Labor law (forecast lecture Be Relentless: Your Bar Companion-disclaimer based on their own intuition

only)

1. Entitlement of disability benefits

 In 2015, Razon was hired as a seaman by Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. On board the
vessel, Razon felt moderate pain upon carrying a heavy motor. He was diagnosed with
Prolapse Lumbar Disc and eventually got repatriated back to the Philippines. He was
placed in the care of company-designated physicians, which declared him unfit for work
with Disability Grade I (partial disability) and was offered disability benefits. However,
Razon insisted on obtaining total and permanent disability benefits. So, he consulted
another orthopedic expert, Dr. Magtira, who diagnosed him "permanently unfit in any
capacity" to resume his duties as a seaman. Razon filed a complaint before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), claiming total and permanent disability
benefits plus damages.

Was Razon entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?

Yes, Razon is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because the company-
designated physicians failed to issue a valid medical assessment within the prescribed
period under the law.

The POEA-SEC governs the procedure for his claim of disability benefits and provides
for the period when the company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment. Despite the issuance of a purportedly "final disability grading" in the
Disability Report, Razon was still required to return almost a month later for "re-
evaluation with results" in the Medical Report issued on the same day. Taking these two
documents together, the medical assessment was clearly not a final one because it still
required further action on the part of the company-designated physicians. Without such a
valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physicians, the law
already steps in to consider the seafarer's disability as total and permanent. [Zaldy
Razonable vs. Maersk-Fili-Pinas Crewing, Inc. and/or A.P. Moller A/S 937 SCRA 421,
June 10, 2020]

 Pastrami was an Environmental Team Leader onboard the vessel Carnival Fascination
owned by Bahonia Shipping Services. He experienced lower back pain after lifting a
heavy waste bin. He was repatriated back to the Philippines for medical treatment.
Pastrami reported to the company-designated physician, who diagnosed him to be "fit to
work". In another assessment, he was declared "unfit to work" since he still had a stiff
trunk and painful gait. Then, another company-designated physician diagnosed him with
Herniated Disc. According to the doctor, he is entitled to benefits covering a disability
grading of Grade 11.
However, a private doctor declared him "permanently unfit in any capacity" so he
demands for total and permanent disability benefits from Bahonia in a complaint before
the LA.
Is Pastrami entitled to permanent and total disability benefits?
 Yes, Pastrami is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.

Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified
as Grade 1 may be considered total and permanent. However, if those injuries or
disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would
incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120
or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.

The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the

seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. If
he failed to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer
shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. The company physician was unable to
timely issue a final assessment of Pastrami's disability. Such failure rendered his opinion
on Pastrami's disability irrelevant. The law had already stepped in and
considered Pastrami permanently and totally disabled. [Henry Espiritu Pastrana vs. Bahia
Shipping Services, Carnival Cruise Lines, et. al. G.R. No. 227419, 937 SCRA 301, June
10, 20antless

[ G.R. No. 227419, June 10, 2020 ]

The seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits for work-related illness or injury is governed by the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulation (IRR), the POEA-SEC, and prevailing jurisprudence.

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. and Atlantic Marine Ltd.64 (Vergara), the Court
explained how the pertinent provisions in the Labor Code, its IRR, and the POEA-SEC operate, viz.:

In this respect and in the context of the present case, Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

x x x The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules;

[x x x x]

The rule referred to — Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the
Labor Code — states:

Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such
disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240
days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However,
the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary
total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental
functions as determined by the System.

These provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA Standard Employment Contract whose
Section 20 (3) states:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty
(120) days.

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of
the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his
condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires
further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition.65

In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following
rules (rules) shall govern:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days
with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended
period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.67

While Elburg states that the 120 or 240-day periods shall be reckoned "from the time the seafarer reported
to [the company-designated physician]," subsequent cases consistently counted said periods from the date
of the seafarer's repatriation for medical treatment. This is true even in cases where the date of
repatriation of the seafarer does not coincide with the date of his first consultation with the company-
designated physician. This will be observed, for instance, in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v.
Pasamba68 and Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Ramoga, Jr.69 This is consistent with Section 20(A)
(3) which provides for the repatriation of the seafarer in case of work-related illness or injury, and the
obligation of the employer to give the seafarer sickness allowance from the time he signed off until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of his or her disability has been assessed, but not exceeding 120
days, viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of
his contract are as follows:

     x x x x

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer
shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as
well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated. However,
if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness,
he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of
his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer
shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic
wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the
seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the
sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

Thus, Elburg should be read as requiring the company-designated physician to issue a final and definitive
disability assessment within 120 or 240 days from the date of the seafarer's repatriation.

As held by the Court in Vergara and Elburg, the initial 120 days within which the company-designated
physician must issue a final and definitive disability assessment may be extended for another 120 days.
The extended period, however, may only be availed of by the company-designated physician under
justifiable circumstances.

In Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias,70 the Court held that the seafarer's uncooperativeness
with his medical treatment justified the extension of the period of the medical treatment and assessment to
240 days.

In Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. v. Buenaventura,71 the Court found that the extension of the
initial 120-day period was justified by the seafarer's need for further treatment, as in fact, the seafarer
underwent therapy and rehabilitation beyond the 120-day period. The need for further medical treatment
also justified the application of the 240-day period in Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc. v. San
Jose72 and Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Simbajon.

The Court stressed, however, that to avail of the extended 240-day period, the company-designated
physician must perform some complete and definite medical assessment to show that the illness still
requires medical attendance beyond 120 days, but not to exceed 240 days.74 The employer bears the
burden of proving that the company-designated physician had a reasonable justification to invoke the
240-day period.75 Thus, in Hanseatic Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Ballon,76 the Court did not give
credence to the employer's belated and unsubstantiated invocation of the 240-day period.

The duty of the company-designated physician to issue a final and definitive assessment of the seafarer's
disability within the prescribed periods is imperative. His failure to do so will render his findings
nugatory and transform the disability suffered by the seafarer to one that is permanent and total. As
explained by the Court in Pelagio v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.

Otherwise stated, the company-designated physician is required to issue a final and definite assessment of
the seafarer's disability rating within the aforesaid 120/240-day period; otherwise, the opinions of the
company-designated and the independent physicians are rendered irrelevant because the seafarer is
already conclusively presumed to be suffering from a permanent and total disability, and thus, is entitled
to the benefits corresponding thereto.

Similarly, in Olidana v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,79 the Court declared as follows:

x x x The Court in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, held that the declaration by the company-
designated physician is an obligation, the abdication of which transforms the temporary total disability to
permanent total disability, regardless of the disability grade, viz.:

Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade
1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability
grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his
usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical
treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. In other words, an
impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities
found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code
and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the
Labor Code. That while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded from earning
doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do.
Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120
or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the

seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail
to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.
2. Romeo was employed as a Special Operations Officer in the Quezon City Department of Public
Order and Safety from 1999 until his death in 2012 due to cardiopulmonary arrest. His Discharge
Summary/Clinical Abstract shows that he complained of abdominal pain and chest pain. Records
show that Romeo was previously diagnosed with hypertension in 2002. Juliet, the surviving
spouse of Romeo, filed a claim for compensation benefits before the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) under PD No. 626, which was denied on the ground that Romeo's
ailment was not connected to his work and that no evidence was found that his duties increased
the risk of contracting the said ailment.

Can Juliet claim compensation benefits for the death of her husband Romeo?

Yes, Juliet can claim compensation benefits for the death of her late husband Romeo because she
can base the claim on the principle of social justice.
The constitutional guarantee of social justice towards labor demands a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability. Hence, the liberality of the law
in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by
law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of
the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhance [Julieta Verzonilla vs.
Employees' Compensation Commission G.R. No. 232888, 914 SCRA 182, August 14, 2019)
3. Batman and Robin are security guards employed by Symex Security Services, Inc. (Symex)
engaged in the business of investigation and security services. They filed a complaint for
underpayment/nonpayment of wages and damages among others, against Symex and its president
Rafa. Captain Marvel (Head/Captain) told them that they were relieved from their posts and had
to wait for further assignment because the guards on duty were reduced. But later, they were told
that they would not receive an assignment unless they withdrew their complaint before the LA.
Hence, Batman and Robin amended their complaint to include illegal dismissal. Symex and Rafa
maintained that they did not illegally dismiss respondents. They claimed that respondents are still
included in petitioner Symex's roll of security guards. They shifted the blame to the respondents,
arguing that respondents refused to accept available postings.

Batman and Robin were illegally dismissed because they clearly established that they were
dismissed without any valid or authorized cause.

In cases of illegal dismissal, the employees must first establish by substantial evidence that
they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or
illegality thereof. Here, proof that the employees were dismissed was shown by the offer of the
sample affidavit of desistance given to them by Capt. Marvel to support their narration that Capt.
Marvel threatened to terminate them unless they executed such an affidavit of desistance. Such
dismissal is not covered by any valid or authorized cause. As such, they were illegally dismissed

[Symex Security Services, Inc. and Rafael Arcega vs. Magdalino Rivera, Jr. and Roberto Yago,
844 SCRA 416, November 08, 2017)
4. In 2009, Coca-Coca Bottlers Philippines., Inc. (Coca) issued notices of termination to 27 rank-
and-file employees/union members on the ground of redundancy of their positions due to the
removal of two selling and distribution systems. To Coca Union, the newly implemented systems
would result in the diminution of the union membership amounting to union-busting. Hence they
filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the
ground of unfair labor practice. Thereafter, Coca Union conducted a strike.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. While the case is pending,
Coca Union filed a motion for execution praying for the cancellation of the dismissal of the union
members to follow the DOLE Secretary's directive not to commit any act that would exacerbate
the situation. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and declared valid the
dismissal of the employees due to redundancy.

Did the NLRC err by not enjoining the effectivity of the employees' termination when the DOLE
assumed jurisdiction over the lab dispute?

Yes, the NLRC erred by not enjoining the effectivity of the employees termination, when the
DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Coca violated the return-to-work order
directed by the DOLE Secretary. As jurisprudence dictates, from the date the DOLE Secretary
assumes jurisdiction over a dispute until its resolution, the parties have the obligation to
maintain the status quo while the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum, which
could be with the DOLE Secretary or with the NLRC.
[San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-And-File Union (SACORU) vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
Inc. (CCBPI) G.R. No. 200499, 842 SCRA 1, October 04, 2017]

5. Eren was the head of the Front Desk Department at La Luz Resort owned by GRRI. Eren violated
several company policies, like abuse of authority for rejecting guests and by threatening a person
in authority with physical harm. When GRRI implemented a reorganization in the Resort, Erin
was transferred to the Storage Department without diminution in rank and benefits. However,
Eren refused to sign the Notice to Transfer, which eventually led to her termination. Eren filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the LA.

Was Eren illegally dismissed by GRRI?

Yes, Eren was illegally dismissed by GRRI because the dismissal was not for a valid cause.

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the
employee's dismissal was for a valid cause. Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been
willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"
and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and
must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requirements are not
present in this case.
 While Eren's refusal to sign the Notice of Transfer was willful and intentional, it is far from being
"wrongful and perverse." So, there is no basis to dismiss her on the ground of insubordination
[ Villanueva vs. Gonco Resort and Recreation, Inc., G. No. 227175, 928 SCRA 265, January 08,
2009.

6. Karen was hired by respondent Sintron Systems, Inc. as a sales coordinator. She attended the
training in the USA without any condition imposed upon her attendance. However, when she
returned to work on November 7, 2013, SSI asked her to sign a training agreement that required
her to remain with SSI for three years, otherwise, she was to pay a penalty of P275,500.00. She
refused to sign the agreement, arguing that she should have been informed of the same prior to
her departure for the training. Thereafter, in a meeting held on November 18, 2013, SSI's
President Ken humiliated Karen and shouted at her vindictive words such as "mayabang" and
"mahadera." She took leave, and when she returned, she was surprised to learn that Ken sent
emails to clients stating that Karen had abandoned her job and accused her of intentionally
hurting the reputation of SSI to the latter's clients.

Was Karen's dismissal valid?

Yes, Karen's dismissal was valid because gross negligence is a just cause for her termination.
Here, Karen's prolonged absences without turning in vital information and deleting the files from
her company-issued computer and email account, causing injury to clients and SSI, constituted
gross negligence which would have been a valid ground for her termination. [Rodessa Rodriguez
vs. Sintron Systems, Inc. 910 SCRA 498, July 24, 2019].
7. The Heritage Hotel Manila employed Kim Chu as a Service Agent on September 1, 1995. She
was last assigned at the hotel's restaurant, Le Cafe. Her tasks included assisting in the serving of
food and beverages to Heritage's guests. In two separate incidents, Chu allegedly exhibited
behavior not inimical to the hotel's image wherein she disrespected and showed discourtesy to
guests. Complaints were formally filed before the human resource department of the hotel against
Chu and she was heard, later on, penalized for suspension from work with the 2nd penalty
indicating a warning that repetition of the same act would warrant dismissal. Aggrieved by the
decision, she filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), illegal suspension, and other monetary
claims.

Is the suspension valid and legal in this case?

Yes, Chu's suspension is valid because an employer has free reign and enjoys wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill
discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring
employees.

Jurisprudence states that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of

management imposition. What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer
company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its
 business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to assure
that the same would be complied with. [The Heritage Hotel, Manila vs. Lilian Sio 906 SCRA
167, June 26, 2019].
8. Butch was hired as Butcher by Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Inc. He claimed that he worked from
Monday to Sunday, from 6:30 P.M. to 7:30 A.M., with a daily wage of P700.00, which was later
reduced to P500.00. The next day, however, he was shocked when he only received P200.00 due
to his previous undertime and was informed that he could no longer report for work due to his old
age. Kalookan Slaughterhouse alleged that it imposed policies on entry to the premises, which
applied to employees, dealers, independent butchers, hog and meat dealers, and trainees. They
allege that Butch is an independent butcher and not an employee. Also, according to them, Butch
violated the policies and he misconstrued the disallowance to enter the slaughterhouse as an act of
dismissal.

Rule on the claim of the Slaughterhouse?

Kalookan Slaughterhouse's claim that Butch is an independent butcher and not an employee is
wrong because all the requisites of the employee-employer relationship is present between the
plaintiff and defendant based on the four-fold test.

It is settled that "[t]o determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four

elements generally need to be considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employee's conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called 'four-fold' test of the
employment relationship. "It is undisputed that petitioner rendered butchering services at
Kalookan Slaughterhouse. [Arnulfo Fernandez vs. Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Incorporated 905
SCRA 271, June 19, 2019]
9. EQ had been the Regional Sales Manager RSM of Asia Brewery Inc. for eight years and was
stationed in Northern Luzon. His compensation package consisted of a monthly salary amounting
to P67,000.00 and P250.00 a day per diem allowance. The management of private respondents
split the said region into two to spur a better growth rate in its income and to give more direct and
focused handling of the areas covered by these sales offices.

One year and three months after the split of the NCLR, Ray, the vice president for sales of
private-respondent, made an evaluation of the experimental split of the NCLR and recommended
the reversion to the old setup of putting the NCLR under one RSM. He opined that the decision
did not achieve any gain. He further recommended that since the re-merger would result in
redundancy in the office of a Regional Sales Manager, the office of the petitioner should be
abolished on the ground of redundancy.

Was EQ validly terminated on the ground of redundancy?

Yes, EQ was validly terminated on the ground of redundancy because his position has become an
excess of what is reasonably required by EQ's company due to the merger.
 Redundancy exists when the service of an employee is in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the business.
redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over-hiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously
manufactured by the company, or masing out of a service activity formerly undertaken by the
enterprise. For a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the employer must comply with
the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE at least
one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to
at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, as
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant. Among the
accepted criteria in implementing a redundancy program, are (1) preferred status; (2)
efficiency; and (3) seniority [Elpidio Que vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., 901 SCRA 1, April 10, 2019]

10. Quinito started as Mathematics and CAD Instructor at MAMA Education System's Quezon City
Campus and was promoted as School Registrar in Binan Branch. Petitioner filed a request for
early retirement manifesting his desire to reside abroad with his family. His request was however
disapproved. Before the denial could be communicated to him, Petitioner had already left the
country. Petitioner failed to submit his resignation letter and to follow the standard company
policy on proper turnover of work and accomplishment of clearance. Private respondents further
contended that they were willing and ready to release to Petitioner his last
salary/incentive/allowance/recurring income and 13th-month pay in the total amount of PHP
28,046.34.

While there was no written retirement plan, AMA has a long-standing practice of granting early
retirement, separation pay, or cash gift or benefit to those who have not reached the compulsory
retirement age or mandatory twenty (20) years of service.

Respondents insist that AMA has no company policy in granting early retirement to its
employees. Even if early retirement was granted to former employees Catolico and Creencia, the
grant thereof has not ripened into a company practice. The giving of said benefit was not proven
to be consistent and deliberate.

Is Quinito entitled to the retirement benefits?

Yes, Quinito is entitled to retirement benefits because he has proven that the school has an
unwritten policy of granting early retirement that has ripened into a company practice.
Article 100 of the Labor Code expressly prohibits the elimination or reduction of benefits
received by employees. However, the basis for the grant of said benefit must be shown through
an express policy, written contract, or an unwritten policy that has ripened into a company
practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the
employer over a significant period of time.
 Here, was able to prove the existence of an established company practice of granting early
retirement to its employees who have rendered at least 10 years of service, regardless of age, with
substantial evidence.
[Beltran vs. AMA Computer College-Biñan/AMA Education System, 900 SCRA 85, April 03,
2018]
11. Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services, Inc. hired Johnny as a janitor who allegedly has a
heart ailment. 20 years thereafter the contract between Airborne and Meralco Balintawak Branch
expired and a new contract was awarded to Landbees Corporation, and the latter absorbed all
employees of Airborne except Johnny. According to the doctor, Johnny is fit to work but
Airborne ignores the result. Johnny filed a complaint about constructive/illegal dismissal.

Was Johnny constructively dismissed?

Yes, Johnny was constructively dismissed because of the company's failure to observe the twin
requisites of notice and hearing.

In a decided case by the Supreme Court, it states that in employees' termination cases, the well-
entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed except for just or authorized cause
provided by law and after due process. Dismissals of employees have two facets: first, the
legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and second, the
legality in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. Clearly, the failure
to observe the twin requisites of notice and hearing not only makes the dismissal of an
employee illegal regardless of his alleged violation but is also violative of the employee's
right to due process. [Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services, Inc. vs. Arnulfo Egos 900
SCRA 72, April 03, 2019]
12. Robinhood was a business office manager of E & R Hospital and Pharmacy owned and managed
by spouses Nottingham. Later, he received a Notice of Termination due to loss of confidence,
habitual tardiness, texting insulting words to the employer, uttering offensive words against the
employer, and texting and threatening to kill the employer and his family. Dr. Nottingham alleged
that Robinhood's termination was brought about by several infractions he committed and his
habitual tardiness. Robinhood, on the other hand, claims that he did not receive any notice to
explain prior to receiving the notice of termination.

Is Robinhood's dismissal valid?

No, Robinhood's dismissal is not valid because the employer failed to comply with the two notice
rule.

The employer must comply with the two-notice rule, as mandated under the Implementing Rules
of Book VI of the Labor Code. The employer must serve the erring employee a first notice which
details the ground/s for termination, giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his
side. In practice, this is commonly referred to as the notice to explain (NTE). The second notice
pertains to the written notice of termination indicating that upon due consideration of all
 circumstances, the employer has decided to dismiss the employee. [Pardillo vs. Bandojo 899
SCRA 161, March 27, 2018]
13. Petitioner Bigmac's alleged that on February 16, 1996, around 50 union members staged an
illegal "sit-down strike" in Bigmac's restaurant. The union did not comply with the requirements
of sending a Notice of Strike to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

Neither did the union obtain the "strike vote" from its members and belatedly filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB on the same day to conceal the illegality of the sit-down strike. The
employees were placed under preventive suspension. For failure to comply, they were sent
employment termination letters on February 19, 1996. On the other hand, the union members
accuse Bigmac's of interfering with union activities. Allegedly, in February 1996, union members
were asked to withdraw their membership under threat of losing their employment.

On the other hand, the union members filed a complaint before the NCMB for unfair labor
practices, illegal dismissal, and damages. Upon compliance with the procedures of a valid strike,
the union conducted another strike on March 5, 1996. However, the union members were
disruptive and violent.
Were the strikes held on February 16, 1996, and March 5, 1996, illegal ?

Yes, the strikes held on February 16, 1996, and March 5, 1996 are illegal because the union did
not file the requisite Notice of Strike and failed to observe the cooling-off period.

The Labor Code and the IRR limit the grounds for a valid strike to (1) a bargaining deadlock in
the course of collective bargaining, or (2) the conduct of unfair labor practices by the employer.
In both instances, the union must conduct a "strike vote" which requires notification to the
regional branch of the NCMB of the conduct of the strike vote at least 24 hours before the
conduct of the voting.

Thereafter, the union must furnish the NCMB with the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike or lockout. This seven-day period has been referred to as the "seven-
day strike ban" or "seven-day waiting period. [Bigg's, Inc. vs. Boncasas 895 SCRA 178, March
06, 2010]
14. Doggie was assigned as counter crew/cashier of a Jollibee franchisee pursuant to a Service
Agreement between Generation One and the franchise operator Southgate. Under the Service
Agreement, Generation One was contracted by Southgate to provide "specified non-core
functions and operational activities'' for its Jollibee Alphaland branch. Daguinod also executed a
Service Contract with Generation One where specific work responsibilities to be performed by
Doggie were left blank. Later, he was alleged to have committed theft and was illegally dismissed
by Southgate.

Generation One and Southgate averred that Generation One is a legitimate labor contractor and
that the Service Agreement between the two companies was valid.

Is Generation One a legitimate labor contractor?

No, Generation One is not a legitimate labor contractor because it shows blatant badges of
labor-only contracting.

Jurisprudence states that Labor-only contracting is declared prohibited. There is labor-only

contracting where: (a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others;
and (b) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the
principal business of the employer. [Daguinod vs. Southgate Foods, Inc. 894 SCRA 172,
February 20, 2019]