Strategic Analysis

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India–US Ties: Reviewing the Relationship

Chintamani Mahapatra

To cite this article: Chintamani Mahapatra (2015) India–US Ties: Reviewing the Relationship,
Strategic Analysis, 39:2, 170-175, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2014.1000667

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.1000667

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 Strategic Analysis, 2015
Vol. 39, No. 2, 170–175, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.1000667

Commentary
India–US Ties: Reviewing the Relationship
Chintamani Mahapatra

rime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington and a summit meeting with
P President Barack Obama re-energised a relationship that was widely perceived to
be moving towards a dead end. During almost 10 years of Manmohan Singh-led
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, India’s relations with the United
States held all the promises of becoming robust and a model strategic partnership
for international relations. The signing of a history-making civil nuclear cooperation
agreement, a large number of defence deals, including arms trade and technology
transfer, the conclusion of a new 10-year defence framework agreement, regular
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

military exercises involving all branches of the armed forces and efforts towards
enhancing bilateral trade and investment ties were remarkable developments in
bilateral relations.
To be historically correct, one should credit President Bill Clinton for taking a
novel path to progress America’s ties with India into a highly positive strategic
partnership. After imposing massive economic sanctions on India for conducting a
series of nuclear tests in May 1998, President Clinton changed his course by the
closing months of his administration and visited India for five days in March 2000. A
series of agreements were signed and an inspiring joint ‘Vision Statement’ was issued
carrying the signatures of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Bill
Clinton, allowing the two countries to embark upon a new strategic partnership.
There was a change of guard in the White House and in India, but the foundations
laid in 2000 provided the base for subsequent administrations to construct a bold
bilateral strategic partnership encompassing the economy, politics, diplomacy and
security. Both Washington and New Delhi witnessed bipartisan support for the
Indo-US strategic partnership, cutting across the respective political divide. Thus,
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) making way for the UPA to form the
government in India and the Republican Party winning the election to occupy the
White House did not negatively affect the broad parameters of the emerging strategic
partnership between the two countries. The Clinton–Vajpayee understanding was
carried forward by Bush–Singh initiatives, making some of India’s neighbours
envious, and some anxious or apprehensive. Pakistan in particular appeared to have
developed anxiety, while China was apprehensive.
When Barack Obama succeeded George Bush in the White House, questions were
raised in India about the continuity of Bush’s policy towards India. President Obama’s
first term almost coincided with the second term of the UPA government, which

Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra is Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.

© 2015 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

 Strategic Analysis 171

succeeded the NDA government. Obama certainly did not disappoint Manmohan
Singh, and during his visit to Delhi in 2010 went a few steps ahead of his predecessor
to announce his support for India’s permanent membership in the UN Security
Council, Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
(NSG) and other non-proliferation regimes.
By the time Obama’s second term unfolded, it was becoming clear that the second
UPA government was not in a position to deliver on its promises and live up to
American expectations on civil nuclear trade, bilateral investment treaty negotiations
or attractive economic reforms. While the nuclear liability act passed by the Indian
parliament made it difficult for US companies to build nuclear reactors, coalition
politics prevented Prime Minister Singh from enacting fresh legislation to institute
economic reforms. Stung by its own financial crisis and adversely affected by the
persistent euro-zone economic crisis, the Obama administration had considerable
expectations from emerging markets, particularly Indian markets, to navigate the
US economy amidst recession. But Indian coalition politics, lacklustre economic
performance and President Obama’s preoccupation with his own domestic politics
and foreign policy challenges slowed down the momentum in the Indo-US strategic
partnership. Critics promptly characterised this bilateral relationship as one that had
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

reached a plateau. However, when the arrest of an Indian female consular officer and
her perceived mistreatment by the New York Police Department (NYPD) created a
diplomatic furore, the goal of a robust Indo-US strategic partnership seemed to have
entered rough waters.

Indian general election

It was during this rocky period in India’s ties with the United States that general
elections were held in India. There was widespread speculation about the near certain
defeat of the Congress Party and its UPA coalition, although there was no expectation
of a clear victory by any other party, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Yet
the emergence of Narendra Modi as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, and his
impressive election rallies, alerted the international community to a potentially new
political landscape emerging in India after the election.
Before the Obama administration could review the Indian political scene, the
British government and the European Union made their first move to build contacts
with Narendra Modi. Questions that circulated in the US and India were about US
visa denial to Modi since 2005 and its impact on bilateral relations in the event of
Modi becoming the next Indian prime minister. Interested parties in the US, which
included some Muslim groups, Jewish groups and human rights champions, continued
to lobby in the US Congress to maintain Modi’s visa denial. The strength of such
lobbying activities is indicated in US Congressman Fran R. Wolf’s demand in
December 2012 in the presence of 25 other members of Congress on the steps of
the Capitol that the US government should ‘never … grant a visa to allow Chief
Minister Modi to visit’ the United States ‘under any circumstances’.1 Significantly,
Narendra Modi was the only individual who was ever denied a visa on the basis of a
1998 law that made individuals responsible for severe violations of ‘religious
freedom’ ineligible for an American visa.2 When various election forecasts predicted
a Modi victory, there was a continued demand in certain circles that President Obama
deny a visa to him under a 2011 Executive Order that he issued amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act to grant the president the authority to deny a visa
 172 Chintamani Mahapatra

to a person responsible for committing ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity or other
serious violations of human rights…’.3
However, the State Department changed course, despite the mood to the contrary
in the US Congress, when it became increasingly likely that Modi would become the
next Indian prime minister. US Ambassador Nancy Pelosi followed the British and
EU example and met Narendra Modi in February 2014. It was then made clear that
Washington would welcome whoever was to become the new prime minister in India
and the State Department issued the following statement:

We have a very close—very, very close—relationship with India on a whole host of issues,
whether it’s energy, the economy, environmental issues, security issues, a whole host of
issues. That has not changed. We look forward to growing that even stronger. We will work
with whoever the people of India decide should lead their country. We believe it’s a critical
partnership, and we’re moving forward with it.4

Subsequently it was pointed out that the head of a state would not require a visa to
enter the United States.
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

Modi as new PM
When the BJP won the general election with a resounding majority and the natural
choice of the party for the post of prime minister was Narendra Modi, the Obama
administration moved swiftly to change gear in its approach towards India. President
Obama called Modi to congratulate him and invited him to visit the United States.
Significantly, Modi promptly agreed to the visit and set at rest all speculations about
his intended policy towards a country that had denied him a visa for so long. Prime
Minister Modi demonstrated his pragmatism and kept the country’s interests above his
personal feelings and views.
A series of high-level US delegations to India soon materialised, partly to test the
new leadership and also to prepare the ground for Modi’s visit to the United States.
The seriousness of the Obama administration’s desire to restore the momentum in its
relationship with India was reflected in three high-level visits to India in a week, led
by Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Commerce
Secretary Penny Pritzker.
The immediate goal was to end the diplomatic logjam that had affected the Indo-
US relationship in the wake of the Devyani Khobragade episode. Starting with a long
diplomatic spat over the arrest and strip-search of Indian diplomat Devyani
Khobragade in New York in September 2013, Indo-US relations had experienced a
downward spiral with both countries going to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
with an assortment of trade disputes, escalating differences between them on
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues, downgrading of the safety ranking of
India’s airlines by the US, and Washington complaining about the safety of drugs
manufactured by Indian pharmaceutical companies and sold in US markets. While
these differences were not unique to US relations with India, they drew unusual media
attention against the backdrop of the rocky political ties over Devyani’s arrest.
It appeared that a cloudy climate had engulfed the Indo-US partnership and that
the hitherto upward trajectory in Indo-US relations had encountered an insurmoun-
table road-block. The big ticket items announced with much fanfare to promote civil
nuclear cooperation and the American promise of support for India’s permanent
 Strategic Analysis 173

membership in an expanded UN Security Council and international non-proliferation

regimes were no longer expected to see the light of the day.
Secretary John Kerry visited India to set at rest all doubts over the future of the
US–India partnership project. He wrote an article in the Economic Times highlighting
the huge potential for improving bilateral ties during his visit to India in early August
2014 and sought to make it a ‘transformative moment’ in Indo-US relations. However,
Kerry’s visit did not go as smoothly as hoped. The Washington Post had just
published a report about US spying on BJP leaders, along with HAMAS and a few
others, and the political atmosphere was charged in Delhi during his visit.5 Foreign
Minister Sushma Swaraj conveyed to him the ‘public anger’ over this issue and Kerry
was defensive in the press conference, during which he said: ‘We value our relation-
ship with India … we try to have our intelligence communities to work to resolve any
questions or differences that may exist. We will continue to work actively with India
… and we fully respect and understand the feelings expressed by the minister’.6
Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker likewise came to Delhi to interact with the
new government and reinvigorate the economic cooperation between the two coun-
tries. However, the position of India’s new government on the issue of the Trade
Facilitation Act at the WTO apparently disappointed her and she openly expressed her
feelings: ‘I am very disappointed in India taking a step back from the agreement and it
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

will have significant ramifications in terms of the Doha round and India needs to
recognize that’.7
While the US secretary of state and secretary of commerce returned home with
little satisfaction over the outcome of their visit to India, Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel’s visit appeared successful, at least in the eyes of the people. He called for
‘results oriented’ defence cooperation, going beyond arms trade to ‘co-production and
co-development’ weapons systems and ‘freer exchange of technology’. Such ideas
found appreciation in India and his observation that India ‘need not choose between
closer partnership with America and improved ties with China’ went down very well
among the Indian people.8
At the end of the three US secretaries’ visits to India, it was clear that the
momentum in regular dialogue and deeper and comprehensive cooperation was
restored. The next logical step in these renewed efforts for mending and improving
bilateral ties was the Modi–Obama summit in Washington.

The summit
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States was a momentous development both
in terms of unprecedented methods and new initiatives to reshape and invigorate the
bilateral strategic partnership. Modi’s goal appeared to be to promote India’s image as
a global player and as a country that was prepared to play its role in shaping a new
world order. In this regard his performance in the United Nations before visiting
Washington was significant in setting the tone of his initiatives in the US. In his
speech at the UN General Assembly, Modi gave a call for the creation of a ‘Group of
All’ in view of various kinds of groupism afflicting global peace and stability. This
was not an outlandish call given the escalating threat to the very concept of nation-
states (members of the UN) by ever proliferating numbers of non-state actors. His call
for a comprehensive convention to combat terrorism was partly aimed at strengthen-
ing unity among nations in the face of growing challenges from the invisible enemies
of nation-states.
 174 Chintamani Mahapatra

Prime Minister Modi also created history of a sort by addressing an audience of

about 60,000 at New York’s Central Park and by advocating global poverty eradica-
tion. He then reached out to thousands of Indian Americans by addressing them at
Madison Square and announcing his government’s decision to merge the Persons of
Indian Origin (PIO) with the Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) and issue them with
lifetime visas. In return, the prime minister urged the Indian Americans to invest their
time, energy and capital in India’s growth and development. This was in a way a
master stroke in public diplomacy. After all, the Indian American community in the
US is large, prosperous and increasingly influential. The Obama administration has
been trying to harness the capability of this community to the benefit of the US, as
reflected in his appointments to higher posts in local governance as well as foreign
missions. On the eve of Modi’s visit to the US, President Obama nominated an Indian
American to be the next Ambassador to India.
Other unprecedented developments during Modi’s US visit included the issuance
of a joint vision statement with a carefully written title in Hindi and English, President
Obama greeting him in Gujarati and Modi answering him in English, publication of
an article by the Indian prime minister in the Wall Street Journal and a joint article by
Obama and Modi in The Washington Post.9
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

Finally, the joint statement issued after the summit by Modi and Obama was
anything but a usual joint statement. Many new initiatives and clearer foreign policy
positions found a place in the joint statement. For example, the two leaders agreed to
ease ‘travel between their two countries, as India introduces visa-on-arrival for US
citizens and work toward meeting the requirements to make the United States’
Global Entry Program available to Indian citizens’.10 It was a commendable initia-
tive by a leader who had been denied a visa, to facilitate travel for citizens of both
countries.
Some portions of the joint statement sent clear signals to China, Pakistan, Iran and
North Korea, and even to international terrorist organisations. For example, Modi and
Obama expressed their concern ‘about rising tensions over maritime territorial dis-
putes and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security ensuring free-
dom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in South China
Sea’. What else could be a clearer signal to China? In response to China’s selective
citation of history to promote connectivity by reviving the Silk Route and creating a
new maritime Silk Route, the two leaders ‘emphasized the need to accelerate infra-
structure connectivity and economic development corridors for regional economic
integration linking South, Southeast and central Asia’. Moreover, the joint statement
sent a message to Pakistan by mentioning Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company and the Haqqanis as
a threat to international security and stressing ‘the need for joint and concerted efforts,
including the dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks’.11
Significantly, no big ticket items were announced, simply because already
announced big ticket items first needed to be implemented. The Indo-US strategic
partnership, in fact, has been a kind of project in progress. It has met many road-
blocks in the last several years because of domestic compulsions in India and the US
as well as other critical challenges in the world arena. Prime Minister Modi’s agenda
for the US trip was aimed at rebuilding confidence, renewing serious dialogues and
implementing agreements already concluded. It was overall a successful, construc-
tive and innovative diplomatic mission to Washington by the new Indian prime
minister.
 Strategic Analysis 175

Notes
1. ‘Narendra Modi Should Be Denied Visa: US Lawmakers to Obama Administration’,
Economic Times, December 5, 2012.
2. ‘Why Narendra Modi Was Banned from the US: Narendra Modi is the Only Person Ever
Denied a US Visa Based on a Little-Known Law on Religious Freedom’, Wall Street Journal,
May 2, 2014.
3. On August 4, 2011, President Obama issued Presidential Proclamation 8697 on the
‘Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in
Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses’. Details can be
found at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222942.pdf.
4. Business Standard, April 2, 2014.
5. Report cited at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/bjp-among-parties-spied-
upon-by-us-says-report-uproar-in-india-roundup-114070101370_1.html.
6. Economic Times, August 1, 2014.
7. Times of India, July 31, 2014.
8. For the text of the speech, please see http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?
SpeechID=1874.
9. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/narendra-modi-and-barack-obama-a-us-india-
partnership-for-the-21st-century/2014/09/29/dac66812-4824-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.
html.
10. For the joint statement, please see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-
india-joint-statement.
Strategic Analysis 2015.39:170-175.

11. Ibid.