Article

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Journal of Asian Security

and International Affairs
Triangle: Unentangling the 1(2) 203–222
2014 SAGE Publications India
India, China, US Relations Private Limited
SAGE Publications
on Conflict and Security Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
in South Asia1 Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2347797014536641
http://aia.sagepub.com

Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

Abstract
The objective of this paper is to give insight into the debate over the strategic
triangle and how it impacts conflict and security in South Asia. First the new
geopolitical motives of the United States in the Asia-Pacific are outlined. Then
the concept of strategic triangle is elaborated and its applicability discussed; third,
details about China and India’s relations and responses to the new US policy are
being analyzed; the perspective turns to the implications for conflict and security
in South Asia with a focus on Afghanistan and Iran where oil and energy secu-
rity are the main denominators of foreign policy calculations and moves in the
strategic triangle; and finally, some concluding remarks are offered to explain the
recent shifts in interactions between these core players in the emerging world
order and whether a new geopolitical architecture is emerging.

Keywords
Strategic triangle; international political economy; foreign policy; security;
the United States; India; China

Introduction
Although most scholars agree that the United States is in a motion of relative
decline it may be premature to talk about a shift from a unilateral to a multipolar
or tripolar world order. We do see the contours of a new world order but do not
know yet the end result or whether in fact it will turn out as world disorder. The
gridlock of multilateralism and immanent crisis in the United Nations (UN)
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has changed global policy priorities and

Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political

Science at Aalborg University, Denmark. He can be contacted at E-mail: jds@dps.aau.dk
204 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

decision-making towards regional groups, bilateralism and transnational relations.

Rapid global change is also connected to the rise of East and South Asia in the
world system. According to recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) projec-
tions India and China will continue being the fastest growing countries in the near
future. Forecasts show positive growth rates in the longer run indicating a deep-
ened shift of geo-economic gravity towards the Eastern hemisphere and this may
involve a genuine shift in geopolitical priorities as well.
The recent foreign policy change or strategic rebalance by the Obama
administration illustrates this post-hegemonic stalemate. The seemingly diplo-
matic shift from Europe to Asia can be viewed as an attempt of launching a new
Cold War in Asia ‘viewing oil as the key to global supremacy’ (Klare, 2011)
and a strategic shift to project US power ambitions in the region. It can be
interpreted as a downsizing of the transatlantic partnership and an emerging
unpredictable situation of renovated nationalism, re-installing currency wars
and beggar-thy-neighbour policy. The launching of the new defence strategy at
the Pentagon on 5 January 2012 was accompanied by the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin Dempsey’s key message emphasizing that ‘All trends are
shifting to the Pacific…. Our strategic challenges will largely emanate out of
the Pacific region’ (Pilkington, 2012).
These indications coupled with embryonic protectionist policies by Washington
and the European Union (EU) to overcome the economic crisis and relative
decline vis-à-vis especially China, but also India and Brazil have increased fears
of an all-out trade war. The White House has a potentially dangerous power
instrument: the threat of currency tariffs (Beattie, 5 December 2011) while the
newly emerging economies in the form of BRICS2 are advocating a re-writing of
the international financial architecture and a gradual de-coupling from American
Dollar hegemony. The BRICS have also reiterated their wish to rewrite the rules
and regulations governing other global political and economic institutions (Legro,
2012), a move strongly supported by India as well as other non-Western countries.
The BRICS countries seek an enhanced role in international affairs and greater
influence in global decision-making and leadership.
In this context the shifting geopolitical and geo-economic global order is
changing focus away from the traditional strategic triangle of Europe, the US and
China to a newly renovated interest in the conflictual, competitive and contradic-
tory relationship among India, China and the US.3 The strategic interactions
among these three countries have become the subject of intense analysis by schol-
ars and analysts all over the world. It also raises the question whether the new
American strategy ‘Pivot to Asia’ has any real substance. In fact, India is the only
country mentioned by name as a vital partner and this implicitly indicates the
impact on the Sino-Indian relationship and furthermore it illuminates the argu-
ment that we are observing a real geopolitical and geo-economic shift in strategic
importance from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. This would imply a weakening
of the European sphere of influence whether in the institutionalized form of the

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 205

EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the prime Atlantic secu-
rity organization.
The objective of this paper is to give an insight into the debate over the
strategic triangle and how it impacts conflict and security in South Asia. First,
the new geopolitical motives of the United States in the Asia-Pacific are out-
lined. Second, the concept of strategic triangle is elaborated and its applicabil-
ity discussed. Third, details about China and India’s relations and responses to
the new US policy are analyzed. Fourth, the implications for conflict and secu-
rity in South Asia are fleshed out with a focus on Afghanistan and Iran where
oil and energy security are the main denominators of foreign policy calcula-
tions and moves in the strategic triangle. Finally, some concluding remarks are
offered to explain the recent shifts in interactions between these core players
in the emerging world order and whether a new geopolitical architecture is
emerging.

Obama’s New Asia-Pacific Strategy

In October 2011 the US Senate passed a bill that potentially will compel the US
to use calculations of currency undervaluation when assessing to what extent
imports are deemed to be unfairly priced, for the purposes of imposing emergency
so-called ‘anti-dumping’ and ‘countervailing duty’ tariffs. This bill is being used
as a threat by the Obama Administration to impose protectionist sanctions on
China in order to pressurize an upgrading of the Renminbi and gives a geo-
economic twist to American geopolitical ambitions in the Asia-Pacific.
As a follow-up to these policy changes, in his remarks to the Australian parlia-
ment on November 17, 2011, President Obama declared that Washington was
making the Asia-Pacific region a top priority. While promising a continued and
even expanding the US military presence in the region, he also hinted at strength-
ening US–China cooperation. This seeming paradox denotes a certain degree of
ambivalence in the White House’s strategy and questions whether the official dis-
course has any real substance. In the same speech, however, Obama declared a
whole battery of anti-China moves: the US to deploy military forces permanently
in Australia for the first time; the US to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(a multilateral trade agreement excluding China); and the US to discuss the South
China Sea problem at the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
summit (Sakai, 2011)—a significant move to discuss what China regards as a
bilateral issue in a multilateral forum.4
While the reception of the American pivot was more relaxed in India, it cre-
ated mixed reactions in Beijing. Army Major General Luo Yuan, replied on the
website of the People’s Daily that Washington was clearly trying to fence in
Beijing: ‘...its ‘return to Asia’ has been positioning pieces and forces on China’s
periphery, and the intent is very clear—this is aimed at China, to contain China.’

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

206 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

He went further noting: ‘the US has been bolstering its five major military alli-
ances in the Asia-Pacific region and is adjusting the positioning of its five major
military base clusters, while also seeking more entry rights for military bases
around China…. Who can believe that [the US is] not directing this at China?’
(Cf Reuters, 28 November 2011).
India’s reaction was more responsive. Initially it was seen as neatly comple-
mentary to Delhi’s ‘Look East’ policy, although interpretations and opinions
varied and there was some irritations against American slogans like ‘it is not
enough to ‘Look East’’ but ‘engage East’ and ‘act East’ (Clinton, 2011a). One
observer noted that the US pivot to Asia would strengthen Indo-US defence coop-
eration, allow India to bargain with the US on a number of issues such as military
and civilian nuclear technology, and help secure Delhi’s inclusion into the global
governance authorities: ‘There is considerable synergy between India’s approach
and that of the US ‘pivot’ on preserving and reinforcing global norms such as
freedom of navigation, democracy and human rights in the Asia-Pacific region’
(Muni, 2012, p. 7).
The apparent shift in the US strategic thinking, with its distinctly military focus
combined with diplomatic and economic means, appears dangerously provocative
to China and reflects America’s obsession with oil as the predominant denomina-
tor of global hegemony. As a result of China’s booming economy and the emer-
gence of a big middle class and domestic market, the country’s oil consumption is
exploding. For China, all this spells potential strategic impairment. The great
majority of oil comes by tankers from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America
over sea-lanes policed by the US Navy: ‘Indeed, almost every tanker bringing oil
to China travels across the South China Sea, a body of water the Obama adminis-
tration is now seeking to place under effective naval control’ (Klare, 2011)
together with India and other strategic partners.
With India and China proving to be the economic engines of global growth it
seems premature to deploy a containment strategy of counterbalancing in the
region; such a strategy would have been more suited to the Cold War era but not
so in the new Millennium. Containment during the Cold War days meant eco-
nomic and cultural isolation, militarization and arms race and little social contact.
No country in the region wants this to happen; but they also do not want to be
dominated by China. So engagement and cooperation on transnational issues
seems to be the best way forward (Nye, 2013).5
In the context of complex interdependence where geo-economics take prece-
dence over politics, it is difficult if not impossible for foreign policymakers in
Delhi to look at the ‘new pivot’ in an exclusive US–China perspective. They can
ill afford to see the new American strategy as China-centric but consider how it
impacts American weaknesses and promises, Chinese fears and Sino-Indian rela-
tions. Is India the keystone and ‘natural ally’ of Washington with shared long-term
strategic goals and values or are there obstacles in terms of access to oil, energy
and security, which may prove to be hindrances for a full-blown strategic
partnership?

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 207

These initial observations lead to a search for theoretical and conceptual means
which can give some plausibility to explain what seems to be an emerging con-
frontation or collusion in the Asia-Pacific involving the big three—namely India,
China and the United States. Furthermore the aim is to entangle the impact of this
new strategic triangular geopolitical and geo-economic positioning on security
and conflict in South Asia.6

Strategic Triangle
One useful concept, which illustrates the changing relationship among India,
China and the US, is that of a strategic triangle.7 It refers to a situation in which
three major powers are sufficiently important to each other that a change in the
relationship between any two of them has a significant impact on the interests of
the third. The greater that impact, actual or potential, the greater is the signifi-
cance of the triangular relationship (Harding, 2004, p. 321). A strategic triangle
conveys a strategic interplay of interests among three nation-states but it may also
denote both competition and cooperation. In this sense, it is an inherently restricted
triangle with its degree of triangulation restricted in different situations. The more
restriction the less effective the triangulation and the pivot leverage would thus be
creating variations in countries’ role conception and triangular conceptions from
time to time (Carlow, 1956; Chandra, 2010).
Strategic triangle denotes that the initial distribution of power decides who will
align with whom. It has been used by realist theory to argue that the fate of the
remaining side is determined by the nature of the two other relationships, because
players pursue cognitive consistency. However, the theory has caveats in its
explanatory power as it does not say much about domestic politics and social
configurations and also cannot explain the interplay of domestic and external
powers.8 This is why this contribution attempts to bring in domestic politics and
state-society configurations in order to complement the theory9 and focus more
squarely on the triangular dynamics and to illuminate how the India–China–US
relationship fits with security and conflict in South Asia.
China’s foreign policy is in a flux, still relying on a pragmatic approach, but
increasingly the leadership is under pressure from a variety of interests who push for
a more activist approach. More non-state actors are penetrating foreign policy
matters. Military leaders and the growth of nationalism and public opinion dissemi-
nated by an increasingly vocal media (Zhao, 2013, p. 544) but also domestic think
tanks and regional and local actors and governments penetrate strategic lines in
foreign relations (Hongyi, 2010; Schmidt, 2014). Beijing is utilizing traditional neo-
mercantilist foreign soft power policies towards developing countries. This includes
business and cultural tools and aid, and trade and investment in so-called packaged
deals as a way to penetrate foreign markets (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 84). This implic-
itly indicates a growing collusion between internal and external relations.

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208 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

In India, pressures come from the economic sphere but also from strategic
issues related to conflict within the regions (Schmidt, 2014; Schmidt forthcom-
ing). The impact of new actors and the soft penetration of prerogatives of national
sovereignty impinge in a positive way on conflict prevention in some areas and in
a negative fashion in other areas. The increasing synergies created by think tanks,
NGOs, social movements, regional parties and local governments, private compa-
nies and minority populations like Muslims in India and China have important
consequences for prospects of peace and stability. In the United States, well-known
lobbyists, big capital and other domestic actors for long have influenced foreign
policy. Democracy and elections may also impinge on the direction and change of
‘national interest’ which cannot be treated as a ‘black box’ or static entity.
Domestic actors therefore must be taken into consideration in order to compre-
hend the full explanatory power of the strategic triangle as a conceptual and theo-
retical framework.
With the rise of the Indian and Chinese power in the twenty-first century, it is
unclear what pattern the triangle will evolve into: ‘some speculate about a US–
India alignment against a rising China; others emphasize about a Sino-Indian
cooperative framework against the unipolar world order led by the US’ (Harding,
2004, p. 323). So far, there is only speculation and more or less a dominance of
nationalist- and interest-driven predictions. After the end of the Cold War, India
seems to have pursued a new strategy that attempted to reduce tensions with
China while at the same time enhancing the strategic relationship with the United
States. China, on the other hand, has sought to improve relations with India by
breaking off from its strategic containment policy while also seeking continued
stability in its relations with the US.
India and China find themselves locked into what can be termed the ‘security
complex’ within which they are expected to manage their rivalry and develop ties
of cooperation (Buzan, 1991, 2012). Security competition between India and
China is inevitable as their economies grow but ‘the positive note is that this secu-
rity competition does not have to be conflictual’ (Chatterjee, 2011, p. 84). In fact,
there are signs that geo-economic competition and cooperation, notably in areas
of energy and oil, has overtaken the geopolitical conflict and security-ridden
issues (Schmidt, 2014). Since the mutual symbolic recognition of the Tibetan
Autonomous region as part of China’s territory and Sikkim as a state in India,
bilateral relations have improved significantly. It is also noteworthy that both
countries have established a framework for frequent high-level exchanges among
defence ministries and armed forces, an annual defence dialogue and joint mili-
tary exercises, as well as exchange of officials for study tours and seminars (Yuan,
2010, p. 134).
Economic growth strategies in China and India need the cooperation and sup-
port of the United States. Given America’s need to access two of the biggest
global markets, the US may become a positive factor in Sino-India relationship if
it enhances regional stability and economic growth in East and South Asia. But
America could play a negative role if it is able to utilize the ‘India card’ or plays

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 209

the ‘China card’ against the other country. In the words of Kaplan (2010: 3), ‘the
direction India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the
21st century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state.’

US, India and China Relations: An Emerging

Global Order
When President Obama visited India in November 2010, he reiterated the US sup-
port for India’s full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australian Group and the
Wassenaar Agreement without insisting on India signing the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India’s membership in these regulatory bodies would
give it an equivalent status to the five recognized nuclear weapons states and
make it a genuine partner rather than a target of international non-proliferation
efforts. President Obama told the Indian parliament that the relationship between
India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the twenty-first
century, rooted in common values and interests. Following up on this positive
note, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stressed: ‘The Obama administration has
expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India’s Look East efforts,
including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a
new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and
Central Asia, with India as a linchpin’ (Clinton, 2011b).
Progressive scholars, policymakers and activists in Beijing and New Delhi
often see enhanced Sino-Indian ties as a constraint on American hegemony and a
counter-strategy to Washington’s overtures. Neo-realists in the United States and
India, however, are suspicious of China and seek to build up US–India military ties
as a strategic counterweight to Beijing’s growing influence.10 While the US–India
and China–India relationships steadily improve, Sino-American relations seem to
be entering another strained and turbulent phase (Chatterjee, 2011, p. 90).
China is now the world’s second largest economy. India is sixth in purchasing-
power parity terms. China’s defence spending has experienced double-digit
annual growth during the past two decades. India was the world’s largest buyer of
conventional weapons in 2010. In 2003–2010, a study by the US Congressional
Research Service listed Saudi Arabia, India and China as the three biggest arms
buyers; Saudi Arabia bought arms worth US$ 29 billion, India bought nearly
US$ 17 billion worth of conventional arms and China around US$ 13.2 billion
(Acharya, 2011). These numbers suggest that perhaps spurred on by its fear of
China, India is pursuing military modernization with gusto and spending enor-
mous amounts of valuable money on armaments, which might have been used for
development purposes in the domestic realm. Again securing access to and safe
transportation of oil and energy seems to be the common denominator for the
Asian arms race but of course it is not the only factor.

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210 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

According to realist analysis, India’s foreign policy is partly driven by a

desire, encouraged by the US and Southeast Asian countries, to assume the role
of a regional balancer vis-à-vis China (Pant, 2012a, 2012b). India has also sought
a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for a long time and is trying to
establish international support for this move. India has engaged in the G-20
forum, but never came up with any substantial reform proposals to restructure
the global multilateral order.11 China and India have the resources but they still
suffer from a deficit of regional legitimacy in East and South Asia. This might be
partly a legacy of the past: Japanese wartime role, Chinese subversion and Indian
diplomatic highhandedness in its near neighbourhood. But their mutual rivalry
also prevents them from assuming regional leadership singly or collectively
(Acharya, 2011).
As a regional power, India also needs to consider its geostrategic limitations
and one of its major interests is to ensure that the changing contours of the
Indo-US relationship do not disrupt the balance of power between India and
China and consequently the peace and tranquillity in the neighbourhood
(Chatterjee, 2011, p. 81). Asia remains the emerging geopolitical core of India’s
foreign policy and ‘China will for the foreseeable future, remain a significant
foreign policy and security challenge for India. It is the one major power, which
impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space. As its economic and military
capabilities expand, its power differential with India is also likely to widen’
(Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 12). The challenge for India is to strike a careful balance
between cooperation and competition, economic and political interests, bilateral
and regional contexts and ‘this is perhaps the single most important challenge for
Indian strategy in the years ahead’ (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 15) with notable
wider ramifications.
The interactions and impacts of the strategic triangle on the present world
order are huge. Since the late-2000s, Europe has been hit hard by the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). Almost the entire EU region has suffered from sovereign
debt crisis and has been in desperate need of investment and cash injections.
While Europe was going through this financial and economic turmoil President
Obama unleashed his ‘Asia First’ announcement, which was virtually a declara-
tion of a ‘Europe Second’ policy and a challenge to the European Commission’s
and member-states’ desire and support for a multipolar world order based on
multilateralism.
It also seems apparent that the navigation of the new strategic triangle shows
the same fluidity and less static characteristic not dissimilar to the previous
strategic triangular relationship among the EU–US–China before the GFC
(Shambaugh, 2005, p. 21) and even earlier attempts to create a Indo-Sino-Russian
anti-hegemonic and strategic ‘Asian’ triangle challenging the US unipolarity
(Ambrosio, 2005). An action by one side of the strategic triangle does not neces-
sarily trigger the opposite reaction. It seems that despite some hype about attempts
by the US to create an alliance with India against China, there are no clear exam-
ples of two nations strategically aligned against a third. It is even more interesting

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The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 211

to note another important layer related to increased interactions especially in trade

and growing societal interdependence. On the other hand, India and China share
scepticism of US hegemony and have common interests in the promotion of a
multipolar world order and reliance on multilateralism. What is even more inter-
esting in this regard is an emerging common view on these matters among EU,
China and India since they share an intended downplaying of the national security
imperative as the driver of international politics and economics.
Although these positive signs may imply a perceived strategic partnership,
with common interest in transforming the international system, and the establish-
ment of multipolarity and peace, India and China remain sensitive to each other’s
ties with the United States based on the perception that an ‘alignment between
Washington and its rival would place it in a very difficult strategic situation’
(Ambrosio, 2005, p. 404). It is safe to say, therefore, that India–China relations are
strongly affected by the US foreign policy while US–China and US–India rela-
tions are relatively unaffected by actions of the third party in the triangle. Among
the three sides of the triangle it is only the India–China dyad that is sensitive to
triangular impacts (Xun, 2005, p. 8). Interestingly, there are signs that domestic
forces in India and China are trying to work out a peaceful and pragmatic rap-
prochement between the two countries; hence, increasing exchanges at both civil,
military and government levels may create a more dynamic bilateral relationship
in the near future.
However, potential frictions in the India–China–US strategic triangle have
important spill-over effects in South Asia, which could be characterized as a
hotbed of unresolved border issues and sensitive problems related to American
withdrawal from Afghanistan and threats and sanctions against Iran. How politi-
cal elites in Beijing and Delhi perceive and react to American projection of power
in Eurasia is the general issue while a more specific problem is related to the
impact in the Western part of South Asia. Afghanistan and Iran may be regarded
as tipping points for the emerging political and economic order at the continent.

Implications for Conflict and Security in South Asia

An important question is how Sino-Indian relations have evolved and what kind
of responses to the new American foreign policy (whether re-active or pro-active)
have emerged from Delhi and Beijing? Another related question is what are the
implications of this new scenario for conflict and security in South Asia?
A rapprochement of sorts between India and China started with the signing of a
declaration in 1999, and reiterated again in 2003. Through these declarations, India
explicitly noted that it did not consider China as a threat and acknowledged that
improvements in Sino-Indian ties need not hinder China’s alliance with Pakistan.
In the following decade, the two countries remained on the path of reconciliation
and China recognized India’s desire to become a global power (Yuan, 2010,
p. 135). However, several incidents in recent times point to a more contradictory

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212 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

relationship. For instance, India seems to have challenged and angered China
by agreeing to undertake joint oil exploration with Vietnam in the disputed Spratly
Islands of the South China Sea. Furthermore, growing Indo-Vietnamese defence
cooperation and Hanoi’s granting of berthing rights to the Indian Navy at the Nha
Trang Port was viewed with suspicion by Beijing given China’s unresolved terri-
torial disputes with Vietnam and other neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia.
Beijing, therefore, reacted aggressively to the presence of the Indian Navy in the
South China Sea (e.g., ‘bumping’ incident involving Indian and Chinese warships),
and experts portrayed this as China’s opposition to India’s ‘claim to be a regional
power’ (Pant, 2012a).
India has also established the Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership
and also enhanced relations with ASEAN including improved relations with
Myanmar and Vietnam. New Delhi’s Southeast Asia diplomacy could create prob-
lems for Chinese–ASEAN relations while Indian and Southeast Asian naval coop-
eration could impinge on China’s maritime interests, making a final resolution of
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea even more difficult. Indian foreign
policy-makers are also worried about the US policies in South and East Asia.
American strategy in the region is seen as downplaying India’s status as a pre-
eminent power, as a counterweight to China, and placing primacy on America’s
alliance with Pakistan (Schmidt, 2014).
China’s response to the new Obama Asia centred foreign policy thus relies not
only on its relationship with India but a growing anxiety over the intensification
of economic and political disputes with Japan, the EU and the United States.
Beijing’s growing economic clout and its wish to use economic leverage and soft
power to further advance its foreign policy goals has been applied in South Asia
as well.
China’s support to Pakistan remains a key element in China’s South Asia pol-
icy. Beijing has urged the US and India to help stabilize Pakistan and not to con-
tribute to that country falling apart. Pakistan is not a strategic counterweight to
India but remains a battleground for the US and Chinese interests. China does not
want its relations with Islamabad ‘to scuttle the process of normalization with New
Delhi, or worse, want to be dragged into the middle of a nuclear exchange between
India and Pakistan’ (Yuan, 2007, p. 139). The same may be said about China’s
relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal; with these countries China’s rela-
tions have acquired ‘multiple dimensions, ranging from cultural diplomacy, eco-
nomic engagement to security cooperation’ (Palit, 2010, p. 21).
China’s position in both East and South Asia is characterized by a paradox:
‘despite its relative decline, the United States has become the most sought-after
power in the region. For all want to benefit from economic ties with China, but
none want the region dominated by Beijing or their policy options constrained by
China. Put simply, there is no desire to replace the fading US hegemony with
Chinese hegemony’ (Malik, 2012, p. 346). The perception in Beijing is that
although the US remains the provider of global order and the only nation that can
establish security guarantees worldwide, Washington and the Pentagon’s attempts

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The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 213

to isolate China and destabilize its neighbourhood may lead to problems.

To Beijing, the aim of the US strategy is not only to contain China but also to
promote adherence to American sanctioned international norms and rules of con-
duct. It is an attempt to establish a regional order undergirded by rules and institu-
tions embedded in multilateral solutions. For instance, the American position
with regards to the South China Sea disputes is based on the principle that to
prevent conflicts from breaking out all countries concerned must adhere to exist-
ing international law. According to a Filipino observer Walden Bello: ‘That this
approach appears to favour certain countries—and that Beijing objects to multi-
lateral cooperation that might constrain its ability to coerce its neighbours—says
more about its bias than it does about any American bias’ (2013). The bottom-line
is that the United States forges ahead with efforts to counter China’s influence in
Asia. This is evident in Myanmar’s opening towards the West and India as well,
the dispute over a chain of small uninhabited islands—called Diaoyu in Chinese
and Senkaku in Japanese—these incidents can only be seen as an attempt to con-
tain China (Wade, 2013). The brewing tension in North Korea is also partly an
outcome of the new American strategy, which puts pressure on Beijing. The fact
is that China is encircled with very few friendly states and does not have many
allies (Brezinski, 2013).12
A key focus of India’s foreign policy at present and also possibly in the future
is non alignment and avoidance of formal strategic alliances with other actors
(Khilnani et al., 2012). Non alignment is understood in Delhi as renunciation of
formal military alliances. According to an influential recent study (Khilnani et al.,
2012; Tellis, 2012), the success of India’s foreign policy in the coming years will
be determined by India’s internal development rather than the realization of
any grand strategy. The study highlights the importance of creating greater socio-
economic equity, social safety nets and energy security in India. It points out that
India’s democracy has fuelled rising popular expectations ‘precisely when many
institutions are in atrophy or disrepair’ (Tellis, 2012, p. 18). Hence, the main for-
eign policy challenges ahead for India consists of accommodating new regional
parties, imparting stability to the relationship with Pakistan, and more seriously
attempting to economically integrate the immediate neighbourhood. These moves
are key to enhancing conflict prevention and stability, growth and social justice
both domestically and in the South Asian region and healthy and mutually bene-
fitting relations with China.
Critics, however, point out that ‘China remains suspicious of India’s partner-
ships and in particular sees improved Indian ties with America and Japan in
simple zero-sum terms. It follows that over the long run, the triangular relation-
ship between India, China and America will need very careful management’
(Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 32). Khilnani et al. further emphasized: ‘The partner-
ship game, if played delicately, can yield real benefits. The prospect that India is
a potential partner can give it leverage, both with the country courting it and
with potential rivals. India must leverage to the full extent possible this dual
diplomatic potential’ (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 32).

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214 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

Oil and Energy in Afghanistan and Iran

Two issues illustrating the fragility of the US–India relationship are the with-
drawal of American combat troops from Afghanistan and the Iran nuclear issue.
The latter is closely connected with oil and energy security but also create a
sense of preserving what is perceived in Delhi as the natural geopolitical envi-
ronment of South Asia. These issues show clearly the wish to preserve a certain
degree of autonomy when defence and strategic issues are at stake (Ungaro,
2012, p. 8).
During the so-called ‘war on terror’ both India and China gave support to
George W. Bush and Washington’s decision to invade Afghanistan. The US gov-
ernment’s announcement of 2014 as the exit date for the US and ISAF forces from
Afghanistan has created nervousness among the political class in Delhi. In
NATO’s view Afghanistan is a part of Central Asia, while in Delhi it is regarded
as an organic and natural part of the Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan is seen by
India as ‘a strategically vital rear base for Pakistan, India’s rear enemy’ and the
most efficient way to undermine American–India relations is for the US to ‘with-
draw precipitously from Afghanistan’ (Kaplan 2010, p. 11 and 13). It would
potentially force a re-accommodation between Delhi and Beijing in order to avoid
the emergence of radical Islam in the region and it can be interpreted as one more
sign of American decline. India and China share a wish for stability, security and
infrastructure to facilitate trade and investment in Afghanistan and not chaos and
renewed interference by Pakistan’s powerful army and intelligence service, the
Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
India has always tried to embrace whoever was in power in Kabul in the wider
regional economic and political structures. This has nothing to do with altruism
but rather a conscious and calculated strategy aiming at advancing its own secu-
rity objectives by projecting power at the regional level, destructing safe heavens
of Islamic terror against Indian soil, and not least advancing and gaining access
to energy and trade resources (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012). India remains the largest
regional donor in Afghanistan with over US$ 2 billion in reconstruction and
development aid; India has also provided limited training to the Afghan military
and provided other security assistance; furthermore, India has provided expertise
to promote education, health care, power generation, and trade and private invest-
ment. In spite of this role, however, Delhi was not involved or consulted by
Washington in deciding to get out of the Afghan quagmire.
American hardliners and India’s pro-American neo-realist lobby recommend
de-linking the US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to curb
Pakistan’s and more importantly China’s influence in South and Central Asia
(Pant, 2010, p. 187). But the de facto link with the Iran issue obviously shows that
India and China share interests in creating a bulwark against Western dominance
in the region.
One-quarter of Afghanistan’s exports go to India, but it is re-directed through
Iran because Pakistan does not allow goods destined for India to cross its territory.

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 215

Delhi’s support for road building in Afghanistan is an attempt to facilitate Indian

mining companies’ access to the country’s minerals wealth estimated to be worth
US$ 1 trillion. Delhi is also planning to build a rail link from Hajigak, a mineral-
rich area in Bamyan province, through Zaranj, and onward to the Chabahar port
in Iran. India is also working with Iran to build a 600-km road from Chabahar to
the Iranian city of Zahedan, near the southwestern corner of Afghanistan that
would follow a similar route to the rail line (Hanauer & Chalk 2012, p. 17). At
the same time, Pakistan, with extensive Chinese aid, has built a port in Gwadar
to serve as gateway for Chinese trade but so far it has been relatively unsuccess-
ful. The idea was to create an energy gateway or corridor for China. These exam-
ples not only illustrate the intense rivalry that is taking place in the region but
also show the potential for collaboration between India and China once the US
has left Afghanistan and is also linked to neighbouring Iran’s interests in the
region.
The US and European decision to impose economic sanctions against Iran (in
order to discourage Tehran from developing a nuclear bomb) is at loggerheads
with India and China’s core national interests. India and Iran share deep histori-
cal and cultural links and India’s own Shia Muslim population—the largest out-
side Iran—acts as a powerful domestic political constraint on Indian foreign
diplomacy. The Iranian Embassy in Delhi has close ties with the Indian Shia
clerics and communities in Lucknow, Delhi and elsewhere and brings enormous
pressure on the Indian government to pursue a ‘friendly’ policy with Iran
(Karnad, 2012). Maintaining friendly relations with Tehran, moreover, are criti-
cal for India to maintain access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the
Iranian Chabahar port on the North Arabian Sea and to retain a reliable supplier
of oil and gas. It is counter-productive for India therefore to support sanctions
against Iran.
India, however, has been pressured by Washington to downsize its imports
from Iran by some 20 per cent, while China has resisted the American pressure
and not supported sanctions against Iran. Some other countries such as Germany,
South Korea, Turkey and Japan maintain significant trade, commercial and finan-
cial ties with Iran. An isolated Iran locked in conflict with the United States, by
pinning down the US military in the Persian Gulf so that it is harder to pivot
towards the Pacific, provides China with a unique opportunity to expand its influ-
ence in the Middle East and to gain some breathing space in the Asia-Pacific
region (Garver, 2011). Already China is by far the biggest investor in Iran’s energy
sector while India has held high-level talks with Iranian government officials and
may invest heavily in the oil and gas sector.
China, India and Pakistan have continued to break the US attempts to isolate
Iran. All three countries are importing oil from Iran despite the international sanc-
tions. India is also the second-fastest growing energy market in the world with
some estimates suggesting that by 2030 India will be importing 80 per cent of its
oil and gas needs (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 12). Pakistan and China have similar
needs to source gas from Iran and Central Asia. All three states, therefore, support

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216 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

the construction of a proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan

and Pakistan to India and China. If constructed, the pipeline would generate
increased energy stability.
Despite four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions and the US attempts
to isolate the country financially and in other ways, Tehran has relied on col-
laboration with China and India who do not endorse the sanctions. China is now
Iran’s biggest oil customer and economic partner and they have formed a joint
oil and gas committee to expand energy cooperation and also established indus-
trial and mining activities. China has thus emerged as Tehran’s main external
protector (Harold & Nader, 2012). India’s position towards Iran is unemotional
but practical and reflects the fact that India is highly dependent on imports of
Iranian oil.
The positive conclusion is that it is undoubtedly in India’s best interest to have
a deep and wide engagement with as many powers as possible and who are will-
ing to engage with Delhi. Washington may be a likely alliance partner for India
but this would be premature and ‘both India and the United States may be better
served by being friends rather than allies’ (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 32).
At the same time it may be possible to identify two distinct approaches in India
towards the ‘pivot’, the new overture from the United States, and the strategic
triangle. One is positive and sees the overture as a way to access much needed
technology and military hardware; therefore growing engagement with
Washington will benefit India in geostrategic terms. The other approach is more
sceptical and warns against India becoming a pawn in the US containment strat-
egy of China; it advocates that an independent and self-interest-based approach
linked with strategic autonomy will benefit India in the long run (Sahgal, 2012).
India’s Cold War-era suspicions of the US run deep in sections of the military,
civilian bureaucracy and political establishments, recalling the decades of
American sanctions and unfriendliness. India has therefore, so far refused to
invest either economically or politically in major defence agreements with the
Americans. The refusal by India to even include an American aircraft in the final
shortlist for its Multi-role Medium-Range Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) in 2011 is
the latest instance of a major drawback for the US in terms of its defence indus-
try’s expectations of the Indian market.
Relations among India, the US and China are complex and in flux. Much will
depend on how Beijing will assert its interests, especially with regard to India’s
core strategic objectives along its borders in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean.
Within this strategic triangle, one of the friction points is Pakistan: as China’s
interests in Asia are firmly linked to Islamabad, not only the Chinese–Indian rela-
tionship struggles to take off—because of the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict—
but also India–US relations are compromised since Washington still relies on
Pakistan despite recent diplomatic and political tensions (Ungaro, 2012, p. 9).
However as one prominent Indian analyst has remarked: ‘No subcontinental
neighbor or state in India’s near abroad is a credible military threat, least of all
Pakistan’ (Karnad, 2012).

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The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 217

Concluding Remarks: From Atlantic to Asian Triangle

Historically speaking, the US has in political, cultural and economic terms regarded
itself as an Atlantic country. The new Obama strategy launched in 2012 denotes a
strengthening of American emphasis on Asia and the Pacific and could implicitly
lead to a situation where the US will give less priority to Europe although NATO
is still functioning as the main pillar of trans-Atlantic security ties.
It is unclear whether Obama’s Asia-first policy is a policy to contain China and
what the US wants to offer India in order to establish a binding alliance between
the two countries. The conclusion drawn from the foregoing analysis is that
Obama has not reversed the previous course of American strategy towards China.
On the contrary, it is a codification of what the US had already decided to do dur-
ing the previous Bush Administration and what was pointed out already in the US
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Hardy, 2012).
The interests of the military-industrial complex, which pushed the US to treat
China as enemy, have been paralyzed by the Bush administration’s obsession with
terror. Large US companies are making profits in China and would not want to be
driven out of the Chinese market as a result of worsening US–China relations. The
main question remains who at the centre of power in the US wish to promote an
anti-China policy that goes beyond campaign rhetoric?
The key question for India is how far it will push its containment strategy
towards China that is long on symbolism and short on substance, thereby manag-
ing to be simultaneously provocative and ineffectual. India’s relationship with
the United States is based on partnership not alliance and thus an act of conveni-
ence. Whether Delhi is willing to parlay these rather symbolic moves into a per-
manent role within a loose US-led alliance of democratic Asia-Pacific nations
depends more on Chinese actions than those of the US. In India there are also
some observers who subscribe to the possibility of encirclement by Beijing in the
form of military bases in the Seychelles, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. As a
commentator at Jane’s note: ‘Unless the fear of a ‘string of pearls’—as this encir-
clement theory has been tagged—becomes a reality, then New Delhi may prefer
to keep the US at arm’s length. It is all very well for Washington to see India as
an ‘anchor’ in the IOR, but New Delhi may not want the accompanying chain’
(Hardy, 2012).13
As long as India–China–America is constrained by the strategic triangular
relationship it remains to be seen what impact it will have on the evolving world
order. So far there seems to be agreement to manage India and China’s integration
into the world system as smoothly and peacefully as possible. Furthermore, the
cornerstone of enhancing strategic triangularity is the bilateral rapprochement
between India and China in trade and security which is growing rapidly and in
vital ways although not without obstacles as well. On the other hand, the India–
US relationship has been pragmatic and well conceived. Not without serious disa-
greements and contradictions but constructive and probably a US that needs India
more than the other way around. The biggest obstacle is the US–China strategic

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218 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt

relationship which is entering a phase with new turbulence and issues of disagree-
ment which could impact security and conflict in East and South Asia.
The future challenge is to treat disagreements in the triangle as a virtuous circle
rather than a competitive triangle but this hinge on the Sino-American relation-
ship, which needs to be improved in order to conceive a smooth and effective
form of strategic triangularity. The United States wishes to reinforce its role as ‘an
anchor of stability and prosperity in the Pacific’ may have backlashed in the sense
that it has created more turbulence and uncertainty and may in fact indirectly
strengthen ties between Delhi and Beijing. One of the main findings of this paper
is related to the consequences of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
sanctions and isolation of Iran. There are possibilities for this scenario leading to
further cooperation between India and China in their search for energy security in
the region but also as they obviously need stability and prosperity in the region.
This situation will lead to frictions within the triangle and a possible backlash of
Obama’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific.
The concept of strategic triangle offers an alternative view of the strategic rela-
tions between the United States and the two would-be emerging world powers
India and China. While the approach itself does not hold predictive power it offers
an alternative analytical conceptualization, which gives room for monitoring
shifting power relations in the triangle. The focus on two particular cases of
energy security, Afghanistan and Iran, illustrate that the triangle is not a closed or
static circuit but rather open to shifting alliances and strategic considerations
which are not necessarily impinging national interest but may also reflect domes-
tic actors wishes and concerns. One problem is the lack of conceptual tools that
provide evidence of the linkage between state-society complexes or in other
words the impact of domestic actors, institutions, norms and ideologies that may
or may not inform, influence and in some cases even determine foreign policy.
This paper has made a modest attempt in that direction but more research is
needed in order to provide informed empirical analysis.

Notes
1. The author would like to thank the participants at the Research Workshop on the
Changing Dynamics of Conflict in South Asia, 18–19 October 2012, Dublin City
University, Dublin, and at the International Conference on the Status of India in
International Relations: Regional and Global Dimensions, Centre for Contemporary
India Research and Studies, Warsaw, Poland, December 2011, for useful comments
on earlier drafts of the paper. Useful input is also appreciated from two anonymous
referees.
2. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
3. A scenario, where the European Union and its member-states are increasingly
marginalized. A recent study financed by the EU shows that the political class in
Delhi currently does not perceive EU as ‘a major military power or a serious global
geopolitical player, with most of its diplomatic energies focused on trying to handle the
problems of EU integration and expansion, and in preventing the re-emergence of old

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 203–222

The Asia-Pacific Strategic Triangle 219

fault lines’. In other words, neither the EU as a whole nor any of the European states
individually currently constitute a vital element in the ‘triangular’ power relationships
and consequently do not significantly figure in India’s strategic calculations’ (Novotny
2011: 101; also Schmidt 2013).
4. It may be superfluous but necessary to remind that the US keeps more than 320,000
troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 per cent of its formidable global naval
assets. This will be expanded with more than 10 per cent over the coming few years
(Heydarian, 2012).
5. In an interesting paper Amitav Acharya (2014, p. 171) notes that regions may ‘constrain
emerging hegemons’. A notion that fits well with the American strategic pivot and its
attempt to embed China’s rise in the regional and multilateral institutional context.
6. Traditionally South Asia includes India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka,
Pakistan and Nepal but here Afghanistan and Iran have been added and this is in
accordance with Indian tradition to include these two countries in South Asian
strategic thinking as they are linked organically to the Indian subcontinent (See
Kaplan 2010).
7. There are disputes in the literature about who launched the concept and original idea
about the ‘grand strategic triangle’ and ‘deténte’ that emerged in the 1970s among
China, the United States and the Soviet Union. Some scholars claim it was French
President de Gaulle who made the proposition to President Nixon (Rowland 2011: 78);
and others credit the idea to Chairman Mao (Xiyu 2002: 37).
8. This is not to claim that neo-realist notions about distribution of capabilities, anarchic
international relations, strategic balance of power or state survival etc. are irrelevant
but the emphasis is often exaggerated and serve specific purposes.
9. For a discussion about critical IR theory see (Schmidt 2014; Schmidt forthcoming).
10. See for instance Pant (2012b).
11. One reading may be related to the Obama administration’s proposal to create a
G2 consisting of the United States and China in response to the global financial crisis
in 2008. This initiative did a lot of harm to India-US relationship and is probably
not easily forgotten in Delhi.
12. As a bizarre illustration of Beijing’s assertive response, China’s new passport design
includes the disputed islands in the South China Sea sparking new concerns among its
neighboring countries.
13. Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has enormous strategic importance and Delhi is expanding
its blue water fleet in an attempt to project increasing power in the Ocean and naval
expansion is seen as a way to curb Chinese influence.

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