2023 BAR REVIEW LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS

Handout No. 11
JUDICIAL ETHICS

Magistrates should respectfully but firmly end phone calls the moment they realize that the
caller intends to talk about a case.

While it is true that Justice Sabio could not have possibly known prior to his brother’s call that his
brother intended to speak to him about the Meralco-GSIS case, the fact remains that Justice Sabio
continued to entertain a call from his brother, who also happens to be an officer of the executive
branch, despite realizing that the conversation was going to involve a pending case. In his Motion,
Justice Sabio asks the Court if he should have immediately slammed the phone on his brother.
Certainly, such boorish behavior is not required. However, as soon as Justice Sabio realized that
his brother intended to discuss a case pending before him or in his division, Justice Sabio should
have respectfully but firmly ended the discussion. xxx Justice Sabio had no business discussing
with his brother court matters xxx which by his own account are not yet “official” and more
importantly, he should not have allowed the conversation to progress to a point that his brother
was already discussing the merits of the case and persuading him (Justice Sabio) to rule in favor
of one of the parties. Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.], Resolution in
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 15 October 2008

Section 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary maintains
such a high bar of ethical conduct that actual influence is not a prerequisite before a violation
is deemed committed.

That Justice Sabio did not do as his brother asked is of no moment. Section 5, Canon 1 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct maintains such a high bar of ethical conduct that actual influence is not
a prerequisite before a violation is deemed committed. If a magistrate’s actions allow even just
the appearance of being influenced, it is deemed a violation. xxx By allowing his brother to discuss
with him the merits of one party’s position, Justice Sabio gave his brother the opportunity to
influence him. Any reasonable person would tend to doubt Justice Sabio’s independence and
objectivity after such a conversation with a close family member who also happens to hold a high
government position. Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.], Resolution in
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 15 October 2008

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A judge is guilty of gross misconduct for his/her deliberate and repeated failure to comply with
the Supreme Court and Office of the Court Administrator’s lawful orders and directives for
violating Canon 1, Secs. 7 and 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Compliance with the directives issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge
accepts upon assumption to office as laid out in Canon 1 [Sections 7 and 8] of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct xxx. In this case, the Court cannot countenance the unjustified refusal of Judge
Galvez to comply with the Court’s twin Resolutions xxx, as well as the directive from [Deputy
Court Administrator] Elepaño. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the OCA that Judge
Galvez is guilty of gross misconduct for his deliberate and repeated failure to comply with the
Court’s lawful orders and directives. He owes candor to the Court when rendering an explanation,
in the same way that he expected it from lawyers who appeared before his court. It is even hardly
necessary to remind Judge Galvez that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take
their bearings. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Galvez (ret.), A.M. No. RTJ-19-2567, 14
August 2019

All directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence,
should be respected. Similarly, these directives are not mere requests, but should be complied
with promptly and completely by judges.

Concomitant therewith, all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are
issued in the exercise of this Court’s administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel,
hence, should be respected. Similarly, these directives are not mere requests, but should be
complied with promptly and completely. Assuming arguendo that the twin Resolutions were not
served upon Judge Galvez, his unexplained disregard of the directive of the OCA for him to decide
or otherwise dispose of the cases Raffled to him shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just
for the OCA, but more importantly for the Court, which exercises direct administrative
supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA. His indifference to, and
disregard of the directives issued to him clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will
not tolerate. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Galvez (ret.), A.M. No. RTJ-19-2567, 14 August
2019

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 2023 BAR REVIEW LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS
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A judge’s extramarital affair and public display of his also-married “other” woman exhibit
indecency, lack of integrity, depravity, and moral indifference to community standards and
values.

Judge Laron’s extramarital affair, his public display of his also-married “other” woman, and the
damage his indiscretion caused not just to other people but also to the dignity of the office he
serves, certainly reek of immorality. His actions exhibit indecency, lack of integrity, depravity, and
moral indifference to community standards and values. For transgressing public morals and
defiling the image of the judiciary, he must be stripped of his judicial robe and dismissed from
service. Tuvillo vs. Laron, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756, 18 October 2016

For a judge, having a close friendship with the litigant is to be avoided at all costs. With more
reasons should a romantic relationship with one be shunned.

Judge Laron first met Melissa, who was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, inside his chamber, without the presence of the offended parties. They became lovers, and
their meetings extended to more private spaces. For a judge, having a close friendship with the
litigant is to be avoided at all costs. With more reasons should a romantic relationship with one
be shunned as this destroys the litigants’ confidence in the “judge’s impartiality and[,] eventually,
undermine the people’s faith in the administration of justice.” Tuvillo vs. Laron, A.M. No. MTJ-
10-1755, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756, 18 October 2016

The failure to present evidence that the respondent acted with partiality and malice can only
negate the allegation of impropriety, but not the appearance of impropriety.

The OCA also reported the questionable and suspicious haste in hearing and resolving cases xxx.
In Civil Case No. 894-KC, Judge Alzate rendered judgment therein within a period of only three
(3) months, two (2) weeks and one (1) day. Indeed, as noted by the OCA, the filing of the Report
on the Investigation of Collusion between the parties, the pretrial, and the initial trial which all
happened on the same day xxx put in serious doubt the integrity of the proceedings in the said
case. xxx While there was no concrete evidence presented to prove Judge Alzate’s partiality and
malice, it must be emphasized that Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” The failure to
present evidence that the respondent acted with partiality and malice can only negate the
allegation of impropriety, but not the appearance of impropriety. In Dela Cruz vs. Judge
Bersamira, this Court underscored the need to show not only the fact of propriety but the
appearance of propriety itself. It held that the standard of morality and decency required is

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exacting so much so that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 24, Regional Trial Court,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, under Hon. Raphiel F. Alzate, as Acting Presiding Judge, A.M. No. 19-01-
15-RTC, 1 September 2020

Judges who solicited “donations” for the repair of their office and for their personal travel
expenses violate their duties of integrity, independence, and propriety.

In Galang vs. Judge Santos, a judge’s personal actions, whether in the bench or in his daily life,
should be beyond reproach and free from the manifestations of impropriety. In In Re: Judge
Benjamin H. Virrey, this Court dismissed from service a judge who solicited “donations” for the
repair of his office and for his personal travel expenses. This Court has held that such
irresponsible and improper conduct erodes the public’s faith in the judiciary. These acts clearly
violate the judge’s duties of integrity, independence, and propriety. Tuvillo vs. Laron, A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1755, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756, 18 October 2016

A judge gambling in a casino violates P.D. No. 1869 and Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in casinos as
provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869. Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a
penalty for any act done in contravention of its provisions particularly the prohibition on
gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr., it was held that such
transgression constitutes violations of paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics xxx.
Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary xxx. The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves
irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior
every day. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, 13 March 2018

When there is persistent disregard for well-known rules, judges not only become liable for gross
ignorance of the law, but they also commit gross misconduct.

However, when there is persistent disregard of well-known rules, judges not only become liable
for gross ignorance of the law, they commit gross misconduct as well. It is then that a mistake

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can no longer be regarded as a mere error of judgment, but one purely motivated by a wrongful
intent. The fact that in many instances, Judge Alzate chose to ignore if not completely disregard
the glaring irregularities and noncompliance of the rules, and mindlessly proceeded with the
court proceeding breeds a suspicion that he has personal interest in those cases before him. His
unusual interest in the cases before him, not only displayed his utter lack of competence and
probity but also make him liable for gross misconduct. xxx Judge Alzate’s act of issuing decisions
that voided marital unions despite irregularities and noncompliance with the rules not only made
a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise violated the basic norms
of truth, justice, and due process. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, under Hon. Raphiel F. Alzate, as Acting Presiding
Judge, A.M. No. 19-01-15-RTC, 1 September 2020

Misconduct refers to any unlawful conduct on the part of a judge prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause.

Misconduct refers to any unlawful conduct on the part of a judge prejudicial to the rights of
parties or to the right determination of the cause. It entails wrongful or improper conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or deliberate purpose. Simple misconduct is defined as
an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.
On the other hand, gross misconduct connotes something “out of all measure; beyond allowance;
not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.” Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, under Hon. Raphiel F. Alzate, as Acting Presiding
Judge, A.M. No. 19-01-15-RTC, 1 September 2020

There is gross ignorance of the law when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules.

Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and
precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands. In the instant
case, Judge Alzate’s blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC [Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Mariages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages] shows
not only a lack of familiarity with the law but a gross ignorance thereof. Re: Report on the Judicial

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Audit Conducted in Branch 24, Regional Trial Court, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, under Hon. Raphiel F.
Alzate, as Acting Presiding Judge, A.M. No. 19-01-15-RTC, 1 September 2020

Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the
administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case
and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary.

The Constitution expressly provides that all lower courts should decide or resolve cases or
matters within three months from the date of submission. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct likewise provides: “Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.” xxx More
particularly, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides: “3. Judges shall observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.” xxx Failure to decide
cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Judges must
decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice
deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the people’s
faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied. Re: Judicial Audit Conducted on
Branch 64, Regional Trial Court, Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, Presided by Hon. Mario O.
Trinidad, A.M. No. 20-07-96-RTC, 1 September 2020

A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law. S/he needs to ask the Supreme Court for a reasonable extension of time to
resolve them.

We are also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts, as well as the different circumstances or
situations that judges may encounter during trial, thus, the Court has allowed reasonable
extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the
Court. Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a
reasonable extension of time to resolve it. However, there is no showing that Judge Trinidad
requested for any extension of time within which to decide the said civil cases and the said
pending incidents for resolution. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Re: Judicial Audit Conducted on Branch 64,
Regional Trial Court, Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, Presided by Hon. Mario O. Trinidad,
A.M. No. 20-07-96-RTC, 1 September 2020

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The judge should inhibit him/herself from hearing his/her spouse’s petition for notarial
commission.

Judge Alzate, however, was disqualified and should have inhibited himself from “sitting in the
case” involving his wife pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Section 5, Canon III of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct. The case pertained to his wife’s petition for notarial commission
requiring him to ascertain first whether the petition was sufficient in form and substance;
whether the allegations therein were true; and whether his wife had read and fully understood
the Notarial Rules. Surely, these matters required Judge Alzate to exercise his discretion in
passing upon whether or not his wife’s compliance with the rules and qualifications to be
commissioned as notary public. Sindon vs. Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2576, 29 January 2020

A magistrate shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which a judge, his/her
spouse, or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.

Based on the provision above, a magistrate shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in
which a judge, his/her spouse, or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise. Here, Judge Arocena’s husband is a member of the board of directors of Self-Reliant
Cooperative, which has pending civil actions in her court. As a director, her husband has an
interest in the outcome of the case, which should have been the basis of her inhibition. However,
Judge Arocena failed to do so and violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Furthermore, the Court resolves that Judge Arocena violated the provisions on impartiality and
propriety of the 2004 New Code on Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which
superseded the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct. Re: Anonymous
Complaint Against Presiding Judge Analie C. Aldea-Arocena, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1889, 3 September 2019

A judge should disqualify him/herself from acting on all matters emanating from his/her desire
to retaliate, following Canon 3, Section 5, para. (a) and Canon 4, Section 8 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Nothing extenuated Judge Yu’s abuse of authority and arrogance. Instead of accepting the error
of her ways, Judge Yu defended her conduct by insisting on having the authority to initiate
contempt proceedings against her fellow Judges and court personnel. xxx Moreover, the Court
notes that Judge Yu’s issuance of the show-cause order emanated from her desire to retaliate
against her fellow Judges and the concerned court employees considering that the allegedly
contumacious conduct was the copying of court records to be used as evidence in the

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administrative complaint against her. She thereby breached her duty to disqualify herself from
acting at all on the matter. Such self-disqualification was required under Section 5, Canon 3, and
Section 8 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, A.M. No. 12-1-09-METC, A.M. No. MTJ-
13-1836, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815, OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2398-MTJ, OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2399-MTJ, OCA
I.P.I. No. 11-2378-MTJ, OCA I.P.I. No. 12-2456-MTJ, 22 November 2016

The mere appearance of the name of the judge as a previously engaged lawyer in a case makes
him/her disqualified to participate in the proceedings. The evil sought to be prevented by the
rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge’s degree of participation in
the case before becoming the judge.

Given the foregoing, the CA’s justifications directly contravened the letter and spirit of Section 1
of Rule 137, supra, and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, supra. The words counsel in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and
lawyer in Section 5 of Canon 3, supra, are understood in their general acceptation because their
usage by the rules has not been made subject of any qualifications or distinctions. As such, the
mere appearance of his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446
sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the
State in the prosecution of the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality
as the trial judge who would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself
from being the trial judge in Criminal Case No. 17446. To be clear, that Judge Elumba’s prior
participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the
public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not
really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation
whatsoever with the judge’s degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He
must be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly
be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them should be
appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. Lai vs. People, G.R. No. 175999, 1 July 2015

Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition. There must be
extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith on the judge’s part. Moreover, the evidence must be
clear and convincing to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his/her noble
role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.

Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with prejudice, passion, pride,
and pettiness in the performance of his/her functions cannot overcome the presumption that

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the judge decided on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. Mere imputation
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition. There must be extrinsic evidence of malice
or bad faith on the judge’s part. Moreover, the evidence must be clear and convincing to
overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his/her noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence without fear or favor. Because voluntary inhibition is discretionary,
Judge Aquino would have been in the best position to determine whether or not there was a
need for her to inhibit from the RII Builders case, and her decision to continue to act on the case
should be respected. Simply put, there is no basis for the Court to take any administrative action
against Judge Aquino for her non-inhibition in the RII Builders case. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Aquino, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2413, 15 September 2018

A sitting Supreme Court Justice, although an impeachable officer, may be found disqualified
from holding his/her office by the court in a quo warranto proceeding.

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the
ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of “ouster,” while
impeachment affords “removal.” A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It
is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment.
xxx The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph
7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice- President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With
this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). xxx This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise
jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable
officers are not immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the Court to take cognizance
of this case would not only be a breach of its duty under the Constitution, it would also accord
respondent an exemption not given to other impeachable officers. Republic vs. Sereno, 833 Phil.
449, G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018

Substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the Judiciary, and
complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints.

The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary
must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy
and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them. This is consistent with the rule that in
administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their

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complaints by substantial evidence. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures)

Against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, 13
March 2018

Errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his or her adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through available
judicial remedies.

The inquiry into the correctness of Judge Racoma's act of taking cognizance of the Petition for
Certiorari filed by Mayor Jalgalado, docketed as Civil Case No. 8403, is undeniably judicial in
nature and which is best settled through the available appropriate judicial remedies under the
Rules of Court, and not by way of an administrative complaint. Errors committed by a judge in
the exercise of his or her adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Gov. Tallado, et
al. vs. Judge Racoma, A.M No. RTJ-22-022 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 19-4966-RTJ), 23 August
2022

Only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline judges of lower courts. The Court of Appeals
has no authority to discipline judges or even the court personnel of lower courts.

The exclusive power of the Court to discipline judges of lower courts is reiterated in A.M. No. 18-
01-05-SC, which prescribes new rules of procedure for punishing judicial misconduct. xxx In
lodging the power to discipline judges of lower courts exclusively with the Court, it curtailed in
the same breath the inherent power of the CA to punish for contempt. The CA have no authority
to discipline judges or even the court personnel of lower courts. At most, the CA can only
recommend to the Court the necessary disciplinary action. xxx Evidently, the CA overstepped the
bounds of its authority when it took cognizance of the case and thereafter imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 against petitioner [an RTC Judge]. Hon. Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes, the Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42 vs. Everglory Metal Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, 6 October 2021

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Instead of filing a contempt petition against a judge or court personnel of a lower court for
allegedly disobeying an order/directive of an appellate court, the complainant should file an
administrative case against them before the Supreme Court.

In lodging the power to discipline judges of lower courts exclusively with the Court, it curtailed in
the same breath the inherent power of the CA to punish for contempt. The CA have no authority
to discipline judges or even the court personnel of lower courts. At most, the CA can only
recommend to the Court the necessary disciplinary action. xxx Everglory should have filed an
administrative case before this Court in order to determine whether petitioner disobeyed the
lawful order of the appellate court. xxx Assuming, there was bad faith on the part of any judge in
disobeying an order of an appellate court, there is still the judicial remedy of certiorari, or appeal,
or a disciplinary proceeding which exclusively belongs only to this Court. Hon. Amifaith S. Fider-
Reyes, the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42
vs. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, 6 October 2021

A judge’s retirement or separation from service does not necessarily divest the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the service.

In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the
service. As we held in Gallos vs. Cordero: “The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing
of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in
office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications x x x If
innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.” Nor does
separation from office render a pending administrative charge moot and academic. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Presiding Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati City, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ], 2 February 2016

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The death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a cause for its
dismissal considering his or her constitutional rights to due process and presumption of
innocence.

Thus, the Court so now holds that the death of a respondent in an administrative case before its
final resolution is a cause for its dismissal. Otherwise stated, the non-dismissal of a pending
administrative case in view of the death of the respondent public servant is a transgression of his
or her Constitutional rights to due process and presumption of innocence. Simply put, upon the
death of the respondent public servant awaiting final judgment, the dismissal of the
administrative case against him/her should necessarily follow. xxx [I]f viewed from the
Constitutional lens, particularly that the respondent in the administrative case, similar to the
accused in criminal cases, likewise enjoys the rights to presumption of innocence and due
process, the Court now deems the dismissal of the instant administrative case proper based on
the following grounds: (1) pending final judgment in the administrative case, the respondent
enjoys the right to be presumed innocent; (2) the rule in criminal cases that death of an accused
extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony when
the death occurs before final judgment should likewise be applied in administrative cases; (3) the
essence of due process necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case; and (4)
humanitarian reasons also call for the grant of death and survivorship benefits in favor of the
heirs. Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Godofredo
B. Abul, Jr., Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte, Resolution in A.M.
No. RTJ-17-2486 (formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC), 8 September 2020

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