Natural Sciences

There are in fact two things, science and opinion; the former begets knowledge, the latter ignorance.

Hippocrates

Science literacy is the artery through which the solutions of tomorrow's problems ow.

Neil de Grasse Tyson

The natural sciences aim to acquire knowledge about the natural world. The scienti c method is a
key feature of what makes the natural sciences so scienti c. The underlying methodology that
binds all disciplines within the natural sciences together is so important that we may even use it to
distinguish "real" or "good" science from "bad" science and even pseudo-science. Within this
method, evidence and justi cation play a very important role.  Each discipline within the natural
sciences aims to produce knowledge about different aspects of the natural world. In this sense,
each discipline within the natural sciences will tweak its methodology somewhat to t its particular
purpose and scope. Nevertheless, all disciplines within the natural sciences will broadly have a
shared underlying scope, methodology and purpose.

At this point in time, we tend to place much trust in the natural sciences. "Scienti c proof" has
almost become some sort of guarantee of the quality or veracity of knowledge. Unfortunately, this
trust can be abused. The cosmetics industry may seduce you to buy their latest anti-wrinkle cream
by ddling with statistics and plastering "scienti c sounding language" on the packaging of its
products. Research funded by entities that bene t from its ndings will often eliminate inconvenient
data and truths. If a study (albeit indirectly) funded by a multinational oil company, for example,
claims that climate change is not real, we have reason to doubt the quality of its knowledge. In this
sense we should also approach "scienti c research" on products sold by pharmaceuticals with
caution. It is worth remembering that knowledge from the natural sciences is not necessarily
correct, simply because it is scienti c. The natural sciences have come a long way since they
originated in Ancient Greece (or earlier- depending how you start counting), both in terms of
knowledge production and methodology. Our current understanding of the natural sciences and its
methodology is primarily based on the most recent developments of the area of knowledge within
the last few centuries. Much knowledge that was previously considered scienti c, has now been
discarded. If your doctor would use Hippocrates' humor theory to diagnose a tumour, you would
probably be outraged. As knowledge within the natural sciences develops, some incoherent
knowledge gets discarded and at times even paradigm shifts occur. The natural sciences are in se
open to scrutiny, because peer review and falsi cation are currently part of its methodology. At this
point in time, there are some shared methods and values that underpin the nature of knowledge
production in the natural sciences. However, these values and shared methods within the scienti c
community might change over time. In this sense, it is dif cult to predict how knowledge within the
natural sciences will evolve.

We are now at some sort of turning point in history, where we are able to manipulate the world
around us to the extent that it de es human boundaries. Increased scienti c knowledge comes
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 with great ethical responsibilities. It is not always easy to establish possible criteria that help us
decide whether knowledge acquisition in the natural sciences is ethical or not. These ethical
considerations might perhaps pose one of the biggest challenges for the natural sciences in the
years to come.

1. Reflection: How would you translate the word "science" into your
language? What does the nuance of your translation imply?

The value of scienti c knowledge

The natural sciences currently enjoy a great status. This is partly due to its relatively recent
successes and achievements. The contributions of the natural sciences to knowledge as a whole
are undoubtedly enormous. Fascinating scienti c discoveries have helped us understand human
nature better, grasp how our planet has evolved and even conceive what the universe may look
like. The natural sciences give us so much knowledge that they almost seem to overshadow all
other areas of knowledge. Western civilisation went through a major cognitive paradigm shift
around the 17th Century. Discoveries by  Galileo  and  Newton  challenged the prevalent dominant
discourse. A new theory of knowledge primarily based on empirical evidence and reason was
created. Scienti c evidence soon became synonymous with 'ultimate proof' and religious
knowledge was challenged by scienti c sceptics. This  scienti c revolution  brought about
major changes in the way we thought about the world, particularly in the West. Mankind arguably
bene ted in many ways from this cognitive paradigm shift and with an increased understanding of
the world around us, living standards and arguably education generally improved. Yet, the natural
sciences were not always as highly regarded. There have been cases were scienti c hypothesis
were seen as ludicrous and even dangerous because they did not t within the dominant way of
thinking (cognitive paradigm). Science had to t in with the world view of the time and not the other
way around. Scientists who dared to propose knowledge that was different were often ridiculed
(like Darwin) or tried by the inquisition (like Galileo). Nowadays it seems that the tables have
turned. Once upon a time, some scienti c discoveries were rejected because they did not t in with
the paradigms of religious knowledge systems. Nowadays, some people  reject (their) religion
because it does not t in with the scienti c way of thinking. Although the natural sciences have
undoubtedly made enormous contributions to knowledge as a whole, we may question whether
this necessarily means that the natural sciences offer better quality knowledge than other areas of
knowledge. To answer this question, we rst need to look at what constitutes good science, how
the natural sciences work and what they can produce knowledge about.

2. Reflection: Why might some people regard science as the supreme

form of all knowledge?

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 Distinguishing good science from bad science

• How might we distinguish good science from bad science?

• Under what circumstances should we be suspicious of scienti c ndings?
• What criteria could we use to distinguish science from pseudo-science?

We live in a society exquisitely dependent on science and technology, in which

hardly anyone knows anything about science & technology.
Carl Sagan

Lots of scienti c knowledge you have personalised throughout your education is in fact second
hand knowledge. You acquired this knowledge mainly through language, either via a textbook or
the words of your teachers. You arguably trusted your teachers and believed that what they told
you in science class was true. But under which circumstances should we accept second hand
scienti c knowledge? The motto of Britain's very rst scienti c society  (The Royal Society)  is
"Nullius in Verba", which means "Take nobody's word for it".  One of the key features of the natural
sciences is the necessity of being able to prove what you claim.  Good science does not only
require proof. It also actively invites peer-review and even falsi cation. For example, if your teacher
claims that starch will turn blue when mixed with iodine, you will want to test this yourself. Within
the natural sciences, you should be able to repeat experiments to see if a hypothesis is correct.
But what should you conclude when an experiment 'does not work'? If this happens in you science
lesson, you may have made a mistake. Perhaps the conditions were not exactly the same as what
the experiment had in might, which may have led to different results.

However, if you are a practising scientist and your experiment shows that a hypothesis from
another scientist does not work, you may be on to something. Maybe the hypothesis of the other
scientist was not correct, or you could have discovered particular conditions in which the
experiment does not work. In that case, knowledge from other scientists may need to be re ned,
built upon or even discarded (when proven wrong). Some scientists do not conduct their studies
correctly and they may dispose of inconvenient data. When scientists are not open to peer-review,
we should approach their knowledge with caution.

There are circumstances in which experts get it wrong. This can be because they deliberately
created erroneous knowledge, to seek fame or nancial gain. Andrew Wake eld, for example,
deliberately tweaked the ndings of his research to claim that MMR vaccines cause autism and
Crohn's disease. He published these ndings in respectable journals such as The Lancet. The
scienti c community, however, soon found that there were ethical and factual problems with his
methodology. Incorrect scienti c knowledge can surface for a while within the scienti c community,
but over time, these ideas are (hopefully) phased out through peer review. Wake eld's claims have
now been discarded; The Lancet retracted the original article and Wake eld is not allowed to
practise medicine anymore. Nevertheless, fear amongst the wider (not scienti c) population led to
a decline in vaccinations, with disease and mortality as a negative consequence.

False scienti c knowledge can become widely accepted by the larger community, as this
community is often unable to distinguish good science from bad science. Ben Goldacre points out
how 'bad science' permeates popular culture and belief. Should we perhaps be wary of scienti c
knowledge claims (in media) which rely too much on emotive language (often fear)?  When it
comes to distinguishing good science and bad science, it is important to check the funding of
research as well as the possible pro table nature of its ndings. Ben Goldacre explains in his TED
talk, how the pharmaceutical companies can play with statistics and inconvenient ndings to prove
the ef ciency of their medication, for example. 
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 Moving on from bad science, we can also be confronted with pseudo-science. Pseudo-science
may on the surface look like real science, as it aims to present itself that way. However, a key
feature of the natural sciences is that scienti c claims can be tested. The latter is not the case for
pseudo-science. The history of medicine as a discipline illustrates that there were times when the
lines between science and pseudo-science were blurry. I would argue that with the increased quick
dissemination of information through current media, pseudo-science has somewhat gained in
popularity. Astrology is one of the more traditional  examples of pseudo-science. It draws on
con rmation bias (you count the hits and forget the misses). Its vague descriptions will ensure that
virtually every loyal horoscope reader will be able to nd "hits" that "prove" astrology works. The
descriptions about life events and personalities offered by horoscopes are so applicable to a
multitude of situations and people, that we may think they are actually catered to our particular
situation.  Depending on the knowledge community you belong to, what is science to some, may
be pseudo-science to someone else. Where would you place graphology, phrenology,
acupuncture, homeopathy, Feng Shui, or brain gym?

Although the notions of testing, falsi cation and peer review play a crucial role in distinguishing
good science from less credible scienti c knowledge, it is important to remember that not all
scienti c hypotheses can be tested in the same way. Sometimes evidence is not available (yet),
because we do not have the means to observe things that are too small for current technology to
"see", or perhaps simply too far away. In this sense, we should not automatically discard all
scienti c knowledge that cannot be tested in a laboratory. Nevertheless, it is very important to
check the sources and methodology used to produce knowledge that claims to be scienti c.

Methodology
Science is a way of thinking more than it is a body of knowledge.                                           
Carl Sagan

When you cannot measure, your knowledge is meagre and unsatisfactory.                             

  Lord Kelvin

Scientists try to "map" the natural world. This map tries to describe, predict and explain di erent
essential aspects of the natural world. To produce knowledge about the natural world, scientists
currently use a particular method: the scienti c method. This method is based on observation and
hypothesis, which is tested (through experimentation). Scientists  may formulate a law and/or a
theory, both of which explain things about the natural world. A scienti c law "predicts the results
of certain initial conditions" (Matt Anticole at TEDed). In short, it predicts and explains what will
happen. A scienti c theory, on the other hand, "provides the most logical explanation as to why
things happen as they do". In short, it explains why things happen. Sometimes scienti c laws
stand the test of time, whereas theories don't. Kepler's laws of planetary motions, for example,
are still used today, whereas his theory of musical harmony has now been replaced with the
theory of gravity to explain why the planets move the way they do (see TED ed, theory versus
law). 

To verify the reliability of your hypothesis, you (and others) should ideally be able to repeat your
experiments. Repeating experimentation may help us accept that something is right. In theory,
this seems feasible within the natural sciences, because the natural world can arguably be veri ed
empirically. However, some great scienti c hypotheses cannot be tested through experiments
based on observable data. Our sense perception is not perfect, and despite the enormous
advancements in technology, we cannot observe as much as we would like to. It is also practically
impossible to repeat experiments in nitely. In that sense, Popper proposed that scientists try to
falsify (prove wrong) each others' ideas and ndings. For example, if a scientist claims that metals
expand when heated, other scientists are invited to actively prove that this is not true. They could
look for situations in which metals do not expand when heated. This process of falsi cation aims
to ensure the validity of scienti c knowledge. It may also lead to the improvement of scienti c
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knowledge, as theories can be re ned, for example. Nevertheless, the processes of falsi cation as
well as veri cation are limited. This is partly due to problems with induction, reasoning and
observation, which all play an important role within the scienti c method.

Reason and observation (through sense perception) are very much key to the scienti c method.
We use inductive reasoning to come up with a hypothesis. We observe things around us and pick
up patterns. From these patterns we may form a hypothesis that explains what happens or even
why things happen. We need reason to do this. We can evaluate the validity of scienti c
knowledge by verifying whether the rules of mathematics and reason have been respected. We
can also verify whether ndings are empirically correct. But sometimes empirical data contradicts
a theory and vice versa. In a way, it is very di cult to o er ultimate proof of scienti c knowledge.
This is especially the case if we want to create knowledge about things that cannot easily be
observed. Sometimes we have to observe the e ects of something rather than the thing we want
to observe, sometimes the tools we use to observe (such as is the case of fMRIs) are quite far
removed from a simple act of observing. Extensions such as telescopes and magnifying glasses
are arguably mere extensions. But there is more at hand with fMRIs. In addition, sometimes
observing is not as passive as what may appears to be the case. If we were to stick with what
was easily observed and veri ed, our scienti c knowledge would be limited. In addition, by relying
merely on reason and sense perception, we may well be able to explain what happens, but we
would probably be less successful at explaining why this happen.

Revolutionary breakthroughs in the natural sciences show that scientists sometimes had to take
"a leap of faith". On occasion, observable evidence was not available yet. In that sense, the leap
of faith relates to going beyond available evidence. For example, 100 years after Einstein
predicted their existence, we now have evidence of gravitational waves.  Sometimes scientists
have to overcome the limits of our current frame of understanding things. They have to look at
things from a di erent perspective and o er a more original theory than the ones that t within the
worldview at the time. In this context, it is worth remembering that imagination plays a much
bigger role within the scienti c method than may appear at rst sight.   Helen de Cruz and Johan
de Smedt argue that (progress in) science is in fact a form of  structured imagination, whereby
analogies with knowledge in other elds drive scienti c discoveries. In fact, our intuitions about
the natural world are often not very scienti c at all. For example, children across the world
intuitively feel that earth is at. If no one told you that the earth travelled around the sun, your
intuition would probably tell you it was the other way around. By transferring distant analogies, we
can overcome these intuitions and make scienti c progress through what de Cruz and de Smedt
call 'structured imagination'. By using good reasoning skills combined with imagination, great
thinkers such as Copernicus made important breakthroughs in the natural sciences.

3. Reflection: Can we still call a discipline a natural science if we take

away its scientific method?

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 Evidence and observation

Science is a way of describing reality; it is therefore limited by the limits of observation,

and it asserts nothing which is outside observation.
                                                                           
Jacob Bronowski

As seen previously, scientists sometimes need to take a leap of faith and propose ideas
that cannot be verified yet. Sometimes we do not have the means to empirically observe
the evidence we need to prove our theories. Years later, with the advancement of
technology and progress in other areas, these ideas might be proven wrong, or right. The
latter was the case for Einstein, who predicted the existence of gravitational waves as part
of his general theory of relativity. This part of the theory (gravitational waves) was widely
accepted within the scientific community, but until recently, we had no empirical evidence
of it yet. Nevertheless, in 2015, 100 years after Einstein's initial predictions, scientists have
been able to spot the first gravitational waves. In an article by TIME magazine, Jeffry
Kluger observes that "humanity’s genius, as often happens, was a big step ahead of
humanity’s machines." He continues to cite scientist David Shoemaker from MIT: “It is
remarkable that humans can put together a story, and test it, for such strange and extreme
events that took place billions of years ago and billions of light-years distant from us.”

Within the natural sciences we rely heavily on sense perception and reason.
Advancements in technology have allowed us to create better tools to observe, but there is
still much we cannot access through our (limited) human frame. Some inventions, such as
the microscope, telescope and magnifying glass are arguably mere extensions of human
sense perception. Others, go beyond that and "some evidence is produced by processes
so convoluted that it’s hard to decide what, if anything has been
observed." (plato.stanford.edu). "The role of the senses in fMRI data production is limited
to such things as monitoring the equipment and keeping an eye on the subject. [...] If fMRI
images record observations, it’s hard to say what was observed—neuronal activity, blood
oxygen levels, proton precessions, radio signals, or something else. [...] Furthermore, it’s
hard to reconcile the idea that fMRI images record observations with the traditional
empiricist notion that much as they may be needed to draw conclusions from observational
evidence, calculations involving theoretical assumptions and background beliefs must not
be allowed (on pain of loss of objectively) to intrude into the process of data production.'" If
we need to resort to tools that go beyond mere observation through senses (because of
additional manipulations and calculations), this may affect the validity and neutrality of
empirical data.

Observation can indeed be less passive or receptive as what we might think. It also takes
great skill and practice to conduct correct scientific observations (especially when we
access tools such as microscopes or telescopes). Our assumptions and wishes may also
influence what we see. If are desperate to find evidence for something, chances are we
will find it. We may fall in the trap of confirmation bias or selection bias. We could count the
hits and forget the misses. With inductive reasoning (which is intrinsic in the scientific
method) comes the danger of hasty generalisations. We may conclude things based on
insufficient observations. Nevertheless, it is not possible nor desirable to observe
everything all the time. Within the natural sciences, the concept of evidence might
encompass more than just empirical evidence and empirical evidence may mean different
things in different situations.

Falsification and the importance of peer review

Why do we need a scientific community of knowers?

In questions of science, the authority of a Just because an idea is true doesn't mean it
thousand is not worth the humble reasoning can be proved. And just because an idea
of a single individual. can be proved doesn't mean it's true.
Jonah Lehrer
Galileo Galilei

Although we place  a lot of trust in scienti c ndings, one should not forget that
sometimes even the greatest scientists can be wrong. What was once considered
genuine scienti c knowledge may currently be discarded. The scienti c method places
much emphasis on peer review and falsi cation. This process aims to improve the
veracity of scienti c claims. We should be wary when scientists refuse their hypothesis to
be tested by peers. This may indicate that they have something to hide, such as unethical
or erroneous methodology, data manipulation or  unfounded claims.   Some scientists
have even become guilty of scams and hoaxes such as the Piltdown hoax. The drive to
come up with ground breaking scienti c discoveries has led some researchers to tamper
with data and evidence. The more recent case of Andrew Wake eld and the MMR vaccine
highlights the importance of peer review and the questioning of expert opinion in the eld
of the natural sciences. To verify scienti c knowledge, we should ideally be able to repeat
experiments. However, some great scienti c hypotheses cannot be tested through
experiments with observable data. Our sense perception is not perfect, despite the
enormous advancements in technology. It is also practically impossible to repeat
experiments in nitely. In that sense, Popper proposed that scientists try to falsify (prove
wrong) each others' ideas and ndings. For example, if a scientist claims that metals
expand when heated, other scientists are invited to actively prove that this is not true.
They should look for situations in which metals do not expand when heated, for example.
This process of falsi cation aims to ensure the validity of scienti c knowledge. It also
leads to the improvement of some scienti c knowledge, as theories can be re ned, for
example. Generally, we do not accept scienti c knowledge that is not supported by a
wider scienti c community. Sometimes individuals can be right, but over time, the wider
community usually catches on. Peer review is very important. When one expert claims
something is scienti cally true, his/her peers will review the validity of the claims. This can
happen through veri cation or falsi cation. Within the scienti c community, we do not
accept a claim by an expert simply because s/he is an expert. Someone's word is simply
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not enough. Nevertheless, falsi cation as well as veri cation are limited. This is partly due
to problems with induction, reasoning and observation, which all play an important role
within the scienti c method.

As our scienti c knowledge advances, we may have to revise previous ideas. Our
understanding of atoms and human DNA  has evolved considerably over the last
century, new elements have recently been added to the periodic table, and the list goes
on and on. Our knowledge sometimes expands and we can ll in the gaps of the
knowledge maps (for example when the previously predicted elements of the periodic
table have been discovered). Sometimes, we have to rewrite the knowledge maps
because previous maps were inaccurate. For example, phrenology or the theory of
harmony have been removed from our scienti c knowledge map. In this sense, scienti c
knowledge arguably improves over time. It becomes better, more accurate and more
expansive.

This progress is not necessarily gradual. It can happen in shocks and waves. Sometimes
we have to revise our entire way of scienti c thinking and a paradigm shift occurs, as
described by Thomas Kuhn.

Progress...  but at what price?

Should scienti c research be subject to ethical constraints,

or is the pursuit of all scienti c knowledge intrinsically worthwhile?

Western civilisation went through a major cognitive paradigm shift around the 17th
Century. Discoveries by  Galileo  and  Newton  challenged the prevalent dominant
discourse. A new theory of knowledge primarily based on empirical evidence and reason
was created. Scienti c evidence soon became synonymous with 'ultimate proof' and
religious knowledge was challenged by scienti c sceptics. This  scienti c
revolution  brought about major  changes in the way we thought about the world,
particularly in the West. Mankind arguably bene ted in many ways from this cognitive
paradigm shift and with an increased understanding of the world around us, living
standards and perhaps even our education generally improved.

Others question the impact of natural sciences exactly from the perspective of other
areas of knowledge such as ethics. The possession of scienti c knowledge undoubtedly
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 entails ethical responsibility. How far can and should we go in our search for scienti c
knowledge? What kinds of experiments should we (not) conduct and why? On what basis
can we decide that something is called progress? On what basis can we decide it is OK
to "redesign nature”?

Some people also question the human limitations in the search for scienti c knowledge.
We are bound to our human frame in our understanding of the world. Can we trust our
human ways of knowing? What can we do to enhance the power of these human tools? 

Lesson idea: Ethical "Carte Blanche"

On Ethics and The Natural Sciences

What if...? 

What if natural scientists had an ethical "carte blanche"? 

What kind of things would we (want to) research?

What might we know?

What might be the possible consequences of scienti c knowledge acquired through such
means?

• Brainstorm the above questions in groups on large sheets of paper/write on tables. 

• For each possible consequence of your "ethical carte blanche", think of other
subsequent consequences (be creative!)

• Walk around the tables and compare your group's ndings with those of others.

Follow-up discussion:

What criteria could we use to decide whether the pursuit and/or possession of scienti c
knowledge is ethical?

Scope: A scienti c theory of everything? 

Science and technology revolutionize our lives, Science does not tell us how to live
but memory, tradition and myth frame our
response. Leo Tolstoy
Arthur Schlesinger

With the rapid advancement of knowledge produced by the sciences over the last
centuries, people started to explore the boundaries of the latter's scope. Some feel that
because of science's successes, virtually everything can and should be explained through
the natural sciences. In that respect, science can become a kind of religion, the basic
explanation of our human condition and an answer to our moral questions.  But are the
successes in the eld of the natural sciences su cient to discard knowledge constructed
within other areas of knowledge? 

Not really, the natural sciences do not o er much guidance in terms of how we ought to
live our lives, for example. The natural sciences can explain things in its own neutral
language, but there are situations in which this would not be the most appropriate. For

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 example, when a friend of yours gets cancer and you want to have a conversation about
his/her feelings. 

Scienti c language is more neutral or distant than the language we use in every day
conversation. When your doctor explains the disease in scienti c terminology
(neoplasms, carcinoma, lymphoma, etc), the knowledge he passes on is correct. But if
you want to tap into the emotional core of what the disease is about, this kind of
explanation is perhaps quite useless. In that sense,  Stromae's artistic interpretation  is
much more suitable and powerful. When we de ne love in scienti c terms, we may ignore
nuances which artists can grasp, for example. Reducing love to the e ects of chemicals.
is perhaps a little bit sad. I would truly hope that the love I feel for my children and my
husband is not merely a matter of chemicals or "a love potion", as we might call it.
Reducing depression to mere biological factors may not be very good at explaining the
full extent of this human behaviour. Our human nature is only partly biological. So are we
suitable objects for (natural) scienti c study? Can we fully explain how our body works in
scienti c terms? Is illness purely biological? What about mental illness? Where do natural
sciences stop and human sciences begin? Human beings are di cult and complex
objects of study.

It is important to remember that despite the obvious strengths of the natural sciences as
an area in which we create knowledge, the natural sciences may not answer all of life's
questions. Are we at risk of reducing the world through our love for the natural science? Is
there room for a a holistic approach towards knowledge in a world so heavily in uenced
by the (largely compartmentalised) scienti c method? Or does science have the ability to
give us knowledge about more than just the natural world: our origins, what is right or
wrong, or even God?

Making connections to the core theme, as suggested by the TOK Guide

• How might members of the public judge whether to accept scienti c ndings if they
do not have detailed scienti c knowledge? 

• How is it that scienti c knowledge is often shared by large, geographically spread

and culturally diverse groups?

• How do scientists make use of, or work around, their intuitions?

•
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