1II11lljl IillW fllllllllllft1d Illtpl' I lully JtU 1111/4 VllhHllll,
1111 hlllHllfllllt IW~\1l1 111 llll
puhlhmllll1l111 I hl,~lllwl' N wJlt IllHN.
lt Nhould hl) mllllllllllllmd IhuI Ihot\lll~lhwdulll Llll1Ílll'IlMI llkq Il\ll /ll'llolillfltl
article, also rllHChlldout t() UIl 11l1()1I11lllollnl
111H1l(~II(jO •. IIlholl 0110 ¡huI (jollld
understand HusserJ in Gorman. HuI, JluÑÑol"lIÑcogniwnl lhnt Clonnun I1my Hol
be the native language of many of his audience, in any case. He also knowfl Ili!
audience will consist of learned people from a range of disciplines, not JHHI
philosophy. So the Amsterdam Lectures, then, are directed not just to philoNo
phers but also and especially to psychologists and by extension to all tl10Ml
inquiring researchers and practicianers who would find in phenomenology
transcendental foundation for their methodologies. Furthermore, it is Iltll
without significance for us as readers that, in contrast with the Brital'lll/('II
article, the Amsterdam Lectures were composed specifically for oral prescnl/l
tion. The compression appropriate for an encyclopedia article would obviouNly
not be necessary or appropriate for a scholarly lecture in Amsterdam. HUI(
Husserl is trying to put the same ideas into a form that can be understood h
persons confronted with these ideas in oral formo His argument becomes 11100l
intelligible and accessible. Husserl the pedagogue, a man with a lifetimll nj
experience in lecturing, surely must have been on that occasion the lively allll
~ngaging lecturer Shestov depicts in his memoir.
At the height of his career in 1928, when his classrooms were jammed lo
standing room only, not just with German students but also Japanese, Polish,
Austrian, Australian, Hungarian, British, and other nationalities, Husserl'
philosophy seemed to be taking hold internationally. He was invited to sponlí
in London, Paris, Amsterdam and Groningen. Reassured, energetic, light 011
his feet, he held his audience in Amsterdam for two hours on two lectu.ll'
occasions, had interviews with interested persons, offered a conversation
evening for further discussion, and confidently invited Shestov, a critic of híll'
to lunch. This was an occasion in which Husserl invited one into his phl\
nomenology and tried to show what it was.
The Amsterdam Lectures clearly do not have the depth, detail, and greuI
ness of such masterworks of Husserl as the Logicallnvestigations, Ideas 1-.1,
the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, or the Crisis t!/
the European Sciences. J:he strong point of the Amsterdam Lectures is thal
they represent an effort by the mature Husserl to address an internationl}1
audience, and they sum up in the clearest and 1110Stpersuasive terms possiblt
iR four hours of intense lectures Husserl's vision of phenomenology and
ehenomenological psychology: their definition, their methods, and what thcy
~an offer a listener/reader willing to take them up and work with them. Husserl
wrote many introductions to his phenomenology, but for the reasons presented
here, and perhaps for other reasons, also, the Amsterdam Lectures should bu
of continuing interest to English-speaking readers of Husserl.
WiI,.
,
TBE AMSTERDAM LECTURES
<ON>
PHENOMENOLOGICALPSYCHOLOGY
11
translated by Richard E. Palmerl
PART l. PURE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY:
ITS FIELD OF EXPERIENCE, ITS METHOD, ITS FUNCTION
~ l. The Two Senses of Phenomenology: As Psychological Phenomenology
and as Transcendental Phenomenology.>
At: the turn of the century as philosophy and psychology struggled for a
Il/olorouslyscientific method, there arose what was at once a new science and a
II~W method both of philosophical and psychological research. The new
donce was called phenomenology because it, or its new method, was devel-
IIllod through a certain radicalizing of an already existing phenomenological
IlIothod which individual natural scientists and psychologists had previously
Ik~l'I1alldedand practiced. The sense of this method in men like Mach and
Iléring lay in a reaction against the threatening groundlessness of theorizing in
tho exact natural sciences. It was a reaction against a mode of theorizing in
1I11lthematicalspeculations and concept-forming which is distant from intui-
tloo, a theorizing which accomplished neither clarity with insight, in any
I~gitimate sense, nor the production of theories.
Parallel to this we find in certain psychologists, and first in Brentano, a
ystematic effort to create a rigorously scientific psychology on the basis of
IThe text of this translation is from Husserliana IX: 302-349. The elaborate Iisting of Husserl's cross-
in the manuscript, pp. 615-624, has not been included in this translation, a1though some contentual
111118
lI11lntionsor Husserl's marginal conunents have been retained as footnotes. A11translator's footnotes have
hecn ~o indicated. Editorial insertions by the Gennan editor (Walter Biemel) are indicated by triangular
hlilckets. Otherwise, the footnotes are taken from Hu IX. The pages of the Hu IX Gennan source-text have
.INO been indicated in this translation as follows: /303/ marks the beginning of p. 303 in the German text.
PWiI 11111'111111 1~¡illí"II\W 11 IlIllI lluI
dlllH 1Il'IlllH
1I111111lllN
111 dlllll (lll'Hydlll
IIN
HllllNIII"). 1I WIlN 11m Ihlll1llIlll~lhlldl¡' 1I,"tll\lIt'llllI (whlt-h, hy 1111
Illdhllli/,hlH 111
wuy, WúJ'b Ull'blldy qllJh~ortOIl dllll"II:II,d:tAld IlN l'I'IHllllllll\llllllo~dclll") 1, lO \ I
more particularly in lile Sphl,ll'cof' Ihc 1I1CIIIlI1 101' I'sychiclIl, tI(I.I' 1',I'Yt.'¡'¡.I'I'¡'I'i
and in the rational-theoretical spherc which WtlNal Ihul Umu in genul'lll inllll
woven with it, which led to a quite novel method of investigation of the )Jun,1
menta¡2 and at the same time to a quite novel treatment 01' questiolls Iltlll
concern specific principIes of philosophy, out of which there began to surf'III'¡'t
as we mentioned before, a quite new way of being scientific [eine neual'0n
Wissenschaftlichkeit] .
In the further course of its development it [the phenomenological] preNt.l111
us with a double sense of its meaning: on the one hand, as psycholoRII'/JI
phenomenology, which is to serve as the radical science fundamental to pN
chology; on the other hand, as transcendental phenomenology, which fol' 11
part has in connection with philosophy the great function of First Philosophy t
that is, of being the philosophical science 01'the sources from which philoNO
phy springs.
In this first lecture, we want to leave out 01'play all our philosophical inltll
ests. We will be interested in the psychological in the same way as a physiclNI
is interested in physics. With pure objectivity in the spirit 01'positive scielll\l't
we will weigh the requirements for a scientific psychology and develop 1111
necessary idea 01'a phenomenological psychology.
§ 2. Pure Natural Science and Pure Psychology.
Modern psychology is the science of the real events [Vorkommnisse, whlll
comes forward] arising in the concrete context of the objective and real world,
events which we call "mental" [psychische). The most exemplary way In
which the "mental" [Psychische] shows itself arises in the living sell
awareness of what 1 designate as 'T' [or ego] and 01' indeed everything thlll
shows itself to be inseparable from an 'T' [or ego] as a process lived by an "1"
or as mental processes (like experiencing, thinking, feeling, willing), but alSíI
as ability and habit. Experience presents the mental as a dependent stratum o/
being toman and beast, who are at a more fundamentallevel physical realitiu/
Thus psychology becornes a dependent branch of the more concrete sciencu
of anthropology or zoology, and thus encompasses both the physical alld
psychophysical.
2 Translalor's nOle: Because of associations in English of "psychic" phenomena wi!h weird evenlS 111
parapsychology. 1 have here rendered das Psychische as "!he mental." 11 can aIso be translaled as ",111
psychicaI," bul in English "psychic ability," again, is generaIly taken lO refer lo !he ability lo see inlo lh
future or read minds, which is decidedly nol Husserl's rneaning.
11 WII 1\1\1I111hm lhn wlIl'ld 1I111~II!IIII\lh l\ 111 htl llllllllly, Wll 111l1llhlll ¡IN IIllliil¡
1" lo II/mll lulo llll ilJlf'lI 1111 1l\i1 Y III ¡'III\I\I "'i) 14!1J/I¡1.) 11111HtllIIl, Aooord
111j l<.lIlllltl
11l~\ lo IIN IIUhlll),1:\()/j,j 1" 0111'11 IlhlHIIl plllqmlllll' hololl¡.(N11 phYNiclI10orJ)ornllty,
111 ItlllNIUNU folllllvdy OílllCIQllllIi1hllhllltllllrol' I'ho llx.tru-physical characteris-
1I¡'Nlhat 111'0 pOIlHlblyIllyon.d <m ¡t, to whj~h belong, flor example, the determin-
lll{ factors through which a physical bCldybecomes a work 01' arto We can
IIhNlructconsistently from all extra-physi~al determinations, and that signifies
lhul we regard every reality and the whol~ world purely as physical Nature. In
IhlNthere lies a structurallaw of the worllj of experience. Not only does every
l\llllcrete worldly or real thing have its Ilature, its physical body, but also all
hodies in the world foem a combined Ullity, a unity which in itself is linked
lllgother into infinity, a unity of the tot<tlity of Nature which possesses the
Illlifying foem of spatiotemporality. FroIt\ the correlated standpoint of method
IlllNis expressed as follows: A consist~ntly abstractive experience can be
'tmtinuously and exclusively directed t() the physical and on this basis of
physical experience one can practice atl equally self-contained theoretical
dance, the physical science of nature - Physical in the widest sense, to which
IlIlIsalso belong chemistry, and also physical zoology and biology, abstracting
IIwayfrom it whatever pertains to the spifit [Geistigkeit).
Now the question obviously arises as to how far it is possible within an
IlItcrest one-sidedly directed to themental in brute animals and in the world as
IIch, which we grant never emerges aut<:lnomously,for there to be an experi-
IIce and theoretical inquiry which consi~tently and continuously moves from
mental to mental and thus never deals wlth the physical. This question leads,
fllrther, into another: to what extent is a ~onsistent and pure psychology pos-
ible in parallel with a consistent and purely developed empirical natural
;ience? This latter question is apparently to be answered in the negative:
I'sychology in its customary sense as an empirical science of matters of fact
;unnot, as the parallel would demand, be apure science of matters of mental
fllct purified of everything physical in the way that empirical natural science is
purified of everything mental.
No matter how far pure mental experience may reach, and no matter how
fuI' by means of it a [pure] theorizing m<tybe effected, it is certain from the
vcry outset that the purely mental to which it [pure mental experience] leads
still has its spatiotemporal determination~ in the real world, [305] and that ip
I¡'~concrete factualness, like everything teal as such, it is only determinabl~
Ihrough local spatiotemporal determinat),ts. Spatiotemporality as system of
pfáces [Stellensystem] is the foem [Form] of all actual, factual being, of being
wrthin the world of matters of fact. And ~o it follows from this that all deter-
rñination of conc~ete facts is founded <:Inspatiotemporal determinations o.f
place. Spatiotemporality, however, bel,?llgs primordially and irnmediately to
nature as physical nature. Everything out~ide the physical, in particular every-
1111111' 11l111lltll;tllillu111l1lll11l1lU' NIIII1l1l1I'lIll"llll1IITfIT,iHIIII 1/1/,':''1 1I11ly Imll ,:,nlhCf-xnmph' 1I111IWlrl" whlll
p'IOlllldlllg 1Ji1ll1i1l"I/IIiHI lu I'IIYMit'1I1('wplIlllllly Al'! 11ldll\Hly, lt 1M.\Ii '1'11«1 NJiI'1 10(' dlllllH 1111 111 lb
gras)) tltut wllhlll Ulllpld;.;ul psydlll101\Y 11 1'Il111pll\(lllyps)!('II¡,llll\!¡:lIlllltjuh Y ¡lllll dlNl'loSIl il/,alll' lo liS. JlllNl, 11I'llllllw Ii
never be isolated theorotlcully fh)l)1 Iltu psyultopltysluIII. 111 olhuI' w'inl/ 1\1l\~Il\pllll
Y oxputlUlIUll 1\.111 IIUI! lllllllllhlt~ IlXII1IlpluN.Alld puroly 111\."11,111 l.lXD"-
Within psychology as an objectivc, matlcr-of-fuct ScitlllCU, 1111 ulnpiriclIl w'
rll)II\.lC \.l~~¡lIlly l'ulIlJimN 11 llu~Il11HII 101' Itspropor stud~J.
ence of the mental cannot be established as a self-containcd discipline, It CIIII
never let go of all thematic consideration of and connection to the physical 01 !. Uvcry ex'pl.lrioncJllt\ 01' "llml' klw/ of directcdness towards the mental take~
"luce in the madI..: of ruflucdoll. 'l'o livo as ego-subject is to "live thraugh" the
psychophysical.
1;1\)lltalin multiplc wuys. Butthis, our lived-thraugh life, is, so to say, anony-
On the other hand, it is clear that investigation into the purely mental is,
1I1\)IIS; it goes on, but we ~U'C not focussed on !t; it is unexperienced, since to
nevertheless, in some measure possible, and has to playa role in any empiriclIl
1~1lperience something amounts to grasping something in its selfhood. In wak-
psychology which strives for a rigorously scientific character. How otherwisl:
Ilg life we are always busied with something, now this, now that, and at the
is one to attain rigorously scientific concepts of the mental in terms of its OWII
lowest level with the nonmental: Perceiving something means we are occupied
essence and without regard to all its concrete interwovenness with the physi.
wil'h the perceived windmMI; we are focusserl on it and only on it. In memory
cal? If we reflect on the fact that to these concepts there must also necessarily
Wl.lare dealing with the something remembered; in thinking we are occupied
belong concepts which encompass the universal and necessary eidetic form 01
with somethin thou ht; in our feelin -valuin life, we are occu ied with wh~i
the mental in its ownmost essential character - which are concemed with all 01'
wc are finding beautiful 01' whatever other value we attach to it; in volitional
that without which something like the mental would simply not be thinkable -
tdving we have to do with ends and means. So straightforwardly occupied as
then there opens up the praspect of a possible a priori science of essences
wc then are, we "know" nothing of the life-pracess in play3 at the time; we
belonging to the mental purely as such. We take this as our guiding idea. 11
"know" nothing of aIl [307] the various peculiarities which essentiaIly belong
would not be parallel to physics as an empirical science of nature but to a
lo this pracess so that '?le are able to have the specific types of being occupied
science of the apriori conceivable Nature as such in its own pure essencc,
IlIat we have, so that somehow things can be given as bodily present 01' can
Although one does not [ordinarily] speak of apriori natural science, it is never-
Ilrise in memory again with the thoughts, values, goals, and so forth, again can
theless very familiar in the form of certain important particular disciplines,
Ntand in our thematic gaze, and we can in such and such a way be occupied
such as the apriori doctrine of time, or as pure geometry and mechanics. [306]
~ith them. Only reflection, tuming one's gaze away from the straightfor-
wardly thematic, makes mentallife itself - the highly diverse ways of "being
occupied with," "having as a theme," "being conscious of," with aIl their
<§ 3. The Method ofPure Psychology (Intuition and Reflection);
peculiarities and possible backgrounds - the object of thematic gaze.
Intentionality as the Fundamental Characteristic of the Mental.>
Ip such a reflective perceiving and experiencing, mental life as such, mental
¡ife is grasped and itself made a theme which one can work with in a variety of
Apriori truths are not so easy to arrive at as we thought in earlier times. wa s. NaturaIl this new ex riencin and makin somethin thematic i~
They arise as authentic eidetic truths in apodictic insight only fram out of their
reflection is itself also latent but likewise also can be disclosed through still
original sources in intuition. These sources, however, must be disclosed in the higher reflectioq.
right way. They can only become fruitful [useful] by means of methodical
2. Whatever becomes accessible to us through reflection has a noteworthy
formulation and through completely unfolding their horizons. Consequently, ;:1.
real grounding is needed for our guiding idea of an a priori and pure psychol-
general character: that of being consciousness o[ something, of having some;
, 3

tE.ing as an object of consciousness, 01' to be aware of it correlatively _~

<?gy which goes back to the experiencing intuition, an intuition methodicaUY
~ealt with and allsidedly disclosed, an intuition in which the mental is pre-
sented to us in its original concrete givenness, in which it becomes a arent,
~s we a so sal , 10 ltS ownmost essential selfhood. In this process, the thi~g
Jilaced individually before our eyes functions as an exampl,e. Our attention is
directed fram the very outset to what ('reserves itself within the free variatio.n
speaking here of intentionali~y. This is the essential character of mentallife in
the full sense of the word, and is thus simply inseparable fram it. It is, for
example, inseparable fram the perceiving that reflection reveals to us, that it ͧ
o/ this or that; just as the process of remembering is, in itself, remembering ol
recallin!! o[ this or that; just as thinkin!! is thinkin!! o[ this 01' that thought,
Being busied <or occupied> with something is itself a lalenl flowing-a1ong.
 I/IHHlI11tllhIH, 1111I1 W,' Illtl ,,1/11' IIlIIlH 111
~Il 1111
pl1llklJ'H I)j IIpplllll Ill/\ 111 hl1vllll\ IltllllllihhiH"1'
Pt;III'.Wht;l'ovt;l' wo Npllllkol' llPPllllrlllH'jV(1 lllél h·¡1 Illll'k II! IHlhJt'úlr; ill Whlll~l
§omcthing appcars; lit tho slImo limo, howt;vor, Wúlll'tl "INIl lod to Il\IJlll\,)ntN
their mental life in which • (In upp<.:arunc()lllk<.:splneo 11/\ tilo IIppólIring
something, of that which is appearing in il.
•. In a way, and perhaps stretching the point a little, one can say of CV~I
mental process that in it something is appearing to the particular "1" insofar 11,
the "1" is somehow conscious of it. Accordingly, phenomenality, as a chartl"
teristic that specifically belongs to appearing and to the thing that appcaf,~,
would, if understood in this broadened sense of the term, be the fundamenllll
ch,aracteristic of !he mental. AndOfhe pure psychology whose possibility we nI'(
~ow weighing would [308]properly be designated .•,as "phenomenology" and
~I\deed as apriori phenomenology. Naturally such a psychology would al sO
have to deal with ego-subjects, singly and cornmunally, purely as subjects 01
s~ch a phenomenality and do this in the manner of an apriori discipline.
After this only terminological discussion we now tum back to the questioll
of methodically establishing pure phenomenological experience and disclosinf
it. "Phenomenological experience" - this is ofcourse nothing but that sort 01'
reflection in which the mental becomes accessible to. us in its own specilll
essence. It is reflection carried through consistently and with a purely theorelj·
<;alconcem so that the living, specific, egoic liJe, the life of consciousness, iN
I}otjust glimpsed fleetingly but explicitly seen in its own proper eidetic com-
ponents and, as we said above, in the allsidedness of its horizons.
<§ 4. The Meaning of the Concept of Purity [Reinheit].>
~ Here the first question is how this [phenomenological] experience is to b .
plethodically employed so that as apure experience it will actually lay bar
that in the mental which is seen to belong to its own particular essence.
a. The purity of which we are speaking obviously means, fjrst of all, bein
free of all that is psychophysical. In the psychological focus, mental experi-
~nces are taken as concrete moments of animal and first of ¡dI human realities;
they are alyvays taken as interwoven with the corporeal element in concretc,
animal experience. Whatever pertains to this, physical 01' psychophysical
experience this must consequently remain out of account, it is not to be dealt
~ith; [rather] we are to practice phenomenological experiencing e?Cclusively
;iIld purely, and consider only what it presents, only what becomes explicit in
it~ Whatever in the mental links it with 01' places it in Nature is to be lefl
outside the topic. Manifestly, the same goes for deliberations with regard to all
11Ill!'IIIVllblll ptiYI h1l11lH111I1 IJ11Iotlhlllll"H. jtU IIIIHI'IIII 1111 illl
1,11111 llll'llllllly IllIplldlllH'l,d 111 hutllty, IhllY 1111I HIlIll'lIUI1/IIj¡
11I1N,Nil/l Iollly I dlltll 01'pllllNlhlll PNYI 1,11 ,1"Hh '111 (11\ p(l.h)ll( 'l),
nj
lloro f'lltlhLII'dlfl'leultlt'N IIWIlItIir¡~ to whlll \1Xlllllt(;1111 111\ 110tl111lly
(;OIlNiNlll\ll,
III
Pllfl.lfJh'!IUlllumolo~l('(/1 (,lXJllllltlllllll'. licitud IIlId, 1'309] ubovo n/l, j>1)NNlhlo,lit
lime! icúd; HlldSo whlll I,lxl\')1l1 clln únú l'hrough Sllch u practico of pl'()gr\,)sslvllI
lJfocl,;cding from somc ¡;olf~givollmentul (fhing] to anolhe;,f selfwglY(mU It.llll/l I
Ithing) cvcnlually roach a unitwy und rure rield of expericnce which in ll¡jiil
111i1/, never brings that which is outside the essence of the mental with it i.!\!i\
I'lli.lunity of its pure, intuitive context, that is, into the closed realmof pOIlNibl(
purcly phenomenological intuitions.
b. On the other hand, pure [phenomenological] experience clearly illlplll,l~'l
Ibstention from al1 prejudgments sternming from scientific 01' other erivill,\gu(\
pheres of experience which could render one blind to that which phcIlO\l~.;_
Ilological reflection actually lays before us, actually makes available to \1/\ /1
)ll'ogressive cognizance-taking that from the beginning proceeds by PIlI,l
"tu/tion, that is, one that from the beginning is an explication 01"eXlllllplúN111
IIItlleir dimensions, of the purely mental moments implicit in them.
The combination of both these difficulties has been so effective thut Oll\') ellO
Ycnture the following paradox: In al1 of modem psychology there has Il(,)v~
heen an intentional analysis which was fully carried through. And this dosplt
the fact that for centuries psychology has wanted to be based on inner Oxpl,ld
nce and sometimes to be a psychology descriptive of the data of purc COI)_
Nciousness. Here 1 cannot even exempt Franz Brentéplo and his school, al-
l'f~oughit was his epoch-making contribution to have introduced intentionalily
INthe basic descriptive characteristic of the mental. Further, he demanded th
;onstruction of an empirical psychology on the foundation of a systematic and
rrom the beginn~ng purely descriptive inquiry into consciousness. But th
distinctive meaning and method needed for apure analysis of consciousness
I'cmained hidden from him.
The persistent prejudifes that make people unresponsive to what we 1'1'0-
pose to accomplish arise first of all from the way the natural sciences have
Ncrvedas rnodels for our thinking. In faet, the erevailing naturalization of ~
mental that has lasted right up to our day, and the way an essential identity"Or
methods in psychology and the natural sciences is assumed to be self-evident
Iboth] arise from this. Historically, these prejudices make their appearance
I1ready in the great originators of modem psychology, Descartes and Hobbes,
nod, most sharply expressed, in Locke' s tabula rasa interpretation [310] of the
Iife of consciousness as well as in David Hume' s concept of consciousness as
II bundle of mental data. Brentano's discovery of the intentional character of
consciousness broke through the general blindness to it, but it did not over-
come the naturalism which overpowered, so to speak, the intentional processes
 IIf 11111111111111111 lll,,"by. No.
Ihl1 Imrlllll hll111l'dlllltllyll,llllwlll/l, lhlli 1I1IY dllJt~lilllt 'l'lI11 'ftllllllW: /lhillmlt
aglllllsl "lIll,lllinl1\IOIlIINIII"t1ld !loí 111111111
~llIYIH.lI 1111 1 t'ltll'(lillll fl'OllIlIulul'IIlIlllll
with rcgard 10 thu IlIUI!!IlI,fül' 11mIIlodlNh rCCI)III'NV lo "1\ONtllll~qllllliilt.iN"
"forros of the whole" only chuntcturl"cd now modo nI' lIa(uralism. ,,'111
1I
foundations [das Prinzipielle] of a mental natllralism us slIch (and, inc1mlud In
this, a most broadly conceived sensualism of the inner and outer senses) ollly
ge,ts to be truly understood for what it is and emptied of its seductive P()WI~I
when apure phenomenological experience is seriously carried through, III
other words, an experience in which the proper essence of intentional liI'l:
thus disclosed in consistent allsidedness and evidence and can accordingly
brought to apure description.
Before my methodical instruction about this expenence, which is shortly 1(1
follow, 1 would like to note as a prior clarification that the deep source ol' 1111
our errors lies in the equating of !mmanent temporality with objective, COII
c~ete temporality - an equation which initially seems to press itself on us 11
self-evident.
. Objective time is the extensional forro of objective realities, and indul,d
primarily and authentically of physical nature, which extends through the I'tllll
world as its structural basis. Mental lived experiences or processes [ti
seelische Erlebnisse], in and of themselves, do not, therefore, either s}ngly 01
combined into wholes, possess any concretely real uniting forro [reale Eln
heitsform] of coexistence and succession of the type one finds in concrete alltl
real spatiotemporality. The forro of flowing, or of being in flux in the unity 01
a stream of conscious~ess which is proper to their nature is not an actll/il
parallel forro to this spatiotemporality. The image of a stream plays a trick 011
uso Intentional analysis of immanent temporality actually destroys this imll¡~
ipld at the same time place s its legitimate sense before uso Precisely in
doing, however, every genuine material analogy between analysis of cou
sciousness and analysis of nature, whether physical, chemical, or even bio
logical, falls away, as does the whole analogy betwe~n [311] the way ~f beil\l
of consciousness and the "1" of consciousness, on the one hand, and on tlu
other hand, the way of being of nature. The concepts of physical thing aud
attributes, of whole and part, uniting and separating, cause and effect, and th(
like, which are logical when applied to Nature, are all of them rooted in thl
originarily real, that is, in Nature, ílnd therewith in its basic determination, rI',I'
extensa. When they are taken overinto the realm of the mental [zum Psy
chischen], i.e., as psycho-Iogical, these concepts lose what is fundamentally
essential to their meaning, and what remain are only the empty husks of fOI
mal-logical concepts of object, attribute, composition, and so on.
WII
011,
111111 Alld lloW WlJ ItlJ 11 lO IlIq 0111111' Illlllmllll di I'flCllltillSwhich hillder Iho clIlI.YIl-
llll!\ nI' (;()lIsiSIOlllIIwl )ltllll phOlllllllUllOlogiuulUX.PUr/OIlCÚ,
11 difficlIltic::; which,
IllINl.ldUll to ¡ts illvolvulllont wlt'h cxporioncc of the physical. We wi11refrain
"011) uny tradilionul projudgments, even the most universally obvious ones o(
IllIditional logic, which already have perhaps taken from Nature unnoticed.
1~ll\J)lontsof meaning. We will hold ourselves resolutely to what phenomen-
ological reflection presents to us as consciousness and object of conscious-:
11I IltlNN, and purely to what comes to actual, evident self-givenness. In other
words, we will interrogate eXclusively the phenomenological experience,
'Il.lHrJyand quite concretely thinking into a reflective experience of conscious-
[lllSS, without interest in determining concretely occurring facts. Such
Iphcnomenological] experience does not have the individual experience [in
vluw], but the Gestalt most immeq.iate to a11as Selj-Experience. For only in it'
;onsciousness and the ego of consciousness given in fully original selfhoo?"
'I~when 1 perceivingly reflect on my perceiving. 1 as phenomenologist thus
lllu..:overmy own living (in the attitude of fantasy, directed toward concrete~
possibility), my concrete possible living in this or that concretely actual and
!'oncretely possible forros. One can can easily see that it is there, on the basis
111' this irnmediacy of my self-experience, that all other experience of the
Illuntal (always understood as experiencing intuition) is founded, pure experi-
1~IlCe of what,is strange or other [Fremde1ahrung] as well as of the comm\}-
Illlt.. So it is quite natural that from the outset the method of taking pure self-
x.perience is treated as the method appropriate to a consistently conceived
I·~12] phenomenological disclosure of oneself. How can we manage to refrain
NIl "fom accepting any components drawn in by experience of what is extemally
flhysical, through which tht:n also everything pertaining to the mental life of
nmeone else [das Fremdpsychische] would remain eo ipso excluded? The
xperience of something "extemal" (more clearly: of something "physical") is
tsclf a mental experience but related to the physical through our intentionaJ
x.perience. Naturally the experienced physical thing itself, which is presup,-
Jlosed as what is physically actual in the world - the thingly real with all it~
mal moments - of necessity does not belong to the inventory of essence~
proper to us in our experiencing life-process. The same holds for any and
very consciousness \n which the being of something real in the world is
IIlcant and accepted, as well as of every activity of consciousness in my natu-
1'1I1 and practicallife.

II\d
1husif 1 as a phenomcnologist wil'h \.0 dl,)lIlwlth plll'll lI\lmtlll C)(POI'lOIlI'(
and only with it, if 1 wish to take the life of my coml<;iOtllllleSIlIIJ¡·WI.',J/f
seinsleben] in its own pure essentiality as my universal ond c~stcnt lhllllll
d to malee it a field for purely phenomenological experiences, then 1 Cl1'
tainly must leave out of account the totality of the concrete world which W1l
~nd is continuously accepted in its being by me in my natural, straightforwllnl
living; 1 must thematically exclude it as outside the being of the mental. Thllt
is to say: as phenomenologist 1 may not in my descriptive practice, in 111\
practice 01' exercise of pure experience of something mental, 1 may not CXOI
~ise in a natural way my believing in the world; rather in further consequencl.l I
must dispense with all the position-taking which plays its natural rale in ll~
natural,practicil1life of my consciousness.
ti On the other hand, it is cJear and has already been emphasized, that lt
~ elon s to and is inse arable fram erce tion as intentional mental ex eriencl'
~ ~h.atit is perception of what is perceived, and this goes for every kind of COII
/ ,sciousness with regard to what it is conscious of. How could we describe
perception, 01' a memory, 01' anything else in regard to its own peculiar essencc
as this concrete mental experience without also sayin~ that it is perception oj'
this 01' that, and is precisely of this object? This is manifestly so, quite apar\.
from the question of whether the perceived landscape actually exists, 01' if, as
further experience may show, it proves to be illusionary. [313) Even in an
iÚusion the illusionary landscape still appears, but if we recognize it as iIlu-
sionary, as appearing in an altered mode of our believing, according to which,
although it appears the same to us, it does not have the status of simple actu-
ality but that of nullity, of a negated actuality.
Now let us link the conclusion just reached )-Vi~hthe one we arrived al
earlier. According to the earlier assertion, a mere reflection on consciousness
does not yet yield the mental in purity and in its own essentiality. Rather, ':!Le
~ru~pdition abstain from that believing in being [Seins-Glaubens] by
virtue of which we accept the world in the natural life of consciousness and
<2ur reflecting on it; as phenomenologists, we are not permitted to go along
'fith this (and in further consequence, indeed, we must abstain fram every
~osition-taking of any kind toward the world na'ively accepted by us). As
phenomenologists we must be as it were non-participating onlookers at the
life of consciousness, which can only in this way become the pure theme of
our experiencing. Instead of living in and thraugh consciousness, instead of
being interested in the world in it, we must merely look at it, as if it, in itself, is
consciousness of this or that, and at [precisely] how it is interested in its
objects. Otherwise, the extra-mental world and not pure consciousness of it
wlluld \ 1 IIHH 111ltl Y 1111 hullldl'd 111111•• 11I1~1l1l1 \11 11111 dmHlipllllll. Nnw tlll lIH
!lulId WO hllvo Huid IlIul lhlll '" I 111 111I/H 1\1111011, lhlN "'VIII/'II,"."
111111\1 Ill""l~\l
111l1hillP, uho;'l 11, 1I0d 11"'1 IlV1líY 1lIIlI1I11lIINllONN h/lN 111 /llId ni' TINdl' 11N C\W~I.
IlhJI'Otivhy IIN Nllch, lo wllh'h Ihllll\N 11111 IIPIlt1IIlIIIB lI11d 111\1 kllnwu 111Nlll1h lIud
\wh 11WIIY.; 01' 1)0111.11', 'l'li II11W IlUY thllt pn.·dllcly thl'9ugll thlN phClIíHIlI.1110111}'.
~1I1 'Ipoché whul II.pPClIfN NlfllldN 0111 IIN 1111appellriug l'h¡lIg, WhHt iN k'II)Wll"
Ihlll pHl'ticular COIlNcioUNIICNN standN out as such, as somcthing whTch Tt.W!(f'
,lt'lOlL¡':S to one 's mental inventory. Thc externally experienced thing NIICh, 111'
tht) thing we are conscious of io some way as meant, is accordingly no! */1111 •
thillg tllat in this iostance simply exists, 01' that is simply possible, probabkl 11.
III11H..:xistent; rather, it is the specific intuitive 01' non-intuitive content t'hnl iN
1}IClmtas existent, supposed, 01' non-existent. This is the meaning of t~l.lCUN •.
tomary talk in phenomenology about parenthesizing [01' bracketing). Placill},
omething in parentheses [01' brackets] mentally serves as the indox 01' 111(
"poché. But inside the parentheses there is that which is parenthesized.
ne matter that should be paid attention to: The faith we have in Otll'I,)XPI
dl.lncing, which is at work in whatever specific consciousness ano IN IlOW
hnving and is precisely ~here in an unthematized and concealed way, IIllfUI'f1l1y
hlllo~ along with all its further modes of position-taking, [314] j;Q t'lll~lilil
11
!I0menological content of that moment of mental process. Butm!f.h bcliql' IN,"
~t1ch,only disclosed and not "participated in" by Jl1eas phenomenolo~l; :IN '~
lIIoment of mental experience, it becomes thematic for me through thll fuct t1!!~t
( take up the phenomenological focus, which means that 1 move out 01' l~\
~llI'iveand natural practice of taking this 01' that position, to one of holding l)lId
from it and 1become, as mere spectator, an observing ego.
This describes in substance the necessary and consciously practiced method
()f access to the realm of pure phenomena of consciousness, namely II~Hf
peculiar change of focus which is called the phenomenological reduction ..13y
rneans of it our gaze was directed toward a principal aspect of pure phenol11;
;na of consciousness, which ,is the noematic (and about which traditionul
psychology did not know what to say). Through the phenomenological reduc-
!ion intentional objectivities as such were first laid open. They were laid OpOIl
liS an essential component of all intentional processes and as an infinitoly
fruitful theme for phenomenological description.
But 1 must irnmediately add that the universality of the phenomenological
lpoché as practicedt by the phenomenologist from the very beginning - thll
IInivetsality in which he 01' she becomes the mere impartial observer of the
totality of his conscious life-process - brings about not only a thematic p.urifi-
catioQ of !he. individual processes of consciousness and thereby discloses ¡ts
noematic components; it further directs its power on the ego of consciousness,
which it frees of everything concretely human, everything animally real. ,If all
of Nature is transformed into a mere noematic phenomenon in that its concrete
 1I1lllty IN1IWll'l\lld"d, IIU\IIIhuIIH", wld, 11IHIIIIl\lW IUI'lllldllll,d lit 1I1lt1lIlIl'tllltl 1l11l11l\1l1l10¡\h'1l1
1I111111t1Ii, IIljl IIII 11111 11I111ll' 11I Ilí,p.It,,1 11'lhlllll h Wlllll 1// ItI JH

1I1l11lifn, pllll'llllN, iN llit 1011/:111

1'!I~T'I}j 1111\1'01\('11110,IIIUil~dllll l 1I11lhllllly llgll \VI IY1l1\lll\lNIHlld lillll (IlHllllllh'l~d Il~ 1 lllllillllllllllllfl(l 1IIII'Illlllillll-lIlow 01"111'111
llhl~'I'IIVi¡l(lXPllJ!ll11i1,,1
;101IllI111Y spl\lIk of¡ Ihlll Is, Ilul hlllll/lIl i11\1' 01' 1110111111111I1, 1\11I11)IN 11m pllft1 1II'~~P'"I\IlIi/l liN"lI 1111111)1'1-'011 11m VIII h'HIIII,d lIlh nI' 1'1l11
(9~.Bulhor, it hus Il()W ltsell' hlll1111110
Ihu jllllllltllld 1111,1thluf¡ 1/.1' 1"/¡llldll,1 1IlllHHII\NN IINIllll NtltlllllllllP, tllllh 01 t11111Hl1N (Ir Ihlll ~gn 1" NtH:.:h Ilotlvltlt'/'IIIN 111\'
only; it has beconlt; ti nocllIatic phl.lll()III~II()lI. . tlllNlp,lllllCd "1 pOI'coiVt;," "1 1I1l111'lIIl!lll',".. In Nh{wt, "J oX,POriOllOO/' ul Jllllkl
Everything meant or intcndcd as slIch, und this inclllduN my bl.llllg IIN 11 llllllllhlng pn.lsúlIt (<) lJIysdl' In 11 1l()lI-illWltivo WA;Y/' or nl¡¡o "1 livo ill l'rol
human creature in the world and my process of living in thc world, is, rc..l llItl11I• IUIlIIINIr,jllg,"in the Nenso I'hul "1 lIIn ongagcd" also in the modos in which lllY
be"r, something intended within an intending life-process; one which, thllllkN lo vululllg, slríving, and Qealing consciousness occupies itself. Tht.l [316,1 thUllI1
~he phenomenological focus on the purely mental, the life-process 111 '''"t l'IIIIS through all of these is the essential [reciprocal] two-sidcdlloss 01'
",reduced" form, is [315] inseparable from it as its intentional sense. Naturull I llllrwlousness [on qne hand] and what one is conscious of, as such, tho nooll"
this intending life-process is always and continuously to be found in the ril.lld ulld Ihe nocmatic.
.
of phenomenological reflection. "
. '('he fundamenta11y essential difference b~tween the way of being 01' COII
I'lllllsness in ~ts phenomenological purity in contrast to the way 01' beiug h
whk:h Nature is given in the natural focus can be seen above all in the idclIlh
<§7. The Ego-Pole as Center of Acts ofthe Ego. 111'Iho holding back or being in a suspended state which characterízl.ls 1111
The Synthetic Character of Consciousness.> illlotnatic components of a specific consciousness. It is also seen, wC CIIIl rmy,
ti the uniqueness of that synthesis by which l?very consciousness is llll¡nud VI
The consistent unfolding of the noema, of the intended thing as such in eaeh ,INClfanqagain--'~y_~hi~!1e consciousness is united with anothor jlllt) tlll
separate case; c~n be redirected into an examination ánd analysis of the rcll! Illlity of _a l§.Ln-Ele, unitary] consciousness. The different kinds of Y 11Ih 1'1

, tively hidd~n noesis In it - that is, of the particular process of holdi~g som¡: tlltjmately a11 point back to identifying syntheses [Identitiitssynthc.I'enl. J\YIJIY
thing in conscio~sness. But gi!Lthere is something it can call its own: that iN I}ved experience [Erlebnis] in ou!.._consciousness is a consciousness Qf NOllli:
ihe ego-center, the ego ["1"] in the cogito ["1 think"]; 1 have in mind the ego
-. o _. - ,
thing:, But this involves the fact that there are also given in and with eVlll
that remains phenomenologica11y identical in a11the multiple acts of the ego Ilvod experien"ce in consciousness many others (idea11y speaking therc nrl.l fUI
tp'e ego apprehended as the radiating center from which, as the identical ego nfinite variety of other such experiences) which are marked out as reul ()I
.gole, the specific acts [of the ego] radiate forth. For example, when 1 look at I1 possible, each of which is united with it, or would be united with a consciou¡,¡-
thing actively, in experiencing 1explicate it, 1 comprehend and judge it, and so lICSSwhich was consciousness of that same something. When, for inst'Ulco._1
"on. ~llIve as a mental experience, the perception of a house, there "resides" within
'The ego-poi e is, however, not only the point from which my acts strean¡ lt (and is right there within it itself if we "interrogate" it, as 1 would like lO
forth "but al so a point into which my emotions and feelings stream. In both show) the fact that the same house (the same noema) ,can be intended in fUI
respects the phenomenologically ~e ego-center remains a great phenomc- ~ppertaining multiplicity of other perceptions 'lDd in all sorts of other modes 01'
nological theme which is ultimately interwoven with everything else. To mi' ;onsciousness as the same house. Precisely the same holds for every othor
this is evidence that a11 consciousness is consciousness belonging to my eg",. kind of consciousness as consciousness of the objectivity of its noemll,
This also carnes with it the idea that consciousness in al! its forms, in al! th" Through this, the intentional relation demonstrates even more firm1y its fun-
modes of active and passive participation of the ego, carnes out noemati damental nature. The "something" to which it is related as that which it is and
functions and therewith ultimately is joined into the unity of a context 01" that of which the consciousness in question is conscious - or to which the ego
functions; in this, what is already expressed is the fact that a11 analysis 01" is related in a way appropriate to consciousness - this is a noematic poi
consciousness has to do with, at the same time and ultimately even if implic- \yhich serves as an index or reference-point for an open, infinite manifold of
itly, the central ego. over again other experiences in consciousness, for which it would be abso-
Now among the specific themes in connection with studying fhe ego, therc lutely and identica11y the same thing. And s¿ it belongs to the fundamentaí
~e Vermogen [abilitLto do something] and Habitus [tendency to do some- nature of consciousness that this object-pole, indeed that every noematic unity
thing),
...----. and really, in ways which cannot be gone into here, these are phe- is an ideally identical thing in a11 the mental experiencing making up its syn-
thetic multiplicity, and in everything is ~hus not contained really but "idea11y."
 HI\Ul'wll
llltllhllrlllllllltlll'Olli'ml1l l"divfdlllllly
1" t.lOOlllltllllwlthIl!o1\111Yllt11hi\ilOI"i~N
IduJlti<':lIl'Jllltl~U"t "PPIIIl)lIt I~\I'/Ilu
;ery evident way lhal in oni.lHlld 111Ihu Illhuf jl\NllllICQ wu Ilri.l<';()lIsclousof 11\1
same thing; one and the sume house intellded purcllplulllly 01' otlmrwisll ls sllU
the same house, noematicalIy understood as the Sume intonded object, hlllh
inseparably belonging to each of the multiple appearances yet at the SilmQdllll
being nothing less than a real moment. In other words, we can say thal it ltht
--lo house as ideal object] is irnmanent in consciousness as sense. In fact, in wlilll
ever other way we may speak of sense, it has to do with ,an ideal sOlTIothlllJ'
'Yhich can be the object of intention throughout an open infinity of possihll
and .actual intentional experiences. This is probably the reason that eVilly
analysis of consciousness begins by explicating the concrete, individual (iV/Id
experience and makes its demonstrations from it. Yet these analyses alway
and necessarily lead from the individual conscious experience into the COIn
sponding synthetic cosmos [Universum] of lived experiences in consciousnlls
Indeed, wÍthout laying claim t<;>this cosmos that which lies noematiclllly
wÍthin consciousness and at which they are aimed ás an intentional objectivit
cannot be explained at alI.
Accordingly, intentional analysis is totally different both in method and III
what it accomplishes from an analysis of concrete data, of what is concretllly
given. For example, using the phenomenological approach to describe tl"
perceived thing as such means first and foremost, taking as one possibility Illi'
previous example of the perceived house, to go into the various descriptivi
dimensions which, as we soon see, necessarily belong to every noema, 111
t~ough in vari~us particularizations. The first [point] is the directedness of 011.1
gaze toward the ontic component of the noema. Looking at the house itself WI
focus on the various distÍnguishing features and of course we look exclusivol
at those which realIy show themselves in this perception itself. But when WI
. express the malter in tiÜs way, we are taking it as self-evident that beyond t~i
actual perceptual moments, the perceived house still possesses a multiplicit
of other moments not yet grasped. So theo the question about the basis fOI
speaking in this way irnmediately leads to the fact that to the noema of lh(,\
perceived house belongs a horizon consciousness; in other words, what i.~
genuinely ~een in itself refers us in its "sense" to an open "more" of deterl1lj
'nations ~hich are unseen, partly known, partly undetermined and unknowllo
The analysis cannot stop at this point, however. The [318] question irnmedi
.ately arises as to how come it is evident that this pointing-ahead belongs to tht
. phenomenon-in-consciousness?' How come this horizon-consciousness refen~
us in fact to further actualIy unexperienced traÍts of the same [phenomenon)'
Certainly this is already an interpretation which goes beyond the moment 01
experiencing, which we have calIed the "horizon-consciousness," which ¡s,
11
11 Ol'!
1'1111llxplication of the intentional sense thus leads, under th0 hllHdlllg 01
hlld1,Oll-cxplication (explication of anticipations), from the explicatioll (lf "
'\IISill'hat is already intuitively vetified to the construction of aO cidi.ltlcllll
'U'lli~IIHiningsynthetic manifold of possible perceptions of that ~rnl.i thlnl:.'
'1lIllllmctively we produce a chain of possible perceptions which show how
Ih., object would look and would h.ave to look if we perceptually PUI'slIl)d11
hlllllol' and further. In this regar~, however, it also becomes evident Ihll.1tlli
IUIle.house, continued, that we just spoke of, that is, the same ontic hOllsc (ni
1111 ldl.lnticallink in the shain of multiple possible noemas) separatcs ¡tsdf nlld
dllltlllguishes itself from the "hous~" [that is given] in the "how" of i'ltultlvi
11'IIIi:t.ation;each of the individual perceptions of the same house brillgs Ilu
11110 thing forward within a subjective "how" [how it appears], bringing wlth
1 1lI11nclya different set of actuall)' seen determinations of it. This holds tnl(
11 ti similar way for the other descriptive dimensions of el noema of cxtOlllll1
'1\pe.rience; for example, those und~r the heading of a "perspective." Whalovlll
11 Ihcperceived thing comes forw"'d in the actual intuition does so in s\l<.:h11
WtlYthat every genuinely intuitiv~ moment has its mode of givcnlll.lss; l'(~t
llNlunce,what is visually given will be in a certain perspective. And wll'h IlllN,
tlli~perspective again irnmediately points toward possible new [319.1 pOrH)('ll"
tlv(,lsof the same thing, and we are again drawn, only looking now in 11l\()th(~1
Illl'\,)ction,into the system of possible perceptions.
Another descriptive dimension has to do with the modes o/ appMrtllII'l'
I/\'rscheinungsmodi], which, throQgh the possible differences in (,lSS(~Ill'!
IIlIIongperception, retention, recalling again, prior expectation, and ~()()n, 111"
1111 determined by the same thing. Tbis, too, leads, as will be demonstratcd, lo Il
nd of intentional explication, on~ which by means of the specifically gl Vl1Il
11 ved experience leads constructively beyond it into methodical c1ariflclltIon
which Gonsist of constructing appe!1aining synthetic multiplicities. Aguln, llti
time thing Qol~s with regard to the descriptive dimension that is characlori:t.l~d
hy its separating sense material frQtn the mode of [its] acceptance. AIJ of l'holU
Ihnensions are determined in aC~ordance with the horizon and I'cquir'
 1111 IHul 111 1111" ¡"wl¡¡ IIwl IIlullIII
dIlWlq/J'Hu,
'I'IIINNhllllld r1i¡f'jkoto 1I111kl\ 11ilVldtlllt Ihul tlm llllly IWlllllltllNllhloIIlNks01
ill hallllltitllllll Illllllysls wlthln 11 pIU,.lIlOllillllllIO¡¡ltllll
pNYl'hOI0I'.YhllVll 11 1011111
dlmll'tlllt S(mNUfrOlIltlU.iC\lStOllIlIlY nlllllYNON 111 thll Oh.lllCliVl.l,
IUI\lS SIIY, nal\ll'lIl
phllHl. IlllollliollUI uxplic.uion has lhe unique pGculiarity bl,llºns!!!lLtQ lis
(llllllll 11lIt\lfU, that i::¡aS an intcr~tiv~~ge:>i:> [I\uslegung] of noesi:> and
III)(illlll.Inturproting (is taken of courso] in a broader sense and not in the seQ/,,'
~llllu_rolylI11nlyzingan intuited concrete thing into its component traits.
(),,(l IllOI'Ocorroborating operation should be carried out. Up to this poinl
Ihollllll1Yl:Is01" properties was what we have had in mind. But "analysis" often
IlId In thu Iiloral sense means breaking something down into its parts. [It is
tlllll Ihllt'! I¡ved experiences in consciousness do have, in their irnmanenl
(liIIlpomlity within the stream of consciousness talcen concretely but purely, a
kllld 01" fual, partitioni!1g and a correlative real connection [with each other).
11111 it would certainly be foolish to want to look at the connecting and parti-
tioning in consciousness exclusively from the viewpoint of putting part:>
t()gl.ltherand taking them aparto For example, a concrete perception is the unity
¿fllll immanent flowing along in which each of the component parts and
[lllllsOSallows of being distinguished from one another. Each such part, each
IICItphase, is itself again a consciousness-of, is itself again perception-of, and
IN thil), has its own perceptual sense. But not, let us say, in such a way that the
ndividual senses can simply be put together into the unitary sense [320] of the
wholú perception, In every component of a perception flowing along as a
phm¡c of a whole perception, the object is perceived whose unity of meaning
ll~lcnds through a11the meanings esenses) of the phases and, so to say, nour-
tsltcs itself from them in the manner of gaining from them the fu11filment of
l\loro exact deterrnination - but this is by no means a mere sticking things
"r
together, and it is anything but merely the type of combination into a whole
which is to be found in sensible forms. For not every synthesis in conscious-
ness exists as this type of continuous synthesis (and the substratum for corre-
sponding analyses of phases and parts). But in general it is valid to say that
consciousness as consciousness perrnits no other manner of linking to another
consciousness than such synthesis, such that every partitioning down into parts
again produces meaning or sense, just as every combining generates a syn-
thetical1y established sense. Synthesis of meaning or sense - synthesis of an
ideally existent thing - stands generally under quite different categories from
those of real synthesis, and real totality.
rhe !ife of consciousness constantly flows along as a life that i& sense-
constituting in itself and which also constitutes sense from sense. In ever new
levels these objectivities are carried out within pure psychological subjectiy-
ity, a production and a transformation of "objectivities" appearing to the
nWh'h 111M 1'1\11 illll,1I 1l~~lllnl
dl'ft~lllllJlhiH IUIIIIIII 11I "11th"," U11II 111 I II(lle'l
hy li II,~11l\I"Hfllll 1"
ll!tl¡'li Vllllt,d llllldm: 01 vulldlly. A llwlol
huI 1110 IIllg01li}
NYllthúlllNwhioh INllNI)l'c1llity(·ItIiJO lo tito (lNNllllllllfnul,III'O(Ir ti OOllllfulllly
lItúrrcllllúd IH't.i0/1 COIlSclOUSlIllSH,
1I11Uin fllcl ulwuys núccNsaríly bclongs to ¡t,
N Iltt.:synthosis 01'all cxpcricnces into the unity of one experience; and within
(hiN,the synthesís of concordant experience, interrupted to be sure by discords
hllt always through correction restoring again the form of an a11-bracing har-
lIIony. A11the kinds and forros of reason in cognition [erkennender Vemunft]
~ro forms of synthesis, of accomplishment of unity and truth by cognizing
NlIbjectivity. To shed light on the intentional is a huge task for phenomenol-
ogical-psychological research,
The descriptive phenomenology which we have been speaking of up to now
IS in itself first was egological phenomenology. In it we conceived of an ego
{lisclosing its own pure mental being, its realm in the strictest sense as original
,?xperience of the mental. Only after an egological-phenomenological [321]
inquiry that has been pressed sufficiently far does it become possible to
broaden the phenomenological method in such a way that experience of some-
one else and of the cornmunity is introduced into it. Then and only tben does
the insight _cli~closeitself that an all-embracing phenomenology is to be car-
ríed through in consistent purity, and that only in this way is intentional psy- .:
chology~t allJ~_ossibl~- that the unity of synthesis encompasses the individua!
subjects as a phenomenology of intersubjectivity.,
Not only is the conscious life of an individual ego a field of experience that
i.senclosed in itself and needs to be gone tbrough step-by-step in phenomenol-
ogical experience; the a11-embracing conscious life which, reaching beyond
lhe individual ego, also !inks each ego to every other in real and possible
oornmunication is like this,
Instead of thematizing the psychophysical experience of humankind passing
from man to man and to animals in one's activity and in this way regarding
this experience as mediated by nature and realities connected witb nature out
there in the world, one can, rather, ,start from one' s own irnmanent life-process
and ~~~!!~the in.!~ntiona!ity contained within it in such a way that a
purel'y_p!!~~omenological continuity in experiences from one subject to an-
other subject is produced and purely preserved. It is tbe intentionality in one's
own ego which leads into the alien ego and is tbe so-ca11ed "empathy," and
one can put it into play in such phenomenological purity tbat Nature remains
constantly excluded from it.
 What we have disclIssed /lO flll' híl/l dUlIlt wllh 11H.l11Iulh(ldhy whk:h íI ptlH
psychological sphere of cxpcricncc rcvcals ilsolf as a ficld of purcly Inollllll
data, a field that needs to be described, a field thal is self-disclosing in (,)()Il
tinuous intentional explication. In this connection we will also speak in 11

general way of cornmon and essentially fundamental peculiarities which are lo

be' encountered in this field. Nevertheless, as long as we remain within rnun
eJ,'perience, thus clinging to singular facts and to the empirical g~neralizalionl
arising from them as these are formed naturally in the course of experience, IIN

long as our description retains the character of a mere empirical descriptioll,

we do not yet have a science. . .
. [322] We already know that apure, pl).enomenological psychology as 1\
science of real facts is not possible. For such a science the purely mental factr
that are revealed through phenomenological method would require a method
ology that goes after their "real" [external, concrete] meaning, that is to say
takes account of their physical signification, and therewith enters into th<.:
realm of the psychophysical. This líes outside our theme. But, as we predicted,
~ now, b.L'yirtll~_.9L2~~.h!l:'yin_g _l!.p_t~_e_
_<.?p.~t.!~~ ..~~~lm ~f_p~~e..intersubjecti vity t
~evealed with phenomenol~~l consistency and purely practiced experien
as a unity, and indeed as a reality and possib!!!!y, an apriori science can be
est.~bi~~~~~_aself-contalned, pure phenomeñOlogicaI-aprióri psychology.
But how is a phenomenological apriori arrived at? One must not here think
of an effusive mysticism of logic. Rather, the method of g'J,ining apure apriod
is a completely sober, well-known method readily available in all sciences
however much a reflective clarification and final explication of the meaning 01'
this method may be lacking - a clarification and explication which can only bu
brought about for all methods of cognition through apure phenomenology. 11
is the method of attaining to pure universals [Allgemeinheiten, generalízationsj
intuitively and apodictically, universals free of all co-positing of concrete/act,
which are related to an infinite range of freely conceivable possibilities as
purely possible facts. Indeed, [it is a method] which prescribes apodictically
the norm of being conceivable as possible fact. Once brought to light these
pure universals, even if they are not 'generated through strictly logical meth-
ods, are pure pieces of self-evident knowledge which can be tested at any time
by asking whether it is conceivable that they be otherwise without there aris-
ing in insight a contradiction or absurdity. A parallel example in the sphere of
nature is the insight that everything that is intuitively imaginable as pure
possibility, or, as we say, everything conceivable possesses the fundamental
spatiotemporal and causal properties of a res extensa [extended thing]: spatial
and temporal dimensions, spatiotemporallocation, and so on.
 11'1jllllllt '1I1,1I1'IIII'd 1111111
wlIlIh"Itlll lltllll'l IlItl, III IIl1\llullllllilll~1111!\I!lwtllll!lUI
lltllltlllllll whll'l, 1111\ 1I1'lllllllyI1lllll11plml¡hllt 11 11HIt 1111 IlIlwlh·d w\lhlu Illll)l'lIHVl'
OXPl.ll'lOllCll l.liilll.lily111lho l1iilllut 111111lhoy t:11I1ho lIihld 1111 IlIdv¡'IH lit 11pUII
uní.versa!. In r0gard lO ¡hu phl.lIlOll10l1ologiulll UXlmlil'Ill'1lwlth ltN ho"¡zolls O~
il~tentioJ;lalimplication, this mClllls lhllt IICC0SN lO lhu ~:~ulllnc llpriori is VUI
difficult. Phenomenological expericncc as explicilly NllChis ilsolf a mallor 01'
accomplishing difficult methodical functions. ~lcing the method of Vf\ril,lH
!ion in the egological focus produces, first of al1, the system of invariants iu
:one's own ego, unrelated to the question of the intersubjective acce§sibilily,
:awl validity, of this apriori. If one brings into consideration the experience 01;
others, then what becomes cIear is that it belongs a priori to the objectivQ
s~nse of that experience (thus, <as it is> to the alter ego) t1}atthe other be
analogous in its essence with my ego; that the other, then, necessarily has th"
same essence-style <Wesensstil> as 1. In this way, egological phenomenology
is valid for every ego whatever, not just valid for me aJ;ldmy fantasy-variants.
A~ter the reduction has been broadened to incIude phenomenologically pur
intersubjectivity, then a universal apriori for cornmunities of subjects becomes
apparent in the reduction of them to their inoer-phenomenological and pure
unity.
§ 9. The Essential Function ofPhenomenological Psychology
for an Exact Empirical Psychology.
The apriori concepts generated by eidetic reduction are an expression of the
~ecessary essence of the structure [Stilform] to which all conceivable, factual,
egoic being and the life of consciousness is tied. ¡\ll empirical-
P~E()_~~.!!..~~g.~calconcepts take their place among them [the apriori concepts
just mentioned] as logical forms, in the same way as all empirical concepts in
~hich natural science's factual assertions proceed participate at the same tim~
in the apriori concepts goveming Nature. Thus, the unconditional normative
validity of the apriori truths grounded in apriori concepts for all their respec-
tive regions of being, in this case for purely mental empeiria [facts] to which
these concepts pertain, is self-evident.
Here we add what quite naturally comes next: a discussion of the signifi-
cance of a phenomenological psychology for the much more far-reaching
subject of psychology in general. Phenomeno!Qgica!J32~lpsy(;~.~ogy is the
unconditionally necessary foundation f2r the construction of a rigorously
~~!.ific psychologL~.!ti~_~ould be the genuine and actual analogue of
exact natural science. The exactness of exact natural science [natural science]
lies in its being grounded on its apriori, within each of its own disciplines,
Vl'1l 11 111 .
1I111l1l IIIlIlIIl'll. '1'IuOtlHII ih
'u l~ lo thlN lIpdod 01' lllllll, Ih" VIlI\,il1(1Iilll/'l"'(1 t1l11111N
OXI'l,llh.llllJlldJ
guío a
lhlllllll \lNiHmnlllllt't'l1NNlly, Ndullnnc 1\l(,)lhodal) a whole gains
IIwl 1111I11111111'111
Il .1~IlN\) Ilml iI iN IInd\,lI'HhdhIHwllh "11XIIClncss"all the vague concepts and,
11111,,1; ¡huI is, lO 1I'I()lIldtht) PIlltlullllll'll,which can only be brought out and
dl'lt\lIl1lllcd in the lighl~or llX.Plll'lollc0ublematters of fact, to the measure o(
'Ipllml form; which as stlch pmNcríbes to everything empirical, insofar as it is
ltl !In "objective," a necessity within the totality of Nature.4 The fact that the
lll'dod is here quantitative, expressed in size and number, is simply due to the
1\~NI1IIC(')of Nature as Nature.
IItlt oxactness in the more general sense is demanded for every genuine
III1IICC.of facts, [and thus] also for psychology. It, too, has its all-goveming
Illlldlllnental concepts; or [what is] the same thing, even the experiential realm
dtlllll with by psyc4010gy has !ts apriori set of structural types, and standing iI1
'l'NI place, obviously, is the set of structural types of the mental in the specif~c
1111Ni.l
- the apriori without which an ego (and a cornmunity of egos) would
IIlply be inconceivable to consciousness [as would also] objectivity in con-
dOllsness, an apriori prior to all the contingencies of factual phenomenologi-
:111mmerience. Eidetic-psychologkaLphenomenology llDCOVerstbis apriori
III\uordingto all. the sides and dimensions which belong to noesis and noema. -¡
I'hlls, it produces the fundamental rational concepts which extend through :'"
tWlllYconceivable psychology, so far as it is in fact psychology, that is to say it .:¡
,1I1N
to do with the mental, with ego and intentionality, and so on. ~
But obviously this apriori phenomenology we have just described, eve~ ~
though it is in itself the first foundational science of exactness, does not ex:- :.
hllust the whole of apriori psychology, in so far as ~ychology remains a ~
~cience of the mental as it makes its appearance in the given world as real ~
1Il0ment [of experience] and [326] which as a s chophysical [em hasis -:i
Idded] datum fits itself into and is coordinated with Nature. As such a science '
pllychology finds itseif co-founded on the aprion' of Nature. It rests, therewith, ~
on both the empirical anq the apriori natural science and is grounded in its
()wn apriori, which has to belong to the psychophysical as such, but which ha~
,¡over been worked out.5 . .
Apure phenomenological psychology, as we indicated earlier, only makes
Nense as an eidetic science. On the other hand, we now see that any genuine
nod, in the good sense, l?xact psychology - 01'better any psychology which is
lO possess the form of a rational science of facts according to the type qf
4 Here is underlined the necessary recourse to idealization and hypothesis of idealization!
5 Logically ideal imagined things are conceivable only in identity within the world and (in general) vice
versa. The Apriori is not just Iying around in the street and apodicticity must actually be constructed.
 11 11 1111IIllIt,. mllllH I u~IIHnc:lIH'"' y IIl1dl~1I11 "llllillll~hll "11I"

'phllIl01lIlmolo}',1l'1I1 pNydlllltt~\Ylt 111 NlJ bu IIN 11 tltlllM 1101 11.1111wllh tho lt1111 t1i1lHli1 whh llil'¡' IlN/lmU'll/j. 111" UHHlltlly h!lliHI}1
n1l.llllullt!o.l'"voL ¡',\)It:It!,w'/¡¡' llll thllllllNINof VIlHtH;
1 flll'tllllll')(Pt~Jilllll'llNdlllllll,t1 hWllldu/lwifhill ll/llllf 01/ if/l/lmll'll/g
1111 NIII/,lml/M'Y('ho/OJiY Oj' ,,1(1,\'011 /llld lf

in vague empírical concoplllulltlos hut rIllhl.lr011 thc haHiNof Un 1IIlal.llllh,'lIdlll IlIlIdlllliS; lllúllgsldl.l, of C()lIfNtl,p!alj)llllllliIlOloHY ()f Ullft.lIlNOIlIIlld tilo whlllt
phenomenological experience and a doctrinc 01' ciuotic phl.lIlOlllonologitml I Hflll';()IYof thl.lpus~ivl.l('UiléJtJOIlS of COIlSCi()IiSIll.lSS which CllI'l'il.lNfhll 11I.h~1 01
~ssenees rooted in it - or we could say, on lhe basis of an aDriori loni<.:01 lI'INNO<.:llltioll."
Thl~ phol1omonologil.:ulpsychology 01'rQHsOniN,hOWI.lVl.lI', ill lt,~
psyehology that accords with its own essence. whllll.lfUlldamental ¡Josition unphilosophieal. (t no mOfe bCC0l110N phil<)SI)ph
In our presentation here, it eould seem as if psychology were one eXIII'I, 1/11 hy starting out relying on the apriori than geometry becomos philosophiclIl

positive science among others and thus as an eidetic science one among olh
ers. But no matter how true it is that the mental arises as one among other rolll
eomponents of the world, it still has the amazing quality - precisely that whleh
in phenomenology is investigated in its purity - that it relates, or lets itself hl
related, intentionally [emphasis added] to everything extra-mental as well
hy Htmting out relying on the spatial apriori with respeet to spaee. 'r11<.) thli(ll
111'rI,,lllsoni~ositivity, the psychological theory of reason, still bclollgs to tlu
[!lINitiveseiences.
Nevertheless, in a certain way not only this psychologieal theory 01'kllowl·
11 I'dgc but also the whole of phenomenological psyehology stands quito 111.11ll' ItI

everything conceivable at all. Human beings are in the world along with oth~iI
~ealities, but human beings also have consciousness of the world, themselvl.iN
in,cluded; it is owing to this that a world is there for us at all, and that il iN
é¡leceptedas existent. Granted, it may appear to be distorted and lawless in lh
in?ividual case, but in terms of the whole it proves to be lawful and consistent;
it may appear theoretically good or bad; it may be determined by us in lIlI
philo~ophy. For, once it is firmly grounded and established in ¡ts fulI 1111
lilllbraeing universality, all that is reguired is the Copernican 180fJ 7'tml ll.~,.,
lhl.ltranscendental reduetion] [328] in order to give this whole-p"'hcnonll.llll,h'}ly.
'¡lid theory of reason transeendental significance. The radical Chlllll\ll o;
lIl,laningarises through the fact that the constant presupposition UPOIlwhldl
Ihe totality of scientific positivity - even that of empirical and phellOll 11illll 1

insightful or an erroneous way. But the world is what it is for us on the ba:Üs,
of our ()'W'!lft:1.n~.t!~l!s_~~~o.Il~ciousness [Bewuj3tseinsleistungen]. ¿he science~
.' partieularly, are on every level formations [Gebilde] produeed in intentional·
ity, which produces their sense of being true from the operations of confirma-
tion within the individual [327] subjectivity and within the intersubjective,
, Scientifically valid theory is a system of intersubjective results which carry u
" self-eonstituting and enriehing sense of objectivity within subjeetivity itself.
Theory of scienee as u~iversallogic, as seienee of the apriori form [Form] of (\
" scienee as such and of the apriorietically prescribed types (regions) of scien·
~. tifie knowledge [Wissenschaftstypen], keeps to the customary meaning of
~~ ~~ienee, namely as theory, as a system of resultant truths.6 With this (versio~,
'oí scienee], however, the whole subjeetive life-process that shapes both truth
and science remains outside the topic. Obviously fl full and eomprehensive
~heory of seience would demand that the funetion (Leistung] be explored as ~
formation in the functioning [leistenden] subjectivity; It would demand that all
forms and pattems of scientific (and so also of any type of) rationality be
included in the research. Clearly this research would be absolutely requisite to
~ universal pure phenomenology which comprehende? within itself all theory
of knowledge, theory of science, and theory of reason.
, [Admittedly] this looks like a restoration of psychologism. What is said by
it, though, is only that an all-embracing phenomenology - so far as it malees
l~.ical p~ehology - rests is put out of play by an epoché [braekoting}: ll,'lll:k
olcd is the presuppositionof a pregiven world, of what, aceordingJ:o C(lllllllllll
l~x,perienee, is the self-evidently existing world. In other words: InHU.lIllI 01
Jl()f;itinga world in advanee, this pregiven world, and then only asking how
this self-evidently existing world is to be determined truly, this world iH 111
t'ead treated as noema. Absolutely posited is subjectivity, purely as sucl".z.~.
which the world is constituted and which is now no longer meant as animllt
IH.lbjectivity in the world. In a word, the psychological-phenomenologiclll
J'cduetion is transformed into the transeendental-phenomenologiclIl
Il'eduction], and therewith psychological phenomenology is transformed 11110
llbsolute or transcendental phenomenology.
PART ll: PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE TRANSCENDENT.AL PROBLEM
The idea of a purely phenomenological psychology has not only the ref()I'-
mative function for empirical psyehology which we have just set forth. It ell')
also, for very deep-seated reasons, serve as a preliminary .stage for laying oUl
the idea of a transcendental base-science [Grundwissenschajt], a transcendcn.
tal phenomenology.

6 It is lheory of lheory.

,Evun historiclIlly, pill.lIlOIlIl}liOlllgll'1I1
pl'lYt'h(llollYdld 1I0t llilvtlloJl 1"'0111 111.
requirements of psychology ¡t.~olf.1\1Ihough ¡hu l'i.llllhl'llllkliU'(lllghÍ/(;(;lllllld
only at the beginning of our century, tl10 hislory of phenol1mnologicnl JlM
chology leads us back to Locke's noteworthy foundational work and Yill
shortly thereafter to the significant working out of impulses from it by (1
Berkeley and David Hume, In the Hume's Treatise [Concerning I1UIIIIII/
lJ.nderstamfing] already we find a first effort at a systematic phenomenology, il
first attempt at a systematic exploration of the sphere of pme lived experioll(;(
[Erlebnissphiire], although admittedly not by means of eidetic method alld
furthermore involving a contradictory sensualistic [329] set of connections III
conscious life as such. Already in classical British philosophy [in Lockul,
then, the intended limiting [of focus] to the pmely subjective sphere Wlll
determined by interests external to psychology.
'This inward-turned psychology stood in the service of the transcendenllll
problem that had been awakened by Descartes, although this problem was no
grasped in genuine fOrol and properly formulated by Descartes himself. Still,
in' the very first of the Cartesian Meditations the thought was there - tangiblu,'
underdeveloped, but there and ready to be developed - a thought one can
designate as the fundamental impulse of modern philosophy, that which
essentially determines its particular style, namely: Every objectively real thing
[alies Reale], and ultimately the whole world as it exists for us in such and
such a way, only exists as an actual or possible cogitatum of om own cogita·
tio, as a possible experiential content of our own experiences; and in dealin
with the content of om own life of thought and knowiÍlg, the best case being in
myself, one may assume our own (intersubjective) operations for testing and
proving as the preeminent form of evidentially grounded truth. Thus, for us,
true being is a name for products of actual and possible cognitive operations,
an accomplishment of cognition [Erkenntnisleistung].
Here lay the motivation for all the later transcendental problems, bogus as
well as the genuine. Right away in Descartes the thought took a form which
misled him and succeeding centuries. With seeming self-evidentness he pro-
ceeded in the following way: 1J1e experiencing and cognizing subjectivity is
thrown upon its own resomces. Cognition takes place within its own pme
imm~ence. The evidentiality of the ego cogito, of pme subjective inner
experience, necessarily precedes all other evidences, and in everything is
already presupposed. How can 1, the cognizing entity in this case, legitimately
go beyo-nd the component elements which are given with immediate evident-
ness to me alone? Obviously only through mediating inferences. What do
these mediating inferences look like? What can give them that wonderful
capacity to enter a world transcendent to consciousness?
11Illlll~1 lih!ll\ll!~d hy tht' It·"lIIUII
1',"11111111, whldllllIHI(·d l'I~lIflllk'lIl1llhhl~jIIHwllh IhlllH~ IIhH'I.d h.lI'Hlllj 1811//1,1'1
1"'I.I'llIIIfIllI'lMi'/II'II, ¡Hlll iwldi1llhll1l1lll'Ill1l1 11 11101 tlll'(IIY IlIilJlld 1111 ¡"llllmu',
'\11 tilo Ijllllll), tl,ll) h'lIl1Nt'lilldllllh,1 IHohlt~lIl WIIN pmplIl'l1d 1'01'IIlId IIl1tlt'II)II\t'd;
ntll1llillHl WII,~ fO(')IlNNt.:Id
0',1111011\1, '~IIlIIl'Il('Il\I~ Ilmtvi:f',I,tI,l(:1 NllhJi.l<.ltl
v11Y (11'<.lOIl
IIlWHlCNN
I 1II1dIINPONNUNNloll nI' wodd, !)C8úlil'l'ON'l,not'hod 01'dOllhl t.1111l
11 he;
dt1tll,\lllltcd111)lhu /'inK 1111..llhod
01'Qxhlhllln13lransccndcnlul sllbjuctlvilYI lit 1(l'1N
thlil nI' Ihe ll'anscendental ego n~ a unified self contercd in the i.lI3Q1I11dl!~
t IIp,nlllve life-process. One can say: it is the first transcendental thl.lOIYalld
t tlflqllc [in the Kantian sense] of universal experience of the world lht fiN
1lIIIIldlltlonrOl'a transcendental theory and critique of objective scien""".
In IInsuccessfully working out the transcendental problem, in the twlslllll'
lnvlllvcd in Descartes' wrong formulation of the transcendental problolll, th
1/ hecomes pure mens [mind] as substantia cogitans [cognative subNtanci.lI,
,hui is, mens as concrete mind [Seele] or animus, existing for itself yOl agalll
lllllcthing that exists for itself only through causallaw and its link with COIPO
lC1alsubstance.
Locke, without sensing the depths opened up by the first Meditatioll.l' '1IId
Ihe fully new position attained there in relation to world and to mind, lOok th
IImc ego from the outset as pme mind-substance [reine Seele], as tho "hlllllllll
IlIlnd," whose systematic and concrete exploration on the basis 01"ovlllelll
111101'experience was to be the means of solving the questions of undcrSlm)(1
Ilg and reason. However great his epoch-making contribution was, of huvlllH
IH),~edthis question concretely and in the unity of a scientific-~heoroticlll
horizon and of having shown its relationship to the primal foundation in innul
llxperience, still he missed its genuine transcendental meaning becausc 11"
l.)onceivedof it as psychological inner experience.
So he became the founder of psychologism, a science of reason - or as vtl1
(!Ill also say it in a more general way: a transcendental philosophy on lh,
foundation of a psychology of inner experience.
The destiny of scientific philosophy hinged, and still hinges, on establishllllJ,
lt as genuine transcendental philosophy, or what goes with this, on a radlclIl
overcoming of every form of psychologism; a radical overcoming - mllnt.ll
one that lays bare in one stroke what is sense, what is in principIe nonscllHll,
lnd yet what is its transcendentally significant kernel of truth. The sourcc tli
psychologism's continuous and [331] invincible power through the cenlllrilW
comes, as will be shown, from drawing on an essential double meaning whl~,h
the idea of subjectivity and therewith all concepts of the subjective take Ol~
and which arises as soon as the genuine transcendental question is posed. Thl
disclosure of this double sense which Iinks psychological and transcendentlll
subjectivity together, and indeed not accidentally unites them, is brought abOlir
when the divorce is accomplished between phenomenological psychology ami

§ 11. The Transcendental Problem.
The transcendental problem designates an all-embracing [universal".I'1
problem which is related to the cosmos and all the sciences that deal with ()\I1
world, but points to a fully new dimension of this in contrast with the NatuJ"ll1
universal problem whose theoretical solution is branched out into the poSilivI
SClences.
The transcendental problem arises from a general turning around 01' tlu
natu!~LfoCus 2f consciousness, the focus in which the whole of daily Ii f'(
flows along; the positive sciences continue operating in this natural focus. ,In
this focus the."real"world is pregiven to us, on the basis of ongoing expor
ence, as the self-evidently existing, always present to be learned about world
to be explored theoretically on the basis of the always onward movement ()f
,experience. Everything that exists for us, whatever is or was accepted as all
existing thing, belongs to it; not only minds but also the irreal objectivitioN
which are to become our own, like for example linguistic meanings, scientific
theories, or even the ideal constructions of arto They still have their existenc('
[.Qasein] in the world as irreal determinations that exist precisely as [332'1
~eaning or significance of physical word-sounds, or of physical signs, of real
marble, and the like.
The constantly present and accepted world before us with all its real alld
irreal determinations, serves as the universal theme of all our practical and
theo~Ji~al interests, and, in the final analysis, it is also the theme of positivl.l
~cience. This remains the case, and historically speaking it remained all-
pervasive unti,l a motivation became operative which was suited to putting th
natural focus (a focus which by reason of its very nature necessarily comes
fi~st in the individual and historically) out of play and, in the same move, to
compel a new focus, which we call transcendental. Such a motivation arose
when, under the aegis of philosophy, there developed a truly a1Í-embracing
[universale] theoretical interest, in which questions were posed about the
universe as such, about the world as the cosmos comprising every existing
Il Illllt/U Illtl" IlulIlIHh lhr lill I lhlll I'hllll/lllphll1lllllljnlílhlll WIl
thlll).l, WhllltlVlll,
11'llml Ii1WIlIi 111111 tlll\ 1,1 i ,,11I11
h'IIHW"/C1l \/I,illlll,I"\",I'tl//l,\'/,rllI'fll, Illld ""IlIIII\'
Wllln thlll tilo wol'ld Whl('h llu 1I/'l \11 ",11,," WIII'1tI, IN 0 ••.·11111111 lll/lr/¡tllltl"1I J
~ININfUl'lIN111 thh; lit' Ihlll WIIY,IN/ti
OdNI'II11Nt:iOIlNllONN
>'IINNOIll0lhlllf,I'Pl"~III,
"M. 11"'11111,
I"glt1 llllllcd, 1" ,hltl - Ihat Nllm(;CCIIlNCiollNllCJNN,
¡'OI/,\'¡'/O/l,I'Iti:,\'.I' AM
111111 IINWCbccome~wlIl'o 01'IhIM,WlllIl'O1" fnct io a now cognitionlll NltUlllhlll
W,Átffl/¡lni.l'lage). Evory lllcnning Ibut Ihe world has for us, wc noW mUNtNII
hnlh lIN1I11detcrminedgeneral seose as well as its meaning detcnnined acoo('(1
1I1~lo OOllcrete particulars - is "intentional" meaning that is encJoNcd ill ti"
IIUIPlIII.lSN of our own experiencing, think.ing, valuing life-process, and iN 11
1I1111llllng that talees shape within our consciousness. Every acceptancc of t(¡t
vlllldlty of being [Seinsgeltung] of something is carried out within oursc.lv.l:W;
vmy I.lvidence within experience or theory which grounds that acccl?tancc IN
living within ourselves and henceforth is habitually motivating~ Thil:i 11l)ldN
111IIho wOrld in every determination, even in the most self-evident, whllr
vmything which belongs to the world is "in and for itself' as it is, whclhcr 01
1Il11 1,or whoever, may be accidentally aware of it or not.
<)nce. the world in its full universality has been related to the COIlNCloWI
uhjcctivity in whose conscious life it malees its appearance as precis~l)' ~%l.l,
w"dd ini!~Q..ecific meaning at that time, then its mode of being a~Jll11'1lI1 11
.Illlllmsion of unintelligibility and guestionability. This "makillg>1I11
"l'pCarance," this "being-for-us" of the world as something that CUJI (1111
llhjcctively be brought to llcceptance and foundational evidentnesN, do.:.
I!,lluire clarification. The first [333] ,\wareness of the radical relatednl.lSNof
world to consciousnness does not, in its empty generality, yield any und"r-
lllnding at all of how consciousness in its multiplicity, in its restless stroam¡ll¡~;
tlld self-transformation, so contrives that, for example, in the structurc 01"
p(~rceptionthere emerges a persisting, real objectivity that belongs to a thing /IN
hodily existing, and as something transcendent to consciousness, that en••
hccome known as existing in and for itself, indeed that can even be provcd 1••
Iln cvidential way to be there. How can we account for the fact that a pre.w!Iljl,
occurring experience in one's consciousness called "recollection" makos 11
llonscious of a not-present event and indeed malees us aware of it as past? Alld
how is it that in the "1 remember" moment, that sense can be included in JlI!
llvidential way with thesense: "1 have earlier perceived"? How are w" to
\Inderstand the fact that a perceptual, that is to say, bodily characterized proll-
lit can at the same time contain a co-presence with the sense of a perceivabil-
lty that goes beyond the [irnmediate] perceivedness? How are we to undl.lr-
stand the fact that the actual perceptual present as a totality does not close out
Ihe world but rather always carnes within itself the sense of an infinite plu.\'
ultra [more beyond]? Yet our whole life in the world as conscious life in all IIN
rclationships, is not intelligible at all if, instead of engaging in na'ive praxis, w
 1/1Hi"l' 11111h 1M "lIllw" 111 Ilit' 1IlldMl Ilf Ih
IlvlllH IlllldlnUN 01 Itlltlll)'III0IlH l'IIII~H'lillllllllINM, lt MIIII dlll1H Ilqllllli~l~ 11l1'llll¡¡lhli
lhis fundlonlllg, whlch IIPPi"l/ll'Nlu lt\IHI hlt\'k 11110 IlllkllllWlI 1IIIl1lltlllN "t' ,'1111
cealed contexts and connccllOlls.
Apparently this problem applics also to cvcry kind 01'"ideal" world, ill~'hlll
ing the worlds which many sciences have disclosed to us in abstraclivu *\1111
ration from all relationship to the real world; such as, for examplc, lh\; w"dd
of pure numbers with its peculiar character of being "in itself," or the world (11
"truths in themselves." .
ynintelligibility enshrouds in an especially painful way the mode of bolll/
of our self. We, individually and in cognitive cornmunity, are supposed to 111

the ones in whose conscious life-processes the real and every ideal wodd
~hould gain meaning and acceptance according to all that they are (as pregiVI\1l
to us, at hand, and as existing in and for themselves). We oUfselves, hOWCVIII,
I1 l.tiJ § 12. The Psychologistic Solution to the Transc~\)
Qental Problem.
as human creatures, supposedly belong only to the real world. In accordan('( I'lm working out of the idea of an apriori psychological
with the worldliness of our meanings, we are [334] again referred back 1(1 .h'lllollslrated to us the possibility that one can, through él. tJhenomenology IlHI¡
RUfselves and the conscious life wherein this special meaning takes shapc. 1
1I11tphonomenological reduction, disclose in eidetie g~~~()nsistently card(,)d
another way of clarification conceivable than interrogating the life and pro\, l"lIpm' to mental subjectivity. This includes with it the ~tality the eSSÜIlCI.
1:l

esses of consciousness itself and the world that we become consciqus oi

through it? Surely it is as something intended by us, and not from any oth01
s.ourc~, that the world has acquired and always ,acquires its meaning and ¡ti
validity. On the other hand, however, .how are we going to interrogate COll
scious life without falling into a circle with regard to its reality [Realitdt J'
fudeed, before we go any further, here, lel' s take yet another important step,
step which raises the level of transcendental problem to that of basic principlw.
This step is to recognize that the demonstrated relativity of consciousness [t.()
the subject] has to do not just with our world as factum but with every con·
ceivable world whatsoever. For if in free fantasy we vary our factual world
an~ transportourselves into random conceivaqle worlds, we inevitably also
vary ourselves, to whom, after all, they are the environing worlds. We trans-
form ourselves each time into a possible subjectivity that would have the
particular fabricated world in question as its surrounding world, the world of
~ its possible experiences, the world of its possible theoretical evidentness, oí its
possible conscious life in every kind of transaction with the world. In this way
the problem of the transcendental world is removed from [the sphere of] fact
and becomes an eidetic problem to be solved in the sphere of eidetic (apriori)
theories.
The same thing holds in a different way for ideal worlds of the type of pure
mathematics; for example, the world of numbers. Such worlds we cannot in
fantasy think as freely transformed; every such effort leads to the cancellation
IW,l,I'llnstypik] for all the forrns of evidentness, begin~of essential typ~'l
mlllal types for experience which agrees or harmoni~ \)~ with the ::Jet (:lf
Ill'llleinstimmige Eifahrung] and, in further consequenc~ ~ .With other exp()rl.
1IIll.lturalsystem of human reason which establishes anq' ~cludes the whol~
111 I'lIrther eonsequence it would include the essential ~-eserves law. Antl
11
wudds of experience, or possible systems of harmonizin~ ~ttems for possibl"
l~lItificthought established on the basis of them, in \\th~~periences and th
11hjcctivit ossible at that time and lace constitu~es f~e immancncc th
,\utllcgitimacy of a world existing in objectiye truth . .cOl)t ltself the mcau.!»H
Ilological psychology, systematically carried out, woulQ ~quently, e..hcI101lll;l-
~ll'hin itself in radical generality the totalit of research ~~em to e~Ol't1pl\l.¡s
twccn objective being and consciousness. It gives the ap~ ~11correlatiOlll>b
flfoper place for all transcendental clarifications. ~<\tance of being th
But on the other hand we must not overlook the fact t~
IS disciplines belongs to the "positive" sciences. In ot~ ~t psychology in all
ht.lginnin to end a science [c:uned out] .in the natural f~ words: It is frolrj
world is continuously reglven as sun 1 there at \\s, in which "the"
vorhandene] and functions as its eneral and universal t~ Qand [schlechthll'l,
pllychology especially wishes to ex lore are the minds ~tnatic basis. What
Illinds which resent themselves within this pregiven WOtl~~ cornmunities of
ogical reduction serves as a psychological method of ~~' The phenomenol-
t,tining the menta]
ttW1I1I 11I/¡l I11It1l11lI 1111 1 Illllll'l tllllllllllld 1'11111I11VlllllllllllllllllltlIlIlIlIHI'¡\
11\ (,ld(~IlI'l'lh'lIllllli'lIlilll",lt'IIIIII/mllll 11,1111111,
IIIUlIllll\lll1 mllllllH tilo l)X l/l(llllt 1111
SullNI,j lSd",\',\'ifm,llI,ppI'Oplillltl io whlll L~ 111 hlilllllll
¡lIo wIII'Id hut llOW l'lllltll'd
~o possiblo (conc!.livl1blo)1'0111wor!(iN. I\Vl.i1llINlIlI ddl..lllt:phOIlOlllonologisl, 11\l
psychologist is transcendentally na'fvc. 1Jowúvur much 1Il.l 01' she may try to PI~t
everything psychophysieal out of Qlay in directing his/her interest towal:d th~
urely mental, these are still actual or possible "minds," minds thoughL qj
completely in the relative sense of this word [336] as always the minds 01
bodies out there, that is to say, mind of concrete human beinlls in a soalilll
world.
BUt if we allow the transcendental interest instead of the natural-woridly
interest to become our theoretical standard, then psychology as a whole, Ii)<
every other positive science, must be labelled as transcendentally problemali"
[questionable]. Psychology cannot make available any of its premises to trans-
¿endental philosophy. The subjectivity of consciousness, whieh is its topie,
Le., the mental [seelische], cannot be that which is inguired back to transcen-
gentally.
At this decisive point everything hinges on whether one keeps in view with
unerring seriousness. the thematic meaning of the transcendental mode 01'
mqUlry.
We have been driven out, expelled, from the na'iveté of naturalliving-along;
we have become a~are of a peculiar split or cleavage, so we may call it, which
runs through all our life-process; namely, that between the anonymously
functioning subjectivity, which is continuously constructing objectivity for us,
and the always, by virtue of the functioning of anonymous subjectivity, pre-
, given objectivity, the world. This world also includes within it human beings
wj.th their minds, with their human conscious life. When we consider the
p~rvasiv~ and unsuspendable relatedness of the pregiven and self-evidently
~xisting ~orld to our functioning subjectivity, humankind and we ourselves
appear as intentionally produced formations whose sense of being objectively
real and whose verification of being are both self-constituting in subjectivity.
Also, the being of the objective, a being that appeared to the contingent con-
sciousness as "over against" it and "in and of itself," has now appeared as a
p1eaning ~hat constitutes itself within consciousness itself.
'I'hil tllNk tl\llt llnW 111 l/ION
'IH'r~tibJQc(jv¡tyIInd cOIINtillltúuobJoclivlty j1l1olllglblu,II\)t.I11Ntlo prllttlllllboll(
I 1111lIl\ply ü()J\orality bot lO ~lllrify lt In lorl1ls 01' 1111
tilo en(ugo,llIt 1'OU1)s 01
woJ'ldlllloss LWcltlid~eit], in tlccordancc with tho universal Nh'lCtllf<.l1:l 01' 1I~(
wodo jtN~f. lf wc accept the premise that the constitulivo fonctiom¡ al' Q<W-
dOIlNncSI!JJ337] both active and passive, are actllallllQ. be brOllght to Ilg!.Jll
IIIIll,)1l011S
which make evident to us the meaning and self-verifying beillfl 01'11
wodd we accept as there, then this task is manifestly a totally differonl ()Il(,l
t'mlll that of all positive sciences - and, as compared with all of thom, IN
"l\lnpletely new. Por all of,these sciences, the intelligible existence [DaseinJ 01
" world is presupposed, and its fundamental knowability, also, to no loss a
d(lgl~. Both of these remain outside the topie [of a transcendental phcllomo-
lIology]. The all-embracing question for these sciences is how this world, Illld
I world as such, is to be determined in objective truth. The question which
llr'oady leaps beyond every positivity, namely whether there is a world at Hit lo
\lhjective truth, and the critical question of how this is to be established, IlUI
1I0t be held before us at the outset, no matter how much the latter quoNllüll
,I!'Oadypenetrates into what is primordially transcendental. Rather, ~ o,IBI-
11111 and in itself chief question, as we mentioned, is directed to a cIarifylng
\}lsclosure of the consciousness that, as such, constitutes all objectivily. AlId.
llorrelatively it is directed to that whieh emerges in it (and in the whole objoc-
llvizing subjectivity) as a result, the world and a possible world as such as a
IIlcaning of being [Seinssinn] that originates in this way for uso
Like every meaningful question, the transcendental question presupposes a
fou,~d5~f.un'l!!esti~.,!ed_being, in which all the means for its resolution must
he contained. When we pose this question to our factual world,7 we presup-
pose our being and our conscious life, understood as that through whose
Ilnknown productive functioning this world acquires a meaning for us, as welI
'8 aU that is determined within the world of these objects of experience, etc. In
ddetic inquiry we have to do with a conceivable world as such in apriori
enerality, and indeed as related to a freely conceivable modification of our
subjectivity, again presupposed as constituting that worlq. Admitt~dly, as
factual presences in the background we inseparably also play our role, in so far
liS we are the ~es who have conceived the possible worlds of possible consti-
lllting subjectivities. It should be evident that this unguestioned and presup-
posed ontological gronnd (Seinsboden], which is also the basis for the presup-
posed possibilities, is not to be confused with what the transcendental
7 Translator' s note: Emphases in this paragraph have been added by the translator.
11I'!NIIOII 111 1I/11-l111ll'lllllly 11l~'IH 11' hlllll qlHlHlhlll
'I'liu IllliVIlINltldOllUdll .,1 IlllllNl'llltdl\lltlilCjlltlllllllllllhllHyiN tilo lolllllty 01
tl'HllNclllldunlll1 wbkb INtbu wholool' t1llllltlll iIVldí1lltly llxiNtlllp,wol'ld
1l11'(VI.l16
as such, Accordingly,
acceptance; it is suspended wjthout1'111
thiNwol'ld lit PHI'l.llllllmltl/1
m:king whol11ol'¡111M
IN \'\lit
h '11p.lln110 ils si'lIple
1MJIlMtll1ód l)r nol. "\Nu,
do not aIlow ourselves to make a statement str~¡jghl-()lItllbollt anything renl
[l~eales]; we may not make use of anything in the realm of what iti at hand, 11()
mªtter how evident it may be. To do so would be absurd - contr~ to th
m~aning of transcendental inquiry. Iv-accordance with it all positive sciences
are I\ubjected to an epoché caIled the_"transcendental epoché." - Along with
this, then, it would be a "transcendental circle" to base transcendental philoso-
phy, that is, the science constructed according to the demands of the transcen-
d\mtal question, on psychology, which, to be sure, ~xists not only as an em-
p~rical science but also as an eidetic positive science. 01' stated equivalently:
The ~ubjectivity which itself constitutes aIl (real and ideal) objectivity cannot
be psychological subjectivity, not even that psychological subjectivity which
cidetically and in phenomenological purity is the topic of psychological phe-
pomenology.
But pow do we overcome the paradox of our doubling [Verdoppelung] -
and that of all possible subjects? We are fated as human beings to be the
psychophysical subjects of a mental life in the real world and, at the same
time, transcendentaIly to be subjects of a transcendental, world-constituting
Ffe-proce~s. To clarify this paradox, consider the foIlowing: mental subjectiv-
ity, the concretely grasped "1" and "we" of everyday discourse, is grasped
experientially in its own essentiality through the method of phenomenological-
psychological reduction. Its eidetic variation (in focussing on what is a priori
conceivable) creates the basis for pure phenomenological psychology. The
sybjects, which as "minds" [Seelen] are the topic for psychology, are the
human subjects we find every day when we are in the natural focus. They are
out there before us, and we ourselves as human beings are bodily and mentaIly
present to ourselves through objective external apperception and eventually
through topical acts of external perception. We observe that every externa)
perception of individual realities, and thus every moment that is not self-
~ufficient within us, has its being within a universal external apperception
which runs through the whole course of our waking tife; [339] it is through
this apperception, operating steadily and continuously, that one is aware of a
total perceptual present with its horizon of an open past and fut~re; and in the
course of this flowing-along one is conscious of this as tile changing modes of
appearance of the one unceasing spatial world existing from out of living
temporality.
If in reflection we focus on this all-embracing apperception of what is
external, and next on the total conscious life in which it is grounded, then this
11111 "" Ih", 11I1111ll Y IHlhll" lIvII IIl'ilIH IIlId 111,' pllll"
1111\ hl,lll~ lllillc' 1011.111\ 01'"111.,"wol'1d
,11111¡,ti lIl\l Nlil'dlk 1"d1ll11lH 1"II11ilm¡ ¡lIlli llW Ih\lm fol' 11I0 • , IN1I11\(ll~t NI) 10
lli,"k. Thl.l wodd ., of whldl W., 1111\ 1IlWIIYN NpOllklllg,whlch Wl) t.:UIl Hlway~
Illo.lm;1 111 flllltllNY 01' 11I1IlJjlnutloll 1I11llJ}', wilh ()voJ'ytblng tbut 1::\ iu1\ljj:~v 01'
lop,klllly thoro rol' UN- l~ 1I01lt)othor ihHIItht.:nocmatic cQuelate oí this
1'llthJ'lIcingsubjectivlty ()f cOl1/,clousnoss, and the experiential world given.
Ihwllgh that all-embracingJ!..pporcoption of the externa! world. Now how do
Ihlllgs I)tand in relation to this subjectivity? Is it [subjectivity] something that 1
111' Woas human beings experience? Is it something experienceable? Is it what
hofore us, available in the world of extension as belonging to the spatial
wOl'ld?We ourselves as human beings are out there, are present to ourselves,
IIdividuaIly an9 collectively, within an all-embracing apperception and yet
ollly present to ourselves by virtue of special external apperceptions. In p~r-
l'nptions 01 external things 1 myself am given to myself within the total ~-
I'nption of an open spatial world, a perception that extends still further into the
ull-mnbracing; thus, in external experience I also experience myself as a
hlll11anbeing. It is not merely my outward bodily corporality which is exter-
Illll1y'perceived; the merely natural body is the object of an abstractive focus;
hllt, as concrete person 1am in space; 1am given in the spatial world as every
lIthor person as such is given, and again as every cultural object, every art-
work, etc., is given. In this focus on external experience (in the world of
iprLCe)my subjectivity and every other mental subjectivity is a component of
lhís concrete being as person and consequently it is the correlate of a certain
¡(temal apperception within the all-embracing apperception of the world.
(t is now evident that the apperceiving conscious life-process, wherein the
world and human being in its particularity within it are constituted as existen.-
llnlly real, is not what is [340] apperceived 01' constituted [in it]; it is not the
lIIental which as human mental being 01' human mental life-process comprises
Ihe apperceptive make-up of the real world. Something [else yet] is necessary
111 order to make this distinction between transcendental and worldly, concrete
.)onscious ¡¡fe (between transcendental and real subjectivity, respectively), as
fully secure as possible, and in order to make transcendental subjectivity
vident as an absolutely autonomous field of real and possible experience
(thus to be called transcendental), and as a further consequence to secure and
l!,ake evident an absolute 01' transcendental science based on it [real and
possible experience]. To this end we will treat the "transcendental-
phenomenological reduction" a liUle more precisely, the method of access
which leads systematicaIly from the necessarily first given field of experience,
that of external experiencing of the world, upward into all-embracing, consti-
tutive absolute being, i.e., - into transcendental subjectivity. In or~er to make
our ascent easier we will not carry out the transcendental reduction directly;
lulh.", Wt' wlll lilIlí .'1';1 Nll'jlWlthl 111111I Ihll ptlYllhllll¡\h
1I,1I1It'1IolI, Jilld ilt'JiI ¡Ilo h'llIír~t'11Il1hll1I111 1I,¡hllllI1l1l
;ruws out 01' IIl1d fu 11 11 IN Ilul I1NYt'hulUHltlllll'lldIl01l0Il,
phenom~nological rcdllctlcm l"'l\\,)llcod by tlit.l pNychof()IJIiH, As l\ n.lNiJlIrchor TII
~ositive science, the psychologist hus as his úbjoct 01' stwJy montal ,~l1bjol'
tivit~~_~omething real in the pregiven, constantly and naturally aCCl.lpi(1tl
~, ~s_~ide..tic p_henomenologist, however, he explores the logos of 1111
mental. His thel]:la~~grJ)und is then a conceivable world as such, likewise Ntlll
thought of ~s simply exi~tiI!g and_pregiv~n.
The phenomenological-psychological reduction is for him a method 01
limiting the concretely mental [das real Seelische] and above all the in/en
tional process, to its eidetic essence by putting out of play or leaving out 01
account the transcendent positings at work in this life-process. ,In order to g:llll
th~ pure mental totality from the outset in the form of all-embracing Hlld
unitary phenomenological intuition, and fram there to press on to an eidolk
psychology of pure phenomenological subjectivity, that putting-out-<Jf
~ccount, thai-p¡lenomenological epoché, must be carried out beforehand 111
generality and in a habitual v~. In doing this, however, the psychologiNI
still does not cease to be a positive-science researcher; in other words, [34 J] lo
hold his apperception of the world in acceptance as valido But as soon as III
radically inhibits his apperception, a Copernican revolution take place which
attacks the whole of his life, including all of his work as a psychologist. Ih
becomes a transcendental phenomenologist who now no longer has "thoH
world (or even a possible world that he presupposes as existent); he no 10ng!)1
is investigating objects at hand, realities that belong to the world. For him lh¡
worlº--ªº(L~Y_~l}'_Qºssibleworld is mere phenomenon. Instead of having .!Jw
~orld as pregiven existence, as he as normal human being previously did, he
~ merely a transcendental spectator who observes and, in experience and
analysis of experience, uncovers this having of world, [i.e.,] the way that
world and this world "appears" in consciousness in accordance with meanin¡.
and is accepted as real.
While the psychological inner eXQerience conceived purely as phenomenol
ogical always still remained a kind of external, worldly eXQerience, after lh!
radical epoché with regard to world-acceQtance the Qsychological inner eX129"
rience became a new kind of transcendental experience in which absolutely
nothing fram real, spatial-worldly being is straightforwardly posited. Whil<.:
the psychologist as psychologist was from first to last included in the topic ill
apperceptive form as a person in the world, the phenomenologist as phenomc.
nologist, on the other hand, is for himself no longer 1, this particular person;
rather, as person he or she is "put in parentheses," is himselflherself a phc-
nomenon. For his transcendental ego, he or she is a Qhenomenon of egoic
being, of egoic life-Qrocess [lch-Seins and Ich-Lebens], which in the radica.!
Id Iplll'Holl1l1lhllnHh 1,11
"""'/1,' lI\llll,IUI~ l'ollillllllllWly t1IIIlIIlIlNflHltlu 11/1 )l1"IlINI\ly ¡hlli uhhllllli1ly IU'II
UN 11 tUl thlíl' lI'IIII('1I0H wlll'" 1
1IlI1IhlH 11IIhkdlvlly WhOM'l IlIllvlllllNly hlddllll IIlll10/lll'llNhlll11lll 1/'1 11,1) 1111
I.oí IlilllWlt;W tlil', typi' 01 .'1111" 1lt'IIlB II,Plllmll1pfllIlI 01 lIUl wlldd.
'j'1\ll h'IIIlHCI~lIdQntlll il/UJI,/;(l, 11m Illdllml pulllng 011I 01' clll\NJclol'lltll)nóv~IY
Illlhlillltl WhIlI,NUt.lVl.lf 01' Ill~llOI'''IIH i!lo "oxiNtlllg w0dd," iN IlcoOlupllshod
IhlOllgll un nct of wlI!.Jn SH¡;h11WIIY I'llUt i¡ is Honce llnd for uB"; fi'Qn1 nQw ()ll
thlNIUlbitually and consluntly finn rOt/olveof wiU maleos the phenomenologist
11 Iru\l/3ccndcntal phenomenologist and opens up to him or her the field 0'1'
IIl1lINccndentalexperience and the eidetics of the transcendental.
(j ís easy to see, now, that the whole of mental content [seelische Gehalt) in
IN proper essence, a content which the psychological-phenomenological
Il'duction brings to light and which psychological phenomenology describes,
,'l1Inuinsconserved as [342] transcendental content thraugh the higher-level
IllId radicalized epoché, except that whatever is of psychological-real signifi-
l'lIl1cewithin it is left behind in the phenomenon. This [transcendental] content
INconstantly braadened to encompass the apperceptive bestowing of meaning
1111 human consciousness, lhe human mind [or soul], and the like.
If the transcendentally attuned [or focussed] ego, that is, the ego living in
¡!lo habituality of the radical epoché, accomplishes its reflection on conscious-
IItll)6, ever and again repeating such reflection, then there is generated for it the
puro transcendental, ever and again the transcendental; indeed, it comes in the
1I1lUlIler of a quite new kind of experience which is "inner" in the transcenden-
1111 sense; 01', better, is transcendental experience. And parallel with this, the
/(ll1owing also holds tme: !f the reflection on consciousness is accomQlished
hy someone in the Qhenomenological-psychological focus, and in iteration,
offers reflection on this reflection, and so on, no matter how much the {e-
1.\
llrcher may obtain thereby for the phenomenological, his or her reflection on
'onsciousness will still only attain a psychological meaning.
11
The transcendental field of being [Seinsfeld] as well as the method of access
lo it, transcendentlj.l reduction, are in parallel with the phenomenological-
pNy~hological field" and to the means of access to it, the psychological reduc;
tlQ.!!:. We can also say: the concretely grasped transcendental ego and transcen~
<Iontal community of egos, along with the concretely fulI transcendental life,
IIre the transcendental parallel to the level of ''r' as human being and we as
human beings in their ordinary meaning, concretely grasped as purely mental
Nubjects with their purely mental life. Parallel in this case means: a corre-
Np'ondence that is parallel in each and every particular and connection; it
means a being different and a being seQarated that is different in a quite pecu-
liar way and yet not with an outsideness from each other in any kind of natu-
ral-level sense of the worId. 1,Jlis must be correctly understood. My transcen-
dental ego is, as the ego of transcendental experience of self, clearly
"~i(fe!~e from my natural human ego, and yet it is anything but some kind of
 IIlylhhlH huI 11 t11l1l111t~1lI
1\111
lIJII 1 HImNo 111'llllll ImhlH lIutNldl~ I!ln 1I11111hlil.Il\llrrd, lwldlilllly
quiroN un t1110rlltioll 01' fOCIlN, 1ll11dlllhld t1l1'lIt1gh ¡!In 1l1lll/h'Ulldlillllll
trll!!sform my purcly psychologicul (,j)(podcncc 01' sdl' (1110 plmllOll)l,lllologil:.:1I1,
illJl psychological sense) into transecndental oxp0dollCO 01' Sl.lIf.And eorr\,)
sponding to this, all the things 1 meet with in my lnind Hcquirc through it by
the confirmation of their proper essences, a new, absolute transcendental
meanmg.
§ 14. On the Parallelism between Phenoménological Psychology
and Transcendental Phenomenology.
This transition within transcendental reflection necessarily creates an
identification. 1, who am in my absolute and ultimate being wholely and
completely nothing objective but rather the absolute subject-ego, find myself
within my life-process, which. is constituting all obje~tive being for me, as an
a~ceptance-~orrelate [Geltungskorrelat: that is, the correlative entity within
the mental process of accepting things as this or that and as truly existent] in
an apperceived form as human ego accepted as an object, that is to say, as the
content of a self-objectivation (self-apperception) which, as something pro-
duced by me - that is, as a production [Leistung] in which 1 am imposing a
concrete meaning on myself - belongs precisely to my absolute being. If this
intermingling has become intelligible by means of. an alteration of focus - an
alteration which, of course, is already taking place within the transcendental
fo~us - and with ~hj~_the_~~!:!!iat:overlapping_?l.~pheres of _experience right
down to specific details, then the result is self-evident: a remarkable parallel-
ism, indeed, to a certain extent an overlap, of p~enomenological psychology
~d transcendental phenomenology - both understood as eidetic disciplines.
J:he one is implicitly concealed in the other, so to speak. If. while remaining
c¡;aptivetq normal positivity we cultivate _aconsistent psxchological phenome-
~ll-er!!!>_racing intersubjectivity, a universal eidetics based on purely,
mental intuition, then a single volitional step - the willing of a universal and
radic<!.L~ch~-=-_'!Yl!lliad to .t,l,.!!'.!l1~l?ndental
transvaluation of all the results
?f phenomenological psychology. Obviously this requires as motive for it all
the considerations that lead to transcendental inquiry, Tuming this around:
Standing on a ficm transcendental foundation [Boden] and working out a
transcendental science, we certainly can still put ourselves back into the
natural focus and give everything that has been transcendentally determined
regarding structural forros of a possible transcendental subjectivity the eidetic
signification of phenomenological-psychol~g!fal structures, In this instance,
IhIlUI¡h, ,h
11111t\Iill'h .
Jt IIl1ly n
I hlllnp.hH Ihlll III! plIrJhlVhy. 1I1l11 IlIIIH'dlllly pNytl!1olllHlolll JlONHlvlly. iN 11
l'I}(W/¡¡f, lo
1I111~lllllllo fOl'lllllllolllllllllilllpllNh,'d hy !llIlIIlO11lldllllllll 0POl'II110IlN,
I 1I1t1sl sfin 1ll0lltlOll 11111 1'1I1l! tlUit, IIN1)110 CUn SCO,oidctic l344] plumol11onol-
".,.10111 psychology is ullythlllH hul 11lllOrOoidetics of the individual ego; it is,
Iltl!lllr, the eidetic~ 01' phollollll.lllological intersubjectivity. With the introduc-
tlnll 01'the transcendentaJ rcduction this intersubjective psychological eidetics
Illlds its transcendental parallel. Concrete, full transcendental subjectivity is
illt, ¡\ll [space, cosmos] that comes from within, pure, transcendentally har-
1I11)llious and only in this way the concrete cosmos [All] of an open community
tlf IlgQ§..
Transcen.dental intersubjectjvity is the absolute and only self-sufficient
I)JllolQgicalfoundation [Seinsboden]. Out of it are created the meaning and
vlllidity of everything objective, the totality [All, cosmos] of objectively real
¡¡lstent entities, but also every ideal world as well. An objectively existent
Ihlllg is from first to last an existent thing only in a peculiar, relative and
lIuomplete sense. It is an existent thing, so to speak, only on the basis of a
oovcr-up of its transcendental constitution that goes unnoticed in the natural,
focus [or attitude]. And on account of this cover-up, the fact simply does not
12~~come visible that the objective thing is a unity whose intentional unity and
ICceptance as valid is intentionally constituted, and it has its true being in and
(ve itself only on the basis of a transcendental bestowal of meaning, thus
I-jlliningits continuing credibility and persuasiveness from ongoing processes
01' )egitimation within the transcendental and through the habituality arising
~)\Itof these [processes] in accordance with their essence.
§ 15. Pure Psychology as Propaedeutic for Transcendental Phenomenology.
<The Radical Overcoming of Psychologism.>
Through a clarification of the ambiguity of meaning in the nature of
(phenomenologically pure) conscious subjectivity and the eidetic science
rclating to it, we can understand on deepest grounds the historical invincibility
()f psychologism. Its power lies in a transcendental semblance or illusion
rSchein], quite in accordance with its essence. which, so long as it remained
nnnoticed and undisclosed as an illusion, had to continue exercising its influ-
I.lnce.
From Descartes' time into our own, the transcendental problem did not
penetrate through to clarity and scientific definiteness with regard to its fun-
damental and necessary principIes, Only radical reflection of an unlimited all-
1111\111111 ili}\1ll1NII tu whhllillllliliit'1Vli'il~11l1 11I pNVI 1l1l1"HIlIlll, wllh 11 1" "'1l11l1 'n "111 P"
IlIll.llllitlltllllllldlll 01 iHil Iwhkllivlty lI11dI'VI"Y ,wh¡t'cllvity Wtl i'c;tdd OVI"
I'hllllllllphy, lilld Yi)i IN ltlhdly Un,.. lIilll'd I,V H,l'llfllllClllN Ihl1Jlllyilholol-\lIlOl
•• j' lti
conceive O/' (U lié!whose I'UIII,,;1l01l1l 01'1,)0llNUl0llNlIllNN
Jll(lihiOlltlV(llYIlllllllllll!"01
1"111'1IJ1lll'hullllo lllp'll' 111 11I 1'111/111111
plI'yl1llo!o}',INlIllI In l'tHllllIl lix.lo!(lgy IlIld
being and every truth), could lout! to thu g011uinutrIlIlN<.ll.llldolltul prObll.llllI ~Il!'ll 1111"1 u yo/ I JlI'lIullu() I/'/'(I~m l.
and to the radical question ol' the sense ol' being [Seill.l'silU1) 01"thi::;subjcct ¡vil
1'0 110 NUrl.l,thl.lfOW'IN /10 ltll'k 11/ /1I'glll1ll.lntatlvo
untlpsychologism in ,tradi-
and the method of grasping it. Only when the transcendollllll
IhuHIIII'lllIlicc,mdolltlll phlloNop!ly, hill,lIowhcre were the objections deeply and
phenomenological reduction was developed could our knowledge matun.l ll!
1h lllly t.lllough bascd, 11:7/' did hoso who explored the evidence see conceptu'"
f
fullness: that the transcendental subjectivity of consciousness (which WII
ullV lhal u science of tho tnlllllCundental must self-evidently go back to con~
presupposed in the problem) ~s not an empty metaphysical postulatc b,,1 ,IOIIN uxperience (BewusstseinseJjahrung] and on tbis ground [Boden]
spmething given within an experience of its own type, namely transcendent I 11
,1I1111l~h tictual descriptive, analytic and eidetic work, carry out a radical clari-
experience, but, to be sure, [this subjectivity is] an infinite realm of manifold
lit 1I1l0/lol' all of reason in its special forros. This path, had it been pursued
special types of experiences and therewith also of an infinite number. 01' d
wlfll I'Ildical consistency, would have led to tbe development of apure eidetic-'
scriptions and analyses.
1'1I1111oJnonology. Even before tbe necessity for a fundamental separation
From that point it was a fundamentally ~mportant further step to recogniz(
lt"lwt\cll psychological and transcendental phenomenology (and, within this, a
the significance of the transcendental-phenomenological experience: namely, 1'1I1\IlOmenologicaltheory of reason) had been recognized, such an eidetic
that its sphere is not merely the philosophizer' s own transcendentally purificd
1'1I1\/lomenologywould have at least implicitly accomplished the main work,
ego but rather, it is what makes itself known in this ego through the manifold
"llh()lIgh tbe truly definitive solution could only come about after this separa-
alter ego opened by transcendental empathizing and then from the transcen-
111I/l, lo contrast to this possibility, the foes of psychologism, because they
~!!y_02.el!!_<?ndJess~..8.<?J_~._~g_~~~i.tt_':Yhic:h manifests itself transcenden- tIlO tricked by anxiety over tbe potential psychologism of systematic and
tally ~nevery ego in changing orientation. ,
Illllvursal research into consciousness and pushed it away to the psychologi~ts,'
. Therewith, a transcendental philosophy as rigorous science8 resting on th
'.,11 loto pointless formalistic argumentation and distinguishing among con-
absolute ontological foundation [Seinsboden], which is to say the experiential I l'pt'/l; this was contrary to the spirit of genuine science and could bear little'
foundation [Eifahrungsboden] of transcendental intersubjectivity, instead 01' 11I11t.

on our groundless speculation (namely, resting on no corresponding experi-

A definitive clarification of the real meaning of transcendental philosophy,
~nce), which is always ready to envelope everything in mythical metaphysics.
wcll as of transcendental psychologism and the definitive overcoming of it,
,tIC
The breakdown in conceptualizing transcendental subjectivity in a radical
ollly became possible through developing the idea of an eidetic phenomenol-
way, or what amounts to the same thing, the absence of the method of tran-
II~y as something double, and through radical meditations appertaining to it of
scendental reduction, did not allow a separation to be made between this tht)sort we have presented above.
transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity. One of these is, so
to say, the above-the-world, as world-constituting, theme of transcendental
philosophy, first and foremost of eidetic transcendental phenomenology; the § 16. The Building of a Transcendental Philosopby.
other is internal to the world as the empirical topic [Thema] of psychology, as
the eidetic theme of phenomenological psychology. So the psychology 01'
This malees understandable a certain independence from psychologiéal
cognition [Erkenntnis, knowledge] had to be transformed unnoticed into the
phullomenology in the construction of a transcendental phenomenology, anc,I
transcendental theory of knowing [or epistemology], and the psychology of the
vlcc versa, in spite of their being fundamentalIy intertwined and interimpli-
valuing and practical reason had to be transformed into the transcendental t'Uledwith one another and therewith, conceived in their fulfillment with full
theory [346] of these sorts of reason [Vernunftsarten]. Psychologism thus had
lf-understanding of their meaning, and their identicalness. l) It is already
to remain unclarified and in force - 1 mean the fundamental [prinzipielle],
dcar at the outset that without linking up with psychology at alI (much less
with any other science) one can at once take into consideration the relatedness
8 Rigorous science - of COUl'Se,!his concepl is transfonned through !he whole undertaking by phenome-
no!ogy of!he reduction. The will 10 u!timale responsibility. in which !he universe of possible Icnow!edge is lo ti" all objectivity to consciousness, formulate the transcendental problem,
~se. !eads lo a recognition of!he fundamental insufficiency of al! "rigorous science" in !he posilivisl sense,
~. proceed to the transcendental reduction and through it to transcendental expe~
lll' W \' Hllll dllc~t h t "'111'1111 11 rnn-n. 'TU •• .-,' , •• , . '-n.---'~I
n ..·-'...,n-..

dlll'otly IllllI hl,IVH' 111',11 t, Ihh¡ INIhill (Iltllml /liil1Illpli'd '11 11111 lll~t, 011\di/lit ully lu íllll"~llllllllllhIH 1111' Wlllllllln llullllIHlllf IlIltillUllll\l1I pllll
11 lIU,lothQr la/lUd, l)i10 (JI1lI, IlN1)1\1' PtilNllllllllIl)1l1" ih(jNil h'CtlllllN l\ll¡-lNh\1WlI, 'llllll~l'oxpmhmtm." whlolt ,dlllldy III,lollgM lo llulklll~ 11 pllyohlll!lfd('III plli
start out al first uudjstllrbl.ld hy Iluy h'llUNCQud01l11l1-phlll)NOphiClIl Illil,lmNtN, 1I11111l111111l)gy1II1d11 IHIY('l\lIlollY 111'1 ",IItHílll IH'h'lli.l~lnI' IlIolN plwllhhlj IIlId lli'l'
from t.be guestion of the rcquil"cmont!l fOI"a Ij.gol"ously Ncicntific pNtchololSY 11 Illhlly, tilo djf'ficully III lllldt111ltlllldl1l}\11 tl'lIIINClmclI.lIlLJ,1qll~Nll()ll¡nH sllllldJloltil
positive science: one can demonstratc the necessity fOI"a lTIothodica~ 1'01111 ltlllltléllhod which g0\.l1JhllYOlld 1111 pONlllvity.'1
dational and purely rational (eidetic) discipline focussed 011 what belongN 1(1 'l'lm lruIlNCI.ll1dcntllUntl.ll'üNIItllkl.lu 111ilNülf, iN ccrtain1y [349J tho hlgla0NI IIfld
the very essence of the mental and on the all-embracingness of a purel.y m(;ullll IIhlllllllll Nclcntific intewsl; /lO rnuch so, that lranscendental phcnOll\l,mology iN
eOñteXi,- and Tn--ihIsway-systematical1y rlevelop the idea of an eidetic 1'1)( 11111 oldy :\ philosophical discipline in a specialized sense and tl philONOphiclIl
nomenological psychology, having it establish itself in the full ;~, 1IIIlIIdlltional science, but also is the all-embracing absolute scicnco which
embracingness of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Afterwards, t11l' I'ullhkls cvcry possible science to be an ultimately scientific sciencc, In ll.~
peculiar nature of the necessary phenomenological epoché as "parenthesizing" YlltC\lI\llticdevelopment it leads to all eidetic sciences, through which thün all
the whole world, even though an acceptance of the natural world as exislclll 11I('illlllsciences are rationalized, but at the same time, when transccndcntally
certainly lies at its foundation, irnmediately offers an obvious motive 1'01 ('/HllhIiNhed, they are so broadened as to leave no more meaningful problelOR
radicalizing this reduction, for awakening the transcendental problem in it1'l IIpllll - say, under the heading of philosophical problems that got 1eft out.
purest form, and producing, like the Copernican revolution, a transcendent.HI AI'(1ol"dingly, in a system of sciences, 01' better, in the construction of a llllivbr-
revolution in psychological phenomenology. Ihis indirect path through tlw d Ncicnce in which each individual science is not a separated and iNollltcd
eositivity of e.~~rical and eid~tic psychology has great propaedeutic advan- pll'co but rather a living branch of the universal [all-encompassing] NclbIlC""
tages: IIlIl I'ight way to go is first to formulate transcendental phenomenology lndll-
--a-The transcendental focus which is set up through a radically consistent Ill\lIdontly in its transcendental theories, and next show what it is in ¡tsulf h
and conscious transcendental reduction, signifies nothing les s than an [3481 llX hibiting the essential namre of the natural focus as over against the CSSbllll1l1
áltering of the whole ~orm of life [Lebensform] previously practiced not only 1IIII.III"eof the transcendental focus, and through this bring to light the pONsibll
by the particular 'T' and "we" but also historically by humanity as a whole: an Iy of making a conversion of the transcendental phenomenological doctrino/!
absofüte.all-embrac1ng, and radical shift in the naturalliving-along of life and ulo doctrines of psychological positivity.10
one's natural living in a pregiven world; a change in the mode of experiencing,
of thinking, and of every other kind of activity, and also in all the modes 01'
reason. The radical undergirding of this sort of life and wOrk and attunement.
of all of life on the foundation of transcendental experience must by virtue of
its absolute alienness fram everything to which we have been accustomed, be,
iike anything new,'very hard to understand. And likewise with the meaning of
a purely transcendental science,
v Historically, transcendental phenomenology developed in such a way !hat eidelÍc phenomcnolof\y 1110"
2:...On the other hand, psychological phenomenology is certainly also a new
~1l1l1cditself firsl, which in its novelty saw !he hislorical psychology as some!hing set in opposlllon lO 11,
thing historically in its method of. intentional analysis, and especially in its IIl'olll!he beginning it [transcendental philosophY] !hought of itself as !he basic [Grund] sciencc dcdlOlllcd II¡
<;lisclosure offñteñtionaf~pHeatIOJiS:-comPíetcly- original. And since it moves Ir 11Ilscendental c1arificalÍon, but certainly at !hal roinl wi!hout c1arity about its genuine mcnnlOll, !ljj¡1I
within the natural focus, it still possesses the accessibility of all positive IIlthout !he most radical grasp of !he transcendental problem; !hus, still in transcendenlal nmblgllhy I(JI
IToubleness of meaning, Doppeldeutigkeit],
science. Once it is clear and distinct with regard to its idea and at least some 10 (Overview of!he Planned Third Part:)

basic steps have been taken for carrying it out, then it will only take a little Part m. Transcendental Phenomenology:
Philosophy as UlÚversal Science Established on an Absolute Ground
deeper-level reflection in order to make the transcendental prablematic palpa-
§ 17, Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology,
ble and <¡lear by means of it and then to turn the phenomenological reduction § 18. Phenomenology and !he Crisis of Foundations in !he Exacl Sciences.
around and thus accomplish the transformation of the essential content of § 19. The Phenomenological Grounding of!he Factual Sciences and !he Empirical Scicnccs,
§ 20. Complele Phenomenology and Universal Philosophy.
phenomenological psychology into apure transcendental [philosophy]. § 21. The Highesl and Ultimale Problems as Phenomenological.
One may distinguish two fundamental difficulties in pressing on into the § 22, The Phenomenological Resolution of AlI Philosophical An!hi!heses,