Institutional Anomie Theory and Cybercrime: Cross-country Comparison Analysis of

Individual and Institutional Factors of Anomie and Online Offending

Parti

Foriest

Dearden

Hawdon

Räsänen

etc

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 Abstract

This paper addresses the gap in the literature by empirically assessing a cross-national

comparison of institutional anomie theory and self-reported cyber offending. We used survey

data from Finland, Hungary, and the United States to examine the relationship between

institutional anomie and cybercrime. Each country represents different types of societies, which

makes them interesting cases for cross-national comparison. With Hungary representing a

conservative welfare regime, Finland a social democratic welfare regime, and the US a liberal

welfare regime, we predict that the more political regimes intervene in economic relations and

support non-economic institutions, the less applicable institutional anomie theory’s variables will

be in predicting cybercrime perpetration. In line with these predictions, binominal regression

models suggest that IAT works best in the United States, where individualism, achievement,

fetishism of money increased the indices of cybercrime offending. IAT variables were less

useful in predicting cybercrime offending in the other nations. Yet, also in line with our

prediction, family has a strong external control function in Finland, protecting participants from

cybercrime offending. However, no IAT indexes achieved statistical significance in Hungary,

where a work-based welfare system suppresses family related values. Education has a mixed

effect on cybercrime offending. Thus, IAT is valuable for understanding cybercrime offending;

however, it should be examined in more countries with social institutions and individual value

systems different from that of the United StatesS’s.

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 Institutional Anomie Theory and Cybercrime: A Cross-country Comparison Analysis of

Individual and Institutional Factors of Anomie and Online Offending

Technology has affected almost all aspects of our lives. From working online to interacting with

strangers or friends, many of our offline behaviors have moved, at least partially, online. Crime

is no different. Crimes are now occurring online or through some form of computer facilitation.

These crimes include online fraud, identity theft, spam, hacking, and cyberbullying (Ngo and

Jaishankar, 2017). For example, aAn American Gallup poll recently reported that 23% of

households were victimized by some type of digital financial crime, including unauthorized

credit card transactions, which is higher than many offline forms of theft such as vandalism

(11%) and home burglary (3%) (Reinhart, 2018).

Considerable work by criminologists have expanded our understanding of the

motivations behind computer-facilitated crimes. For example, routine activities and lifestyles

routine-activities theory are often used to explain the convergence in digital space between a

motivated offender, suitable target, and lack of a capable guardian (Choi and Lee, 2017;

Dearden, 2018; Hawdon et al., 2019; Holt and Bossler, 2009; Reyns et al., 2019; Weulen

Kranenbarg et al., 2019). Other common theories utilized in cybercriminology research include

self-control (Dearden and Parti, 2021; Donner et al., 2014; Holt et al., 2018; Nodeland, 2020;

Reisig et al., 2009) and social learning (Hawdon et al., 2019; Holt et al., 2010; Weulen

Kranenbarg et al., 2021). While some work also focuses on cybercrime and strain (e.g., Hay and

Ray, 2020), little work has been done relating to anomie and cybercrime (for an exception, see

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Dearden et al., 2021). This paper attempts to address this shortfall in the literature by empirically

assessing a cross-national comparison of institutional anomie and cybercrime.

Literature Review

Anomie theories follow a series of evolutions amended by various scholars. Originally,

Merton (1938) defined anomie as the result of the differential access to legitimate, institutionally

defined means to achieve cultural defined goals. Merton suggested that these goals were

generally focused on economic success. This initial premise has been revised by a series of

theories. For example, general strain theory was an individual-level adaptation from Merton’s

original ideas, expanding the range of types of strain one can experience in society (Agnew,

1992). Of specific attention for this project, institutional anomie theory (IAT) was developed by

Messner and Rosenfeld to “overcome significant limitations in Merton’s treatment of the

institutional dynamics that underlie crime” (Messner et al., 2019: 162).

IAT is situated in anomie theories generally but draws from both Merton and Durkheim

to more comprehensively address the structural strains created in modern industrial societies,

especially the United States. One key focus of IAT is the pursuit of the American Dream.

According to IAT, crime rates are, at least in part, a function of the cultural pressures created

from the American Dream (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012). Within the American Dream, four

primary values are defined. First, individuals should focus on achievement at any cost. This

partially leads to the second value of intense individualism. That is, the achievement at any cost

is not defined by some group success, only by individual success. Third, everyone should have

the same universal goal. Historically, other societies could have had varying goals, including

non-economic goals. Moreover, some societies could even have different opportunities to obtain

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success (e.g., non-anomic society). However, in our modern economic system, this is no longer

true. Success is only defined by economic success. Finally, the fourth value identified by IAT is

the fetishism of money. While money has represented an intermediary for trade, helping to

establish systems whereby goods can be traded beyond in-kind trades, today money itself holds

some intrinsic value, at least according to IAT. Given this, money becomes the end goal of

individuals. Money becomes a means to show of success, with increasing money representing

increasing success. This fetishism of money leads to the massive holdings of individuals, without

any intention or even ability to realistically spend their vast amounts of money (Messner and

Rosenfeld, 2012).

IAT was not designed to explain crime directly, but rather through institutional pressures.

As mentioned above, the economic pursuits and pressures create an environment with poor

opportunity for other means of success. Historically, and likely in other systems or economies,

market institutions did not dominate other institutions. Institutions such as family, religion, and

politics all served a vital role in balancing opportunities and goals for individuals. Success in

such societies can be defined in other ways, including political aspirations, familial relations, or

religious devotion. In the American system, these institutions have been weakened, leading to

dominance by the economic institution (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012).

The non-dominant institutions struggle to maintain some degree of relevance, while also

acknowledging they are not as important as the dominant economic institution. According to

Messner and Rosenfeld (2012), this is done in three ways. All non-economic institutions are

devalued, serving only to perpetuate the values of the dominant institutions. Education provides

a good example, where the values of education are often only seen in relation to economic

principles, such as the return-on-investment of education, a focus on marketable majors, and the

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general commodification of education (Lawrence and Sharma, 2002). Non-economic institutions

also must accommodate the economic institution whenever there is a conflict. This may be a

physical accommodation, such as the transition in business from generally not operating on

traditionally religious days (e.g., Saturday or Sunday) to generally operating on traditionally

religious days. Religious institutions are then forced to respond and accommodate those who

work during typical service times through recorded sermons, televised opportunities, or even

sermons via a podcast. Finally, penetration occurs, where even non-economic institutions

attempt to “look like” the economic institution to showcase their relevance. For example,

politicians are often forced to adopt a singular focus on the “bottom line” or even shift economic

priorities away from the values of politics and more towards the values of the economic

institutions (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012).

As a structural theory, IAT has little to say about individual behavior. However, this has

not discouraged scholars from offering hypotheses and even creating individual-level

assessments based on IAT. Given that both original authors of IAT have discussed individual

assessment in follow-up articles (e.g., Messner et al., 2019), it appears that IAT has at least some

support for individual assessment. The general individual-level assessment is theoretically

informed by Durkheim’s (1898) moral and egoistic individualism.

Empirical Support for IAT

While individual-level assessments of IAT exist, it is a structural-level theory. As such,

IAT can and has been assessed cross-nationally to consider the different institutional pressures

associated with both the system and age of the government. Anomie generally, and IAT

specifically, have a focus on later-staged market economies. Empirical work cross-nationally has

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most often been tested using homicide data (Hughes et al., 2015; Kim and Pridemore, 2005;

Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Rogers and Pridemore, 2022). Other crimes have been considered

as well, although these studies generally focused on cross-county or cross-state variation using

data within the United States. Examples of these studies include applications of IAT to violent

crime (Piquero and Piquero, 1998), property crime (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995), white-collar

crime (Schoepfer and Piquero, 2006), and cybercrime (Dearden et al., 2021). Overall, these

assessments have generated mixed support. However, methodological challenges, including

accurate data and conceptual measurement of variables, complicate the discussion of the theory’s

utility for explaining cross-national variation in crime.

Of specific interest to our focus, individual-level tests have often found support for IAT

(e.g., Dearden et al., 2021; Muftić, 2006; Rosenberger, 2016; Tuliao and Chen, 2019). For

example, using a sample of college students, Muftić (2006) found that individual measures

pertaining to IAT values of individualism, universalism, achievement, and fetishism of money

correlate to academic cheating. Muftić (2006), additionally, measured level of commitment to

other non-economic institutions, finding that individuals who were less committed to family and

politics were more likely to cheat. Relating to cybercrime, using a survey of US adults, Dearden

and colleagues (2021) found a positive correlation between IAT and self-admitted cybercrime

perpetration. However, the strongest models were non-linear, indicating a curvilinear

relationship between IAT-identified beliefs and cybercrime. Individuals with the lowest and

highest levels of individual IAT beliefs were the most likely to have admitted to committing a

cybercrime.

Cross-national individual-level or multi-level models have found more mixed support.

For example, Hirtenlehner and colleagues (2013) used multi-level modelling to test the effects of

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cultural forces and social institutions on morally dubious behaviors. These scholars found little

support for the “cultural imperative of the ‘American Dream’” across Europe. Consequently,

while support for IAT at the individual level remains fairly impressive, tests including

international samples are less conclusive.

Nevertheless, as a structural-level theory, IAT should be tested cross-nationally whenever

possible. Moreover, whenever possible, cross-national tests of IAT should include predictions

about the cross-national applicability of IAT for the nations included in the specific sample used

to conduct the test. Logically, IAT should work best in the United States since the theory is

based on the concept of the “American Dream.” While American culture has certainly

penetrated the world system, the extent to which the “American Dream” is held in other

countries undoubtedly varies. Similarly, the extent to which the economic system has come to

dominate other institutions varies cross-nationally. Additionally, it is not necessarily valuing

economic success that leads to criminal behavior according to IAT; rather, it is doing so at the

expense of all other means of success, believing that success must be achieved individually, and

valuing money intrinsically rather than as a tool for other means of success. As with other strain

theories, it is when these values are deeply held and success does not occur that crime ensues.

Thus, logically, IAT should apply in some countries more than it does in others.

Here, we purposefully include three nations that should provide variability in terms of the

extent to which IAT applies. We include the United States as the “baseline” nation since it is the

basis of the theory. We also include Finland and Hungary as these nations provide stark contrasts

to the United States in terms of their economic systems and the relationship of the state to the

citizenry vis-à-vis the welfare system. Consideration of these factors allow us to derive specific

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hypotheses concerning the ability of IAT-informed variables to account for individual-level

criminal behaviors. We turn to these considerations now.

Welfare Regimes and Institutional Anomie Theory

We anticipate that the welfare regime type a nation adopts will influence the applicability

ofr IAT. Since IAT argues that crime is the product of “cultural pressures for the unrestrained

pursuit of monetary success and weak social control deriving from an imbalanced institutional

structure” (Messner and Rosenfeld 2012: 99), we predict that the more welfare regimes intervene

in economic relations and support for non-economic institutions, the less applicable IAT-related

variables will be. While it is true likely true that surrounding cultural circumstances contribute

significantly to individual pressures, the focus on national economic arrangements is crucial

here. This is why we relied Relying on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) widely used typology on

welfare state regimes. The , the three nations included in our study exemplify his three original

types of institutional welfare arrangements welfare regimes: liberal regimes, conservative

regimes, and social democratic regimes. These institutional differences have several implications

for both IAT and additional confounding independent measures.

The American welfare model is an example of a liberal regime. Liberal regimes tend to

provide modest, means-tested assistance typically to the poor and working classes, and they

typically rely on market solutions to problems. The American system is based on a principle of

“minimal state interference” (Hass, 2006: 69), and the state becomes involved in welfare

provision only when the market, voluntary organizations, and the family fail to provide services

(see Gilbert, 2002). As an “enabling state” (Gilbert, 2002), the US state mandates private social

welfare expenditures or finance services either directly through contracts or vouchers or

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indirectly through tax incentives (Gilbert, 2002; Katz, 2002; Hacker, 2002). As a result, the US

social safety net is comparatively limited. In addition, there has always been a strong anti-statism

in the United States, and state intervention into economic affairs is generally unpopular

(Quadagno and Street, 2005).

Next, Hungary is an example of a conservative welfare regime (see Aspalter et al., 2009).

Conservative regimes tend to encourage family-based assistance where the state intervenes only

after the family is unable to provide assistance. Conservative welfare state regimes are

distinguished by their “status differentiating” programs where benefits are earnings‐related and

geared toward maintaining existing social relations. The family and other institutions play an

important role in the provision of benefits, and the redistributive impact of transfer payments is

minimal (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  Prior to the imposition of the Soviet system after WWII,

Bismarckian policies provided sickness and disability insurance as well as old age pensions

(Szikra, 2018). Then, under Soviet-style state socialism, social protection was extended to almost

the entire population and included near full-employment guarantees, cash-transfers, and price

subsidies. The Bismarkckian traditions returned in the post-Soviet era, and these policies largely

protected Hungary’s citizens from the harshest effects of the turbulent transition to a capitalist

democracy (Aspalter et al., 2009; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Szikra, 2018). This was indeed

the case in Hungary following the Soviet Union’s collapse, as the country increasingly adopted

the policies of a conservative welfare regime (Aspalter et al., 2009). However, these protections

started to erode as early as the 2010s when the old-age pension was partially privatized. In

addition, a radical departure from the European social model occurred during Prime Minister

Orbán’s second term when he argued that instead of a Western type of welfare state that is not

competitive, Hungary would establish a “work-based society” (Szikra, 2018). This

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transformation resulted in changes to pension policies in 2010-2012 and family policy in 2010-

2017. These policy changes dramatically weakened social provisions (Szikra, 2018), but

Hungary still retains the major traits of a conservative welfare regimes.

Finally, Finland is a classic Nordic welfare state or social democratic regime (see

Esping-Andersen, 1990; Räsänen, 2006). Social democratic regimes attempt to avoid market-

based access to welfare services by adopting a universalistic system that offers high levels of

social protection in the form of universal coverage of old-age pensions, sickness insurance, child

allowance and parental leave, and occupational injury insurance (Greve, 2007; Lin, 2004).

Nordic welfare systems have extensive fiscal interventions in the labor market, and the marginal

tax rates are very high (Alesina and Glaeser, 2006). In addition, there is historical support for an

interventionist state and a tradition of “statism” in Finland (Lin, 2004; Midttun and Witoszek,

2010). In the language of IAT, the economic system is far less dominant in Finland than it is in

the United States. Other Finnish institutions are not as devalued, forced to accommodate the

economic system, or penetrated by economic norms as their American counterparts are.

Considering the welfare regimes in the three nations, we would predict that IAT would be

most applicable in the United States. American citizens are relatively unprotected from market

forces and other institutions are not widely supported by the welfare state. For example, parental

leave policies are far more limited in the US than in social democratic regimes (see Gilbert,

2004). Conversely, IAT should be far less applicable in Finland. Finnish citizens enjoy universal

welfare provisions that de-commodify welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which is often reflected

in relatively small attitudinal variations by socio-economic background.. Additionally, Nordic

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countries they have family policies that provide generous support for child allowances and

parental leave (see Bent, 2007; Lin, 2004).

Finally, we predict that IAT would apply moderately well in Hungary. While the polices

of conservative regimes provide less protection against market forces than those of social

democratic regimes, two factors can potentially counteract the effect of these policies on crime.

First, the focus on maintaining existing status relations should reduce the hyper-competitiveness

found in nations like the United States. Second, the clear recognition of the importance of non-

economic institutions such as the family implies that there has been less devaluation of these

institutions than seen in liberal regimes. Therefore, we predict that, if IAT applies in Hungary at

all, its applicability would be somewhat tempered, at least compared to the United States.

Methods

Sample

Samples of adults from Hungary, Finland, and the US were collected in March 2022.

The samples were selected from Dynata’s (formerly SSI) panels of respondents. Dynata, a

professional sampling and survey fielding company, uses random digit dialing, banner ads, and

other permission-based techniques to recruit participants to create their panel databases. Dynata

offers a small fee or reward to users who qualify for and participate in a survey. Online

proportional sampling panels, demographically balanced on important population characteristics

such as sex, race, and ethnicity, have been found to yield similar results as random probability-

based samples (Simmons and Bobo, 2015; Weinberg et al., 2014; authors, forthcoming; although

MacInnis et al., 2018, offers a differing perspective). Demographically balanced panels ensure

one-time participation through IP address matching and eliminate speeders through attention

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checks and mean-time comparisons with the overall sample (Evans and Manthur, 2005;

Wansink, 2001). Moreover, pre-panel interviews and participation incentives increase participant

interest and the overall response validity of the data (see Wansink, 2001).

Dynata provided the online samples to the researchers, and the surveys were designed

and hosted by a research team from universities in each of the three nations. The surveys were

designed by the research team in English and translated to Finnish and Hungarian by native

speakers who are also fluent in English.

All samples are representative of their respective nation’s population in terms of age and

sex. Although the US sample is representative of the population for race and ethnicity as well,

we did not collect data on racial and ethnic origins in Europe due to privacy protection and data

regulatory rules (the European Data Protection Regulation does not allow collecting data about

race and ethnicity as these are considered sensitive data in European Union member states). 1

For consistency, we decided to omit racial and ethnic data from the current analysis entirely.

Individuals who failed to complete or sped through the survey were excluded from the

analysis. In total, 4,763 respondents started the survey (1,585 in Finland, 1,553 in Hungary, and

1,625 in the US). We dropped 486 speeders (167 in Finland, 110 in Hungary, and 209 in the US)

and 72 people (28 in Finland, 22 in Hungary, and 22 in the US) who did not complete the survey

from the sample. Another seven cases were dropped from the analysis because they were missing

a country code. In total, 4,205 participants remained in the final sample, out of which 1,390

respondents were from Finland, 1,421 were from Hungary, and 1,394 were from the US. In the

total sample 903 participants admitted to at least one cybercrime (in Finland 303, in Hungary 321

and in the US 279). Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the sample.

---Table 1 about here---

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Measures

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable consists of self-reported participation in several cyber offending

behaviors during the 12 months preceding the survey. Counts and percentages of each offending

behavior per country can be found in Table 2.

---Table 2 about here---

We combined the binary responses of each offending behavior to create a general index

of cyber offending for each country. For this general cyber offending variable, the minimum

value was 0, indicating no offending behavior within the 12 months prior to completing the

survey, and the maximum value was 10, indicating self-reporting all offending behaviors within

the 12 months before participating in the survey. Of all participants who reported cyber

offending (n=903), only 12.4% (n=112) reported only one offending behavior. All others

reported two or more offending behaviors.

Independent variables

We used the scale of institutional anomie operationalized by Muftic (2006), which

includes 23 items that comprise six subscales: Individualism, Achievement, Universalism,

Fetishism of Money, Family, and Education, as our primary independent variable (see Table 3

for measures).

As stipulated by IAT, four cultural values constitute the foundation of the American

Dream: achievement, individualism, universalism, and fetishism of money (Messner and

Rosenfeld, 2001). Respondents were asked questions on a 5-point Likert scale on separate

elements of the four cultural value systems. For instance, respondents were asked how much they

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agreed with the following statements (5 representing strongly agree and 1 representing strongly

disagree): “I will sacrifice a lot of other things to have a lot of money,” and “I intend to do

whatever it takes to have some of the really expensive things in life.”

Next, IAT proposes that social institutions regulate human conduct (Messner and

Rosenfeld, 2001). The institutions discussed in IAT are the economy, the political system

(polity), the family, and educational institutions. Respondents were asked 5-point Likert scale

question about their associations with two of these four institutions: family and education. For

example, respondents were asked how important the opinion of their

mother/father/siblings/friends is (1 representing extremely important and 4 representing slightly

important). To test their connection to education as an institution, respondents were asked to

estimate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 representing strongly agree and 5 representing strongly

disagree) how strongly they agree with statements such as “College education is important so I

can be a better person” and “College education is important so I can be a better citizen.” Factor

analyses were conducted for each subset of institution categories, producing a composite

measure of the two institutional categories. Separate scales were then created to represent family

and education. Higher scores indicate higher participation in or commitment to the institution. At

the same time, higher scores represent weaker commitment to the belief of the American Dream.

Cronbach’s alphas were calculated to determine internal consistency for each scale. Table 3

reports the 23-item IAT scale breakdown for the whole sample as well as the three participating

countries.

---Table 3 about here---

Control variables

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 We also include common variables used in analyses of cybercrime, including measures of

routine activities. To measure time spent on the darkweb, participants were asked, “How many

hours per week do you spend on the dark web,” and responses were recorded as a continuous

variable. In addition, we included a control for sex (male=1, other=0), and education level.

Education level was measured on a Guttman-like scale ranging from “Less than a high school

diploma,” “High school degree,” “Some college,” through “A college degree,” “A master's or

professional degree or higher.”

Analysis.

Several models investigated the effect of individual levels of IAT on general cyber

offending. As cyber offending, the dependent variable, was a count variable (i.e., an index of

binary responses to specific cyber offending in the past 12 months) and because the data were

significantly overdispersed, negative binomial regressions were utilized. In practice, binominal

regression is not restricted to the assumption that the variance is equal to the mean. Otherwise,

tThese models are similar to regression in that they allow correlations to be established, but they

are appropriate for count data (Long and Freese, 2006).

Results

In the first negative binomial regression model, cyber offending was regressed on the

overall IAT index to examine the independent relationship between IAT and cyber offending in

all three countries (AIC=6245.51). Of the six IAT measures, four were significantly related to

cybercrime offending: Individualism, Universalism, Fetishism of Money (FoM) and Education.

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Individualism and FoM increased the probability of cybercrime offending while Universalism

and Education decreased the probability of cybercrime offending.

The second binominal regression model included all covariates with the general index of

IAT. This model was created to understand the multivariate relationship between IAT and

cyberoffending by using the above-mentioned control variables. Compared to the first model, the

model fit improved (AIC=5109.003). The results of this analysis and subsequent analyses are

reported in Table 4. First, a unit increase on the individualism scale resulted in an approximately

7% increase in cybercrime (IRR=1.073, p<0.001), and a unit increase on the FoM scale resulted

in a 4% increase in the probability of committing a cybercrime (IRR=1.043, p<0.05). However, a

1-unit increase on the Universalism scale decreased the risk of cybercriminal activity by 10%

(IRR=.903, p<0.001). Achievement, Family, and Education were not significantly related to the

cyberoffending index.

All of the control variables were statistically significant predictors of cyberoffending.

The risk of committing a cybercrime increased by approximately 37% with every hour per week

increase of time spent on the darkweb (IRR=1.374, p<0.001); men committed 54% more

cybercrimes than did women (IRR=1.537, p<0.001); and people with the lowest (less than high

school) and highest education levels (PhD or professional degrees) committed online crimes

more often than those with a secondary education.

---Table 4 about here---

Next, we ran binominal regression on country samples separately. As Table 4 shows, the

model’s fit improved in all countries compared to the full model. In the Finnish sample, the

model was well fitted (AIC=1668.025), but the only IAT variable that was a statistically

significant predictor of cyberoffending was Family. A unit increase in the scale reduced the

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probability of committing a cybercrime by 5% (IRR=.954, p<0.05), demonstrating the external

control function of family as an institution in Finland. Among the control variables, the results

were similar to the whole model. A one-hour-per-week increase of time spent on the darkweb

increased the risk of cyber offending by 28% (IRR=1.283, p<0.05), and men were more than

twice as likely to report cyberoffending as women (IRR=2.022, p<0.001). In the case of

education, the highly educated and those with very low levels of education were also more likely

to commit cybercrimes, similar to the results using the whole sample.

The model for the Hungarian sample also had a better fit compared to the previous model

(AIC= 1659.861). Here, however, none of the IAT indexes achieved statistical significance.

Among the control variables, education was not significant, but darkweb activity and sex were.

Similar to the full model, a one-hour-increase per week in time spent on the darkweb increased

the risk of committing cyberoffenses by approximately 21% (IRR=1.208, p<0.001). Men were

62% more likely to report cybercrime activities than were women (IRR=1.624, p<0.001). Table

4 also reports these results.

Finally, compared to the full model, the model fits best in US sample (AIC= 1726.318).

Among the IAT indices, Family and Education were not statistically significant, however, a one-

unit increase in the Individualism resulted in an 11% increase of risk of cyberoffending

(IRR=1.105, p<0.001), and a one-unit increase in Achievement increased the risk of committing

a cybercrime by 7% (IRR=1.073, p<0.05). Conversely, a one-unit increase in Universalism

decreased the risk of cyberoffending by approximately 22% (IRR=.784, p<0.001). As expected,

a one-unit increase of FoM was related to an 8% higher risk of offending (IRR=1.082, p<0.05).

Based on these results, it appears the institutions of family and education are so weak that they

fail to control individuals who intend to engage in cybercrimes. As for the controls, neither sex,

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nor education level were significant predictors of offending; however, a one-hour increase per

week of time spent on the darkweb increased the probability of engaging in a cybercrime by

approximately 37% (IRR=1.367, p<0.001). For the IAT scales distribution per country sample,

see Table 5.

---Table 5 about here---

Discussion

Using survey data from Finland, Hungary, and the United States, the current study

provides a cross-national, micro-level test of the relationship between institutional anomie theory

and self-reported cyber offending. As expected, results from our full sample model indicate an

overall significant, positive association between particular IAT cultural values (Individualism

and Fetishism of Money) and self-reported cyber offending. Consistent with our predictions,

cross-nationally, IAT is most applicable in the United States—a liberal regime where the

economic social safety net is limited. In fact, the positive correlations between institutional

anomie theory’s cultural variables and cyber offending are only significant in the United States,

as results from our split-sample, within-group models, do not find a statistically significant

relationship between Individualism, Achievement, Universalism, and Fetishism of Money and

cyber offending in our conservative regime (Hungary) and social democratic regime (Finland).

We also examined the empirical validity of institutional anomie theory’s predictions

concerning the relative ability of social institutions to control crime. According to IAT, the

criminogenic strain of economic institutions is not buffered, nor mediated by the otherwise

protective influence of noneconomic social institutions. As expected, our analyses indicate that,

in the United States, where we find institutional anomie theory to be most pronounced, the

family and educational institutions do not exert any independent influence on cybercrime. We do

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find that involvement in and commitment to the family does discourage cyber offending in

Finland.

Taken together, the results presented here are generally in support of institutional anomie

theory, at least in the United States, but our study is consistent with other comparative analyses

that find the criminogenic strain of the American Dream to be uniquely American. This is

unsurprising as the United States is the original impetus from whence institutional anomie theory

is derived. Although we improve upon the extant literature by enhancing the generalizability of

institutional anomie theory to account for cross-national variation in individual-level cyber

offending, our study raises an important question: Why is Universalism, a core tenet of

institutional anomie theory that is expected to increase the probability of offending significantly

and negatively associated with crime? To account for this inconsistency, we propose Merton's

deviance typology (Murphy and Robinson, 2008), which offers various individual-level

adaptations to strain, including, but not limited to criminal behavior. Of these, it is Merton’s

“Conformity” adaptation that best explains why institutional anomie theory can sometimes

protect against offending. Merton’s Conformists are individuals who accept anomic cultural

goals but will only rely on conventional means to attain said goals (Murphy and Robinson,

2008). Consistent with this view, Merton’s Conformists can recognize the ubiquitousness of the

American Dream without legitimizing the anomic goals imposed upon them by society. Further,

whereas cultural values associated with institutional anomie theory embody egoism, goal

orientation, and materialism, Universalism does not assume the manifestation of IAT-related

values conducive to crime, per se. Instead, Merton’s universalist Conformists may select into the

American Dream due to an organic affinity for accountability, personal responsibility, and

altruistic achievement. For Conformists, who may be as invested in the conventional means as

20
they are inspired by the intense pressure to succeed in achieving conventional goals, the

American Dream might function as a source of informal social control. Thus, our discovery of a

significant inverse association between institutional anomie theory and cybercrime warrants

future directional tests of institutional anomie theory and prescribes an extension of its

conceptual framework to account for possible prosocial outcomes.

Our study is not without limitations. Although the sample represented the three

participating nation states with respect to age and sex, the survey’s representativity is vulnerable

because survey participants in paid panels apply self-selection and tend to be more educated and

disproportionately from higher income brackets (Singer and Kulka, 2002). Second, although the

countries in this study represent liberal, conservative, and social democratic economic systems,

IAT must be further examined involving more countries with social institutions, cultural factors

and individual value systems different from that of the United StatesS’s. Third, more nuanced

scales must be applied to examine the effect of structural and individual factors that predict

engagement in cyber offenses. Although we found IAT being supported best in the US, the

nation where the concept of the American Dream was invented, we need to study how different

social, economic, and political systems and institutions induce cyber deviant activities. Despite

these limitations, our analyses suggest that IAT is a valuable theory for explaining cyber

offending, at least in the United States.

Conclusion

Institutional Anomie Theory was originally offered as an extension of Merton’s strain

theory. Over the years, it has been adopted to explain individual-level offending and applied to a

variety of crimes. Our analysis continues this tradition by using common individual-level

21
measures of the various cultural values and institutional variables to predict involvement in

cybercrime. Yet, we extend existing work by considering the theory’s applicability cross-

nationally. Since the theory was originally developed as a structural-level theory, it is

appropriate to consider how cross-national variation in the adoption of the American Dream can

account for cross-national variation in criminal behavior. We contribute to the limited body of

literature that do such cross-national analyses by considering IAT’s applicability to cybercrime.

While we find support for IAT in the United States, we predicted and found that it would be less

useful in Hungary and Finland because of the welfare regimes found in these nations. Additional

theorizing and testing is needed to determine its utility, and we argue that considering the role

played by the welfare state in mitigating the dominance of the economic institution could be a

fruitful. Ultimately, a much larger sample of nations that varying on the extent to which they

adopt the American Dream is needed to truly assess IAT’s value in explaining cross-national

variation in crime. We offer a small step in that direction.

22
 Notes

1. https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/; see also OECD, 2018: https://one.oecd.org/document/SDD/DOC(2018)9/En/pdf

23
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 Table 1: Demographics and other characteristics of total sample and countries
Whole sample US sample Finnish sample Hungarian sample
Total Offender Total Offender Total Offenders Total Offenders
N=4205 s N=1394 s N=1390 N=303 N=1421 N=321
(100.00 N=903 (100.00%) N=279 (100.00% (100.00% (100.00% (100.00%)
%) (100.00 (100.00% ) ) )
%) )
Count measures
Sex
Male 2001 497 680 (50%) 154 627 158 688 185 (59%)
(48%) (56%) (56%) (46%) (54%) (49%)
Female 2131 385 690 (50%) 121 732 133 708 131 (41%)
(52%) (44%) (44%) (54%) (46%) (51%)
Non-binary 16 9 (1.0%) 5 (0.4%) 3 (1.0%) 8 (0.6%) 6 (2.0%) 3 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%)
(0.4%)
Race
White n/a n/a - - n/a n/a n/a n/a
Non-white n/a n/a - - n/a n/a n/a n/a
Education
Less than 328 (8%) 84 (9%) 65 (5%) 11 (4%) 164 52 (17%) 99 (7%) 21 (7%)
high school (12%)
High 1649 320 347 (25%) 55 (20%) 542 95 (31%) 760 170 (53%)
school (39%) (35%) (39%) (54%)
Some 631 137 311 (22%) 64 (23%) 198 48 (16%) 120 (9%) 25 (8%)
college (15%) (15%) (14%)
College 1006 222 428 (31%) 88 (32%) 267 63 (21%) 307 71 (22%)
degree (24%) (25%) (19%) (22%)
Master’s or 563 140 232 (17%) 61 (22%) 206 45 (15%) 124 (9%) 34 (11%)
professiona (13%) (16%) (15%)
l degree
Darkweb 576 240 308 (25%) 151 94 (7%) 42 (15%) 174 47 (16%)
(15%) (29%) (63%) (13%)
Continuous measures
Age N=4090/ 884/42.8 1357/45.9/ 274/35.1/ 1341/47.4 293/45.8/ 1385/47.1 317/46.7/1
Mean=46 /15.5/18- 17.5/18-88 12.1/18- /16.4/18- 15.3/19- /16/18-89 5.9/18-82
.8/ 85 85 87 77
SD=16.7/
Min-max
18-89

31
Table 2: Self-reported offending behavior 12 months preceding the survey – Whole sample;
Country samples
Total US Finnish Hungarian
offenders: offenders: offenders: offenders:
n; % of total n; % of US n; % of FI n; % of HU
sample sample sample sample
Types of offending behavior N=903; 22% N=279; 21% N=303; 22% N=321; 23%
Posted hurtful information about someone 355 (9%) 205 (15%) 73 (5%) 77 (6%)
on the internet
Threatened and insulted others through 201 (5%) 133 (10%) 48 (4%) 20 (1%)
email or instant messaging
Excluded someone from an online 592 (14%) 178 (13%) 201 (15%) 213 (15%)
community
Hacked into an unauthorized area of the 169 (4%) 108 (8%) 43 (3%) 18 (1%)
internet
Distributed malicious software 178 (4%) 127 (9%) 35 (3%) 16 (1%)
Illegally downloaded copyrighted files or 339 (8%) 131 (10%) 97 (7%) 111 (8%)
programs
Illegally uploaded copyrighted files or 224 (8%) 133 (10%) 54 (4%) 37 (3%)
programs
Used someone else’s personal information 178 (4%) 129 (9%) 31 (2%) 21 (2%)
on the internet without their permission
Purchased illegal drugs online or bought 172 (4%) 123 (9%) 36 (3%) 13 (1%)
prescriptions without a prescription on
online pharmacies or websites
Posted nude photos of someone else 167 (4%) 117 (9%) 32 (2%) 18 (1%)
without their permission

32
Table 3: Institutional Anomie Scales in the US, Finnish, and Hungarian samples
Total US sample FI sample HU sample
sample
IAT measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Individualism (⍺=.772)
Being successful is more important than being 2.12 1.08 2.42 1.32 1.94 0.90 2.02 0.92
happy
I intend to do whatever it takes to have some of 2.09 1.14 2.52 1.29 1.97 1.50 1.77 0.91
the really expensive things in life
I expect to make as many sacrifices as are 2.40 1.16 2.83 1.30 2.02 1.01 2.35 1.02
necessary in order to advance my work/career
I expect to devote whatever time and energy it 2.48 1.22 2.94 1.31 2.24 1.15 2.25 1.05
takes to move up in my job/career
Being happy is more important than being 2.10 1.09 2.18 1.13 1.93 1.02 2.19 1.09
successful
Achievement (⍺=-0.367)
I will sacrifice a lot of other things to have a lot of 2.29 1.11 2.61 1.26 2.13 1.02 2.14 0.98
money
I don’t need help from others to succeed 2.86 1.09 3.01 1.21 2.77 1.01 2.80 1.01
I am getting/have gotten education because it’s 3.51 1.19 3.13 1.27 3.70 1.14 3.70 1.04
expected by my friends or parents
Success is measured by the amount of money a 2.50 1.19 2.57 1.30 2.44 1.16 2.49 1.11
person makes
I am getting a college education because it’s 3.83 1.21 3.38 1.31 3.99 1.16 4.12 1.01
expected by my parents
Universalism (⍺=0.626)
Anyone that works hard enough can be successful 3.52 1.11 3.76 1.12 3.52 1.09 3.29 1.08
You only have yourself to blame for your failures 2.97 1.11 3.37 1.14 2.67 1.06 2.86 1.02
in life
Fetishism of Money (⍺=0.667)
Having lots of money is one of my major goals in 2.55 1.18 2.95 1.29 2.37 1.13 2.35 1.02
life
Education is only helpful to get a good job 2.86 1.13 2.89 1.26 2.88 1.08 2.80 1.05
Education is useful because it helps you make 3.25 1.02 3.40 1.08 3.34 .94 3.02 .99
more money
Family (⍺=0.841)
How important to you is the opinion of your 2.59 1.28 3.36 1.21 2.09 1.13 2.32 1.11
mother?
How important to you is the opinion of your 2.50 1.29 3.43 1.26 2.00 1.07 2.09 1.00
father?
How important to you is the opinion of your 2.80 1.24 3.03 1.30 2.67 1.23 2.70 1.15
siblings?
How important to you is the opinion of your 2.44 1.19 2.70 1.22 2.34 1.21 2.30 1.12
friends?
Education (⍺=0.803)
A college education is important so I can be a 2.85 1.25 2.65 1.25 3.16 1.30 2.76 1.11
better person
A college education is important so I can be a 2.82 1.31 2.85 1.27 2.99 1.39 2.63 1.24
better spouse/parent
A college education is important so I can learn 2.95 1.34 2.57 1.22 3.31 1.39 2.95 1.30

33
about different cultures
A college education is important so I can be a 3.22 1.26 2.63 1.25 3.53 1.20 3.48 1.12
better citizen

34
Table 4: Regression models
Whole model Finland Hungary US
Goodness of Fit
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
5109.00 5186.62 1668.02 1732.89 1659.86 1725.00
3 7 5 9 1 6 1725.784 1784.874
Parameter estimates
Parameter B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Individualis 0.071** 1.073** 0.100** 1.105**
m * * 0.010 1.010 0.037 1.037 * *
Achievemen
t 0.015 1.015 0.025 1.025 -0.023 0.977 0.071* 1.073*
Universalis - -
m 0.102** 0.903** 0.243** 0.784**
* * -0.060 0.942 -0.044 0.957 * *
FoM 0.042* 1.043* -0.027 0.974 0.048 1.049 0.079* 1.082*
Family 0.001 1.001 -0.047* 0.954* 0.015 1.015 0.025 1.026
Education -0.011 0.989 0.000 1.000 0.019 1.019 -0.017 0.983
Darkweb 0.318** 1.374** 0.249** 1.283** 0.189** 1.208** 0.312** 1.367**
* * * * * * * *
Male 1.537** 0.704** 2.022** 0.485** 1.624**
0.43*** * * * * * 0.227 1.255
Less than
high school 0.306* 1.358* 0.482* 1.620* 0.311 1.365 0.282 1.326
High school -
0.322** 0.725** -0.386* 0.680* -0.052 0.949 -0.216 0.805
Some
college -0.097 0.908 -0.144 0.866 -0.422 0.656 0.075 1.078
College
degree -0.105 0.9 -0.003 0.997 0.000 1.000 -0.133 0.876
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

35
Table 5: IAT scale items’ distributions by country
Finland Hungary United States
N=1,086 N=1,109 N=696
IAT index IRR b p IRR b p IRR b p
Individualism 1.01 .01 .611 1.037 .037 .074 1.105 .100 <.001
Achievement 1.025 .025 .414 .977 -.023 .443 1.073 .071 <.05
Universalism .942 -.060 .112 .957 -.044 .209 .784 -.243 <.001
Fetishism of .974 -.027 .392 1.049 .048 .088 1.082 .079 <.05
Money
Family .954 -.047 <.05 1.015 .015 .444 1.026 .025 .180
Education .000 1.000 .979 1.019 .019 .288 .983 -.017 .326
Intercept .474 -.747 .206 .140 -1.966 <.01 .101 -2.293 <.001

36