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NEW ORLEANS LEVEE FAILURES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA

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New Orleans Levee Failures During Hurricane Katrina.

Abstract

This article aims to overview the period between 23rd and 31st of August 2005, which

will remain a catastrophic day of disaster in the history of the U.S. for what is today known as

Hurricane Katrina. A tropical storm slammed the southeastern United States, killing around 1800

people. It has kept a record as the costliest natural calamity in U.S. history. It began on August

23rd as a tropical depression over the Bahamas, and in 2 days, it became stronger, making landfall

between Miami and Fort Lauderdale. New Orleans, whose much of its coverage is below sea

level, was at the peak of the disaster when the storm brought down the levees that held the waters

of Lake Pontchartrain, thus causing flooding and hence. Though the then-mayor had commanded

that the people evacuate the area the previous day, some moved, and others remained in their

homes while others sought refuge at Louisiana Superdome.

Table of Contents
New Orleans Levees........................................................................................................................2

History..........................................................................................................................................2

Overtopping and Breaching Timeline..........................................................................................2

17th Street..................................................................................................................................3

London Avenue Canal – North................................................................................................3

London Avenue Canal – South................................................................................................3

IHNC West...............................................................................................................................4

IHNC East................................................................................................................................4

Failure Analysis...............................................................................................................................5
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Levees..........................................................................................................................................5

Floodwalls....................................................................................................................................5

Degree of Vulnerability Today........................................................................................................6

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................6
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New Orleans Levees

A levee is a low ridge embarkment mounted along the edges of a river or a stream to

prevent flooding of the adjacent land. In the case of New Orleans levees, there are two important

functions: protect flooding caused by the Mississippi River and keep Lake Pontchartrain at bay.1

History
There was a great need to control the water in the Mississippi River in 1717, but this

remained a puzzle without an answer since fortifying the natural riverbank levees was done from

time to time due to erosion. The French built the first manmade levee system near New Orleans.

After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, the Army Corps of Engineers decided to design and construct a

stronger and more efficient levee in New Orleans. However, due to environmental invasion due

to the construction, the U.S. district court warned against its continued construction 2. In 1985

surge barriers were replaced with longer levees and construction under supervision by the Army

Corps of Engineers. On August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina destroyed the levee system.

Overtopping and Breaching Timeline

Below is a summary of the results from a study of water levels and on sight account

studies conducted by IPET. This study aimed to design and develop a stronger overtopping and

hurricane protection system.3 As always expected, the survey results must have discrepancies,

1
Gall, Melanie, and Susan L. Cutter. "2005 events and outcomes: Hurricane Katrina and

beyond." In Emergency Management, pp. 191-217. Routledge, 2019.

2
Rusovich, Gregory. "The New New Orleans." New England Journal of Public Policy 32,

no. 1 (2020): 18.

3
KAKUTURU, SRUTHI. "Spatial Analysis of Flooding and Dewatering of New Orleans

during Hurricane Katrina."

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and only estimations work best in such a case. The most sensitive data was gathered from

timestamped digital images and videos depicting and documenting flooded regions. While

stopped clock data frequently gave vital insight into the timing of events, it also included

ambiguity. This research examined how the hurricane defence system fared during Katrina's

landfall. This paper's summary is limited to the following five locations:

 17th Street Canal

 London Avenue Canal – North

 London Avenue Canal - South

 Western IHNC and;

 Eastern IHNC

17th Street
Despite the expected diversity of eyewitnesses here, two credible explanations indicate

that the initial break happened at approximately 6: 30 a.m. on the 29 th of August. A man used a

telescope to observe the breach; north of it, he lived in the Lake Marina Tower high-rise

structure. He reported that a section of the levee was breached at dawn and that when he looked

later, the entire wall had vanished. According to the study, the initial failure occurred at 6: 30

a.m. and was entirely developed by 9:00 a.m.4 Eyewitness and digital pictures reveal that the

hydrograph-constructed Lake Pontchartrain stage would have been positioned in the canal at

around 7.3 feet elevation North American vertical datum of 1988, which is significantly beneath

4
Flynn, Stefan, Farshid Vahedifard, and David Schaaf. "A dataset of levee overtopping

incidents." In Geo-Extreme 2021, pp. 99-108. 2021.

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the topmost part of the barrier. The top of the 17th Street floodwall, as per post-Katrina studies,

is about 12.5 feet above the breach at the floodwall panels.

London Avenue Canal – North

Although no eyewitnesses were located in the vicinity of the breach, some stopped clocks

were seen within a ten-block radius of the breach. The breach appears to have occurred between

7:00 and 7:30 a.m. Assuming it occulted at 7:30 a.m., the canal's equivalent stage would be 8.9

ft, approximately 4 ft, lower than the highest point as observed from the floodwall height of 12.9

ft.

London Avenue Canal – South

Between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on Monday, a resident who lives immediately across from

the breach reported water. At around 8:00 a.m., another witness at a second position claimed that

the water rose swiftly from the west.5 On Monday, between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m., the London

South Breach appeared to have happened. According to the stage hydrograph for London

Avenue Canal, if the break happened at 8:00 a.m., the canal's elevation would have been around

9.5 ft. This region has a floodwall that is approximately 12.9 feet high.

IHNC West
Three breaches occurred within this system's scope; at the railroad crossing near I-10, a

breach at the intersection of the floodwall and the earth levee at pumping plant No. 19, and a

storage yard collapse near the Road of France. There was insufficient data to provide a reliable

timetable; nonetheless, it looks as though water began to enter this area at approximately 5:45

5
Song, Chung R., Sudarshan Adhikari, Ahmed Al-Ostaz, and Alexander H-D. Cheng.

"Development of deformation criteria for predictive monitoring system for

levees." International Journal of Geotechnical Engineering 13, no. 4 (2019): 369-376.

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a.m. The canal's water level was around 14 feet and poured over the maximum point of the

barrier.

IHNC East
The wall suffered two significant failures; near Florida Avenue, and the other was about

2,700 feet south. IPET personnel interviewed Lower Ninth Ward occupants to ascertain the

breaches that occured.6 Water began rushing into his home just after 4:30 a.m. on August 29th,

and by 5:00 a.m., the water had reached his ceiling. Water began flooding the Lower Ninth Ward

before 5:30 a.m., maybe as early as 4:30 a.m., according to eyewitness testimonies and stopped

clock data. This proposes that the water entered the IHNC floodwall via one or both breaches.

Water levels, however, were projected lower than the floodwall's top. According to an IPET

study, a small section measuring 200-foot of the IHNC floodwall on the east side near Florida

Avenue was ruined between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. at a water level of approximately 10.2 ft. At

approximately 7:30 a.m., the remaining floodwall was breached. The Lower Ninth Ward and St.

Bernard Parish experienced a peak in water levels of approximately 10.5–11 ft. By 7:30 a.m., a

600-foot portion of floodwall had been broken, possibly overtopped.

Failure Analysis
Levees
Levees and floodwalls are distinguished in the following sections, with the former

including no concrete or steel components. There were no levee collapses due to overtopping.

The intensity of the surge and wave action and the type of soil and compaction energy given to

6
Marr, W. Allen. "Forensic Investigations Get to the Facts: East Side IHNC Flood Wall

Breaches during Hurricane Katrina." GeoStrata Magazine Archive 22, no. 4 (2018): 34-

40.
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the levee filler material all had a role in the level of breaching and overtopping scour. Levees

built with hydraulic fill and containing more silt and sand were badly damaged. Along the

MRGO's Lake Borgne frontage, the levee was built with hydraulic fill that included a lot of sand

and muck; it had multiple breaches, and the levee portion was completely lost.

During this catastrophe, however, rolled fill levees made from cohesive materials

endured overtopping without breaching for the most part. The IPET research didn't look at the

logic behind planning or design decisions.7 As a result, there was no reason presented for using

hydraulic fill or why overtopping protection was not used for levees at risk of overtopping

erosion. A valuation of the draft final IPET report by an external review panel directed by ASCE

revealed that too little could be gleaned from all of the information and data collected to reason

for the development and design decisions.

Floodwalls
Overtopped I-type floodwalls experienced varying grades of wearing away and scour. The

destruction occurred at a rate equivalent to that of levees. The degree of erosion was governed by

the type of soil and compaction of the material eroded by the overtopping waters. The IHNC's

south breach, which badly flooded the Lower 9th Ward, exemplifies this type of failure.

Floodwaters flowed over the wall's top, eroding the soil that provided the floodwall with the

passive resistance it required to remain afloat. 8 When this passive barrier was eliminated, the

7
Rosenthal, Sandy. Words Whispered in Water: Why the Levees Broke in Hurricane

Katrina. Mango Media Inc., 2020.

8
Özer, Işil Ece, Myron van Damme, and Sebastiaan N. Jonkman. "Towards an

International Levee Performance Database (ILPD) and its use for macro-scale analysis of

levee breaches and failures." Water 12, no. 1 (2020): 119.

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wall became unbalanced and was breached. The four breaches were caused by I-type floodwalls

that broke due to soil instability in the foundation soils rather than overtopping and erosion. As

the canal's water level climbed, a break emerged on the floodwall's waterside, jeopardizing the

In-wall system's stability and performance. All three canals were impacted: the 17th Street

Canal, the London Avenue Canal's two breaches, and the IHNC East Bank at the Florida Avenue

pump station.

Degree of Vulnerability Today

Hurricane Katrina unleashed the vulnerability of the levee system. Today, safety is not

guaranteed for those residing inside the levee protection system. After the disaster, the Army

Corps of Engineers designed and constructed the risk reduction system to enhance the protection

of the area9. Considering that the sea level is rising with time and the levee system is sinking, the

question at hand is whether the levees can be overtopped. According to reports, the short answer

is yes. Storm Surge Specialist Jamie Rhome argues that it does not have to be a significantly

powerful hurricane to cause overtopping again.

Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina wrecked devastation on the Army Corps of Engineers of the United

States (USACE). The application of competent design techniques aided in the efficacy of flood

barriers. Failure to perform showed project faults and underscored the USACE's need to improve

its understanding of project failure mechanisms and the conditions of the foundation under which

9
Richardson, Gabriele. "The vulnerability of New Orleans’ black and foreign-born

populations in the 1878 yellow fever outbreak: a reassessment." GeoJournal 84, no. 6

(2019): 1465-1480.
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projects are erected. The USACE, a forward-thinking organization, is still implementing

Katrina's lessons. Designers and researchers continue to interact as additional information about

why project components performed as they did become available. As lessons gained in field

settings are applied, and specifics are debated and evaluated, design criteria and procedures have

evolved and will undoubtedly remain to evolve.

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Bibliography

Flynn, Stefan, Farshid Vahedifard, and David Schaaf. "A dataset of levee overtopping incidents."

In Geo-Extreme 2021, pp. 99-108. 2021.

Gall, Melanie, and Susan L. Cutter. "2005 events and outcomes: Hurricane Katrina and beyond."

In Emergency Management, pp. 191-217. Routledge, 2019.

KAKUTURU, SRUTHI. "Spatial Analysis of Flooding and Dewatering of New Orleans during

Hurricane Katrina."

Marr, W. Allen. "Forensic Investigations Get to the Facts: East Side IHNC Flood Wall Breaches

during Hurricane Katrina." GeoStrata Magazine Archive 22, no. 4 (2018): 34-40.

Özer, Işil Ece, Myron van Damme, and Sebastiaan N. Jonkman. "Towards an International

Levee Performance Database (ILPD) and its use for macro-scale analysis of levee

breaches and failures." Water 12, no. 1 (2020): 119.

Richardson, Gabriele. "The vulnerability of New Orleans’ black and foreign-born populations in

the 1878 yellow fever outbreak: a reassessment." GeoJournal 84, no. 6 (2019): 1465-

1480.

Rosenthal, Sandy. Words Whispered in Water: Why the Levees Broke in Hurricane Katrina.

Mango Media Inc., 2020.

Rusovich, Gregory. "The New New Orleans." New England Journal of Public Policy 32, no. 1

(2020): 18.

Song, Chung R., Sudarshan Adhikari, Ahmed Al-Ostaz, and Alexander H-D. Cheng.

"Development of deformation criteria for predictive monitoring system for

levees." International Journal of Geotechnical Engineering 13, no. 4 (2019): 369-376.