Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu's Traditional African Polities

Author(s): Bernard Matolino

Source: Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory , MARCH 2016, Vol. 63, No. 146
(MARCH 2016), pp. 36-55
Published by: Berghahn Books

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24719959

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 Rationality and Consensus
in Kwasi Wiredu's
Traditional African Polities
Bernard Matolino

Abstract: The disagreement over what was responsible for arriving at consen
sual positions, in traditional African polities, is best captured in the classic
debate between Kwasi Wiredu and Emmanuel Eze. The former holds that
rational persuasion was the sole informant of decision-making while the latter
argues that non-rational factors played a crucial role in securing a consensual
decision. If Wiredu is correct then consensus could work in modern society as
it can be argued that it does not rely on traditionalistic scaffoldings. If, on the
other hand, Eze is correct, then consensus cannot work in modern largely
urbanised Africa as its traditional underpinnings have largely disappeared.
While Emmanuel Ani's intervention in this debate is welcome for its earnest
search for a system that could work, his support for Eze is not bold enough to
undermine Wiredu's rationalistic orientation in consensus.

Keywords: African traditional polity, consensus, decision-making, Eze,

Wiredu

Introduction

In this article I seek to pursue two aims. Firstly, I seek to contest Emmanuel
Ani's reading of Wiredu regarding his support for the role of rationality in
securing consensus in traditional African polities. I seek to show that as a
result of Ani's misreading of Wiredu, his attempt to offer a revised form of
consensus does not work. Secondly, and more positively, I seek to show that
Wiredu's decisional consensus is possible without participants having to
develop identity of values.
Emmanuel Ani's contribution to the classical objections raised by
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1997) against Kwasi Wiredu (1997), on the factors
responsible for securing consensus in traditional African polities, should be
welcome for its refreshing forthrightness. Ani appears genuinely to seek to
engage the delicate question of whether pure rational deliberation or other
scaffolding elements were responsible for securing consensus among various

Theoria, Issue 146, Vol. 63, No. 1 (March 2016): 36-55

KI
doi: 10.3167/th.2016.6314603 • ISSN 0040-5817 (Print) • ISSN 1558-5816 (Online)

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 37

political players in traditional political structures. An answer in support of

either of the two alternatives has far-reaching consequences for the accept
ability, transferability and workability of this traditional mode of politics in
serving as an inspiration to modern African polities.
Wiredu has, over the years, fervently defended the idea that Western
inspired majoritarian democracy's numerous inherent weaknesses render it
unsuitable to serve as a dominant polity or as an inspiration to the democratic
order in modern Africa. Wiredu points to three particular weaknesses that are
associated with majoritarian democracy; firstly, their nature of organisation
along political party lines makes competition for power exclusionary (Wiredu
1997: 307-8). Secondly, their conception of democracy is narrow as it only
satisfies the procedural aspect of representation while failing to satisfy the
substantive requirement of representation (ibid.: 307). Put simply, this means
that majoritarianism, while retaining features of parliamentary representation;
fails to secure the articulation of the voice and needs of ordinary citizens in
decision-making processes. In effect majoritarianism promotes the growth of
party loyalty, by representatives, at the expense of articulating what the repre
sented really wish. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, majoritarianism by
virtue of its procedures, favours the majority at the expense of the wishes of
the minority. Since political preferences and decisions are settled through vot
ing, whosoever has the greatest number of votes is sure to win all political
debates (ibid.: 310).
For Wiredu, this process may lead to the disaffection of the minority since
they would suffer the brunt of being continually marginalised. Unable to
muster the right number of votes, to effect their preferences, the minority may
resort to other means to register their displeasure. Relying on the traditional
Akan polity, Wiredu argues for the superiority of consensual democracy over
majoritarian democracy. Chief among the attractions of consensual democ
racy, according to Wiredu, is the idea that decisions in this polity are not
reached by a process of the majority prevailing over the minority (ibid.: 310—
11). On the contrary, decisions, in a consensual polity, are arrived at through
negotiations/dialogue/conversations/exchanges of ideas that seek to appraise
'the initial bones of contention' (ibid.: 304) with a view to arriving at consen
sus. The particular attraction for such a process, for Wiredu, is that decisions
reached through consensus do not lead to disaffection of the minority since all
parties are party to the decision.

Eze on Extraneous Factors in Consensus

Before venturing into the details of Eze's objections to Wiredu's outline of

consensus, it is crucial that I define the nature or type of consensus that
Wiredu advocates. He makes it clear that the sort of consensus he wishes to
discuss is of a practical sort that 'does not necessarily involve a complete

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38 Bernard Matolino

identity of moral or cognitive opinions' (ibid.: 304). The decisions he has in

mind are of a sort of whether people agree to go to war or not. While he
acknowledges that there is difficulty of arriving at decisions in situations
where there is no total agreement, he argues that in traditional society con
sensus could be had because no single group was permanently placed in a
position of being a minority. Although Ani disagrees with this form of seeing
consensus as merely practical but as involving epistemological conversion,
Wiredu insists that it is possible to have decisional consensus without altering
respective values of participants.
Eze has trouble accepting the reasons forwarded by Wiredu for the worka
bility of consensus both in its claimed traditional setting and proposed future
use. In particular he questions the role assigned to reason in negotiations that
resulted in or led to consensus. While Wiredu insists that the key defining fea
ture that was responsible for converting people from their dissenting views to
a consensual view was reason alone, Eze casts doubt on whether reason alone
could have been responsible for such conversion (1997: 317). Eze argues that
there are other features, besides reason, that were responsible for persuading
participants to accept one position over another (ibid.). In particular he ques
tions the role and influence of the religious aspect of the chiefs office on
political decisions. In opposition to Wiredu, he maintains that these 'other'
factors must be taken into account as influencing decision-making processes
that would lead to consensus. From this, Eze extends his argument to question
whether these factors that worked well in traditional Akan society would be
able to work in the same way in modern society to achieve consensus (ibid.:
316). He proposes that if it is found to be the case that these factors would no
longer work in modern society, then, there is need to discard them and invent
new ones (ibid.: 318).
There are three things to note at this stage. The first is that there is a real
difference between Wiredu and Eze's views on the role of rationality in secur
ing consensus. The second issue is that Eze does not believe that the tradi
tional appendages of consensus can still effectively work in modern African
societies whose religious status is significantly different from their traditional
forerunners. Thirdly, on account of one and two, immediately above, Eze seri
ously suggests that consensus should not be seen as easily workable as Wiredu
suggests. If that is the case, then Wiredu's suggestion that consensual democ
racy is preferable to its majoritarian counterpart is not so easily demonstrated.
It is for this reason that Eze offers what he considers to be a more appropriate
definition of democracy as successful management of individuated desires
(ibid.: 320).
Contributing to this debate, Ani states his position as follows: 'My general
reaction to Wiredu's call for consensus in decision making is that of qualified
acceptance ... My particular focus here is on examining Wiredu's presentation
of traditional African consensual practices, by examining the issues of imma
nence, pure deliberative rationality, and their implications for deliberative the

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 39

ory' (Ani 2014: 345). Thus what Ani seeks to do is to show why he cannot
fully accept Wiredu's position. He seeks to do this by rejecting what he con
siders to be Wiredu's suggestion of the immanence of consensus to Africans.
Ani also expresses his doubt of the possibility of purely rational deliberation
leading to consensus. Finally he seeks to point out what he argues are the real
factors influencing decision-making. For Ani, the real factors that lead to con
sensus cannot be purely rational. In this sense he shares the same position as
Eze. However, his attempt to support Eze is not successful, so I will argue. I
will achieve my ends by contesting Ani's interpretation of Wiredu on the
notion of immanence as well as his argument against the possibility of reach
ing consensus through purely rational deliberation.

Question of African Immanence of Consensus

Ani reads Wiredu as committed to the idea that consensus was immanently
African. Ani rejects the idea that immanence is African; rather, he argues,
immanence should be seen as a human feature as opposed to a peculiarly
African characteristic. Ani's reading is based on Wiredu's position that holds
that consensus was not only a political feature of decision-making but was
axiomatic in all adult relations. Attendant to this position is Wiredu's idea that
consensus can serve as an inspiration to modern African polities. In the light
of difficulties that have been occasioned by the adoption of majoritarian
democracy, Wiredu suggests that some of these problems could be avoided by
the adoption of consensual democracy. The point, then, is that consensus is
something that was quite natural to Africans and Africans can tap into its suc
cesses to author their modern-day political outlook. Ani finds this argument
problematic. Identifying it as a question of immanence, he argues against its
particularisation to Africans when he writes:

Thus, I am not so much opposed to the doctrine of immanence as to its African par
ticularisation, as I do not see how such selective or taxonomic particularism will
give a helping nudge to its contemporary practice in Africa, or how it can, for that
matter, help us to dislodge other alleged (and more unhealthy) taxonomic particu
larisms and 'inherent' differences like that of inherent White superiority in intelli
gence. (ibid.: 346)

It is important to note that Wiredu does not only use the word 'immanent';
neither does he describe nor write of consensus' immanence in the traditional
Akan political set-up. The other word he uses is 'axiomatic' (Wiredu 2001:
303). In the full sense of the usage of these words Wiredu writes:

But for now, let us note an important fact about the role of consensus in African
life. It is that the reliance on consensus is not a peculiarly political phenomenon.
Where consensus characterises political decision making in Africa, it is manifesta

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40 Bernard Matolino

tion of an immanent approach to social interaction. Generally, in interpersonal rela

tions among adults, consensus as a basis of joint action was taken as axiomatic.
This is not to say it was always attained. Nowhere was African society a realm of
unbroken harmony. On the contrary, conflicts (including mortal ones) among lin
eages and ethnic groups and within them were not infrequent (ibid.).

Wiredu is clear to insist that consensus was not merely a convenient political
tool or, as Ani suggests, an immanent feature of the constitution of Africans.
Rather, Wiredu makes clear that consensus was axiomatic in all adult relation
ships, meaning that its immanence was realised in specified social interaction.
One can add that Wiredu sees consensus as having been the currency of inter
personal adult relationships - social and political relationships.
I suggest that Ani's selective concentration on the use of the word 'imma
nent' is not innocuous. Ani's quote above shows his real intention. While he
starts off by insisting that consensus' immanence is objectionable on the
grounds that it must not be seen as a particular African feature, but should be
seen as a human feature, he then adds that the particularism attached to con
sensus will not help its case for acceptability. On the contrary, it will achieve
the opposite by falling into the disreputable trap of helping other particularism
and inherent differences that seek to show 'inherent White superiority in intel
ligence' (Ani 2014: 345). Although Ani appears to be making a case against
discrimination of a certain people on the grounds of their race and although
he condemns what he considers to be essentialising Africans, his choice of
insistence on the word 'immanence' is questionable. He does so while ignor
ing the connection Wiredu makes between immanence of consensus as a social
practice to its axiomatic presence in all adult relations.
The word immanent refers to a quality that is inherent. The word axiomatic
refers to something that is self-evident. The difference between these two terms
is vast, particularly if used disjunctively; the former is disparaging and the latter
is not disparaging. Wiredu only understands consensus as immanent in the sense
that it was an axiomatic social feature. Joe Teffo (2004:446) describes this setup
as a communocracy. For Teffo, a communocracy is a social system that symbol
ises and inspires continuity of a community's traditions and cultures. These tra
ditions and cultures are of consensual democracy which is rooted in individuals'
community involvement and participation. The basic organising principle, for
Teffo, is the idea of solidarity between members of the community.
Solidarity prioritises and promotes cooperation while shunning adversarial
relations and politics. These social structures do not testify to anything imma
nent about Africans that causes them to give rise to these societies. On the
contrary, these are values that are characteristic of traditional societies. Wiredu
is only too aware of the nature of pre-modern traditional societies (Wiredu
1980: 37-50). He has made a compelling argument admonishing those who
wish to compare traditional African societies to modern Western societies. He
argues that such a comparison will yield nothing save to demonstrate that
those who are intent on pursuing such comparisons are ignorant of the nature

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 41

of traditional Western societies. He argues that all human traditional societies

retain similar features.
For Wiredu, consensus was never an immanent feature of Africans. On the
contrary, he argues that Africans' starting point was dissensus, and that at
times they engaged in brutal differences that led to wars and deaths. The same
point is made by Edward Wamala (2004: 436) who in his description of tradi
tional Ganda society points out that the power structures between the lineage
head (mutaka) and the chief (ssabataka) was chiefly characterised by tension
which led to an avoidance relationship. Further, in the event that the individual
mutaka felt aggrieved by the ssabataka he could physically withdraw from the
jurisdiction of the ssabataka. For Wiredu, consensus was crucially about
'restoration of goodwill' and 'suspension of further recrimination'. What this
suggests is that at those meetings where consensus was eventually sought and
reached, the starting point would have been either goodwill that would have
been lost or goodwill that would have been destroyed in the course of human
interaction. The aim then would have been to find ways that are agreeable and
acceptable to all parties in attempts at restoring this goodwill. A suspension of
further recrimination means that at the initial stage there would have existed
such high levels of blame and accusations between the parties. But as Helen
Lauer points out, the purpose of a consensual meeting, and in particular the
role of the adjudicator, is not to find out who is to blame or who the loser is
and who the winner is but restoration of the goodwill that was there before the
dispute arose (Lauer 2012: 52). What this shows is that consensus was not an
immanent feature of being African. Wiredu does not make such a claim and
neither do any of the serious sympathisers of consensus make such a claim.
What is really profitable, for Ani, is to find out what made Africans (who had
a humanly natural disposition to engage in conflict) prefer consensus.
Wiredu's idea of consensus being axiomatic and Teffo's notion of communoc
racy may steer Ani towards a more fruitful consideration of the true driving
force of consensus in traditional African societies.
However, Ani disputes the idea that consensus would have led to a solution
that goes beyond mere abstention from further disputes. He claims that this
form of presentation of consensus - rather than its advocacy - has earned it
the label 'return to tradition' or 'return to the source'. He notes that with some
irony Wiredu, in the first chapter of his Philosophy and an African Culture
(1980), notes that milieu is gone either for bad or good. He notes that other
'return to the source' projects have been executed by Senghor and Nyerere.
However, for Ani, there is a problem with such a project when he writes; 'To
be sure, the project of reaching into African tradition for conceptual schemes
(which in my view is admirable) has otherwise been recently tainted with a
presupposition of not just cultural but human or biological dichotomies
between races' (Ani 2014: 346). Further, like Eze, he holds:

The problem with discussing consensus - and the foundation of the controversy
surrounding Wiredu's proposal - arises from such dichotomies. They, for instance,

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42 Bernard Matolino

render concepts like majority and consensus to be either/or, and they create these
inter-continental dichotomies in order to advocate the obvious, namely, to drop
what is described as African. But deliberation as process and consensus as outcome
are being discussed and developed globally. Unless we say that Africans are imma
nently different human beings, much of this work has normative merits for the con
tinent. (Ani 2014: 346)

For Ani, it does not make sense to discuss consensus without also discussing
deliberation. He points out that the existence of vast literature on deliberation
is against reification of consensus as immanently African. Hence consensual
paradigms should be discussed on their normative potential as opposed to
alleged antecedents in traditional societies which are not easy to access today.
This then, for Ani, is the major problem of the 'return to the source' political
theories - they are simply too remote, whatever was there has been disrupted
by colonialism and a lack of a written tradition does not make things any eas
ier. Ani then charges that what we are left with are descriptions by proxy or
conjecture - and most of this is inspired by nostalgia as opposed to being an
accurate description.
However, in contrast to Ani, I think there is no basis to doubt that the
process of consensus, or its attainment, would not have led to abstention from
further recrimination. What Ani is probably missing is the import of the polit
ical structural arrangement of the society in which Wiredu's consensus oper
ated. It was a society whose most basic unit of political power was the lineage.
The lineage head (or a chosen representative) was one who represented this
particular lineage in council. Alongside other lineage heads they sought to
arrive at decisions that were consensual. If it were the case that there were
serious differences between two or more lineages, their ultimate aim would
have been to restore goodwill that was under threat.
The nature of inter-lineage constitution is relational. Such a nature is apt
to induce tendencies to cooperate among social and political players. This is
based on the filial associations that would have been established through
social structures that promote cooperation and caring for other members of
society. Secondly, Ani deliberately casts aspersions on the 'return to the
source' project that Wiredu advocates by citing it along more discredited pro
ponents of African socialism that Wiredu is opposed to. There is value in
pointing out that Wiredu, on one hand, and Senghor and Nyerere, on the
other, use the same traditional source to argue for different polities. Further
value would be obtained in pointing out that Wiredu and Senghor and Nyerere
have similar reports about the foundations of traditional society. However,
they reach different forms of interpretation and advocacy about how post
independence Africa should put this traditional basis to use (Matolino 2012).
While Ani gestures towards this by claiming that Wiredu's description of tra
ditional polities has led his notion of consensus to be identified as 'return to
the source', his next move is to place it alongside one-party thinkers that
Wiredu is opposed to.

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 43

Without accompanying analysis or explanation of that move, I am left with

one conclusion - that Ani is up to mischief. His mischief is that he reads
Wiredu and Senghor and Nyerere as cut from the same cloth. There would be
nothing wrong with such a claim but it has to be argued for. This leads Ani,
surprisingly, to raise a point against the dangers of essentialising races which
is responsible for superior views of certain races over others. But this move is
evidence of just how Ani has missed Wiredu's real point. This objection to
essentialising of races is preceded by Ani pointing out that Wiredu is opposed
to a return to a traditional set-up that is long gone. Unfortunately for Ani he
has read Wiredu out of context. Wiredu's major argument is directed at over
coming what he considers to be three evils that besiege African societies. He
cites those evils as follows: (1) anachronism - an insistence on using outdated
modes simply because they are African. It is here that he states that we should
guard against yearning for a return to a long gone era; (2) authoritarianism -
relying on old and traditional authority, and (3) supernaturalism - believing in
things just because ancestors have said so (Wiredu 1980: 1-5).
If we read Wiredu's arguments in favour of consensus alongside his cau
tioning against the three evils, then it becomes evident that Wiredu is not an
advocate of a blind return to the past. On the contrary his arguments in favour
of consensus seek to show the natural advantage that consensus has over
majoritarian democracy. The fact that it was found among Akans in their tra
ditional set-up does not impoverish or compromise its claimed conceptual
superiority over majoritarian democracy.

Ani on Rationality

Ani argues that Wiredu's account of a purely rational deliberation is an exten

sion of immanence. He objects to both the extension as well as the idea of
pure rational deliberation. He also rejects Eze's argument that deliberative
outcome is influenced by non-rational factors. Relying on Aristotle's three
components of persuasion - character (ethos), emotions/experience (pathos),
and word/logic (logos) - he argues that all these factors play an important role
in influencing how people make decisions. For Ani, while Eze leans too much
on character or moral status of participant, Wiredu leans too much on moral
status as well as logical force of argument. To correct Wiredu in particular,
following Aristotle, Ani argues that 'under normal circumstances and when
unchecked, humans ascribe credibility to an idea or information based on (I)
reason, (II) emotion or attitude, (III) perceived social trustworthiness' (Ani
2014: 35). For Ani, we make decisions, as humans, by relying on these three
factors, with each factor having a specific role to play in how we weigh infor
mation. He cites an example of American jurors, wherein studies have shown
that those who have higher status jobs and education tend to speak more and
are perceived to be more accurate. For him, modern societies have replaced

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44 Bernard Matolino

religious authority with professional authority. However, in highly religious

societies religious figures speak with authority even on political issues.
I read Ani's actual position to be a rejection of Wiredu's purely rational
deliberation. Yet at the same time he is not prepared to accept Eze's position
on the influence of non-rational factors in decision-making. This leaves him
with a certain position that vacillates between what he thinks are the two
extremes. On the whole my reading of Ani is that he is more sympathetic to
Eze. This is seen in his refusal to accept the veracity of traditional Akan prac
tices, his refusal to accept the possibility of pure rational deliberations, and
his insistence that both traditional and religious scaffoldings of consensus have
no place in modern society.
However Ani's rejection of rationality is indecisive and as a result a much
weaker account than what Eze's position is. It is not entirely clear to me what
Ani is really trying to achieve. He rejects pure deliberation, and at the same
time he rejects Eze's articulation of the role of non-rational scaffoldings to the
success of Akan deliberation. Seeing both positions as extremes, Ani proposes
Aristotelian three-pronged factors affecting decision-making or acceptance of
persuasive powers of statements/arguments.
Eze targets religious belief. His original argument is that since the chief
was both a religious and political figure it was never quite clear what the
source of the legitimation of his political authority was (1997: 316). Since he
played the role of a religious leader such factors would also have easily come
into play in influencing people to accept his authority. The most obvious argu
ment against Eze is that the chief, ideally, never sought to lean on people in
any way. His word was not law but an expression of the word of council. In
effect the chief was expected to be largely silent during deliberations, only
speaking through his representative, if he absolutely had to. His was to listen
to the people and, thereafter, pronounce the consensual decision. So the reli
gious influence Eze imagines the chief to have had effectively falls away. But
at least Eze stakes his claim on what he sees as the problem.
Ani, on the other hand, runs himself into some fogginess when he seeks to
maintain a balance between what he thinks are scaffolding factors and pure
rationality. Ani is against what he considers to be Wiredu's pure logical per
suasion as well as Eze's argument for the role of other factors in securing the
persuasive force of an argument. In the place of both positions he proposes
Aristotle's three components of persuasion as more appropriate in influencing
the acceptability of a position. I suggest that if we look at Aristotle's three
components of persuasion, as outlined by Ani, and at Wiredu's entire outline
of the character imbued in the chief and the manner in which he is supposed
to have decisional influence over his people, we can only conclude that it is
not so much at odds with what Ani is suggesting.
Wiredu argues that at the stage of selecting the chief, the most obvious
candidate would be one who is morally worthy. This character is considered
crucial in his chieftaincy as the only other reason for his deposition is moral

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 45

degeneration. This, effectively, in my view, correlates to Aristotle's compo

nent of character or perceived social trustworthiness. As for Aristotle's com
ponent of reason it is equal to Wiredu's insistence that what worked was the
king's persuasive power. While Wiredu has given reason priority, it is not
entirely lost on him that there were other factors that were crucial in deter
mining what type of person would sit on that throne. Not only was the person
supposed to exhibit highly rational tendencies or capacities but that person
had to temper or combine that quality of rationality with other equally
admirable or important qualities.
I think Wiredu's point can be expanded by considering the undesirability
of the following scenario: let us imagine a king who is selected on the basis of
his intelligence, cleverness or rationality. He is quite witty, clever, jocular,
incisive and considered to be a thoroughly good thinker. He can sway people
by using all these characteristics, but, quite unfortunately, he is a man of little
scruples. He is actually a power-monger who will stop at nothing to further
his interests, and he, by natural orientation, has no regard for morally worthy
conduct. He cuts corners, trumps opponents and always gets his will done. All
this is owed to his magnificent mental capacities. On Wiredu's account, such
a king would be undesirable. Although he has the rational or intellectual capac
ity necessary for the exercise of power, his lack of morality is objectionable to
his either becoming a king or continuing as one (if he were already in office).
For this reason, Wiredu, like Aristotle, combines rationality with other factors.
In this sense Wiredu is unlike Eze who sees reason as playing a limited role,
with other characteristics such as the divine nature of the king's office actually
influencing the acceptability of the king's word. Wiredu's actual point is that
what determines the acceptability of an idea is its natural appeal as rationally
argued for. But when it comes to the person who is in that seat of power, he
may just as well have to be a person of a particular character.
This consideration is similar to Ani's suggestion. A convincing king is not
one who is only clever but one who has a reputation that satisfies Aristotle's
other components. In a word, I do not think Wiredu would necessarily have a
problem accepting Ani's formulation. I actually think that Ani's proposition
is just a restatement of Wiredu from an Aristotelian perspective. As for
Aristotle's component of emotion or attitude, it is neither a revision nor a
development of Wiredu's position. It is a component that can be easily
accommodated in Wiredu's scheme, if there ever was need to develop com
mitment to explicitly stating it. I suggest that, with Wiredu's scheme, it is the
case that attitude is an implicit component that needs to be realised in the
general disposition of the king.
That being the case, Ani's assessment is harmless to Wiredu. It neither
undermines his position nor bolsters Eze's position. It also neither adds any
thing new to Wiredu nor develops anything specific to Ani. However, and
most importantly, above I suggested that Ani appears to be in Eze's camp by
his refusal to accept the force of pure rational deliberation. He then, like Eze,

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46 Bernard Matolino

tries to develop a comprehensive account of the acceptability of an idea by

his reliance on Aristotle. However, Ani's account is considerably different
from Eze's. Eze rejects the sole influence of reason. Ani, on the other hand,
includes reason as a concomitant component of decision-making. Ani's inten
tion is to develop a theoretical framework that is comprehensive but different
from both Eze and Wiredu. However, he unwittingly undermines the strength
of Eze's objection by imagining that there could be a system that embraces
both the rational and the non-rational. He does that by positing non-rational
factors as important as the rational factor. Eze does not consider that to be
the case. I concede that it is not Ani's claim that he seeks to support Eze.
However, his position, just like Eze, seeks to deny the importance of rational
ity as a procedure of decision-making. Ani, though, unlike Eze, who thinks
that rationality is either not a factor or is aided by other things, suggests that
rationality is equivalent to or operates together with the other two Aristotelian
factors. This suggestion clearly sees reason as something that could be had
with other factors. This diverts from the debate in considerable ways. Though
Ani's quest is clearly an attempt to advance the debate and make sense of
conditions of securing consensus, he loses the actual point of what the debate
is about.
The debate is really about whether rationality alone can secure consensus
or it cannot. Wiredu will definitely be impatient with Eze's rejection of the
sole use of reason as a determinant of decision-making. Eze, on the other hand
is completely sceptical of the possibility of reason working as a sole determi
nant of decision-making. Both have their reasons for thinking so. While Ani
tries to take the debate to another level, he fails to appreciate the real import
of the divide in the Wiredu-Eze debate. The real import of the debate has to
do with whether rationality is scaffolded or not - whether rationality alone
could work or not. Ani's waddling into this matter by introducing Aristotle
effectively undermines a position that he appears implicitly to endorse - Eze's
extraneous factors; by claiming that rationality works in tandem with other
factors. If that is the case it makes Eze's position much weaker in the sense
that it would concede that rationality works as long as it is aided in the right
kind of ways by other factors.
My initial point (Matolino 2009) which Ani refers to as driving us back to
the rationality discourse sought to show that Eze was unwarrantedly suspi
cious of the possibility of rationality independently securing consensus. My
rejection of Eze's suspicions was based on the desire to secure conditions of
consensus as capable of rational deliberation. That, as all supporters of con
sensus would maintain, makes consensus a pure deliberative process that is
anchored in reason alone. What Ani's contribution does is at the very least
support Wiredu's comprehensive treatment of consensus starting from desir
able qualities of a leader right up to how his logical prowess ought to stand
out and be used.

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities Al

Social Conformity

In his consideration of what he calls the question of social conformity Ani

points out two problems and accompanying suggestions of how to get rid of
these problems. The first problem, according to Ani, is that although consen
sus has a more inclusive value, it will not necessarily lead to superior deci
sions. On the contrary, decisions made under the consensual scheme will be
of an inferior form as consensus favours securing inclusivity as a value. Ani
argues that although Wiredu thinks that voting is an inferior way of securing
decisions, he (Ani) does not see how the act of voting is any different from
Wiredu's preferred consensus which is said to have qualitative superiority.
Ani holds that even though the minority is prevailed upon, through deliber
ation, by the majority, that could just be evidence of the retention of pre-delib
erative preferences. If that is the case then the retention of pre-deliberative
preferences is equivalent to voting. Hence he argues: 'Thus, unless effective
deliberative techniques are created, the difference between consensus and vot
ing is often more procedural, semantic, or theoretical than practical. In the
real world, a good proportion of common agreements are likely in fact to be
majority outcomes' (Ani 2014: 353). The function of consensus, then, is
merely to ensure psychological superiority of inclusivity. It does not have any
epistemic superiority since its real aim is to attain more inclusivity which leads
to less conflict. However, this value may be lost as the minority group might
not genuinely change; they could only change in a cosmetic manner which
could lead to sabotage, or half-hearted support of the decision.
The second related problem, according to Ani, is that strict imposition of
requirements of consensus will lead to a loss of epistemic value and better
judgement which is to be derived from genuine deliberation. For Ani, strict con
sensus will lead to complacency and powerful pressure to conformity; at the
same time difficult engagement will be avoided in favour of trade-offs, and crit
ical thinking will be sacrificed on the altar of unity. Further, besides the minority
being forced to accept the decisions of the majority, there will also be pressure
towards group-specific interests, and the dominant players may direct energy at
an out-group thus diverting attention from genuine issues. Ani thinks that these
three factors are related and can be manipulated in ways that lead to the creation
of what is taken to be the best interests of the group. Ani argues that if we are
interested in better judgements and epistemic value of decisional outcomes we
must aim less at fixed procedural structures like consensus and aim at improv
ing the quality of deliberation. Hence he writes: 'Here quality of deliberation
can be described as its capacity to effectively transform pre-deliberative opin
ions. But opinion changes may not necessarily be results of better argument,
they may well be results of inequalities in deliberative capacities or group
dynamics' (ibid.: 356). Group dynamics, Ani maintains, may lead to a shift
towards group consensus that undermines arriving at truth. Added to this, power
struggles will result in the less powerful people's views being undermined.

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48 Bernard Matolino

Ani's suggested solution is to deconstruct communal, consensual and

group-centrist sentiments which are whipped by the dominant to camouflage
their manipulative propositions. For Ani '(T)his deconstruction must involve
not just finding common interests but clarifying conflicting interests. Again,
like the issue involving the components of persuasion, the issue will be to find
a common balance, in this case between common ground and conflicting inter
ests, instead of abandoning one for the other' (ibid.: 357). He warns against
forging towards common interest as it will generate unrealistic expectations
and obfuscate conflict as 'too great an emphasis on discovering existing inter
ests suggests that interests are fixed, static, and waiting to be found' (ibid.).
His ideal deliberation is one that must contain a balance of cooperative and
adversarial components. He holds that agonistic inquiry must be allowed as it
is akin to cross-examination in court. It would serve to counteract cognitive
biases and prevents deliberation from sliding into a consensus-oriented dis
cussion. For Ani, adding heat to entrenched positions may lead to transforma
tion which is not a result of any pressure to conform. Further, he holds that
critical inquiry and a cooperative environment will lead to better and right
answers. He values the role of a dispassionate sort of 'Devil's Advocate' and
he calls for the minority opinion to be regarded as playing the role of the
devil's advocate. For Ani, what stands between confrontational and construc
tive moments of questioning is agonistic inquiry. 'And agonistic inquiry may
work best in a cooperative setting which simultaneously accommodates dis
passionate inquiry. Thus it will need some character and level-headedness on
the part of the participants' (ibid.: 361).
The quote above shows the failure of Ani's argument. Ani's foregoing argu
ment which is embodied in this quote is problematic and fails for this basic
reason: Ani's whole account fails to show how his argument either threatens
Wiredu's position or provides reason for the need to revise it so we can accom
modate Ani's qualified acceptance. What Ani claims to be a positive statement
in favour of the devil's advocate and dispassionate inquiry neither contradicts
Wiredu's position nor warrants its revision. Although Wiredu does not employ
Ani's terminology of the devil's advocate or dispassionate inquiry in his
description of the actual workings of the decisional moments of consensus,
Ani's terminology and subsequent advocacy of the role of these practices can
easily be accommodated in Wiredu's greater scheme. Wiredu, for instance,
has not even advocated that any discussion be of a form that is not charac
terised by dispassionate inquiry or be in opposition to it. He has not opposed
Ani's perceived role of the agonistic inquirer. Wiredu's instructive point, in
opposition to Ani's assumption that there should be unanimity, is that the start
ing point of any consensual discussion is that there is dissensus.
If there was no dissensus there would be no point to seeking consensus. If
this is the case what this means is that consensus does not, as a matter of
essence, seek to ensure the attainment of the psychological value of inclusiv
ity as Ani would want to believe. In fact Wiredu notes that there were deadly

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu's Traditional African Polities 49

conflicts within consensual dispensations. If those deadly conflicts were pos

sible, Ani's suggestion that consensus always sought to preserve the psycho
logical value of inclusivity falls away. Wiredu seems to be more alert to the
real nature of the conflicts when he suggests that agreements that were
reached really avoided attaining what he calls cognitive or moral conversion.
On the contrary, discussants sought to reach agreements on what was an
agreeable path of action to all. This shows that Wiredu does not consider the
value of psychological inclusivity to be any more important than the value of
dispassionate inquiry.
It is not hard to imagine Wiredu agreeing with Ani's claim that the minority
must be seen as playing the role of the devil's advocate. This agreement would
derive from the argument that Wiredu makes which seeks to show that all par
ticipants' voices had an equal standing in council. It follows, then, that if there
was any minority, it would be entirely up to it how it chose to play out its role
of being a minority. If it chose to play the role of the devil's advocate that
would entirely be in keeping with Wiredu's claim that what won arguments
was logical persuasiveness. Any manner of logical persuasiveness does, at
least, involve some element of playing the devil's advocate. However, Ani
struggles to accept Wiredu's proposition that all debate was carried out within
a framework of only logically persuasive ideas winning the day. This refusal
to see the force of reason's persuasive powers makes Ani go on a search for
dispassionate inquiry and so-called devil's advocates that are already easily
catered for in Wiredu's broader outline. I suggest that on Wiredu's scheme the
devil's advocate is what Wiredu's position approves. If the so-called devil's
advocate would lead to reaching better rationalised decisions, then such a role
player, either in earnest or jest would be most welcome.
However, a very important consideration would be to establish how plausible
Ani's position is. Right from the start Ani rejects both Wiredu's rational con
struction and Eze's non-rational factors in securing consensus as two extremes
of decision-making. Relying on Aristotle, he suggests the desirability of deci
sion-making that involves both rational and non-rational factors. However,
Ani's endorsement of the position and the functions of his so-called devil's
advocate is essentially an endorsement of the rationalist thesis. For indeed what
is the role of the devil's advocate save to ensure that rationality is protected,
maintained and furthered? Just like Wiredu, Ani advocates the function of what
he calls 'critical inquiry in the cooperative environment of consensus' (ibid). It
should be recalled that Wiredu conceives of consensus as a non-adversarial but
cooperative structure that prizes making decisions through use of logical argu
mentation and persuasion. Ani thinks that to avoid heterogeneity within a
homogenous group there is a need to introduce a devil's advocate, including
one who might have to just role-play. Ani states that such role-playing

however, does not, in my view, entirely reduce the merit of playing this role in a
homogenous group. But more importantly, I agree with B,a.chtinger that minorities

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50 Bernard Matolino

who play the authentic Devil's Advocate role will serve to heighten majorities'
awareness of overlooked problems and serious flaws in policy proposals. This is
because in circumstances of non-reflective majority opinion, agonistic inquiry has
the potential to shake up the opinion table, (ibid.: 359)

The only substantive point which is different from Wiredu, made by Ani, is
his insistence on his lack of desire to shake off the suspicion that consensual
dispensations are essentially heterogeneous and by virtue of their heterogene
ity they tend towards unquestioned consensual positions. By the fact of the
heterogeneity they are unable to question, interrogate and subject to critical
rational examination the decisions they are about to take. But this is just Ani's
suspicion and I do not wish to labour for long in addressing his suspicions.
The most significant move that Ani makes actually firmly puts him together
with Wiredu's rationalistic mode of consensus. Ani's imagined devil's advocate
role is actually what each participant at every decision-making body, in
Wiredu's scheme, is expected to do. If that is the case, then both Ani and Wiredu
do not need to rely on any other non-rational factor to secure consensus.
Lauer appears to appreciate this dichotomy much better than Ani when she
summarises Eze's position essentially as a view that negates the valuable her
itage of traditional Africa while valorising its anachronistic superstition. Among
other things, she correctly points out that Eze believes that the secularisation of
today's Africans has led to their enlightenment, the myths that held people
together have disappeared as life in today's (West) Africa is remarkably differ
ent from its traditional precedent, differences are diametrically opposed, and
the debating of elders was tolerated as it occurred under the hocus-pocus of
ancestral power. Lauer's of Eze might be instructive as she shows that Eze
erroneously concentrates on the wrong thing as the issue is not about the
acceptability of a polity of a specific era but what legitimises its practice.
We have to look elsewhere for a promising critique of Wiredu's consensual
polity. I suggest that such a promising critique can take two possible avenues.
The first avenue is to strengthen Eze's initial claim that consensus was made
possible by the traditionalistic anchoring of then Akan society. Lauer (2011)
and myself (Matolino 2009) have in different ways sought to show that Eze's
critique of traditional Akan society is misplaced. Lauer, for example, argues
that Eze should not criticise consensus for its traditional basis but rather
should concentrate on its theoretical viability. While I, on the other hand,
seek to show that he is unnecessarily sceptical of the Akans' ability to sepa
rate issues of logical rigour from traditional non-rational, even irrational,
scaffolds. To undermine Wiredu effectively, or substantially revise him, it
might be more useful for Ani to provide arguments that show that Eze does
not necessarily critique the traditionalism of consensus but targets its theo
retical viability. If such a defence could be offered, it could serve to expand
and shed more light on Eze's initial point. It could point out what theoretical
reservations Eze really has about the workability of consensus in modern
Africa. However, this critique is not the strongest as it seeks to be limited to

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu's Traditional African Polities 51

questions of workability and these may be merely issues of practicality as

opposed to issues of philosophical significance.
The second avenue, which either can serve as an effective critique of
Wiredu or is in need of qualified acceptance, has to do with how Wiredu has
formulated consensus as a non-party polity. Carlos Jacques (2011) has
attempted to show Wiredu's advocacy of consensus as a non-party polity to
be not so different from the advocacy of the nationalists' one-party polity.
He holds that the difference is merely in terminology as they are both
reducible to the same concept of not having parties. I think Lauer is correct
in dismissing Jacques as having misread Wiredu's real position. She states,
quite correctly, that Wiredu is against one-party regimes as he sees them as
dictatorial. In my view the most important critique of one-party polity by
Wiredu (1997) is his argument that the victors in this polity are only crowned
victors because they would have murdered all opposition parties. Hence it
can be said that Wiredu is not sympathetic to dictatorial one-party rule. How
ever, though Jacques' analysis of Wiredu and his attempt at painting
Wiredu's system as indistinguishable from a one-party system fails, his point
deserves further investigation.
While Lauer (2011), in her response to Jacques, has provided a compre
hensive list of sources and quotes that show Wiredu distancing himself from
one-party rule, she does not, at least, fully analyse one of Wiredu's claims
contained in one of the sources she cites. Wiredu does not always show with
precision how he conceives his polity as a non-party save to claim that all par
ties will seek to be party to the project of good governance hence there being
no need of political parties. There is only one place, which is cited but not
analysed by Lauer, where Wiredu (2001) spells out in detail that consensus is
a non-party3 polity but has different parties, which seek to be party2 to good
governance. Party3 represents oppositional politics and is to be avoided; party,
can not be avoided as it represents different interests that will be reconciled in
the project of good governance represented as party2. He further suggests that
the worst form of party political tyranny is when there exists what he charac
terises as party, 3. Elsewhere I (Matolino 2013) have offered a critique of
Wiredu's characterisation of parties as party,; party2; party3, and party, 3. I
have sought to argue that this form of representation of party politics does not
particularly add value to Wiredu's claim that his consensual polity is of party,
and not party3 type. In literature this aspect of Wiredu remains under-theorised
and I think it would be useful to evaluate what the theoretical significance in
characterising a non-party polity as party, while seeing an oppositional polity
as party3 and its worst instance as party, 3. Both Lauer and Jacques have
ignored this crucial aspect of Wiredu and Ani might find it more useful in his
pursuit of a qualified acceptance of Wiredu.
My critique against Wiredu's formulation of the different notions of parties
is that it does not actually cohere very well. For a start there is a problem of
conceptual analysis. It appears to be the case that Wiredu holds the idea that a

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52 Bernard Matolino

party of people which he characterises as party, 3 is conceptually equivalent to

the idea of attaining a decisional moment in consensus which is characterised
as partyr As a result he proceeds to accept the desirability of party2 on the
grounds that there is a moment where people who had varied positions in
party, come together to hold the same position. However, the matter is that all
the three senses of parties that are employed by Wiredu are conceptually dis
parate and his case for the undesirability of political parties is not secured by
his numerical characterisation of parties.

Beyond a Critique of Ani

In this last section of the article I present my own contribution to the debate
on the role of rationality that seeks to transcend criticism of Ani's project. The
main object of my article has been to show that Ani has misread Wiredu in
significant ways. This misreading of Wiredu has led Ani to seek to propose a
corrected position of how consensual democracy should be understood to be
obtained. I find this new proposal unsustainable because it is based on a mis
taken understanding of what Wiredu seeks to achieve, hence in this section I
seek to articulate what I consider to be a correct understanding of Wiredu's
real aim when he discusses the role of rationality in decision-making under a
consensual dispensation.
The aim of this section is twofold; firstly, I seek to outline what consensus
is as a decision-making procedure that does not have to involve, as a matter of
necessity, the values of participants having to coincide. My argument is that
consensus, as articulated by Wiredu, is a matter of strict practical considera
tions which seeks to answer this single question: 'what is the best practical
option?' Ani's immediate objection would be that all matters of practical deci
sions are informed by considerations of value. Ani would further argue that
those values are effectively ones that are responsible for arriving at this or that
particular decision. Further, in his view, this would also involve some epis
temic shift of participants from one view to the other.
I do not think that what Ani suggests is always the case. Although the issue
under consideration is of a system of governance that may speak to the notion
of values of what this system wants to attain, when it comes to actual deci
sion-making, issues of those values may be suspended. I will give a very sim
ple example to make the point that some matters are simply of practical
exigency. Let us imagine that there is a group of people who are debating
about the best strategy to cut a particular tree down. There could be different
suggestions of what the best method is, but whatever agreement is reached
does not have to speak to their values or some conversion about cutting trees.
If at all there is any conversion that has happened it is due to recognising the
practical astuteness of the alternative suggestion. The same applies to issues
of how best to ambush an enemy or even whether to fight such an enemy or

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu 's Traditional African Polities 53

not. Whatever decision or strategy is eventually adopted does not call for the
epistemic shift that Ani thinks necessary. All that is required is that opposing
parties appreciate the practical necessity of adopting one act over another.
What is being pursued here is a practical outcome as opposed to some repre
sentation of what this or that act really is in terms of values that inform it.
Under this system people are allowed to retain their original epistemic values.
All that is required is conversion of a practical sort from one option to the
other. An immediate question, much in the mould of Ani's objection, would
be whether such practical conversion is possible without accompanying con
version in the values that discussants previously held. I suggest that an exam
ple will also suffice in this case.
Let us imagine a case of sport. Let us say there is a soccer coach who
strongly believes in a certain team formation and has a certain 'philosophy' of
how to attack and defend in a match. In one particular game he feels that his
'philosophy' and tactics cannot match those of the opposing coach. At half
time he changes his 'philosophy' and tactics to deal with the present dangers
presented by this specific game. He even succeeds in making his players see
that what he has told them before about soccer does not work or apply in this
game. Whatever conversion that happens between the coach and his players is
one of a practical mode that does not involve and change in epistemic status
or value. At the end of the match the coach might even openly declare that he
does not believe in what he instructed his players to do but had to do it out of
necessity. Yet at the next game he reverts to his old 'philosophy' and tactics.
What can we say about this coach? Can we say that he is a bad coach who
deserves to be fired? I think such a coach would enjoy success because he will
have the ability to read a game and do what is necessary at every game. I sug
gest that this is how we could think of decision-making structures and proce
dures under the dispensation that Wiredu proposes. Both are a matter of
practical consideration that eschews questions of defending values.
The second aim of this concluding section of the article is to outline what I
take to be the form of reason that Wiredu should be seen to be working with.
While I think there is no merit in pursuing the question of whether rationality
existed among traditional Akans, I believe that a promising question will have
to do with inquiring into what its nature was in both social and political set
ups. I suggest that rationality in this case must be seen as of a practical sort.
This means that it was different from rationality of a speculative sort. If we
follow Ani and seek to entertain questions of value, then we end up pursuing
rationality that is highly speculative. But if we follow my suggestion that tra
ditional rationality sought to achieve practical outcomes, then we can see how
it was possible for the Akans to be considered to be engaged in rational dis
course when making decisions. To ratiocinate is either to reckon with some
thing or to use reason in a particular way.
In his discussion of Eze's notion of reason, Bruce Janz attempts a distinc
tion between reason and rationality. 'The distinction is as follows: reason is a

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54 Bernard Matolino

process and an activity, while rationality is a property of the person, one that
expresses itself through (at least) the processes of reason. Rationality
expresses itself through reason, but reason may not only be the expression of
rationality' (Janz 2008: 296). What Janz shows is that there has to be a prop
erty of rationality that is possessed by an entity in order for it to exercise rea
son. If that property is there, the individual entity may be able to express it
through reason (among other things). While there may be debate on whether a
means-end form of reason is rationality, what is important is the concession
that rationality leads to an expression of reason. In the political sphere of tra
ditional Africa, I suggest, the participants in political decision-making had
that property of rationality, and it was in the exercise of that property that they
expressed the reasons they had for this or that position. In the course of the
engagement with various reasons, through the use of the faculty of rationality,
some members of that political community changed their preferred course of
actions for a different course of action. This, to my mind is how reason in
consensus must be construed.

Conclusion

While Ani seeks to find an answer to the basis of consensual decision-making,

he fails to appreciate the significance of the consequences of adopting either
position. His suggested way out of the debate does not succeed as he tends to
shift between the two extremes. In the absence of convincing reason from Ani
I suggest that Wiredu's claim that consensus was based on rational procedure
in the traditional polity is persuasive. Ani has to look elsewhere to find a for
midable critique of Wiredu's notion of consensus.

Bernard Matolino is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of

KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. He is author of Personhood in African
Philosophy.

References

Ani, E. I. 2014. 'On Traditional African Consensual Rationality', The Journal of

Political Philosophy 22(3): 342-65.
Eze, E. C. 1997. 'Democracy or Consensus: A Response to Wiredu', in E. C. Eze
(ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell,
313-23.

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Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu's Traditional African Polities 55

Jacques, C. 2011. ' Alterity in the Discourse of African Philosophy: A Forgotten

Absence', in H. Lauer and K. Anyidoho (eds), Reclaiming Human Sciences and
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