Can game theory be used to analyse the effectiveness of

bluffing in Kuhn poker?

 Contents Page:

1: Title Page

2: Contents Page

3: Introduction

4-5: Kuhn Poker Rules

6: Nash Equilibrium

7-8: Real World Nash Equilibrium Application: Prisoner’s Dilemma

9-10: Kuhn Poker Probability Trees

11: Dominated Strategies

12-13: Calculating Frequency of Bluffing

14-16: Expected Values

17: Varying Bet Sizes

18: Adding a Placeholder Value

19: Real World Application: Testing strategies on family

20: Reflection

21: Bibliography

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 Introduction:

I was taught how to play poker from a very young age. We would play as a family along with

family friends. I started with Kuhn poker but built up to other variations such as Texas

Hold’em. A key part of this process has been learning to know when and when not to bluff in

games. Because of this, I have chosen this research question through which I should find a

mathematical answer to this question in the simplest version of poker: Kuhn poker, also known

as 3 card poker.

I will be utilising game theory is a mathematical framework made for analysing decision-

making situations, where the interactions between multiple players affects the outcomes of

given situations to answer my question. One of the most interesting applications of game theory

is in analysing the effectiveness of bluffing in various games such as Kuhn poker. Bluffing is

defined as “attempting to deceive or mislead” by the oxford dictionary and in the context of

games it is to mislead opponents as to the strength of one’s position or hand and is an important

tactic in poker used to gain an edge over your opponents. I will specifically be discussing non-

cooperative, sequential (where players must act in order such as in chess rather than making

the decision at the same time such as in rock, paper, scissors) game theory which is where the

players cannot cooperate and must decide their strategy on their own. In Kuhn poker, which is

a simplified version of poker, the two players only have a one card each and due to its

simplicity, it provides an excellent setting to study the effectiveness of bluffing. The aim of

this investigation will be to find the most successful rate of bluffing in Kuhn poker through

which I hope to gain a better understanding of the strategic behaviour of individuals in poker

games and the role of bluffing in their strategic decision-making which can then be extrapolated

to ‘real poker’ (Texas Hold’em).

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 Kuhn Poker

Kuhn poker is an extremely simplified version of poker developed by Harold Kuhn which

includes only 3 of any cards as opposed to a full deck (I.e., King (K), Queen (Q), Jack(J)). The

rules of the game are as follows:

• Each player puts in 1 to play, which is called the ante

• Each player is dealt one of the three cards, and the third is put aside unseen.

• The player with the higher card wins after the showdown

• Player 1 can check or bet 1.

o If player 1 checks, then player two can check or bet 1.

• If player 2 checks, there is a showdown for the pot of 2 (i.e., the

higher card wins 1 from the other player).

• If player 2 bets, then player 1 can fold or call.

o If player 1 folds, then player 2 takes the pot of 3 (i.e.,

winning 1 from player 1).

o If player 1 calls, there is a showdown for the pot of 4 (i.e.,

the higher card wins 2 from the other player).

o If player 1 bets, then player 2 can fold or call.

§ If player 2 folds, then player 1 takes the pot of 3 (i.e. winning 1 from

player 2).

§ If player 2 calls, there is a showdown for the pot of 4 (i.e. the higher

card wins 2 from the other player).

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Player one has the possibility of getting one of 3 cards: for the sake of this investigation, I will

be using a King, Queen and Jack notated as K, Q and J respectively. The player has an equal

chance of getting each of those cards: 1/3. Since the player has already put in 1 to play, they

have the incentive to bet or check rather than fold hence the need for bluffing when one receives

a lower card. 1

1
Wikipedia. (2023). Kuhn poker. [online] Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuhn_poker [Accessed 3
May 2023].

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 Nash Equilibrium:

Nash equilibrium is a concept in game theory that describes a situation where the players in a

game all make the best possible decision, given the decisions of the other players; it is a state

of a game where no player has an incentive to change their strategy. A Nash equilibrium is

achieved when each player's strategy is the best response to the possible strategies chosen by

the other players. This means that no player can improve their own outcome by changing their

strategy as a change in strategy would result in a worse outcome. A Nash equilibrium can exist

in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, so long as there are strategies that all players

can adopt that lead to the best possible outcome for each of them (given the strategies of the

other players). In some cases, there can be several Nash equilibria in a game, and it may not be

clear which one will be reached. I will be using the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explore how this

concept can be applied in real world scenarios before moving on to applying it to Kuhn poker.

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 A real world application of Nash Equilibrium: The Prisoner’s

Dilemma:

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two individuals are both accused of a crime. They are held in

separate cells and are only looking out for themselves. There is not enough evidence against

them, so they are both given the option to either deny the crime of admit. If both confess, they

each get 10 years, if both deny they get 5 years and if one confesses whilst the other denies the

confessor is given 0 years whilst the denier is given 20 years. This dilemma is key to

understanding Nash Equilibrium. To visualise this easier here is a payoff matrix:

Prisoner B
Deny Confess

Deny (-5, -5) (-20, 0)

Prisoner A

Confess (0, -20) (-10, -10)

Looking at the prisoners as a whole, the best option for them combined would be for both to

deny as then they receive a total of 10 years between them as opposed to the 20 but since both

do not care for the other, they will aim for the best outcome for themselves. Looking at this

from prisoner A’s perspective; if prisoner B denies the best outcome for him will be to confess

and get 0 years. Prisoner B can then realise that this is the best outcome for prisoner A he will

have the choice to Deny, getting 20 years, or to confess, only getting 10, so he will confess.

This is a symmetrical dilemma as both players are faced with the same options. No matter what,

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both should confess as that gives them the least possible time (the worst either could get is 10

years). It is at this point that we reach a Nash Equilibrium which is a situation where players

do not benefit from deviating from their courses of actions: for the prisoners the risk of 20 years

by denying is not worth it even though it may not be the best option for the players combined.

This type of Nash equilibria is called Pure strategy (advantageous to do the same thing every

time) but there is also Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria where the players randomise their

actions with a certain probability of outcomes, and this is which applies to poker.

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 Kuhn Poker Probabilities:

There are 6 total possible scenarios for card dealings: the 3 losing hands; JQ, JK and QK (where

the first letter is Player One’s card) and the three winning hands; Q J, KJ, KQ. As mentioned

in the rules, having been dealt the cards, Player 1 is able to fold, check or bet however, for the

sake of this investigation I will be ignoring the option of folding straight away for P1 as it

simply not a reasonable move to make: if you were to fold every time you would lose your ante

each time and even if you were dealt J (the lowest card) you would still have the possibility to

win by bluffing. Here is the possibility tree for all of the possible actions after a ‘losing hand’:

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And for a winning hand the tree diagram looks like this:

It is important to note that although the total pot after say a Check, Bet, Call in a winning

hand would be 4, the profit for P1 would only be 2 and so I will only be referring to these

‘profit margins’. I should also clarify that the squares depict the original hand given to player

1 followed by black lines which represent the variable options that the player can make, the

triangle represents the choice of a player (notated inside of the triangle) and the ovals

represent the pay-outs with the first number being player 1’s pay-out and the 2nd number

being player 2’s. Since this is a zero sum game the pay-out of one player equates to the loss

of the other and in total the pay-outs/losses add up to -5/+5 for the losing hand and +5/-5 for

the winning hand. Obviously, such pay-outs could never happen since the maximum sum you

could win would be 2.

These will obviously apply to the losing hand tree diagram table as well.

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 Dominated Strategies

To determine a successful playing strategy, we must first eliminate all dominated strategies.

A dominated strategy is one that produces a higher utility (winnings) every time regardless of

the strategies of your opponents: we know that a player should never check or fold on a bet

with a K as it is the best card so you can never lose with it and hence there is more utility to

be gained by betting (2 compared to 3). Furthermore, one should never bet with a Q as half

the time their opponent will have the K and always bet hence always leading to a loss of 3.

Alternatively, they would have the J and sometimes bet and sometimes fold which would

lead to +3 hence equalising the two options after betting with a Q meaning it is pointless.

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 Calculating Frequency of Bluffing

I will be defining the frequency of bluffing by checking with Q as E(c).

Hence, E(c) equals the probability of player 1 having a K and betting (which is always),

multiplied by the outcome plus the probability of player one having a J and betting (hence

bluffing) multiplied by the outcome is equal to 0 which is the other possible outcome:

folding. Written out as an equation it looks like this:

1 1
𝐸(𝑐) = ∗ 1(−1) + 𝑃! (3) = 0
2 2

1/2 is the probability that player 1 receives either card, the number in the bracket is the

outcome (pay-out) and 𝑃! is the probability that player 1 bets with his card. We can solve this

equation in the following way:

−1 + 3𝑃! = 0

3𝑃! = 1

1
𝑃! =
3

Hence E(c) is 1/3

This is how often one should call as player 2 with Q in order for it to be an unexploitable

strategy.

Now for calculating the frequency of betting with J. We once again set the value of player 1

betting with a J as E(B). So, E(B) equals the probability that player 2 has K multiplied by the

outcome plus the probability that player 2 has a Q and calls multiplied by the outcome plus

the probability that player 2 has the Q and folds:

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 " " "
𝐸(𝐵) = # (−1) + # 𝑃$ (−1) + # (1 − 𝑃$ )(2) = 0

Once again 1/2 represents the possibility of player 2 having K or Q. However, since there are

2 possible options with Q and we have already established that the other player will use a

mixed strategy, sometimes calling and sometimes folding, we include a third option. The

numbers in the brackets again represent the pay-outs and 𝑃$ represents the probability that

player 2 calls and 1-𝑃$ represents the probability that player 2 folds with Q. We can now

solve this like so:

−1 + 𝑃$ (−1) + (1 − 𝑃$ )(2) = 0

−1 − 𝑃$ + 2 − 2𝑃$ = 0

−3𝑃$ = −1

1
𝑃$ =
3

Therefore, we have now created an unexploitable strategy. By following the principles of

these two scenarios along with the dominated strategies we should be able to maximise our

expected output hence winning more of the time over the other player. However, by rotating

the role of player 1 and 2 and with both players following these strategies this creates a

symmetrical game. This is as both have the same winning odds and losing odds so would

come out to 0. By making this a non-rotating game player 1 would have the advantage.

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 Expected Values:

The expected value what the player would expect to win on average in the long run of a

game. In order to calculate it we must add up all the probabilities of certain hands and their

respective frequencies of betting/checking with them by their pay-outs for both players.

Hence, the expected value for P1 is the following (where E() is the expected value, B is bet

and Ch is check):

1 2 1 1
𝐸0𝐵% 1 = 2 (2) + (−1)3 + (1)(−1)
2 3 3 2

1 4 1 1
𝐸0𝐵% 1 = 4 − 6 −
2 3 3 2

1 1
𝐸0𝐵% 1 = −
2 2

𝐸0𝐵% 1 = 0

This can be explained as:

How often P2 has the Q*(How often P2 folds with Q*(Your pay-out) + How often P2 checks

with Q*(Your pay-out)) + How often P2 has K*(How often P2 bets with K)*(Your pay-out)

We can apply the same logic to other hands:

1 1
𝐸0𝐶ℎ& 1 = (2) + (0)
2 2

𝐸0𝐶ℎ& 1 = 1

1 1 2 1
𝐸(𝐵' ) = 2 (3) + (2)3 + (1)(2)
2 3 3 2

1 7
𝐸(𝐵' ) = 4 6+1
2 3

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 13
𝐸(𝐵' ) =
6

1 13 1 1 1 2
𝐸(𝑃" ) = 4 6 + (1) + ( (0) + (0)
3 6 3 3 3 3

13 1
𝐸(𝑃" ) = +
18 3

19
𝐸(𝑃" ) =
18

We can also do the same for Player 2:

1 1 1 2
𝐸(𝐾) = (2) + 2 (3) + (2)3
2 2 3 3

13
𝐸(𝐾) =
6

1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
𝐸(𝑄) = 2 (−1) + (0)3 + 2 4 6 (3) + (2) + 4 6 (0)3
2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3

1 1 1 13 4
𝐸(𝑄) = 4− 6 + 4 + 6
2 3 2 9 3

12 2
𝐸(𝑄) = =
18 3

𝐸(𝐽) = 0

1 13 1 2 1
𝐸(𝑃# ) = 4 6 + 4 6 + (0)
3 6 3 3 3

13 2
𝐸(𝑃# ) = +
18 9

17
𝐸(𝑃# ) =
18

15
 "
We can therefore expect P1 to be ahead by ( points per game and P2 to be down by the same

amount if the most optimal strategy is followed.

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 Varying Bet Sizes

We can also explore the rate of bluffing with different bet sized. For example, we can set the

cost of bluffing as 3, keeping the ante the same. We keep the same equation for bluffing with

Q and now, this is what the equations would look like:

1 1
𝐸(𝑐) = (−1) + 𝑃! (7) = 0
2 2

And we can again solve for 𝑃! :

−1 + 7𝑃! = 0

7𝑃! = 1

1
𝑃! =
7

Therefore, we should call with Q 1/7 of the time.

And now to apply this to the J scenario:

" " "

𝐸(𝐵) = # (−1) + # 𝑃$ (−1) + # (1 − 𝑃$ )(7) = 0

−1 + 𝑃$ (−1) + (1 − 𝑃$ )(7) = 0

−𝑃$ − 7𝑃$ = -6

7𝑃$ + 𝑃$ = 6

8𝑃$ = 6

3
𝑃$ =
4

Therefore, player 1 should bet 3/4 of the time with a J to maximise their profit margin.

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 Adding a Placeholder Value:

We can also incorporate x into our calculations in order to achieve a generalised formula for

easily calculating the betting rate whilst being able to easily change the bet sizes. This time,

the equation would look like this:

1 1
𝐸(𝑐) = (−𝑥) + 𝑃! (2 + x) = 0
2 2

And we can again solve for 𝑃! :

−𝑥 + 2𝑃! + 𝑃! 𝑥 = 0

𝑃! (2 + 𝑥) = 𝑥

𝑥
𝑃! =
2+𝑥

This can now be utilised universally in Kuhn Poker with any bet size where Pb is the probability

the other player bets with J and so you bluff by checking with your Q and x is your bet size.

With regards to bluffing with a J here is the equation with a placeholder value:

" " "

𝐸(𝐵) = # (−𝑥) + # 𝑃$ (−𝑥) + # (1 − 𝑃$ )(2) = 0

−𝑥 − 𝑥𝑃$ + 2 − 2𝑃$ = 0

x+𝑥𝑃$ − 2 + 2𝑃$ = 0

𝑥𝑃$ + 2𝑃$ = 2 − 𝑥

𝑃$ (𝑥 + 2) = 2 − 𝑥

2−𝑥
𝑃$ =
𝑥+2

Where 𝑃$ is the frequency with which you bluff with J.

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 Real world application: Testing strategies on family:

In order to further engage with the research question, I decided to play this game with several

family members. Each of them was explained the same set of rules but not told them about

the unexploitable strategy. I first decided to pit my parents against each other before playing

them each individually and applying the unexploitable strategy. They played with the original

bet size (1) which after 20 games ended with P1 (Dad) up by 1 point. I then played both

individually applying the bluffing technique which ended with me being up an average of 3

points across 4 games against both P1 and P2 each with 20 rounds. I then explained the

strategy to P1 (Dad) and let him play against P2 (Mum) again which led to him being up 2

points across 20 rounds. Finally, I explained the bluffing strategy to both of them and let

them play another 20 round game where P2 came out on top by 1 point. From this, it is clear

that the strategy is successful and greatly increases your success rate against players who do

not know the optimal bluffing technique.

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 Reflection:

Having completed this research, I am now much more familiar with the mechanics of game

theory and Nash Equilibrium. I can also confidently say that I can apply my new knowledge

to successfully win against other players in Kuhn Poker. However, as aforementioned, Kuhn

Poker is an extremely oversimplified version of Texas Hold’em poker and in this poker the

maths is much more complicated owing to not only the inclusion of a full deck and more

cards being given out to each player but also due to there being more betting/calling rounds,

each with more options of betting. The probability tree for a game with so many different

variables would simply be too complicated and regardless, since it is a game with incomplete

information (where players do not have full knowledge of past events) it is not

mathematically solvable. However, by analysing Kuhn poker we can establish a base of

understanding for bluffing in games. I have successfully found the most effective bluffing

technique in this game through the use of algebra and probabilities by eliminating dominated

strategies.

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 Bibliography:

• Wikipedia. (2023). Kuhn poker. [online] Available at:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuhn_poker [Accessed 3 May 2023].

21