Ad hominem (Latin for 'to the person'), short for argumentum ad hominem, is a term

that refers to several types of arguments, most of which are fallacious. Typically
this term refers to a rhetorical strategy where the speaker attacks the character,
motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than
attacking the substance of the argument itself. This avoids genuine debate by
creating a diversion to some irrelevant but often highly charged issue. The most
common form of this fallacy is "A makes a claim x, B asserts that A holds a
property that is unwelcome, and hence B concludes that argument x is wrong".

The valid types of ad hominem arguments are generally only encountered in

specialized philosophical usage. These typically refer to the dialectical strategy
of using the target's own beliefs and arguments against them, while not agreeing
with the validity of those beliefs and arguments. Ad hominem arguments were first
studied in ancient Greece; John Locke revived the examination of ad hominem
arguments in the 17th century. Many contemporary politicians routinely use ad
hominem attacks, which can be encapsulated to a derogatory nickname for a political
opponent.

History

Aristotle (384–322 BC) is credited with raising the distinction between personal
and logical arguments.[1]
The various types of ad hominem arguments have been known in the West since at
least the ancient Greeks. Aristotle, in his work Sophistical Refutations, detailed
the fallaciousness of putting the questioner but not the argument under scrutiny.
[2] His description was somewhat different from the modern understanding, referring
to a class of sophistry that applies an ambiguously worded question about people to
a specific person. The proper refutation, he wrote, is not to debate the attributes
of the person (solutio ad hominem) but to address the original ambiguity.[3] Many
examples of ancient non-fallacious ad hominem arguments are preserved in the works
of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus. In these arguments, the concepts
and assumptions of the opponents are used as part of a dialectical strategy against
the opponents to demonstrate the unsoundness of their own arguments and
assumptions. In this way, the arguments are to the person (ad hominem), but without
attacking the properties of the individuals making the arguments.[4] This kind of
argument is also known as "argument from commitment".

Italian polymath Galileo Galilei and British philosopher John Locke also examined
the argument from commitment, a form of the ad hominem argument, meaning examining
an argument on the basis of whether it stands true to the principles of the person
carrying the argument. In the mid-19th century, the modern understanding of the
term ad hominem started to take shape, with the broad definition given by English
logician Richard Whately. According to Whately, ad hominem arguments were
"addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past
conduct of the individual".[5]

Over time, the term acquired a different meaning; by the beginning of the 20th
century, it was linked to a logical fallacy, in which a debater, instead of
disproving an argument, attacked their opponent. This approach was also popularized
in philosophical textbooks of the mid-20th century, and it was challenged by
Australian philosopher Charles Leonard Hamblin in the second half of the 20th
century. In a detailed work, he suggested that the inclusion of a statement against
a person in an argument does not necessarily make it a fallacious argument since
that particular phrase is not a premise that leads to a conclusion. While Hablin's
criticism was not widely accepted, Canadian philosopher Douglas N. Walton examined
the fallaciousness of the ad hominem argument even further.[6] Nowadays, except
within specialized philosophical usages, the usage of the term ad hominem signifies
a straight attack at the character and ethos of a person, in an attempt to refute
their argument.[7]
Terminology
The Latin phase argumentum ad hominem stands for "argument against the person".[8]
"Ad" corresponds to "against" but it could also mean "to" or "towards".[9]

The terms ad mulierem and ad feminam have been used specifically when the person
receiving the criticism is female.[10]

Types of ad hominem arguments

See also: List of fallacies
Fallacious ad hominem reasoning is categorized among informal fallacies, more
precisely as a genetic fallacy, a subcategory of fallacies of irrelevance.[11]

Ad hominem fallacies can be separated in various different types, among others are
tu quoque, circumstantial, guilt by association, and abusive ad hominem. All of
them are similar to the general scheme of ad hominem argument, that is instead of
dealing with the essence of someone's argument or trying to refute it, the
interlocutor is attacking the character of the proponent of the argument and
concluding that it is a sufficient reason to drop the initial argument.[12]

Tu quoque
Main article: Tu quoque
Ad hominem tu quoque (literally: "You also") is a response to a personal attack (or
ad hominem argument) that itself is a personal attack.[13]

Tu quoque appears as:

A makes a claim a.
B attacks the character of A by saying they hold a property x, which is bad.
A defends themself by attacking B, saying they also hold the same property x.[14]
Here is an example given by philosophy professor George Wrisley to illustrate the
above: A businessman and politician is giving a lecture at a University about how
good his company is and how nicely the system works. A student asks him "Is it true
that you and your company are selling weapons to third world rulers who use those
arms against their own people?" and the businessman replies "is it true that your
university gets funding by the same company that you are claiming is selling guns
to those countries? You are not a white dove either". The ad hominem accusation of
the student is relevant to the narrative the businessman tries to project thus not
fallacious. On the other hand, the attack on the student (that is, the student
being inconsistent) is irrelevant to the opening narrative. So the businessman's tu
quoque response is fallacious.[15]

Canadian philosopher Christopher Tindale approaches somewhat different the tu

quoque fallacy. According to Tindale, a tu quoque fallacy appears when a response
to an argument is made on the history of the arguer. This argument is also invalid
because it does not disprove the premise; if the premise is true, then source A may
be a hypocrite or even changed their mind, but this does not make the statement
less credible from a logical perspective. A common example, given by Tindale, is
when a doctor advises a patient to lose weight, but the patient argues that there
is no need for him to go on a diet because the doctor is also overweight.[16]

Circumstantial
Main article: Bulverism
Circumstantial ad hominem points out that someone is in circumstances (for
instance, their job, wealth, property, or relations) such that they are disposed to
take a particular position. It constitutes an attack on the bias of a source. As
with other types of ad hominem attack, circumstantial attack could be fallacious or
not. It could be fallacious because a disposition to make a certain argument does
not make the argument invalid; this overlaps with the genetic fallacy (an argument
that a claim is incorrect due to its source). But it also may be a sound argument,
if the premises are correct and the bias is relevant to the argument.[17]

A simple example is: a father may tell his daughter not to start smoking because
she will damage her health, and she may point out that he is or was a smoker. This
does not alter the fact that smoking might cause various diseases. Her father's
inconsistency is not a proper reason to reject his claim.[18]

Philosopher and pundit on informal fallacies Douglas N. Walton argues that a

circumstantial ad hominem argument can be non-fallacious. This could be the case
when someone (A) attacks the personality of another person (B), making an argument
(a) while the personality of B is relevant to argument a, i.e. B talks as an
authority figure. To illustrate this reasoning, Walton gives the example of a
witness at a trial: if he had been caught lying and cheating in his own life,
should the jury take his word for granted? No, according to Walton.[19]

Guilt by association
Main article: Association fallacy
Guilt by association, that is accusing an arguer because of his alleged connection
with a discredited person or group, can sometimes also be a type of ad hominem
fallacy when the argument attacks a source because of the similarity between the
views of someone making an argument and other proponents of the argument.[20]

This form of the argument is as follows:[20]

Individual S makes claim C.

Individual S is also associated with Group G, who has an unfavorable reputation
Therefore, individual S and his views are questionable.
Academic Leigh Kolb gives as an example that the 2008 US vice‐presidential
candidate Sarah Palin attacked Barack Obama for having worked with Bill Ayers, who
had been a leader in the Weather Underground terrorist group in the 1960s. Despite
Obama denouncing every act of terrorism, he was still associated by his opponents
with terrorism.[21]

Guilt by association is frequently found in social and political debates. It also

appears after major events (such as scandals and terrorism) linked to a specific
group. An example, given also by Leigh Kolb, is the peak of attacks against Muslims
in the US after the September 11 attacks.[21]

Abusive ad hominem
See also: Name calling and Verbal abuse

Abusive Ad hominem lies near the bottom end of Graham's Hierarchy of Disagreement
Abusive ad hominem argument (or direct ad hominem) is associated with an attack to
the character of the person carrying an argument. This kind of argument, besides
usually being fallacious, is also counterproductive, as a proper dialogue is hard
to achieve after such an attack.[22][23][24]

Key issues in examining an argument to determine whether it is an ad hominem

fallacy or not are whether the accusation against the person stands true or not,
and whether the accusation is relevant to the argument. An example is a dialogue at
the court, where the attorney cross-examines an eyewitness, bringing to light the
fact that the witness was convicted in the past for lying. If the attorney's
conclusion is that the witness is lying, that would be wrong. But if his argument
would be that the witness should not be trusted, that would not be a fallacy.[25]

Argument from commitment

An ad hominem argument from commitment is a type of valid argument that employs, as
a dialectical strategy, the exclusive utilization of the beliefs, convictions, and
assumptions of those holding the position being argued against, i.e., arguments
constructed on the basis of what other people hold to be true. This usage is
generally only encountered in specialist philosophical usage or in pre-20th century
usages.[26] This type of argument is also known as the ex concessis argument (Latin
for "from what has been conceded already").[27]

Usage in debates
Ad hominem fallacies are considered to be uncivil and do not help creating a
constructive atmosphere for dialogue to flourish.[28] An ad hominem attack is an
attack on the character of the target who tends to feel the necessity to defend
himself or herself from the accusation of being hypocritical. Walton has noted that
it is so powerful of an argument that it is employed in many political debates.
Since it is associated with negativity and dirty tricks, it has gained a bad fame,
of being always fallacious.[29]

Author Eithan Orkibi, having studied the Israeli politics prior to elections,
described two other forms of ad hominem attacks that are common during election
periods. They both depend on the collective memory shared by both proponents and
the audience. The first is the precedent ad hominem, according to which the
previous history of someone means that they do not fit for the office. It goes like
this: "My opponent was (allegedly) wrong in the past, therefore he is wrong now".
The second one is a behavioral ad hominem: "my opponent was not decent in his
arguments in the past, so he is not now either". These kinds of attacks are based
on the inability of the audience to have a clear view of the amount of false
statements by both parts of the debate.[30]

Criticism as a fallacy
Walton has argued that ad hominem reasoning is not always fallacious, and that in
some instances, questions of personal conduct, character, motives, etc., are
legitimate and relevant to the issue,[31] as when it directly involves hypocrisy,
or actions contradicting the subject's words.

The philosopher Charles Taylor has argued that ad hominem reasoning (discussing
facts about the speaker or author relative to the value of his statements) is
essential to understanding certain moral issues due to the connection between
individual persons and morality (or moral claims), and contrasts this sort of
reasoning with the apodictic reasoning (involving facts beyond dispute or clearly
established) of philosophical naturalism.[32]

See also
Philosophy portal
"And you are lynching Negroes"
Appeal to authority
Appeal to emotion
Appeal to motive
Character assassination
Ergo decedo
Fair game (Scientology)
Fake news
Fundamental attribution error
Gaslighting
Hostile witness
Negative campaigning
Poisoning the well
Presumption of guilt
Race card
Red herring
Reputation
Shooting the messenger
Smear campaign
Straw man
Tone policing
The Art of Being Right
Whataboutism
References
Walton 2001, p. 208; Tindale 2007, p. 82.
Tindale 2007, p. 82.
Nuchelmans 1993, p. 43.
Walton 2001, p. 207–209; Wong 2017, p. 49.
Walton 2001, pp. 208–210.
van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2015, pp. 615–626.
Walton 2001, p. 210.
Tindale 2007, p. 91.
Wrisley 2019, pp. 71–72.
Olivesi 2010; Sommers 1991.
Walton 2008, p. 190; Bowell & Kemp 2010, pp. 201–213; Copi 1986, pp. 112–113.
van Eemeren 2001, p. 142.
Wrisley 2019, p. 88; Walton 2015, pp. 431–435; Lavery & Hughes 2008, p. 132.
Wrisley 2019, p. 89.
Wrisley 2019, pp. 89–91.
Tindale 2007, pp. 94–96.
Walton 1998, pp. 18–21; Wrisley 2019, pp. 77–78.
Walton 2001, p. 211.
Walton 2001, p. 213.
Walton 1998, pp. 18–21.
Kolb 2019, pp. 351–352.
Tindale 2007, pp. 92–93.
Hansen 2019, 1. The core fallacies.
Walton 2006, p. 123.
Wrisley 2019, pp. 86–87.
Merriam-Webster 2019, note1.
Walton 2001.
Weston 2018, p. 82.
Walton 2006, p. 122.
Orkibi 2018, pp. 497–498.
Walton 2008, p. 170.
Taylor 1995, pp. 34–60.
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Kolb, Leigh (2019). "Guilt by Association". In Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael
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External links

Look up ad hominem in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Ad hominem at PhilPapers
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