Journal o f Refugee Studies Vol. 27, No. 4 © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.

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doi: 10.1093/jrs/feuO 15 Advance Access publication 29 June 2014

T h e Bali Process and G lo b al R efu g ee Policy

in th e A s ia -P a c ific R egion

SUSAN KNEEBONE
Faculty of Law, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia
susan.kneebone@monash.edu

M S received September 2013; revised M S received March 2014

This article examines the role of two regional actors in the Asia-Pacific region,
namely the Bali Process and the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network
(APRRN), a platform of civil society organizations, as two very different
models of mechanisms and agenda-setting on Global Refugee Policy (GRP).
The Bali Process has limited actors and a narrow discourse on refugees which
reflects a hierarchical agenda-setting process or ‘steering mode’. By contrast, the
APRRN is a non-state network actor which works through non-hierarchical
mechanisms as a transnational activist network (TAN) and has a normative
agenda. This article demonstrates the tension within GRP which is being cre­
ated within the region through these two intermediaries between the global
North and the global South.

Keywords: Global refugee policy, actors, discourses, irregular migration, Australia,

asylum seeker policy

Introduction

The term Global Refugee Policy (GRP) contains an assumption that there is
a globalized refugee policy (Miller 2012). Such an assumption has been fos­
tered by the creation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which contains a set of
principles which apply to the states parties to the Convention, and a specia­
lized global institution, UNHCR. Moreover, there is common agreement
amongst refugee advocates that an ‘international refugee regime’ has evolved
from these formal sources (Barnett 2002). Underlying the notion of an ‘inter­
national refugee regime’ is the essential but contested role of the state, both
as the agent of protection of the refugee and as the guardian of state sover­
eignty (Mertus 1998; Hathaway 2007). In this context states are described as
the main agents or actors ‘in an increasingly interconnected global environ­
ment’ (Gibney 2004: 36). But the ‘Janus faced’ role of the state suggests that
if GRP is conceived as the sum total of legal standards, then it has a pro­
tective and a restrictive function which are constantly in tension.
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 597
The concept of a global regime raises more possibilities for analysis of
GRP. In particular a school of scholarship on the nature of international
relations (IR) calls into question the dominance of the state paradigm, the
view that states are the main actors, to explain how global governance re­
gimes operate (Slaughter 1995). The existence of transnational and sub­
regional actors and discourses which take place on many issues of global
importance (Keck and Sikkink 1998) challenges the ‘traditional’ view of inter­
national law, and the perception that states are the main actors. Through a
focus on the plurality of actors it is possible to reconceive international law
somewhat differently to the traditional view of the state’s ‘vertical’ relation­
ship with individuals. A focus on the role of state and non-state actors
through a sociological lens reveals the ‘discursive’ discourses (Keck 2004)
which shape global regimes.
In looking at the idea of GRP I am interested in ‘the actor dimension’, that
is, in identifying the actors and their agenda-setting or ‘steering modes’ (Risse
2004) to evaluate the dominant mechanisms and discourses which are deter­
mining GRP. This article examines the role of two very different regional
actors in the Asia-Pacific region, namely the Bali Process and the Asia
Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN), a recently formed platform of
civil society organizations. The Bali Process is a state-led policy-formation
mechanism that works in parallel to the international refugee regime. It has
been suggested that the two key components of a global refugee protection
regime are the right to asylum and a durable solution (Betts 2009: 7, 10). For
this purpose a regime of global refugee protection can be conceived as a
‘global public good’ (Betts 2009: 8, 25) under which states share the
burden of such protection. However, the Bali Process encapsulates the re­
strictive side of the international refugee regime and the idea of responsibility-
shifting rather than burden-sharing. The APRRN by contrast is a non-state
network actor which advocates for refugee protection. This article analyses
the potential influence of the APRRN on refugee policy in the Asia-Pacific
region, where regional discourse is dominated by the state-led Bali Process.
A feature which is common to both the Bali Process and the APRRN is
the involvement of North-South actors and issues, which suggests that both
venues of policy formation are linked to GRP. Another common link is the
role of UNHCR, which is part of the Bali Process and a supporter of
the APRRN. This article explains the dynamics of the interaction between
the Bali Process and UNHCR’s advocacy in the region. It also examines how
UNHCR’s role in the region has influenced the APRRN’s networking role as
a non-state actor. But discussion of UNHCR in this article is limited to its
role as an observer to the Bali Process and as a sometimes quasi-intermediary
between the Process and the APPRN.
After setting the scene for refugee issues in the Asia-Pacific region, I out­
line the Bali Process and its focus over different periods, with some discussion
of UNHCR and agenda-setting within the Process. I then examine the
APRRN to explain its unique role as a transnational activist network
598 Susan Kneebone
(TAN) which is committed to changing regional policies on protection of
refugees (Piper and Uhlin 2004). This case study of the Asia-Pacific region
shows that GRP is being made separately within the region through these two
actors, the Bali Process as a state-led process and the APRRN as a non-state
actor, both of which are intermediaries between the North and the South.

Background
The refugee ‘problem’ within the Asia-Pacific region is described in the 2012
Regional Update by UNHCR as follows:

The Asia-Pacific region is home to the world’s largest and oldest refugee
populations. The protection environment continues to be fragile with very few
countries having signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees__ The region is characterized by population movements, with
asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka representing the
three largest groups moving irregularly. The majority of these individuals
settle in urban areas (UNHCR 2012a).

Indeed the Asia-Pacific region is host to some 10.6 million people ‘of con­
cern’ to UNHCR, representing almost 30 per cent of the global refugee
population (UNHCR 2012b).
Within Southeast Asia, the main ‘hosting’ countries of refugee populations
are Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Whilst the Southeast Asian region
has a ‘protracted refugee problem’, Indonesia and Malaysia are well-known
transit countries for asylum seekers en route to Australia. This is one of the
key factors in shaping a ‘regional’ response through the Bali Process. Due to
the geopolitical factors which exist within the region, including the nature of
the regional refugee ‘problem’, the actors and the processes which have
emerged at the state level are dominated by Australia under the Bali
Process. Under that Process, refugees are constructed within a securitized
discourse on ‘irregular migration’, a construction which is mirrored in
other regional consultative processes, and within the ASEAN1 process
(Kneebone 2014). This construction applies within the context of sovereign
states in the region. In Thailand (Muntabhorn 2005), Malaysia (Nah 2012:
501), and now Indonesia (Nethery et al. 2013) refugees and asylum seekers
are constructed primarily as ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migrants. Even as recog­
nized (UNHCR status) refugees their status is defined primarily through their
migration.
Next, I examine the development of the state-led Bali Process and explain
its ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘steering modes’, and briefly contrast that with the
ASEAN dialogue on refugees. The importance of this ‘agenda’ is that it
highlights a regional concern with irregular migration and consequently
UNHCR’s difficult role in advocating for protection of refugees. This pro­
vides the setting for discussion of the APRRN. As UNHCR has described
the situation, ‘geopolitics and national security issues prevail over
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 599
humanitarian considerations’ (UNHCR 2012c). In this discussion I explain
how the Bali Process is intrinsically linked to Australian national policy on
asylum seekers as well as to a general reluctance within the region to see
refugees as persons in need of protection. The Bali Process is a state-led
regional response which links North and South interests, and it serves
intra-regional interests at the same time. Finally, I examine how the
APRRN responds to the ‘statist perspective’ of the Bali Process and to
states’ reluctance to protect refugees in the region.

The Bali Process: Origins and Provenance

There are two sources for the Bali Process, which show its mixed origins as a
bilateral process between Australia and Indonesia, and as a multilateral
regional process led by the Australian government. This is important, as
recently Indonesia stepped aside from both the bilateral process and the
Bali Process to convene a Special Conference on Irregular Movement of
People, which led to the Jakarta Declaration on Addressing Irregular
Movement of People (2013). This suggests that Indonesia is keen to take a
leadership role on this issue, within a multilateral framework.
In its manifestation as a multilateral regional process, the Bali Process
arose out of a regional ‘securitized’ discourse on irregular migration which
began in the 1990s. Under the Bali Process this discourse contextualizes refu­
gees within ‘mixed flows’ and the ‘migration-asylum nexus’ (Kneebone
2009: 3). The Bali Process has many features in common with ASEAN dis­
course in its characterization of the issue and in its avoidance of the language
of human rights to frame refugees (Kneebone 2014). It has limited actors and
a narrow discourse which reflects a hierarchical agenda-setting process or
‘steering mode’.
The full title of the Bali Process is the Conference on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. According to the
official website, it was ‘initiated’ at the Regional Ministerial Conference on
People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime
held in Bali in February 2002 (Bali Process n.d.). This was the first formal
meeting of the Bali Process, which originated from a 1996 Regional Seminar
on Irregular Migration and Migrant Trafficking in East and South Asia, led
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and known as the
‘Manila Process’. This process led to the 1999 Bangkok Declaration on
Irregular Migration which refers in turn to the Manila Process and to the
Inter-governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced
Persons and Migrants (APC n.d.). These processes are known generically
as Regional Cooperation Processes (RCPs) which are led generally by IOM
(an inter-governmental organization) in the region. As a rule, RCPs are state
led and involve ministerial level consultations, and do not include outside
representation. Thus they have been critiqued for the limited discourse and
access to information which they provide (Kneebone 2010a).
600 Susan Kneebone asal irregular migrasi

The 1999 Declaration, from which the Bali Process arose, was made ‘to
address the question of international migration, with particular attention to
regional cooperation on irregular/undocumented migration’ (Bangkok
Declaration 1999). Throughout the Declaration, international migration is
conceived as irregular migration and as involving ‘smuggling and trafficking
in human beings’. There is no reference to refugees or human rights or to the
role of UNHCR in this document. The language of the Declaration is typical
of the ‘securitized’ concept of irregular migration and the regional response to
human trafficking in the 1990s (Kneebone and Debeljak 2012: 91-98).
It presages the mechanisms and agenda of the Bali Process.
In comparison to the 1999 Declaration, an earlier regional declaration
referred specifically to refugees and displaced persons, in the context of the
rights of ‘vulnerable’ persons. This was the 1993 Declaration made ahead of
the World Conference on Human Rights (UN 1993). In it, the rights of such
persons were linked to inequalities in development between the global North
and the global South (UN 1993: Art 18). By contrast the 1999 Bangkok
Declaration on Irregular Migration focused upon inequalities within the
region and a regionalized concept of security. This highlights how the re­
gional agenda on refugees shifted during the 1990s to conflate the issue
with irregular migration.
A second source for the development of a formal Bali Process was a bi­
lateral arrangement between its two co-chairs, Australia and Indonesia. In the
late 1990s, Australia sought to establish a formal mechanism or ‘Regional
Cooperation Arrangement’ (RCA) with Indonesia, which eventually came to
fruition in 2000 in a Regional Cooperation Model (RCM). The focus of the
RCA was upon prevention of people smuggling within a transnational crime
framework. This was the beginning of the processing of refugees in Indonesia,
involving the Indonesian government and provincial authorities, UNHCR
and IOM (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2002). The bilateral
RCA between Indonesia and Australia is still extant (Taylor and Rafferty-
Brown 2010: 559-560). This is a key plank of Australia’s domestic policy: the
availability of UNHCR processing in Indonesia and the prevention of sec­
ondary movements are used as justifications for imposing penalties on asylum
seekers who move on to Australian territory.
These facts are important as they show the hybrid origins of the Australia-
Indonesian led Bali Process which arose out of a bilateral relationship with
Indonesia, and from the analogy of RCPs, which have limited ‘actors’ as they
exclude civil society, and an agenda of state security and migration. For
example, the APC RCP referred to above initially examined issues concerning
refugees and displaced persons, but later its focus changed to illegal migration
and border controls (UNHCR 2003) when IOM became a partner of the
group in 1997. Initially the Bali Process had 36 member countries in the
region, and IOM and UNHCR had observer status (now they are full mem­
bers). Thus the Bali Process operates both as an Australian-managed, state-
led dialogue involving other states in the region which are concerned to
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 601
manage irregular migration, and as a bilateral relationship with Indonesia.
Recently the latter has shown its willingness to act outside the Process (albeit
acknowledging its existence) (Jakarta Declaration: August 2013) and to
assume leadership within a multilateral framework.
Australia has continued to develop its policy response to asylum seekers in
the region through bilateral relationships with Indonesia and other Pacific
nations. Australia has arguably exported its restrictive policies towards
asylum seekers to Indonesia and other countries within the region, through
Australian-funded detention centres and Australian-led legislative changes
which depend upon characterizing asylum seekers as ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’
migrants (Nethery et al. 2013). In 2013, Australia entered into bilateral rela­
tionships with Nauru and Papua New Guinea to process and resettle asylum
seekers intercepted by Australian authorities.

Revival o f the Bali Process 2009

The first meetings of the formal Bali Process were held in 2002 and 2003,
after which there was a gap until 2009 when the Process was ‘reactivated’ and
‘enhanced’, with some new mechanisms described in the next part of this
article. During this second period the discourse of the Bali Process became
increasingly ‘securitized’, by focusing on transnational crime, and increasingly
restrictive for asylum seekers.
The development and revival of the Bali Process tracks the flows of asylum
seekers travelling from the region to Australia, which as stated above is a key
destination for asylum seekers in transit. The period 2001 to 2002 was one of
increased flows of asylum seekers making ‘secondary movements’ to Australia
(Kneebone 2006: 696-698). In the period leading up to 2001, the number of
boat arrivals had escalated in response to the conflicts in Afghanistan and the
Middle East. In the period 2002 to 2008 there was a slowing down of the flow
of asylum seekers to Australia, but in 2009 there was a sharp increase, and a
heightening of tension about refugees in the region.
In April 2009, in the context of an increase in asylum seeker ‘boat arrivals’,
Australia, Indonesia and other governments in the region attended the Third
Bali Regional Ministerial Conference (BRMC) and re-confirmed their com­
mitment to the Bali Process (Kneebone 2010b: 349). This increase in asylum
seekers could be attributed to conflicts in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, and in line
with global trends, there was a sharp increase in the number of asylum
seekers attempting to reach Australia by boat from Indonesia (Kneebone
2010b: 355).
Within the region, there was also concern, in particular about the treatment
of thousands of Rohingyas from Myanmar who, since December 2008, had
been forcibly expelled and abandoned in international waters by the Thai se­
curity forces, and about another two million forcibly displaced refugees from
Myanmar, who were sheltering in surrounding countries (Thailand, Malaysia
and India). In addition there was a humanitarian crisis in northeast Sri Lanka
602 Susan Kneebone
due to the ongoing civil war, and an increasingly significant population of
African refugees in Asia (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme 2009). This was the context in which states renewed their commit­
ment to the Bali Process in 2009. Importantly the Bali Process now has over 40
members, including countries in the region, source countries for refugees tran­
siting to Australia (such as Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq) and ‘superpowers’ such
as the United States of America and the Peoples’ Republic of China.
Additionally, as noted above IOM and UNHCR are now official members
of the Bali Process. I now turn to focus more closely upon the agenda of these
actors and their new ‘steering modes’. In particular I highlight the tension
between the protective and restrictive faces of GRP.

The Bali Process: Actors and Agenda

Development o f Agenda and New Mechanisms: 2002-2011

At the first meeting of the Bali Process in 2002, the Co-Chairs’ Statement
recognized its direct lineage and ‘cultural heritage’ by acknowledging the
legacy of the 1999 Bangkok Declaration on irregular migration discussed
above, the work of the APC and of ASEAN (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2002).
Whilst this 2002 statement has a strong focus on ‘people smuggling and
trafficking in persons’, it refers also to the human rights dimensions of the
problem (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2002: §3), and links the issue of irregular
migration to refugees. There is recognition of the need for international sup­
port and assistance to countries producing and hosting ‘large refugee popu­
lations’ (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2002: §21), which appears to echo then current
global discourse on international refugee protection. This was the period of
Convention Plus and the Agenda for Protection, which was intended to
engage states in a dialogue in support of the anniversary of the 50 year old
Refugee Convention (Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei 2007: 18-20). It is pos­
sible that the 2002 Bali Process was influenced by the agenda which UNHCR
put on the table at that meeting.
Another important statement from the 2002 meeting also supported
UNHCR policy on international refugee protection, but at the same time
linked it to the migration-asylum nexus. It was said that:
Ministers, while acknowledging that the Conference had not been convened to
deal directly with the issue of refugees, affirmed that nothing in this statement
was intended to prejudice the legitimate rights of genuine refugees to seek and
enjoy asylum in accordance with relevant... Conventions and Protocols. They
called for effective measures to be put in place to ensure that protection is
provided, consistent with the international obligations of individual States,
while preventing abuse by people smugglers of the relevant UN Conventions
on refugee protection. Ministers noted that all countries, including origin, tran­
sit and potential destination, should play a part in finding solutions for refu­
gees, while providing for return in a humane manner for those found not to be
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 603
refugees. In certain circumstances, for return to be sustainable, the issue of
return would require international support and cooperation (Co-Chairs’
Statement 2002: §26).

At the 2003 meeting, in a rare statement at a Bali Process acknowledging the

causes of ‘refugeehood’, the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs referred
to the Iraq conflict as the ‘humanitarian tragedy’ and ‘backdrop’ of the
meeting (Wirajuda 2003). UNHCR reminded the parties that if durable so­
lutions and burden sharing were practised, they would result in a reduction of
people smuggling and related transnational crime. UNHCR said that:

You must therefore not only live up to the spirit of the 1951 Convention, but
also engage in comprehensive solutions—in Convention Plus. Solutions for refu­
gees and burden sharing is not only a humanitarian but a political challenge
(UNHCR 2003: 10 quoted in Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei 2007: 175).

As noted, these discussions arose whilst the Agenda for Protection, which
arose out of the Global Consultations, was being drafted. The Agenda re­
affirmed the need for comprehensive approaches to international protection
and the importance of international cooperation, burden sharing and respon­
sibility (Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei 2007: 18-20). However, these prin­
ciples did not subsequently become part of the Bali Process’s agenda.
The third Bali Conference held in April 2009 reaffirmed instead the agenda of
transnational crime and ‘enhanced regional cooperation, including extradition
of people smugglers and traffickers, [to] help dismantle criminal networks and
reinforce regional efforts to counter the illegal trade in persons’ (Co-Chairs’
Statement 2009). It ‘affirmed’ the migration-asylum nexus when it stated that
the ‘root causes of movements within the region, particularly those involving
people smuggling and trafficking in persons’ resulted from ‘poverty, economic
disparities, labour market opportunities, conflict, and [human] insecurity’ (2009:
§13). There was however a direct reference to ‘genuine’ refugees, ‘particularly
those [whose claims were] based on humanitarian grounds’ (2009: §18), with
recognized rights under ‘relevant UN Conventions and Protocols to which
States are party, national law and practices’ (2009: §18).
At this third meeting in April 2009, it was agreed that an Ad Hoc Group
(AHG) ‘mechanism’ be ‘activated to bring together key source, transit and
destination countries as well as relevant international organizations’ to develop
regional responses to current irregular migration challenges affecting the Asia-
Pacific region. In December 2009 the AHG endorsed the creation of a
Regional Immigration Liaison Network (RILON), and a Regional
Cooperation Framework (RCF) concept was developed and endorsed by
Ministers at the Fourth BRMC in 2011. Simultaneously, UNHCR and IOM
were incorporated more closely into the Process, in particular to advance the
RCF concept, and the establishment of a Regional Support Office (RSO) to
facilitate the ‘operationalization’ of the RCF. At the third AHG meeting in
June 2010, UNHCR was tasked to set up a ‘co-hosted workshop to develop a
604 Susan Kneebone
coordinated and comprehensive regional approach to refugees and irregular
movements, including secondary movement’ (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2010).
The AHG is composed of Senior Officials, as well as Ministers representing
policing of borders and customs. Thus the Bali Process has created a hier­
archy of state structures; meetings at Ministerial level through the full Bali
Regional Ministerial Conference (BRMC), and the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of
Senior Officials plus a network of RILONs in Bangkok, Colombo and New
Delhi under the RCF. Unsurprisingly, the language of the AHG mirrors that
of the full BRMC. This was noted in a statement of the APRRN who at­
tended an AHG meeting in July 2009, where the discussion focused on the
criminal aspects of irregular migration, capacity building and intelligence
sharing (email correspondence, 19 August 2009).
Later in this article I will describe how UNHCR’s attempt to reinforce a
protection agenda with the 2009 revival, which it had encouraged in the first
meetings, were frustrated in this state-led Process. In the next section I de­
scribe an incident under the Bali Process which shows the tension between its
restrictive agenda, which is focused on irregular migration, and that of the
global refugee protection regime.

The Bali Process 2011-2012: the Malaysia Arrangement and the

‘Level Playing Field’
Under the Bali Process, Australia emphasizes the collective responsibilities of
other countries in the region, who are mostly not parties to the Refugee
Convention, to prevent onward ‘flows’ of asylum seekers to Australia, and ap­
peals to the mutual interest of states in preventing irregular migration. This
creates the perception that it is the region’s ‘responsibility’ to protect
Australia, on the basis that Australia’s interests are self-evidently more im­
portant than those of other states in the region, which have substantial pro­
tracted refugee populations. It does not use the term ‘responsibility’ in the
international law sense of ‘state responsibility’ or burden-sharing (as this is
understood in refugee law, discussed below), or as in IR, as concerned with
refugee protection as a ‘global public good’ (Betts 2009: 25).
For example, in the lead up to the July 2011 Arrangement with Malaysia
(discussed below), at the Bali Process Senior Officials’ Meeting on the topic
of Regional Framework Approaches, in March 2011, the Co- Chairs’ official
statement underlined:

[T]he collective responsibility of source, transit and destination countries in

responding to complex migratory movements, noting that a cooperative frame­
work approach would offer an opportunity to accommodate the interests of all
states involved, consistent with applicable international standards (Co-Chairs’
Statement 2011a: §9; Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011b: §15).

The focus of the Bali Process under the Australia- Indonesian chairs is primar­
ily upon promoting orderly migration in the context of the migration-asylum
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 605
nexus (2011b: §16(i)). At the Fourth BRMC on 29-30 March 2011, the Co-
Chairs’ Statement provided only qualified support for the principle of asylum
and non-refoulement. It was said:

Where appropriate and possible, asylum seekers should have access to consistent
assessment processes, whether through a set of harmonized arrangements or
through the possible establishment of regional assessment
arrangements... (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011b: §16(ii); italics added).

It also stated that: ‘Persons found not to be in need of protection should be

returned, preferably on a voluntary basis, to their countries of origin, in
safety and dignity’ (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011b: §16(iv); italics added).
Although it is stated that: ‘Arrangements should promote human life and
dignity’ (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2011b: §19(i)), the primary focus of the
Process is seemingly upon deterring irregular movement.
In light of the agenda which developed under the Bali Process, it is not
surprising that when Australia did attempt to reach a burden-sharing ar­
rangement with Malaysia, it did so with mixed motives. The July 2011
Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of
Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement (the Arrangement), was a bilateral
agreement concluded under the Bali Process, providing for the exchange of
800 asylum seekers arriving ‘irregularly’ by boat in Australian excised terri­
tory, or who are ‘intercepted in the course of trying to reach Australia by
irregular means’ (Arrangement 2011: clause 4(1 )(a)), with up to 4,000 recog­
nized refugees awaiting resettlement in Malaysia. Although promoted as an
arrangement which would alleviate Malaysia’s protracted refugee problem, it
had a ‘sting’ in that it was a deterrent measure in relation to the 800 asylum
seekers who were to be ‘exchanged’. Following a challenge to the legality of a
decision to implement the Arrangement, a majority of 6:1 of the High Court
of Australia declared that there was an invalid exercise of power (Plaintiffs
M70/2011 and M106 o f 2011 v M IA Q .
The High Court reached its decision by applying a provision of Australia’s
domestic legislation, which coincidentally accords with the idea that burden
sharing of refugee protection is governed by a ‘level playing field’. Here I am
referring to the view which has developed as an aid to interpretation of the
Refugee Convention, that a state which intends to transfer its asylum seekers
(and its responsibility to them) to another state, can do so only if there is
equivalent ‘effective protection’ provided in that state (Foster 2007: 230-231).
Prior to the decision in Plaintiffs M70, Australian law was that asylum
seekers could be transferred by Australia to any designated ‘safe third coun­
try’ under a lower standard of ‘practical’ protection (Kneebone 2008). The
importance of this decision is that it highlights the practical difficulty of the
‘level playing field’ in the region, namely that apart from New Zealand,
Australia is the only country in the region which can provide ‘effective pro­
tection’ to asylum seekers.
606 Susan Kneebone
In interpreting the domestic legislation, the majority of the High Court in
Plaintiffs M70 accepted that asylum seekers seeking entry to Australia, who
have engaged Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, even
before their claims have been processed are owed at least rights relating to
education, the practice of religion, employment, housing and access to the
courts wherever they are processed (Refugee Convention, Articles 3, 4, 16(1),
17(1), 22(1), 26) (,Plaintiffs M70/2011 and M106 o f 2011 v M I AC, per Gummow,
Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). That is, the High Court accepted that once its
protection obligations under the Convention are engaged, Australia cannot con­
tract out its responsibilities unless equivalent ‘effective protection’ is provided in
the third country to which it intends to send the asylum seekers.
Subsequent to the decision, a new Subdivision on Regional Processing in­
serted in the Migration Act made it clear that in order to enter into a coopera­
tive arrangement with another country in the region, Australia does not expect
that the other country will adhere to the full set of rights in the Refugee
Convention. Australia has thus ‘legitimated what can only be described as a
responsibility-shifting rather than responsibility-sharing regime’ (Foster 2012:
422). It has effectively spurned the idea that there is a regime of global refugee
protection which can be conceived as a ‘global public good’.
Following the failed Arrangement with Malaysia, in 2012 the Australian
Government commissioned a Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers,
to canvass the development of a ‘regional cooperation framework’. The
Expert Panel Report reaffirms the principles which underpin the Bali
Process. For example, the migration-asylum nexus is described as ‘an inter­
national environment in which irregular migration and asylum seeking are
facilitated by accessible travel, networked people smuggling. . . ’ (Australian
Government 2012: 10). Recommendation 1 contains a statement that the
relevant policy principles include ‘managing asylum and mixed migration
flows across the region’. The Report explicitly asserts that Australia’s policies
towards asylum seekers operate as a ‘pull’ and seeks to promote ‘greater use
of regular migration pathways and international protection arrangements’
(Australian Government 2012: 11). The RCF is described as bilateral cooper­
ation with Indonesia and Malaysia ‘in particular’ and as ‘enhancing relevant
capacity building’ in Southeast Asia (Australian Government 2012: 12;
Recommendations 3 and 4). It is presumed that asylum seekers, who are
labelled ‘irregular maritime arrivals’, are to be processed in locations outside
Australia. This discussion thus illustrates the difficulty in creating a ‘level
playing field’ and protection agenda between Australia and other countries
in the region under the Bali Process.

UNH C R and the Bali Process

This section evaluates the role of UNHCR as a formal member within the
Bali Process, and its ability to influence the agenda of the Process. This is in
part background to discussion of the APRRN, as their roles are intertwined.
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 607
Indeed as noted above, the APRRN, which was formed in November 2008
with support including that of UNHCR, said in 2009 that it needed to work
through UNHCR because of its exclusion from the formal Bali Process. At
that time the APRRN noted that the language and concepts of the Bali
Process were focused on ‘traditional rhetorics [sz'c]’ (namely security and ir­
regular migration) (email correspondence, 19 August 2009).
In its Overview of the Asia-Pacific region of 6 March 2012 UNHCR claimed
that the ‘fragile protection environment makes it, UNHCR, the main agent and
custodian of protection’ in the region (UNHCR 2012c). UNHCR undoubtedly
plays a large role in this region, as protection opportunities are limited. It fills
the vacuum created by the fact that few states in the region are parties to the
Refugee Convention. In particular it is primarily responsible for refugee status
determination (RSD) in the region and leads policy formulation with states. In
November 2010 it organized a regional meeting on the 10 point Plan of Action
on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration in Manila which was said to have
been ‘positive’ or ‘pragmatic and solution-oriented while principled’ (Feller
2011). For many years now UNHCR has led another process in the region,
namely the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), which in
1966 formulated an instrument for the protection of refugee rights, the Bangkok
Principles (Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees as adopted by the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee at its Eighth Session 1966)
(Kneebone 2014). The Principles were reaffirmed in 2001 (Asian-African
Legal Consultative Organization 2001).
Due to its unique role as custodian of the Refugee Convention UNHCR is
closely linked to both state and non-state actors, or ‘civil society and NGOs’
as Barnett describes them (Barnett 2002: 259). As UNHCR is largely depend­
ent on state donations, the dichotomy between state and non-state is some­
what ambiguous in this context. Further, as its major RSD role shows, it acts
as a state substitute in the Asia-Pacific region. UNHCR’s relationship with
the APRRN (as discussed below) highlights the difficulty of characterizing
UNHCR as either a state or a non-state actor (Stavropoulou 2008).

UNHCR: Expanding Protection Space in the Bali Process?

Although present at the inception of the Bali Process in 2002, since 2009 UNHCR
has been included more fully in the Process, and has attempted to shift the agenda
to a focus upon refugee protection (Towle 2011). Its re-involvement was noted in
April 2009 by High Commissioner Guterres, who welcomed the reactivated
Process and the prospect of a regional response (UNHCR 2009).
This spirit of optimism and hope for regional collective action with
protection outcomes continued in 2010 when the UNHCR summary of the
Asia-Pacific region for that year said:

UNHCR is promoting comprehensive regional approaches to protection includ­

ing: addressing the root causes of displacement in countries of origin; improving
608 Susan Kneebone
conditions of stay in countries of asylum; and finding durable solutions. The
recent Bali Process meeting, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia, provided
the opportunity for UNHCR to put forward refugee protection issues as an
important element of this regional consultative process. Cooperation with civil
society representatives and countries belonging to the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) paved the way for consultations in 2010 on access to
asylum and refugee protection, and access to basic services, particularly in the
context of broader migration movements (UNHCR 2010: 3).

In March 2011, at the Fourth BRMC, Erika Feller, Assistant High

Commissioner (Protection) UNHCR, said that although ‘asylum-related
issues, until quite recently, have been somewhat on the periphery of the dis­
cussions ... [t]here is now an evolution of thinking in this regard’ (Feller
2011). This statement suggested that UNHCR had changed the agenda
under the Bali Process to a focus on protection needs.
On 25 July 2011 the Arrangement between Australia and Malaysia was
concluded. Under this Arrangement, both UNHCR and IOM had significant
roles. Indeed Clause 3 stated:

This Arrangement will proceed on the basis that UNHCR and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) can fulfill the roles and functions envisaged
in the Operational Guidelines at Annex A (Arrangement 2011: clause 3).

This was an important factor in the High Court of Australia decision in

Plaintiffs M70, to the effect that states cannot abdicate their responsibilities
to asylum seekers to non-state parties, such as IOM and UNHCR. Despite
UNHCR’s somewhat cautious support for the Arrangement (UNHCR 2011)
it was seen by groups such as APRRN as having betrayed its protection
mandate.
Meanwhile, UNHCR continued to work directly with the Bali Process and
appeared to have been given an agenda-setting role. In September 2011, it
was invited to prepare a ‘Note on The Operationalization of the Regional
Cooperation Framework in the Asia Pacific Region’ (Bali Process Steering
Group 2011). The preambular statement to the Note read: ‘The irregular
movement of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants by sea creates particular
challenges for States and raises humanitarian concerns for the individuals
involved’ (2011: 3). Thus, whilst not referring to human rights or legal
rights as such, but rather to ‘humanitarian concerns’, the language neverthe­
less specifically refers to refugees and asylum seekers and by implication to
their protection needs.
Under this Note UNHCR proposed:

[T]he establishment of a Regional Support Office (RSO) to facilitate the oper­

ationalization of the Regional Cooperation Framework and to support and
strengthen practical cooperation among Bali Process Member States regarding
refugee protection and international migration, including irregular migration,
human trafficking and smuggling (2011: 1).
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 609
UNHCR proposed that the RSO should operate under the oversight and
direction of the Co-Chairs of the Bali Process and in consultation with
UNHCR and IOM (2011: 2). Under the UNHCR concept the RSO was
intended to ‘operationalize’ three regional functions. Two of these embodied
protection norms within a deterrent framework:

— Pilot-Testing of Joint Activities on Selected Caseload(s): described as ‘pro­

cessing and case management; resettlement and burden sharing and return to
countries of origin with respect to selected caseloads including early warning
and prevention’ (2011: 3; italics added);
— Irregular Movements by Sea: activities under this objective include: ‘or­
ganization of a regional roundtable in close cooperation with UNHCR and
IOM to promote a common understanding of conceptual issues on irregular
movements by sea with a view to informing the development of bilateral or
multilateral arrangements among interested States’ (2011: 3).

This proposal was presented to the Fifth Meeting of the Bali Process Ad Hoc
Group Senior Officials, October 2011, in Sydney (Co-Chairs’ Statement
201 lc). However at this meeting the UNHCR proposal was largely sidelined.
The key theme of the meeting was to reinforce the value of the RILON as a
forum for sharing information on irregular movements by air in major hub
locations in the region, building an information base on people smuggling
activity and irregular migration (2011c: paras 5 and 6). The Co-Chairs’ state­
ment contained no reference to UNHCR’s role, it only referred to IOM
(2011c: §17). In particular the language of burden sharing was missing.
Rather the emphasis was upon cooperative action on disruption of irregular
migration practices.
The Regional UNHCR Refugee Newsletter of November 2011 suggested
that the Bali Process is leading to ‘positive indications from a number of
States that the humanitarian and protection needs of asylum-seekers [.?;<■]
and refugees in their territories can be addressed more effectively through
regional cooperation’ (Towle 2011: 1). In March 2012 UNHCR anticipated
the functioning of the RCF and the RSO later in the year, but since that
point, UNHCR efforts to put refugee protection onto the agenda of the Bali
Process appear to have been overwhelmed by a strong focus on irregular
migration.
The RSO which commenced operation in Bangkok in September 2012 is
co-managed by Australia and Indonesia and largely reflects the agenda of the
Bali Process and the Australian government’s national policy on irregular
movement in the region (RSO 2012: 1). The RCO principles and activities
mainly emphasize data collection and sharing, and disruption of irregular
migration (RSO 2013a; RSO 2013b).
The Co-Chairs’ statement following the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Bali
Process, 2 April 2013, ‘underscored that strengthening efforts to reduce irregular
movements in the region’ is paramount (Co-Chairs’ Statement 2013: §2).
610 Susan Kneebone
The Ministers acknowledged the ‘unprecedented number of irregular move­
ments by sea in the Asia Pacific region in 2012’, a fact which is driving
Australia’s current response to refugees. At the conclusion of the same meeting,
Erika Feller from UNHCR lamented the lack of ‘concrete and cooperative
action’ in the Bali Process to meet the protection needs of refugees. She
concluded:

In our experience, to be effective and sustainable, a comprehensive approach

must accommodate both the ‘state security’ and the ‘human security’ dimen­
sions of the problem. The RCF and the RSO are but tools. There is now a need
to move beyond the language of cooperation to practical and concrete action.
Otherwise, the momentum towards including asylum and refugee protection
objectives as an integral part of the Bali Process agenda is in real danger of
being lost (Feller 2013: 7).

Despite these indications that UNHCR is disappointed with lack of progress

on refugee protection within the state dominated Bali Process and mechan­
isms, Volker Turk, the Director of International Protection, was optimistic
about the prospects of the RSO in his speech at the Special Conference in
Jakarta in August 2013 (UNHCR 2013).

The APRRN: Setting the Agenda on Refugee Protection?

The Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) is self-described as ‘an
open and growing network consisting of 160 (as of July 2013) civil society
organizations and individuals from 22 countries committed to advancing the
rights of refugees in the Asia Pacific Region’ (APRRN 2013). It is important
that it chooses this description in preference to the term Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO), which arose more typically in the context of the UN
system of global governance (Korey 1998; Chamovitz 2006) as it highlights the
APRRN’s regional and democratic role (Piper and Uhlin 2004). The APRRN
was formed in November 2008 at an Asia Pacific Consultation on Refugee
Rights, hosted jointly by Forum-Asia (Asian Forum for Human Rights and
Development—Thailand) and the Centre for Refugee Research, University of
New South Wales. The meeting received support from UNHCR, AusAID, the
Canadian High Commission and the International Detention Coalition (IDC).
These facts show that an essential feature of the APRRN is that it was formed
as a platform for existing civil society organizations, and some academic or­
ganizations, with support from some ‘Northern’ international organizations
(IOs), and UNHCR (from which it continues to receive support).
The APRRN operates as a TAN which is committed to changing regional
policies (Piper and Uhlin 2004) on refugees to bring them in line with the
international refugee protection regime. Until recently the APRRN has
worked in five thematic areas (Immigration Detention, Legal Aid and
Advocacy, Right to Health, Women and Girls at Risk, and Statelessness)
and in four geographical working groups, namely, South Asia, Southeast
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 611
Asia, East Asia and Australia and Pacific. As described below, a fifth area of
Regional Protection has recently been established. In the area of Immigration
Detention it works closely with an international coalition, the IDC. In the
area of Legal Aid and Advocacy, it works within the region to provide
‘capacity-building training’ on legal education. The importance of the
APRRN is that the reach of its advocacy and activities is transnational,
regional and international. Its members include a number of Australian
individuals and institutions and other ‘transnational’ individuals such as
Barbara Harrell-Bond (founder of the Refugee Studies Centre).
This section describes the APRRN’s activities and methods of communi­
cation, and assess its efficacy as a TAN. Since 2008 it has established an
important role in the region, not only as an advocate on refugee rights, but
also as a provider of capacity-building training to refugee advocacy groups
on important issues such as the mental health of refugees and legal education.
The APRRN explains that its role is fulfilled through information sharing,
mutual capacity building, and joint advocacy. The information sharing occurs
through a range of media including a well-maintained web page.
Its advocacy role is both general and specific: that is, it advocates generally
for the rights of refugees and on specific issues and cases. In the 2011 Annual
Report it listed the following examples of successful outcomes of its advocacy
which support the promulgation of protection principles and practices: the
development of arrangements for the release of refugees and asylum seekers
from immigration detention in Bangkok, the passage of a new refugee law in
South Korea, and the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
in Indonesia (APRRN 2011: 4). The SOP acknowledges key principles of refu­
gee protection such as non-refoulement and non-discrimination. Through its
work the APRRN promotes the central principles of refugee protection and
the global refugee regime.
The essential feature of the APRRN is that it provides support to those
within its network in their advocacy of refugee rights. That is, the ‘umbrella’
which the APRRN provides strengthens the advocacy of other individual
organization members. Its activities have a ‘boomerang’ effect which allows
its members to reach out of their state to influence domestic politics (Keck
and Sikkink 1998). The APRRN does not claim that it represents refugees,
that it fills a gap between the individual and the state; rather, it advocates for
the rights of refugees (Taylor 2013: 53) at a transnational and regional level.
The APRRN also produces joint statements on key issues affecting the
region, in order to inform and influence public policy, and to put pressure
on states. This is an example of ‘monitoring’ activities. Some examples of its
joint statements on key issues include the July 2011 statement critiquing the
Australia-Malaysia swap agreement, and the June 2012 statements on sect­
arian violence in Rakhine state, Myanmar and on the deportation of
Rohingya refugees by Bangladesh. At the Fourth Asia Pacific Consultation
on Refugee Rights (APCRR) held in Seoul in August 2012, it was suggested
that the APRRN ‘as a regional network has enabled the collective voice of
612 Susan Kneebone
refugee rights advocates [to] resonate with decision makers’ (APRRN 2012a:
13). These facts are important to show how the APRRN functions as a
mediator between states and regional institutions to incorporate GRP into
the region.
The APRRN rejects the hierarchical ‘steering mode’ of the Bali Process.
Following the Fourth APCRR Consultation in August 2012, it established a
Regional Refugee Protection sub-committee. At this Consultation the leader
of the sub-committee contextualized regional cooperation as embodied in the
Bali Process as a ‘statist perspective’. The APRRN’s role in this context was
described as: to ‘generate a position outside of that set by states... [a] shared
vision for civil society engagement with states’ to ‘drive regional cooperation
initiatives’ (APRRN 2012a: 13). But at the same time it was recognized that
there is limited space for NGO involvement in the RCF and Bali Process
(APRRN 2012a: 26). A ‘First Consultation Draft on APPRN’s Vision for
Regional Protection’ was shared at the Annual U N H C R N G O Consultations
in June 2013. A workshop, ‘Towards the Development of a Regional
Protection Framework’, hosted by the Japan Association for Refugees took
place in Tokyo on 9 September 2013. The principal aim of this workshop was
to develop a ‘coherent vision for the protection of refugees’ and to lay down
basic principles for refugee protection as guidance to all stakeholders includ­
ing governments and UNHCR.
The APRRN works not only with its members from different states (both
North and South) but also with other regional and international NGOs.
Since 2010, it has raised refugee rights through informal ASEAN processes,
working through the SAPA (Solidarity for Asia People’s Advocacy)
Taskforce on ASEAN Human Rights. According to the APRRN March
2012 Updates the new collaboration began with the 2011 ASEAN Civil
Society Conference in Jakarta and continued in 2012 with a view to liaising
on joint actions (APRRN 2012b: 2). This relationship has been fostered since
the cooling of the relationship between the APRRN and UNHCR following
the failed Australia-Malaysia Swap Arrangement in 2011, as explained
above.
The APPRN has become increasingly confident about its ability to influ­
ence state agendas on refugee issues (APRRN 2012a: 13) at the same time
as its relationship with UNHCR has become more complex. In 2012 the
APRRN was selected as the rapporteur at the annual UNHCR NGO con­
sultations held in Geneva which it attends with other NGOs. In the 2012
report it highlighted key protection gaps in the region, including lack of
ratification of international treaties and ‘weak domestic legal frameworks’
(APRRN 2012b: 2). However some members of the APRRN have clashed
with some UNHCR regional offices over perceived shortcomings in refugee
status determination (Taylor 2013: 54). This shows the APPRN’s focus on
challenging state responses to refugees in the region in its own right.
In terms of the APRRN’s relationship with UNHCR, it has been suggested
that the APRRN must try to convince states that the responsibility to protect
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 613
refugees does not fall solely on UNHCR. As Velath expressed this, it
‘presents a formidable challenge to practitioners in the region’ (APRRN
2012a: 11). On the other hand, the APRRN depends on UNHCR to support
its activities but some individual members are not comfortable with
UNHCR’s attempt to persuade states to provide protection to refugees as
persons who are in a ‘humanitarian’ ‘protection space’. Martin Jones, one of
the founding members of APRRN, argues that such an approach privileges
international interests and fora and UNHCR as the negotiator (Jones 2014).
The APRRN by contrast characterizes itself as a regional actor, which at­
tempts to persuade states within the region to conform to basic principles of
international refugee protection. It is thus defining a role for itself which
responds to the mechanisms and discourses which characterize both the
Bali Process and UNHCR in the region.
Although the APRRN appears to frame itself as an alternative to state
power, as a ‘civil society’ umbrella organization, it functions as a regional
and global TAN using information, symbols and leverage to affect situations
where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence (Keck and
Sikkink 1998: 16). The possible limitation of the APRRN is its inability to
hold states accountable. Its exclusion from the Bali Process illustrates both
the limits of its role as a non-state actor within that process, and the limits of
this RCP. UNHCR by contrast may have more direct leverage with some
states because of its relationship with states with large refugee populations
(Stavropoulou 2008: 5).

Conclusion: Implications for GRP

This article has discussed the role of two very different actors in the Asia-
Pacific region, their mechanisms and discourse, in relation to GRP. In look­
ing at the idea of GRP I focused on ‘the actor dimension’, to identify the
agenda-setting or ‘steering modes’ (Risse 2004) and to evaluate the dominant
mechanisms and discourses which are determining GRP. The first actor is the
Bali Process, a Regional Consultative Process (RCP), which also advances
Australia’s national policy to refugees, and appeals to the collective interests
of states in the region in preventing irregular migration and onward move­
ment to Australia from Southeast Asia. The Bali Process works primarily at
the state level and has direct lineage to the securitized discourse of irregular
migration which was established in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. The APRRN
by contrast is a relatively new actor on the regional scene. As a platform for
other civil society organizations it has developed a lead role as an advocate of
refugee rights in the region. UNHCR is another key actor in the region, but
in this article discussion of its role is limited to its relationship to the other
two actors.
The Bali Process is an example of ‘hierarchical’ steering which works
within the nation-state paradigm to protect the interests of states. The dis­
course emanating from the Process has heightened since 2002 in its focus on
614 Susan Kneebone
state interests, to provide legitimacy for its migration-disruption activities.
It does this by appealing to the mutual interests of states to control irregular
migration in the region, but the arrangements with other states are also de­
signed to protect Australia’s national interest. As the wealthiest nation in the
region Australia is able to exercise leverage over other states because of its
superior bargaining power. Australia uses the granting of foreign aid and
other capacity-building assistance incentives to negotiate agreements under
the Bali Process. As the critique by the High Court of the 2011
Arrangement with Malaysia demonstrates, there is no ‘level playing field’
(Risse 2004: 304) in the region. The circumstances for ‘ideal speech’ (Risse
2004: 303) are absent. The breakaway meeting organized by Indonesia in
August 2013 which led to the Jakarta Declaration 2013 confirms that states
in the region do seek multilateral action on irregular migration. However, as
the experience of the ASEAN model shows (Kneebone 2014), whilst there is
general agreement amongst states in the region about the need for restrictive
policies on irregular migration, it is difficult to achieve consensus on protec­
tion goals.
If GRP means policy and measures directed to the key elements of the
global refugee protection regime, then the Bali Process illustrates the ability
of a state-led process to show the restrictive face of the international refugee
regime. Neither Australia nor the agenda of the Bali Process support the key
elements of the global refugee protection regime, namely the right to asylum
and durable solutions through burden-sharing. As the response of the
Australian government to the High Court decision in Plaintiffs M70/2011
and M106 o f 2011 v M I AC demonstrates, it conceives burden-sharing as
responsibility shifting. The seeming frustration of UNHCR’s efforts as a
‘quasi non-state’ actor to change the agenda of the Process, to bring norms
of international protection into the discourse, demonstrates the dominance of
the state paradigm in this context.
The APRRN by contrast appeals to the norms of the international pro­
tection regime to justify its actions and to achieve outcomes. Its discourse,
which reaches both the region and the global level, contains a claim of ‘nor­
mative rightness’ (Dean 1999: 177) or moral legitimacy (Risse 2004: 292). It
steers ‘softly’ (Risse 2004: 288) through the discourse in ‘non-hierarchical’
modes, relying on advocacy, argument and persuasion to achieve outcomes.
Its legitimacy is bolstered by its democratic role within the region. Overall its
success in establishing itself as a credible and effective actor in the region and
globally challenges the dominance of states on refugee issues in the region.
Thus of these two models of actors on GRP in the Asia-Pacific region, the
‘statist’ regional Bali Process, and the TAN APRRN, it is the latter which
provides a richer discourse on GRP.

1. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations), founded in 1967 to promote

regional stability and collaboration on matters of common interest, originally
involved five states, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia
 Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region 615
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