Workshop Poetry and Philosophy, on Plato’s Protagoras

th
Rome, 18 October 2013

Fi di g the ‘eal Si o ides. A ‘eading of Protagoras 338e-348c

Elena Irrera (University of Bologna)

1. Setting the issue

In the central section of the Protagoras, Socrates and Protagoras are portrayed by Plato as
confronting each other on the issue of virtue and its teachability within an extremely challenging
theoretical battlefield: the one represented by the critical exegesis of poetic compositions. Being
strongly convinced that a man’s education, in its greatest part, consists in being skilled in the matter
of poetic verses (Prot. 338e7-8), Protagoras invites his interlocutor to transpose their joint
investigation on virtue to the sphere of poetry and to critically reflect on the content of a work
written by Simonides. The sophist, who openly admits to be a teacher of virtue (Prot. 316c5-d3;
317b2-5; 318a5-8), has just taken on the initiative to resume discussion by question and answer,
having previously experienced a temporary impasse due to Socrates’ initial refusal (and professed
inability) to accommodate himself to the discursive strategies endorsed by the sophist1. Coming to
an agreement with the philosopher, also thanks to the help of the other participants in the meeting at
ἑallias’ house, Protagoras accepts to hold a leading role in the conversation, illustrating the main
tenets of Simonides’ poem and asking Socrates to express his judgment on the mentioned verses.
As it seems, Protagoras’ ultimate goal is to lead his interlocutor to accept the view that a
supposed logical inconsistency occurs in the text with regard to the verses contained in two
different strophes. In the first strophe (Prot. 339b1-32), Simonides claims that

For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard,

In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Fashioned without reproach3.

In the second strophe (Prot. 339c3-5), he states:

Yet Pittacus’ familiar words, I find, do not

Ring true, though they come from a wise man;
It is hard, he said, to be noble4.

1
In Prot. 334c7-γγ5cθ Plato represents Socrates as openly displaying signs of intolerance towards Protagoras’ tendency
to answer the questions he poses by way of long speeches, which tend to lead the interlocutor astray from the focus of
discussion.
2
Cfr. fragment 37 of E. Diehl (ed. by), Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, Lipsia, Teubner, 1954.
3
In this paper I shall draw on two different translations. Translation of this passage is by W.R.M. Lamb (Protagoras, in
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.
1967. The edition of the Greek text I will employ is N. Denyer (ed. by) Plato. Protagoras, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
4
Translation of this passage is by B.A.F. Hubbard&EέSμ Karnofsky (edsέ), Plato’s Protagoras. A Socratic Commentary,
London, Duckworth, 1982.
At a prima facie reading, one might be tempted to conclude (just as Protagoras does) that, by
criticising the wise man Pittacus and his ideal of the morally virtuous man, Simonides appears to
contradict himself. How can he claim that it is indeed hard to become a good man and, in the same
poem, attack Pittacus for expressing the same view? Socrates’ faltering attitude in his responding to
Protagoras is soon replaced by a firm, autonomous line of interpretation on his part. The brevity of
his initial answers makes room for a wide speech, crafted in the hope to restore coherence to the
poem.
Remarkably enough, the different exegetical solutions proposed respectively by Protagoras
and Socrates seem to provide a fresh start to the investigation of virtue. Their approach proves
radically different from those adopted in the previous sections of the dialogue. Although in Prot.
320c2-328d2 the sophist has already drawn on the domain of poetry, introducing a mythical
narration5 on the origin of mankind and its most distinctive values, aidōs and dikē, followed by an
explanatory logos, his display of skill in the poetic craft has turned into a mere unidirectional
illustration, one to which no critical reply by Socrates is offered. Only within the frame of a
confrontation between Protagoras’ and Socrates’ opposing interpretations of Simonides’ poem
poetry becomes a suitable ground on which attempts of dialogic convergence between rivals can be
experienced. Shared attention is paid by Socrates and Protagoras on different and seemingly
incompatible pictures of the morally good man; this time, equal is the footing on which each of
them approaches the poem. Viewed under this light, poetry (and, in the case at hand, Simonides’
poem) might turn out to be a vehicle for an interesting pedagogical experiment, not simply because
of the ethical themes it contains (i.e. themes which get interiorized by those who read and study it),
but also and especially for the possibility to be used by contestants as an opportunity to cultivate a
respectful dialogical interaction.
The analyses undertaken by the two main characters certainly display different and
incompatible standpoints on the possible internal consistency of Simonides’ poem; even more, what
emerges through their words is a substantial divergence on the appropriate way to pursue an
exegetical experiment. For instance, Protagoras demonstrates to place high attention on a few
isolated verses, without considering the poem from an overall point of view. By contrast, Socrates
appears committed to a more detailed analysis, which involves a critical reading of verses that
Protagoras omits to mention. Even more, he reveals the importance of an interpretation able to
prevent the reader from losing sight of the text as a whole6, and this facilitates the chance to solve
puzzles without having to admit that the poet is falling into glaring contradiction. Despite such
differences, a trait which Socrates seems to share with Protagoras is a substantial lack of interest
towards the prospect of a rigorous reconstruction of the original message conveyed by Simonides’
poem In the second strophe (Prot. 339c3-5), he states:

Yet Pittacus’ familiar words, I find, do not

Ring true, though they come from a wise man;

5
The question as to whether the myth is an authentically Protagorean creation has sparked endless debate among
scholars. According to some, the speech my owe some insights to a book by Protagoras entitled On how things were
originally arranged (see fragment DK κί A Iέ55)έ See for instance Denyer’s (citέ) commentary on the Protagoras at p.
99; cfr. A. Levi, 'The ethical and social thought of Protagoras', Mind 49(1940), pp. 281-299. I personally believe that
there is no basis in the text on which to decide.
6
For a well-articulated comparison between the two rival exegetical approaches see F.M. Giuliano, ‘Esegesi letteraria
in Platone: la discussione sul carme simonideo nel Protagora’, Studi ἑlassici e τrientali 1λλ1(XδI), ppέ 1ί5-187.
It is hard, he said, to be noble7.

At a prima facie reading, one might be tempted to conclude (just as Protagoras does) that, by
criticising the wise man Pittacus and his ideal of the morally virtuous man, Simonides appears to
contradict himself. How can he claim that it is indeed hard to become a good man and, in the same
poem, attack Pittacus for expressing the same viewς Socrates’ faltering attitude in his responding to
Protagoras is soon replaced by a firm, autonomous line of interpretation on his part. The brevity of
his initial answers makes room for a wide speech, crafted in the hope to restore coherence to the
poem.
Remarkably enough, the different exegetical solutions proposed respectively by Protagoras
and Socrates seem to provide a fresh start to the investigation of virtue. Their hermeneutical
approach proves radically different from those adopted in the previous sections of the dialogue.
Although in Prot. 320c2-328d2 the sophist has already drawn on the domain of poetry, introducing
a mythical narration8 on the origin of mankind and its most distinctive values, aidōs and dikē,
followed by an explanatory logos, his display of skill in the poetic craft has turned into a mere
unidirectional illustration, one to which no critical reply by Socrates is offered. Only within the
frame of a confrontation between Protagoras’ and Socrates’ opposing interpretations of Simonides’
poem poetry becomes a suitable ground on which attempts of dialogic convergence between rivals
can be experienced. In fact, as Protagoras declares at Prot. 339a1-3, to be an expert in poetical
matters amounts to being able to capture in the utterances of the poets what has been rightly and
what wrongly composed, and account from them when questioned. However, this does not
necessarily involve a willingness to hearken back to what the poet originally meant to say.
Notably, Socrates does not seem to depart from Protagoras’ attitudeέ In Prot. 340a7 and
340d6 he speaks about interpreting Simonides in terms of making corrections (epanorthōma) on his
poem, which might betray a lack of concern for restoring its original meaning on his part. If we
assume that neither Socrates nor Protagoras appear to be interested in the original spheres of
meaning enclosed in Simonides’ poem, we might wonder whether the Platonic dialogue under
examination affords readers insight into Simonides’ original intentions. Also, a set of
interdepending questions might be elicited: (i) Does Simonides endorse an internally consistent
view of moral goodness? (ii) does Socrates’ view of virtue and the possibility of its attainment
match Simonides’ own view on the topic? If so, to what extent?
In this paper I shall argue that Socrates’ discussion of Simonides’ poem, if backed up by other
testimonies on the poet that have come down to us from secondary sources external to the dialogue,
provides the reader sufficient clues for a reconstruction of its original sense. More to the point, in
the first part of my discussion I shall contend that:

1) Plato’s attempt to restore the internal consistency of the poem by drawing a conceptual
distinction between “being good” and “becoming good” is a voluntary misinterpretation of

7
Translation of this passage is by ἐέAέόέ ώubbard&EέSμ Karnofsky (edsέ), Plato’s Protagoras. A Socratic commentary,
London, Duckworth, 1982.
8
The question as to whether the myth is an authentically Protagorean creation has sparked endless debate among
scholars. According to some, the speech my owe some insights to a book by Protagoras entitled On how things were
originally arranged (see fragment DK κί A Iέ55)έ See for instance Denyer’s (citέ) commentary on the Protagoras at p.
99; cfr. A. Levi, 'The ethical and social thought of Protagoras', Mind 49(1940), pp. 281-299. I personally believe that
there is no basis in the text on which to decide.
 his text. Simonides believes that it is difficult not only to become good, but also to be good
in a stable way.
2) In the first set of Simonidean verses mentioned by Protagoras, Simonides tries to convey a
view of the morally perfect man by undertaking a re-conceptualisation of the archaic view of
the Greek hero in the light of Pythagorean insights. I maintain that such a re-
conceptualisation, although presenting many aspects of conventionality in relation to poems
composed by other lyric poets, does not involve mere reproduction of the Homeric/Hesiodic
ideal of human excellence. Special attention is devoted by Simonides to the idea that the
virtue which is hard to attain is amenable to the tradings of tychē.
3) Despite evidence to the contrary, on Simonides’ view, to say that it is difficult to become
and to be good does not involve a logical impossibility to attain virtue. What is truly
unreasonable for Simonides is a human expectation to possess virtue permanently.
4) Simonides shares with Pittacus the idea that it difficult both to become and to be virtuous,
but they diverge on the role played by luck in the human pursuit of happiness.

In the last part of this paper, I shall introduce the rest of the fragments of Simonides’ poem made
available by Plato in the Protagoras. The focus of my discussion will be the idea that, given the
exceeding degree of demandingness carried by the ideal of perfect virtue, a better solution is to stick
to a less ambitious pattern of morality:

Therefore never shall I, in quest of what cannot come to pass, vainly cast my life's lot upon a hope impracticable—of
finding a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of the broad-based earth. If I light upon him, be
sure I will report it (Prot. 345c5-11)

[…]

Good enough for me the man who’s not all bad ( ὴ α ὸ ᾖ)

Nor lawless (ἀπ α ο ) to excess,
who knows the worth of justice, bastion of cities;
a healthy man ( ): I will find no fault with him (Prot. 346c3-d13)9.

I shall argue that, 4) on closer inspection, Simonides is not proposing such an ideal of moral health
as a more profitable and convenient alternative. In other words, by admitting that only a god can be
endowed with a steady moral perfection, Simonides is not really inviting his addressees to dismiss
the demanding ideal of moral perfection in favour of a more approachable one. What is doing is
simply to fix a threshold below which a man cannot be regarded as “a moral being”έ

2. Socrates. A Faithful Interpreter?

Having being challenged by Protagoras over the supposed logical incongruity of Simonides’ claims
concerning the morally good man, Socrates attempts a rehabilitation of his poem by crafting a
philosophically engaging reconstruction of it, to the effect of emphasising its inherent consistency.
As he points out in the first stage of his exegetical speech, the apparent discrepancy can be
explained away by resorting to a semantic distinction between being (ἔ α / ἶ α ) and becoming
( α ) good. τn Socrates’ understanding, a contradiction would subsist only if Pittacus
endorsed the same view as Simonides on the hardship involved in becoming a good man. Socrates,
however, contends that this is not what Pittacus meant to claim. Invoking the help of Prodicus of

9
Translation of this passage is mine (although following largely B.A.F. Hubbard&E.S: Karnofsky (eds.), cit.).
Ceos (465 BC-395BC), one of Simonides’ most well-known fellow citizens, and drawing on his
expertise in the field of the linguistic analysis of ethical terms, at Prot. 340c3-d1 Socrates explains
that

[…] what Pittacus said was not, as Simonides said, that it is hard “to become” but “to be” good. Now being and
becoming, Protagoras, as our friend Prodicus says, are not the same thing; and if being and becoming are not the same
10
thing, Simonides does not contradict himself .

Despite his being ranked among the most illustrious representatives of the sophistic movements, the
Platonic Socrates seems to treat Prodicus and his technical knowledge with particular respect11 and
trust. Still, it is clear that, in making use of Prodicus’ insights on being and becoming, he is trying to
transcend the strict domain of a self-referential linguistic analysis. As it is attested in the following
lines, he quotes the poet Hesiod to articulate what he takes to be a properly ethical remark:

Perhaps Prodicus and many others might say with Hesiod that to become good is hard, “for Heaven hath set hard
travail on the way to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof, 'tis an easy thing to possess, though hard
before” [Hesiod, Works and Days 289] (Prot. 340d1-4).

The question then arises as to whether the internal consistency of the poem which the Platonic
Socrates12 endeavours to reconstruct relies on authentically Simonidean convictions or rather on
purely Socratic (Platonic) assumptions. An even more crucial set of questions is perhaps the
following: when Socrates expresses the need to practise an epanorthōma of the poem, what does he
mean? Does he aim to correct Protagoras’ personal view on the poem or does he rather propose to
correct Simonides’ statements? In case he means to critically ameliorate13 Simonides’ position on
virtue, does he perform such a task by making use of distinctively Socratic-Platonic assumptions?
To begin with, some interpreters of Plato’s Protagoras accept that Simonides’ song really
hangs on the contrast between becoming good and being good, although not on the same terms as
those on which Plato supports such a distinction14. It has been claimed, for example, that a clear
conceptual distinction between the verbs genesthai (to become) and einai (to be) was already well-
established in Plato’s timesέ Evidence of this has been provided by Giuliano15, who reports a
passage of Aristophanes’ Frogs (vv.1187ff.) in which the tragic poet Aeschylus reproaches
Euripides for inappropriately using the verb genesthai instead of einai16. Also, in a Scholium to

10
Translation of this passage is by W.R.M. Lamb.
11
See for instance Plato, Hippias Major βκβc, where Socrates calls Prodicus his “friend” ( αῖ ο ).
12
In this paper I will not venture to face the complex issue of the relationships between Plato and Socrates. I shall
confine myself to talking about the Platonic Socrates as a character who, without betraying the image of Socrates
conveyed by other sources, holds attitudes and beliefs consonant to Plato and his philosophical intentions.
13
The “ameliorative” meaning of epanorthōma is stressed by F.M. Giuliano, ‘Esegesi letteraria in Platone: la
discussione sul carme simonideo nel Protagora’, citέ, pέ 1γ4έ See in particular footnote 105 Cf. L. Goldberg, A
Commentary on Plato’s Protagoras, New York-Berne-Frankfurt am Main 1983, p. 1θβ, 1κ5, 1λ1, 1λγν ώέ ύundert, ‘Die
Simonides-Interpretation in Platons Protagoras’, Studien zur antìken Philosophie 7(1977), pp. 71-93 (both authors are
mentioned at footnote 1ί5 of ύiuliano’s essay)έ
14
See δέ Woodbury, ‘Simonides on aretē’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
84(1953), pp. 135-163: 140; H. Parry, ‘An Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl)’, Transactions and Proceedings of the
American Philological Association 96(1965), pp. 297-320: 306-307. For a richer list of authors who defend this view
see F.M. Giuliano, ‘Esegesi letteraria in Platone: la discussione sul carme simonideo nel Protagora’, citέ, p. 141,
footnote 139.
15
See F.M. Giuliano, ‘Esegesi letteraria in Platoneμ la discussione sul carme simonideo nel Protagora’, citέ, pέ 14γέ
16
See Aristophanes, Frogs, vv. 1182-1188. Euripides says: «At first was Oedipus a prosperous man»
(ἦ Οἰ που ὸ π ῶ ο α ω ἀ ). Aeschylus replies that this cannot be so, given his lack of good luck even
before he was born. So Euripides: «Then he became in turn the wretchedest of mortals»
Iliad VI, 98, we learn that Homer, in having Helenus claim that Diomedes became the mightiest of
the Acheans, was right in using the verb genesthai instead of einai17.
Along a similar line, scholars like Schwartz, Woodbury and Parry18 have argued that the
verb genesthai was employed by poets almost as a “technical” term, which would refer to the act of
displaying virtue throughout difficulties (mostly an act of military nature)19. In other words,
genesthai would be regarded as a different verb from einai/emmenai (i.e. verbs which, by contrast,
express a stable condition) insofar as it evokes the image of courageous people who expose
themselves to high risks in the battlefield and dynamically perform acts of excellence.
This established, is Simonides really grounding his argument on a dichotomy between being
and becoming? Woodbury believes that the unspoken assumption of Simonides’ argument, is the
idea that becoming virtuous is truly difficult in that, as Socrates will make known in the course of
his interpretation, luck (tychē) and, especially, bad luck, may bring obstacles to the human
acquisition of virtue20έ Unlike becoming, on Woodbury’s view, being virtuous would not be
difficult for Simonides, in that good or bad luck plays such an overpowering role on human lives
that possessing virtue or not would not depend on human efforts or good inclinations. In that case,
Socrates would try to convey the idea that it makes no sense to speak, as Pittacus does, of “being
virtuous” as a difficult thingέ
As I maintain, Woodbury’s reading of Simonides, fascinating however it might be, does not
manage to explain at least a couple of problematic questions. In the first place, if good and bad luck
are so deeply entrenched in human life and inescapably affect it, why shouldn’t we say that not only
being, but even becoming virtuous is either easy or impossible? In the second place, if Simonides
really meant to play on the distinction between being and becoming, shouldn’t he offer his
addressees more explicit advice about it? As some scholars have suggested, it is highly implausible
to think that Simonides has introduced such a subtle semantic distinction in a poem addressed to
non-philosophers by taking it for granted21.
It is my belief that, by interpreting Simonides as implicitly championing a distinction
between being and becoming, Plato is mainly attempting to direct his readers’ attention to a
philosophical issue which is distinctively ‘Platonic’, not ‘Simonidean’έ His quotation of Hesiod
may evoke his own concern for the difficulty involved in becoming truly virtuous (i.e. the concern
expressed for instance in dialogues like the Republic and the Laws), and also for the idea that
acquiring a sound disposition of character proves a necessary precondition for the practice of
intellectual contemplation. As we might evince from a joint reading of Plato’s dialogues, one of the

( ἶ᾽ ᾽ αὖ ἀ α ο ο ῶ ). Aeschylus: «Not at all; he never ceased to be»

( ὰ ὸ Δ ᾽ ο ῆ ᾽, ο ὲ οὖ πα α ο). Although failing at expressing logical beliefs on Oedipus, Euripides
expresses familiarity with the distinction between the verbs “was” and “became”έ
17
α ῶ ο ἶπ ἶ α,ἀ ὰ α.
18
See E. Schwarts, Ethik der Griechen, Stuttgart 1951, p. 24; A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. A study in
Greek Values, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. β55 footnote 1ι and β5κ footnote θλν ώέ Parry, ‘An Interpretation of
Simonides 4 (Diehl)’, citέ, pέ γίιέ δέ Woodbury, ‘Simonides on aretē’, citέ, pέ 155 footnote 44έ (Such authors are
mentioned by F.M. Giuliano, ‘Esegesi letteraria in Platoneμ la discussione sul carme simonideo nel Protagora’, citέ, p.
143).
19
Further evidence of this use is provided at Plato, Menexenus 242b6-c1.
20
See for instance Plato, Prot. 344c3-5 («While a man cannot escape being (emmenai) bad dragged down by helpless
circumstance») and 344e6-7 («For if he does well, any man is good, but bad if he does badly» (Translation of this
passage is mine (Tr. B.A.F. Hubbard&E.S: Karnofsky).
21
See εέ Dickie, ‘The Argument and όorm of Simonides 54β Pεύ’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 82
(1978), pp. 21-33: 22; U. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Sappho und Simonides. Untersuchungen über griechische
Lyriker, 2. Berlin, unveränderte Auflage, 1966, pp. 159-191, p. 167.
most forceful messages that the philosopher seems to express is that acquiring a stable disposition
of character like justice, through abidance by law and study, can offer a path to happiness. Also,
acquiring virtue involves getting out of a precarious situation in which conflicts between opposing
desires can occur within the individual soul. By contrast, Simonides suggests that, even admitting
that a man can become virtuous, such a man will stay as such only until external circumstances
allow for it. This is for instance what we learn at Prot. 344d7:

But a good man is bad sometimes as well as noble at others.

Also, becoming virtuous involves restless struggling in Simonides’ thought, and no reward seems
to be allotted in response to thisέ ἐy contrast, in Plato’s view (as well as in ώesiod), there is a time
in which toil and sacrifice make room for rest and happiness 22. Spending efforts in following an
educational path to virtue might create stable conditions which, even if not everlasting, nevertheless
are not easily shaken by negative circumstances.
It is plausible that, by making references to the role of luck in Simonides, Plato is inviting
his readers to establish comparisons between Simonides’ idea that “luck creates the man”, so to
speak with the Socratic view that good luck depends mainly on human efforts. As we read in the
Euthydemus, good luck ( υχ α ) is generally regarded (for instance by Cleinias) as the highest
among the goods that make a man happy (Euh. 279c11-12). Socrates, leading the run of the
discussion towards his own philosophical concerns, asserts that wisdom ( οφ α) is certainly to be
identified with good luck (Euth. 279d10). On his view, those who know how to practice a craft (e.g.
flute-playing, grammar, the expertise of pilots and generals or the medical craft) are those who have
most success in the good exercise of the relative task ( π α α), and one would surely prefer to
share dangerous situations with competent people, with the reasonable expectation of achieving
good outcomes (Euth. 279e1-280a9). Therefore, as Socrates claims,

…wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate: since I presume she could never err, but must needs be right
in act and result; otherwise she could be no longer wisdom (Euth. 280a10-14)23.

τn Socrates’ view, happiness cannot depend on resources provided by good luck by

themselves; a correct use is instead required. Happiness, then, is not the outcome of luck, but the
result of good practice according to knowledge and expertise:

Since we are all eager to be happy, and since we were found to become so by not only using things but using them
aright, while knowledge, we saw, was that which provided the rightness and good fortune, it seems that every man must
prepare himself by all available means so that he may be as wise as possible. Is it not so?

Yes, he said (Euth. 282a1-9).

To conclude this section, by attempting to offer an interpretation of Simonides’ poem in the

Protagoras, Plato gives his reader precious clues on how to keep the Socratic views distinct from
Simonides’ own view on virtue. Still, this is not necessary a good reason to suppose that Socrates is
22
With reference to this, see P. Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Englightenment. A Commentary on Plato’s
Protagoras, pp. 102-103. The author claims that Simonides conceives of virtue as “something difficult”, which leads to
the glorification of heroism and courage – in a word, of the active life of motion. Non-heroic virtue, by contrast, is easy
in its exercise and, as maintained by Hesiod, points to wisdom, to the contemplative life, and to rest.
23
Tr. W.R.M. Lamb in Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3. Euthydemus. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1967.
operating a correct interpretation of the poem. Whether failure at finding the real meaning of
Simonides’ poem is voluntary or not, it not a matter that will be treated in this paperέ What is
certain is that the Platonic Socrates makes use of Prodicus’ insights on being and becoming without
staying confined to the domain of a self-referential linguistic analysis. We might advance the
possibility that he is willing to build on Prodicus’ findings, and so give the reader a foretaste of a
proper ethical distinction between “becoming good”, understood in terms of “being involved in a
hard educational path” and “acquiring a stable disposition of character”, iέeέ one which, once
acquired, makes it easy for a person to perform virtuous actions.

III Simonides and the Encomium to Skopas. Two Alternative Reconstructions

Before engaging in a reconstruction of the poem and its meaning, it is perhaps appropriate to make
some short introductory remarks on the form of Simonides’ poem and the occasion of its
composition. Simonides, born in Kea island (situated in the Cyclades archipelago), presumably
from an aristocratic family, lived approximately between the 556 e il 468 a.C. Being hailed as one
of the most renowned lyric poets in ancient Greek world, he is generally regarded as the pioneer of
what has conventionally been identified as the second phase of a poetical tradition called “choral
lyric poetry”έ The label “choral lyric poetry” refers to a trend of Greek poetry whose span runs from
the poet Alcman in the archaic period (7th century B.C) to Timotheos in the classical period
(beginning of 4th century)24. Unlike purely recitative poetry, choral lyric poetry was performed in
choruses through songs, originally to the accompaniment of a lyre, and composed for a specific
occasion. The second phase of choral lyric poetry departs from the first with regard to the
circumstances of performance. Differently from the first phase, in which poems were presented
before a wide audience (who constituted their main addressee), the second phase is distinguished by
the production of poetic works specifically addressed to single individuals or to an aristocratic élite,
i.e. the same who commissioned the works themselves. The need to satisfy the expectation of the
members of such élites explains the frequent occurrence of encomiastic verses towards the
committees.
In line with this tendency, Simonides’ poems were often commissioned by tyrants or holders
of absolute power. The poem introduced in the Protagoras is addressed to Skopas, son of the
Thessalian king Creon, a man outstanding in power and wealth and yearning for celebration25. By
almost unanimous admission, the form of Simonides’ poem in the Protagoras is the encomium26.
Despite the difficulties experienced by scholars in reconstruction of its original sense and the
controversies arisen with regard to the occasion of its composition, it seems pretty plausible to state
that Skopas has asked Simonides for his opinion of Pittacus’ ideal of manhood, i.e. an ideal that
emerges from Pittacus’ claim that it is difficult to be good, and the poem would contain Simonides'
answer to him27. As it seems, it is not possible to establish with an acceptable degree of certainty
how Simonides’ claims on aretē relate to Skopas. Some scholars have suggested that Simonides’
insistence on the difficulty of being perfectly good represents a warning for the king not to be too

24
For a detailed introduction of lyrical poetry see D. Del Corno, Letteratura Greca, Milano, Principato, 1988, pp. 76-
79.
25
τn Skopas’ desire for honour and his request to Symonides see Cicero, De Oratore 2.86.352.
26
See όέεέ ύiuliano, citέ, ppέ 1ίι ffέ όor a different view see ἐowra (ἑέεέ ἐowra, ‘Simonides and Scopas’, ἑlassical
Philology 29(1934) pp. 230-239) refers to the poem as a skolion26, i.e. as one sung by invited guests at banquets.
27
See ἑέεέ ἐowra, ‘Simonides and Scopas’, citέ pέ βγίέ
self-demanding in terms of general ethical conduct28; others have instead proposed that Simonides
is endeavouring to free Scopas from an accusation of specific acts of injustice, to console him29, or
to provide him with an ethical code that may excuse a persistent policy of oppression30.
The uncertainties concerning the aims of Simonides’ poems towards Scopas should not
discourage any attempt to retrieve the original message on virtue conveyed by Simonides’ verses
and take its problematic nature into examination. Such an ambitious task requires a preliminary
investigation of the structure of the poem and a possible internal arrangement of the lines made
available by Plato in the Protagoras. Particularly controversial is the issue of the disposition of the
first two strophes. The reconstruction traditionally accepted since the 19th century is the one
reported in PMG 542.11–2031:

ἄ ᾽ἀ ὸ ὲ ἀ έ έ ό ,
ί ὶ ὶ ὶ όῳ ά ,ἄ ό
έ *

…[seven lines missingς]

***

ὐ έ ἐ έ ὸΠ ά έ ,
ί φ ῦ ὰφ ὸ ἰ έ : ὸ φά ᾽ ἐ ὸ
ἔ . ***

ὸ ἂ ό ῦ ᾽ἔ έ ,ἄ ᾽ ὐ
ἔ ὴ ὐ ὸ ἔ ,
ὃ ἂ ἀ ή φ ὰ έ ῃ.
ά ὲ ὰ ὖ ᾶ ἀ ὴ ἀ ό ,
ὸ ᾽ ἰ ῶ …

It’s hard for there to be a truly good man —perfect in hands, feet, and mind, constructed flawlessly. . . . But that saying
of Pittacus doesn’t ring true to me (even if he was a smart man): he says “being good is hard.” *** Only a god can
have that prize; with a man, there’s no way he can help being bad when some crisis that he cannot deal with knocks him
down. Any man’s good when he’s doing well in life, bad when he’s doing badly . . .32.

As suggested by Beresford, on this internal arrangement of Simonides’ poetic verses, the poet
would claim that being good is not hard (as Pittacus by contrast believes) simply because it is
impossible. In fact, only a god can enjoy such a status. In this respect, the traditional version
appears to be quite counter-intuitive, and it is mainly for this reason that Beresford goes for an

28
See H.W. Smyth (Greek Melic Poets, New York, Macmillan,1904, pp. 311-12) says that «it is uncertain whether the
poet is endeavouring to free Scopas from an accusation based on some specific act of injustice, or to furnish him with
an ethical code that may excuse a persistent policy of oppression».
29
See όor instance Dέ όrede, ‘The Impossibility of Perfectionέ Socrates’ ἑriticism of Simonides’ Poem in the
Protagoras’, Review of Metaphysics 39(1986), pp. 729-ι5γμ ιγκν cfέ ‘An Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl)’, citέ, pέ
310.
30
See . J. T. Sheppard, The "Oedipus Tyrannus" of Sophocles, Cambridge, Tresidder Publisher, 1920, according to
whom Simonides «is warning his patron against self-righteousness», p. xxxi.
31
A detailed bibliography of the debates over the text occurred from 1ιλ5 to 1λθβ is offered by ἐέ ύentili, ‘Studi su
Simonide’, Maia 16(1964): 278–304: 278.
32
I quote ἐeresford translation, from Aέ ἐeresford, ‘σobody’s Perfectμ A σew Text and Interpretation of Simonides
Pεύ 54β’, Classical Philology, 103(2008), pp. 237-256: 239.
alternative reconstruction of the poem. As he suggests, it is probably more likely that the
afterthought “ύod alone can have this privilege” at Prot. 341e3 constitutes a justification of the
extreme hardship involved in becoming good (Prot. 339b1-3)33.

Beresford, then, proposes a different order of the fragments and rearranges the whole poem
as follows:

ἄ ᾽ἀ ὸ ὲ ἀ έ έ ό ,
ί ὶ ὶ ὶ όῳ ά ,ἄ ό
έ *

ὸ ἂ ό ῦ ᾽ἔ έ ,ἄ ᾽ ὐ
ἔ ὴ ὐ ὸ ἔ ,
ὃ ἂ ἀ ή φ ὰ έ ῃ.
ά ὲ ὰ ὖ ᾶ ἀ ὴ ἀ ό ,
ὸ ᾽ ἰ ῶ ,< ᾽ ἱ ὶφ ῶ ῖ ,

ἰ ᾽ἄ ί.>

ὐ έ ἐ έ ὸΠ ά έ ,
ί φ ῦ ὰφ ὸ ἰ έ : ὸ φά ᾽ ἐ ὸ
ἔ .

ἔ ᾽ἐ ῖ
ὃ ἂ ὴ ὸ ᾖ ᾽ἄ ἀ ά , ἰ-
ώ ᾽ὀ ί ί
ὑ ὴ ἀ ή : ἐ ὼ
ή —

ῶ ὰ ἠ ί ἀ ί έ ,
ά ά, ῖ ί ᾽ ἰ ὰ ὴ έ .

᾽ἐ ὼ ὸ ὴ έ
ὸ ή ὰ ἐ ἄ-
ἐ ί ῖ ἰῶ έ ,
ά ἄ , ὐ ῦ ὅ
ὸ ἰ ύ ό :
ἐ ί ᾽ὑ ῖ ὑ ὼ ἀ έ .

ά ᾽ἐ ί ὶφ έ
ἑ ὼ ὅ ἕ ῃ
ὲ ἰ ό :ἀ ά ῃ ᾽ ὐ ὲ ὶ ά :

For a man it’s certainly hard to be truly good—perfect in hands, feet, and mind, built without a single flaw; only a god
can have that prize; but a man, there’s no way he can help being bad when some crisis that he cannot deal with takes

33
See A. Beresford, Nobody’s Perfect, citέ, pέ β44μ «The first strophe of σV [iέeέ the new version] expresses a very clear
and familiar thoughtμ “A man cannot be perfectν only god can be perfectέ ώuman beings are not flawless, and at some
point, in the face of overwhelming stresses and difficulties, are bound to act badlyέ” This is refreshingly simple and
coherent in contrast to the baffling second strophe of ST [i.e. the standard translation].
him down. Any man’s good when he’s doing well in life, bad when he’s doing badly, and the best of us are those the
gods love most.

But for me that saying of Pittacus doesn’t quite ring true (even though he was a smart man): he says “being good is
hard”; for me, a man’s good enough as long as he’s not too lawless, and has the sense of right that does cities good; a
solid guy. I won’t find fault with a man like that. After all, isn’t there a limitless supply of fools? The way I see it, if
there’s no great shame in it, all’s fair.

This is the version of Simonides’ text I accept. Still, I do so on different grounds from those made
explicit by Beresford. Beresford’s version of the poem’s arrangement is guided by the assumption
that, on Simonides’ view, being virtuous, contrary to Pittacus’ view, is an easy task, and this can be
so if we reject the ideal of a morally perfect, foursquare man, and adopt in its place an ideal of
moral goodness lower than the one introduced in the first strophe. However, I find such a view
highly implausible. First, were it so, Simonides would utterly dismiss not only Pittacus’ ideal, but
also the extremely demanding ideal of perfect goodness embodied by the tetragōnos man. In the
second place, the lower moral ideal expressed by the figure of the healthy (ugieios) man is simply
presented as the conclusion of a reflection which has stressed the negative aspects of the human
search for perfect goodness, not the ground on which Pittacus’ saying is criticised by the poetέ The
ideal of goodness Simonides has taken issue so far consists in highest ideal of virtue, not the lower
one. Were Simonides truly criticising Pittacus on the assumption that being virtuous is in fact easy,
the first attack he should have launched against him is that Pittacus has a wrong idea of what being
good means, not that he is wrong in maintaining that being virtuous in the perfect sense is hard, but
this does not seem to happen. In all probability, Pittacus endorses a demanding ideal of goodness,
not one of a virtue easily attainable, and it would make it no sense to criticise him for attributing the
property of hardness to a concept of virtue which is defended only by Simonides.

IV. An Impossible Ideal of Moral Goodness? The Tetragonōs man

Despite the difficulties I detect in ἐeresford’s theory, I believe that his way of rearranging the poem
is more logical than the standard one. It can also offer us the opportunity to work out a different
way of reinstating coherence between verses. ώaving subscribed to ἐereson’s reconstruction of
Simonides’ poem as the most plausible one, let us consider the first strophe with a view to
analysing the ideal of moral goodness encapsulated in the Poet’s assertion. The leading questions
from which my discussion will proceed are the following: (1) What kind of moral ideal is
Simonides expounding here? Does it represent a mere restatement of an archaic view of ideal
manhood (i.e., the one handed over by a number of Greek Poets starting from Homer), or does it
contain genuinely new insights on moral goodness? (2) How does Simonides relate to such an ideal
of moral perfection? Does he drop such an ideal in favour of a less demanding ideal, or do the two
ideals coexist in his views on morality? In other words, does the ideal of the perfect man persist as
reference background even when he chooses a less complex moral ideal and less rewarding in terms
of honour and self-realisation? As we have already seen, the first lines of the strophe run as follows:

ἄ ᾽ἀ ὸ ὲ ἀ έ έ ό ,
ί ὶ ὶ ὶ όῳ ά ,ἄ ό
έ . [fr. 37.1.1. Diehl]
In the above mentioned lines, Simonides states that it is hard to become truly an ἄ ὲ ἀ α ὸ . There
is no certainty as to the place and role held by the adverb ἀ α ω in the first line. One possibility,
i.e. one which Socrates regards as the most plausible, is that the adverb at issue qualifies the
adjective χα π , so that the meaning of the sentence would be the following: it is truly difficult to
become a good man (Prot. 343e2-344a4). A second reading of Simonides’ view, which Plato by
contrast dismisses, is that becoming truly good is difficult (Prot. 343d4-e2)34.
Although Plato rules this second reading away (even though, perhaps ironically) as a silly
one, one should not downplay the possibility that Simonides is really meant to distinguish the ideal
of a truly good man from a simply good man, for instance the merely “healthy” one portrayed at the
end of the poem. The image expressed by the phrase “truly good man” suits perfectly well with that
of the tetragōnos man spelled out in the first strophe of the poem. The adjectives employed by
Simonides to empower the ideal of authentic moral perfection supply it with an aristocratic nature.
By means of some conventional phrases widely used in the literature of his time, Simonides
qualifies the agathos man as physically faultless. The datives of relation chersin te kai posi (“in
hands and feet”) – and mentally (noōi) applied to the adjective tetragōnos (i.e. perfect, unshaken),
echo for instance Pindar. The lyric poet, on the one hand, stresses the combination of the
excellences of hands and feet as the featuring trait of his victorious athletes (Pyth. x. 23, chersin kai
podon arête krathsais) and also heroic prototypes such as Erginus (Ol. iv. 24-25) and Achilles
(Isthmέ viiiέ γι)ν on the other, he uses the combination of “head” and “hand” in his descriptions of
ideal manhood as embodied by men such as Aiakos (Nem. viii. 8) and in his enumerations of great
qualities (ibid. ix. 39; Pyth. i. 42)35. Notably, Simonides’ verses also evoke those of the poet
Timocreon, who, speaking of an unnamed man (possibly Themistocles), claims that such a man
outshines for excellence in hands and mind36. The conjunction of talents forms an essential part of
the archaic notion of aretē, and it is most likely that the exhibition of a coexistence of intellectual
and physical excellences paves the way for the idea that the Greek Hero, as a truly virtuous man,
made use of his wit as a guide for the use of his physical parts in view of outstanding performances
in war and, more generally, in the public life.
We might think that, by adopting the same stylistic device, Simonides expresses his
subscription to a traditional pattern of human virtue37 whose main trait, far from being completely
“moral”, consists in physical and intellectual outstandingness. The above mentioned attributes do
not necessarily entail the presence of fundamental ethical attitudes like justice, inner balance
between opposed strives and the capacity to put oneself in relation to one’s fellows without causing
any damage to them. To qualify the image of the good man illustrated by Simonides as a proper
moral ideal intervenes the use of an adjective equipped with a powerful symbolic meaning:
tetragōnos. Such an adjective, which I have already translated (following Lamb) as “four-square”,
is a distinctive coinage of the Pythagoreans, for whom the number 4 (tetras) was sacred38. As stated
by the byzantine philosopher Proclus (412 –485 AD) in his comment on Euclides’ Elements (Ad
34
See F.M. Giuliano, cit., pp. 144-145. Giuliano mentions also a third reading. Alatheōs would be referred to the whole
sentence.
35
See ἑέεέ ἐowra, ‘Simonides and Scopas’, citέ, ppέ βγ1-232.
36
PMG 727; Plutarch, Life of Themistocles 21 Bowra 231. G.P. Goold, Greek Lyric, Vo. IV, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (Massachusetts), London, England, 1992, at p. 85 reports the content of Sud. T 625 (iv 558 Adler). As we
learn from it, Timocreon, was a Rhodian and also a playwright of the Old Comedy. «He was at loggerheads with
Simonides, the lyric poet, and with Themistocles the Athenian, against whom he composed a poem of censure in lyric
metre. He wrote a comedy on the same Themistocles and the lyric poet Simonides in addition to other words».
37
This is Dickie’s position (‘The Argument and όorm of Simonides 54β Pεύ’, citέ)έ
38
See ἑέεέ ἐowra, ‘Simonides and Scopas’, citέ, pέ βγβέ
Eucl. Elem. 48 G), the old Pythagorean notion of to tetragōnon bears the image of the divine
essence. Numbers played a foundational role in the Pythagorean view of the universe and the order
inherent in nature39, and they were spatially represented by means of geometrical figures. One
figure in particular, the so-called tetraktys, was a triangle consisting of ten points arranged in four
rows, and it consisted in the geometrical representation of the number four. As a mystical symbol, is
played a central role in the secret worship of the Pythagoreans, who used to perform their initiation
ritual by swearing by it and using the following formula:

By him who gave to our soul the tetractus40

The source and root of everflowing nature

The practice of swearing by the tetratkys and the idea that the number “four” was regarded as a gift
offered to the soul of human beings suggests the existence of a strong link between the numerical
reality and the sphere of manhood. We might even suppose that the tetraktys has an explanatory
power in ethical terms. As Kahn for instance explains, in Pythagoras’ times, number patterns were
used as symbols of moral powers. In particular, number four was identified with justice (understood
as retaliation) (See DK 58B40)41.
This established, we might hypothesise that Simonides, by qualifying the agathos man as
tetragōnos, carries out a combination of two ancient ideals of outstandingness: physical and
intellectual outstandingness of Homeric inspiration on the one hand, moral excellence of
Pythagorean flavour on the other. In other words, I suggest that he is re-conceptualising and
enriching the archaic notion of goodness. Maybe it is not a case that, by outlining the view of a
tetragōnos man, Simonides uses the phrase agathos aner rather than esthlos aner (which is
introduced as a quotation by Pittacus). The adjective esthlos is massively used by lyric poets
inclined to bring out an aristocratic ideal of virtuous manhood, ranging from nobility to courage 42.
By employing the adjective agathos, Simonides might express a personal and, possibly, original
view of human moral perfection.
Having discussed the nature of the moral idea encapsulated in the figure of the tetragōnos, it
is now time to take issue with the following questionμ how does Simonides’ moral code relate to the
ideal of a perfect man? Does he express appreciation of such an ideal, although in the last lines of
his poems he takes it to be quite utopian? Or does he dismiss it on the ground that it be attained only
by a god? My idea is that, despite evidence to the contrary, Simonides does positively assess and
retain the conception of the tetragōnos man as a regulative moral ideal, even though he lately
expresses a preference for a less demanding one. I maintain that, to his understanding, such an idea
might be nearly impossible from an empirical point of view, but not totally implausible from a
logical perspective. Exceptional cases, in other words, might be admitted, even though Simonides
warns us not to indulge on direct our expectations to such an eventuality. To argue for my thesis, I
will resort to textual sources external to the Protagoras, and show that Simonides’ statements as
they appear in the Protagoras, although prima facie suggesting the need for dismissing the perfect

39
Pythagoras divined the importance of number as an aid to the construction of any representation of the conditions
involved in the order of nature (See C. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. A Brief History, Indianapolis, Hackett,
2001, p. 1).
40
See C. Kahn, cit., p. 31.
41
See C. Kahn, cit., pp. 33-34. Cf. F.M., Giuliano, cit., p. 110, who speaks of the moral worth of number 4 as the
symbol of the four cardinal virtues. Cf. also C.M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry, Oxford 1961, p. 328.
42
See H.G. Liddell-R. Scott-Jones, Oxford, Clarendon press, 1976.
ideal of the tetragōnos man, can be read as an invitation to retain such an ideal as a background
moral guide, one that should display a moral direction to follow according to human possibilities.
In the first place, I maintain that there is no reason to hold that for Simonides the ideal of the
tetragōnos man is impossible to attain. If we take an exegetical indication provided by Protagoras as
reliable, at Prot. 341d3-6 we learn that Simonides uses the adjective chalepon as meaning “not
easy”. While Criticising Prodicus for believing that chalepon is used by Simonides as “bad”,
Protagoras states:
‘That’s quite wrong’, he [Protagoras] said. ‘I know perfectly well that Simonides meant by “hard”
precisely what everyone else means: not “bad” but “that which is not easy and is accomplished
only with great effort”’43.

To corroborate the idea of a difficulty which does not end up into impossibility occurs a fragment of
Simonides (fr. 579 PMG; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata iv, 7.48), where virtue is ideally situated
in a space44 which is difficult not only to reach, but also to contemplate.

There is a tale that Merit (ἀ ) dwells on high rocks, hard to climb […] patrols the holy place.
Not all men’s eyes may look upon her – only he who sheds heart-stinging sweat and reaches the
summit of manly endeavour 45.

As the fragment unequivocally suggests, the road to pursue for the attainment of virtue is not
available to anyone, but only to those who are ready to make efforts to climb the road. The good
success of the undertaking is possible and concerns a few men who can reach the top of the
endeavour. Contemplation of virtue, as introduced in the passage above, is the outcome of a
successful – and therefore possible, even though exceptional - practical achievement.
On the other hand, Simonides’ moral outlook seems also characterised by a certain realistic
approach in matters of virtue. The poet is well aware that holding fast to the peak of the rocky
toward to virtue is an almost super-human possibility, i.e. one that only a god can guarantee:

[…] And if someone who has no shutters to his mouth cavils, why, smoke is ineffectual stuff, gold does not stain, and
truth alone prevails. But God grants few men such distinction as endures throughout: it is no easy thing to keep high
standards, for despite himself a man is overborne by irresistible desire of gain or the scheming Love-goddess’s
compelling itch or lively rivalries. Still, if he cannot keep the path of sanctity throughout his life, but to his best
ability…(541 PMG; P. Oxy. 2432).

It’s not clear whether Simonides, talking about a grant by God, is referring to the supply of
favourable circumstances for the pursuit of a virtuous path, or if he is rather pointing to the
distinctive human inclinations and traits of character typical of outstanding men. What is likely,
however, is that, without the aid of God, men would end up succumbing to temptations like love of
money or of erotic pleasure46, and also that a man should try to do his best, compatibly with his

43
Translation of this passage is by B.A.F. Hubbard&E.S: Karnofsky.
44
τn the spatial dimension of virtue for Simonides see Aέ ἑarson, ‘ώow σot to Read a Poemμ Unmixing Simonides
from "Protagoras"’ Classical Philology 87(1992), pp. 110-130: 124. Carson maintains that even Protagoras, as emerges
in Protέ γβ5d, conceives of virtue in ‘spatial’ termsέ
45
West’s translation in εέδέ West (edέ by), Greek Lyric Poetry. The Poems and Fragments of the Greek Iambic,
Elegiac, and Melic Poets (excluding Pindar and Bacchylides) down to 450 BC, Oxford, Clarendon, 1993.
46
Cfr. Fr. 526 PMG (Theophilus Antiochenus ad Autolycum ii 8): «None wins distinction without the gods, no man, no
city. God is the one who can contrive all things: in mortal life nothing is safe from harm».
talents and external constraints. The ideal of moral perfection, then, is not to be dismissed, but
followed as far as possible according to human possibilities.

τf course, one might object that, given Simonides’ admission (Prot. 341e3) that only God has the
privilege to be good, human beings cannot come to possess virtue. However, such a claim is not
incompatible with his insistence in other places on the attainability of virtue by humans. The most
compelling explanation is offered by Socrates at Prot. 344b6-c5:

A little further on he [Simonides] says, if we imagine him developing an argument, that whereas it is truly hard to
become good man but possible for a short while, “yet according to you, Pittacus, having once reached that state, to
remain in it and be (einai) a good man is impossible and superhuman…

The typical privilege of the God is not being good, but being so in a permanent fashion. To say that
a human being cannot be permanently good is not the same as saying that it is not possible for him
to achieve virtue for a limited amount of time. So, the impossibility mentioned by Simonides which
emerges through a comparison between man and God does not regard the attainability of virtue by
itself, but the capacity to preserve what one has achieved through one’s own effortsέ ώuman life is
inscribed into a horizon to which the imperturbability of the God is structurally precluded.
In line with most lyrical poets of his age47, he enriches his poetical works with a constant
reference to the precariousness of life and the fragility of virtue and goodness. Just to quote some
examples, in a fragment of Elegy n. 1λ (West’s edition) tells us that

‘As is the breed of leaves, e’ven so is that of man’. Few mortals who have had that in their ears have taken it to heart,
for everyone relies on hope; it’s planted in a young man’s breast’.
But there’s one saying of the man of Chios - which passes all, ' The life of man is even as the life of a
green leaf ' ;
yet few that receive it with the ear lay it away in the breast ; for there's a hope which springeth in every heart that is
young, and so long as man possesseth the flowery bloom of youth there is much that his light heart deems to have no
end, counting neither on age nor death, and taking no thought for sickness in time of health. Poor fools they to think so,
and not to know that the time of youth and life is but short for such as be mortal ! Wherefore be thou wise in time, and
fail not when the end is near to give thy soul freely of the best48.

Also, in fr. 527 PMG Simonides claims that:

There is no ill that men should not expect; in a short space of time God reshuffles everything

The issue of the unbeatable power of bad luck is also handled in the Protagoras throughout Socrates’
interpretationέ As he makes it known with reference to Simonides’ view, there are events that
cannot be in any means turned into profitable conditions for virtuous action, such as a dreadful
storm that might render a steersman helpless, or the advent of a bad season that might leave a
farmer without resources (Prot. 344d1-5).

47
With regard to possible analogies between Simonides and a whole tradition of lyrical poets on the theme of tychē see
εέ Dickie, ‘The Argument and όorm of Simonides 54β Pεύ’, citέ, ppέ β1-33. Dickie compares Simonides’ poem with
the 14th epinician by Bacchylides («He says that it is best for a man to be allotted a fair fate by god, but that misfortune
crushes the esthlos, while good fortune raises the kakos on high». He also mentions Pindar, Nemean 7.54-56: «it is said
that we are allotted different things by nature and that no man succeeds in gaining complete good fortune».
48
Reported by Stobeaus, Anthologyέ ἑfέ a fragment of Elegy βίμ «…only a short time…»έ
However, I believe that, in claiming that becoming (and also being) virtuous is difficult, Simonides
is not exclusively referring to the capacity of extremely helpless circumstances to compromise
human endeavour with no possibility of redemption. Rather, the difficulty he is talking about might
be mainly related to the task of acting in complex, but not utterly irreparable circumstances. This
entails a capacity of particularly virtuous human beings to establish in a correct way which
circumstances can be turned to their own advantage. There might be cases which, just in virtue of
their challenging power, can constitute a strong incentive for the continuation of a virtuous path.
This message is for instance transmitted by fr. 590 PMG:

Even what’s though becomes attractive in emergencies.

To my understanding Simonides’ reflections seem to pave the way for the existence of a ‘positively
bad’ luck. One does not become good simply in virtue of the good luck dispensed by the gods. The
latter is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. It is rather possible that the good luck mentioned
by Simonides is actually identifiable with a series of conditions that allow the expression of
virtuous behaviours involving efforts. Difficulties may coexist with the possibility to become good
thanks to a good luck, and such an opportunity does not eliminate a component of effort, nor the
risks implied in human interaction. This might for instance be the meaning of the following
fragment 94: West, where Simonides says: “luck helps the brave”.

Pittacus: A ‘Stoic-like’ View of Morality?

ώaving established that, in Simonides’ view, good and bad fortune play a crucial role in the ethical
directions taken by individuals, we might now turn to Pittachus view, and try to understand in what
sense Simondes believes that his claim on the difficulty of becoming virtuous is out of place. By
criticiὐing Pittachus’ claim, does Simonides contradict his belief that becoming virtuous is a
difficult task? As I have already anticipated, I believe that the incompatibility between Simonides’
claim and what emerges from his criticism of Pittacus is simply apparent. I suggest that the key to
solve the prima facie incompatibility between the content of the two strophes lies in the possibility
to provide a sound reconstruction of the views on morality held respectively by the two characters
and, what is most important, to trace back the set of moral convictions underlying such views, so as
to be enabled to compare them. Having already attempted to establish what Simonides really
believed about virtue, what remains to be done is to find Pittacus’ own standpoint on virtue and the
underlying rationale of [set of principles that support] his claim concerning the difficulty of being a
virtuous man. Unfortunately, all that remains about Pittacus is a bunch of fragments, and no well-
articulated argument by him has come down to us. Plato, perhaps ironically, reports that Pittacus, in
line with a tradition in force in Sparta, used to speak in the form of aphorisms, so that the task of
interpreting them is wholly up to us (Prot. 343a). To do that, I suggest to look at some of the
evidences we have on Pittacus provided by secondary sources. The most informative is the one
offered by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Philosophers. The chapter devoted to him brings
into light some traits of his character and moral outlook. He is described as a man whose intellectual
and moral outstandingness is combined with (and possible underpinned by) attitudes of restraint
towards temptations. Pittacus’ ideal of moral goodness seems to perfectly match the description of
the tetragōnos man in terms of intelligence, courage and moderation.

Diogenes reports that Pittacus undertook civil and military actions by way of witty expedients,
showing an impressive ability to draw on limited resources and make the best of them. Native of
Mitylene, he was aided by the brothers of Alcaeus he overthrew Melanchrus, tyrant of Lesbos (I,74
4-15); he took chief command in the war between Mitylene and Athens for the territory of Achileis,
and agreed to meet Phrynon, champion in the art of the pancratium and general of the Athenians.
As we learn from Diogenes, “with a net which he concealed beneath his shield he entangled
Phrynon, killed him, and recovered the territory”.

Being highly honoured by the people of Mitylene, he was entrusted with the government of the city.
He was actively involved in political life for ten years and, according to Diogenes, laid down his
office only after bringing the constitution into order. One of the traits for which he was well-
regarded was surely his moderation.

The following passage from Diogenes Laertius (I, 75.4-12) gives us a display of such an attitude.
After laying down his office, he lived another ten years after his abdication and received from the
people of Mitylene a grant of land, which he dedicated as sacred domain; and it bears his name to
this day.

Socrates relates that he cut off a small portion for himself and pronounced the half to be more than
the whole. Furthermore, he declined an offer of money made him by Croesus, saying that he had
twice as much as he wanted; for his brother had died without issue and he had inherited his
estate49.

On other occasions, Diogenes stresses the fact that Pittacus urged men to win bloodless victories,
which might be read as a token of the importance of the virtue of courage in his thought. What is
most important, Pittacus holds virtue to consist in the capacity to fight against difficult
circumstances (I.77-78):

It is the part of prudent men before difficulties arise, to provide against their arising; and of courageous men
to deal with them when they have arisen.

Judging from the insistence placed by Simonides on the role of luck in the acquisition of virtue on
the one hand and his criticism of Pittacus on the other, I would suggest that this criticism is
grounded exactly in Simonides’ recognition of a substantial lack of concern for luck on Pittacus’
part. In that case, as I maintain, Simonides qualifies Pittacus’ saying as “not reasonable” neither
because he deems virtue to be impossible, nor because it is an easy task. Simply, Pittacus’ saying
does not make sense if virtue is taken into account without consideration of the pivotal role played
by luck. If my interpretation is correct, Simonides would not criticise the idea that it is difficult to
be a good man, but the idea that being difficult depends exclusively on human strength.
In conclusion, I believe that a substantial distinction between Simonides’ and Pittacos’
views on the role played by luck in the achievement and possession of virtue. Unfortunately, the
Protagoras does not give us any clue on Pittacos’ view. However, it seems that, unlike Simonides,
who believes that Luck affects the ethical disposition of human beings to a substantial degree,
Pittacus thinks of virtue as a target that human beings can reach at the cost of extreme personal
efforts, probably without considering the precariousness of the human life and the structural
dependency of the human life on frequent and sudden reshuffles of good and bad luck.

49
Translation by Hicks (R.D. Hicks (ed. by), Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Vol. I, London,
William Heinemann Ltd, 1966 [first published 1925]).
 Given the high difficulty involved in becoming and staying virtuous, Simonides suggest his
addressee/s to lower our his/their expectations, and invites him/them to live a life consonant to
human possibilities, by avoiding to yield to the impracticable hope of finding a totally blameless
man (Prot. 345c11). As I have previously said, Simonides seems to make room, at least virtually,
for the possibility to find such a manέ As he points out in the form of an afterthought, “Se io lo
troverò a voi novella ne darò”έ Still, his insistence is addressed to the need to preserve a more
realistic attitude. Such a need is more informatively spelled out at Prot. 346c3-d13. In the attempt to
express the main reason why he issues in criticism of Pittacus, he states:

Good enough for me the man who’s not all bad ( ὴ α ὸ ᾖ)

Nor lawless (ἀπ α ο ) to excess,
who knows the worth of justice, bastion of cities;
a healthy man ( ὴ ): I will find no fault with him (Prot. 346c3-d13)50.

To judge from a first reading of these poetic verses, one might tell that Simonides is criticizing
Pittacus’ ideal of the truly virtuous man on the ground of its demandingness, and not because of his
particular way of conceiving of virtue. But, if so, how to reconcile such a claim with his description
of the tetragonōs man, which is a description to which, as I have suggested, he seems to subscribe,
although with the proviso that luck conspires against perfection? On my reading, however,
Simonides criticises Pittacus not for upholding an excessively ambitious moral ideal, but simply
because he thinks of the possibility to become and be virtuous with no regard for the overwhelming
power of bad luck. The idea of a man able to win over any negative condition is purely utopian on
Simonides’ partέ This is what the poet cannot acceptμ the idea of a man who stoically resists the
attacks of bad luck and manages to preserve virtue throughout the whole span of his life. If this is
really Pittacus’ view of human virtue, such a view proves way more demanding than the idea of a
foursquare man constrained by the possible strikes of luck.
At the same time, I do not believe that Simonides means to discourage his addressees to the
pursuit of a higher virtue, i.e. one consisting in courage, moderation and wisdom 51. Simply, we
might assume that he is establishing a minimum level of virtue required not to succumb to utter
immorality. To borrow an expression coined by the contemporary Political Philosopher John Rawls,
we might speak of a “range property”52, that is, a threshold property below which no man can be
deemed virtuous. This, nevertheless, admits of various degrees, whose highest peak might indeed
coincide with the ideal of the tetragonōs man. In this respect, virtue can be seen as a scalar
property, which has as its extremes the simply ugieios man and, at the top, the tetragōnos man.
As it is worth noting, the so-called basic level of virtue outlined by Simonides is decined in He does
not speak of an excellent man, but he mentions a “not too bad” one ( ὴ ὸ ) ᾖ , and also one
who is not lawless to excess ( ᾽ἄ ἀ ά ). Given the inferior position credited to
such an ideal in comparison with the tetragonōs man, it seems that it consists in not committing bad
actions and abiding by the laws. Such a level appears to be highly ingrained in the dimension of the

50
Translation of this passage is mine (although following largely B.A.F. Hubbard&E.S: Karnofsky (eds.), cit.).
51
For a view opposite to mine see εέ Dickie, ‘The Argument and όorm of Simonides 54β Pεύ’, citέ
52
See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 443-445έ ἑfέ Iέ ἑarter, ‘Respect and the ἐasis of Equality’, Ethics 121(2011),
pp. 538-571: 548: «A range property is a binary property: it is either possessed or not possessed. To possess a range
property is to possess some other, scalar property, within a specified range».
political community, but it does not seem to involve a display of genuine ethical excellence. Being
non-lawless and knowing justice might give men the opportunity to stick to right in force in the
community without possessing justice as an authentically virtuous attitude. Conceived as mere
conformity to law, justice is a good way to avoid being wicked. It is highly likely that the notion of
ugieia in Simonides’ poem is employed to endorse an ideal of basic moral health, which establishes
the main preconditions for a path leading to the acquisition of authentic virtue. It might be
hypothesised that Plato’s moral thought is to some extent inspired by Simonides with reference to
the ideal that ugieia can be a condition of the soul rather than simply of the body or of the mind53.
As Plato’s Socrates shows extensively in the Gorgias, an unjust man cannot be happy precisely
insofar as his soul is not healthy (Gorg. 470c-471d), and, by way of analogy with physical illness,
he tries to argue that committing injustice, if understood in terms of damaging one’s own soul, will
appear worse than to receive it (Gorg. 473c-481b, especially 480b-c). Similarly, in Republic IV,
444c-e and Crito 47d-e he draws meaningful analogies between healthy and infected things in the
body and those which are respectively as such in the soul. Even more, as we learn at Republic IX,
591b, health in the soul, consisting in a state which accommodates moderation, justice and wisdom,
is much worthier than the condition in the body, which would be obtained if the body itself
contained strength, beauty and health.
The section relative to the interpretation of Simonides’ poem ends with a refusal by Socrates
to pursue the path of exegetical analysis, on the ground that such a path does not seem to offer any
real and steady contribution to the search for virtue and its teachability. Most people, when proving
unable to solve problems, invoke the poets as witnesses of their own speeches and defenders of
their personal views (Prot. 348a), and there is no way for poetry, taken by itself, to autonomously
confer truth or special plausibility to the debated issuesέ Still, what Simonides’ poem shows is that
the original meaning of a text can be interpreted and intentionally modified by intellectuals with a
view to introduce personal convictions on human goodness. Poetry becomes a valuable ally of
philosophy, and it can offer a precious source of reflection on human goodness, its limits and
possibilities.

53
τn the notion of ‘non-bodily health’ before Simonides see ἐowra, citέ pέ βγκέ