FROM THE STATES
A New Politics of Caste
Praskanva Sinharay
Caste has never been a relevant
category in the politics of West
Bengal. That has now changed
with the political assertion of
the Matua Mahasangha which
represents the organised voice of
the Namasudras.
Praskanva Sinharay (praskanva@gmail.com) is
a research scholar at the Centre for Studies in
Social Sciences, Kolkata.
26
Caste is a legacy of the feudal system and
viewing the social scene from the casteist
angle is no longer relevant for West Bengal.
– Jyoti Basu (1980)1
I shall work for the Matuas as long as I am
alive. I was moved when baro ma told me
how her people were being looked down
upon as most of them belonged to lower
castes. I do not believe in casteism and have
no problem if people call me low-caste. I
have instructed the railways to fill up all
posts for SC/ST immediately.
– Mamata Banerjee (2009)2
T
hese two statements expose the
changing politics in West Bengal.
The first statement from Jyoti Basu,
the Left Front’s (LF) mascot and former
chief minister, expresses the Front’s
position vis-à-vis the caste question which
treated caste as an irrelevant category.
The second comment, on the other hand,
made by the then railway minister and the
present Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee,
reveals that caste resides as a suppressed
organising principle for people of the
lower castes and has asserted itself as
a determinant category in the present
electoral politics of West Bengal. In short,
what we see is an emergent new politics
in the state.
The Politics of Yesteryear
The politics of West Bengal, compared to
other states of India, had been truly
unique, particularly with regard to the
caste question. Caste was considered
antagonistic to “modern” politics; it never
had been a determinant category in the
electoral politics of the province for a
number of reasons.
One, the “secular” public image of the
erstwhile ruling parties and coalitions
(initially the Congress and then the LF);
two, the prolonged rule of the LF as well
as the presence of a leftist political cul-
ture where “class” politics apparently
subsumed “caste” politics; and three,
the politics of the state had been histori-
cally dominated by the urban-educated
august 25, 2012
upper-caste bhadralok who had consti-
tuted much of the leadership of political
parties, irrespective of ideologies. Partha
Chatterjee (1997: 82) has observed
the absence of caste articulation of political
demands does not mean that caste authority
and caste linkages have not proved useful to
various political parties as instruments of
gathering electoral support in the relatively
un-mobilised areas. But the considerable
fragmentation among the middle castes, and
the overall dominance of modes of culture
and thought of the urban intelligentsia, have
prevented any successful aggregation of
caste interests in the state election scene.
In other words, the caste question had
been suppressed. This had been the
pride of the bhadralok soul that secured
its modern liberal image, evident in Jyoti
Basu’s statement. The hegemonic domi-
nation of the modern liberal bhadralok
over the public life of Bengal has now been
fractured with the dramatic entry of the
lower caste Matuas as a major vote con-
glomerate. Like a dormant volcano, they
have erupted on the state’s electoral
scene – first, in the panchayat elections
(2008), then in the Lok Sabha elections
(2009) and finally, in the state assembly
elections (2011).
A History of Caste Struggle
The term “Matua” has gained popularity
in recent times but their story of resist-
ance towards the brahminical social order
dates back to the colonial period. The
Matua sect, formed by Harichand Thakur
(1811-1878), originated as a movement
of the lower caste “untouchable” Nama-
sudras of eastern Bengal to resist the
oppression of brahminical Hinduism.
After some initial failures of the move-
ment, in 1872-73, the leadership of the
community was taken over by Guruchand
Thakur, son of Harichand, who organ-
ised them around a set of demands
and practices.
First, the adaptation of upper-caste
rituals and cultural practices. Sekhar
Bandyopadhyay (1994: 90-119) notes that
these cannot solely be explained by the
concept of Sanskritisation as the idea
behind such practices was to turn the
social order upside down. Second, the
Namasudra leaders, particularly their
vol xlviI no 34 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

preceptor Guruchand Thakur, exclusively
stressed upon community formation,
education and employment as his teach-
ings. Contrary to the ideals of 19th century
Vedantism and Vaishnavism, the Nama-
sudras were asked by their guru to get
educated, earn money and collectively
resist the upper-caste exploitation for a
respectable social status and economic
well-being.
Third, they demanded the public recog-
nition of the term “Namasudra”, instead of
the earlier “Chandal” which was dropped
in the 1911 census. Finally, the community
demanded representation in the formal-
legal institutions from where they had
been excluded. As the Namasudra leader-
ship identified the nationalist politics with
the upper caste bhadralok, the commu-
nity refrained from participating in
the nationalist movements since 1905.
Instead, the leaders were more inclined
to the British raj for securing their
demands for an esteemed social posi-
tion. Over time the Matua sect gradually
increased in popularity among the
Namasudras by proving itself a viable
agency of community assertion.
The Matuas organised themselves
through regular kirtans, periodical gath-
erings on the eve of Baruni Mela, uplift
meetings, jatras and print-culture which
continues till date. With the progress of
the movement, the Namasudras were
split into two halves – one, an emergent
elite section of Namasudra leaders, parti-
cularly under the Thakur family and,
two, a subsequent subaltern population
of poor peasants who hardly realised the
benefits of the ongoing caste struggle. At
this juncture, leaders like Jogendranath
Mandal, Pakistan’s first law minister, and
Birat Chandra Mandal came up from
among the common peasants. They
effectively mobilised the Namasudras and
aligned with B R Ambedkar, as well as
the Muslim League, to build a resistance
towards the upper caste bhadralok domi-
nance of public life and institutions
in Bengal.
After the death of Guruchand Thakur
in 1937, the movement, now under the
leadership of his grandson Pramatha
Ranjan Thakur and Jogendranath Mandal,
faced a series of problems, the greatest
of them being the communal threat in
Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 25, 2012
eastern Bengal and consequent migration,
particularly after Partition. One identity
that the Matuas carry with themselves is
that of migrants and refugees who set-
tled in large volumes in the border dis-
tricts of West Bengal like North and
South 24 Parganas, Uttar and Dakshin
Dinajpur, Malda and Nadia.
The Congress made a populist move
by incorporating them mostly as “unrec-
ognised refugees” whereas the LF recog-
nised them in a clandestine manner by
providing them ration cards and other
benefits for securing votes (Bandyopad-
hyay 2011). P R Thakur, who joined the
Congress and was twice elected to the
state legislature and once to the Lok
Sabha, emerged as a charismatic leader
of the Matuas. He established the head-
quarters of the Matua Mahasangha at
Thakurnagar in North 24 Parganas. Yet,
the Mahasangha remained on the mar-
gins of the state’s politics.
Present Politics
The indifference of the LF towards the
caste question, the bhadralok dominance
over its leadership and its non-cooperation
with the Mandal Commission in the 1980s
widened the rift between the ruling gov-
ernment and the Matuas. The Matua
Mahasangha organised itself independ-
ently of the political structures in order
to secure its long list of demands relat-
ing to social status, migration and citi-
zenship problems, as well as economic
well-being. It issued identity cards for its
devotees, held periodical gatherings,
published books, journals and pamphlets
to propagate the teachings of Harichand-
Guruchand as well as organised rallies
and other mass-mobilisation work.
The Matua Mahasangha today has more
than seven million followers capable of
influencing the electoral results in about
74 constituencies. It is presently under
the leadership of Baroma Binapani Devi
(widow of P R Thakur) who did not let
this opportunity go waste. What fol-
lowed in the state politics vis-à-vis the
Matua community was what Gopal Guru
(2010) calls “a politics of compensation”.
Late on the move, the LF government
instituted an award in the name of
Harichand-Guruchand and honoured the
present head of the Matua Mahasangha,
vol xlviI no 34
FROM THE STATES
Kapil Krishna Thakur, in 2009 for his
contribution to dalit upliftment. It also
sanctioned the establishment of the Sri
Sri Harichand-Guruchand Thakur Govern-
ment College at Chandpara and made
many other promises.
The TMC made similar moves of
upgrading the Thakurnagar railway sta-
tion, promising government jobs to Mat-
uas, a railway stadium and hospital and
above all, a candidature to Manjul Krishna
Thakur to contest in the state assembly
elections. The Mahasangha also recipro-
cated by offering life membership to
Mamata Banerjee, making her the chief
patron of the organisation.
After the sweeping victory of the TMC
in the assembly elections, Manjul Krishna
Thakur was appointed minister for refu-
gee relief and rehabilitation. A crack is
quite visible within the Matua leadership
along party lines, with the two brothers –
Kapil Krishna and Manjul Krishna –
being loyal to the Communist Party of
India (Marxist) and the TMC, respectively.
The Mahasangha has, however, still
maintained its formal apolitical stance.
Whether the present politics signals a
successful culmination of the Namasudra
movement or an extension of their politics
of resistance, or whether the Namasudra
elite will replicate bhadralok culture is
an open question. For now, all we can
say is that the caste question is no longer
alien to the politics of West Bengal and
for that the long resistance of the Matuas
is responsible.
Notes
1 Jyoti Basu, 1980, cited from Jaffrelot, 2002: 255.
2 Mamata Banerjee, The Times of India, 6 Decem-
ber 2009.
References
Bandyopadhyay, Sandip (2011): “Who Are the
Matuas?”, Frontier, Vol 43, No 37, 27 March-
2 April.
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar (1994): “Development,
Differentiation and Caste: The Namasudra
Movement in Bengal 1872-1947” in Sekhar
Bandyopadhyay et al (ed.), Bengal: Communities,
Development and States (New Delhi: Manohar
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– (2004): Caste, Culture and Hegemony: Social
Domination in Colonial Bengal (New Delhi: Sage).
Chatterjee, Partha (1997): The Present History of
West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism (New
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Guru, Gopal (2010): “Social Justice” in Niraja
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