Korean Reunification: Overcoming Perceptions and

Challenges

1
Table of contents

One Introduction
Two Perceptions
Three Economics of Reunification
Four Stability, Security and Global Korea
Five Conclusion
Six References

2
 Introduction
On the 25th of June, 1950, troops of the Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel
into South Korea, initiating the Korean War that would leave the Korean Peninsula
formally divided into two countries, the Republic of Korea (South Korea, ROK) and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK). Constrained by the
external factors of the Cold War and their need to rebuild after the disastrous war and
years of harsh Japanese colonisation, the war and the unity of Koreans was left
unresolved, with new difficulties mounting after those of the Cold War had partially
vanished.​1 As a country with a rich, long and united history, there is hardly reason to
argue why the two Koreas should remain separated after external circumstances forced
them apart, or kept the Korean people from governing themselves between 1910 and
1948.
Given the existing division, this essay will argue why the Korean reunification
should happen, what ought to be considered when it happens and what it means for
Korea and the rest of the world. As the essay question postulates, the underlying
assumption for reunification will be a peaceful one that is led by the ROK, as the values
of DPRK would be an anathema to the way of life and prosperity in the South, and what
the South could bring to the North to make the reunification viable. However, two
possible variants will be taken into consideration: a sudden collapse of the DPRK
regime, and a gradual and mutual negotiation process that paves way for the
reunification. Many of the issues discussed will focus on the former in order to explore
the challenges and how to best respond to them, instead of mere wishful thinking that
may be unrealistic. Furthermore, the essay will assume that any Chinese intervention is
very limited in nature, as anything larger could complicate a peaceful unification.
Broadly speaking, the essay will look at the perception of (South) Koreans towards
reunification. The issues raised by those perceptions will be evaluated through
economic, social and security issues. Lastly, the geopolitical side of things will be
considered to explain why a united Korea would benefit both global and regional
economy and security. For the final part, considerations for the future of weapons of
mass destruction and the realignment of Korea’s armed forces are not particularly
discussed as they warrant an essay of their own.

Perceptions: A Pragmatic (Re)Union

Multiple surveys indicate that the support for reunification is relatively high amongst
South Koreans. Although the support has fluctuated throughout the recent decades, for
example, due to the shelling of Yeonpyeong and other incidents, the rate of approval
has remained fairly high since then (Kim et al., 2018). Amongst all age groups, the
geographic unification of the Korean Peninsula consistently ranks as the top answer
when asked what the reunification means. However, there are some differences between

1
​Henry Kissinger provides a splendid account of the diplomatic and strategic (mis)calculations involved, in his
book ​Diplomacy​ (1994).

3
older and younger generations, with the former placing more value on cultural and
ethnic kinship, and the latter on preventing war between ROK and DPRK or improving
the economy (Lee & Lee, 2019). Furthermore, most groups acknowledged that the
reunification may not come soon, and that it can be a long process, which may involve a
state-union of sorts of a confederation between North and South. In addition, many of
the people who took the survey (particularly younger age groups) suggested that
improvement in the economic and political conditions of the North and approval from
other regional and major actors were important preconditions to achieving reunification
(Lee & Lee, 2019).
Thus, the research and opinion polling suggests that the Korean reunification has
significant support among the South Korean populace, and despite its difficulties is a
goal worth pursuing. As Kim et al., argue, ‘’The data suggests that restoring national
identity through unification is not important to the younger generation. Rather, it would
be accurate to say that the younger generation views North Korea as a nation
threatening South Korea’s security rather than as a people sharing the same ethnic
background’’ (Kim et al., 2018).
Their findings suggest that the common shared identity is not as important, and thus
care should be taken when making arguments and information campaigns for the
reunification. However, this view appears short-sighted. Although the initial note is
important, the South Korean government should certainly do its best to retain an image
of a shared culture and nation-state which in turn would help the two nations integrate
once the reunification succeeds. Highlighting, understanding and tolerating certain
differences developed over the decades is equally important to ensure that people from
the North feel welcome in the united society, and vice versa. The most important gain
here is two-sided - national unity should be retained and strengthened after the
reunification, even if pragmatic concerns should be kept at the forefront to prepare the
Korean people for the initial costs incurred from unification.
In the case of DPRK, information campaigns are crucial. Unlike East Germany
which had a modicum of stability and economic success for an Eastern Bloc country (a
prime reason for the so-called ​ostalgie and partial disenfranchisement today), North
Koreans are often faced with starvation and more overtly repressive means and thus
would undoubtedly appreciate the benefits brought by the reunification (Wolf &
Akramov, 2005). The flow of information, especially combined with the ongoing
marketisation in North Korea, may cultivate an atmosphere for change as happened in
the 1980s across Eastern Europe (Lee & Lee, 2019). This in turn, could pressure
factions within the leadership to push for a change, or in a less optimal situation, topple
Kim Jong-un (or an equally repressive successor). This could be combined with
international sanctions in a more refined stick and carrot approach that would try to seek
credible human rights concessions from North Korea, thus freeing up the flow of
information, even if it will no doubt be a slow process with multiple setbacks.
The challenge is, while Western influences were not appreciated by the East German
authorities, such influences may easily lead to death in North Korea (Bennett, 2018),
thus complicating the psychological operations and the use of soft power. Bruce W.
Bennett argues that co-opting North Korean elites through information-sharing is

4
imperative to ensure that they perceive reunification as a positive event, as the elites
may prove to be one of the main obstacles from a security perspective. Ensuring that
they know there is a place for them in a united Korean society can help bring forth the
reunification, formally end the war and smoothen the process itself, as the elites have
vested interests in their current position and the DPRK regime, and may fight against
change. However, overt propaganda should be avoided to ensure they do not fuel North
Korean paranoia and induce large setbacks to mutual dialogue and other means of soft
power, as Bennett and Park also point out, respectively. (Bennett, 2017 and Park, 2015).
As most of the writing generally seems to suggest, the reunification can be certainly
framed in pragmatic terms - no war and economic gains. Co-opting both the elites and
giving the common North Korean a stake can be eased through a confederation or a
union of some kind as suggested by a few authors (Bennett, 2018, Choi, 2007, Park,
2015 and Kim et al., 2018), even if care should be taken that these are not formed too
loosely to prevent a collapse of efforts. As the integration is no doubt a long process, a
certain amount of autonomy with close Southern oversight seems reasonable to ensure a
smooth transition that deals with endemic corruption and bad practices, and introduces
North Koreans further to ROK laws and way of life.

Economics of Reunification
The costs of reunification are one particularly divisive factor. A widely-cited report by
Goldman Sachs detailed how the reunification could spur Korea into the G7 and allow
its economy to overtake France, Germany and possibly Japan with North Korea’s
untapped potential, resulting in a ‘’bonanza’’ as described by the former South Korean
President, Park Geun-hye (Goohoon, 2009 and Cronin et al., 2015). Others dispute
excessive growth and focus on the long and costly burden of integration that the
stagnating industry of North Korea requires (Lankov, 2016).
As written before, most Koreans seem to acknowledge this cost, and perhaps the
former chief of the Ministry of Unification Ryoo Kihl-Jae managed to explain it in a
very balanced way, citing both the boons and the immense price tag reunification would
bring (Park, 2017). Realistically, a united Korea may not see itself transformed into a
gargantuan economy overnight, or even in years, but the synergy between north and
south, if managed prudently, is difficult to deny. Most importantly, the price of
reunification and integration is far lower than the human and economic cost of war that
remains a possibility as long as the demilitarised zone remains a flashpoint.

Stability, Security and Global Korea

As noted above and in the beginning, the reunification is assumed to be peaceful.
However, the ROK Armed Forces do have a role to play in the reunification. First of all,
absorbing a sizable amount of territory with a huge army requires it to be demobilised.
(Wolf & Akramov, 2005) Secondly, especially in the case of a sudden regime collapse,
instability may ensue in the North. Thirdly and most importantly, in such a scenario,
factions within the North Korean military may reject Southern authority and provoke
security concerns (Long, 2017). This will not be discussed in detail, but it is noteworthy

5
to realise and acknowledge that such may occur even if the reunification proceeds
peacefully otherwise. Otherwise, ROK Armed Forces can assist in humanitarian
operations to ensure an orderly integration and development.
Although the Korean reunification is generally supported by what could be called
stakeholders on the issue (its neighbours and great powers, more or less), the People’s
Republic of China (China, PRC) presents the most challenging issue after North Korea
itself. In spite of public and personal support towards the unification, Chinese position
remains ambiguous. (Cossa & Glosserman, 2012). Despite growing evidence that
Beijing is displeased with North Korean behaviour, it has continued to support it and
has at least two major interests at stake: the possibility of refugees and rise of Korean
nationalism within its borders, and the positioning of American forces within Korea
(Bennett, 2018). Bennett argues that US forces may be needed to stabilise the North in
the case of a regime collapse, but this seems to run counter to Chinese, and thus South
Korean interests as it could cause a diplomatic crisis or worse (Bennett, 2018). Thus, it
is imperative for South Korea to ensure not only contingency plans for itself to deal
with the multitude of issues that need to be solved internally with the reunification, but
also with its neighbours - with China at the forefront. Russia may be equally opposed to
American encroachment, but has been certainly less supportive of DPRK. Ensuring that
the refugee issues are handled swiftly, perhaps with Chinese help on ​their side of the
border, and that the American troops do not make over moves north of the 38th parallel,
but instead support South Korea through other means can negate this issue and avert the
main external obstacle to the reunification.
However, the reunification poses questions for the ROK-US alliance and the nature
of Korean military - what for, and what next? While South Korea’s existential threat
would vanish, it would nonetheless need to reorient its military to possibly meet
regional and global challenges to a certain extent, while treading a fine line between the
US and China, especially as their relations continue to sour, and as South Korean
attitude towards China may harden as well, as it did during the Yeonpyeong incident
which China did not condemn (Cossa & Glosserman, 2012, Kim, 2017). In a volatile
region, Korea’s role as a balancer between China, Japan and the US would be greatly
enhanced, and its military burden possibly eased. In addition to being a cultural and an
economic beacon, a unified Korea would no doubt play a growing part in global affairs,
making good use of its unofficial motto to ‘’benefit broadly the human world’’.

Conclusion
This essay has sought to explore the rationale for Korean reunification and the means
and considerations that need to be taken into account. As the perceptions suggest,
reunification is viewed as an important but also a lengthy process that entails many
obstacles and costs that need to be overcome, ranging from the current DPRK regime to
economic and social planning in the aftermath to ensure stability. With the mindset and
diplomacy on both sides geared towards eventual reunification, it is easy to argue why it
ought to eventually happen, and why mutual efforts need to be continued between the
two Koreas. Thus, while the division of Korea into two separate states was regrettable,
the South began offering the people what the North could not, leading up to the Korean

6
developmental state and the Miracle on Han River. South Korea has continued its
success story with added liberty, human rights, respect and prosperity, and there is no
reason why their northern kin should not be able to enjoy the same rights and the fruits
of their labour and stand united as a nation once again.

References

Bennett, B.W (2018) ​Alternative Paths to Korean Unification​, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, pp. 48,
52-54, 64-67, 77-78, 81-85.
Bennett, B.W (2017) ​Preparing North Korean Elites for Unification,​ RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
pp. 1 and 4-18.
Choi, W. (2007) ‘’From War to Peace: A Permanent Solution to the Korean Question,’’ ​International
Journal on World Peace,​ Vol. 24, No. 1 , pp. 10 and 12.
Cossa, R. & Glosserman, P. (2012) ‘’The Illogic of China’s North Korea Policy,’’ ​Pacific Forum,​ N. 32,
pp. 1-2.
Cronin, P. et al. (2015) ​Solving Long Division: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification,​
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, pp. 7 and 12-13.
Goohoon, K. (2009) ‘’A United Korea?’’ ​Global Economics Paper - Goldman Sachs Global Economics,
Commodities and Strategy Research,​ N. 188, pp. 6 and 9-20.
Kim, J. & et al. (2018) ​South Korean Youths’ Perceptions of North Korea and Unification​, Policy Brief
for the Asan Institute of Policy Studies, pp. 6, 9 and 10-11.
Kim, H. (2017) ‘’China and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Promoting a Trilateral Dialogue,’’ ​The Council on
Foreign Relations,​ discussion paper, pp. 1 and 5.
Kissinger, H. (1994) ​Diplomacy,​ Simon & Schuster, New York, pp. 474-490.
Lankov, A. (2016) ‘’’Development Dictatorship’ Could be North Korea’s Most Hopeful Future,’ ​Radio
Free Asia​, commentary,
https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/parallel-thoughts/korea-development-07192016155616.html
(last accessed 15/10/2020) pp. 1-2.
Lee, W. & Lee, E. (2019) ‘’The Issue of Mind Integration in the Unification of Divided Systems,’’
Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung,​ Vol. 44, N. 4 pp. 254.
Lee, W. & Lee, H. (2019) ‘’The Perception of Integration of North and South Korea,’’ ​Historical Social
Research/Historische Sozialforschung,​ Vol. 44, N. 4 pp. 299-304.
Long, A. (2017) ​Insurgency in the DPRK? Post-regime Insurgency in Comparative Perspective,​ The
US-Korea Institute at SAIS, Washington DC, pp. 7 and 13-17.
Park, I. (2017) ‘’The Past, Present and Future of Korean Reunification,’’ ​Harvard International Review,​
Vol. 38, No. 3. Pp. 74-75.
Park, M. (2015) ‘’Korean Unification: A New Kind of Peacebuilding Project,’’ ​Harvard International
Review,​ Vol. 36, No. 3. Pp. 29-30.
Wolf, C. & Akramov, K. (2005) ​North Korean Paradoxes - Circumstances, Costs and Consequences of
Korean Unification​, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, pp. 53-58.

2200 words