Sigeri de Brabante. Questio de creatione ex nihilo. Paris BnF lat.

16297, f. 116fb-vb, with edition, translation and study by Andrea

Aiello. Firenze: SISMEL. Edizione del Galluzzo, 2015.

<Question on Creation Ex Nihilo>

Whether something can be generated or made from nothing, or

not from something.

It seems that <the answer is yes> because form is generated

when it receives being after after not being (post non esse) and is
not generated from something. For then it would be composed, as
is taught in Metaphysics 7.

<2.> Again, the reason why something generated must be from

something seems to be because in generation there must be as
subject something which comes to be that which comes to be. But
there are certain things generated which begin to be without
coming to be, as is said in the De sensu. Therefore, at least things
such as these could have been able to be generated from nothing.
<3.> Again, because what generates requires something from
which it generates, the reason seems to be a defect on the part of
what generates because it has a particular potency or power not
potent enough in regard to the whole substance of the thing
generated. Since, therefore, the first generator is without
diminution, having a universal power potent enough in regard to
the whole substance of any thing whatsoever, presuposing
nothing, it seems that at least an agent such as this is able to
make something completely from nothing.

<4.> Again, it is evident that the heavens have been made even
according to the opinion of all the philosophers, since it has the
cause of its being. The Commentator also expressly says in the De
substantia orbis that the heavens were made and that their mover is
their maker and they are not made out of something, for in that
way they would be generated; therefore they are from nothing.
Also in his commentary on De Caelo book 1, the Commentary,
providing an explanation of the text in which Aristotle says that the
heavens are not made from something, says that Aristotle says
well that the heavens were not made out of something because
they were made from nothing and in no time.

<5.> Again, the making which is the production of the whole

being, since it comes to be with nothing presupposed, is from
nothing; but the universe was made in this way.

Contra <1.> Before it was generated and has been generated,

everything generated has potency to be. However, that is nothing
but matter. Therefore, every generated thing has matter from
which it is generated.

<2.> Again, nothing has causality over the heavens or over

something else; therefore some thing cannot be made from
nothing in such a way that the term ‘from’ denotes causality. Also
the non-being of the heavens according to Aristotle does not have
an order of duration in regard to the heavens themselves.
Therefore it also cannot be said that it is made from nothing in
such a way that by “from” the order of duration is denoted, nor
also in such a way that by “from” there is denoted the order of
nature by which the non-being of the heavens precedes its being
according to what Avicenna seems to say, because, if were so, the
non-being of the heavens and its being would be two things
existing simultaneously in duration, which is impossible.

<Solution.> If by “generated” one understands what at first not

existing and later existing, proceeds to being through a change
from non-being to its being, something such as this must be
produced out of something. [This is] because every change
necessarily requires a changeable thing. However, this should be
understood regarding what has being per se, for such a thing also
has coming into being (fieri) when it is not.

Since, however, form does not have being per se, it is also not
generated per se but per accidens, namely, by the generation of
the composite. The composite, however, is generated per se,
namely, from something of its own (scilicet ex aliquo sui). What is
supposed prior to generation does not also come to be in its
substance.

Here it is also on the basis of this that immaterial forms do not

have generation, neither per se nor per accidens. It is also
legitimate [to think] that certain things begin to be without a
coming to be which belongs to them in their own right and which is
also in their matter or subject, nevertheless not without the
coming to be of something in an absolute way, and not without a
coming to be of these according to that, as air begins to be
illuminated not through a coming to be which is of the light in its
own right and also not through a coming to be which is in the
subject of light as in air according to something else, but through a
local change on the part of what is doing the illuminating. And in
regard to such things it should be said that they are also
generated from something, both because they are not things
generated without some [sort of] coming to be and also because,
as change implies a changeable thing which is changed, so too
changed being implies something that has been changed. In this
way such things are generated from something and they have
been generated from something.

If by “generated” one understands what, not having being in act of

itself, nevertheless has it from another in some way by an efficient
cause, so that it is also without change, as according to the
Philosopher the heavens are held to be eternal and yet made or
having a cause of their being — for in the case of certain eternal
things nothing prevents [them from] having a cause as is said in
Physics 7 and Metaphysics 5 — in this way, I say, something can be
made, as [are] the heavens and other things which according to
the Philosopher are eternal, yet not as generated through a
change. Rather, it should be understood only by this sort of
making a relation of the thing made in the notion (ratione) of
effect in reference to that as to its cause. Such a thing can
therefore properly (bene) called a thing made or an effect, yet it
cannot be said to be made from nothing, whether the “from”
indicates the circumstance of causality or of order in duration.

For what Avicenna says — that the heavens have been made from
nothing in such a way that there is indicated by this a certain order
of nature itself of the non-being of the heavens to their being so
that those two are simultaneously existing by duration in the
heavens and regarding these, yet one naturally precedes the other
not in an absolute way, but in such a way that the non-being of the
heavens, insofar as it is in its own right, is simultaneous in
duration with the being of the heavens through another, and yet
by the order of nature the non-being of the heavens precedes its
being because what belongs to one thing per se belongs to it in a
prior way than that which is from another — cannot stand,
because it is false to say that the heavens of themselves are non-
being or nothing. For non-being neither is in the principle (ratio) of
the heavens nor do the heavens of themselves have a cause on
the basis of which they might not be. For whatever way they are
existing, it would not be from another. It is also false that the
heavens of themselves are able not to be; rather, of themselves it
is impossible for them not to be. Nevertheless, it is true that they
do not exist of themselves as by an efficient principle, and it is true
that heavens are something by another thing. And for this reason
the heavens of themselves are something and sempiternal, yet by
another thing.

Therefore, there is a difference between saying the heavens are

not made from something and that they are made from nothing.
For by the first it is negated that something has the nature (ratio)
of a material cause for the heavens themselves which [cause] an
agent will have presupposed. By the second it is affirmed that
nothing or non-being has causality and order, or at least order.
The first is true because the heavens, with regard to all that is in
them, are from their own agent and for this reason it is not made
from something. However, that they were made from nothing is
false unless by “the heavens are made from nothing” one
understands that the heavens were not made out of something.
Still, it does not follow, if the heavens are not made out of
something, that they are made from nothing (ex nihilo).

It is true, therefore, that, in regard to the making which is the

production of the whole being, something is not presupposed.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that such making in which
nothing is presupposed is from nothing, but it is necessary that it
not be from something.

Nevertheless, this production cannot be through some change of

something from non-being to being because such [a change]
requires a substrate from which what is produced is produced. But
in this sort of production there is only the understanding that the
whole being is from another as from its cause.

Still, according to the intention of Aristotle, such a production

cannot be new; rather, according to him, it is necessary that
everything newly made come to be from something. [This is
because] also according to him everything newly made comes to
be through change. For the effect is not distinguished in
posteriority with respect to its cause and in newness, not
immediately a being with its cause, except because it proceeds
from its cause according to the order of a certain change. For
change causes priority and posteriority in duration.
Again, what of its own nature (ratio) is such that it is impossible for
it to be, totally lacking potency to being, can receive from nothing
that it be a being. The pure non-being of some thing is of such a
sort because it has no potency for being, neither per se nor per
accidens; rather, of its own nature (ratio) it has impotence in
regard to this in such a way that not only is it unable by its own
nature to be but of its very nature (ratio) it is prevented to/ may
not be.

Again, what of its very nature (ratio) is a non-being never has from
another that it is a being; pure non-being without a subject is of
this sort; therefore, etc. For it is reasonable that matter of itself is
not a being in act, yet it is not of itself non-being in act because it
never would come to be in act by an agent.

If it may be said that Socrates of his own nature (ratio) is a being

and nevertheless from another he has it that at sometime he is a
non-being, it should be noted that Socrates of his own nature
(ratio) is a being in potency to non-being and for this reason of his
own nature (ratio) he is not absolute being and for all time, but
only for some determinate time. But pure non-being and nothing of
its very nature is absolute non-being, not having potency for
being; therefore he will not have from another that he is a being.

Some say regarding these things that pure non-being without a

subject does not receive being or is changed in being, but to such
a non-being itself there follows being by an emanating agent.

But, on the contrary, the necessary not only does not change into
the opposite but neither also does the opposite follow necessarily.
But pure non-being in its non-beingness is necessary since it does
not have the potency of being disposed otherwise, neither per se
nor per accidens since it is without subject. Therefore, being does
not follow upon such non-being.

If it would be said that such non-being does not have potency for
being which is its own or of itself, nevertheless it can be by the
potency of an agent, in such a way that, even though such non-
being in its non-beingness would be necessary insofar as it is of
itself, yet it is possible for the opposite on the part of the agent.
Against that it is said in the On the cause of the motion of animals that
that which is immobile of itself no one can move; therefore, what
is of itself impossible, no one is able to bring about.
Again, since an impossible being is a non-being, it is impossible for
any agent to make such a non-being; therefore, since a non-being
is impossible to be, it is not possible for any agent to make that a
being.

Again, as what is a pure being (purum ens) or pure to be (purum

esse) in no way can not be, so too it seems that that which is pure
non-being can in no way be.

Again, if something can come to be from nothing by any agent,

prime matter would not be something attested; for in no <process
of> making, neither more easily in one case rather than in
another, is matter apprehended to exist by the senses. But matter
is comprehended from the fact that an agent does not have the
ability to make something when it is not yet, unless there is the
possibility of that thing for being; however, that through which
something is a being in potency is called matter. If, therefore, that
very nature of the thing which comes to be by an agent through
which it is possible to be is no longer dependent on one making
than on another, unless it is universally true that no agent makes
that which is of itself impossible, but only that which in this way is
of itself possible to come to be, then it does not happen that prime
matter is known.

On account of this it seems that it should be said that some agent

is able to make that which is impossible for another agent, but no
agent is able to do but what is possible absolutely. However, it is
said that something is possible, from the term’s relation, when the
predicate is not repugnant to the subject in such a way that
everything which can have the concept (ratio) of being has the
nature of absolute possibility.

Therefore, that what of its very nature lacks the potency to be, and
in this way of its notion (ratio) is a non-being, comes to be or to
have being implies a contradiction. The contradiction,
nevertheless, is not seen to be implied by certain thinkers [i.e.
Aquinas], because they consider only the fact that the being of
that is found from the agent which is pure act and potent with an
infinite potency for the whole substance of the thing. But if one
pays attention to the fact that that thing of its very principle (ratio)
lacks potency to being, and in this way of its very notion (ratio) is a
non-being, then it is repugnant to the concept (ratio) of being
which it is said to be able to have also from the agent.