences if they are to be successfully misled. For example, a demonstration could include
a simulated aviation landing in an enemy’s depth or the movement of armour forces to a flank, either
of which would likely prompt an enemy reaction that then ties up enemy forces.

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CHAPTER 7
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter an adversary’s offensive actions and to
hold ground. Defensive operations do not generally result in a decisive conclusion to a campaign, but
they can be instrumental to the campaign success. While the offence is the most decisive combat
operation, the defence is usually the strongest. Defensive operations include delay activities.

2. Defensive operations are not intended to be merely reactive, but rather, they should have as their
aims limiting an adversary’s freedom of action and setting the conditions for achieving the desired effect
and objectives. Most often, the BG defensive operation is aimed towards developing the conditions for
future offensive operations. For example, during the early build-up following an intervention in a failed
state, the BG may be forced to adopt a defensive posture against asymmetric threats. Once the build-up
is complete, the BG could then transition to offensive or stability operations as the situation develops.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

EA
Decisive Action

Shaping Action

OBJ

CCP
Sustaining
Shaping Action
Shaping Action
Action

Battlespace encompasses all things commanders must understand to apply combat power effectively.

Figure 7-1: Defensive Effects and Purpose93

93. 
Engagement area (EA) is a NATO term that equates to killing zone (KZ).

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KEY PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3. A BG CO should emphasize these principles of war during when planning and conducting
defensive operations:

a. Concentration of Force. This includes not just massing of force, but massing of fires. At the
tactical level, BG COs should be seeking to site weapons systems and create fire plans that
allow for mass fire effects on the attacker. Deception, concealment, counter-battery fire, use of
screening forces and air defence are all factors that should be considered to help minimize the
vulnerability of massing forces.

b. Offensive Action. BG COs must foster the offensive spirit even in the defence through the
promotion of manoeuvre, speed and violence, as appropriate. Patrolling and countermoves/
counter-attacks are examples of offensive activities within the defensive battle. UAVs,
information operations and air strikes could also be committed toward offensive aims even
when a defensive posture is taken; therefore, they are good examples of offensive action in the
defence as well as maintaining the offensive mindset in order to exploit all opportunities.

c. Security. A BG CO must take steps to allow the force to meet and defeat any attack from any
direction. Security is provided through the use of covering forces, coordination and mutual
support between different arms and levels, effective use of ISTAR assets to provide surveillance
and early warning as well as the rehearsed concentration of force to meet threats.

d. Flexibility. Flexibility entails the BG CO’s ability to develop new plans, shift the main effort
as appropriate and/or move quickly to the offence.

FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4. The employment of the BG on defensive operations is based upon the following fundamentals:

a. Information Gathering. Information is collected before and during the battle and is primarily
drawn from four sources: covering forces, ISTAR elements, patrols and troops in contact.
Information superiority is gained through collecting, analysing and disseminating information
while denying information to the enemy. The intent is to provide the BG CO with thorough and
rapid SA while denying the same to the enemy.

b. Use of Ground. One of the keys to any defensive position is the ability to use the terrain
in order to deploy one’s forces to maximum advantage. That ability hinges upon being able
to determine key terrain and vital ground.94

c. Disruption. Disruption—intended to frustrate an adversary’s attempts to manoeuvre and

concentrate forces against the defence—can be achieved by defeating the enemy’s recce;
using fixed defences and aggressive counter-attacks to destroy adversarial cohesion and
achieving the destruction of critical assets in reserve.

94. Key terrain is any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. (Source: DTB, record 4612) Vital ground
is the ground that is of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of the mission. (Source: DTB, record 1529) See Section 9, Chapter 7,
B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for more detailed explanation on determining key terrain and vital ground.

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d. Coordination. Coordination begins during the planning phase and continues throughout the
operation. One important consideration is the need for a BG CO and staff to understand the
TTPs of potential JIMP partners in the defence.

e. Mutual Support. At the BG level, this is mainly concentrated on ensuring that gaps between
defended positions are covered by fire (preferably direct fire). Terrain, visibility and effective
weapons range will all impact on mutual support. Mutual support is possible even within the
non-contiguous battlespace. Shaping and sustaining actions must be planned to support the
decisive action and hence, while they may be separated spatially, they need to be linked
in time.

f. Depth. A defence in depth allows time for a defender to determine an attacker’s main thrust
and thus counter it. It also allows for absorbing the momentum of an attack and aids in preventing
breakthroughs. An attacker is forced to attack in successive stages and will often be without
detailed recce as the attack progresses.

g. Manoeuvre. By combining firepower with movement, the defender will seek to overwhelm the
attacker by striking repeated and unexpected blows before the attacker is able to bring a
cohesive force to bear on the main defensive position. Using manoeuvre, a defender will be a
position to transition to the offensive, should the attack fail, or will be in a position to either
counter-attack or withdraw should the position become untenable.

h. Firepower. Closely related to manoeuvre, the effectiveness of the defence often rests on the
ability of a BG CO to plan for mutually supported fire of all weapons. This may include external
fire support from naval gunfire, aviation, tactical air and multinational assets from outside the
AO. The abilities to ensure the planning for those fire assets is complementary, coordinated
and applied at the right time and place are critical for a successful defence.

i. Use of Reserves. Reserves provide the defender with freedom of action. The main functions
of reserves at the BG level are reinforcement, blocking, counter-attacking, flank or rear
protection and replacement. Once committed, a BG CO must reconstitute the reserve.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

5. There are two types of defensive actions:95

a. Defence. A defence has two forms: an area defence (see Figures 7-2 and 7-3 for examples)
which seeks to hold ground or deny it to the enemy or a mobile defence (see Figures 7-4 and
7-5 for examples) which seeks to deny the enemy the freedom of movement while a striking
force manoeuvres to defeat; and

95. 
Note that the withdrawal is considered an enabling operation and will be dealt with in Chapter 9, “Enabling Operations.”

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EA

Covering Force Shaping

EA

Reserve

Reserve

An area of defence denies the enemy forces access to specified terrain. Defending in depth, exploiting terrain
advantages and strong covering forces characterize the area defence.

Figure 7-2: Example of an Area Defence

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Figure 7-3: Area Defence

Fixing Force Shaping Actions

Assault Force Decisive Actions

Reserve

The assault force conducts the decisive action in a mobile defence—a counter-attack from an unexpected direction.
Minimum combat power is committed to fixing forces that shape the depth of defence.

Figure 7-4: Example of a Mobile Defence

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Figure 7-5: Mobile Defence

b. Delay. In the delay a defender trades time for space to reduce the enemy’s momentum and to
inflict damage without becoming decisively engaged. The purpose of the delaying force is to
provide time for its parent formation to prepare for subsequent operations, normally a defence.

STAGES OF THE DEFENCE

6. The two stages of the defence occur in sequence. However, the transition from one stage to another
is seldom distinct, and it often occurs at different times and in different locations in a formation’s area
of responsibility. The stages are:

a. covering force stage; and

b. main defensive stage including countermoves.

7. Covering Force. The covering force operates outside the main defensive area (MDA) to shape the
defence by protecting the deployment of the main force, delaying the enemy and identifying the enemy
intent and main axis(es) of advance.96 The covering force consists of:

a. a security screen force to observe, identify and report information, which fights only in self-
defence. The security screen is normally designed to provide the minimal security necessary
while allowing the BG CO to retain the bulk of the combat power for commitment at the decisive
place and time. A BG screen would normally be formed from recce and surveillance assets and
would rely upon indirect fires including attack, aviation, if available to destroy enemy recce
elements and/or slow the movement of other enemy elements. Screen tasks generally include:

96. 
Chapter 9, “Enabling Operations” provides more detail on security operations and the three missions thereof: cover, screen and guard activities.

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 (1) detecting and reporting on all enemy ground elements that pass through the screen area;

 (2) maintaining continuous observation on all avenues of approach into the area that
are capable of transit by a designated unit size, under all conditions of visibility;

 (3) destroying or causing the withdrawal of all enemy recce elements, within capabilities;

 (4) locating the lead elements of the enemy advance guard and reporting on its direction/axis
of advance into the screen area;

 (5) maintaining and reporting contact with enemy forces within the AO;

 (6) maintaining contact with the main body of the BG and any flanking security forces;

 (7) impeding and harassing the enemy advance within capabilities;

b. a guard force to protect the main force by fighting to gain time and destroying enemy capabilities
early in the defensive battle. It also observes and reports information, but will make use of its
combat power to prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position whereby it can observe and
engage the main defensive position. A guard force can become decisively engaged.97 Typically,
it operates within range of the main body’s indirect fire support and on a much narrower frontage
than the security screen to permit concentration of its combat power. A BG guard would normally
be formed around a combat team (usually an infantry-centric team with armoured elements
attached). Guard tasks include all those of the security screen, plus:

 (1) destroying the enemy advance guard;

 (2) forcing the enemy main body to deploy and thus delaying it;

 (3) reporting on the direction of the enemy main body’s advance.

8. At the formation level, usually only one covering force is deployed forward, and it will act as a guard.
Given the combat power and modular/scalable nature of the BG, this is an ideal BG task. After its
withdrawal as guard force for its higher formation, the BG will usually move to a subsequent task.

9. Main Defensive Stage. The main defensive stage begins when the covering force breaks contact
with the enemy and passes responsibility for the battle to the main defensive force at a handover line.
Main force troops assist the covering force to disengage and pass through the MDA. The main defensive
stage is fought according to the BG CO’s scheme of manoeuvre and several supporting plans:

97. 
That allowance to become decisively engaged will normally be tempered by the higher commander’s direction that will direct the guard commander to retain a certain
percentage of combat power.

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a. Information Management Plan (IMP).98 The IMP is geared towards the effective management
of information flow both internally and externally to the BG. The IMP assigns IM responsibilities
to specific staff, describes information requirements, provides guidance to system management
organizations on requirements for voice and data communication links as well as command
guidance with respect to information currency requirements and information protection needs.

b. Barrier Plan.99 The barrier plan is part of the overall defence plan and defines how a BG CO
will employ obstacles to support the manoeuvre plan and impede that of the enemy. It is fully
integrated with the manoeuvre and defensive fire plans and is adjusted as barriers are improved,
time permits and the battle proceeds. Barrier plans are always covered by observation and fire.
The BG CO relies upon the engineer advisor to coordinate and manage the barrier plan.

c. Defensive Fire Plan.100 The DF plan is synchronized with the manoeuvre plan through the
early definition of objectives for indirect fire support (this includes the use of mortars). It is
based upon targets that are intended to force the enemy to adopt an approach that is favourable
to their destruction or dispersal by the manoeuvre force. The authority to engage DF targets
is normally controlled by the BG CO within boundaries; the BG CO may elect to delegate this
authority to the combat team commanders. The DF plan identifies two types of targets:

 (1) Close DF. This includes final protective fire targets;

 (a) Close DF are those which break up the enemy’s assault while it is forming up on the
line of departure or during the assault. As a general rule, a close DF target is on
dangerous and likely approaches and within 600 metres of friendly troops. Typically,
a combat team will have no more than three close DF targets per combat team
battle position (BP).

 (b) One or more close DF targets may be designated by the BG CO as being so vital
that an immediate fires response is guaranteed. Such close DF targets are known
as FPF and indirect assets will be loaded and aimed at the final protective fire (FPF)
target when not firing at other tasks.

 (2) DF in Depth. Targets that permit the disruption of enemy attack penetrations, and strike
at enemy reserves or command and control systems, are known as DF in depth targets.
These are normally designated and fired at formation level.

d. ISTAR Plan.101 The ISTAR plan is intended to provide a plan for integrating the intelligence
function with the BG’s surveillance, target acquisition, recce and other information-generating
assets to improve the BG CO’s SA, streamline the decision-making process and cue manoeuvre
assets. Based on the information requirements of the BG CO, the higher commander and
subordinate commanders, the ISTAR plan in general looks at three areas:

98. Information management is planning, coordinating and controlling the acquisition, analysis, processing, integration, distribution, use, safeguarding and disposal
of information, associated technology and supporting resources. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations provides more detail on information
management and IMPs.
99. Chapter 5 of B-GL-361-001/FP-001 Land Force Engineer Operations – Volume 1 provides detail on barrier planning
100. Chapter 4 of B-GL-371-003/FP-001 Field Artillery Operational Procedures provides more detail on fire support planning.
101. Chapter 1 of B-GL-394-002/FP-001 Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance provides detail on the ISTAR plan and planning process.

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 (1) which collection assets could best service the requirements of the ICP. This is generally
the intelligence section’s function;

 (2) how those assets will be tasked to meet the individual collection tasks. This involves
coordination between the ISTAR coordination staff and the BG Ops O;

 (3) the tactical planning for the use of specific sensors and platforms. This is completed by
the operations staff of each unit or subunit.

e. Countermoves Plan. The countermoves plan consists of the plans for the BG depth and
reserve to reinforce, block and/or counter-attack to contain enemy penetrations. The BG
countermoves plan must be coordinated with the formation plan for blocking or counter-attacks
within the BG area and will include:

 (1) the selection, reconnaissance and rehearsals of routes, attack positions, defended
localities, BPs and fire positions;

 (2) any requirements for route maintenance or improvement including negotiating obstacles;

 (3) the requirements for fire support and AD;

 (4) the requirements for surveillance of intended countermoves task areas;

 (5) the command and control measures;

 (6) rehearsals by day and night.102

f. Air Defence Plan. Normally under formation control, AD assets may be allocated to the BG if
necessary. The commander of the attached AD assets will act as the BG CO’s advisor and
complete the AD plan, ensuring it ties into the overall formation plan. While individual BG units
and subunits have AD measures spelled out in their unit SOPs and specific orders, the overall
BG AD plan will include, at a minimum, the following:

 (1) the requirement for AD sentries;

 (2) warning systems and signals, including how AD warnings will be disseminated;

 (3) AD ROEs.

102. 
Essential pieces of information provided by rehearsals are the response times for each countermove task by day and night. This allows the BG HQ to ensure notices
to move are reduced and deployment orders are given in good time.

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g. Direct Fire Plan. The direct fire plan is the product that results from the coordination of direct
fires in support of the shaping and decisive activities against the enemy. It normally includes all
direct fire weapons within the BG, from hand-held antitank through to tank guns. The direct fire
plan is closely coordinated with the DF, barrier and countermove plans, and is centred on the
killing zone (KZ). KZs are established on likely enemy main approaches and are tied to the
direct fire range of the infantry company’s weapons. Longer-range armoured weapons are then
added to the KZ framework to ensure that the enemy is kept under continuous fire. Accordingly,
a KZ is established as wide and as deep as possible. Key points to consider when creating
the direct fire plan are that:

 (1) fires should be concentrated on the KZ;

 (2) coordination and movement of direct fire weapons is centralized at the BG HQ,
while control of fire is decentralized;

 (3) direct fire weapon systems are grouped in such a way as to allow the BG CO flexibility
to influence the defensive battle;

 (4) detailed recce and coordination at all levels are essential to the success of the direct
fire plan;

 (5) boundaries must not inhibit the concentration of fire when required.

h. EW Plan. The EW plan is created and controlled at formation level, and a BG CO can expect
to have little latitude in modifying the plan. A BG CO can expect to have EW detachments
operating within their AO.

i. CSS Plan.103 The CSS plan is the responsibility of the OC HQ squadron / CSS company
(depending upon the composition of the BG) who also directs the CSS portion of the battle.
CSS planning considerations are covered later in this chapter.

10. The overall concept of operations is determined at the highest level of command. Each subordinate
commander bases their plan on their superior commander’s concept and plans. This planning process,
repeated at each level of command, ensures a consistent application of the concept and defensive
operations plans that give a cohesive defence where tactical actions are linked in time by purpose.
The BG CO thinks one level up and plans two levels down.104

11. The following are considered when conducting battle procedure for the main defensive stage:

a. Time for recce, planning and preparation may be limited. The early identification of critical
intelligence and information requirements (IRs) and the tasking of Sense assets are vital
in assisting in the development of defence options. The early issuance of a warning order and
access to higher formation planning permits concurrent activity at all levels.

103. See B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Sustainment of Land Operations for detail on CSS planning.
104. 
At times when a hasty defence is necessary, a BG CO and subordinate commanders may not have the time to plan in detail (that is, to site individual positions)
two levels down. The BG CO must, in such cases, give a clear indication of intent for the various portions of the defensive position and battle and articulate to
subordinates two levels down the results that their positions and plans are to achieve.

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b. A general plan for defence is made after a detailed “sensor” study of the terrain using
all available resources is completed. This is followed by a recce of the ground.

c. When time is limited, meeting subunit commanders on their positions may shorten battle
procedure. This saves time since the subunit commanders will be in position to conduct their
recce and detailed planning before returning to the RV for orders.

d. The scheme of manoeuvre and supporting plans are explained to subordinate commanders
and staff so they are well understood by all.

e. Supporting plans are coordinated with other units whose actions are linked in time by purpose
with BG actions as well as with adjacent units and formation HQ.

12. The strength of the defence depends largely upon the selection and use of ground. The skill of the
BG CO to analyse the ground, determine the approaches, select key terrain and deploy forces may
determine success or failure.

13. A BG CO looks at their area of responsibility firstly from the enemy’s point of view. This is challenging
against an unconventional asymmetric enemy. However, this examination reveals the approaches into
and through the area. Then, from the defender’s point of view, a BG CO considers the ground features
that dominate or obstruct movement. The BG CO continues this ground study throughout the depth and
width of the area and also notes areas of concealment as well as routes that offer good going. Finally, the
BG CO looks for possible infiltration routes through complex terrain. From a study of the ground the BG
CO determines:

a. main and secondary approaches into and through the area of responsibility;

b. key terrain dominating likely enemy approaches;

c. natural obstacles that impede or canalize movement, how they can be improved and
requirements for their improvement;

d. ground providing the best concealment and BPs, including primary and secondary positions;
and

e. suitable routes for reinforcing, blocking, counter-attacking and withdrawing.

14. A BG may occupy the higher formation’s vital ground. Within this area, the BG CO identifies own key
terrain and vital ground. The designation of vital ground is relative to the level of command. What a BG
CO designates as vital ground may be key terrain to the formation commander. By clearly stating what
ground is vital to the defence, the BG CO directs subordinates to focus on the ground that blocks or
dominates approaches.

15. The selection of KZs reflects the formation commander’s concept of operations and identifies areas
where the enemy is forced to concentrate or change formation, thereby making lucrative targets. BG COs
designate specific KZs and employ obstacles, direct fire, indirect fire, BPs and a reserve to contain and
destroy the enemy. BG COs should coordinate all assets, lethal and non-lethal (kinetic and non-kinetic),
as early as possible to shape the enemy and prepare it for defeat. Where an approach falls into two BG
areas, the formation commander coordinates that particular KZ.

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16. Subunit BPs provide all-round defence, mutual support and depth. They are concealed as much as
possible from ground and air observation. Positions on reverse slopes, in forests and built-up areas offer
the best concealment and should be used if fields of fire adequately cover the approaches. The BG CO’s
general plan establishes a framework for the defence based upon:

a. Positional Elements. These elements are BPs held by infantry companies supported by
additional direct fire weapons. They are located to cover obstacles, enemy approaches and
KZs. As there are rarely sufficient infantry companies to occupy all selected BPs, vital ground,
nodes and/or key terrain (as determined by the BG CO’s estimate), are occupied first. This may
well result in a non-contiguous defensive posture, which, threat dependent, may require a more
robust mobile element and/or allocated fires. BPs are classified in order of priority. If they are
not occupied initially, they are developed as alternative BPs. Subunits prepare primary BPs
while engineers will usually be employed to prepare secondary BPs. Subunit hides are occupied
to maintain security of BPs until the battle is joined. All unoccupied BPs are picketed.

b. Mobile Elements. Mobile elements have the role of shaping the enemy and, in concert with the
positional forces, setting the conditions for decisive action by countermove elements. Mobile
elements include reserves and uncommitted mobile forces.

17. The BG CO is responsible for locating and constructing field fortifications within the area
of responsibility, ensuring that:

a. sustaining actions are planned, rehearsed and executed by forces with sufficient C2,
SA and self-defence capabilities for the given threat environment;

b. priorities for engineer work are stated; and

c. the types of field fortifications and stages of construction are stated.

18. The construction of field fortifications is an all-arms responsibility, although engineers provide the
bulk of the specialist digging equipment. The BG CO must prioritize the work, in particular the engineer
effort, as the relevant equipment is similarly required for obstacle preparation. As required, alternative,
secondary and dummy positions may be constructed. Concurrent activity and security are key concerns
during all stages of preparation. A sample defensive layout is shown in Figure 7-6.

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MAIN APPROACH SECONDARY APPROACH

EA1

EA2

Reserve

Figure 7-6: Defensive Layout

19. Conduct of the Main Defensive Stage. The defensive battle involves the following actions:

a. using coordinated fires (eg, fire control orders and open fire policy) and manoeuvre to create
the desired effect on the enemy, always with a view to transitioning to offensive operations;

b. blocking and containing enemy penetrations; and

c. restoring the integrity of the defence by retaking lost ground.

20. The BG’s aim is determined by the higher commander’s intent. The BG may be required to defeat
the enemy, allow penetration, slow an enemy advance or otherwise shape the enemy for defeat by higher
formation assets. The BG is assigned tasks that synchronize with the higher formation’s other forces.

21. The success of the defensive battle depends upon the BG CO’s ability to impose one’s will on
the enemy and not to merely react. Before the battle begins, security, surveillance, noise and light
discipline, control of electronic emissions and movement as well as concealment are stressed. BPs are
occupied as late as possible to avoid early detection. Once the battle begins, BG COs have two principal
means of influencing its outcome:

a. control and direction of fire; and

b. countermoves.

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22. BG COs control fire directly or indirectly through their subordinates to conform to the defensive plan
and to remain in accordance with established fire control orders and open fire policies. The economy of
fire, particularly in low priority areas, is necessary if concentration of fire is to be achieved at critical times
and places. A major dilemma to be resolved will be the relative importance of long-range attrition versus
surprise. Selective long-range engagements may reduce the enemy’s fighting strength. Alternatively,
withholding fire, as in an ambush, may achieve surprise and shock effect. Fire control is applied:

a. to minimize the detection of weapons and units;

b. to ensure that scarce ammunition, particularly antiarmour missiles, is not wasted; and

c. to reinforce the effect of the obstacles and BPs.

23. Long-range attrition of the enemy starts with the application of fires. The BG CO establishes
an open fire policy as described below:

a. for artillery / sniping elements, the open fire policy is based upon the type and number
of vehicles, geographical aspects and the proximity to friendly troops; and

b. for troops in the BPs, the open fire policy is controlled by the commander at each level
of command in accordance with unit SOP or the operation order.

24. As the enemy advances, they are canalized and disrupted by obstacles and long-range fire. Other
direct fire assets normally do not engage until the enemy is within effective range of the largest possible
concentration of weapon systems. At that time, all weapons open fire together to achieve the maximum
surprise, concentration of fire and shock effect. Once the BG CO gives the open fire order, fire control
becomes the responsibility of subordinate commanders.

25. The BG reinforces, blocks or counter-attacks to contain and defeat the enemy. Reinforcing and
blocking are conducted with all or part of uncommitted, depth or reserve elements. Subunits in contact
continue to defend. When reinforcement is required, sufficient firepower, usually direct fire weapons, is
added without unduly depleting the reserve. Blocking is achieved by deploying a unit or subunit not in
contact, but movement to an alternative position must not jeopardize the integrity of the defence. Blocking
by depth or reserve subunits is best.

26. The reserve is committed as a whole, not piecemeal and, if necessary, undertakes different tasks in
succession. Once committed, the reserve’s purpose becomes the decisive action. Speed is vital. In
blocking or counter-attacking, minutes or even seconds may decide the outcome. Upon committal of the
reserve, the BG CO should create another. Until this is done, the BG CO’s ability to influence the battle
is limited.

27. The BG ratio of reserve to uncommitted enemy determines whether the enemy is to be defeated or
contained. The enemy may reinforce their penetration, particularly on a major axis. If the enemy is able
to assemble sufficient strength to make containment untenable, the BG CO may need to call upon the
formation commander for assistance. Foresight and early warning are important in the timely deployment
of such forces. The BG CO must read the battle and request the support. Such reinforcing missions have
to be planned up to at least the LD. The network enabled BG has an increasing ability to self-organize
once combat has commenced. Enabled by the commander’s intent and more comprehensive SA,
subunits are expected to react to developments and fulfil their assigned purposes.

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28. Countermoves Stage. At the formation level, the countermoves stage begins when the depth or
reserve force is committed to reinforce friendly forces, block enemy penetrations, counter-attack or exploit
success to defeat the enemy to maintain or restore the integrity of the defensive area. The formation
commander normally preserves the integrity of the reserve so that it can execute its primary task of
counter-attacking. Depth BGs are used to block and reinforce as much as possible before the reserve is
committed. Reinforcing, as described earlier in this section, is equally applicable at formation level.

29. The BG, as the formation reserve, may be tasked with countermoves, including reinforcing, blocking
or counter-attacking. The BG varies in size according to tasks but can include artillery and engineers,
in addition to direct fire units and infantry.

30. Security for the reserve force is still achieved by concealment and dispersion. The principal means
of concealment are:

a. careful siting and camouflage to escape direct observation and to screen or disguise electronic
and heat emissions;

b. use of the full range of counter-surveillance measures, ranging from the imposition of radio
silence to restrictions on starting engines; and

c. restrictions on movement, particularly by day.

31. Dispersion greatly increases the difficulty of control and administration. The degree of dispersion
necessary depends upon the cover available and the threat. Hides are sited to be defensible against
increasingly unconventional threats while still providing concealment and dispersion.

32. The movement of a reserve BG may be planned and controlled by formation HQ or by the BG.
In either case, the aim is to move the BG to its assembly area or attack position undetected, and in time
to carry out its mission. The major planning considerations are:

a. Security. The enemy threat may affect the timing of the move, the selection and number of
routes as well as the grouping and order of march. In extreme cases, it may prevent a daylight
move or force the BG to disperse into smaller groups moving on several routes.

b. Tasks. There may be several tasks for the BG. The number and nature of these tasks determine
groupings and orders of march for moves.

c. Timings. The urgency of tasks determines when and how quickly moves are to take place. The
BG CO balances speed against security in planning and executing moves. It is also necessary
to use foresight and plan for eventualities that may impede movement. It may often be
advantageous to conduct preliminary moves to reduce response time. Formation and BG HQ
staffs adjust the degrees of notice as situations develop, without keeping troops at an
unnecessarily high level of alert. However, in an emergency, the BG CO should not hesitate to
order immediate movement, overriding formal degrees of notice.

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d. Routes. Separate subunit routes that take advantage of all available cover are preferred. The
selection of alternative routes and the employment of engineers forward minimize disruption to
movement. ISTAR provides SA to the extent that subunits may use widely dispersed routes
and join the battle at the appropriate place and time. All routes are reconnoitred in detail and
maintained as necessary. They are marked to facilitate movement at night. This is particularly
important for routes through obstacles. Waiting areas adjacent to routes are selected. A program
of routine route recce confirms the capability to support traffic.

e. Order of March. An order of march positions troops in the sequence required for the task.
It also enables the BG to fight en route if required, with advance and flank guards deployed.
Sense assets allow the BG to warn of obstructions (such as IEDs) and enemy contacts as well
as to report on the situation in the battle area. When elements travel on dispersed routes, they
must provide the majority of their own protection.

f. Control. Control measures (including the designation of routes and waiting areas, assembly
areas, attack positions, LDs, objectives, blocking positions, phase lines and traffic control
points) are used to avoid or minimize risk and control movement.

33. The main points to consider for recce and liaison are as follows:

a. Routes, alternative routes, waiting areas, assembly areas and objective areas must
be reconnoitred in detail.

b. Commanders at all levels conduct recce to be fully conversant with their tasks and responsibilities.

c. Liaison is established as per Section 21 of Chapter 3 of B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties

for Land Operations.

d. Detailed plans are coordinated with formation HQ.

34. Rehearsals are conducted forward if the situation permits or in rear areas on similar terrain. They
should be conducted by day and by night, but they may be restricted to the night-time for security reasons.

35. Blocking. Blocking forces are tasked firstly from depth units and then, if necessary, from the reserve.
Blocking tasks are assigned by the formation commander to support the plan and with an aim, if possible,
of avoiding the depletion of the reserves, thereby saving it for the primary task of counter-attacking. If the
size of the enemy penetration is such that only containment and stabilization can be achieved, the
formation commander may decide to employ the reserve to block as a prelude to a higher formation
counter-attack. Blocking may involve:

a. moving to a blocking position;

b. augmenting the fire of the in-place force to defeat the enemy penetration; and

c. containing the enemy until a counter-attack is launched.

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36. Hasty blocking is conducted to contain enemy penetrations in unexpected areas or in areas where
it has achieved overwhelming strength. Hasty blocking usually requires a quick response to a critical
situation. The success of a hasty block depends upon quick reaction, decisiveness and the initiative of
commanders at all levels. Battle procedure is abbreviated. The aims are to deploy quickly whatever
forces are immediately available and to strengthen the position as more troops arrive. A likely sequence
of action follows:

a. Issue a warning order, including orders to commence movement to the objective area. A waiting
area near the objective may also be assigned.

b. Attempt to gain further information on the enemy from available sources, particularly through
ISTAR (including formation HQ), the in-place force, aviation elements, etc.

c. Determine critical timings.

d. Complete an estimate.

e. Issue radio or graphical orders on the move, confirming the details of the warning order and
ordering the initial deployment and tasks selected from the map. If possible, this should be
done early enough to avoid using a waiting area so that troops can move directly into position.

f. Deploy to BPs without further orders or recce. Subordinate commanders must use their initiative
to adjust their positions and coordinate arcs of fire.

g. BG and subunit commanders coordinate, adjust and improve positions, possibly while
in contact with the enemy.

37. Deliberate blocking is planned in detail and conducted from prepared positions. For each task,
the BG CO or subunit commanders establish:

a. a movement plan for the occupation of the position;

b. a coordinated defence plan, including supporting plans;

c. critical timings for the movement forward and occupation, which are passed to formation
HQ; and

d. the priority of work for the preparation of defence.

38. Counter-attack. The aim of the counter-attack is to regain lost ground or defeat the enemy. Counter-
attacks are planned and coordinated in detail. The BG CO’s initial plan anticipates likely counter-attack
tasks and places them in priority. The BG CO then reconnoitres and makes contingency plans for each
task, including:

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a. Assumptions. The situation paragraph of the operation orders should include planning
assumptions,105 either those from the formation commander or those made by the BG CO,
to include:

 (1) likely strength and disposition of the enemy;

 (2) forces available for the attack;

 (3) friendly forces remaining effective in the area and the degree of support, if any, which
may be expected from them;

b. Alternative Plans. The BG CO may develop one or more alternative plans for each counter-
attack task. The final selection of the plan, with modifications as necessary, is made before the
attack, when more information is available. The plans cater for the possibility of an attack by
day, by night or in conditions of reduced visibility.

39. For each counter-attack plan, the BG CO establishes:

a. a movement plan including assembly areas, attack positions and fire support positions;

b. a coordinated fire support plan for all fires using all integral, attached and higher systems
available;

c. groupings and tasks for recce, assault, fire support, flank protection, consolidation
and exploitation;

d. the order of march based upon the assigned tasks; and

e. tactical controls such as LDs, axes, boundaries, objectives, phase lines, fire support coordination
lines (FSCLs) and limits of exploitation.

40. The counter-attack force moves from its assembly area, through an attack position and across the
LD. Initially it does not close with the enemy. Part of the force takes up a fire position, preferably on key
terrain, overlooking the KZs and engages the enemy. This fire is complemented by artillery, CAS and, if
available, AHs.

41. The timing of the counter-attack is critical. Every effort is made to contain the enemy and strike them
when they are off-balance. If the counter-attack is too soon, the enemy could still be advancing, turning
the counter-attack into a meeting engagement. If it is too late, the enemy may have reinforced their force
and consolidated their position. Once the counter-attack force and the in-place force have neutralized the
enemy, the assault can begin. This may be the responsibility of the counter-attack force, the in-place
force or both.

42. Mopping-up, clearing pockets of resistance and collecting enemy stragglers are infantry tasks
and are supported by direct fire elements and artillery. With the counter-attack, the limit of exploitation
is more restrictive than in the attack. Defence of the sector is re-established as quickly as possible.

105. 
These assumptions do not predict the exact situation at the time of the counter-attack, but they help to develop an outline plan.

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Following the counter-attack, the attacking troops are dispersed rapidly to avoid becoming a target and
to prepare for subsequent tasks.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

43. General. BG COs exercise C2 of the defensive battle from wherever they have access to the best
SA. Control measures such as reference points and arcs of fire are used to synchronize the BG.

44. Grouping. Reinforcing subunits, committed to blocking in a BG area, come under the command of
the in-place BG once deployed. These subunits join the in-place BG command net as early as possible
to keep informed of the situation and to coordinate their movement into location.

45. Signals. Secure communications are used as much as possible to protect the BG from the enemy’s
offensive info ops. Consideration must be given to the use of command and control information systems
(C2IS) and electronic protective measures (EPM), which contribute to concealing defensive positions.
This typically involves a trade-off between communications effectiveness and security. For a detailed
description of signals support during defensive operations, see B-GL-351-001/FP-001 Signals in
Land Operations, Volume 1: Principles and Fundamentals.

CSS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

46. Sustainment during defensive operations puts emphasis on certain support functions and tactics.
While offensive operations suggest a decentralized employment of resources, defensive operations
require a more centralized approach, mainly to ensure support does not encumber manoeuvring forces
and to reduce the risk to critical resources. As with support to offensive operations, it is the officer
commanding combat service support company (OC CSS Coy) / headquarters squadron (HQ Sqn)
who directs the CSS battle, tailoring the plan to suit the stage of defence in which the BG is engaged.
These stages and their support characteristics are:

a. Covering Force Stage. Forces placed in advance of the main defence will be fighting a
combination of mobile and positional defence, in effect fighting a delay. It should be supported
by placing key resources (eg, combat supplies, ambulances, recovery) under OPCON or
OPCOM of the BG, and by establishing caches in key areas. The remainder of the CSS Coy /
HQ Sqn should be positioned so that it does not affect manoeuvre. This stage concludes with
a passage of lines, something that must be coordinated by Bde HQ. The BG’s CSS Coy, and
higher echelon support, must then reconstitute the BG to prepare it for follow-on tasks.

b. Main Defensive Stage. A BG in the main defence is likely fighting from prepared positions,
including mounted and dismounted troops. This stage is characterized by high ammunition
consumption. Dumping of artillery ammunition as well as forward stocking of other ammunition
and defensive/engineer stores may be conducted by the higher formation to ensure that the
required rates of consumption can be met. OC CSS Coy / HQ Sqn will coordinate with the
dumping unit. CSS Coy / HQ sqn focuses on readying equipment and personnel for combat.
Once the BG is engaged, the CSS company replenishes combat supplies, evacuates casualties,
replaces personnel and equipment and recovers damaged equipment rearward for repair.
Mobile elements need to be more self-sufficient than positional elements.

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c. Countermoves Stage. Forces conducting countermoves will most likely be conducting the
BG’s decisive action and, as such, are likely to require high availabilities of equipment. Moreover,
they will likely be the main effort for maintenance before battle. However, they will not likely
require any particular CSS resources assigned to them during the countermove stage.

47. Centralized employment of the echelon resources is essential to ensure that the battlespace is not
cluttered with support equipment and to reduce the risk to CSS assets. While material support can be
cached or stocked with the F echelon, control must be maintained or placed on weapon systems, their
repair parts and ammunition natures that are in short supply or are critical to the fight.

48. BG CSS assets are vulnerable to attack, particularly in non-linear defensive operations. The echelon
must be capable of defending itself and have alternative locations sited. The BG usually groups CSS
assets in a support area, collocating or siting them so that mutual defence is enhanced. The CSS subunit
must not only be capable of self-defence, but be recognized by the enemy to be capable. This self-
defence functionality is required while static and while on the move. Within the COE, the cold war CSS
model of limited radio communications and crew served weapon distribution amongst CSS forces
engenders great risk. CSS forces require vigilance and the equipment to effect self-defence, C2 as well
as maintain SA similar to the combat arms forces that they are supporting.

THE BG IN THE DELAY106

49. General. The delay uses manoeuvre and fires to trade space for time against an advancing enemy
force. The delay is defensive in nature; however, it may also be conducted in conjunction with offensive
operations. Even against an irregular opponent, situations may arise, particularly in the early stages of
a conflict, that demand the use of a delay battle in order to transition to defensive or offensive operations.
It is conducted for any of the following reasons:

a. to slow the enemy’s advance and reduce their offensive capability by inflicting casualties;

b. to determine the enemy’s main point of attack and overall intent;

c. to protect the deployment and preparations of forces tasked with other operations; and

d. to channel the attacker towards an area or to place them in a position that leads to their destruction.

50. In the case of flank and rear guards, delaying actions are fought for one or more of the following reasons:

a. to allow the main force time to react to the new threat;

b. to prevent the enemy from interfering with the main force;

c. to stop the enemy from gaining information concerning the actions of the main force; and

d. to permit the main force to disengage and move away from the enemy during a withdrawal.

106. 
This section describes BG delaying actions as part of the covering force battle. The delay is a shaping action that is viable in both linear and non-contiguous
operations. It also has applicability in peace support operations (PSO) particularly if hostilities recommence and pressure to withdraw is placed on intervening forces.

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51. Fundamentals of the Delay. In a delay, the BG attempts to inflict heavy losses on the enemy while
conserving its own strength. The delay has the following fundamentals:

a. Manoeuvre. Engaging at long range surprises and confuses the enemy; it also makes them
pause and deploy. Such fire imposes caution and causes casualties on the enemy without
revealing the disposition of own forces. Extensive use is made of long-range fires, integral
indirect fire assets and coalition fires. Manoeuvre elements disengage and move to new
positions when the enemy concentrates to attack.

b. Balance. Manoeuvre elements are organized so that they can deal with unexpected situations.
This requires a judicious balance between the number of troops maintaining surveillance,
conducting recce, engaging the enemy, withdrawing to new delaying positions and being held
in reserve.

c. Maintenance of Contact. Manoeuvre elements maintain contact with the enemy to avoid
being surprised and to determine their advance and direction.

d. Use of Terrain. Manoeuvre elements use terrain to force the enemy to conduct time-consuming
and costly attacks in order to advance. The terrain selected has natural or easily improved
obstacles that canalize and slow the enemy advance. It offers good observation and fields of
fire; it also allows for easy disengagement.

e. Time and Space. Usually the amount of time needed to prepare the defence, or to shape the
enemy, determines the length of the delay. The covering force area must have sufficient space
to meet the required duration of the delay.

f. Security and Protection. Security and protection are vital to preserve the force to allow it to
meet its task. They are achieved through concealment, camouflage, deception, COMSEC, EW,
CI as well as protecting bridges, crossing sites and critical points along the axis required for
rearward movements.

52. Concept of the Delay. The delay comprises a combination of defensive and offensive actions. It
entails continuous fire and movement that compels the enemy to repeatedly deploy and thus delay them.
Within the formation commander’s overall plan, manoeuvre elements usually occupy a series of delaying
positions from which they may either break contact and move behind other delaying forces or withdraw
to their next positions in depth. Delaying forces engage the enemy, especially recce forces, and conduct
limited attacks until decisive engagement is threatened. Decisive engagement must be avoided. To avoid
decisive engagement, forces disengage or fight their way back to the next delaying position. This process
is repeated until the mission is accomplished, at which time the BG breaks contact with the enemy and
passes the responsibility to the in-place force. This in-place force would normally be a force in a main
defensive area albeit likely with its own covering force deployed. Although decisive engagement should
be avoided, higher commanders must plan to deal with the possibility that an element or elements of the
delaying force may become decisively engaged. If decisively engaged, commanders will need to consider:

a. reallocating subsequent tasks and/or missions to alternate forces as the now engaged force
will not be available;

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b. altering the CSS plan and providing support to the engaged force elements; and/or

c. allocating forces and fire support to assist in the extraction of the engaged forces.

53. Formation Commander’s Direction. The formation commander provides the BG COs with
the following direction regarding a delay:

a. general locations of the initial and subsequent delaying positions;

b. the length of time that the enemy is to be delayed, the degree of destruction to certain
elements of the enemy or simply an order to cause maximum casualties bearing in mind the
subsequent mission;

c. locations and tasks of friendly forces that provide the screen, flank guards, rear guards and
demolition guards;

d. support allotted to the BG;

e. control measures such as phase lines, report lines, boundaries and reserved routes;

f. barrier plan including preliminary and reserved demolitions;

g. coordination for the rearward passage of lines;

h. areas to be occupied; and

i. subsequent tasks once the delaying mission is accomplished.

54. Planning Factors. Defensive plans for each delaying position are prepared in as much detail as
possible. Time is limited and BG COs rely upon subunit commanders to complete detailed planning.
These plans are kept simple and flexible so that they can deal with unexpected developments. The BG
CO’s plan is derived from the formation commander’s direction with particular attention to the following:

a. Forces and Tasks. Essential elements in the BG include:

 (1) Armour. The firepower and battlefield mobility of tanks and other armour elements
provide the most suitable platforms for conducting the delay in open terrain. In complex
environments, tanks and the other armoured elements act predominantly in support of
the infantry.

 (2) Infantry. Infantry participate in delaying operations chiefly in complex environments

where the enemy is engaged at shorter ranges. Infantry may fight from defensive positions,
which act as pivots for other elements.

 (3) Fires. Fires slow, block or fix the enemy and assist manoeuvre elements to disengage.
The full range of munitions is used to blind the enemy, cause enemy attrition and mine
approaches or flanks.

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 (4) Ground-based Air Defence. GBAD resources should be positioned to protect large
static targets. In the delay, these may be choke points such as reserve demolitions,
bridges and lanes.

 (5) Engineers. Engineers prepare and improve obstacles including minefields and
demolitions. Nuisance minefields are particularly useful in delaying the enemy. Engineers
also improve and maintain routes and crossing sites to enhance manoeuvre. The
responsibility for obstacles (such as reserved demolitions, including arrangements for
their security and the closure of lanes) must be clearly specified. Subunit commanders
must know which lanes and crossing sites are open for their use. Engineers move with
the subunits that are in contact to undertake route denial, fire demolitions, breach
obstacles and lay mines. They may also be employed a tactical bound ahead of the
rearward moving force in order to prepare obstacles and demolitions. The delaying force
will be responsible for closing those obstacles and demolitions.

b. Groupings. A balanced combat organization offers flexibility and freedom of action for the BG
CO so that the problems of C2 and regrouping may be avoided.

c. Selection of Delaying Positions. Delaying positions are selected far enough apart to cause
the enemy to reorganize before continuing their advance. They should dominate enemy
approaches and offer:

 (1) good fields of fire and observation;

 (2) natural obstacles to the front and flanks or be locations in which man-made obstacles
can be developed easily;

 (3) good withdrawal routes.

d. Reserves. The BG CO should maintain a reserve to block penetrations, extricate subunits and
counter-attack.

e. Obstacles. While the barrier plan is prepared at formation level, the BG CO has delegated
authority within defined control measures for the detailed location of obstacles in their area of
responsibility. Well-sited and integrated obstacles can significantly shape the enemy’s advance,
but they must not impede the movement of the BG or other friendly forces.

f. Surprise and Deception. Security is maintained through concealment, disciplined movement

and the control of electronic emissions until contact is made. Within the formation deception
plan, there may be ample scope for the BG to employ deception techniques to delay and
confuse the enemy.

g. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Reconnaissance and surveillance are distinct activities.

Recce is active and entails searching for something while surveillance is passive and implies
watching something. Both activities are key to a successful delaying action. Recce forces can
serve many purposes in the delay, but primarily, they should be tasked to find routes and
positions and to assist in providing positive control by marking BPs and lanes. Moreover, recce

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forces can perform surveillance tasks. Surveillance assets can perform many functions, but in
the delay, they should be tasked primarily to observe named NAIs and target areas of interest
(TAIs) to confirm enemy activity.107

h. Coordination. The following is coordinated:

 (1) CAS and indirect fire;

 (2) routes and movement;

 (3) flank and rearward liaison between subunits and BGs;

 (4) passage of lines, particularly at the handover line;

 (5) CSS, with particular emphasis on replenishment of combat supplies and casualty evacuation.

55. Conduct of the Delay. A delaying force begins by engaging the enemy at a distance and from
ambush positions, causing damage and confusion that disrupts their advance. The enemy, ground and
the authority to withdraw forces are major considerations in selecting types of engagements. Engagements
are meant to inflict maximum casualties and cause delay at minimum cost.

56. Fire missions are used continuously to harass and disrupt the enemy’s advance. Covering and
defensive fires support the continuous manoeuvre and withdrawal of the delaying force. FOOs/FACs
remain well forward to continue engaging the leading enemy units.

57. Methods of Delay. The two methods of fighting delaying actions are:

a. Delaying on Successive Positions. Also known as the caterpillar method, Figure 7-7 illustrates
this delay method. Subunits delay continuously on and between each position: ground is never
abandoned needlessly. The sequence is as follows:

 (1) The approaching enemy is engaged at a distance, and as they advance, shorter-range
weapons engage and the volume of fire is increased. The purpose is to disorganize the
enemy and force them to stop and deploy their force for an attack.

 (2) Subunits avoid close combat. When the enemy threatens to close with or outflank the
position, and the maximum delay has been achieved, troops withdraw to the next position.

 (3) When the order to break contact is received, a part of the delaying force moves to the
next position. The remainder of the force maintains contact with the enemy and continues
to cause delay as it withdraws to the next position. When the enemy has advanced within
range of the next position, the defenders cover the final withdrawal of the part of the force
that is in contact. The withdrawing force now rejoins the troops occupying the new position.

107. A
 n NAI is the geographic area where information that will satisfy a specific IR can be collected. NAIs are usually specified to identify enemy COAs, but may also
be related to conditions of the battlefield. TAIs represent areas where a commander can influence the battle by destroying, delaying or disrupting the enemy.
B-GL-352-001/FP-001 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Volume 1 ― The Enduring Doctrine provides more detail on both.

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When the reunited force can no longer hold the position without becoming decisively
engaged the procedure is repeated.

 (4) During the delaying action, engineers fire demolitions, close lanes in the minefields
and prepare other obstacles as time and material permit.

FIRST DELAY DEPLOYMENT

A1
C1

B1

C2
A2 SECOND DELAY DEPLOYMENT
B2

C3 THIRD DELAY DEPLOYMENT

A3
B3

Figure 7-7: BG Delaying on Successive Positions (Caterpillar)

b. Delaying on Alternating Positions. Also known as leapfrog, this method is illustrated in

Figure 7-8. When using this method two or more subunits manoeuvre along the same axis.
One occupies the first delaying position and engages the enemy. The second occupies and
improves the second delaying position, normally sited in depth to the first person. The sequence
is as follows:

 (1) The subunit on the first position forces the enemy to deploy at long range. It withdraws to
avoid close combat, or on order, through or around the subunit on the second position to
the rear, proceeding directly to the third delaying position. This movement is supported by
the second, depth position.

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 (2) The subunit on the second position engages the enemy to force them to deploy. The
procedure is repeated, with each force being alternately in contact and responsible for
causing delay. When not in contact, the rear subunit is responsible for improving the
position it occupies and providing covering fire for the withdrawal of the subunit in contact.
When this method of delay is used, the subunit held out of contact is normally identified
as the reserve. Delay on alternating positions gives more time for the improvement of
delaying positions and the opportunity for troops to be out of action.

FIRST DELAY DEPLOYMENT

B D

A C SECOND DELAY DEPLOYMENT

THIRD DELAY DEPLOYMENT

B D

FOURTH DELAY DEPLOYMENT

A C

Figure 7-8: BG Delaying on Alternate Positions (Leapfrog)

58. Armour and/or other direct fire elements may be grouped with subunits or controlled by BG HQ and
are the primary choices to conduct long-range engagements, covering manoeuvre and gaps as well as
providing flank protection.

59. Recce troops/platoons screen flanks and gaps between subunits, reconnoitre and secure routes,
control traffic and maintain contact with adjacent units. Surveillance is maintained throughout the BG AO,
and surveillance assets are deployed to both augment recce elements and to cover those areas
that cannot be covered by other assets.

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60. Command and Control. Using either method of delay, the BG CO coordinates the action of subunits
along delaying lines so that they are not outflanked. The BG CO must be fully aware of the degree to
which subunits are committed in order to avoid decisive engagement and to employ the reserve where
and when required. The strength of the reserve is balanced with the need for flank protection and the
security of withdrawal routes. The speed of delaying operations requires simple command arrangements
that can cope with changing situations. Regrouping is avoided as much as possible. The BG CO expects
subunit commanders to use their initiative to defeat the enemy or impose maximum delay. If prior recce
was not possible, recce parties are dispatched to each delaying position to prepare for a quick occupation.
The following is essential for control and coordination in the BG:

a. the locations of initial and subsequent delaying positions;

b. the length of time of the delay;

c. engagement policies;

d. locations and tasks of adjacent friendly forces including contacts that must be established;

e. support allotted to subunits including direct fire, artillery, recce and engineers;

f. control measures such as phase lines, report lines, bounds, routes, axes and boundaries
throughout the entire area of the operation;

g. actions at obstacles including preliminary and reserved demolitions;

h. coordination measures for the rearward passage of lines;

i. recce of delaying positions prior to occupation;

j. reliable communications; and

k. having authority for early withdrawal.

61. CSS in Delaying Operations. In delaying operations, the fluid nature of the battle greatly affects CSS
planning and execution. Given that the delay comprises a combination of defensive and offensive operations,
CSS in the support of the delay is critical, vulnerable and complex. Some of the characteristics of a delaying
operation that should be taken into consideration in assessing the support considerations are:

a. decentralized support to manoeuvring subunits (ie, only essential CSS assets are detached,
allowing manoeuvre elements to operate without concern for CSS asset protection);

b. the positioning of combat supplies forward, possibly cached on delaying positions;

c. emphasizing recovery or demolition, vice repair in situ; and

d. ensuring that F echelons are topped-up with essential supplies before the operation.

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CHAPTER 8
STABILITY OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. Stability operations are tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other
agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can
function effectively and progress can be achieved. They include security of populations, development of
indigenous security forces, reconstruction of essential civil services and assistance in civil governance
and development. They are often conducted in conjunction with or in support of other agencies once the
security situation allows them to deploy. Although they may not be a main effort during a campaign
dealing with a conventional threat, they must be considered, and their requirements must be foreseen in
operational planning.

2. The fundamental premise underpinning the continuum of operations is that military forces are likely
to be simultaneously engaged in a range of tactical activities—offensive, defensive, stability and enabling.
Together, they constitute the range of military tactical operations that will be conducted by military forces
within a campaign.

3. Long-term security and stability are impossible without meeting the immediate needs of local
populations, such as security, the provision of essential services, humanitarian aid and responsible
governmental institutions. The emphasis on these types of operations will shift over time, but they must
be addressed when their lack of existence has significantly contributed to the conflict and the strategic
end state seeks an enduring stability.

4. Given the non-military nature of many of these operations, there is an enormous role for other
elements of the JIMP framework to assume these efforts on the path to operational and strategic objectives
and end states. This will involve a combination of governments, regional organizations, multilateral
bodies, international institutions and NGOs. Given their expertise in these areas, it is best that these
agencies assume as much of these responsibilities as possible. The military, regardless of the maturity of
the theatre, will normally retain some responsibility for security and security force development. Given the
integrated nature across agencies that many campaigns will demand, there is, therefore, the requirement
for these disparate organizations to define responsibilities, develop a shared understanding, reduce
redundancy, maximize resources and synchronize activities, all within a single campaign to achieve a
strategic objective and end state. In short, they must be linked by a unifying theme. The application of an
effects-based approach at all planning levels will identify the operational objectives, the effects through
which they are realized and the tactical tasks needed to create those effects.

5. Despite the vital importance of non-military agencies, multi-agency involvement in campaigns is

impossible without adequate security and the provision of a permissive environment for their operation
and freedom to work. A lack of security will hamper and even preclude the activities of those efforts
conducted by other agencies: humanitarian work, infrastructure reconstruction and development,
economic development and governmental development. This required security is provided by
military operations.

6. The purpose of stability operations is to establish and maintain the conditions for normal civic activity
and responsible government. It provides the security and control over areas to allow this development
and the freedom of movement for other elements of the JIMP framework to bring lasting security,

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particularly for local governments and populations. The security and control provide freedom of movement
for a local populace so that normal civil activities such as local markets may take place.

7. In certain campaigns or at the early stages of many campaigns, the military may be the only
organization capable of operating in the security environment. Yet the need for reconstruction, humanitarian
aid, policing and other such activities will exist. To be the sole authority source in a region and to ignore
these needs is a moral failing. Thus, the military may have to assume initial tactical responsibility, with
their existing organization, for some efforts that are best conducted by civilian organizations. It is,
therefore, essential that such situations are planned, force packaged, trained for in advance and
coordinated with other agencies so that initial military efforts are complementary to longer term plans.

8. In due course, these responsibilities should be assumed by other elements of the JIMP framework
best suited for their conduct. Even if military forces first initiate these lines of operation and constituent
activities, their planning and design should be done in conjunction with those other agencies that will
eventually assume those responsibilities. This will ensure a unifying theme and overall guidance as well
as allow the initial military efforts to be complementary to later efforts by other JIMP elements.

9. Stability activities will create effects on the psychological and physical planes. The delivery of
humanitarian aid, the reconstruction of essential services and the provision of public safety through
framework patrols will not only create physical effects, but will improve the confidence and security of the
populace and, thus, their acceptance of the military forces and their mission. It increases perceptions
of the legitimacy of the campaign.

10. Stability operations and their associated tactical activities will play a role in all campaign themes,
even in major combat. For example, following a major offensive, there will be a need to establish security
for a local civilian populace, stop any looting and provide emergency humanitarian relief. The import and
emphasis placed upon stability operations will vary with the campaign and within each campaign. Stability
operations will drive the predominant tactical activities within the campaign themes short of major combat.

11. Within an interagency environment, the military should be engaged at all levels at the earliest stage
possible of both the planning and conduct of the campaign in order to ensure that a security vacuum
is not allowed to develop. Therefore, at the tactical level the military must, in cooperation with other
agencies, conduct planning to ensure that security is enforced and maintained through a balance of
tactical activities relevant to the adversary. Failure to do this opens a window of opportunity for destabilizing
elements to disrupt progress towards the strategic end state that underpins the campaign.

12. The development and maintenance of a safe, secure, stable and enduring environment remains
the underlying reason to conduct stability operations.

STABILITY OPERATIONS – TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

13. A comprehensive approach will be applied to campaigns to include all elements of the JIMP
framework, working within a unifying theme to consider and address the full range of influences and
factors that have destabilized the environment. The military strategic objective (which informs the military’s
operational design) is likely to aim to promote and maintain a safe and secure environment. Stability
operations are conducted throughout all campaigns in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations.
In achieving order, security and control, the range of operations is likely to involve both coercive and
cooperative actions.

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14. Stability operations include a wide range of tactical activities. The chief activity relates to security
and control so that the military and other agencies may freely operate and undertake additional activities
and so that civilian populaces and local governments are free to undertake the normal activities of a civic
society. It will allow the other instruments of power—diplomatic and economic—to predominate. In short,
tactical activities all seek to set the conditions for good governance and long-term stability.

15. Stability operations consist of the following tactical activities:

a. Security and Control. The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace
and other elements of the JIMP framework the freedom and safety to conduct normal civic
activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability. The military, along with other
security forces, provides a framework of security in which other agencies, civil authorities and
the general populace may operate with suitable freedom.

b. Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). DDR involves the

standing down of former combat forces and their reintegration to civil society or their move to
create a newly structured and government sanctioned military force. It requires the involvement
of a range of agencies and ideally will include programmes to avoid the creation of a large
mass of unemployed, possibly embittered, former soldiers. Military forces will have a key role
in assisting and securing the process. It is important to note that the DDR process may only
apply to a portion of a military (eg, conscripts), while the remainder may undergo security
sector reform.

c. Support to Security Sector Reform. SSR is a key element leading towards long-term stability
and development of a nation. It is the reformation of the various elements of a nation’s security
sector and, like DDR, will involve a multi-agency approach with other governmental and
international agencies dealing with the judiciary and police forces. The military will have a key
role in reforming/developing the nation’s military capabilities.

d. Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance. Ideally, the reconstruction of essential

services and the provision of governance will fall to JIMP agencies other than the military. In
the early stages of a campaign, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation
improves and other agencies are able to deploy. Additionally though, the military may wish to
pursue some of these tasks, particularly on the tactical levels, in order to engender ongoing
support from local populaces, that is, to create effects on the psychological plane.

e. Assistance to Other Agencies. At times, military forces may choose, or be required, to provide
assistance to other agencies. These are likely to be public elements of the JIMP framework, to
include NGOs, public volunteer organizations (PVOs) and international commercial
organizations. One possible example may be the use of military security or transport to assist
an NGO in the delivery of humanitarian aid. The provision of such assistance should be done
with the aim of supporting operational objectives and creating desired effects on both the
physical and psychological planes.

16. These tactical activities, like offensive, defensive and enabling activities, are realized through
a series of tactical tasks, which are discussed in B-GL-322-010/FP-001 Stability Activities and Tasks.
The broad range of stability operations and the unique considerations demanded by them justify their
own publication.

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THE CONDUCT OF STABILITY ACTIVITIES AND TASKS

17. The purpose of B-GL-322-010/FP-001 Stability Activities and Tasks is to describe a common
understanding and approach for planning and executing a wide range of stability tasks. It also describes
the practical application of tactical stability tasks in any operation. The publication’s emphasis is that
tactical stability activities and tasks will be conducted across the spectrum of conflict in conjunction with
offensive and defensive tactical activities and supported by enabling activities. The distinction between
strategic, operational and tactical levels is often compressed for the conduct of stability activities. This is
especially true with respect to some of the SSR tasks and many of the initial restoration and governance
related tasks.

18. It is important to note that many of the described tactical stability tasks, especially those classified
as support to initial restoration of services and support to initial governance, are not typical military tasks.
Many of these tasks have a civilian or legal basis or deal with financial and infrastructure issues. Military
units will, however, often be the first and only element to support the international community to meet
challenges with respect to these “non-military” issues. This means that the process of solving problems
in those areas must be considered by military commanders, their staffs and their units. This initiative
should also contribute to the improvement of the security situation in the area and will enhance the
feelings and the attitudes of the local populace towards the alliance force.

19. While the undertaking of reconstruction, development and governance support to an indigenous
authority may seem daunting to military tactical commanders given their unfamiliarity and lack of formal
training with such matters, it must be remembered that common sense and a sense of perspective will
support commanders well. Local authorities will be experts in their own nation and their population’s
expectations, and thus, the tactical commander assigned to support such authorities may only need to
assist in organizing and implementing policies, rather than the detailed development of policies.
Remembering the basic needs and desires of all civil societies, regardless of culture, balanced with local
traditions, expectations and social practices in the basic necessities of civil life will help guide tactical
commanders in this challenging area.

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CHAPTER 9
ENABLING OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. Enabling operations link other operations and support the transition between different types of
tactical activities. They may be conducted to make or break contact with the enemy or may be conducted
out of contact. An enabling activity is never carried out in its own right. Its execution must lead to the
active prosecution of another type of tactical operation. For example, a relief in place of a platoon house
during a peace support operation would be proceeded by many of the enabling operations outlined below
(recce operations, tactical movement, etc), depending upon a variety of factors including the nature of the
threat and the terrain to be crossed. The successful execution of these activities relies upon factors such
as the devolution of decision making, the collocation of HQ, liaison and a simple plan. Finally, the JIMP
environment has complicated the conduct of many of these enabling operations and must be factored
into the BG CO’s operational planning.

2. The effective execution of enabling activities will help ensure the following:

a. the ability to make a transition between phases without a significant change in tempo;

b. the forces taking over the battle having the most up-to-date information;

c. fluid movement;

d. fire control so as to use all weapons to further the aim and to avoid fratricide; and

e. quick regrouping.

3. Enabling operations consist of the following activities:

a. reconnaissance;

b. security;

c. advance to contact;

d. tactical movement;

e. meeting engagement;

f. link-up;

g. withdrawal;

h. retirement; and

i. relief of troops in combat and encircled forces.

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RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS108

4. General. At the BG level, reconnaissance elements have a vital role in developing SA, while
attempting to mitigate much of the uncertainty within the COE. Recce operations are enabling operations
carried out across the spectrum of conflict and apply to all tactical land operations. They are characterized
by dispersal, long duration on task as well as the high risks and pay-off that come from placing lightly
armoured vehicles and their crews in critical positions, often at great distances from supporting troops.

5. Ground manoeuvre recce (GMR)109 elements are always present at the tactical level and are
employed by the BG CO with the primary intent of gaining information. Their role is to increase the BG
CO’s awareness of and ability to shape the battlespace. GMR elements do not generally fight for
information, but may sometimes be given fighting roles, typically as either guard or flank protection forces.
They are never kept in reserve, but rather should be actively employed in their primary role.

6. GMR elements enable operations in three distinct ways:

a. Decision Making. The provision of critical information by GMR elements serves the BG CO’s
decision-making process by allowing them to better visualize their entire operating environment,
thereby shaping the battlespace.

b. Targeting. GMR elements provide tactical information that identifies potential targets
for engagement. They may, while adopting an overt or covert posture, be tasked as the sensor-
to-shooter link and end up carrying out engagements themselves through a variety of delivery
means. Once an engagement is complete, GMR elements may find themselves further tasked
to provide BDA.

c. Force Protection. GMR elements can be tasked to carry out tactical security tasks, such
as FOB perimeter security and convoy escorts.

7. There are four core capabilities of GMR elements:

a. Reconnaissance. It is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection

methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or
to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics
of a particular area. Traditional recce activities include:

 (1) Route Recce, which is undertaken to obtain specific information on the route, obstacles,
enemy and adjacent terrain that could affect movement on the specified route;

 (2) Area Recce, which seeks to obtain information about an enemy and terrain in a designated area;

 (3) Point Recce, which is intended to obtain information about an enemy and terrain in the
immediate vicinity of a specific location;

108. B -GL-394-002/FP-001 Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance is the keystone doctrine manual on recce operations and should be read in conjunction with this section.
109. G
 MR is a set of activities conducted by land operations forces that assist the commander in defining and shaping the battlespace. (Source: Defence Terminology
Bank, record 33971)

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 (4) Zone Recce, which is undertaken to provide a concentrated effort to gain detailed
information about routes, terrain, obstacles and enemy forced within a zone defined by
lateral boundaries;

 (5) Recce in Force, which is intended to compel an enemy to disclose the location, size,
strength, disposition and intention of its forces by making the enemy respond to offensive
action. Note that this is considered an offensive operation and has been covered
in greater detail in Chapter 6, “Offensive Operations”;

 (6) Counter-recce, which is the identification, targeting, destruction and/or neutralization

of enemy recce assets; and

 (7) CBRN Recce and Survey, which is undertaken to obtain information to confirm or deny
the presence of CBRN hazards or attacks.

b. Surveillance. It involves the systemic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas,

places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic and other means.

c. Counter-reconnaissance. It is the identification, targeting, and destruction and/or neutralization

of enemy recce elements in order to deny the enemy the ability to collect friendly force and
terrain information. Counter- recce is a potential task during both offensive and defensive
operations. It is based upon the engagement criteria set out by the BG CO or formation
commander: what enemy could the recce force be expected to engage and with what level of
force. The degree to which the recce force has been augmented with combat elements will also
play a significant role in the BG CO’s or formation commander’s decision.

d. Population Engagement. It is the gathering of information from human sources, including

indigenous personnel, detainees and third party witnesses.

8. The fundamentals of recce are:

a. Recce assets are not kept in reserve.

b. Continuous recce should be maintained.

c. Orient activities towards the recce objective.

d. Information is to be reported quickly, accurately and completely.

e. Accurate communications are vital.

f. Freedom to manoeuvre must be maintained.

g. Gain and maintain contact with the enemy.

h. Develop the situation in and out of contact.

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i. Stealth is to be employed to avoid detection of information gathering activities.

j. Recce elements should avoid becoming decisively engaged.

9. Close and Medium Recce. There are two categories of recce that impact on operations at
the BG level:

a. Close Recce, which is the platform-neutral recce tasks primarily conducted by the infantry
recce platoon within the BG’s AOR; and

b. Medium Recce, which is the mounted recce tasks primarily conducted by the armoured recce
sqn within the BG’s or formation’s AOR.110

10. Because of their better battlefield mobility, medium recce elements exist to find a target, while close
recce, because of their more restricted mobility, exist to define the target. Delineation between the two
categories of recce is not neat, but can be clarified by three key factors:

a. Immediacy. The less time available, the greater the need will be for close recce assets.

b. Proximity. The closer the threat, the greater the need will be for close recce assets. Conversely,
the further away from the threat, the greater the need will be for medium recce assets.

c. Latency. Recce elements that are present but have not yet been activated are considered
latent. Achieving latency with recce elements is much more difficult with medium recce assets
than with close recce assets.

11. At the BG level, there are two dedicated recce elements available to the commander: the armoured
recce sqn and the infantry recce platoon. Chapters 4 and 5 of B-GL-394-002/FP-001 Ground Manoeuvre
Reconnaissance provides background detail on the two units including role and organization, capabilities,
limitations, characteristics and tasks.

12. Tactical Aviation in Recce Operations. The role of tactical aviation111 is to support land force
operations by providing aerial firepower, recce and mobility. Tactical aviation tasks in support of recce
operations can include:

a. conducting recce and tactical security missions;

b. directing and controlling fire;

c. providing fire support;

d. engaging and destroying enemy vehicles;

e. escorting convoys;

110. 
Note that the armoured recce squadron can also provide close recce when required.
111. 
Tactical aviation includes recce, utility, armed and attack helicopters.

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f. conducting recce-in-force;

g. providing combat airlift / tactical transport;

h. providing CSS transport; and

i. providing telecommunications support.

13. Employment of helicopters on recce tasks should be designed to take advantage of their speed
and mobility, terrain independence and long-range optical devices. Helicopters can either be employed
by themselves or grouped with a ground force: the latter is optimal if time and troops are available.
Chapter 9 of B-GL-394-002/FP-001 Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance provides more detail on the use
of tactical aviation in support of recce operations.

14. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Support of Recce Operations. The role of UAVs is to provide
target acquisition and combat information beyond the line of sight of supported ground forces, while
reducing the exposure of manned aircraft to enemy fire. UAVs have three key roles that will support recce
operations: surveillance, target acquisition and target engagement. B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Fire Support
in Land Operations has greater detail on planning for and using UAV support on operations.

15. Engineer Support to Recce Operations. Engineer support to recce operations comes in one of
two forms: either engineer recce112 in the form of engineer elements to support higher echelons with
detailed engineer technical information or in the form of engineer resources attached to support the
mobility of the recce forces particularly when obstacle bypass is not possible. Both roles—technical
engineer recce and mobility support—are highly specialized. At the BG level, the technical engineer
recce role would usually be fulfilled by an engineer detachment, usually of one vehicle, attached to the
armoured recce sqn to provide the specialized information/intelligence required in support of mobility and
counter-mobility tasks.

16. Typical engineer recce tasks include:

a. confirming the existence and nature of any obstacles;

b. confirming terrain information to include wait areas, hide locations, lateral routes and their
condition, as well as potential crossing sites;

c. selecting routes that require the least amount of preparation and maintenance; and

d. conducting explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR). EOR includes investigating, detecting,

marking locations, conducting initial investigations and reporting suspected explosive
ordnance (EO) by EOR agents in order to determine further action. Non-explosive ordnance
disposal trained personnel may undertake EOR, provided they have appropriate training.
EOD is not included in EOR.

112. 
The role of engineer recce is to provide the BG CO with timely, accurate and relevant information about the enemy, engineering activities and the terrain, by day and
night, in all weather and in all operations across the spectrum of conflict.

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17. The Recce Link to ISTAR Coordination. ISTAR is a subset of the overarching collection plan.
ISTAR integrates the intelligence function with the surveillance, recce, target acquisition and other
information-generating assets at the BG level, with the aim of improving the BG CO’s decision making.
Central to the ISTAR process is the intelligence collection plan,113 through which land recce elements can
expect to receive their tasks. The ISTAR process and the well-planned use of all available recce assets
are considered fundamental to gaining information superiority.

18. Levels of command at BG and below need to receive, process and disseminate information provided
by combat teams, observation posts, reconnaissance parties and weapon platforms and ensure its timely
distribution to those who need it, be that higher command, adjacent units or logistic resources. They must
respond rapidly and effectively to changes in the tactical situation imposed both from above and below.

SECURITY

19. Security tasks provide early and accurate warning of the enemy’s dispositions and operations.
Depending upon their mission and structure, security forces may provide an element of protection for
a main body force or gain time for preparing other deliberate operations.

20. Security tasks are normally conducted as part of a larger enabling operation or in support of another
type of tactical operation such as the defence. They are an essential element of all operations.

21. Security tasks are based on three missions—cover, guard and screen—defined as follows:114

a. Covering Force. The covering force operates apart from a main body for the purpose of
intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing and deceiving the enemy before they can attack
the covered force. Based upon the definition and the intent of deploying a covering force, the
force must consist of enough combat power to meet the BG CO’s intent. A covering force may
be required to fight a delay battle in support of a main defensive position. The fundamentals
of a covering force are:

 (1) The covering force, first and foremost, provides a BG CO with early warning and time to
react. Interaction through the exchange of information between the covering force and
the main body must be constant. The covering force makes sense of the chaos from early
enemy contact, seeks and maintains contact with the enemy and provides accurate and
early warning of enemy intentions and actions to the BG CO. To provide the BG CO
with reaction time, the covering force commander will take action within capability and
mission constraints.

 (2) The key to a successful covering force is continuous recce. Aggressive patrolling and
recce of key terrain allows the enemy to be sought out and contact made. Occupying
terrain is undertaken when necessary to protect the main body; otherwise, the focus
of the covering force is on the force or facility to be protected rather than on the ground
or enemy objective.

113. Information requirements are generated by the ICP. Note that tasking of units under the ICP is an operations staff function and not an intelligence function.
Hence, the detailed coordination and approval of ISTAR operations is usually led by the operations staff, working with the BG CO’s direction.
114. N
 ote that while recce elements will normally be tasked to fulfill these missions, augmented as necessary by other combat, CS and CSS elements, they are not
the only combat elements that can complete these missions. For example, on a stability operation, tanks could be employed within overwatch positions to provide
security of vulnerable lines of communication. UAVs and patrols can provide security of specific locations for extended periods.

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 (3) Maintaining contact with the enemy must be balanced with the need to avoid becoming
decisively engaged and losing freedom of manoeuvre. The covering force must retain
its ability to remain in front of the enemy and report on their actions.

b. Screen Force. The screen force is a security element whose primary task is to observe, identify
and report information. It only fights in self-defence. The fundamentals of a screen force are:

 (1) A screen force will normally consist of reconnaissance elements, usually supported
by indirect fire (including possibly tactical air) support controllers. It will be key to finding
the enemy for subsequent fixing and striking. A flank screen may also provide security for
a main body against a flanking or surprise attack. Essentially, a screen force operates
a series of OPs laterally across a screen line. The OPs must be established on ground
that provides good observation.

 (2) Normally, the screen will be established with little to no depth; although along high-speed
avenues of approach, the recce commander will likely establish in depth to allow
continuous contact while OPs along the initial screen line are withdrawn. The covering
force may be employed to conduct screening patrols between the OPs. Usually, a BG CO
will not place a time requirement on the screen force, but rather movement from screen
line to screen line will be event driven. Placing a time requirement must be balanced
against the possibility of the screen force becoming decisively engaged with the enemy,
something it will likely not be task-organized to do.

 (3) A screen can be either stationary or moving. A moving screen is typically established on
the flanks or rear of the BG, with the screen’s movement keyed to the movement of the
BG. Screen movement is either via alternate or successive bounds, or may be a continuous
march. A stationary screen is usually employed in front of a static force when the likelihood
of enemy contact is low, the expected enemy is small in number or the main body requires
little to no warning time to react effectively to enemy contact. In either case, a screen
is usually considered an economy-of-force mission based upon a BG CO’s risk
assessment. If a significant enemy force is expected or time and/or space is required to
provide the necessary degree of protection to the BG, the BG CO or formation commander
would be advised to use a guard force instead of a screen.

 (4) A screen can also be reinforced with combat elements, which would allow the conduct of
limited combat operations. Use of reinforced screens allows a BG CO to extend the depth
of the security zone, particularly when forward OPs are to be capable of making contact
with the enemy’s main body. Use of reinforced screens requires a careful assessment on
the part of the BG CO, as there is a balance in providing sufficient resources to the screen
without seriously depleting the main body force. The screen should be extracted prior to
the enemy overrunning it: otherwise, they should be given the resources to sustain
themselves for the duration of the battle. A reinforced screen is usually characterized by
aggressive patrolling, engaging and destroying enemy recce elements and engaging
enemy main body elements prior to extraction back to the main body.

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c. Guard Force. The guard force is a security element whose primary task is to protect the main
force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information. The fundamentals
of a guard force are:

 (1) Apart from gaining time for the commitment of the main body, the guard force, depending
upon the circumstances, may contribute to the attrition of an enemy, may conduct counter-
reconnaissance tasks or may fix an enemy element for striking by the main force.
Guard forces may also deploy to the flank of a main body to provide protection.

 (2) An advance guard, employed on offensive operations, is primarily used to allow the
uninterrupted advance of the main body. It will find and exploit gaps in the enemy’s
defensive network, ensure that the main body doesn’t run blindly into enemy opposition
and will either clear any enemy it meets along the way or will fix the enemy in place until
the main body can manoeuvre to strike.

 (3) A flank guard operates in much the same way as an advance guard. Its critical tasks
include providing continuous surveillance on potential enemy avenues of approach, and
early warning of an enemy attack. It will move via continuous movement, successive
bounds or alternate bounds. Movement speed and type are based upon main body
speed, likelihood of an enemy attack and the distance to the objective. The greater the
level of security desired by the BG CO, the slower the flank guard’s movement will be.

 (4) A rear guard protects the exposed rear of the BG main body on offensive, defensive and
enabling operations. The BG CO will typically establish the rear guard either by having
the guard relieve other troops in place or by having the rear guard establish itself and
then having the main body conduct a passage of lines through its position. The BG
CO will dictate the distance desired between the rear guard and the main body as well
as the method of displacement.

ADVANCE TO CONTACT

22. General. Advance to contact is an offensive operation designed to gain or re-establish contact with
the enemy. The advance to contact can be used as the traditional precursor to the attack or to create an
effect. For example, the effect could be to deter, block, fix, etc and is achieved by bringing forces into
direct fire range of the enemy.

23. The enhanced SA and effects-based operations of modern warfare should significantly curtail the
traditional advance to contact at BG level and above. Rather, with very good SA and usually as part of
a formation plan, BGs will advance towards an enemy that has been shaped for defeat. The BG moves
to a position from which it possesses a distinct advantage over the enemy, a concept known as either
“manoeuvre to strike” or simply “the advance.”

24. Fundamentals. In addition to the fundamentals of offensive operations—shock action, SA, depth,
balance, simplicity and reserves—the following fundamentals apply to the advance to contact:

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a. Maintenance of Momentum. An advancing force that employs quick aggressive actions

designed to bypass or attack the enemy creates momentum. Recce troops, including engineers,
operate well forward of the advancing force, identify enemy positions and obstacles and seek
out bypass routes to maintain the momentum of the main body. Integral and higher level ISTAR
is also an important part of maintaining momentum.

b. Control Vital Ground / Key Terrain. Vital ground and other key terrain should be seized and
held. These include dominating ground, bridges, defiles and built-up areas that serve as choke
points. The value of the ground is not simply determined in relation to the enemy’s defence,
but is also that which provides tactical advantage.

25. A BG CO must also consider:

a. Security, particularly flanks, bypassed enemy, civilians, any obstacles and the need for force
protection in the rear area; and

b. Balance. Time (deadline), space (boundaries and report lines) and the bypass policy will assist
the BG CO in balancing the momentum of the advance versus the requirement for subsequent
action like a hasty attack when dealing with an enemy’s position.

26. Organization. The BG CO will divide their force into five groupings that are organized to achieve
the effects shown in Figure 9-1. Once contact is made with the enemy, the tactical configuration changes
to the force’s best position for its subsequent task (eg, fix, block, attack). The groupings are:

a. Covering Force.115 The covering force grouping is tasked with finding the enemy and other
information that will support fix and strike. It is tasked with screening the BG advance. Typically,
this is accomplished by conducting a route recce forward of the advance guard. The covering
force is normally commanded by the BG HQ but may be placed OPCON of the leading subunits
when the BG is advancing on two or more axes. In either case, regrouping may become
necessary once contact is made. The covering force is usually based around the BG recce
troop/platoon and usually includes a FOO and/or fire controller (FC), an engineer recce party
and possibly long-range direct fire elements.

b. Advance Guard. The advance guard is usually formed around one or more manoeuvre
subunits (tank squadron or infantry company—terrain usually being the determining factor)
with mid- to long-range direct fire elements, plus support from FOO and/or FC and (recce and
combat) engineer elements. Typically, the advance guard will travel close enough behind the
recce element, but not so close that they interfere with the recce element’s advance. Their role
is to maintain the momentum of the advance by reacting quickly to any contact made by the
recce element.

c. Main Body. The main body includes the BG HQ, any uncommitted subunits, support
weapons, support arms and the A1 echelon. The main body normally moves dispersed between
waiting areas that have been previously cleared by recce or the lead subunits. Depending
on the mission, the main body will react to what the covering force finds and fixes. Often this

115. 
Previous versions of BG in Operations have referred to the covering force as the reconnaissance element. The change more correctly reflects the covering force battle
as being a combined arms (or all-arms) responsibility, rather than solely that of a single arm (ie, recce).

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will involve the swift destruction of an enemy force or installation. The threat of such an action
may be enough to bring about the enemy’s defeat. The main body will normally be made up of
the bulk of the BG’s combat power.

d. Protective (Guard) Elements. The BG CO may deploy security elements to the flanks and/or
rear, as the operational situation requires. Protective elements—flank and rear guards—are
usually based upon a reinforced recce platoon/troop116 or, in the case of close country, infantry.
They will move tactically and are tasked with providing early warning of possible enemy contact.
Their activities and movement are coordinated with the advance guard and main body through
the BG HQ.

e. Reserve. A reserve should be retained, wherever possible, in order to react to unforeseen

events. The reserve should also be able to provide an element of security to the rear of the BG
as it advances. The size of the reserve will depend upon direction from the higher commander.
For example, the brigade commander may specify that the BG is to maintain a reserve of a
combat team size for a specific phase of the operation and then allow that reserve to be
reduced for follow-on phases. If unspecified, the BG CO will determine the size of the reserve
based upon the estimate, mission and tasks.

FIND
Covering Force
Advance Guard

FIX
STRIKE

GUARD GUARD

STRIKE

SUSTAIN

Main Body

RESERVE

Figure 9-1: Likely Effects to be Achieved in the Advance to Contact117

116. 
Reinforcements may include a FOO/FC and possible long-range DFS elements or tanks.
117. 
Distances between elements are dependant upon threat and the terrain.

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27. Planning. The key element in planning the advance will be the mission. The higher commander’s
intent, the unifying purpose and the required end state will all set the scene for what type of advance
should take place. The BG CO must be clear as to whether the security of the main body or maintaining
the speed of the advance is paramount. The BG CO’s information requirements for planning the
advance are:

a. Ground, to include possible axis or axes for the advance,118 features that dominate those axes
and may be used by the enemy to impede the advance, defiles and obstacles that must either
be crossed or avoided, covered routes available to the advancing force as well as routes and
hides available for the rear elements.

b. Enemy, to include an analysis of the enemy’s strength, intentions, air capability, known and
suspected positions as well as their state of preparedness. This analysis, coupled with a ground
analysis, will allow the BG CO to decide on the amount of security required, the speed of the
advance, whether there can and should be an advance on more than one axis and possible
tasks that will be required to maintain the advance, including the need to recce alternate routes,
bridges and/or gaps.

c. Environment, to include weather, the local population (including any significant refugee
movement in the area) and sensitive areas like religious sites or places of historic interest that
need to be avoided.

28. Prior to and throughout the advance, the BG CO will be constantly factoring and re-evaluating the
time, space and resources available to complete the mission. In particular, sustainment demands for a
long advance can quickly become significant and need to be planned for as the advance continues. If the
force comes into contact for protracted periods, ammunition resupply may quickly become a critical
planning factor.

29. Frontage is another planning factor. The task, security, required momentum, number of routes
available and BG boundaries will dictate the advance and its frontage. An advance on one route may
allow for greater speed, concentration of force and reduce security requirements, but it can also allow the
enemy to concentrate and possibly impose greater delay. Advancing on two or more axes will force the
enemy into greater dispersion, but may require a more restrictive bypass policy to avoid having bypassed
enemy moving freely and interfering with the cohesion of the operation.

30. A bypass policy needs to consider to what extent bypassed enemy will be able to interfere with the
operation. It should be as liberal as possible, leaving bypassed enemy to be destroyed by the troops in
depth or other units. Key considerations are:

a. Precise information on the location and size of bypassed enemy must be passed to all concerned.

b. The bypassed enemy must be kept under observation.

c. The bypassed enemy must not be able to seriously interfere with follow-on elements. This may
necessitate stationing a security element to ensure no interference takes place.

118. 
Information on all possible axes is perhaps one of the key information requirements for a commander. This allows a commander to provide the covering force with
a broad axis of advance with multiple possible axes, allowing the force to develop specific axis as the battle unfolds. This allows the covering force to exploit success
on alternate axes and thus maintain the imitative.

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31. Command and Control. The BG CO will normally find that command of the advance is easier
done from a tactical HQ which should be far enough forward to be able to read the situation and influence
it, but far enough back to allow the covering force time and space to work. The BG main HQ must control
the advance allowing the BG CO to command. It must anticipate the requirements of the advancing force,
coordinate resources, plan contingencies and regularly initiate situation reports (SITREPs), both down
to subunits and up to brigade HQ.

32. During the advance, well-practised BG drills must be executed quickly. Such drills will include the
fixing force taking over from the finding force, obstacle crossing procedures, quick attacks and possibly
reaction to a meeting engagement. The BG HQ must be in a position where it can best contribute to the
command and control of the advance without jeopardizing its own security.

33. Achieving tempo in the advance while maintaining balance will contribute to the success of the
mission. The following will affect tempo: inability to find the enemy, loss of engineer assets to facilitate
obstacle crossings, loss of communications and the requirement to replenish with fuel and ammunition
(if not anticipated).

34. Fire Support. Fire support resources are critical to the advance to contact.

35. Mobility and Counter-mobility. The primary role of engineers in the advance to contact is
mobility support to the BG. This will involve the use of engineer reconnaissance alongside BG
reconnaissance in the covering force and with the advance guard to identify, as early as possible,
obstacles (both natural and enemy emplaced) and to confirm cross-country going and routes forward for
the BG. Close support engineers will deploy well forward to ensure that they can conduct mobility tasks
(ditch, stream, minor river crossings; obstacle breaches; and route opening, improvement
and maintenance) in a timely manner in order to maintain the momentum of advance. Obstacle crossing
and breaching operations are considered in detail in Chapter 4, Annex B, Appendix 2, “Mobility and
Counter-mobility.”

36. Engineers will need to be prepared to create rapid flank protection obstacles. The use of combined
arms obstacle integration (CAOI) obstacle belts and groups combined with the preplanning of possible
obstacles along the flanks (to ensure a rapid response) will allow the delegation of emplacement authority
to the appropriate level. Belts, groups and pre-planned obstacles should be in areas identified by the IPB
process and be confirmed or amended by the covering force.

37. Combat Service Support. CSS in the advance to contact must be able to react quickly to
changing circumstances and changing plans whenever they occur. The time and distance factors involved
in the movement of combat supplies will directly affect CSS elements’ ability to sustain the advance. For
example, if a BG’s fuel tankers require half a day to travel to a point where they can be refilled, that unit
can only refill its combat vehicles once a day using its organic vehicles. The CSS main effort should
support those involved in combat both during and after the advance. This might include providing
ammunition, fuel and medical support including the development of a casualty evacuation plan. It should
also support the maximum availability of equipment and include planning for the recovery of the battle
winning equipments. During the advance, the A1 echelon may have to be split, in order to facilitate
resupply, as close as a tactical bound behind F echelon.

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38. Action on Contact. Upon contact, the covering force should:

a. determine and report the strength and disposition of the enemy, plus the location and nature
of any obstacles;

b. call for direct and indirect fires as appropriate;

c. manoeuvre to locate the enemy’s flanks, any gaps in their position or obstacles that allow their
position to be bypassed or taken from the flank or rear; and

d. picket or bypass the contact if the enemy contact is not within the capabilities of the covering force.

39. Elements of the advance guard may be committed to assist the covering force in fixing and striking
the enemy or may be committed separately to deal with any bypassed or picketed pockets of resistance.
In either case, any elements of the covering force tasked with containing such pockets should be relieved
by the advance guard as soon as possible to allow them to rejoin the advance and avoid dissipating the
strength of the covering force.

40. The BG CO monitors the progress of the leading and engaged combat elements and commits
forces from the main body as required to deal with resistance and maintain momentum.

41. Transition. The advance to contact is over when either the intended posture is achieved or when
enemy action requires the deployment and the coordinated effort of the main body.

42. Figure 9-2 shows the formation for advance to contact when the BG is in the advance guard.
Figure 9-3 provides examples of infantry- and armour-heavy BGs employed in the advance guard.

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Flank Guard

Covering Main Body

Force
Advance Guard

Rear
Guard

Vanguard Main Guard

Flank Guard

Figure 9-2: Formation Advance to Contact – BG in the Advance Guard119

119. Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.

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INFANTRY BATTLE GROUP ARMOUR BATTLE GROUP

Reconnaissance

FOO/MFC FOO/MFC

HQ

FOO/
MFC

MORTAR
Vanguard
FOO/
MFC

Protective Elements
(On Flanks)

HQ

Main Body

A1 A1

Protective Elements

Figure 9-3: Examples of Infantry-Heavy and Armour-Heavy Battle Groups Employed in the Advance Guard120

120. Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.

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TACTICAL MOVEMENT

43. General. Moving troops and their equipment across the battlefield is an inherent part of all military
operations. For combat operations, troop movement is the mechanism by which BG COs position their
forces to conduct manoeuvre and exploit operational success.121 Rapid and orderly movement of a BG’s
troops and equipment (to allow the concentration of combat power at decisive points and time) underlies
the ability to achieve any sort of battlefield agility. Equally critical is ensuring that the associated logistical
support required for operational success is quickly and effectively moved within the BG’s battlespace.

44. Fundamentals of Tactical Movement. There are three fundamentals of tactical movement:

a. Protection. A force employing tactical movement needs to protect itself to preserve its combat
power in order to apply it at the decisive place and time. The size and composition of the
protection element will vary based upon the enemy threat, the operational situation and the
degree of risk the BG CO is willing to accept.

b. March Discipline. March discipline is not simply maintaining spacing and timings of packets,
but also includes ensuring that correct routes and control measures are followed. At the same
time, a movement order must include sufficient flexibility to allow a force on the move to deal
with enemy encounters, disabled vehicles and mobility issues related to routes.

c. Multiple Routes. The use of multiple routes allows a BG CO to quickly move the force, thus
reducing the length of columns, decreasing vulnerability to air attack and reducing the amount
of time that movement routes are not available to other units. Multiple routes also allow the
BG CO to deal with unexpected situations and to concentrate combat power more quickly.
See Figure 9-4 for an example of an advance to contact using multiple routes.

121. Movement is the activity involved in the change in location of personnel, equipment or stocks as part of a military operation. It differs from mobility, which is a quality
or capability of military forces that permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (Source: Defence Terminology
Bank, record 3114.) The enemy, terrain and weather are the key factors that influence mobility.

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SECONDARY ROUTE MAIN ROUTE

Recce Recce

A B

Lateral Route

Recce Recce
PNR MOR
TAC

Anti–Armour Anti–Armour
C

Lateral Route

Main

A1 ECH

Figure 9-4: Example of an Advance to Contact Using Multiple Routes122

45. Types of Movement. Moving troops about the battlefield can take place by any number of means:
by foot, motor vehicle, air, rail, water and various combinations thereof.123 All movement within a combat
zone is considered tactical movement. This includes movement carried out by CSS units and other higher
formation logistics traffic.

46. There are three types of movement:

a. Tactical Movement. Conducted via packet-based convoys, the tactical move is made by day
or night with an expectation of enemy contact. Note that tactical logistic moves within a combat
zone are considered tactical movement and are planned based upon a threat assessment. It is
carried out by CSS units on controlled routes that, ideally, are free from use by combat
formations and units.

b. Administrative Movement.124 An administrative move is aimed at optimizing transport

to deliver tonnage quickly and efficiently and is utilized when no enemy interference, except
by air, is anticipated. It also can be conducted by day or by night.

c. Independent Traffic. This is the movement of individual vehicles of small columns that are
not part of a scheduled move. Within the combat zone, all impendent traffic is considered
tactical movement.

122. Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.
123. 
The following joint manuals provide detail on the specific types of movement modes: B-GJ-005-404/FP-010 Movement Support Sea; B-GJ-005-404/FP-020
Movement Support Rail; B-GJ-005-404/FP-030 Movement Support Road; and B-GJ-005-404/FP-040 Movement Support Air.
124. 
Note that tactical logistics moves differ from supply moves. Supply moves are generally considered those logistics moves that take place within the theatre
communications zone, vice the combat zone.

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47. Forms of Tactical Movement. Terrain, visibility, the threat and the mission will determine the
form that the BG CO will dictate for all tactical movement. Note that all elements within the BG will adapt
their own combat formation consistent with their own situation. For example, a BG CO may move the BG
overall within column formation, while those BG elements tasked with security may be moving in echelon
left or right to deal with potential enemy contact.

48. The basic combat formations are:125

a. Column. Column is the most commonly used formation. All vehicles and/or personnel move on
a single route or avenue of approach. This formation provides good speed, control and flexibility;
it, however, has limited flank protection and masks direct fires to the front. It also permits rapid
transition into other combat formations. Usually used when enemy contact is not expected and
speed is desired, column requires the BG CO to always be prepared to take immediate action if the
enemy attacks. Figure 9-5 illustrates the column formation with security forward on both flanks.

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 9-5: Column Formation with Security Forward and on both Flanks126

b. Line. This formation, shown in Figure 9-6, provides most of the BG’s combat power forward,
but minimal to the flanks for the rear elements. It is difficult to control and is less secure
than other formations as it lacks depth. It is also the most difficult from which to transition
to other formations.

125. 
All symbols are in accordance with TAM 105 (Military Symbols) of B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for Land Operations.
126. 
Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.

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Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 9-6: Line Formation with Security Forward127

c. Echelon Left or Right. The echelon formation provides firepower forward and to one flank.
It is a useful formation in open areas for control but provides minimal security to the opposite
flank of the echeloning force. It is difficult to control, particularly in restrictive terrain, but does
allow for quick transition in the direction of the echelon. Figure 9-7 illustrates an echelon right
formation with security forward.

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 9-7: Echelon Right Formation with Security Forward128

127. 
Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.
128. 
Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.

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d. Box. This formation, shown in Figure 9-8, provides all-round protection to the force and is
mostly used in open areas. It is difficult to control and disperses the BG’s combat power
throughout the formation rather than providing concentration.

Represents a
combined arms
grouping

Figure 9-8: Box Formation with Security Forward129

e. Wedge. This formation, shown in Figure 9-9, provides the majority of the combat power forward,
while providing security to both flanks of the echeloning force. It is used when the enemy
situation is undetermined or contact is possible.

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 9-9: Wedge Formation with Security Forward130

129. 
Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.
130. Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.

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f. “V.” More difficult to control than the wedge, the “V” formation is also used when enemy contact
is expected. It provides more firepower forward while still having good firepower to the flanks
of the BG. It allows for rapid deployment into other formations and provides flexibility when
contact with the enemy is made. Figure 9-10 illustrates the “V” formation with security forward.

Represents a combined arms grouping

Figure 9-10: V Formation with Security Forward131

49. Planning Tactical Movement. The major tool for controlling tactical movement is the movement
order. B-GJ-005-404/FP-030 Movement Support Road provides planning guidance for tactical movement,
including preparation of the movement order.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT

50. General. The meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely
deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place.132 The activity is characterized by:

a. a lack of information and time;

b. chaos and confusion; and

c. low-level skirmishes that are not part of the coordinated BG response.

131. Distances between elements are dependent upon threat and the terrain.
132. The meeting engagement differs from the advance to contact in that contact with the enemy occurs unexpectedly.

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51. Accordingly, the key to success in a meeting engagement is anticipation on the part of the BG CO.
While a BG CO should make no firm plans, the IPB process should be used to gain an understanding of
the terrain (to deduce areas that are favourable to a meeting engagement); whenever possible, close
recce assets should be used to confirm deductions. Additionally, the BG CO should take particular note
of the latest situation or intelligence reports and assessments and should concentrate on likely enemy
capabilities, objectives and avenues of advance, movement and natural obstacles.

52. This in turn will allow the reaction of the BG to be sped up as a whole through the effective use of
manoeuvre and the use of well-rehearsed BG drills. A successful BG is trained and poised to find, fix and
strike, even when dealing with initial surprise. One final note: during the actual engagement, the BG CO
must be careful not to discard information flowing in from ISTAR assets which does not fit with what
is expected.

53. Planning. Although it will not be possible to plan in detail for this kind of operation, a BG that is
properly deployed in accordance with recognized tactical principles will be poised to react to most
situations. Meeting engagements will invariably force a BG CO to reconsider and then adjust the plan.
The basic principle is to seize and retain the initiative. The BG CO who realizes that they are faced with
a meeting engagement and begins to react before the enemy reaches the same conclusion will achieve
the initiative. This will give the BG CO the freedom of action needed, either to accomplish the mission as
originally intended, or to change the plan to suit the new situation. High tempo is at a premium; success
depends to a large extent on the speed of reaction of the BG CO and their force. The BG CO can then
decide how to develop the meeting engagement into one of the operations of war (offence or defence).
In deciding upon a course of action, though, a BG CO must notify the superior commander as soon
as possible and not lose sight of the original mission and the superior commander’s intent.

54. Battle procedure needs to be efficient and focused. Assuming a reasonable balance of forces,
victory will go to the side with the higher tempo. In the planning stage this implies careful reconnaissance,
mission orders, balanced grouping, forward command and responsive indirect firepower on call. Forward
planning in this type of battle should never be so detailed as to lead a BG CO into a preconceived course
of action; it is not a substitute for the intuitive and bold leadership that overturns material superiority. Well-
practised drills, which should be second nature, will assist the BG. Drills—such as hasty (but effective)
blocks, quick attacks and fast manoeuvre coordinated with decisive use of CS arms (including air and
aviation)—will allow the BG CO freedom of action.

55. Conduct. To permit seizing the initiative, the BG CO must be provided with accurate, clear SITREPs
to allow the making of an informed assessment of the situation. BG staff must rapidly process initial
contacts from lower commanders into an early assessment of the enemy picture. BG staff also need to
provide the BG CO with an accurate BLUE SITREP, so that the BG CO has a clear picture of the location
and status of all BG elements.

56. Security—flank and rear—should become the concern of both the BG CO and their subordinate
commanders. To avoid being surprised (a common aspect of a meeting engagement), BG CO must
ensure they have 360 degrees of security as they manoeuvre. Commanders at all levels should not
become so focussed on the perceived direction of the threat that they neglect their flanks and rear.

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57. Once the BG CO has decided that the BG is in a meeting engagement, they should decide upon
an option:

a. Attack. If the BG is able to fix the enemy force, an uncommitted manoeuvre element, like an
armoured squadron, can then be employed to strike. Often this will involve the striking force
launching into the enemy’s depth to unhinge their position. In any case, this attack should be
supported by all available fires, including aviation.

b. Defend. The BG CO may decide that there is insufficient information on the enemy and their
intent. In this circumstance, it may be appropriate to allow the friendly force that has made the
initial contact, to go firm and establish a block in order to allow time to identify the enemy’s
centre of gravity133.

c. Withdraw. The BG CO may decide that the enemy force outnumbers own forces and that
continued engagement with it would only result in the unacceptable loss of combat power. In
such a situation, it may be beneficial to break clean from contact, using CS and other significant
combat power, in order to withdraw to a position offering better advantage. Preservation of
BG’s combat power may be as important to achieving the original mission as defeating the
enemy in the short term. A quick assessment and liaison with the superior commander will
confirm this.

58. CSS. CSS in a meeting engagement must be able to react quickly to changing circumstances and
changing plans whenever they occur. At the level above that which is in contact, CSS should concentrate
on directing its efforts on those involved in combat both during and after the battle. This might include
providing ammunition, fuel and medical support including the development of the casualty evacuation
plan. The CSS plan should also include maximum availability of equipment and planning for the recovery
of major battle-winning equipment.

LINK-UP

59. General. Link-up tasks are generally offensive in nature. They are conducted to join two friendly
forces in enemy controlled territory. It may, therefore, be necessary to destroy the enemy between these
forces before a link-up can be established. Both forces may be moving towards one another, or one may
be stationary or encircled. They may have the same or differing missions. Link-up tasks may, therefore,
encompass a number of tactical activities, including advance to contact, attack or relief in place to achieve
the desired end state.

60. It would be unusual to conduct link-up tasks at the BG level (ie, subunit linking up with subunit). It is
more likely that a BG will link-up with another BG within the context of formation level operations. It is in
this framework that link-up tasks are described in this section. Link-up tasks are most often conducted to:

a. Complete the encirclement of an enemy force.

b. Assist the breakout of an encircled friendly force.

133. 
Centre of gravity is those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action,
physical strength or will to fight. (Source: Defence Terminology Bank, record 324.) In this instance, the BG CO would most likely be seeking to define the location
of the bulk of the enemy’s combat power, which would be their centre of gravity in a meeting engagement. See Section 609, of B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations
for more detail on centre of gravity.

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c. Join an attacking force with a force inserted in the enemy rear such as an air assault, airmobile,
airborne or infiltration force.

61. Link-up tasks require much more control than normally expected. The major concerns are security
in transit and the possibility of fratricide. The key factors affecting both are position control, good SA and
the ability to quickly change direction.

62. Planning. Planning for a link-up task begins with the development of SA between the two forces
involved in the link-up. Both must have a common SA to include the enemy and nature of the ground
between the two forces. ISTAR assets will need to be deployed to assist in SA development and will
largely be focussed on finding and fixing any counter-attack threat as the BG will be at its most vulnerable
during the link-up.

63. All parties involved must be fully aware of the command relationships between the forces linking up
and the responsibilities of all forces during the actual task. The two elements should be placed under the
same commander throughout the operation.

64. Communications planning should ensure that the BGs are operating with the same communications
electronic operating instructions (CEOIs), normally the unit or formation that is not in contact will be
directed to change. Liaison teams are particularly valuable, and if time and conditions allow, BG COs
should meet with their liaison teams to provide a face-to-face briefing on the upcoming operation. Radio
and/or electronic contact between the two forces should be continuous throughout. Information exchanged
should include enemy and friendly SITREPs, locations and types of obstacles, the CS support plan, AD
measures and combat identification procedures.

65. The moving force or forces may create a vulnerable flank. It is imperative that tight security is
maintained through the use of covering forces. The rate of movement and frontage may depend on the
amount of security required. At the point of link-up there is likely to be a large concentration of forces,
which will be known to the enemy particularly if the in-place force is in contact. Integration of AD assets
must be included to mitigate the threat from air and aviation.

66. All elements in a link-up must carefully coordinate to minimize the risk of fratricide. This coordination
continues throughout and increases as the units approach the link-up points. Control measures134 used
are as follows:

a. Zones of Attack or Axes of Advance. If one or more of the forces are moving, the higher
headquarters controls their direction and objective.

b. Report Lines. A higher headquarters, through the use of report lines, controls movement.

c. Restrictive Fire Lines (RFLs). RFLs are used to prevent friendly forces from engaging one
another with indirect fires. One technique is to make the report lines on-order RFLs.

d. Fire Support Safety Line (FSSL). FSSLs are used in link-up operations to allow converging
forces to engage targets outside the areas of both units.

134. Refer to Figure 4-1: Control Measures and Figure 6-10: Attack Control Measures

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e. Checkpoints. Checkpoints are used to control movement and designate overwatch positions.

f. Link-up and Alternate Link-up Points.135 The link-up point is a designated location where two
forces meet and coordinate operations. The point must be easily identifiable on the ground,
and combat identification (ID) procedures must be planned. Alternative link-up points are
established in the event that enemy action precludes link-up at the primary point.

67. Key points regarding fire support coordination are:

a. Systems must be in place for battle tracking and for disseminating information to the in-place force.

b. fire support coordination measures and combat ID procedures must be disseminated to the
lowest level.

c. Plan fire predominantly short of the RFL.

d. Clear all pre-planned/on call fire beyond the RFL through the controlling HQs.

e. Ensure use of smoke/illumination does not impede friendly operations.

f. Plan to mass fire at the link-up point.

68. Subsequent missions should be coordinated before the link-up task and modified, if necessary,
when the link-up occurs. The two commanders should collocate near the link-up point, or at a prearranged
location, to confirm or coordinate their subsequent operations.

69. Relief of an encircled BG that has been encircled for a period of time may require the relieving BG
to provide CSS. It is possible that the static/encircled force will have taken casualties that it has been
unable to evacuate. Integration of formation level assets may be required.

70. Types of Link-up. There are two basic forms of link-up:

a. Moving Force with a Stationary Force. Speed is essential to reduce the possibility of enemy
reaction and minimize vulnerability to attack. Ground link-up points should be established at
locations where the axis of advance of the moving force intersects the security elements of the
stationary force. RFLs are required to avoid fratricide. Moving forces may be involved in
deliberate attacks or manoeuvre. If the stationary force is encircled, it should attempt to breakout
or take some other diversionary action to ease the task of the relieving force. Once link-up has
been made, the moving force may join the stationary force or pass through or around to continue
to attack the enemy. Subsequent missions must be launched as quickly as possible to exploit
the success of the link-up. Link-up with air delivered or an infiltrated force is normally followed
by a passage of lines or relief of the forces involved. Figure 9-11 illustrates the link-up of
a moving force with a stationary force.

135. 
Link-up points are also known as coordination points or contact points. See B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Land Operations,
SOP 302-1.

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EARLY STAGE LAST STAGE

NFA
RFL
1 1
Initial RV
Stationary BG Stationary BG
Link up BG 4 Link up BG
2 2

ALT ALT
3 3

Link up
Points
RFL
NFA
NFA
FSCL

Figure 9-11: Link-up of a Moving Force with a Stationary Force

b. Two Moving Forces. This is a difficult task normally undertaken to complete the encirclement
of an enemy force and is illustrated in Figure 9-12. Primary and alternate link-up points are
established on boundaries where forces are expected to converge. The reconnaissance
elements of each force should seek contact as soon as possible. As the forces move closer, the
need for positive control becomes important to avoid fratricide and to ensure that the enemy
does not escape between the two forces. The leading elements of each force should monitor
a common radio net.

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3
2
1

OBJ BRASS

RFL

S S

Figure 9-12: Link-up of Two Moving Forces

71. Conduct of the Double Envelopment. There are two examples of the double envelopment:

a. In the first example, two subunits are advancing on separate axes to encircle an enemy force by
linking-up to the rear of that force. The BG has coordinated their actions, has maintained radio
communications and has exchanged liaison officers. The control measures are known to all.

b. A second example is to have the two subunits proceed as in a normal attack with the coordination
of the two attacks accomplished by BG HQ. Each subunit monitors the progress of the other.
The BG CO is directing the fight forward. As the subunits cross the RFL and come into direct
fire range of one another, both subunits display recognition signs and the two commanders
establish direct communications.

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72. The intent of the BG CO is to encircle and reduce the enemy force. Therefore, the forces move into
position after link-up and prevent the enemy from breaking out of the encirclement. The BG CO should
also ensure that the BG is secure from enemy forces attempting to link-up with the encircled force.

73. Link-up with an Encircled Force. In the link-up with an encircled force, the FSCL and RFL will
move as the operation progresses. Ideally, ground and air attacks will be planned to happen simultaneously.
As with the double encirclement, each BG will monitor the progress of the other. As the BG nears the
link-up point, direct and indirect fires will become more tightly controlled to preclude fratricide incidents.
Upon achieving link-up, the forward HQs of both forces will begin coordination for subsequent operations.

WITHDRAWAL

74. General. A withdrawal is the disengagement by a force from the enemy at a time chosen by the
BG CO. Withdrawals are conducted for a number of reasons:

a. To disengage, as the aim of the operation has been achieved.

b. To disengage, as the continuation of the operation offers no prospect of success.

c. To draw the enemy into an unfavourable situation.

d. To conform to the movement of adjacent friendly forces.

e. To allow the use of the force elsewhere.

f. To disengage for sustainment reasons.

75. The withdrawal is different from both the delay (which seeks to inflict damage on the enemy or buy
space and time) and the retirement (which is considered administrative in nature and considers enemy
contact as highly unlikely).

76. A withdrawal is planned to minimize adversarial interference, to allow for the preservation of fighting
power and with the aim of retaining freedom of action, to allow for the rapid transition to either offensive
or defensive operations. Usually, a BG CO will seek to disengage the force from the enemy and break
clean. However, there may be a requirement to maintain contact with the enemy, which may be maintained
through other means like indirect fire or recce (including surveillance). Success in a withdrawal operation
depends upon tight control, security and maintenance of morale. A BG CO will not normally withdraw
without the agreement or direction of the superior commander.

77. A withdrawal will take place when the BG is either in or out of contact with the enemy. The preferred
method is to withdraw out of contact: this allows a BG CO to take the decision as to when to begin the
operation. It also strives to make best use of secrecy and deception to reduce the enemy’s ability to interfere
with the operation. It is more likely that the BG will be forced to withdraw in contact, with an enemy enjoying
air and ground superiority. This is probably the most difficult operation to effect and requires very strong
leadership and a high degree of control to ensure the operation does not turn into a rout.

78. In either case, BG COs should seek to make maximum use of ground, periods of reduced visibility
including darkness as well as deception and secrecy as much as possible. The BG CO’s intent is
to ensure a clean break.

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79. Types of Withdrawal. A BG will conduct either a hasty or a deliberate withdrawal. Hasty
withdrawals are conducted when defending BGs are forced to abandon their positions without adequate
warning. A deliberate withdrawal is planned and coordinated in detail.

80. Principles. The following principles are stressed regarding a withdrawal:

a. Security. It is difficult to prevent an enemy from anticipating a withdrawal, particularly after

unsuccessful action. The best use should be made of recce (including surveillance), deception
and protective measures (such as cover and concealment) to help hide preparations for
a withdrawal from the enemy.

b. Surprise. Difficult to achieve, surprise is necessary for a successful withdrawal and is largely
achieved through speed and deception. Normal activities are maintained to give the appearance
of no change. Limited offensive activities can be used to cover the operation and catch the
enemy off guard. A withdrawal in poor weather or during periods of poor visibility may also help
to achieve surprise.

c. Maintenance of Morale. Perhaps the most important principle, a withdrawal can place a major
strain on morale. At the earliest possible time and when/if the situation permits, troops should
be briefed on the operations, emphasizing the positive aspects. Commanders at all levels need
to remain forward with their troops and maintain positive control. Rumours must be squashed
and opportunities for offensive action, even if limited, should be seized. The provision of
adequate combat supplies and the prompt evacuation of casualties do much to instil and
maintain morale.

81. Organization of Withdrawing Force. A withdrawing force is typically organized into three parts:

a. Covering Force. The covering force fights delaying actions in front of the main body, allowing
the main body to move and establish itself on a new defensive position.

b. Main Body. The main body may either occupy a series of intermediate positions en route back
to the main defensive position or may move directly to the new main defensive area.

c. Reserve. The reserve will normally move with the main body. The reserve is normally organized
to be prepared to conduct limited offensive activities (such as localized counter-attacks to repel
or disrupt enemy penetrations between BPs, reinforce threatened areas, protect withdrawal
routes or extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces). The reserve is generally difficult
to constitute but is essential if a BG CO is to maintain freedom of manoeuvre.

82. Stages of the Withdrawal. The four overlapping stages of a withdrawal are:

a. Thinning Out Stage. Thinning out is the early evacuation of non-essential elements of the
force, particularly the wounded, and the backloading of vehicles, equipment and supplies not
immediately required in the forward area.

b. Preparation Stage. Preparations include developing intermediate positions, redeploying

artillery, developing obstacles, firing demolitions and implementing deception measures.

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c. Disengagement and Withdrawal Stage. This stage sees the commencement of disengaging
and withdrawing.

d. Security Stage. Protective and delaying actions are conducted by the covering force and
security elements. Said actions may include ambushes; counter-ambushes may be employed
to slow the enemy, cause attrition or assist in the extrication of friendly forces in contact.

83. A withdrawal may see these four stages cycle over, if intermediate positions are used by the
withdrawing force.

84. Formation Commander’s Direction. Normally a BG CO will not conduct a unilateral withdrawal
unless authorized to do so by the formation commander. In some cases, a formation commander may
order a BG CO to withdraw and provide a detailed operation order. In other cases, particularly in
unfavourable circumstances, the formation commander may provide only the authority to withdraw and
minimum direction. The withdrawal process starts with the receipt of the formation commander’s direction
to the BG CO, to include:

a. the time before which there will be no rearward movement, except for recce parties and normal
administrative traffic;

b. the time up to which the position must be denied to the enemy. This is the main coordinating
time of the withdrawal plan;

c. additionally, the formation commander may order some or all of the following timings:

 (1) when thinning out begins;

 (2) when the position is finally abandoned;

 (3) when all troops are to be clear of a line that is behind the position to be abandoned,
allowing supporting artillery and aircraft to engage enemy beyond this line;

 (4) when the BGs are to be ready to fight in their new positions;

d. covering force tasks and intermediate positions;

e. the BG’s withdrawal routes;

f. intermediate positions and areas that BGs are to occupy once they have withdrawn;

g. the length of time the enemy must be delayed at each intermediate position;

h. locations and tasks of friendly forces providing flank guards, rear guards and demolition guards;

i. route denial tasks and control;

j. formation support allotted to BGs;

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k. control measures such as phase lines, report lines, routes, boundaries, FSCLs and
traffic control;

l. security and deception measures;

m. coordination measures for the rearward passage of lines; and

n. the policy for the destruction of equipment and combat supplies.

85. In a withdrawal, BGs:

a. defend the position until permitted to vacate it;

b. abandon the position and make a clean break from the enemy;

c. prepare to conduct a fighting withdrawal; and

d. concurrently with the above, reconnoitre and begin preparation for their next task.

86. To achieve these tasks, security and surprise are emphasized in both planning and execution.
For this reason, the deliberate withdrawal normally takes place at night despite the increased difficulties
of control, unless the formation’s plan, time limitations on the BG’s next task or the enemy’s night capability
dictate a daylight withdrawal.

87. Planning for a Withdrawal by Day. This is difficult because it may be conducted under enemy
observation and fire. Navigation and control is easier by day, but a clean break is difficult to achieve.
The sequence for a withdrawal by day is as follows:

a. recce parties deploy to intermediate or new positions;

b. non-essential elements are thinned out;

c. a covering force is established;

d. patrols are withdrawn;

e. forward troops in contact are withdrawn; and

f. troops in depth are withdrawn through the covering force.

88. Planning for a Night Withdrawal. A clean break is easier to achieve by night or in conditions of
reduced visibility because it is difficult for the enemy to detect the movement and bring effective fire to
bear. If normal activity continues on the position until the last possible moment, the chance of achieving
a clean break is greater although navigation, control and surveillance are more difficult. Daylight recce
and strict noise and light discipline are required. The sequence for a withdrawal at night or in conditions
of reduced visibility is as follows:

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a. recce parties deploy to intermediate or new positions;

b. non-essential elements are thinned out;

c. a covering force is established;

d. troops in depth are withdrawn;

e. patrols are withdrawn; and

f. forward troops in contact are withdrawn through the covering force.

89. Withdrawal Plan. Whether the withdrawal is conducted by day or at night, the BG CO incorporates
the formation commander’s direction and the stages of the withdrawal into the detailed planning. The
overall plan is simple, avoiding complicated manoeuvre and regrouping, and sufficiently flexible to
respond to unforeseen enemy actions. Throughout the withdrawal, particular attention is given to passive
and active measures to achieve security and surprise. The BG CO may augment formation security and
deception measures with own forces, provided these are compatible with and approved by the formation.
They may include:

a. Passive Measures, which include:

 (1) Communications Security. No reference is made to the withdrawal over an unsecured

communications net. Unless communications silence is already in force, every effort is
made to maintain the normal pattern of routine traffic until the withdrawal is complete.

 (2) Maintenance of Routine. Any established routine for harassing fire, artillery adjustment,
vehicle and echelon movement, patrols, etc is maintained.

 (3) Movement. Firm control is imposed on recce and thinning out.

b. Active Measures, which include:

 (1) Communications deception is conducted at formation level.

 (2) Fires cover the noise of movement by distracting or blinding the enemy.

 (3) Battle noise, lights and other effects to simulate occupied fortifications, all of which
continue after the withdrawal is complete.

90. Detailed planning considerations by withdrawal stage are as follows:

a. Thinning Out Stage. The thinning out of the BG must not compromise security. The BG CO
must strive to maintain the appearance of normal operations. The best time is at night under
cover of deception plans. Non-essential elements, equipment and combat supplies are
withdrawn early. BG administrative echelons are reduced to minimal essentials. Recce parties
and advance elements needed for future operations are also withdrawn. Recce parties include
seconds in command from all levels. Time and space may preclude the return of recce parties.

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In this case, the BG CO issues orders for the withdrawal and preliminary orders with new tasks
to the recce parties. Recce parties receive and deploy the BG, and the BG CO issues
confirmatory orders. The BG CO balances the number of troops in the recce party with
requirements for security and sufficient strength remaining to defend the position. During this
stage, to maintain strict control of rearward movement and to prevent the loss of surprise, recce
parties from all levels move together.

b. Preparation Stage. Planning considerations include deception measures to be employed, the

location of intermediate and new positions as well as coordination of barrier planning and the
manoeuvre plan.

c. Disengagement and Withdrawal Stage. A withdrawing BG CO plans for a hasty defence or

to assist the covering force at any time during the withdrawal. The BG CO remains aware of the
situation, anticipates and maintains good channels of communications in order to react quickly.
All movement is carefully controlled particularly during night withdrawals. Within the BG, subunit
commanders normally select routes back to subunit RVs. BG HQ coordinates these routes and
RVs. Formation HQ usually assigns routes for the BG withdrawal and BG HQ will assign routes
from the subunit RVs back to formation routes. Movement control assists the smooth,
uninterrupted and rapid movement to the rear. The following are important considerations
for the disengagement and withdrawal stage:

 (1) The movement plan, shown in Figure 9-13 for a BG, includes:

 (a) separate routes for vehicles and dismounted troops;

 (b) arrangements for route recce, route marking, traffic control and guides;

 (c) information concerning the firing of demolitions and destruction of withdrawal routes;

 (d) location of check points, RVs and report lines;

 (e) the order of march;

 (f) timings;

 (g) arrangements for rearward passages of lines;

 (h) emerging technical combat identification (Cbt ID) systems or traditional recognition
signals such as guns over back decks, lights and aircraft marker panels, etc;

 (i) location of areas of responsibility, including delaying actions.

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Troop Platoon Check Point

RV RV

Troop Platoon Combat Team

Dismounted Infantry

Zulu Harbour

Platoon Check Point

Combat Team Check Point

RV

Platoon
RV

Combat Team
Company Check Point

RV

Company

Battle Group Check Point

Battle Group RV

Brigade Brigade Battle Group Battle Group

Start Point Release Point Start Point Release Point

Figure 9-13: Battle Group Withdrawal Plan

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 (2) Tactically, subunits must make the best use of the cover and concealment provided by the
terrain during the withdrawal. Security versus speed must be considered when deciding
to withdraw on roads or cross-country. In either case, defiles or other obvious choke
points should be avoided. Subunit movement is covered by indirect fire during the
disengagement, and by the covering force and troops in intermediate positions later in
the withdrawal.

d. Security Stage. In addition to passive and active measures for security and surprise, the
following are important security considerations in planning the withdrawal by day or night:

 (1) Artillery and mortars are required for all their normal defensive fire and illuminating tasks
and may be needed to provide noise, smoke or blinding illumination to conceal movement.
FOOs remain forward with their respective commanders until the last troops vacate the
position. The BC prepares a continuous fire support program (CFSP) to cover
the complete withdrawal and remains with the BG CO throughout.

 (2) Direct fire elements (such as tanks and long-range antiarmour weapon systems) should
remain on the position as long as possible to provide direct fire support to the front and
flanks. Normally, tanks are also part of the reserve. Range capabilities recommend that
tanks withdraw first to allow them to provide over watch protection for remaining direct fire
elements as they withdraw.

 (3) Some infantry is needed until the last minute to man essential OPs and standing patrols,
provide protection for the direct fire weapons and form part of the reserve. The rest of the
infantry is withdrawn as early as possible to prepare the next defensive position. Infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs) are normally employed on or near BPs, bringing considerable
firepower to the battle. Some may be in hides to the rear of the BPs. The infantry thins out
normally moving back to their IFVs: those IFVs in hides will normally come forward to pick
up the infantry.

 (4) The forward troops act as offensively as possible until the time of final abandonment.
Hasty counter-attacks may be mounted to assist in making a clean break. Even if there
is a covering force, the BG will maintain its own reserve.

 (5) Recce troops/platoons provide security forward and to the flanks. To the greatest extent
possible, they assume responsibility for surveillance tasks to free OPs and patrols
to rejoin their subunits. There are too many surveillance tasks for recce troops/platoons
to be used in route recce.

 (6) Engineers assist the BG in maintaining its mobility by clearing and improving withdrawal
routes. Withdrawal routes are closed with demolitions and mines immediately after the
BG passes through. Engineer equipment is very important in the preparation of new or
intermediate positions.

 (7) Aviation resources are employed at formation level for air OPs, recce, flank security and
antiarmour tasks. Observation helicopters may be allocated in support of BGs and are
particularly useful for conducting artillery engagements and surveillance. Transport
helicopters may be used to move defensive stores, redeploy OPs and evacuate casualties.

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91. Conduct of the Withdrawal. As stated above, the withdrawal is completed in overlapping stages:

a. Thinning Out Stage. Thinning out begins at the time stated in the formation or unit withdrawal
orders. It is completed quickly, using concealed routes through RVs to the designated assembly
area. Some or all of the following concurrent activities occur:

 (1) Recce and planning for the next task begins. The recce and advance parties are
dispatched as soon as possible. The BG recce party is led by the DCO, while the subunit
party consists of the company 2ICs and a representative from each platoon/troop drawn
from men in the echelon.

 (2) Traffic control personnel may be dispatched.

 (3) The A2 echelon replenishes all forward elements and withdraws, taking with it supplies
and stores that are not being carried or needed by the fighting troops.

 (4) Non-essential F echelon elements withdraw.

 (5) Redeploying the step-up HQ to the rear may reduce the BG HQ.

 (6) Regrouping, if required, is completed.

b. Preparation Stage. The preparation stage begins with the deployment of the BG covering
force (if applicable) and the commencement of BG deception measures. At formation level, the
redeployment of artillery, the deployment of the covering force and the commencement of
deception measures occur. Preparation of intermediate and new positions continues. The
majority of engineers are withdrawn to begin preparing the intermediate and new defensive
positions. Some engineers remain to assist in delaying the enemy. The preparation of obstacles
and withdrawal routes is done as early as possible. Obstacles not requiring the use of explosives
are used fully. Preliminary demolitions are coordinated with the manoeuvre plan and executed
without compromising security.

c. Disengagement and Withdrawal Stage. The disengagement and withdrawal occur as follows:

 (1) Disengagement. The disengagement begins as soon as the denial time has passed and
continues until the troops have made a clean break from the enemy or passed responsibility
to a covering force. This stage of the operation is accomplished as quickly and as quietly
as conditions permit, ensuring that sufficient strength remains forward until the time up to
which the position must be denied to the enemy. Security is maintained and movement is
planned and controlled to avoid detection and reaction by the enemy. During this phase,
the following actions may occur:

 (a) Forward troops maintain normal activity and continue to act aggressively for as long
as possible.

 (b) Normal fire support and communications are maintained.

 (c) Local counter-attacks are launched to deceive the enemy, keep it off guard
and discourage it from close combat.

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 (d) Subunits move out of the forward area through RVs.

 (e) The last elements will seek to disengage undetected; otherwise, fire support will
be required to prevent enemy interference.

 (2) Withdrawal. The withdrawal begins when a clean break is achieved or responsibility for
fighting any chasing enemy has been passed to another force. It continues until the unit
is ready to commence its next task. The following actions occur before, during and after
the withdrawal:

 (a) Elements move through a series of RVs to establish control and to allow subunits
to reunite with their parent units.

 (b) Guides and traffic control elements are situated on the withdrawal route at obstacles
or other critical points.

 (c) Once the unit is concentrated out of contact, it withdraws on designated routes
at best speed to prepare for its next task.

 (3) Hasty Withdrawal. In the worst case, defending BGs may be forced to withdraw without
adequate warning and without completing normal battle procedure. The sequence of
a hasty withdrawal is as follows:

 (a) The BG CO selects from the map a new defensive position and orders all troops not
fighting the immediate battle to move there and prepare a hasty defence.

 (b) Those elements in contact fight back through the new position into an assembly
area immediately behind it. Troops are reorganized as they arrive and either
reinforce and improve the hasty position or prepare new defences in depth.

92. CSS in the Withdrawal. BG COs must keep in mind that once the withdrawal starts, access to
CSS resources is limited and normally only available if the plan makes provision for specific items. In the
administrative estimate of the withdrawal, BG COs must take into account the requirement to preposition
CSS resources well to the rear in order to reduce traffic congestion and the risk of enemy interdiction.

93. The replenishment method, amount and items being replenished are dependent upon the withdrawal
timings and circumstances. As a general guide, only combat supplies and necessary Class VIII (medical)
and Class IX (repair parts) materiel are replenished. Moreover, only essential A echelon vehicles,
personnel and equipment should remain forward to provide moment-to-moment support for the withdrawal.
The process of supporting a withdrawal should adhere to the following guidelines:

a. Task-tailor CSS elements with only those vehicles and personnel essential to ensure success
of the mission.

b. Depending upon the withdrawal distances, establish running delivery points (DPs) for combat
supplies and/or caches of stores.

c. Determine the policy for repair, recovery and/or destruction of vehicles.

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94. It is more likely that this action will take place after the withdrawal, but necessity could demand that
personnel and equipment be required to assist with the withdrawal. BG and cbt tm commanders establish
priorities and set deadlines for repairs to be completed. Broken down vehicles that cannot be repaired
within the parameters laid down by the BG CO are backloaded to the equipment collecting point (ECP).
Recovery resources are forward by the time the disengagement and withdrawal starts. Once the
disengagement commences, orders are issued for the recovery of non-operating vehicles as well as for
the destruction of equipment that must be abandoned. Other CSS issues of note for the withdrawal:

a. Stragglers. Straggler posts would normally be sited along the major LOCs. Assistance may
be required to withdraw these stragglers from the combat zone.

b. Refugees and Displaced Persons. Refugees and displaced persons causing congestion
to the LOC could significantly affect CSS operations.

RETIREMENT

95. A retirement is different from a withdrawal in that it is a movement away from an enemy by a force
out of contact. It is generally conducted the same as a withdrawal with one exception: because the force
is out of contact, there is unlikely to be a requirement for a robust covering force. Within a formation
setting, the BG as a whole may be tasked to conduct a retirement, with other formation assets tasked to
provide security for the operation. Typically a retirement is conducted when a BG CO finds it necessary
to reposition part or all of their force for future operations.

RELIEF OF TROOPS IN COMBAT AND ENCIRCLED FORCES

96. General. Relief of a BG may be achieved by conducting a relief in place (RIP) or a passage
of lines. In offensive operations, BGs are frequently relieved using forward or rearward passages of lines,
rather than a RIP, primarily due to the fluidity of the situation, to avoid complicated intermingling of forces
and the security required. The two forces are referred to as the moving force and the in-place force.
The relief is conducted when a force is:

a. due to be rotated in accordance with a rotation cycle;

b. successful in accomplishing its mission;

c. required for operations elsewhere or is being redeployed to a more favourable position;

d. being replaced to avoid exhaustion; and

e. not suitable to continue with a task.

97. RIP. A RIP occurs when all or part of an in-place force is replaced in position by a moving force.
The sequence of activities for a RIP is the same for a passage of lines, but the time available for planning,
preparation and conduct may vary. A hasty RIP requires a rapid response and may commence as a
reinforcement activity. The possibility of confusion is inherent in the RIP as two forces with parallel
command structures are operating simultaneously in one area. The aim is to pass the responsibility for
the area from one force to the other without weakening the defence. This section describes the deliberate
RIP of a BG in contact.

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98. The following considerations pertain to the C2 of a RIP:

a. Transfer of Command. The higher commander must specify the conditions under which
transfer of command will occur. Specific direction must be issued to address the possibility of
enemy attack. Throughout the RIP, the moving and in-place unit commanders are collocated.

b. Signals. The in-place force, moving force and formation signals officers must coordinate
the transfer of the in-place signals assets (eg, trunk, line, EW) and radio control measures
in accordance with the concept of operations and frequency management.

c. Other factors to consider include:

 (1) time when the RIP is to be completed and any other critical timings;

 (2) report lines, routes and assembly areas;

 (3) arrangements for recce, liaison, movement of advance parties, traffic control and signals,
including emission control;

 (4) arrangements for deception including artillery fire, movements in other areas and
electronic emissions;

 (5) restrictions on movement;

 (6) handover of combat supplies and equipment;

 (7) handover of responsibility for the barrier plan.

99. Battle Procedure. The unit being relieved is normally defending, however a RIP may be conducted
to set the stage for the resumption of offensive operations. In either case, battle procedure for a RIP is
different than that for the occupation of a normal defensive position or the resumption of an advance to
contact. In either case, the plan has been made: it is the mechanics of how the RIP will be conducted that
is the focus of battle procedure. Since the in-place force is likely to be under enemy observation, covert
movement and recce during all stages of battle procedure are particularly important.

100. Initial Briefing and Reconnaissance. Once the warning order is received, the moving BG CO
goes forward with the orders group (OGp) to the RV with the in-place BG for briefings. Both groups must
be available for subunit briefings and recce. The OGp then disperses to recce the positions of the in-place
force and get an understanding from the in-place unit about enemy dispositions and activities as well as
friendly dispositions and plans. Ideally, both the in-place and moving subunit commanders will have
a face-to-face meeting to pass on this information.

101. Planning and Orders. The two BG COs agree on the general outline for the RIP, and the moving
force BG CO begins detailed recce and planning. The OGp is reassembled to receive orders for the RIP
and to coordinate the plans for follow-on operations. Meanwhile, platoon/crew commanders exchange
information to ensure total familiarity with the ground, routes as well as current and future tasks.

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102. Preparation and Planning. The moving and in-place BG COs jointly prepare detailed plans.
Formation orders normally specify whether the RIP is to be conducted by day or by night. In most
circumstances, a night-time RIP is preferred because of the greater chance of achieving surprise, despite
the difficulties of control. However, other factors such as the ability of the in-place BG to hold its position
may dictate a daytime RIP.

103. During their planning, the moving and in-place BG COs weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of conducting the RIP as quickly as possible. If it is done quickly, considerable noise is likely to result.
Although it can be masked, it will almost inevitably be detected. Surprise in this case depends upon
speed, completing the mission before the enemy can react. In the case of a defence, dismounted infantry
would ideally carry out the initial occupation, with mechanized forces moving in once the position is
securely held. The moving BG adopts the grouping, disposition and the supporting plans of the in-place
BG. This simplifies and speeds up both the recce and the execution of the RIP. Adjustments to groupings
or weapons sitings are made once the RIP is completed.

104. Planning Factors. Within the formation commander’s direction, detailed planning includes
security, timings, sequence as well as the allocation of routes and areas.

105. Security and Deception. This includes continuing normal activity such as patrols, operation of
surveillance devices, radio transmissions and echelon movement. For a night-time RIP, the moving BG
assumes responsibility for the OPs and patrols before last light the day prior to the RIP or alternatively,
the in-place BG leaves its OPs and patrols in position until the next day. The moving unit moves under
radio silence. Noise and light discipline are strictly enforced. Artillery fire and deliberate vehicle noise may
be used to cover any noise caused by the RIP. These activities may be intensified during the nights
before the RIP to cause additional deception. All deception measures are coordinated with formation HQ.

106. Timings. Plans are made for the exchange of command at all levels. Normally, the moving platoon/
troop commanders assume command when all the in-place force’s sections are relieved, while the moving
subunit or BG COs assume command once more than half of their subordinate elements have completed
the RIP. The two BG COs mutually agree to the time when this occurs. Other critical timings are related
to tasks and resources as well as those factors that affect sequencing.

107. Sequence. A RIP is conducted in distinct phases to ensure the most effective defence during the
operation. Whether the depth subunits are relieved first followed by the forward subunits, or the reversal,
depends upon the time available and anticipated enemy action. While the simultaneous RIP of all elements
of the BG may be desirable, such a procedure may result in an unacceptable number of troops/vehicles
in the area. Other considerations include:

a. Fire Support. The moving BG uses the fire plan of the in-place unit. The in-place unit provides
the fire support during the relief while the moving unit occupies fire positions to the rear of the
in-place unit. However, it is important to note that the BG that has command of the area during
a RIP at the time a fire mission is requested controls all fire support.

b. Exchange of Equipment and Supplies. The RIP may be simplified, the noise reduced and
the move made more effectively and quickly by handing over some items of equipment
in position. In addition, other items that may be either handed over or exchanged include:

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 (1) combat supplies, particularly those that have been dumped;

 (2) surveillance devices;

 (3) any other equipment that is difficult to move.

108. Movement planning includes the following aspects:

a. separate routes for moving and in-place units;

b. separate routes for vehicles and dismounted troops;

c. route marking and traffic control by the moving unit up to subunit RVs and by the in-place unit
from the RVs forward;

d. coordination with formation HQ of movement, traffic control and waiting areas from the rear
area into the new position;

e. BG and subunit waiting areas and routes within the in-place unit area;

f. debussing areas;

g. subunit and sub-subunit routes and RVs;

h. report lines;

i. orders of march; and

j. timings or movement control instructions.

109. Conduct. The conduct of the RIP varies depending upon how quickly it is to be completed. If it is
done swiftly, armour (including tanks and IFVs) will move directly into position on routes that offer the best
possible cover. Alternatively, the infantry could instead park their IFVs as far to the rear as necessary,
dismount and move forward to avoid detection. Until the infantry RIP is complete, the armoured elements,
support weapons and attached arms vehicles remain in waiting areas. Once the infantry RIP is complete,
the others begin their relief.

110. The moving unit proceeds as follows:

a. It moves from the assembly area along one or more designated routes using waiting areas
as necessary. The use of waiting areas is minimized to complete the operation as quickly
as possible.

b. At the release point, subunits proceed to RVs where advance parties meet them. Waiting areas
are used if the distances are long or if more than one subunit is using a route. The last waiting
area may also be the subunit RV.

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c. The moving unit moves forward from subunit RVs using guides from the in-place unit to platoon/
troop RVs from where they move into position.

d. They debus in areas well to the rear, along subunit routes or in the in-place subunit hide
or battle position.

111. The in-place BG then withdraws on a separate route as positions are handed over.

112. Figure 9-14 illustrates a BG RIP in a linear contiguous AO.

Section
Section Section

Section Section
Section Section Section Section

Platoon RV

Platoon RV Combat Team HQ Platoon RV

REPORT LINE

COMBAT TEAM
WAITING AREA

REPORT LINE

Combat Team RV

Combat Team RV Combat Team RV

Combat Team RV

BATTLE GP WAITING AREA

Figure 9-14: BG Relief in Place in a Linear Contiguous AO

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113. Passage of Lines. A passage of lines is the movement of a unit through another unit either to
come into (forward passage) or out of (rearward passage) contact with the enemy. In this manual, the
units are identified as the moving BG and the in-place BG.

114. The movement of a BG through another unit’s position is common during offensive operations: as
an example, a passage of lines would occur when a “fresh” BG is assigned to take over from an exhausted
advancing BG. In defensive operations, however, the passage of lines is more complicated when the
in-place BG is in a prepared defensive position within a developed barrier plan.

115. During a passage of lines, parts of both BGs are temporarily concentrated in the area normally
occupied by one BG, making both vulnerable to artillery attack. There is potential for confusion and the
loss of control in this situation.

116. The decisive factor, as in all missions, is command. Unless duly considered beforehand, the issue
of command will become critical if the enemy attacks during the operation.

117. Command and Control. The following considerations pertain to the C2 of a passage of lines:

a. Selection of Routes. If possible, the moving BG moves through areas not occupied by the
in-place BG or through areas on its flanks. This reduces congestion in the forward areas
and avoids drawing enemy fire. Assembly areas are not used in the forward areas.

b. Attack Positions. Attack positions are sited so they can be easily protected by the in-place BG.

c. Movement. The moving BG has priority on the routes to and within the area of responsibility of
the in-place BG. The in-place BG and its subunits know the movement plan. Guides, route
marking, attack positions, LDs, and traffic control are the responsibility of the in-place BG. The
moving BG may assist with these tasks.

d. Transfer of Command. The higher commander must specify the conditions under which
transfer of command will occur. Assets deployed by the in-place BG, forward of its main position,
come under OPCOM of the moving BG until the assets are relieved or withdrawn.

e. Tactical Support. The in-place BG may launch supportive attacks, provide direct and indirect
fire, operate observation equipment, breach wire and minefields, provide guides and secure LDs.

f. Fire Support. The in-place BG provides all possible fire support for the moving BG. Arrangements
for the control of this fire must be made.

g. Passage through Obstacles. The in-place BG informs liaison teams of all routes through
obstacles, and provides guides and traffic control for the moving BG. A minimum of two routes
per BG is planned.

h. Traffic Control. To reduce troop density and congestion, multiple routes are considered. Traffic
control is provided by the in-place BG and the moving BG is given priority use of routes. The
moving BG CO advises the in-place BG CO when the moving BG has cleared the position.

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i. Waiting Areas and Assembly Areas. The use of assembly areas to collect subunits should be
avoided; however, if necessary, they should be far enough from the in-place BG to avoid
interfering with its tactical or administrative activities. Ideally, the moving BG should roll directly
through the in-place BG without pause.

j. Handover Line. The superior commander designates a handover line to indicate where
geographically the BG CO of the moving force assumes command. The handover line is:

 (1) forward of the friendly defensive positions along the line where the enemy can first engage
the main defensive position with observed fire;

 (2) situated so that crossings and defiles used by the moving force can be protected;

 (3) situated in a defensible area to prevent a running battle;

 (4) easily recognizable on the ground; and

 (5) in a location, such that the area behind the handover line contains good lateral routes
to permit the use of alternative entry points.

118. Forward Passage of Lines. A forward passage of lines occurs when a BG deploys forward
through another BG in contact with the enemy. For a reserve BG, forward passage of lines occurs when
it passes through a committed BG to continue with the next phase of an attack. In either case, planning
and coordination prevent confusion and delay, especially during conditions of reduced visibility.

119. Rearward Passage of Lines. A rearward passage of lines occurs when a BG has completed
a covering force task. When it is withdrawing, the BG it passes rearward through another BG to handover
contact with the enemy. While it is similar to a forward passage of lines, it is more difficult for the
following reasons:

a. The desire for speed and lack of sufficient troops make detailed recce and liaison difficult.

b. The moving BG may have suffered vehicle and personnel casualties.

c. The moving BG may be in close contact with the enemy.

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CHAPTER 10
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS AND UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS

GENERAL

1. There are a number of specific operations and unique environments that will have a significant
impact on land operations. Except as noted, the general principles, fundamentals and operational
methodologies do not change substantially, regardless of the specific operations and environments. The
fundamentals of an attack will apply equally to one taking place in the jungle as one that involves an
assault on an urban village. One difference though is scale: a jungle-based attack may end up requiring
the number of soldiers involved be scaled back significantly, whereas an urban attack is able to absorb
large quantities of soldiers in a relatively short period of time.

2. Airborne Operations. Airborne operations are covered in detail within B-GL-324-004/FP-001

Airborne Operations – Parachute.

3. Airmobile Operations. Airmobile operations are explained in B-GL-324-002/FP-001 Airborne

Operations – Airmobile with additional detail in Chapter 7 of B-GA-441-001/FP-001 Tactical Level Aviation
Doctrine. B-GL-332-010/FP-001 Insert – Aviation is also a useful reference.

4. Cold and Extreme Cold Weather Operations. Operations in cold weather are those that take
place with temperatures between +8 and -20 degrees centigrade (C), and extreme cold weather operations
take place below -20 degrees C. Obviously, these conditions include the Canadian Arctic but they also
include anywhere it is cold, including high altitude regions, most of Canada and Russia, Northern Europe
and even most deserts at night. Operations in these areas are fundamentally the same as those within
more temperate climates. What is different are a number of unique concepts required to overcome
the extreme cold in order to successfully operate within those temperature ranges. Those concepts
are covered within B-GL-323-003/FP-001 Operations in Cold Weather and B-GG-302-002/FP-001
Basic Cold Weather Training. These publications discuss cold weather environments, how they can be
used in our favour, how they can be used against our enemy, and what training is necessary to operate
effectively within these extreme environments.

5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Operations. Annex A provides

more detail on CBRND operations.

6. Jungle Operations. Jungle operations are significantly affected by the jungle’s climate and terrain,
both of which place limitations on any land force. Operational tempo during jungle operations is also
much slower and actions taken by a small force can have an effect out of proportion to its size. Detail on
jungle operations is contained within B-OG-302-004/FP-001 Specific Operations, Volume 4, Part One,
Jungle Operations, and should be read in conjunction with B-OG-302-004/FP-002 A Soldier’s Guide to
the Jungle.

7. Operations in Forests / Wooded Areas. Given the nature and characteristics of forested areas,
offensive and defensive operations in forests are conducted in the same manner as those operations in
built-up areas, following the same methods and stages. The requirement for stability operations will likely
be much less given the lack of a civilian populace in forested areas. See Section 8, Chapter 8 of
B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations for more detail on operations in forests.

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8. Operations in Mountains or High-Altitude Environments. Mountain operations—including

temperate wet, cold, hot barren and jungle conditions—are covered in detail within
B-OG-302-005/FP-001 Specific Operations, Volume 5, Mountain Operations, Part One.

9. Operations within the Urban Environment. Urban operations are covered in detail within
B-GL-322-007/FP-001 Unique Operations – Urban and B-GL-322-008/FP-001 Unique Operations –
A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations.

10. Operations in Reduced Visibility. Annex B covers a number of planning factors for both offensive
and defensive operations during periods of reduced visibility.

11. Domestic Operations. Domestic operations present specific challenges to a BG and are detailed
within Annex C.

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ANNEX A
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE

DEFINITION AND ROLE

1. CBRN defence is defined as the plans and activities intended to mitigate or neutralize adverse
impacts on operations and personnel resulting from the use or threatened use of chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons and devices, the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counter-
force targeting or the release of toxic industrial materials into the environment. CBRN is a condition of the
battlespace, which has the characteristic of increasing friction and casualties. The role of CBRN defence
in the Canadian Forces (CF) is to retain freedom of action in the CBRN battlespace as a precondition
to the successful execution of the assigned missions.

GENERAL CBRN DEFENCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2. The general concept of operations for effective CBRN defence begins with effective surveillance of
the area of operations through the use of any number of detection, identification and monitoring capabilities
to provide early warning of hazards. These collection capabilities allow BG COs to make decisions to
provide optimum force protection to personnel and maintain operational tempo by avoiding hazards
where possible. When hazard avoidance is impossible, the use of physical protective measures (such as
individual protective equipment [IPE] or collective protection), hazard management through
decontamination and availability of effective medical countermeasures becomes essential.

CBRN THREATS AND HAZARDS

3. FSO bring unpredictable, dilapidated urban environments that pose an increased risk to troops from
isolated asymmetric attacks of CBRN weapons and devices or exposure to TIM hazards. The security
environment will be characterized by volatility, uncertainty and complexity, with agile and adaptive
adversaries willing use all potential means to attack our forces and our allies. The threat will be transnational
and will involve non-sovereign asymmetric attacks and include innovative use of highly lethal weapons.

4. The threat from use of CBRN weapons or devices occurs across the spectrum of military operations.
The number of nations or groups capable of developing and possessing these weapons is steadily
increasing. Developing nations are receiving these weapons or the means to develop them through
technological transfer, overt or covert direct transfer or support to belligerent groups or governments.

5. CBRN threats may include attacks by overt or covert means using air, ground, missile, SOF
or terrorists. An adversary can employ CBRN weapons or devices against multiple locations or single
bases or as part of a terrorist attack. The means of delivery vary and may include bursting or spray
devices or the use of improvised devices. Biological agents may also be spread through an infected
person, food or water. The rate of action may be hours to days for biological agents or minutes to hours
for chemical agents.

6. TIMs exist in every area of the world and play a key role in virtually every human activity. Like many
classic military CBRN agents, TIMs can attack through inhalation, direct skin contact or ingestion. Unlike
chemical warfare agents, many common TIMs can pass through the C7 canister on the C4 protective
masks. In certain circumstances, TIMs may displace or consume the oxygen needed to breathe, creating
a deadly, indirect hazard that the C4 mask cannot protect against. Hazards include:

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a. pesticides and fertilizers prevalent in agricultural areas;

b. acids, bases, chlorine, insecticides and compressed flammable gasses common in residential areas;

c. fuel and fuel by-products located near transportation hubs;

d. low-level radioactive material found in hospitals and dental facilities; and

e. chemicals and solvents found in industrial storage areas and shipping sites, such as ports,
airfields and rail yards.

7. CBRN weapons may be used during any phase of conflict. In preparation for or early in a crisis, an
adversary may use CBRN weapons to deter or delay CF intervention by raising the perceived cost of
action, weaken coalition cohesion, demonstrate the will to escalate the scope of conflict, degrade CF and
coalition forces and gain an early tactical advantage. In an ongoing conflict, and adversary could employ
CBRN weapons to prevent the use of reception and staging areas, limit or reverse CF involvement,
create a humanitarian crisis or to fracture public support. Late in a conflict, or as a last resort, an adversary
could employ CBRN as an attempt to avoid defeat, avenge CF actions and influence the terms of
conflict termination.

8. Adaptive, non-state adversaries are more willing to use or threaten use of CBRN weapons. The
urban environment, where regional crises are more likely, leads to increased risks to troops from isolated
use of CBRN weapons and intentional or accidental TIM releases. It provides a wider range of CBRN
threats from any number of potential foes by any number of delivery means. This environment leads
to CBRN and TIM hazards events that will be more likely to occur, will potentially be very complex
in scope, but typically be smaller in scale and will likely affect fewer troops at any one time.

ENABLING COMPONENTS

9. CF doctrine, in line with NATO and America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (ABCA)
agreements, divides the CBRN defence function into five enabling components.136 These enabling
components are the foundations by which appropriate CBRN defence policy, doctrine, equipment,
procedures and training are developed and are the basis of the development of the general concept
of operations for CBRN defence. The five doctrinal enabling components are:

a. Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM). These functions are needed to detect and
characterize CBRN events, identify the agents and hazards, delineate areas of contamination
and monitor the changes. They include CBRN defence surveillance, survey, reconnaissance
and sampling.

b. Communication and Information Systems, Warning and Reporting. These functions aid
the rapid collection, evaluation and dissemination of data concerning CBRN attacks and
hazards, including the prediction of hazard areas. The operational CIS network is used to
disseminate CBRN defence data and hazard prediction. CBRN defence is a command
responsibility and forms part of the force protection function. As such, CBRN defence is an
integral part of the headquarters staff and is supported by CIS.

136. B -GJ-005-311/FP-010 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Operations (Note: superseded by B-GJ-005-380/FP-101 CFJP 3-8.1 CBRN
Defence Operations), Ch 3, Para 303, Apr 2005

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c. Physical Protection. Individual and collective protection (COLPRO) are required so that
personnel can survive CBRN attacks and continue to operate in an CBRN hazard environment.
Measures to protect facilities and equipment are also included.

d. Hazard Management. This is the process needed to limit the impact of CBRN hazards. Hazard
management is based on the principles of pre-hazard precautions, hazard control through
avoidance, control of hazard spread, control and management of individual exposures
and decontamination.

e. Medical Countermeasures (Med CM) and Support. This component serves both to diminish
the susceptibility of personnel to CBRN hazards as well as to treat and evacuate casualties.
Treatment includes both pretreatment and treatment in response to exposure. The treatment
and evacuation of conventional casualties in a CBRN environment is included. All Med CM
are the responsibility of the Canadian Forces Medical Group.

CBRN DEFENCE SUPPORT CONCEPT

10. The LF CBRN defence support concept is based on employing non-specialist integral support and
specialist general support CBRN defence capabilities. In general the LF will conduct CBRN defence
through continued employment of all-arms non-specialists that will be inherently available for all operations.
In addition to those IS CBRN defence capabilities GS CBRN defence specialist assets may be allocated,
grouped and employed in a fashion that best suits the CBRN threat for the given operation. The concept
relies on the CBRN defence skills, knowledge and training of every soldier, commander and staff officer
in the LF for its success as employment of CBRN defence specialist alone will not provide adequate FP
from these hazards. Figure 10A-1 provides a basic concept of how IS and GS CBRN defence assets will
be employed for operations against a sliding threat scale. The figure shows that for all operations,
regardless of the CBRN defence threat, the LF employs its IS CBRN defence capabilities as these
capabilities and skills should already be resident at the appropriate levels. Depending on the CBRN
threat for the operation, additional GS CBRN defence specialist assets can be added up to and including
a complete CBRN defence company to provide the specialist capability required by the force in order to
maintain freedom of action. GS CBRN defence specialist building blocks should be centrally force
employed under the command of a CBRN defence headquarters suitable to the quantity of building
blocks employed.

11. IS and GS CBRN defence capabilities can be defined as follows:137

a. CBRN IS consists of those unit functions that enable a unit or subunit to survive and operate
for limited time in a CBRN environment. CBRN IS resources are limited in scope and are
planned and executed at the lowest possible tactical level.

b. CBRN GS consists of functions beyond the CBRN IS capability, for example highly technical
biological agent detection or mass thorough decontamination. The commitment of CBRN GS
resources is planned at the operational level, but executed at the tactical level.

137. 
B -GJ-005-311/FP-010 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Operations (Note: superseded by B-GJ-005-380/FP-101 CFJP 3-8.1 CBRN
Defence Operations), Ch 3, Para 306, Apr 2005.

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CBRND CONCEPT OF OPS – EXPENDITIONARY

Very LOW/LOW MED HIGH/Very HIGH

Threat CBRN Threat CBRN Threat
NON-SPECIALIST
COMMON CAPABILITY IS CBRND IS CBRND
Capabilities Capabilities

CBRND CC CBRND CC

GS RECCE GS RECCE
Number of Structures Depends On: & SURV
- Threat
- Deployment Footprint
DEDICATED CBRND - Force Employment Concept
GS SURV - Comd Priorities GS DECON
SPECIALIST CAPABILITY
- Environment

GS DECON COLPRO

COY HQ & SP

Figure 10A-1: Integral Support CBRN Defence Capabilities

DETECTION IDENTIFICATION AND MONITORING

12. The foundation of the Army’s hazard detection ability begins with the soldier. Every soldier in the
Army should be capable of employing very basic detection equipment (such as chemical agent monitor,
3-way detector paper and electronic dosimeter [ED]) for detecting chemical and radiological hazards.
This includes an increased general hazard awareness in order to visually recognize the indicators of the
presence of these hazards.

13. The BG and Bde’s enhanced integral DIM capability is provided by their respective recce platoons
and recce subunits. BG recce platoon and Bde recce subunits are responsible for providing their respective
commanders an enhanced capability to detect and monitor and to a limited degree identify CBRN warfare
hazards to a level above that of the general soldier but less than the full hazard spectrum capabilities of
GS CBRN defence recce and surveillance assets. Commanders of these recce subunits and sub-subunits
will be capable of characterizing events and providing reports and advice to the chain of command upon
detection of these hazards with their integral equipment.

14. All company-sized elements within BGs should have one trained and equipped recce/survey team
integral to it that is also capable of providing an enhanced capability to detect, monitor and to a very
limited degree identify CBRN warfare hazards to a level above that of the general soldier.

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CIS, WARNING AND REPORTING

15. The soldier provides the basis of the warning and reporting system. On detection of a hazard, they
are responsible for initiating the warning and reporting system by initiating an observation report.

16. Unit, BG and formation HQs must have integral operations staff with additional occupation speciality
specification based CBRN defence training that provides basic advice to the commander on CBRN issues
in low threat conditions. These staff members also provide an integral basic warning and reporting
capability. This trained staff provides the backbone to which a GS CBRN defence coordination centre
(CBRN defence CC) can be added to provide higher level advice and capabilities to the supported
commander for operations where a greater CBRN threat exists. Integral unit, BG and formation HQ staff
should have capability to:

a. provide very basic CBRN defence advice to command and formation staff;

b. maintain CBRN situational awareness and track AO hazards;

c. conduct CBRN warning and reporting;

d. provide basic CBRN input to estimates, plans, orders and IPB;

e. coordinate CBRN recce/survey and operational decontamination tasks;

f. recommend force protection measures including mission-orientated protective posture (MOPP)

state and Med CM use in consultation with HSS staff; and

g. conduct exposure management (dose management).

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

17. At the unit level the only means of CBRN physical protection available is IPE. There are limitations
of the effectiveness of the various components of the IPE against certain threats, including many TIMs.
The IPE is not designed to protect against TIMs but would improve the user’s ability to escape from
a TIM release.

18. Hazard Management. Immediate decontamination is an individual responsibility that all soldiers
should be capable conducting. Operational decontamination continues to be a non-specialist capability.
Units will be prepared to conduct operational decontamination within their integral resources with a future
expectation that thorough decontamination will be conducted by GS decontamination elements.

19. Medical Countermeasures and Support. Soldiers are to be trained in the use of PB tablets as well
as HI-6 Atropine and Anticonvulsant auto-injectors. At an individual, level soldiers are also capable
of conducting buddy aid and first aid.

GENERAL SUPPORT CBRN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES (SPECIALIST CAPABILITIES)

20. These capabilities come as dedicated elements that perform these functions as their primary role.
They will be assigned to a BG or formation based on the threat assessment.

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DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION AND MONITORING

21. Specialist GS CBRN defence recce assets, within the limits of their equipment, provide a detection,
identification and sampling capability to the supported commander for the full spectrum of CBRN hazards
including TIM and are employed in situations where the CBRN hazard is beyond the capability of the
commander’s IS or CS CBRN defence capabilities. GS CBRN defence recce assets have a more inclusive
range of personal protective equipment that will allow them to respond to scenarios where normal IPE
does not provide sufficient physical protection.

CIS, WARNING AND REPORTING

22. The complexity of the potential threats of a particular theatre may require sustained CIS, warning
and reporting capabilities at the BG and Bde levels beyond their own integral capability. This capability
comes as a CBRN Defence CC and:

a. provides expert CBRN defence advice to commanders for timely, risk-managed decisions;

b. maintains CBRN situational awareness;

c. submits and receives sensor inputs;

d. provides knowledge of hazards in the area;

e. conducts warning and reporting and hazard prediction;

f. provides CBRN input to estimates, plans, orders and IPB;

g. coordinates CBRN recce, survey and surveillance tasks; and

h. identifies and handles samples;

i. coordinates thorough and clearance decontamination tasks;

j. coordinates COLPRO tasks

k. recommends force protection measures including MOPP state and Med CM use in consultation
with HSS staff; and

l. conducts exposure management (dose management).

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

23. Elements of GS CBRN defence elements have the same IPE as found in IS and CS capabilities as
well as additional capability to face the full spectrum of CBRN hazards through additional specialist
ensembles such as level A and B suits with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). GS COLPRO
specialists provide the ability to setup and operate COLPRO shelters for supported organizations such
as formation HQ or formation-level medical facilities.

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HAZARD MANAGEMENT

24. Thorough Decontamination. The GS CBRN decontamination specialist provides thorough

decontamination capability for personnel, vehicles, equipment and terrain for the full spectrum of CBRN
hazards. The smallest employable element of GS CBRN decontamination is a section.

CBRN EOD

25. The responsibility to render safe or neutralize CBRN weapons and improvised devices continues to
be an engineer EOD/IEDD team responsibility. While EOD/IEDD will not be part of the CBRN defence
subunit capability, the conduct of this function will require the support of GS CBRN defence recce and GS
CBRN defence decontamination assets for advice and hazard management.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND SUPPORT

26. Health Service Support is responsible for GS Med CM. These include all medical pre and
post treatments, distribution of IS Med CM, casualty treatment under CBRN conditions, and medical
evacuation under CBRN conditions. See B-GJ-005-311/FP-010 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Defense Operations (Note: superseded by B-GJ-005-380/FP-101 CFJP 3-8.1 CBRN
Defence Operations) and B-GJ-005-311/FP-020 CF CBRN Defence Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
for medical details.

ROLES OF GS CBRN DEFENCE ELEMENTS

27. Depending on circumstances or threats, any or all of the following assets may be assigned to the
BG, either directly or through a parent formation. They may exist in detachment, section or platoon size
and can be collected into a CBRN defence company or platoon with a HQ. Any GS CBRN defence
platoon HQ can coordinate the operations of any GS CBRN defence section or sections. The highest
level HQ present will provide the command, administration and service support of all CBRN assets
available. The GS CBRN defence company HQ will:

a. provide a command and control capability for all CBRN defence assets on expeditionary or
domestic operations;

b. provide the BG CO with additional CBRN defence advice;

c. provide C2 and support to GS CBRN defence assets;

d. coordinate operational and thorough decontamination operations; and

e. coordinate CBRN defence recce, survey and surveillance.

28. The CO of the GS CBRN defence company acts as the senior CBRN defence officer in theatre.

29. The CBRN defence CC will:

a. provide a coordination centre for all CBRN defence assets and activities;

b. provide CBRN defence advice to the commander;

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c. receive all CBRN defence sensor inputs (both automatic and manual);

d. operate manual and automated hazard prediction, warning and reporting;

e. give CBRN defence input to estimates, plans, IPB and orders;

f. coordinate all CBRN defence recce, surveillance and thorough decontamination tasks;

g. recommend force protection measures including MOPP state and Med CM use; and

h. manage exposure to agents including TIMs.

30. The CBRN defence CC will not command CBRN defence assets.

31. If deployed, the COLPRO platoon would provide transportable COLPRO for HQ and medical
facilities. Each platoon can set up and operate a 100-person facility for 14 days on a 24 hour / 7 day basis
without augmentation.

32. GS decontamination assets do require significant outside support to conduct large-scale

decontamination. Support (such as protection, water, logistic support, medical support and traffic control)
will have to be coordinated through other non-CBRN defence assets such as engineers and CSS. Within
this limitation, each section can conduct personnel, equipment, vehicle and terrain decontamination,
although to conduct extensive vehicle decontamination two sections are required. If it is deployed,
decontamination platoon HQ will coordinate and support the decontamination sections, as well as any
other GS CBRN sections assigned. Specifically, decontamination assets will:

a. support unit and subunit level operational decontamination;

b. provide decontamination support to GS CBRN recce operations; and

c. provide decontamination support to CBRN EOD operations.

33. Recce and surveillance platoon HQ will:

a. coordinate GS CBRN recce and surveillance elements as well as any other assigned
GS elements;

b. coordinate CBRN recce, surveillance and sampling operations;

c. advise the BG CO on CBRN recce and surveillance; and

d. coordinate handling of samples, including forensic sampling.

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34. GS CBRN defence recce sections will:

a. detect CBRN and TIM hazards through recce and sampling;

b. conduct field expedient sampling and identification of biological, chemical and radiological
agents (FESIBCRA), including evacuation of samples and presumptive identification of known
agents and materials;

c. support BG IS recce in locating, marking, reporting and identifying bypass routes;

d. support CBRN EOD and IEDD; and

e. assist other CBRN defence sections.

35. GS CBRN defence surveillance sections will:

a. provide vital point protection by establishing CBRN defence surveillance networks;

b. provide early warning of contamination for supported units and HQs;

c. monitor changes to known contaminated areas;

d. conduct FESIBCRA, including evacuation of samples and presumptive identification of known

agents and materials; and

e. assist other CBRN defence assets.

10A-9/10A-10
 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

ANNEX B
OPERATIONS IN REDUCED VISIBILITY

GENERAL

1. Modern technology has largely diminished the differences between day and night visibilities.
However, there remains some degradation of visibility at night, and recent experience has re-emphasized
how the weather (eg, dust storms) can seriously affect visibility. There is a distinct probability that we will
possess a significant advantage in night vision over potential adversaries. Indeed, our advantage may be
such that we would prefer to operate at night. Reduced visibility affects the following:

a. the attacker:

 (1) has difficulty in combat identification;

 (2) moves slower because navigation is more difficult even with a global positioning system (GPS).

b. the defender:

 (1) finds it more difficult to cover the front, acquire targets and thus is likely to engage
at shorter ranges;

 (2) has less warning of an impending attack;

 (3) requires more time to deploy the reserve;

 (4) must either redeploy or accept some gaps.

2. For the attacker, these difficulties may be offset by the opportunity to close with the enemy
undetected. Night and other periods of reduced visibility often provide favourable conditions for surprise.
An attack during periods of reduced visibility should be deliberate, not hasty. The fundamentals and
procedures for such an attack are generally the same as those applicable by day, but with even greater
emphasis on simplicity and surprise. Infiltration may be easier. Travel may be on roads and tracks to
maintain direction and cohesion. Deployment into the assault formation can occur as late as possible.
Even if the BG CO plans to conduct the attack without preparatory fire to achieve surprise, such support
should be on call.

MOVEMENT

3. Special attention is given to the movement plan. Disorientation is a factor that risks delay, confusion
and loss of surprise. Furthermore, troops may blunder into the enemy or each other. Objectives should
be easily identifiable and reduced in size. Intermediate objectives may be required. To minimize the
difficulties of navigation, the plan must select easily identifiable routes, axes, LD and objectives.
Furthermore, every possible aid to navigation should be provided during the deployment and the assault.

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FIRE PLAN

4. Mortars, to release the artillery for HE missions, may fire illuminating missions, but such missions
must be considered in the context of how they may diminish our night vision superiority.

WEATHER

5. Visibility changes very quickly as fog lifts or as clouds obscure bright moonlight. The plan should
provide for such changes and, in particular, for the situation where the attacking troops are suddenly
exposed to view.

RECCE

6. It is essential to allow sufficient time for recce. Ideally, all commanders down to section level see the
ground and, if possible, identify their objectives before the attack begins. Where ground recce is
impossible, air photographs, UAV information, satellite images, patrol reports and even models can help
to familiarize commanders with the ground.

CONDUCT

7. The main differences between day and night attacks are that engagements take place at shorter
ranges and junior commanders require greater initiative. Fire support elements note the location of the
assault elements from progress reports and, when possible, by personal observation. The risk of confusion
or clashes is greatest when a subunit passes through another. Continued improvements in situational
awareness system technology and combat identification capabilities will significantly enhance SA and
allow for greater speed and easier coordination during conditions of reduced visibility. To minimize risks
to friendly forces, the leading subunit:

a. halts on an easily identified feature;

b. consolidates quickly;

c. sends guides to the RV to meet and lead subunit(s) when passing through; and

d. employs effective recognition signals.

CONSOLIDATION

8. Consolidation is likely to take longer by night than by day. Following consolidation, the movement
of armour elements and support weapons onto the objective proceeds quickly yet carefully. Arcs of fire
may have to be confirmed with tracer fire. If the position is compact during a night attack, it may have
to disperse at first light.

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ANNEX C
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. Weather, natural disaster, environmental accidents, fragile infrastructure and a myriad other
conditions present in Canada virtually guarantee the requirement for domestic operations. Although listed
as a brigade or land force area task, it is likely that specific tasks will be given to BGs to support
the overall effort. Detailed doctrinal direction can be found in B-GJ-005-307/FP-040 Humanitarian
Operations and Disaster Relief Operations and DCDS Instruction 2/98 Domestic Operations: Canadian
Army Perspective.138

2. Although domestic operations may not require significant warfighting skills, they demand excellent
leadership, initiative, flexibility, the ability to improvise and a capacity to work in close cooperation
with civil authorities. Polls of the Canadian public have indicated that domestic operations, at least from
their perspective, are the most important operations that the Canadian Forces do. Therefore, these
operations are very high profile and serve to influence public opinion as to the value and relevancy of the
Canadian Forces.

CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

3. Types of Operations. Domestic operations embrace all those military activities to provide temporary
support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law and are normally undertaken when unusual
circumstances or an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Such support can cover
a wide range of activities from humanitarian assistance in time of disaster to restoration of law and order.
Specific operations are:

a. Provision of Services. Units may support community-based activities with short-term loans of
items such as tents or mobile cooking facilities for such events as municipal celebrations and
youth organization jamborees. This type of assistance must not adversely affect CF training or
readiness, compete with commercial alternatives or create a charge against the public.

b. Humanitarian Assistance. This is any action taken to save lives, prevent human suffering or
mitigate property damage. BGs will most likely be involved in conducting humanitarian
assistance in response to a natural or man-made disaster or other civil emergency such as
searching for a lost child. In such emergencies, BGs could be expected to provide, or coordinate
the provision of medical support, potable water, food, fuel, field kitchens, shelters, transportation,
hygiene, heaters, lighting, generators, communications support, engineer support, emergency
shelter, emergency clothing and blankets, and cots.

c. Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies. There may be circumstances where municipal,

provincial/territorial or federal law enforcement agencies seek CF assistance in discharging their
duties. Normally the request will for a unique capability that is held by the Canadian Forces. There
may also be situations where the Canadian Forces are requested to provide resources to support
the enforcement of federal laws or maintain public safety. As an example, the CF has provided
aviation support to counter-drug operations conducted by provincial and federal police forces.

138.  This directive can be found online through the Army Electronic Library (AEL).

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d. Aid of the Civil Power. Canadian provinces and territories do not maintain military forces and
have no internal recourse for situations beyond the control of their law enforcement agencies.
Therefore, each province and territory has the power, under the National Defence Act Part XI,
to requisition the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to take action to restore the authority of the
civil power, if the attorney general of that province or territory declares in writing that a
disturbance of the peace is, or is likely to be, beyond the capability of its law enforcement
agencies to deal with.

4. Principles. Domestic operations are governed by the following principles:

a. Last Recourse. The CF is not a replacement for an already existing civil capability. The CF is
the resource of last recourse to civil authorities at both the provincial/territorial and federal
levels. The CF is particularly capable of providing logistics, transportation, information gathering
and communications support, which can be used to support the responsible agency that has
jurisdiction over the emergency situation.

b. Maintenance of Military Chain of Command. Members of the CF employed on aid of the civil
power will act only as members of military units under military command and are individually
liable to follow the orders of their superior officers.

c. Role of Commanders. The key role of commanders is to support the responsible civil authorities
in planning and effective management within their mandate and responsibility. The consideration
of a request to provide military manpower and equipment should happen only after the
commander has determined that civilian alternatives are not available.

d. Civil Authority Primacy. Regardless of the domestic operation, the CF must be in a support
role to the civil authority. There must be no perception that the military has usurped the legitimate
civilian responsibility.

e. Situational Awareness. Commanders must consistently assess the situation, not only to
ensure that the CF is providing the required support, but also to determine when the situation
improves to the point that the civil authorities have the integral capability to conduct the
operation without CF assistance.

5. Figure 10C-1 provides an aide-memoire for domestic operations that may be useful if the BG is tasked.

10C-2

ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
Provision of Services—
non-crisis community activities
Search and Rescue (SAR)
Primary—CF mission for
aeronautical and maritime
SAR incidents
Civil Disasters
- floods
- forest fires
- hurricanes
- landslides
- earthquakes
- ice and snow storms
Response to Environmental
Emergencies
Other Humanitarian
- Missing persons
- Mercy flights
- Air transportation of patients
- Transportation of vital medical
resources
- Recompression facilities
- Diver assistance
Law enforcement operations
Class 1—where a disturbance
of the peace is occurring or may
occur, and where the support is
in the form of CF personnel and/
or operational equipment
Figure 10C-1: (Sheet 1 of 2) Staff Aide-memoire for Domestic Operations
WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO
MAKE REQUEST
Anyone
Information may come from
any source
Requests from appropriate
provincial/territorial agencies
Direction from federal government
Environment Canada
Provincial/territorial premier/
cabinet minister/law enforcement
agency (LEA)
Federal minister/deputy minister/
LEA
Civilian agencies
Federal Solicitor General
KEY CF QUESTIONS
What, where and when?
What, when and where?
What, where, when?
What, where, when?
What, when, and where?
Have all other sources of support
been investigated and found
unable to cope?
Is the requester prepared to pay
for CF costs, if the authorizing
commander chooses to recover
them?
What, where, when?
Status of provincial/territorial
attorney general’s formal request
to Federal Solicitor General?
IMMEDIATE CF ACTION
None—direct to nearest
appropriate CF HQ
Immediately direct request to
Regional Coordination Centre
(RCC) Victoria, Trenton or Halifax
as applicable
Inform chain of command
including applicable land force
area (DIV) / Canadian Forces
Northern Area (CFNA) HQ
Support as necessary to
save lives
As requested in accordance with
(IAW) memorandum of
understanding (MOU)
Inform applicable operational-
level HQ, usually DIV/CFNA
ASSISTANCE TO PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Inform through chain of command
to National Defence Operations
Centre (NDOC). No support to
be provided until CDS directs
NORMAL CF APPROVAL
AUTHORITY
GENERAL
Lowest possible—also
responsible for saying no
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
RCC Search Master
Operational-level HQ
(usually DIV/CFNA)
Operational-level HQ
(usually MARLANT/MARPAC)
Operational-level HQ
Must be approved by Minister
of National Defence (MND)
NORMAL CF RESPONSE
Subject to availability of CF
capability, discretionary by
authorizing commander.
SAR normally on 30 min notice Applicable RCC
to move (NTM) during normal
working hrs, 2 hrs NTM otherwise.
Provincial/territorial emergency
measurers organization (EMO)
has jurisdiction. CF will be in
supporting role, and respond
to provincial/territorial requests
Subject to availability of
CF capability
Subject to availability of capability, Operational-level HQ
discretionary by authorizing
commander.
CDS will direct level of CF support
and level of force authorized for
CF personnel
NORMAL ASSIGNED CF OPI
Lowest possible level
Usually DIV/CFNA. If magnitude
of disaster warrants, may be
National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) controlled
Operational-level HQ
(usually MARLANT/ MARPAC)
CDS will direct. Operational-level
HQ normally designated as
operational commander
B-GL-321-005/FP-001
COST RECOVERY REMARKS
AUTHORITY
Provision of Services Policy.
Provision of Services Policy.
Authorizing commander may
choose to recover less than full
cost. If NDHQ controlled, federal
government may direct cost
recovery policy
Provision of Services Policy MOU between Environment
Canada and the Department
of National Defence (DND)
Provision of Services Policy.
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B-GL-321-005/FP-001
ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
Law enforcement operations
Class 2—where a disturbance
of the peace is occurring or may
occur, and where the support
is limited to non-operational
equipment
Law enforcement operations
Class 3—where there is no
potential for a disturbance of
the peace, where the support is
in the form of CF personnel and/
or operational or non-operational
equipment
Support to police forces for
other than law enforcement
operations Class 4—where
the support is in the form of CF
personnel and/or operational or
non-operational equipment, or
the use of ranges, training areas
or other infrastructure facilities.
ASSISTANCE TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Fisheries Enforcement Actions
Counter-drug (CD)
Operations— impromptu
interdiction operations
Correctional Services Canada
(CSC)
Counter-terrorism
NDA Part XI—Aid of the
Civil Power
Figure10C-1: (Sheet 2 of 2) Staff Aide-memoire for Domestic Operations
10C-4
WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO
MAKE REQUEST
Provincial/Territorial
Attorney General
Provincial/Territorial
Attorney General
LEAs
Fisheries and Oceans Canada
Federal Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP)
Federal Solicitor General /
Commissionaire of Penitentiaries
Federal Solicitor General
Provincial/territorial attorney
general
KEY CF QUESTIONS
Meets criteria for class
of support?
Potential to escalate to Class 1?
Meets criteria for Class
of support?
Potential to escalate to Class 1?
n/a
When, where and what?
When, where and what?
When and, where?
For federal penitentiaries only.
What, when and where?
What, when and where?
Identification and contact point
of individual making requisition
IMMEDIATE CF ACTION
Inform through chain of command
to applicable operational-level HQ
Inform through chain of command
to applicable operational-level HQ
n/a
Inform NDOC
Inform NDOC for Canadian
Forces Liaison Officer
(CF LO) RCMP
Inform through chain of command
to NDOC
Inform through chain of command
to NDOC
Inform through chain of command
to NDOC
NORMAL CF APPROVAL NORMAL CF RESPONSE NORMAL ASSIGNED CF OPI COST RECOVERY REMARKS
AUTHORITY AUTHORITY
MND. Operational-level commander Operational-level HQ
will direct level of CF support
(MND has delegated to CDS.
CDS has delegated to
operational-level HQ
commanders)
MND. Operational-level commander Operational-level HQ
will direct level of CF support
(MND has delegated to CDS.
CDS has delegated to
operational-level HQ
commanders)
Provision of Services Policy, n/a lowest level practical Provision of Services Policy Support provided must not form
may be limited by chain the basis for any support to law
of command enforcement operations without
a formal request under Classes 1,
2, or 3
CDS IAW MOU MARLANT/MARPAC IAW MOU MOU between DND and Fisheries
and Oceans Canada
CDS IAW MOU Canada Command IAW MOU MOU between DND and Sol Gen
CDS CDS will direct level of support, Applicable DIV commander IAW Officer In Charge (OIC) OIC for CF assistance to CSC
usually IAW standing plans
maintained by DIVs
CDS CDS will direct level of support CDS
CDS CDS will direct level of support CDS n/a
 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

GLOSSARY139

Activity

Tactical level missions assigned to formations and units and are realized through tactical tasks and
effects. In line with the continuum of operations construct, activities are classified as offensive,
defensive, stability or enabling.

Adversary

A malicious entity or person who offers opposition in the achievement of friendly goals. A local
population that acts in support of an irregular group, without taking up arms, can be more correctly
termed an adversary rather than the enemy. (DTB, 22811, modified)

Agility

The capability of a unit or formation to be flexible, responsive, adaptive and show initiative during
times of uncertainty and change.

Area of influence (A of I)

A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations

by manoeuvre, information operations, or fire support systems under his command or control.
(DTB, record 3523)

Area of interest (AI)

The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations,
including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.
(DTB, record 3525) The AI includes JIMP activities within and adjacent to the AO.

Area of operations (AO)

A geographic area defined by lateral and rear boundaries within which a commander has the
authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. At the BG level, an AO and AOR are
considered synonymous. (DTB, records 3528 and 33766)

Area of responsibility (AOR)

A geographical area of ground, sea or air under the command of a commander who has the
necessary authority and power to exercise it. This responsibility is normally extended to intelligence
collection, conduct of operations, control of movements and possibly the maintenance and protection
of facilities, but it can also be limited to a specific domain. (DTB, record 34612)

139. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all definitions are sourced from B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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B-GL-321-005/FP-001

Attached for administration

Means the gaining unit or formation has full authority to direct, and responsibility for, all the logistics
and personnel support matters of the attached unit or element.

Attached for daily maintenance

Attached for a daily maintenance is a relationship in which the gaining command has authority to
direct and responsibility for meeting the routine requirements for combat supplies of the attached
unit or element.

Axis of advance

A line in the direction of the advance assigned for purposes of control; often a road or a group
of roads or a designated series of locations, extending in the direction of the enemy.
(DTB, record 7773)

Basic load

The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and which can be moved by, a unit
or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation
and maintained at the prescribed levels. (DTB, record 229)

Battle

A series of related tactical engagements. (DTB, record 27933)

Battlespace

The area of interest that includes both the physical and moral planes, and the electromagnetic
spectrum. It consists of the commander’s area of operations, area of influence, and area of interest.
(DTB, record 35045)

Battle group (BG)

An ad hoc and temporary combined arms organization based on a manoeuvre unit HQ and consisting
of a combination of integral and attached infantry and armour subunits, with their integral service
support elements. It is optimized for missions and tasks requiring protected manoeuvre and the
holding of ground. Support and additional service support elements may be attached as the superior
commander deems necessary. (DTB, record 19586)

Battle position (BP)

The ground where a defending unit or subunit fights a battle. (DTB, record 20141)

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 B-GL-321-005/FP-001

Bound

A single movement, usually from cover to cover, made by troops often under enemy fire. A bound is
completed on a tactical feature that a commander may use to control the manoeuvre of his forces.
(DTB, record 3684)

Boundary

These define the area of responsibility for a unit or subunit. (DTB, record 214)

Campaign

A series of military operations in one theatre of operations designed to achieve a specific military
strategic objective. (DTB, record 18743)

Campaign themes

The predominant campaign themes are:

Major combat. Combat that is frequent, widespread and intense.

Counter-insurgency (COIN). Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and

civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (DTB, record 3941)

Peace support. An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means,
normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain
peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations. (DTB, record 22802)

Peacetime military engagement. Military activity in peacetime that involves cooperation with other
nations or agencies, primarily intended to shape the security environment. (DTB, record 32316)

Limited intervention. Operations that have limited objectives and scope, such as the rescue of
hostages, security and/or evacuation of non-combatants, re-establishing of law and order, or
providing disaster relief. They are usually conducted with a specific, limited aim and for a short
duration, often a number of days. Due to their limited scope, they are not true military campaigns.
They may occur at point along the spectrum of conflict and may occur while other operations are
occurring in the same area. Most domestic operations are classified as limited intervention. (DTB,
record 33850)

Centre of gravity

Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other
grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (DTB, record 324)

Cohesion

The bonding together of members of a unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment
to each other, their unit, and the mission.

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B-GL-321-005/FP-001

Combat elements

Those elements of a force which have an integrated ability to employ manoeuvre to engage
the enemy directly.

Combat power

The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply
against the opponent at a given time. (DTB, record 3815)

Combat support (CS) elements

Those elements of a force which provide fire support, operational assistance and enablers to tactical
activities conducted by combat elements.

Combat service support (CSS)

The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.
(DTB, record 409)

Combat service support (CSS) elements

Those elements of a force which provide administrative and logistics support to tactical activities
conducted by manoeuvre elements.

Combat team (CBT TM)

An ad hoc and temporary combined arms organization based on a manoeuvre subunit HQ, and
consisting of a combination of integral and attached infantry and armour sub-subunits. It is optimized
for missions and tasks requiring protected manoeuvre and the holding of ground; and may have
support and additional service support elements attached as the superior commander deems
necessary. (DTB, record 271)

Combined arms

A combination of two or more arms in mutual support to produce complementary and reinforcing
effects that neither can obtain separately. (DTB, record 27642) Sometimes known as “all-arms.”

Combined arms grouping

A grouping of disparate arms or weapon systems which are combined and synchronized in
a balanced mix of operational function to fulfil a specific mission. Also referred to as an all-arms
grouping. A BG is a tactical combined arms grouping.

Complex environment

A battlespace with a mix of geographic, environmental and human factors that collectively
and significantly complicate the conduct of operations. (DTB, record 27425)

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Continuum of operations

A conceptual framework that explains the relationship between campaigns and tactical activities
that constitute their conduct. Specifically, it places missions within the broader context of a campaign
line of operations in which the land forces have a lead or supporting role. It includes four major
concepts: Spectrum of Conflict; Predominant Campaign Themes; Types of Operations; and
Simultaneity. (DTB record 35676 and 41381)

Core function

Dynamic functions which form the basis of any activity which seeks to attack an adversary’s cohesion
or affect the will of an adversary and other targets. The four core functions are:

Find. The core function which endures throughout an operation and involves locating, identifying,
tracking and assessing a target, adversarial or otherwise.

Fix. The core function which is undertaken to deny an enemy’s freedom of action while preserving
or increasing our own ability to manoeuvre. (DTB, record 27723)

Strike. The core function which is undertaken through offensive activities on the physical
or psychological planes, or a combination of the two. (DTB, record 5440)

Exploit. The implicit core function which involves the seizure of an opportunity to achieve a higher
commander’s objective, or fulfil part of his intent, directly. (DTB, record 27715)

Culminating point

That point in an operation or campaign at which a force’s fighting power is about to be exhausted
and any further operations will risk tactical or even operational failure. (DTB record, 30389)

Day of supply (DOS)

A unit or quantity of supplies adopted as a standard of measurement, used in estimating the average
daily expenditure under stated conditions. It may also be expressed in terms of a factor, that
is rounds of ammunition per weapon per day. (DTB, record 15719)

Decisive actions

Those actions that will directly achieve the commander’s intent.

Decisive point

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist
in time, space or the information environment. (DTB, record 18747)

Defensive operation

Those tactical activities that resist enemy offensive operations.

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Direct fire systems (DFS)

Mobile support weapons, including antiarmour weapons systems.

Echelon system

The BG echelon system is the organization of CSS elements to provide that integral, organic support
required by a BG CO to deal with tasks of immediate concern to his operations. It is based upon:

F Echelon. The soldiers, weapons, equipment and vehicles essential for combat.

A Echelon. The soldiers, equipment, services, vehicles and supplies required for day-to-day
sustainment, maintenance and administration of the unit or formation. In the case of the BG, the
A echelon is largely based upon the CSS subunit.

A1 Echelon. This includes that portion of the echelon that provides the subunit commander
with moment-to-moment resupply and resources to accomplish the mission. This is normally
found one tactical bound behind the F echelon; and

A2 Echelon. Contains that portion of the A echelon required to provide the daily resupply of the
subunit.

B Echelon. In certain operations those elements not required for the hour-to-hour support of the BG
may be grouped as a B echelon which would be located in a forward support area or base. (Definitions
from B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Sustainment of Land Operations)

Effects framework

The structure used to describe and link tactical operations though the commander’s scheme of
manoeuvre. It is a tool that allows a commander to synchronize the activities of his force by purpose
over time and space. Within the framework, activities are described in terms of purpose as:

Decisive operations. Those activities which directly achieve the commander’s intent. There is only
one decisive activity for any operation or battle.

Shaping operations. Those activities which favourably shape the enemy and battlespace for the
decisive operation.

Sustaining operations. Those activities which ensure that a force has adequate resources
to project combat power throughout and beyond the accomplishment of the decisive operation
and any following exploitation.

Electronic protection

Is the division of EW involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities and
equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade,
neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability.

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Electronic warfare attack

Is the division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or
destroying enemy combat capability. An electronic attack is considered a form of fire.

Enabling operations

Those tactical activities that link, support or create the conditions for other operations (offensive,
defensive or stability).

Engagement

Combat which involves direct and/or indirect fire. A series of related tactical engagements comprise
a battle. (DTB, record 22812)

Enemy

A hostile force that actively seeking our defeat. (DTB, record 27432)

Fighting power

Fighting power is the ability to fight and is composed of three interrelated components: a physical,
moral and intellectual component.

Fires

Physical activities which consume resources and produce immediate effects on the physical plane
through force. Fires can include both lethal and less-lethal systems. (DTB, record 33777)

Formation

A grouping of several units, together with dedicated command and command support elements.
They normally consist of units of several arms and services and thus will consist of combat, CS and
CSS elements. (DTB, record 592)

Full command

Is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers
every aspect of military operations and administration. This degree of command cannot be delegated
outside of our national chain of command (eg, delegated to a NATO commander).

Full-spectrum operations

The simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict. (DTB, record
37434) Also refers to the concept of “three-block war.”

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Ground manoeuvre reconnaissance (GMR)

A set of activities conducted by land operations forces that assist the commander in defining
and shaping the battlespace.

Harbour

An area that permits dispersal and concealment, during rest, maintenance, replenishment or other
administrative activities. (DTB, record 7725)

Hide

The location that troops occupy prior to moving to battle or fire positions. (DTB, record 19709)

Intent

The link between the mission and the concept of operations, intent is the description of how
a commander visualizes the battle unfolding from the current state until the achievement of the end
state. (B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations)

Joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP)

Usually used in the phrase “the JIMP environment,” which refers to the joint, interagency, multinational
and public framework of partners who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve, within a public
environment, shared objectives. (DTB, record 34049)

Killing zone (KZ)

Areas where the terrain, reinforced with artificial obstacles allows the defender to fix and destroy
enemy forces that have been forced to concentrate (DTB, record 777). Equivalent to the NATO term
engagement area.

Key terrain

Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant. (DTB, record 4612)

Linear operations

Traditional form of combat against a conventional opponent in which there are clear front lines
and manoeuvre units operate in contiguous AOs.

Line of operation

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre
of gravity. (DTB, record 19612)

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Lines of support

In land operations, the echelon at which a combat service support function is performed. There are
four lines of support:

First line. Which is that support organic to a unit.

Second line. Which is that support organic to a formation at the brigade or division level.

Third line. Which is that support organic to the corps or national in-theatre support elements.

Fourth line. Which is that support provided from national base-level organizations.

Main effort

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area where a commander seeks to bring about
a decision. (DTB, record 33094)

Maintenance load

The quantity of second line stocks, held on wheels, required to sustain a formation for a given
period. (DTB, record 7867). Note that as with the basic load, the maintenance load can be adjusted
to suit the needs of the commander’s plan.

Manoeuvre

Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential,
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
(DTB, record 4717) An element of the Act operational function.

Manoeuvre warfare

A war fighting philosophy and approach to operations that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering
his moral and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than
by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.

Manoeuvrist approach to operations

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is
paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking
originality, is combined with a resolute determination to succeed. Also known as manoeuvre warfare.

Mission analysis

The logical process for extracting and deducting from a superior’s orders, the tasks necessary
to fulfil a mission. (DTB, record 21035)

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Mission command

The philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative
to subordinate commanders. (DTB, record 21037)

Mobility

A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while
retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. (DTB, record 3114)

Modularity

The adding or removing elements from a unit or formation, without significantly changing that unit
or formation’s capability to successfully complete those tasks for which it is optimized.

Movement

The activity involved in the change in location of personnel, equipment or stocks as part of a military
operation.

Non-lethal weapon

A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate or repel persons or to
disable equipment, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury and damage to property and the
environment. (DTB, record 26986)

Non-linear operations

Operations in which manoeuvre elements usually operate in non-contiguous areas throughout the AO.

Objective

A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature,
neutralizing an adversary’s force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is
essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed. (DTB, record 3119)

Offensive operations

Those tactical activities that seek out the enemy and attack them.

Operation

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operations, tactical, service, training or administrative
military mission; or

The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Both definitions DTB, record 1053)

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Operational command (OPCOM)

OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate

commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical
command and control as the commander deems necessary.

Operational control (OPCON)

OPCON is defined as the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time
or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign operational or tactical control of those
units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the
units concerned.

Operational function

The functional capabilities of a military force, regardless of unit or formation role and level of warfare.
They include:

Command. Operational function that integrates all operational functions into a single comprehensive
strategic, operational or tactical level concept.

Sense. Operational function that provides the commander with knowledge through the integration
of those assets which collect information and then provide the analysis to produce information
and knowledge.

Act. Operational function that integrates manoeuvre, firepower, and information operations
(influence activities) to achieve the desired effects.

Shield. Operational function that provides for the protection of a force’s survivability and freedom
of action.

Sustain. Operational function that integrates strategic, operational and tactical levels of support
to generate and maintain force capability.

Operational pause

A deliberate halt taken to assist in achieving operational objectives. (DTB, record 32314) It can be
used to consolidate gains, reinforce influences, extend operational reach, or prevent culmination.

Operational reach

The distance over which military power can be effectively employed. (DTB, record 32315)

Optimization

The best compromise amongst various structural models.

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Phase line

Easily recognizable terrain features used to provide a convenient means of controlling

and coordinating movement. Phase lines should be at right angles to an axis and be allotted
nicknames. Units normally report crossing phase lines, but do not halt unless specifically directed
(DTB, record 1111).

Report line

A line at which troops, after have reached it, must report to their command echelon.
(DTB, record 1240)

Scalability

The ability of a unit or formation to handle complexity. That complexity could be the result of
adding non-core elements to a unit or formation, or it could be the result of the operating
environment—operations within the joint or multinational environment as an example.

Shaping action

Those actions that favourably shape the enemy and battlespace for the decisive action.

Specialization

Specifically designed and highly skilled at the conduct of certain special activities.

Spectrum of conflict

The environment within which operations occur, discriminated on the basis of prevalence, scale and
intensity of conflict. (DTB, record 35238)

Stability operations

Those tactical activities that are conducted to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order.

Subunit

A subunit is a subdivision of a unit normally commanded by a field grade office in the rank of major.
It consists of a number of platoons or troops. A subunit is the smallest manoeuvre element of a land
force that may contain the integral combat power, command authority, and CSS to complete tactical
tasks independently for up to 72 hours. At the subunit level, full-spectrum operations (FSO)
will likely be conducted sequentially, vice simultaneously.

Sustaining actions

Those actions that ensure that the formation has adequate resources to retain combat power
beyond the accomplishment of the decisive action.

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Sustainment

The provision, maintenance and administration of personnel, materiel, health services

and infrastructure to maintain the combat power of a military force. (DTB, record 41394)

Synchronization

The arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce overwhelming
combat power at critical points on the battlefield. (DTB, record 37147)

Tactical activity

Those tangible undertakings meant to create desired effects or results. Operations are subdivided
into tactical activities, which in turn are assigned to units and subunits, usually through specific
tactical tasks.

Tactical command (TACOM)

TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to assigned forces for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Tactical control (TACON)

TACON is the detailed, and usually local, direction and control of movements or manoeuvres
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Tactical security

The measures necessary to deny information to the enemy and to ensure that a force retains
its freedom of action and is warned or protected against an unexpected encounter with the enemy
or an attack.

Tempo

The rhythm or rate of activity in operations. (DTB, record 32321) It has three elements—speed
of decision, speed of execution and the speed of transition from one activity to another.

Unit

The smallest group capable of independent operations over long periods. It contains integral
command support and CSS elements, and the required maturity and level of command. Integral or
organic CSS normally provides “first line” support only. A unit tasked to operate independently over
an extended period of time or distance may have their integral support echelon reinforced or
be assigned integral “second line” CSS.

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Visualization

A commander’s core mental process that supports his decision-making process. It is the clear
understanding of the current state with relation to the enemy and the environment, from which
a commander envisions an end state and the sequence of activities to achieve that end state.

Vital ground

Ground of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of the mission.
(DTB, record 1529)

Waiting area

These are selected areas along the axis/route used for dispersal, concealment of vehicles
and troops and for control of movement. (DTB, record 14627)

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