Rule 62 #1

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO V. LEONORA TIRONA

G.R. NO.147812
APRIL 6, 2005

FACTS:

Ocampo bought a land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the land’s registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. He
immediately possessed and administered the land even if the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona is a lessee
occupying a portion of the said land. Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona informing her of his acquisition of the
land. Tirona paid her monthly rentals to Ocampo

The land was declared under area for priority development. Tirona did not pay her rent and invoked her
right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. Ocampo made a demand against Tirona to pay her rental in arrears
and vacate the premises but Tirona refused.

Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Tirona.

Tirona argued that she did not pay her rentals because Ocampo was not the owner of the land. She further
argued that Alipio, the registered owner, was his landlord. When Alipio died, the land was inherited by his
children, Rosauro and Maria Lourdes. Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor
of his sister hence, he could not transfer ownership of the land to Ocampo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for interpleader is proper

HELD:

Yes, an action for interpleader is proper. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property . The remedy is afforded
not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of
one liability.
 Rule 63 Case #1
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FIRST E-BANK TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORP.
G.R. NO. 215801
JANUARY 15, 2020
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

FACTS:

First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp. filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking to declare as invalid
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 (RMC No. 65-2012) dated October 31, 2012. Under the said
Memorandum, association dues, membership fees, and other assessments or charges collected by a
condominium corporation are subject to VAT since they constitute income payment or compensation for the
beneficial services it provides to its members and tenants.

First E-Bank alleged that RMC No. 65-2012 burdened the owners of the condominium units with income tax
and VAT on their own money which they exclusively used for the maintenance and preservation of the
building and its premises.

The BIR argued that declaratory relief was no longer proper considering that RMC No. 65-2012 already
took effect on October 31, 2012. The alleged injury which the First E-Bank sought to prevent had already
arisen as of that date.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is proper for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012

HELD:

No, a petition for declaratory relief is not proper for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012.

One of the requisites of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is
that it must be filed before any breach or violation of an obligation. Here, an injury has already existed (the
condominium owners pay their VAT even if they are not covered by such tax since they are not generating
profits) even before First E-Bank filed a petition for declaratory relief to invalidate the Memorandum.
Besides, the issue at hand has already pended for six (6) years.

RMC No. 65-2012 has far-reaching consequences among condominium corporations which have
proliferated throughout the country. For numerous Filipino families, professionals, and students have, for
quite some time now, opted for condominium living as their new way of life. The matter of whether indeed
the contributions of unit owners solely intended for maintenance and upkeep of the common areas of the
condominium building are taxable is imbued with public interest. Suffice it to state that taxes, being the
lifeblood of the government, occupy a high place in the hierarchy of State priorities, hence, all questions
pertaining to their validity must be promptly addressed with the least procedural obstruction.

The Court ruled that certiorari or prohibition, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy to assail the validity
or constitutionality of executive issuances.
 Rule 63 #7
BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., AND JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC., PETITIONERS-
APPELLANTS, V. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, RESPONDENTS-
APPELLEES.
G.R. NO. L-27247
APRIL 20, 1983
DE CASTRO, J:

FACTS:

Ordinance 386 was passed by the City Council of Baguio City. Under the said ordinance, all public lands
within Baguio townsite which are not designated for public use and which are occupied by squatters who
are duly registered as such at the time of the promulgation of the Ordinance shall be considered as part of
the City Government Housing Project. Building permits shall be issued to the squatters if they comply with
the city building specifications and pay the corresponding city building permit fees within 5 years.
The City Council explained that the ordinance is designed to extend a helping hand to the numerous
landless city residents and the called 'Squatters' within the Baguio Townsite in their desire to acquire
residential lots which they may rightly call their own.
Baguio Citizens Action, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief to invalidate Ordinance 386. The lower
Court dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 386 is valid
HELD:
No, Ordinance 386 is not valid. The lands occupied by the squatters are part of the public domain within the
Baguio townsite. Under the law, no disposition of a public land could be made by LGUs without prior
legislative authority. Here, there is no legislative authority to dispose the public lands.
It is the fundamental principle that the state possesses plenary power in law to determine who shall be
favored recipients of public domain, as well as under what terms such privilege may be granted not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership. And the law has laid in the Director of Lands the power of exclusive control, administrations,
disposition and alienation of public land that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other
form of concessions or disposition and management of the lands of public domains.
 Rule 64 #1
LEO Y. QUERUBIN, ET AL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, ET AL
G.R. NO. 218787
DECEMBER 8, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.:

FACTS:

The COMELEC en banc released the bidding documents for the Lease of Election Management System
(EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System to be used in
the 2016 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) set the deadline
for the submission of requirements on December 4, 2014.

The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and
Jarltech International Corporation (collectively referred to as "Smartmatic JV") and Indra Sistemas
submitted their bid.

Smartmatic JV informed the BAC that SMTC has a pending application with the SEC to amend its Articles
of Incorporation. The SEC approved the amendment on December 10, 2014.

The BAC declared Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible to participate in the second stage of the bidding
process. The BAC then issued a Notice requiring them to submit their Final Revised Technical Tenders and
Price proposals. Only Smartmatic JV complied. The BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit additional
documents and a prototype sample of its OMR to know if it complies with the requirement. After the
conduct of post-qualification, the BAC disqualified Smartmatic JV because the demo unit failed to meet the
technical requirement.

Smartmatic JV filed a Protest seeking permission to conduct another technical demonstration before the
electoral tribunal's Technical Evaluation Committee. The COMELEC en banc granted the Protest.
Querubin, et al filed a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, with prayer
for injunctive relief, assailing the decision of the COMELEC en banc in granting the protest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is the proper vehicle to assail the decision of the COMELEC en banc;

HELD:
No, the petition is not the proper vehicle to assail the decision of the COMELEC en banc. Rule 64 does not
cover rulings of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers.
Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the judgment or final order of the COMELEC and COA that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the Commission’s exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the
COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to
its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of elective offices.

Here, the subject matter of Smartmatic JV's protest does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition,
but is, in fact, administrative in nature.
 Rule 65 Certiorari Case #1
PILLARS PROPERTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V. CENTURY COMMUNITIES CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 201021
MARCH 04, 2019
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

Pillars Property Co. (PPC) filed a Complaint for collection of money before the court of Parañaque City
against Century Communities Corporation (CCC) in the amount of P6.7 million for unpaid progress billings
in connection with a construction contract where PPC agreed to deliver 210 housing units. PPC also sued
People's General Insurance Corporation (PGIC), which issued the bonds in favor of CCC to guarantee the
performance of PPC's obligations.

CCC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the venue is improperly laid since under their contract,
they agree that the venue of the action will be the Proper Court of Makati to the exclusion of others.
PPC filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss arguing that the inclusion of PGIC as co-defendant of CCC
took away the case from the jurisdiction of Makati courts because the general rule on venue under Section
2, Rule 4 of the Rules should then apply, PGIC not being a party to the Contract. The RTC granted the
motion to dismiss and deny PPC’s motion for reconsideration.

PPC filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the setting
aside of the Orders of the RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction and there being no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The CA dismissed PPC's petition. The CA reasoned that PPC availed of the
wrong remedy since it is the settled rule that an order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order
and the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

PPC sought the reconsideration but its motion was denied. Not satisfied, PPC filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that the remedy availed of by PPC is erroneous.

HELD:

Yes, the CA erred in concluding that the remedy availed of by PPC is erroneous. Under Section 1(h), Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, an order dismissing an action without prejudice is, thus, not subject to appeal but
is reviewable by a Rule 65 certiorari petition.
Here, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and PPC could not
have appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a dismissal without prejudice. A dismissal without
prejudice allows the refiling of the complaint. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached,
the residual jurisdiction stage.

NOTE:
Under Section 1 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from:
a. An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
b. An interlocutory order;
c. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
d. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
e. An order of execution;
f. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom; and
g. An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

Since walang appeal ‘tong mga ‘to, reviewable sila through certiorari under Rule 65 (check niyo yung sa
section 1 may nakalagay “no appeal”)