VERIFICATION

PFIZER INC., MA. ANGELICA B. LLEANDER and SANDRA WEBB vs. EDWIN V. GALAN
G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001
DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS: Edwin Galan (Galan) was initially employed as sales representative by Pfizer, Inc. (Pfizer). He
was the District Manager of Pfizer Mindanao when he was dismissed from the service due to loss of trust
and confidence – for his alleged unauthorized use of the company vehicle and doubtful cash advances.
With that, Galan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Pfizer demanding reinstatement and other
money claims. The LA ruled in favor of Galan which was affirmed by the NLRC. Thereafter, Pfizer filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition filed by Pfizer for being filed beyond
the reglementary period. The CA further ruled that the Verification executed by one Ma. Cleofe R.
Legaspi, supposedly an Employment Specialist of Pfizer was not properly executed – alleged that she is
one of the petitioners when in fact she is not. Hence, this petition invoking the liberal construction of
procedural rules.

ISSUE: Whether the defect in the execution of Verification warrants the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari.

RULING: NO.

Verification is intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith or
are true and correct, not mere speculations. Generally, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is
neither jurisdictional nor fatal. The court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order to serve the ends of justice.

We firmly believe that the purpose of verification was served in the instant case wherein the verification
of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals was done by Ms. Cleofe R. Legaspi. It remains undisputed
that Ms. Legaspi was an Employment Specialist of petitioner Pfizer, Inc., who "coordinated and actually
took part in the investigation" of the administrative charges against respondent Galan. As such, she was
in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Besides, as
pointed out by petitioners, Pfizer, being a corporate entity, can only act through an officer. Ms. Legaspi,
who was an officer having personal knowledge of the case, was, therefore, merely acting for and in behalf
of petitioner Pfizer when she signed the verification. Thus, the disputed verification is in compliance with
the Rules.

It may not be amiss to state that, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, Ms. Legaspi never
represented herself as one of the petitioners in the petition before the Court of Appeals. Her declaration in
number 1 of the verification reads:

I am an Employment Specialist of Pfizer, Inc., one of the petitioners in the instant case.

If we take this statement together with that in number 4, which reads: "Our company has not commenced
any action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court…," it is clear that the phrase
"one of the petitioners" refers to Pfizer, Inc., and not to Ms. Legaspi. Hence, the finding of
misrepresentation on Legaspi's part is without basis.

PRESCRIPTION
PEPSI COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOB GUANZON AND NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division)
G.R. No. 81162, April 19, 1989
CORTES, J.

FACTS: Job Guanzon (Guanzon) was serving as a route salesman of Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines (PEPSI) when he was terminated due to his alleged misappropriation of money collected from
customers and falsification of invoices and reports. More than five (5) years after his termination and after
the criminal case for estafa filed against him was dismissed, Guanzon filed a complaint for reinstatement
and payment of backwages and damages. However, the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the claims of Guanzon had prescribed under Art. 291 of the Labor Code. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the decision of the LA holding that the provisions of the Labor Code are not applicable since Guanzon’s
complaint is not strictly one for recovery of money claims but is principally an action for illegal
dismissal and reinstatement. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Guanzon’s action for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement and backwages had
prescribed.

RULING: YES.

In an illegal dismissal case, the cause of action accrues from the time the employee was unjustly
terminated. In this case private respondent's cause of action arising from his alleged illegal dismiss
accrued on July 17, 1979, the effective date of the termination of his employment.

The Court cannot sustain NLRC's argument that it was only when PEPSI refused to reinstate private
respondent to his former position, after the dismissal of the criminal case on May 25, 1984, that the
latter's cause of action accrued. Guanzon was dismissed by PEPSI way back in 1979. He could have
immediately challenged his dismissal without waiting for the outcome of the criminal case. His right to
file an action for illegal dismissal is now barred by prescription precisely because he chose to wait for the
dismissal of the criminal case before filing his complaint.

ADJUDICATORY POWER: APPELLATE

NATIVIDAD PONDOC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro
City) and EMILIO PONDOC
G.R. No. 116347 October 3, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: This case rooted from a complaint filed by Andres Pondoc’s wife, Natividad, against Eulalio Pondoc
(Eulalio) for salary differential, overtime pay, 13 th month pay, holiday pay and other money claims alleging that
Andres was required to work by Eulalio during his rest day but was not properly paid. Eulalio The LA ordered
Eulalio to pay Andres. However, on his last day to perfect an appeal Eulalio prayed that the labor arbiter set-off
Andres’ alleged indebtedness against the monetary award. The LA denied, but the NLRC allowed the compensation
and denied Natividad’s MR. Hence, this petition alleging that the NLRC erred acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the alleged indebtedness of the Andres and set-off the same against the
liabilities of the Eulalio.

ISSUE: Whether the NLRC erred in ordering the set-off between Andres’ alleged indebtedness against the monetary
award.

RULING: YES.

As correctly contended by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is a complete want of evidence that the
indebtedness asserted by the private respondent against Andres Pondoc arose out of or was incurred in connection
with the employer-employee relationship between them. The Labor Arbiter did not then have jurisdiction over the
claim as under paragraph (a) of Article 217 of the Labor Code, Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original
jurisdiction only in the following cases:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claim for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanies with a claim for
reinstatement.

On the other hand, under paragraph (b) thereof, the NLRC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by the Labor Arbiters. This simply means that the NLRC does not have original jurisdiction over the cases
enumerated in paragraph (a) and that if a claim does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC cannot have appellate jurisdiction thereon.

The conclusion then is inevitable that the NLRC was without jurisdiction, either original or appellate, to receive
evidence on the alleged indebtedness, render judgment thereon, and direct that its award be set-off against the final
judgment of the Labor Arbiter.
CARDINAL RIGHTS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BOHOL), INC. vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, TEODORO BONIOR, CECILIA MENDEZ, NELIA QUISMUNDO, DEMETRIA
ANUTA AND PRIMO ALMEDILLA
G.R. No. 82144, March 8, 1989
REGALADO, J.

FACTS: This case rooted from a complaint filed by private respondents against Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bohol), Inc. [San Miguel] for, among others, illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive
leave pay, and for non-payment of unused vacation and sick leave pay. San Miguel countered that, private
respondents voluntarily resigned and that they already enjoyed their vacation and sick leaves. The LA in
holding that San Miguel failed to adduce any evidence to disprove and controvert the claims of private
respondents ordered San Miguel to pay private respondents their SIL and unused VLs and SLs. The
NLRC deleted the award for SIL but retained the grant of VL and SL pay. San Miguel’s MR was denied
by the NLRC. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the LA and the NLRC erred in granting VL and SL pay to private respondents.

RULING: YES.

Well-settled rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the public respondent, which have
acquired expertise, are generally accorded not only respect but at times finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidenced. Conversely, such findings of facts unsupported by substantial and
credible evidence do not bind the Court, especially if the conclusions are imprecise and confusing.

Here, both the labor arbiter and the respondent commission awarded the controverted vacation leave and
sick leave pay on the bases only of the complaint filed by the private respondents and the failure of
petitioner to deny the grant of the same in its answer to the complaint. Yet, it will be observed that the
complaint referred to here is merely a printed form accomplished by the private respondents, and which
appears to have merely recited the names of the complainants, their personal circumstances, periods of
employment, respective positions and latest salaries received.

The respondent commission and the labor arbiter should have used every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in the case, speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process and for purposes of accuracy and correctness in adjudicating
the monetary awards.
SUSPENSION OF PROCEEDINGS
RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC., or JULIE YAP ONG vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION ET AL
G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to its application with the SEC, Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. was declared in a state of
suspension payments and its creditors were restrained from enforcing their claims against Rubberworld.
Further the SEC ordered the suspension of all actions for claims against Rubberworld pending before any
court, tribunal, office, and board. With that, private respondents who were allegedly employees of
Rubberworld filed actions for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, damages and money claims.
Rubberworld moved for the suspension of the proceedings with the LA, but it was denied on the ground
that the order of the SEC does not apply to the suspension of proceedings involving claims against
petitioner which have yet to be ascertained. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA and
denied Rubberworld’s MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the LA and the NLRC erred in denying the suspension of labor proceedings against
Rubberworld.

RULING: YES.

Under PD 902-A, "upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a management committee or a rehabilitation
receiver," all actions for claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall
ipso jure be suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims "is to
enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free
from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the
debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in
defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation.

The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is
mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should the Court. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose
of the automatic stays and severally encumbers the management committee's and resources. The said
committee would need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to
work towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. The rule otherwise would open
the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides,
even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could not be enforced as
long as the petitioner is under the management committee.
PROOF AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE
ADAMSON OZANAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ADAMSON
UNIVERSITY vs. ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND
CONRADO MAGLAYA, COMMISSIONER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 86819, November 9, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS: Adamson University (AU) was granted the authority to increase their tuition fees. In believing
that 60% of the increase should be allocated for the increase in the salaries and wages of the members of
the faculty and other members of the school, the Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association
(AUFEA) filed a complaint to recover the 60%. The LA dismissed the complaint, but it was reversed by
the NLRC in a decision dated Sept. 30, 1988, ordering AU to remit to the members of AUFEA their 60%
share. On Jan. 30, 1989, AU filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for having been filed out
of time. Thus, this petition arguing, among others, that service of the decision upon the security guard of
the building where the former counsel of AU holds office is ineffective and does not cause the running of
the reglementary period to file an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the service of the decision upon the security guard of the building where the former
counsel of AU holds office is valid.

RULING: NO.

Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which is suppletory to the rules of the NLRC, provides as
follows:

Section 4. Personal Service. — Service of the papers may be made by delivering

personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his
clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or
his office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the
morning and six in the evening, at the party's or attomey's residence, if known, with a
person of sufficient discretion to receive the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the party or attorney or by
leaving it at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. The service of the court's
order upon any person other than the party's counsel is not legally effective. Where the copy of the
decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk or one in charge of the attorney's office, such service
is invalid and the decision does not therefore become executory. The security guard of the building where
the attorney is holding office is neither the office clerk nor a person in charge thereof as contemplated in
the rules. In PLDT vs. NLRC, 3 this Court ruled that the service of the decision at the ground floor of a
party's building when the office is at the 9th floor is not a valid service.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the service of the decision dated October 11, 1988 on the security
guard of the building where the then counsel for petitioner was holding office was an invalid service and
the running of the period within which to appeal therefrom or file a motion for reconsideration cannot be
deemed to commence thereby.

While it is true that said former counsel of petitioner failed to withdraw his appearance, the NLRC can
take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Justice Narvasa was already elevated to the Supreme Court at the
time the decision in this case was promulgated. Since its decisions are reviewable by the Supreme Court
such matter of public knowledge should be within the judicial notice of the NLRC because of the nature
of their functions
PROOF AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE
SALOME PABON and VICENTE CAMONAYAN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and SENIOR MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 120457, September 24, 1998
MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: Complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by Salome Pabon and Vicente Camonayan
(Petitioners) against Senior Marketing Corporation (SMC) and its Field Manager, Roxas. The summons
and notices of hearings were sent to Roxas at SMC’s provincial office, all of which were received by
SMC’s bookkeeper. The LA rendered a judgment by default after finding that private respondent tried to
evade all the summons and orders of hearing by refusing to claim all the registered mail addressed to it.
The LA further held that petitioners were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement. During the
ten (10) day period to file an appeal, SMC filed a motion for reconsideration/new trial with the LA
arguing that it was not validly served with summons, since its bookkeeper cannot be considered as an
agent under the Rules of Court upon whom valid service can be made. It was only after the reglementary
period that SMC appealed to the NLRC which set aside the decision of the LA. Hence, this petition
arguing that service of summons through SMC’s bookkeeper is a valid service.

ISSUE: Whether the service of summons upon SMC’s bookkeeper is valid.

RULING: YES.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party-defendant by virtue of the service of summons in
the manner required by law. In the case at bar, although as a rule, modes of service of summons are
strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, such
procedural modes, however, are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings, as in this case,
substantial compliance with the same being considered adequate.

Consequently, the conclusion of the NLRC that there was an invalid service of summons on herein
private respondent failed to take cognizance of the fact that the subject summons were received by its
bookkeeper at private respondent's provincial office. Such service had satisfied the procedural
requirement of proper notice.

Also, Section 5, Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or
his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5)
days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such
time.

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that "service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the
addressee or his agent." As can be gleaned from the records, all summons and notices of hearings
addressed to private respondent were served on and received by its bookkeeper on behalf of private
respondent as its employer who, under the circumstances of this case, is considered as an agent within the
contemplation of the aforecited NLRC rule. Such an employee is not one of those lesser employees of the
corporation who would not have been able to appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to her.
DUE PROCESS: OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
MIGUEL SINGSON vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. (PAL)
G.R. No. 122389, June 19, 1997
PUNO, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to an affidavit presented to the investigation committee of Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL) by Ms. Kondo alleging that Miguel Singson (Singson) charged her US$200.00 for alleged excess
baggage and without issuing a receipt, Singson was administratively charged and was later on terminated
from services as Traffic Representative Passenger of PAL. Hence, Singson filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PAL which was raffled to LA Raul Aquino. The LA ruled in favor of Singson and
ordered his reinstatement with backwages. On appeal with the NLRC, presided by Commissioner Raul
Aquino, reversed his own decision. The NLRC also denied Singson’s MR with only two commissioners
taking part. Thus, this petition by Singson arguing that the Resolution of the NLRC is void on account of
Commissioner Aquino’s participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his own decision as labor
arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the NLRC is valid.

RULING: NO.

Administrative due process includes, among others, a tribunal so constituted as to give a person
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction. It is self-evident
from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person
whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, the SC have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review.

Here, Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He
was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, 10 each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who
shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from
the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was
the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in
this case.

Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the
Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The infirmity of the
resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by
two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an
impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial
review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is not
an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
EXTENT OF BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. GEORGE A. EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-In-
Charge, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS Department of Labor and FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (F.F.W.)
G.R. No. L-41106, September 22, 1977
FERNANDO, J.

FACTS: The Federation of Free Workers (FFW) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations against Litex
Employees Association (Union) to hold a referendum among the latter’s members for the purpose of
determining whether they desired to be affiliated with such Federation. As alleged, great majority of the
Union members manifested their desire to join FFW, but not the Union’s president arguing that there is
no statutory authorization for the holding of such a referendum election. The Compulsory Arbitrator held
that the truth of the matter could be best ascertained by a referendum election which was affirmed by the
Bureau of Labor Relations. Hence, this petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations through Mr. George Eduvala to require a memorandum election.

ISSUE: Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations has jurisdiction to require a memorandum election.

RULING: YES.

Article 226 of the present Labor Code states that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations
Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to
act, at their own initiation or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances of problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations
in all workplaces, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation
or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration."

The comment of the then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., treated as the answer, maintained that the wording of the above provision sustains the
authority thus challenged. There is considerable persuasiveness to such a view. It would be an unduly
restrictive interpretation thereof if a negative answer were given to the question posed. It would be
oblivious to the basic end and aim of the present Labor Code to confer on the Department of Labor and
its bureaus the competence to pass upon and decide labor controversies and thus minimize judicial
intervention. There is no legal basis for nullifying such order.
General Rule: Regional Trial Court Cannot issue Injunction Against NLRC
DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC. vs. HON. FERNANDO P. CABATO ET AL
G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS: Private respondents, in a labor case for illegal dismissal, were awarded their monetary claims.
To satisfy the monetary award, the Sheriff, pursuant to a writ of execution, a real property under the name
of one of the respondents was levied and was set for auction. However, before the auction sale,
Deltaventures Resources, Inc. (Deltraventures) filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of TRO against the sheriff arguing that it is the registered owner of the levied property.
The RTC issued a TRO enjoining respondents in the civil case before him to hold in abeyance any action
relative to the enforcement of the decision in the labor case. After hearing, the RTC dismissed the
complaint holding that it is equal rank with the NLRC, hence, has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
against the execution of the NLRC decision. The RTC denied Deltaventures’ MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the execution of the NLRC
decision.

RULING: NO.

The Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity
(except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly observed by court a quo, the main issue
and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of
the Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable.

Also, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored
principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission,
has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of
the latter.
DUE PROCESS: OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
ALFREDO S. MARQUEZ, doing business under the name and style of LITTLE FOLKS SNACK
MOBILE,vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) AND IN BEHALF OF ITS 79 MEMBERS
G.R. No. 80685, March 16, 1989
CORTES, J.

FACTS: The Kaisahan ng Mangagawang Pilipino (Private respondent) on behalf of its members who
were employees of the Little Folks Snack Mobile (Petitioner) filed a complaint with the DOLE for
underpayment of minimum wage, non-payment of ECOLA, non-payment of incentive leave benefits and
non-payment of overtime pay. The employees were required to submit a computation of their claims
while petitioner was required to comment upon receipt of the claim. Both parties were also required to
submit their respective position papers, but it was only the respondent who were able to submit.
Thereafter, one Minerva Peran (Peran) claiming to be the representative of the employees filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of a compromise agreement signed by her and the petitioner. The Regional
Director denied the motion to dismiss which was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. Hence, this petition
arguing, among others, that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner further contends that it was
deprived of its right to be heard when the Regional Director awarded the employees their claims and
denying Peran’s motion to dismiss even in the absence of its position paper.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of its right to be heard.

RULING: NO.

There is denial of due process when a party is not accorded an opportunity to be heard in a case filed
against him. However, what the law prohibits is the absolute lack of an opportunity to be heard. Hence, it
has been ruled that there was no denial of due process where the employer was duly represented by
counsel and given sufficient opportunity to be heard and present his evidence nor where the employer's
failure to be heard was due to the various postponements granted to it or to his repeated failure to appear
during the hearings.

Petitioner, in this case, was given at least three chances by the hearing officer to submit his position paper
but failed each time. Even prior to the hearing officer's order for the submission of the position paper,
petitioner was given the opportunity to traverse the employees' complaint when he was ordered to
comment on the employees' computation of their claims submitted on August 20, 1986. The comment
was never submitted since petitioner failed to appear during the two hearings set for the purpose despite
due notice. Clearly, petitioner was granted ample opportunity to present his case before the Regional
Director.
PAYMENT OF APPEAL FEES
C.W.TAN MFG. and FEDERICO JAVIER as Plant Superintendent and JAIME SO as Plant Manager vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) and
ANGELINO BRIMON
G.R. No. 79596, February 10, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS: Angelino Brimon (Brimon) and Associated Labor Unions (ALU) in which Brimon is a member
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Petitioners alleged that Brimon took a leave of
absence without approval of the management. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint holding that the
ground for Brimon’s dismissal is a valid cause and that he was afforded due process. The appeal to the
NLRC was initially dismissed for having been filed out of time as there was no proof of service of the
appeal to the adverse party, but the NLRC reconsidered its Resolution and ordered Brimon’s
reinstatement. Thus, this petition arguing that the appeal should be dismissed because it was not perfected
since Brimon failed to pay the required filing fee within the reglementary period of appeal (5 years since
the filing of the appeal).

ISSUE: Whether the appeal should be dismissed.

RULING: NO.

The Court held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC that "the failure to pay the
appeal docketing fee confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power
must be exercised with a sound discretion and with a great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances." It is true that in Acda vs. Minister of Labor, the Court said that the payment of
the appeal fee is "by no means a mere technicality but is an essential requirement in the perfection of an
appeal." However, where as in this case the fee had been paid belatedly the broader interest of justice and
the desired objective in deciding the case on the merits demand that the appeal be given due course.

Also, under Article 221 of the Labor Code, it is provided as follows:

ART. 221. Technical rules not binding. - In any proceeding before the Commission or
any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and
its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing, it is clear that the technical rules of evidence are not binding in proceedings before
the NLRC or labor arbiters and that all reasonable means should be used to ascertain the facts of the case
without regard to the technicality ties of law or procedure.

Although it is obvious that private respondent failed to pay the required docketing fee for an unreasonable
length of time, nevertheless this Court finds that under the circumstances of the case and considering the
merit of the appeal, the greater interest of justice will be served by giving due course to the appeal despite
the much delayed payment of the docketing fee. Indeed, private respondent Brimon, being a dismissed
employee, can very well be considered as a pauper litigant whose failure to pay the nominal docketing fee
of P25.00 within the reglementary period should be treated with understanding and compassion.
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF NLRC DECISION
OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third
Division) and FERMIN F. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 138193, March 5, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Fermin Guerrero (Guerrero) was hired by OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. (OSM) for and on
behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC), as a Master Mariner.
Guerrero alleged that he was not paid any compensation for working at the vessel, and worst, he was
forced to disembark. Thus, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries,
overtime pay and vacation pay. The LA ruled in favor of Guerrero which was affirmed by the NLRC.
Challenging the ruling of the NLRC, OSM filed a petition with the CA, but it was dismissed for failure to
attach in its petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the LA’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to attach a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the LA’s decision.

RULING: YES.

Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a petition
be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and prohibition, petitions
need to be accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned judgment,
order or resolution. Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to it may be mere machine copies
thereof. Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals under Rule 45 and in original
civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be certified is
the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Since the LA's Decision was not the
questioned ruling, it did not have to be certified. What had to be certified was the NLRC Decision. And
indeed it was.
DISAFFILIATION
VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED LABOR
UNION FOR METAL, WORKERS, DMG, INC., PEOPLE'S CAR, INC., KARBAYAN INC., and RTC
TRADING, INC.
G.R. No. L-45824, June 19, 1985
CUEVAS, J.

FACTS: Petitioner and the Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL), using the name of
Volkschel Labor Union Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers, jointly entered into a CBA with
respondent Companies. Under the CBA, respondent companies agreed to make payroll deductions for
membership dues and remit the same to ALUMETAL. However, a majority of petitioner’s members
decided to disaffiliate from ALUMETAL to operate as independent labor group. Confronted with the
issue as to whether to continue deducting from employees' wages and remitting union dues, respondent
companies sought the opinion of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Med-Arbiter found the disaffiliation
legal but at the same time gave the opinion that, petitioner's members should continue paying their dues to
ALUMETAL. Both petitioner and ALUMETAL appealed. The Acting Director reversed the Med-
Arbiter’s resolution. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor which referred the appeal back to the
Bureau. The Bureau denied the appeal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s disaffiliation from ALUMETAL is valid.

RULING: YES.

The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. In previous cases, it has
been repeatedly held that a local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the
interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is
consistent with the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Article IV, Section 7, Philippine
Constitution).

Petitioner contends that the disaffiliation was not due to any opportunists motives on its part. Rather it
was prompted by the federation's deliberate and habitual dereliction of duties as mother federation
towards petitioner union. Employees' grievances were allegedly left unattended to by respondent
federation to the detriment of the employees' rights and interests.

In reversing the Med-Arbiter's resolution, respondent Bureau declared: the Department of Labor is set on
a task to restructure the labor movement to the end that the workers will unite themselves along industry
lines. Carried to its complete fruition, only one union for every industry will remain to bargain
collectively for the workers. The clear policy therefore even now is to conjoin workers and worker
groups, not to dismember them. This policy is commendable. However, we must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate of protecting labor and the workers' right to self-organization. In the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations,
the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. In the case at bar, it
would go against the spirit of the labor law to restrict petitioner's right to self-organization due to the
existence of the CBA. The Court agree with the Med-Arbiter's opinion that "A disaffiliation does not
disturb the enforceability and administration of a collective agreement; it does not occasion a change of
administrators of the contract nor even an amendment of the provisions thereof." But nowhere in the
record does it appear that the contract entered into by the petitioner and ALUMETAL prohibits the
withdrawal of the former from the latter.
MEMBERS OF A COOPERATIVE WHO ARE ALSO ITS EMPLOYEES CANNOT UNIONIZE FOR
BARGAINING PURPOSES
EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION: ASSOCIATION, NOT UNION
NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., (NEECO I) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
PRESIDENT RODOLFO JIMENEZ, and members, REYNALDO FAJARDO, ERNESTO MARIN,
EVER GUEVARRA, PETRONILO BAGUISA, VICTORINO CARILLO vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., (NEECO I) and
PATRICIO DELA PEÑA
G.R. No. 116066, January 24, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS: Petitioner were permanent employees of Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative (NEECO I). They
were also members of NEECO I Employees Association, a labor organization established for the mutual
aid and protection of its members. NEECO I ordered all its regular employees to accomplish applications
for either retirement, resignation, or separation from service. Also, certain union officers were promoted
to supervisory rank which was considered as harassment threatening the union members, and
circumventing the employees' security of tenure. With that, a snap election was held, and new set of
officers were elected. Thereafter, NEECO I Employees Association passed a resolution withdrawing the
applications for retirement of all its members. Despite the said resolution, petitioners were either
compulsorily retired or terminated by the management. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against NEECO I. The LA ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered NEECO I to reinstate them
with payment of full backwages and their benefits and privileges as well as moral and exemplary
damages. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the decision of the LA, but deleted the awards of moral and
exemplary damages. The NLRC denied petitioners’ MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the NLRC erred in deleting the awards of moral and exemplary damages.

RULING: YES.

To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the dismissal of the employee was attended
to by bad faith, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was unfair labor practice.

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization, are
inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and
disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As
the conscience of the government, it is the Court's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.

For this reason, the Court find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on private
respondent. However, the damages awarded by the labor arbiter, to the Court’s mind, are excessive. In
determining the amount of damages recoverable, the business, social and financial position of the
offended parties and the business and financial position of the offender are taken into account. It is the
Court’s view that herein private respondents had not fully acted in good faith. However, the Court is
cognizant that a cooperative promotes the welfare of its own members. The economic benefits filter to the
cooperative members. Either equally or proportionally, they are distributed among members in
correlation with the resources of the association utilized. Cooperatives help promote economic
democracy and support community development. Under these circumstances, we deem it proper to
reduce moral damages to only P10,000.00 payable by private respondent NEECO I to each individual
petitioner. We also deem it sufficient for private respondent NEECO I to pay each individual petitioner
P5,000.00 to answer for exemplary damages, based on the provisions of Articles 2229 and 2232 of the
Civil Code