Safety Science 114 (2019) 148–159

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/safety

Promoting and impeding safety – A qualitative study into direct and indirect T
safety leadership practices of constructions site managers
Martin Grilla,c, , Kent Nielsenb
⁎

a
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
b
Department of Occupational Medicine, Regional Hospital West Jutland – University Research Clinic and Danish Ramazzini Centre, Herning, Denmark
c
Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Sahlgrenska Academy, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Managerial leadership is an essential element in preventing occupational risk and increasing safety performance.
Leadership The aim of the present study was to investigate construction site managers’ experiences of how their leadership
Occupational safety practices influence safety performance at construction sites in order to expand present knowledge on the in-
Managerial behaviour fluence of leadership on occupational safety. The critical incident technique was applied in interviews with 37
Construction industry
construction site managers. The results provide detailed descriptions of how construction site managers both
Critical incident technique
promote and impede construction site safety performance through their leadership behaviour. The core lea-
dership behaviours involved in positively influencing safety were found to be continuous planning and co-
ordination, role modelling, monitoring work and proactively correcting deviations. Negative safety leadership
was found to emerge when site managers were subjected to positive feedback to meet deadlines, minimise costs
and refrain from unpopular leadership behaviour. Positive safety leadership may therefore be encouraged by
minimizing such feedback and/or providing site managers with positive feedback for engaging in planning,
coordinating, role modelling, and monitoring. It may also be encouraged by training and coaching site managers
to acknowledge their leadership responsibilities, to communicate clear expectations, to execute individual and
collective risk-assessment, and to execute proactive monitoring and feedback procedures.

1. Introduction Contextual factors frame how managerial leadership is constituted

Occupational accidents cause approximately 300,000 fatalities
every year (Takala et al., 2017) and over 960,000 injuries every day
(Hämäläinen et al., 2009) worldwide. Occupational safety research
indicates that the way managerial leadership is executed may sig-
nificantly affect how occupational risks are managed and occupational
safety is advanced (Conchie, 2013; Pilbeam et al., 2016; Zohar, 2002,
2010). In a recent meta-analysis, Clarke (2013) summarises the present
empirical evidence for the importance of managerial leadership for
occupational risk prevention and safety. Clarke’s (2013) analysis com-
prises empirical studies in a variety of industrial sectors and paves the
way for further research into safety leadership in the construction in-
dustry (Grill et al., 2017). The construction industry is one of the eco-
nomic sectors most challenged by occupational accidents, accounting
for more than 20% of all occupational fatalities in Europe (Eurostat,
2017), and very few evidence-based safety solutions for the construc-
tion industry have been identified (Swuste et al., 2012; van der Molen
et al., 2018).
and how managerial leadership behaviour influences organisational
outcomes (Mirza and Isha, 2017; Oc, 2018; Porter and McLaughlin,
2006). Two essential contextual factors are the occupational sector in
which leadership is executed and the hierarchical level on which the
leadership is executed (Avolio and Bass, 1995; De Hoogh et al., 2005;
Lowe et al., 1996). Most of the previous research on safety leadership in
the construction industry, including Conchie et al. (2013) and Hardison
et al. (2014), has focused on site supervisors. Both Conchie et al. and
Hardison et al. underline that organisational and managerial support
significantly affect the extent to which supervisors engage in safety-
promoting leadership practices. In construction projects, such support is
primarily provided to the site supervisors by the construction site
managers. More research is hence required to understand the role
construction site managers play in providing such support.
Construction site managers have also been identified as vital leaders
in their own right in the construction industry (Mustapha and Naoum,
1998; Styhre, 2012). The site manager is responsible for the entire
construction site, including both the performance of direct reports and

⁎
Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 500, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden.
E-mail address: martin.grill@gu.se (M. Grill).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.01.008
Received 21 August 2018; Received in revised form 21 December 2018; Accepted 9 January 2019
0925-7535/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
the work executed by subcontractors. These managers operate across
organisational boundaries, which requires them to coordinate inter-
dependent employees, subcontractors, clients and adjacent organisa-
tions (Sandberg et al., 2016; Styhre, 2012). On a day-to-day basis,
construction site managers implement leadership at both the opera-
tional and the strategic level (Fraser, 2000; Mustapha and Naoum,
1998). Mustapha and Naoum (1998) conclude that central performance
variables in construction projects were more closely related to site
managers’ personal leadership abilities than to project characteristics
such as building type, complexity/size and project duration. Managerial
leadership entails leadership behaviours performed by managers.
Manager and leader are two distinct concepts: a manager may or may
not perform leadership behaviours, and a leader may or may not have a
managerial position. In the current study our interest lies in leadership
behaviour performed by construction site managers, i.e. managerial
leadership behaviours. These managers execute leadership both in re-
lation to their own direct reports and to construction workers employed
with subcontractors.
1.1. Direct and indirect safety leadership
Griffin and Hu (2013) defined safety leadership as “specific leader
behaviours that motivate employees to achieve safety goals” (p. 200).
Leaders influence their subordinates’ safety behaviour by introducing
and altering reinforcement contingencies in the work place (Boyce and
Geller, 2001; Malott, 2001), and leadership may be defined as “the
management of reinforcement contingencies in work settings”
(Podsakoff et al., 2006, p. 113). Reinforcement contingencies can be
either instrumental/material or social/psychological (Bass and Bass,
2008; Sims, 1977) and their effect on subordinates can be either direct,
occurring as subordinates interact with leaders, or indirect, occurring
though systems and structures set in place and managed by leaders
(Yammarino, 1994).
Cross-sectional questionnaire studies have shown that leadership
practices of construction site managers seem to be important for con-
struction site safety performance in terms of occupational injuries
(Hoffmeister et al., 2014), safety-related work behaviour among em-
ployees (Conchie and Donald, 2009; Conchie et al., 2013; Grill et al.,
2017; Hoffmeister et al., 2014) and construction site safety climate
(Grill et al., 2017; Hoffmeister et al., 2014; Toderi et al., 2016).
However, such cross-sectional questionnaire studies provide little
information about the mechanisms underlying any causal relations
between leadership behaviour and construction site safety perfor-
mance. Furthermore, since these questionnaires rely on employees
rating their managers’ safety leadership, the results become biased to-
wards the direct, relational aspect of leadership (Andersen, 2015). A
significant part of managers’ leadership is indirect (Mintzberg, 1973;
Tengblad, 2006; Yammarino, 1994) and relates to planning, boundary
spanning, implementing and altering programmes, structures and sys-
tems, and coordination. Planning – both long-term planning and day-to-
day planning – has been described by professionals in the construction
industry as an important element in enhancing safety performance in
construction projects (Grill et al., 2015).
Inductive qualitative research is required to understand the com-
plexity of leadership behaviours involved in safety performance on
construction sites (Conchie et al., 2013; Mirza and Isha, 2017) and to
grasp the causal links between actual leadership behaviours and orga-
nisational outcomes, such as safety performance (Alvesson and
Sveningsson, 2003; Andersen, 2015). Construction site safety develops
in social interactions between managers and subordinates and an es-
sential component of such interactions is the leadership behaviours
used by the managers (Grill, 2018; Grill et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2017). In
Tappura et al.’s (2017) study the views of industrial managers on the
factors that promote or hinder their commitment to safety was ex-
plored, and, in their study, the managers emphasise the importance of
superior leadership as a promoting factor.
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Safety Science 114 (2019) 148–159
Exploring construction site managers’ experiences of how leadership
behaviours can influence safety taps the site managers’ knowledge
about the causal links between leadership and safety on construction
sites. Site managers have first-hand experience of how their leadership
practices influence construction site safety performance. Scrutinizing
their experiences with and knowledge of direct and indirect leadership
behaviours can provide a more comprehensive understanding of how
safety leadership practices of construction site managers motivate
construction employees to achieve safety goals.
1.2. Leadership behaviours promoting and impeding safety
Safety leadership research within the construction industry focuses
primarily on positive leadership, i.e. leadership behaviour associated
with increased construction site safety performance (Hardison et al.,
2014; Stiles et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2017). Hardison et al. (2014) list a
range of leadership behaviours among site supervisors associated with
this improved performance: establishing effective communication and
positive leader–member exchanges; planning for routine/non-routine
work tasks and executing effective team building; monitoring and re-
sponding to employee stress levels; directing worker tasks and re-
sponsibilities; executing disciplinary procedures and conflict resolution;
managing, planning and organising work flow; and implementing
methods of safety promotion.
Less attention has been paid to leadership behaviours that impede
construction site safety performance. When it comes to negative safety
leadership, i.e. leadership behaviour associated with decreased con-
struction site safety performance, laissez-faire leadership has been the
prime research focus (Grill et al., 2017; Kelloway et al., 2006; Toderi
et al., 2016). Results from Grill et al. (2017) indicate that laissez-faire
leadership is the leadership behaviour most strongly associated with
construction site safety climate. Bass and Bass (2008) define laissez-
faire leadership as inactive and avoidant, characterised by managers
avoiding performing leadership responsibilities, setting organisational
goals or attempting to influence subordinates. Hence, laissez-faire lea-
dership may be understood as the opposite of leadership or the lack of
leadership behaviours.
However, recent findings by Grill et al. (2018) suggest that negative
safety leadership is not merely the absence of positive safety leadership.
On the contrary, passive/avoidant leadership was found to have an
independent and incremental (negative) effect on construction site
safety climate. Such results accentuate the need for future research to
consider both the nature and the role of negative safety leadership for
construction site safety performance. Hence, more research attention is
required in order to explore this “dark side“ of safety leadership.
The aim of the present study was to investigate construction site
managers’ experiences of how their direct and indirect leadership
practices influence safety performance at construction sites in order to
expand present knowledge on how site managers participate both in
promoting and in impeding construction site safety performance.
2. Method
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with construction site
managers according to the critical incident technique (CIT) as described
by Flanagan (1954) and Butterfield et al. (2005).
2.1. Informants
The National Work Environment Authorities (WEA) in Sweden and
Denmark provided the researchers with contact information for all the
responsible site managers of construction sites registered in accordance
with common WEA regulations in both countries (Building and Civil
Engineering Work Provisions, 1999) between 1st October and 15th
November 2015. In total, 939 Swedish and 140 Danish sites were re-
gistered. Thereafter, three inclusion criteria were formulated: (1) The
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
Table 1
The participating managers’ background and current work situation at the in-
cluded site.
Ratio (%) Mean (SD)
Background information
Age (years) 42.8 (9.2)
Gender (male) 100.0
Experience as construction site manager (years) 9.7 (8.5)
Experience as construction site supervisor (years) 3.3 (3.8)
Experience as construction worker (years) 7.0 (8.6)
Highest educational level
Upper secondary vocational education (e.g. carpenter) 35.2
College education (e.g. building constructor) 35.1
University education (e.g. building engineer) 29.7
Current work situation at the included site
Formally appointed work environment coordinator (% 81.1
of all managers)
Time spent on the current construction project (% of all 72.4
work hours)
Time spent doing paperwork at the construction site (% 54.7
of time spent at the site)
At least one subordinate supervisor on site (% of all 59.5
managers)
Workers on site employed by the main contractor (no) 5.6 (3.4)
Workers on site employed by subcontractors (no) 11.5 (7.1)
construction sites had to begin their construction phase between 1st
January and 1st June 2016; (2) The construction sites had to employ at
least 20 construction employees and thereby require site managers to
be extensively present at the sites; and (3) The construction sites, for
practical reasons, had to be located south of the 60th latitude, a cri-
terion met by all Danish and 90% of the Swedish sites. Of all the sites
that met these criteria, a random selection of 50 site managers were
invited to participate in the study and, of these 50, 37 managers ac-
cepted the invitation to participate: 22 Swedish and 15 Danish. In-
formation related to the participating managers’ background and cur-
rent work situation at the site is outlined in Table 1.
2.2. Procedure
The critical incident technique (CIT) is a set of procedures for col-
lecting direct observations of human behaviour (Flanagan, 1954) and
retrospective self-reports through interviewing have become the
dominant procedure in CIT (Butterfield et al., 2005).
To obtain descriptions of safety leadership that correspond as clo-
sely as possible with the actual leadership behaviour of construction
site managers, the CIT activates the informants’ episodic memories
(Wheeler et al., 1997), i.e. their explicit factual knowledge of events
and personal experiences. Episodic memories tend to be processed in
the hippocampus and stored in the association areas of the prefrontal
cortex, rather than relying on the medial temporal lobe (which is
strongly associated with semantic memory) (Allen et al., 2008). When
informants are asked to recall and describe critical incidents, they tend
to visualise the event (Naidoo et al., 2010). Naidoo et al. (2010) ex-
amined the effects of visualisation (i.e., recalling critical incidents by
stimulating informants to visualise the incident) on ratings of experi-
mental stimuli. They found that visualisation made affect a more cen-
tral aspect of the ratings, allowed better recall of prior leadership as-
sessments, and enhanced accurate retrieval of contextual information.
All three of these effects are consistent with the interpretation that vi-
sualisation enhances access to episodic memory. Shondrick et al. (2010)
argue that, to accurately measure actual behaviour, ratings need to
focus on explicit events that occur within a specific context; these
memories are retrieved through CIT by consciously and deliberately
guiding informants to explicitly recall critical incidents that reflect
central organisational performance dimensions. The performance di-
mension of interest in this study was construction site safety
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Safety Science 114 (2019) 148–159
performance.
Cognitive research also suggests that informants’ retrieval of epi-
sodic memories is enhanced when the retrieval is performed in the same
psychical context as the event took place (Godden and Baddeley, 1975;
Miles et al., 2008). Conducting the interviews at the construction site
exploits the double role of the hippocampus: both the organizer of
memories (which are mainly stored in the autobiographic memory of
the posterior cingulate cortex) and the guardian of the sense of location
(the geographic grid). It is much easier the recall memories when you
are in the situation in which they are stored. For this reason, it is pre-
ferable to conduct critical incident interviews at the managers’ work-
place, i.e., in the same environment as the managers perform their
safety leadership.
A semi-structured interview guide was designed to facilitate the
collection of elaborate descriptions of critical incidents of managerial
safety leadership. The interviews were initiated by asking the in-
formants to describe their roles and responsibilities at the construction
site. The managers were then prompted to describe four types of critical
incident: (1) Incidents of direct leadership resulting in the improvement
of construction site safety performance, (2) Incidents of indirect lea-
dership resulting in the improvement of construction site safety perfor-
mance, (3) Incidents of direct leadership resulting in a reduction of
construction site safety performance, and (4) Incidents of indirect lea-
dership resulting in a reduction of construction site safety performance.
Direct leadership was defined as incidents of leadership in which the
managers influenced safety through the way they interacted with sub-
ordinates, such as employees and subcontractors, at the construction
site. Indirect leadership was defined as incidents of leadership in which
the managers influenced safety through the way they organised and
structured the construction work.
Follow-up questions were used to prompt the informants to visualise
and recollect perceptual content of the critical incidents they described
in the interviews. Sample follow-up questions included: “Can you de-
scribe when and where this happened?”, “What exactly did you do at
that time?” and “How did the subcontractor/worker/client react to
that?”.
To facilitate the recollection of critical incidents, the informants
were provided with the interview guide a few days before the interview
and asked to prepare answers for the questions. The interview proce-
dure is outlined as a flowchart in Fig. 1.
2.3. Analysis
The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and imported
into NVIVO 11 software. Firstly, the incidents were extracted from each
interview and grouped into one of four domains: direct-positive, direct-
negative, indirect-positive, and indirect-negative. Thereafter, the in-
cidents in each domain were analysed separately in accordance with the
process described by Flanagan (1954) as “inductive” and “descriptive”
(p. 344–5). Based on the behavioural descriptions in each incident, the
incidents were grouped into categories. As categories were established,
they were provided with tentative definitions. Additional incidents
were classified into established categories or formed new categories.
During this process, categories were redefined and new categories de-
veloped. The tentative categories were modified and the process con-
tinued until all the incidents were classified and final definitions were
made for all categories.
Thereafter, all incidents in the two direct leadership domains (di-
rect-positive and direct-negative) were analysed together to detect
common aspects of direct safety leadership, positive as well as negative.
This integrative analysis constituted an iteration of the domain-specific
analysis outlined above. The integrative categories were established
from similarities between the domain-specific categories. In the in-
tegrative analysis, all incidents were reanalysed to assure an accurate
categorisation of each incident into an integrative category. During this
process, the categories were developed and redefined. Initial tentative
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
Q1: Describe a critical incident where you as site manager
influenced safety positively at the site
Q2: This was an example of direct/indirect leadership. Can
you also describe a critical incident where you as site
manager influenced safety positively at the site through
indirect/direct leadership?
Q3: Describe a critical incident where you as site manager
influenced safety negatively at the site
Q4: This was an example of direct/indirect leadership.
Can you also describe a critical incident where you as site
manager influenced safety negatively at the site through
indirect/direct leadership?
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the interview procedure.
categories were modified and the process continued until all the in-
cidents were classified and final definitions were made for all in-
tegrative categories. The integrative analysis resulted in the establish-
ment and definition of integrative categories of direct safety leadership.
Thereafter, all incidents in the two indirect leadership domains (in-
direct-positive and indirect-negative) were subjected to the same in-
tegrative analysis procedure.
The informants’ elaborations on the critical incidents primarily
contained comprehensive data on how they contributed to increasing
construction site safety performance (positive safety leadership) or
decreasing construction site safety performance (negative safety lea-
dership). However, when the informants described incidents of nega-
tive safety leadership, they all expanded on their reasons for resorting
to leadership behaviours that were incompatible with safety.
Accordingly, we complemented our analysis of how negative safety
leadership was executed with an analysis of the managers’ stated rea-
sons of why negative safety leadership was executed. This analysis
followed the same procedure for domain-specific and integrative data
analysis procedure as outlined above.
3. Results
In total, 183 critical incidents were described by the informants. Of
these 183 incidents, 95 (52%) pertained to the domains of direct safety
leadership (60 positive and 35 negative) and 88 incidents (48%) per-
tained to the domains of indirect safety leadership (55 positive and 33
negative). The integrative analyses of the incidents resulted in six in-
tegrative categories of indirect safety leadership and four integrative
categories of direct safety leadership, which are outlined in Table 2.
3.1. Indirect safety leadership
The analysis of the critical incidents pertaining to indirect safety
leadership resulted in six categories of positive safety leadership and
five categories of negative safety leadership (see Table 1). The in-
tegrative analysis resulted in six integrative categories: Managing un-
derlying structures, Planning the physical layout of the site, Organizing
meeting structures, Managing safety aids and resources, Planning work
procedures, and Managing concerted actions.
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Safety Science 114 (2019) 148–159
Folllow-up questions
- When and where?
- What exactly did you do?
- How did subcontractors/workers react?
3.1.1. Managing underlying structures
The site managers described how they improved safety performance
at the site when they successfully included safety measures in the very
early phases of the construction projects. Safety was already considered
in the design and planning phases and the managers actively tried to
integrate safety into the underlying structures of their construction
projects. These underlying structures primarily consisted of central
documents, such as tender material, contracts, reward systems, time-
tables and blue prints.
These underlying structures were managed, for instance, by en-
suring detailed descriptions of the distribution of responsibilities in the
tender material and in contracts with the contractors or by discussing
design decisions that supported safe work processes with the architects.
Monetary measures were also used; for example, by ensuring that
projects had a specific budget for safety-related investments or by in-
corporating safety standards into the bonus wages that workers re-
ceived.
The two main ways in which the managers created underlying
structures that supported safety was to manage the overall time sche-
dule and the sequencing of work tasks. This included setting realistic
timelines for the projects. One site manager described an incident in
which he recognised that the original time plan for the renovation of
some apartment buildings was too tight and negotiated with the site
owner to make it twice as long, so that every work task could be
completed sequentially. However, the site managers also reported that
they did not always end up with realistic time plans, because, for ex-
ample, they had to accept a timeline from the developer that was
clearly too tight. This led to a situation in which too many workers were
on site and had negative consequences for construction site safety.
Planning the sequencing of work tasks was described as important
for ensuring that tasks were performed in an appropriate order so that
unnecessary overlaps and associated risks could be avoided. The man-
agers handled this by separating subcontractors in either time or space.
The separation in time was performed by ensuring that each contractor
had sufficient time to finish his/her work before the next contractor
started. Separation in space was performed by allocating specific areas
of the construction site to specific contractors so that contractors could
work simultaneously but in different places. Faulty sequencing of work
tasks was also described by the site managers as critical for how man-
agers negatively influenced the safety of the work sites, as it resulted in
increased risks. Examples provided by the site managers included an
M. Grill, K. Nielsen Safety Science 114 (2019) 148–159

Table 2
Categories of indirect and direct safety leadership practices influencing safety performance.
Integrative categories Positive influence Negative influence

Indirect leadership Managing underlying structures
Planning the physical layout of the work
site
Organizing meeting structures
Managing safety aids and resources
Planning work procedures
Managing concerted actions
Establishing underlying structures that support safety
Appropriate planning of the physical layout of the
work site
Ensuring a safety-related meeting structure
Ensuring appropriate safety aids and resources
Planning safe work procedures
Concerted actions to improve workers’ safety-related
behaviour
Faulty planning of the time schedule and sequencing of
work tasks
Suboptimal planning of the physical layout of the work
site
Failure to ensure a safety-related meeting structure
Failure to ensure safety aids and resources
Insufficient planning of work procedures

Direct leadership Day-to-day management of safety Safety introductions Careless handling of safety procedures
procedures
Role modelling Positive role modelling Negative role modelling
Monitoring risks Identifying safety risks Lack of supervision
Managing safety risks and violations Correcting safety risks Knowingly exposing workers to risk

• Increasing involvement
• Allocating resources for safety
• Increasing knowledge
• Performing symbolic actions
• Issuing directives
instance in which carpenters planned to install 200 kg-windows after
the plumbers had laid out pipes on the floor, which made it difficult to
use lifting devices for the windows.
3.1.2. Planning of the physical layout of the site
The site managers described that planning the physical layout of the
site was important for how they influenced site safety – both positively
and negatively. This planning related to how they organised access
roads, storage spaces for materials, and machines and huts from con-
tractors and subcontractors so that workers were kept separate from
machinery and could move safely around the site. The physical layout
of the site was initially planned by the site managers in the planning
phase and then continuously adapted during the construction phase.
The site managers described how they positively influenced safety
through the planning of the physical layout. For example, one site
manager ensured that the initial physical layout had electrical substa-
tions placed in proximity to all main work areas so that the amount of
electrical cable was minimised, thus reducing the risk of tripping.
During the construction phase, the physical work settings change con-
tinuously and thus the site managers constantly adapt the physical
layout so that safety is ensured at all times. For example, a site manager
changed the entrances to the construction site several times depending
on where groundwork was being conducted so that the workers could
access their work area without passing through areas with heavy ma-
chinery.
The site managers also described how they negatively influenced
safety through suboptimal planning of the physical layout of the work
site; for instance, by providing insufficient storage spaces for materials
and machines, which resulted in unsafe ad hoc storage solutions. Other
examples include sites where the access roads were too few or in-
accessible, which resulted in workers walking through other con-
tractors’ work spaces and increased the risk of injury.
3.1.3. Organizing meeting structures
The managers described that an important part of managing safety
in the construction phase was to establish safety procedures and rou-
tines that systematically identified and handled emerging risks. Site
managers played a key role in this process by ensuring procedures for
continuous safety arrangements, such as safety rounds and meetings.
Different kinds of meetings were held between the site managers and
other stakeholders. Some of these were directly related to safety, such
as safety introductions (informing new workers about site safety rules),
while others focused on work planning and coordination, such as start-
up meetings (meetings with subcontractors at the site prior to starting a
new project), work preparation meetings (analysing and planning up-
coming critical work sequences with subcontractors), and production
meetings (daily or weekly meetings about the progress of work activ-
ities).
One way the site managers believed they positively influenced
safety was by ensuring that these meetings were held systematically
and that safety was discussed at the meetings. As part of company
policy, some managers put safety as the first item on the agenda at all
meetings. However, the site manager also gave examples of how they
diverted from these procedures during the execution of work tasks. For
instance, formal procedures were not complied with when the site
managers postponed safety rounds, cancelled safety meetings and failed
to set up functioning routines for providing safety introductions for new
workers.
Involvement was described as one leadership practice used to or-
ganise meeting structures. This related to both positive and negative
safety leadership. The site managers described that good safety solu-
tions were developed by inviting workers to voice suggestions and
participate in the decision-making process at meetings. For example,
one manager described how workers at a participatory work prepara-
tion meeting suggested using a scissors lift instead of a mobile scaffold
when installing roof rails, which proved to be both safer and faster. At
the other end of the involvement spectrum, a manager described how
he ended up cancelling morning meetings with the workers after he
found it difficult to involve workers and keep the meetings relevant.
“The usefulness of the morning meetings depends on the perfor-
mance of the leader. If I can’t deliver anything of interest, people
will not show up. And if I don’t ask open-ended questions, nothing
good will come out of the meeting, you mustn’t ask questions that
can be answered with a yes or a no. If you can’t lead meetings, you
might as well stop having them, because then they won’t be useful to
anyone.” (Site manager #17)
3.1.4. Managing safety aids and resources
Planning was described as an important aspect of all construction
projects, and the managers’ experiences revealed that they played a
pivotal role in integrating safety into the planning of how the con-
struction work should be executed.
One of the ways site managers influenced safety at the site through
planning was by ensuring that appropriate safety aids and resources
were available when required. This was primarily done during the

152
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
planning phase when managers analysed and planned how work tasks
and procedures could be performed safely during the construction
phase. For example, one manager decided to engage a safety firm in the
planning phase to develop a safe scaffold solution at a site with a
narrow workspace between a crane and a building. During the con-
struction phase, the site managers engaged in monthly, weekly and
daily planning of activities, where they ensured that sufficient safety
aids and resources for the work tasks were provided. For example, one
manager implemented a new fall protection system for the construction
of a roof truss, which included training workers to use safety railing and
safety harnesses. The site managers also described how they ensured
that risk assessments were conducted when deviations occurred.
The site managers provided several examples of how careless
planning, where safety was insufficiently considered, influenced safety
negatively at the sites and resulted in situations where, for example,
safety equipment was not available when required. On one occasion, a
site manager only realised that a scaffold was required to install a large
skylight when he saw the psychical layout of the work area immediately
before the skylight was due to be installed. On another occasion, a site
manager had planned to take down a scaffold before all the work on a
roof was completed. In a similar way, failure in risk assessments also
occurred. For example, a manager decided to remove the scaffolding on
a tall building despite the fact that the delivery of balcony railings had
been delayed; this decision meant that workers within the building had
access to balconies without guard rails.
The site managers described situations in which they deliberately
chose not to provide the optimal safety aids and resources. For instance,
one site manager decided to use a cheaper scaffold supplier, saving
5000 Euro, knowing that their scaffolds were less safe. In such situa-
tions, the site managers were aware of the fact that the solutions were
suboptimal and led to higher risks at the site.
“We decided to go ahead. It was doable if it was done from a mobile
scaffold, if we bended the rules a little. So, we decided to use the
mobile scaffold. And this wasn’t a problem. The thing is - a mobile
scaffold is meant to be used in a specific manner: you go up and do
some work and then you have to pull the scaffold around the corner,
and then you go up and do some more work, then pull the scaffold
again, do some more work, and pull, and work. However, the
workers don’t do that. They go up on the roof and finish the whole
work without moving the scaffold. This results in a violation of the
work environment rules.” (Site manager #6)
3.1.5. Planning work procedures
The site managers described how they continuously planned and
developed specific work procedures for upcoming tasks, during both the
planning and the construction phase. The way in which the managers
planned the solutions for these work procedures affected construction
site safety, since the solutions varied in how safe they were. The solu-
tions were developed in different ways: by the site managers them-
selves, through inviting input from workers, or through consulting ex-
ternal experts. The site managers used their knowledge and experience
to identify risky work tasks in the planning phase; for example, one site
manager identified that there would be a fire hazard if workers welded
inside an old church tower with paper insulation. The managers also
adjusted their plans for work procedures so that work could be per-
formed more safely; for example, one site manager rescheduled all the
lifting of materials to the night shift so that fewer workers would be at
risk at the site, and another manager asked the material supplier to pack
gypsum plates in smaller batches so that they could be handled more
easily and safely at the site. The site managers also described how they
received input for safer work procedures by consulting workers. For
instance, workers at one site suggested that it would be safer to build
the roof truss on the ground and then lift it into place than it would be
to build it at height. The site managers also used external experts to
develop safe working procedures; for example, one manager consulted
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the Work Environment Authorities to find a safe way to plaster the
façade of a building.
Conversely, the site managers described how insufficiently planned
work procedures resulted in negative safety consequences at the sites.
One manager gave the example of how he had planned to pull a large
plug using a truck with an iron chain, which could have broken when
pulled in thrusts, instead of a rope that would have absorbed thrusts
better. Insufficient planning of work procedures was also related to
subcontractors’ inadequate or lacking risk assessments; for example,
one subcontractor suggested to the manager that they use a specific
concrete mould that later turned out to be unsafe.
Just as they had been with regards to the theme ‘managing safety
aids and resources’, the managers were at times aware that they had
chosen suboptimal solutions and thus increased risk at the sites. For
instance, one manager doubled the number of carpenters working on a
specific task in order to complete the job on time even though he knew
space was limited, and, in doing so, he increased the safety risk.
3.1.6. Managing concerted actions
Some managers reported that they had been dissatisfied with stan-
dards related to safety behaviour, cleaning, and the use of personal
protection equipment at the sites and that they had taken specific
concerted actions to address these issues. These concerted actions in-
volved communicating and explaining clear expectations (e.g. at safety
introduction sessions), creating ownership through involvement (e.g.
by inviting workers to start up meetings), ensuring knowledge sharing
about work progress (e.g. by having the different subcontractors inform
each other at daily work meetings), and providing continuous feedback
on compliance to safety rules (e.g. at weekly work meetings and in day-
to-day interactions with the workers at the site).
3.2. Direct safety leadership
The analysis of the critical incidents pertaining to direct safety
leadership behaviour resulted in four categories of positive safety lea-
dership and four categories of negative safety leadership (see Table 1).
The integrative analysis resulted in four integrative categories: Day-to-
day management of safety procedures, Role modelling, Monitoring risks, and
Managing safety risks and violations.
3.2.1. Day-to-day management of safety procedures
The site managers described how they influenced safety directly on
a day-to-day basis through the way they managed safety procedures,
i.e. routines for how work tasks were performed in a safe manner. One
example of this was the safety introduction session for new workers
when they entered the construction site. The site managers had a po-
sitive influence on safety by instructing new workers about the safety
rules, personal protection equipment, tidiness, and site-specific risks
(such as asbestos) and by describing expectations concerning safe work
behaviours. However, site managers sometimes also influenced site
safety negatively by handling safety procedures carelessly; for example,
by not conducting the appropriate inspection of scaffolds, which re-
sulted in one manager almost falling when trying to secure a scaffold in
a storm. Site managers also gave examples of being careless about
conducting and updating risk analyses prior to risky work tasks; for
example, when a subcontractor asked for a crane to lift heavy windows
and the site manager accepted the supervisor’s suggestion to move the
windows by hand, resulting in the windows falling off a roof.
3.2.2. Role modelling
The site managers described their function as role models for all
types of behaviour at the sites, including safety behaviour. The man-
agers described how they increased the use of personal protection
equipment among their employees through positive role modelling
when the managers themselves used personal protection equipment,
such as helmets, safety vests, and safety shoes, at all times at the
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
construction site. The site managers explained that this contributed to
the construction workers increasing their use of personal protection
equipment. However, role modelling could also have the opposite effect
as some site managers described how they also became role models for
unsafe work behaviour. The site managers described how they did not
always use the required personal protection equipment when on site,
such as helmets and safety shoes, and they also occasionally engaged in
risk-taking behaviour and unsafe work practices. For example, they
sometimes walked on unsafe scaffolds or jumped into holes instead of
using ladders.
3.2.3. Monitoring risks
The site managers explained that identifying safety risks was an
important part of the way they managed safety at their sites, and they
identified different types of safety risks. Some were related to the
physical work environment, such as faulty railing on scaffolds and ex-
posed holes, and others were related to workers’ and subcontractors’
behaviour, such as the use of personal protection equipment (e.g. hel-
mets, safety shoes, and dust masks) and unsafe work methods (e.g.
removing instead of sealing in ceiling plates with asbestos).
Safety risks were identified by the safety managers themselves or
brought to the managers’ attention by workers, subcontractors, or au-
thorities. Furthermore, risks were identified by the managers either
proactively or reactively. The managers identified safety risks proac-
tively by monitoring the work site during planned safety rounds or daily
walkthroughs at the site, resulting in, for example, the inspection of a
scaffold before construction workers started to work on it. At other
times, managers identified risk reactively after an incident occurred and
set up preventive measures to avoid recurrence, such as instructing a
subcontractor to properly secure a walkway after it had fallen down.
Similarly, risks identified by others were brought to the mangers’ at-
tention both proactively and reactively. For example, one electrician
proactively informed the site manager that the platform on which he
was expected to work was inadequately secured, and one carpenter
reactively informed the site manager that a window had fallen down
because it had been inadequately installed.
Conversely, the site managers described how they contributed to
lowering the safety standards by not being present at the sites to su-
pervise the workers and monitor the working conditions. This occurred,
for example, while the managers were participating in production- and
budget-meetings.
3.2.4. Managing safety risks and violations
The primary category identified in the analysis of the site managers’
direct leadership behaviour was managing safety risks and violations.
After risks or violations were identified, it was the managers' respon-
sibility to handle these in an appropriate manner. However, the man-
agers did this in different ways, and their actions sometimes influenced
safety positively and sometimes negatively.
Correcting safety risks was the primary way the site managers de-
scribed that they positively influenced safety at their sites. The man-
agers used five approaches to correct safety risks: increasing involvement,
allocating resources for safety, increasing knowledge, performing symbolic
actions, and issuing directives.
Identified safety risks were corrected by increasing involvement, i.e.,
inviting workers and subcontractors to develop tailor-made solutions
during problem-solving discussions. The site managers used involve-
ment in workshops and work preparation meetings to develop novel
solutions to rare problems; for example, to develop a new work pro-
cedure for safe lifting.
Allocating resources for safety was described as an approach that the
managers occasionally used when safety conflicted with other organi-
sational goals, such as productivity and profitability. Thus, the man-
agers corrected some identified risks by allocating resources, such as
money or manpower, to safety. This could include paying for a higher
than legally required scaffold or allowing extra time to implement high
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standard safety measures before initiating work on a roof.
The managers also described how they corrected safety risks by
increasing the knowledge of workers and subcontractors. Knowledge was
transferred from the manager by: (1) demonstrating a better solution
(for example, showing the client how prefabricated steel reinforcement
could increase both productivity and safety); (2) clarifying established
roles and responsibilities (for example, referring to the obligations
under the contract); and (3) persuading workers and subcontractors by
using arguments related to health, safety, common sense, rules, reg-
ulations, standards and quality (for example, reminding workers that
they would be fined by the work environment authorities if they did not
use their safety goggles). In addition, the managers also handled risks
by increasing their own knowledge to be able to develop appropriate
solutions; for example, by consulting health and safety advisors on how
to safely handle asbestos.
The managers sometimes used symbolic actions to draw attention to
safety risks and improve workers’ safety behaviour, i.e., actions de-
signed to convey a message in unusual and illustrative ways; for ex-
ample, snapping a broom in front of workers in a dusty room and then
handing them a swab so they could tidy up without raising dust.
Finally, managers corrected safety risks by issuing directives; in other
words, simply instructing workers and subcontractors what to do
without further discussion. This could include putting on personal
protection equipment, repairing a scaffold or tidying up. Such directives
were either issued at the site workers or at their superior managers. The
directives were usually communicated in an agreeable manner.
However, sometimes they were communicated through authoritative
leadership, such as when one manager shouted at a worker to stand
behind a safety barrier. Such leadership behaviour sometimes formed
part of an escalation when directives were not initially followed or
when violations were repeated. This escalation sometimes meant that
the site manager had to address the workers’ managers, which occa-
sionally led to negative implications for workers, such as being banned
from the site or having to tidy up after work hours. However, some site
managers routinely issued their directives directly to the sub-
contractors’ managers and not to the workers themselves.
The site managers also described how they managed safety risks and
violations in ways that negatively influenced construction site safety.
Negative safety leadership included accepting situations in which their
workers were exposed to risk, worked in an unsafe manner, or even
violated safety regulations. The managers described how they con-
tributed to these situations in ways that were more or less active. The
least active way was identifying yet accepting a risky work procedure;
for example, allowing a roofer to perform work without the required
fall protection. This also occurred when site managers identified unsafe
work behaviour and safety violations among workers and either did not
correct them (e.g. when experienced workers worked for a short period
on a roof without the necessary safety precautions) or stopped cor-
recting them when workers resisted (e.g. when workers laughed at the
manager’s instruction to use safety helmets). Sometimes the site man-
agers even authorised risky work procedures suggested by sub-
contractors; for example, authorizing that joints could be installed from
a ladder even though a scaffold would have been safer. A more active
way managers contributed to unsafe working conditions was when they
implicitly pushed workers to work unsafely by claiming that their
current pace was insufficient, knowing that, in order to speed up, the
workers would have to work unsafely; for example, when managers
claimed that installing doors using a door lift would take too long and
that the workers should install the doors manually instead. The most
active way managers knowingly exposed workers to risky work tasks
was by directly suggesting unsafe work procedures; for example, asking
a crane operator to move heavy windows onto a roof in windy condi-
tions. Sometimes the site manager even talked workers into performing
risky work tasks when they initially hesitated; for example, convincing
reluctant workers to carry heavy windows manually.
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
Table 3
Site managers' reasons for negative safety leadership practices.
Type of leadership Category of reason
General reasons Time pressure
Prioritizing
Avoiding unpopular leadership
behaviours
Reasons related only to direct Risk acceptance
leadership Renouncing responsibility
Communication problems
Inattention
Reasons related only to indirect Deficient risk analysis when planning the
leadership work
3.3. Stated reasons for performing negative safety leadership
For each of the 68 critical incidents of negative safety leadership
practices, the underlying reasons for these practices provided by the site
managers were analysed. This analysis resulted in seven categories of
reasons related to direct leadership and four categories of reasons re-
lated to indirect leadership (see Table 3).
3.3.1. General reasons
Three categories were found in both the analysis of direct leadership
and indirect leadership, and these categories have hence been labelled
general reasons: time pressure, prioritizing, and avoiding unpopular lea-
dership behaviours.
3.3.1.1. Time pressure. Time pressure was reported by the site
managers as having a negative influence on their direct as well as
indirect leadership practice. Time pressure was linked to personal
resources, time schedules, or the completion of specific work tasks.
Time pressure linked to personal resources included working on several
projects at the same time, lacking supervisors to delegate work to, or
having too many tasks at hand. Time pressure linked to time schedules
included delays in work processes without corresponding
postponements of deadlines, which was sometimes the result of a
longer yet safer work process. Some contextual factors also contributed
to increasing the time pressure on specific work tasks, such as having to
complete road works over night before the road reopened in the
morning or having to complete underwater work on a harbour before
the tide changed.
3.3.1.2. Prioritizing. Safety was described as conflicting with other
organisational goals, such as productivity and profitability, which
negatively influenced both the managers’ direct and indirect safety
leadership practice. The managers sometimes prioritised other
organisational goals over safety, such as keeping to the time
schedule, minimizing costs, and meeting demands from contractors.
Because the managers were concerned with the time schedule, they
sometimes allowed workers to perform unsafe work tasks since the
alternative would have been to suspend the work. For example, a
manager allowed an electrician to repair the power supply for a crane in
an unsafe manner so that the crane could unload material from waiting
lorries. The managers described how they weighted cost against safety
when safety solutions were expensive. To minimise costs, managers
sometimes chose cheaper solutions; for example, one manager decided
not to spend 5000€ on the appropriate scaffold because he considered
the possible injury from falling off a 2.5-m high roof top minor
compared with the cost of the scaffold. Finally, demands from
contractors were also described as something the managers prioritised
over safety; for example, one manager agreed to keep a shopping centre
open for business during renovation, which made it difficult to provide
appropriate working conditions to workers.
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3.3.1.3. Avoiding unpopular leadership behaviours. One of the site
manager’s responsibilities is to ensure that safety standards are
upheld across the site. However, the managers explained that safety
is not always the prime interest of workers and that violations can occur
frequently. Such violations encouraged the managers to get workers
more involved in safety and enforce rules and regulations. However, the
managers experienced this as an unpleasant leadership role because
they did not want to be seen as legalists who policed the site. Thus, to
avoid a negative attitude being formed against them, the managers
avoided unpopular leadership behaviours; for example, they did not
point out all violations. The managers also avoided unpopular indirect
leadership behaviours; for example, one manager discontinued planned
morning safety meetings when the workers expressed dissatisfaction
with them. Also, the managers explained that it was difficult to say no
to contractors when they increased their production demands without
modifying the time schedule; for example, a contractor gradually
increased a construction project from 6000 to 27,000 square meters
during the planning phase without altering the deadlines, and the
manager tacitly accepted the arrangement to avoid trouble.
3.3.2. Reasons related to direct leadership
Four categories of reasons were found to be related specifically to
direct leadership, namely: risk acceptance, renouncing responsibility,
communications problems, and inattention.
3.3.2.1. Risk acceptance. The site managers reported that, in some
instances, they accepted that work tasks involved some level of risk,
either because the task was short or because it only involved a small
number of workers. For instance, site managers thought it was
irrational to put railings around holes in the ground at the work site
because the railings would have to be removed and restored
continuously during the on-going work process. The managers had
different opinions on the length of a “short period of time”, but one
manager defined short as up to two days. Another manager accepted
having three workers on a roof without proper safety barrier because
the workers were few enough not to crowd each other.
3.3.2.2. Renouncing responsibility. Another reason the managers
provided for not influencing safety positively at the site was that they
did not see safety as their responsibility. Some managers believed it was
the responsibility of the subcontractors or the workers themselves to
take care of their own safety and some managers stated that they were
in no position to influence safety at the site.
“I can’t be present everywhere. It is the responsibility of each sub-
contractor. They have their own responsibility” (Site manager #5)
Other examples include a site manager who did not perceive himself
as a role model for the workers and another who referred to “user er-
rors” and renounced responsibility for a worker injuring himself when
mishandling a knife.
Another way the managers described renouncing responsibility was
by misplacing their trust in others, i.e. letting their supervisors, sub-
contractors or workers handle risky work tasks without intervening,
even though the managers were aware that these work tasks involved
potential risks.
3.3.2.3. Communications problems. The site managers described clear
communication as a vital factor in effective (safety) leadership and
claimed that poor communication was a reason they could not create a
safe work site, either due to the site manager himself not knowing what
or how to communicate safety efficiently or due to language problems
with migrant workers.
“One thing I often fail to do is to be specific. The communication can
often fail when I’m vague and then risks in the work environment
can easily occur. In my experience, vague communication is
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
something that influences the work environment a lot” (Site man-
ager #11)
3.3.2.4. Inattention. A few site managers explained their negative
influence on safety at the site by them either forgetting the safety
directives at the site, i.e. the directive to always wear a helmet, or by
them being unaware of the rescheduling of a work tasks, which caused
safety risks for other workers in the work area.
“It was a task that was not planned to be performed at that time. So,
it became sort of a quick fix solution“ (Site manager #37)
3.3.3. Reasons related to indirect leadership
One category of reasons was found to be related specifically to in-
direct leadership, namely: deficient risk analysis when planning the work.
3.3.3.1. Deficient risk analysis when planning the work. The site
managers reported that one of the main reasons to why they
influenced safety negatively at the sites through indirect leadership
was because their risk analysis turned out to be deficient. They
described three reasons for these deficient risk analyses. Firstly, the
managers had not planned ahead sufficiently and had not considered
central aspects of the work, such as the sequencing of work tasks or
critical elements in specific work procedures.
“It is planning, I guess. Maybe we focused on the wrong things. Then
it ends up not being planned. That is when the biggest problems
occur. When we do not plan and we end up doing the quick fix
solutions. Then we end up crawling up on a rooftop to change four
tiles. I must admit that this sort of thing happens even now, because
we do not think things through properly” (Site manager #36)
Secondly, the managers made errors in judgement; for instance,
calculating that a specific work task could be completed without the use
of a scaffold, when, in reality, thisinduced a risk. Thirdly, the managers
sometimes did not identify the safety risks until the construction pro-
cess was underway; for example, one manager claimed that it wasn’t
until he saw a particular building with his own eyes that he realised the
skylight could not be installed in the planned manner.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate site managers’ ex-
periences of their influence on construction site safety performance
through direct and indirect leadership behaviour – both positive and
negative – in order to expand present knowledge on how constructions
site managers affect safety in the construction industry.
4.1. Indirect safety leadership
Construction site managers’ indirect safety leadership behaviours
were found to consist of: managing underlying structures, planning the
physical layout of the site, organizing meeting structures, managing
safety aids and resources, planning for work procedures, and managing
concerted actions.
Planning stands out as a critical element in several of these cate-
gories. Construction site managers seem to execute safety leadership by
spending time on and putting effort into preparing how construction
work should be executed according to appropriate work procedures,
with the proper aids and resources and in a safe physical setting.
Planning has previously been identified as particularly important for
safety performance in the construction industry (Grill et al., 2015).
Planning has also been described as essential for task-oriented leader-
ship in Yukl’s (2012) taxonomy of leadership behaviours, as well as in
Behrendt et. al.'s (2017) more recent integrative model of leadership
behaviour. Aligning our findings with previous research implies that
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planning can contribute to both overall organisational performance and
safety performance. Hence, planning can be a way to reach seemingly
competing organisational goals (Törner et al., 2017).
Concerning organizing meeting structures, previous research by
Pousette and Törner (2016) indicates that work preparation meetings
do not always result in increased construction site safety performance.
Correspondingly, the site managers in the present study reported that
meetings need to be efficiently managed to have a positive effect on
safety, i.e. meetings should be frequent (daily if possible), safety
priority should be communicated, and the employees should be in-
volved in risk-assessment and problem-solving.
Concerted actions were identified as a successful way for site
managers to increase construction site safety performance. By com-
bining several activities, the effect of each single activity may be in-
flated. Concerted actions have also been highlighted in contemporary
organisational intervention research as the most efficient way to in-
crease safety performance within construction (van der Molen et al.,
2018). The results of the present study exemplify the leadership beha-
viours involved in executing efficient concerted actions: commu-
nicating and clarifying expectations, creating ownership through in-
volvement, ensuring knowledge sharing about work progress, and
providing continuous feedback on compliance to safety rules.
Importantly, the negative safety leadership behaviours identified in
the interviews can be understood as the lack of positive safety leader-
ship behaviours. Yet the analysis of actual behaviours described by the
site managers shows that negative safety leadership should not merely
be understood as laissez-faire leadership or the absence of leadership.
For example, choosing a cheaper scaffold and thus exposing workers to
increased risk in order to save 5000 Euros is an active planning beha-
viour that impedes high safety standards.
4.2. Direct safety leadership
Construction site managers’ direct safety leadership behaviours
were found to consist of day-to-day management of safety procedures,
role modelling, monitoring risks, and managing safety risks and viola-
tions.
The site managers described themselves as important role models
for work behaviour at the construction sites. The learning mechanism
involved in role modelling, i.e. imitation, was first described in the
1960s by Bandura and McDonald (1963). Thereafter, Sims and Manze
(1982) described role modelling and imitation as important mechan-
isms for the influence of managerial leadership behaviour on employee
behaviour. More recent elaborations on the importance of role model-
ling in efficient leadership practice include transformational (Bass and
Bass, 2008), authentic (Gardner et al., 2005), and shared (Grille et al.,
2015) leadership. Wu et al. (2016) demonstrated how role modelling
and imitation influence safety performance in the construction industry
by outlining how managerial safety leadership behaviour in construc-
tion projects is transmitted from owners to contractors and from con-
tractors to subcontractors. The results of the present study indicate that
modelling and imitation also transmit safety behaviour from construc-
tion site mangers to construction site workers.
Direct safety leadership behaviours were found to primarily com-
prise monitoring and managing safety risks and violations. Such lea-
dership behaviour has been described in previous research as man-
agement-by-exception (MBE) (Bass and Bass, 2008), i.e. monitoring and
correcting potential deviations from standards. Resent research by Grill
et al. (2018) indicates that 39% of all direct leadership behaviour
performed by construction site managers is MBE behaviour. The in-
fluence of MBE on safety performance depends on whether the MBE is
active or passive (Clarke, 2013; Grill et al, 2018). Active MBE improves
safety performance and involves proactive leadership, i.e., monitoring
and correcting deviations before serious problems occur. Passive MBE
decreases performance and involves delayed reactive responses to
identified deviations.
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
The results of the present study reveal the approaches managers use
to correct identified safety deviations and thus elucidate how MBE is
enacted by middle managers in the construction industry. Some site
managers handle deviations in a traditional way, through issuing di-
rectives and allocating resources. Others handle deviations in a more
progressive manner, through involvement, increasing knowledge and
performing symbolic actions.
In addition, the descriptions of negative safety leadership elucidate
how monitoring and managing safety risks and violations can involve a
lack of supervision and knowingly exposing workers to risk. The results
indicate a variation in how active site managers are in exposing workers
to risk, ranging from being unaware of and passively accepting risks, to
being fully aware of and actively exposing workers to risks. Being
unaware of risks was described as a result of a lack of supervision or
incomplete monitoring/risk-assessment and becoming aware of risks
was described as providing an opportunity for risk reduction.
4.3. Stated reasons for performing negative safety leadership
As discussed above, the interviews revealed a “dark side” of safety
leadership, where the site managers at times actively accept, plan,
suggest or encourage unsafe working practices. On some occasions, the
managers even persuaded workers to work in an unsafe manner or
under unsafe conditions. The site managers were aware that these ne-
gative safety leadership practices were against the rules and thus tried
to explain and elaborate on the conditions and reasons why they oc-
casionally had to compromise safety.
Regarding the general reasons for site managers resorting to nega-
tive safety leadership (Time pressure, Prioritizing and Avoiding unpopular
leadership behaviours), the site managers remarked that safety-inducing
leadership behaviours are at times disliked and reproved by important
actors and stakeholders. As such, prioritizing safety over other organi-
sational goals, such as productivity and profitability, seems to involve
both material and social costs imposed by employees, subcontractors,
superior managers or clients. Previous research supports the notion that
managers tend to select leadership behaviours that result in preferred
short-term consequences and that long-term and uncertain con-
sequences – such as safety and reducing occupational accidents – may
have less of an influence on their leadership behaviour (Agnew and
Daniels, 2010; Grill, 2018). Our results expand this general knowledge
into a context-specific understanding of how suboptimal safety lea-
dership behaviours among construction site managers are reinforced as
they result in specific positive short-term consequences, e.g., meeting
deadlines, minimizing costs, and avoiding disapproval from employees
and subcontractors.
Production pressure is strong within the construction industry and
leadership behaviours associated with both safety and productivity are
hence more likely to be successful. Törner et al. (2017) demonstrate
how seemingly contradictory organisational goals such as safety and
productivity can be targeted simultaneously through efficient man-
agerial leadership. Planning the physical layout of the site, organizing
meeting structures and planning work procedures are examples of be-
haviours likely to increase both production performance and safety
performance. Furthermore, since the prime concern in planning is long-
term consequences, such planning behaviours target a root cause of
negative safety leadership (i.e., behaviours guided by short-term con-
sequences). By focusing on long-term consequences, such consequences
become more vivid, evident and more likely to influence current deci-
sions and behaviours.
The more domain-specific reasons for site managers resorting to
negative safety leadership (i.e., Risk acceptance, Renounce responsibility,
Communications problems, Inattention, and Deficient risk analysis in plan-
ning the work) appear to relate more to a shortage of skills and com-
petences among construction site managers to perform appropriate
safety leadership behaviours. Skills and competences related to risk
analysis, planning, communication and attentiveness could potentially
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be further developed by providing construction site managers with
education, training and coaching. Such leadership development inter-
ventions should accordingly focus on developing the managers' abilities
to take on leadership responsibilities, to communicate clear expecta-
tion, to execute individual and collective risk-assessment, and to per-
form monitoring and feedback procedures. Further leadership devel-
opment research is required to determine how such leadership skills are
best developed within the complex work-situation of construction site
managers.
However, leadership development interventions should address
leadership not only at the level of the site managers but also at all
hierarchical levels of construction projects (Conchie et al., 2013; Zhang
et al., 2018). The construction site supervisors in Conchie et al.’s (2013)
study emphasise the importance of organisational and managerial
support as crucial for their efforts to engage in positive safety leader-
ship. Similarly, the construction site managers in our study claimed that
positive safety leadership behaviours are performed when site man-
agers assume responsibly for construction site safety performance.
4.4. Limitations
The goal of the present study was to expand contemporary research
into safety leadership by tapping site managers’ experiences of how
their direct and indirect leadership behaviour influences safety per-
formance. One inherent limitation to interview studies is that the re-
sults are coloured by the subjective views and opinions of the in-
formants. Cognitive research has demonstrated that it is difficult for
informants to provide complete and entirely accurate descriptions of
past events (Schacter et al., 2007). However, by stimulating their epi-
sodic memories, the critical incident technique employed in the current
study was designed to help informants to recollect past events and
behaviours as accurately as possible (Butterfield et al., 2005). Research
on episodic memory demonstrates that memories of past auto-
biographical events contain more perceptual details whereas memories
of imaginations contain more details about one’s thoughts (i.e., cogni-
tive operations) (McDonough and Gallo, 2010). Accordingly, the
follow-up questions used in the interview in the current study empha-
sised the recollection of perceptual content of the critical incidents
described in the interviews and did not ask for the informants’ thoughts
or reflections related to the events. This interview procedure can be
considered to have minimised subjective distortions from the results.
5. Conclusions
Construction site managers may be considered essential for safety
performance in the construction industry. This study has provided de-
tailed descriptions of how construction site managers both promote and
impede construction site safety performance through their leadership
behaviour. The core leadership behaviours involved in positively in-
fluencing safety were found to be continuous planning and coordina-
tion, role modelling, monitoring work and proactively correcting de-
viations. Such leadership behaviours are also compatible with
organisational performance goals other than safety performance, e.g.
productivity. Promoting safety leadership by focusing on leadership
behaviours associated with both productivity and safety may be a fea-
sible way of increasing safety performance in the construction industry.
It may also be possible to increase positive safety leadership by
training and coaching site managers in their abilities to take on lea-
dership responsibilities, to communicate clear expectation, to execute
individual and collective risk-assessments, and to execute proactive
monitoring and feedback procedures. Such interventions should ad-
dress leadership on all hierarchical levels of construction projects, en-
suring organisational and managerial support for positive safety lea-
dership behaviours.
The importance of including the whole organisation in safety lea-
dership is accentuated by the finding in the current study. We found
M. Grill, K. Nielsen
that negative safety leadership is reinforced when the site managers are
provided with positive feedback from employees, subcontractors, su-
perior managers and clients to meet deadlines, minimise costs and re-
frain from unpopular leadership behaviour. In order to manage these
potent reinforcing mechanisms and avoid the emergence of “the dark
side” of safety leadership, the site managers need organisational sup-
port to minimise their influence. In addition, site managers need to be
provided with managerial and organisational support (i.e., positive
feedback) when they do engage in planning, monitoring, coordinating
and role modelling. Acknowledging that social relations are essential in
construction site safety performance (Grill, 2018; Wu et al., 2017), such
managerial and organisational support should operate through in-
strumentally/materially as well as socially/psychologically reinforcing
contingencies.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Danish Working Environment
Research Fund under Grant number 01-2012-09 and AFA Insurance
under Grant number 120176.
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