WORKING PAPER #8

January 2022

A geopolitical Europe and its

relations with Asia:
Assessing the European
Union’s Indo-Pacific
strategy from the lens of
European strategic
autonomy

Calle Håkansson
31 January 2022

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions

expressed in SPEAC Working Papers are entirely
those of the author(s). Copyright for SPEAC
Working Papers remains with the author(s) and
JMEUCE. www.jmeuce.org
A geopolitical Europe and its relations with Asia: Assessing the European Union’s Indo-
Pacific strategy from the lens of European strategic autonomy

Calle Håkansson 1

Abstract: In 2021, the European Union presented its new Indo-Pacific strategy, which outlines the Union’s
ambition to increase its interactions with the Indo-Pacific region in order to create partnerships to strengthen the
so-called ‘rules-based international order’. However, the Union’s strategy also emphasises the intensifying
competition that has been occurring in the Indo-Pacific in recent years due to geopolitical dynamics. This paper
hence seeks to analyse the role of the European Union in the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of the Union’s
ambition to achieve the goal of European strategic autonomy. In the past few years, the European Union’s ambition
for strategic autonomy has become the foremost leitmotif for the Union. Consequently, this paper discusses and
outlines the ambition of the European Union and analyses how it has fed into the work of building partnerships
and greater connectivity with Asian states while responding to the increasingly Sino-US geopolitical competition
in the region.

Keywords: EU Indo-Pacific strategy, EU strategic autonomy, EU-Asia, Connectivity, Partnership, Geopolitics.

1
PhD candidate, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden;
Associate Fellow, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Stockholm, Sweden
calle.hakansson@mau.se calle.hakansson@ui.se
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0216-4071

1
1. Introduction

In September 2021, the European Commission and the High Representative (HR/VP) presented their joint
communication on a new European Union (EU) strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The
communication outlines how the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly becoming a strategically important region for
the Union. Thus, it states that the ‘EU intends to increase its engagement with the region to build partnerships that
reinforce the rules-based international order’ (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 1). However, it also
emphasises that the region has become embedded in geopolitical tensions, intense competition and military build-
up, with regional hotspots in both the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Sea (European Commission and
HR/VP 2021). Moreover, with the United States ever-stronger pivot towards the region and with the ever-
increasing Sino-US competition, which has made the Indo-Pacific the epicentre of great power rivalry, it has been
argued that the EU needs to walk a fine line in this competition (Simon 2021). This paper consequently aims to
address the EU’s approach towards the region. It also seeks to contribute to the literature on the EU’s strategic
partnership with Asian states (Pan and Michalski 2019).

In her 2021 State of the European Union address, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated
that the new EU Indo-Pacific strategy ‘reflects the growing importance of the region to our prosperity and security’
and added that ‘Europe needs to be more present and more active in the region’ (von der Leyen 2021). In the last
couple of years, the EU has shown a stronger foreign policy ambition and the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS)
outlined the goal of European strategic autonomy (EEAS 2016). Following Jean-Claude Juncker’s ‘political
Commission’, Ursula von der Leyen also outlined the ambition of a ‘geopolitical Commission’ (von der Leyen
2019).

This working paper hence seeks to analyse the EU’s ambition with the Indo-Pacific strategy through the lens of
European strategic autonomy and asks the following questions: firstly, is the Indo-Pacific strategy consistent with
the EU’s ambition to achieve strategic autonomy? Secondly, what implications will these ambitions have for the
EU and its partnership with Asia? This working paper also builds upon the ideas of a ‘new normal’ in EU foreign
and security policy making. Especially, as the last decade has been increasingly turbulent for the EU, which has
gone through multiple crises during this time (Ferrara and Kriesi 2021; Schimmelfennig 2018; Caporaso 2018).

This paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the ‘new normal’ in the EU’s foreign and security
policy making. The third section examines the EU’s ambition towards European strategic autonomy, which
includes a discussion of the EU’s ambitions within several policy fields and an outline of how these feed into the
debate on strategic autonomy. The fourth section then analyses the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy in regard to the
EU’s ambition for European strategic autonomy. The fifth and final section discusses the main results of the
working paper.

2. The ‘new normal’ in EU foreign and security policy

The last decade of crisis – spanning from the fallout of the Euro crisis and the rise of populism to Russia’s war in
Ukraine, the migration crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the terrorist attacks of 2015–2017 in Europe,
the election of Donald Trump and the changed geopolitical situation with the revival of great power competition
– has greatly affected the EU. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has further strengthened trends such as increased
geopolitical tensions, Sino-US competition and weakened multilateral institutions. Simultaneously, the pandemic

2
has strengthened European integration (with the new next-generation EU financial package as its greatest example)
(Alcaro and Tocci 2021). Alcaro and Tocci have furthermore argued that the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting
societal and economic crises have not only led the EU to integrate in the economic sphere, but also resulted in
‘shared perception of the need for the EU to sharpen its foreign policy profile’ (2021: 2).

Another effect of the pandemic has been the increased importance of geoeconomics tools. In the past decade, there
has been a retreat from the rules-based liberal trade regime and an increase in the weaponisation of economic
interdependencies (see also Fjäder et al. 2021). These dynamics have only been strengthened by the pandemic.
This shift could result in the EU – as a long-time champion and advocate for free trade and global governance –
being weakened by these dynamics. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this situation presents the EU, given its
large market (and attendant market power), with a good opportunity to engage in this type of geoeconomic
statecraft (Christiansen 2020: 9–11).

Moreover, there has been discussion in academic and political circles on what a more autonomous EU and the
increased geopolitical tensions between the United States and China will imply for US-EU relations. While some
scholars have argued that a more autonomous EU will weaken the EU-US relationship (e.g. Riddervold and Rosén
2018), others have argued that the efforts towards European strategic autonomy could actually rebalance and
strengthen EU-US relations (e.g. Tocci 2021). In recent years, the Union has also started to change its approach
towards China and has taken on a more critical outlook (Brattberg and Le Corre 2020). For instance, the European
Commission and the HR/VP described China in 2019 as simultaneously a negotiation partner, economic
competitor and systemic rival (European Commission and HR/VP 2019). The European Parliament has also
demanded a new China strategy for the EU (European Parliament 2021).

Rieker and Riddervold argue that there has been a shift from the EU side ‘towards a more interest-driven policy
for dealing with pressing perceived or real security threats to the EU, while simultaneously trying to uphold a
principled foreign and security policy objective’ (Rieker and Riddervold 2021: 2). The EU is hence expected to
continue to conduct its foreign policy using a normative approach (Manners 2002); however, the changed
geopolitical dynamics could lead to a more interest-driven foreign policy from the EU. Likewise, Biscop argues
that finding the right outlook and position in the great power competition will be one of the most pressing issues
for the EU in the coming decades. The EU needs to build up its ‘power to engage’ in world politics (Biscop 2020:
1020). The next section discusses one of the new trends of this development: the EU’s quest and ambitions towards
European strategic autonomy.

3. The EU’s quest for European strategic autonomy

Since the 2016 EUGS, the term ‘strategic autonomy’ has become the foremost buzzword to emerge from Brussels.
Yet the definition and meaning of this concept are still politically contested in the Union (Franke and Varma 2019),
which has created political tensions between EU leaders in relation to the concept of strategic autonomy and its
overarching ambition (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 2021). Nevertheless, even though
the concept is politically contested, and no common definition has been achieved thus far, strategic autonomy
remains firmly embedded in the EU public rhetoric as an overarching goal for the Union.

3
The concept of strategic autonomy has been intensively discussed in the think-tank and academic community since
the EUGS (see e.g., Helwig 2020, 2021; Tocci 2021; Grevi 2020, 2019; Anghel et al. 2020; Lippert et al. 2019;
Franke and Varma 2019; Howorth 2018; Fiott 2018, 2021). Moreover, with the Covid 19 pandemic hitting Europe,
discussions on strategic autonomy have steadily expanded (Governments of the Netherlands and Spain 2020).
Strategic autonomy has even been described as ‘the aim of our generation’ by the European Council President
Charles Michel (Michel 2020). Although the concept originated in the security and defence debate, it has now
been broadened to include a more holistic and global perspective (Helwig 2020). Today, the concept of strategic
autonomy spans several different policy domains, including the tech, digital, climate and trade spheres. Strategic
autonomy has thus been defined as ‘the political, institutional and material ability of the EU and its member states
to manage their interdependence with third parties, with the aim of ensuring the well-being of their citizens and
implementing self-determined policy decisions’ (Helwig 2021: 21). Tocci (2021) in turn discusses how European
strategic autonomy implies the ability to both govern interdependencies and rebalance the EU’s relations. She
emphasises that strategic autonomy is about the ‘EU’s capacity to shape international norms and practices towards
formally accepted institutions, laws and procedures’ (Tocci 2021: 6). Others have pointed out the EU’s ability to
set its own priorities and make decisions based on these. While the EU’s first choice would be to act with partners,
it should be prepared to act alone if needed. Therefore, strategic autonomy implies ‘neither autarchy nor isolation,
nor rejection of alliances. An autonomous actor decides on its own, on the basis of its own priorities, with which
actors it wishes to seek partnerships and alliances’ (Lippert et al. 2019: 5).

This paper views the concept of European strategic autonomy as a spectrum of choices rather than as a binary term;
as a result, it perceives strategic autonomy as something that entails the EU’s ability to engage in world politics in
different policy domains. In sum, strategic autonomy is the EU’s ability to manage interdependence while shaping
global policies, norms and practices according to its interests. Grevi has similarly outlined strategic autonomy as
‘an essential enabler of Europe’s shaping power’ and argues that the overarching ambition towards European
strategic autonomy is, in a nutshell, about the future of European integration (Grevi 2019, 2020). Grevi further
outlines three dimensions of European strategic autonomy that can be used to analyse the concept and its
underlying objective. The first dimension entails bracing, which implies that the EU requires the ability to meet
different challenges and threats through an enhanced resilience. The second involves empowering, which refers to
how the EU is more than the ‘sum of its parts’ and hence refers to its collective ability to meet different challenges.
The third dimension involves engaging, which is about the Union’s ability to both support and shape the
international system and the rules-based order (Grevi 2020). The next section analyses the EU’s new Indo-Pacific
strategy from these perspectives.

4. Analysing the new EU Indo-Pacific strategy through the lens of European strategic autonomy
The development of the EU’s new Indo-Pacific strategy was instigated by the adoption of national Indo-Pacific
strategies by France, Germany and the Netherlands. Until a few years ago, the EU had neither discussed nor
defined its various policy priorities for this overall region. However, geopolitical shifts and the increasing
economic and military importance of the region created a new momentum to define the EU’s overall priorities in
the Indo-Pacific region (Grare and Reuter 2021). Consequently, in April 2021, the foreign ministers in the Council
of the European Union adopted conclusions on the overall framework and invited the EU HR/VP and the European
Commission to present a joint and fully fledged EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific by September

4
2021 (Council of the European Union 2021). The present paper analyses both the April 2021 Council conclusions
and the European Commission-HR/VP communication through the lens of European strategic autonomy,
following Giovanni Grevi’s (2020) three dimensions of bracing, empowering and engaging.

4.1 Bracing
In this working paper, the dimension of bracing is viewed as comprising a focus on the EU’s need and ability to
decrease various dependencies (e.g., in critical value chains, technologies, industrial components or critical
minerals) and the EU’s ability to react to different pressing challenges. This includes, for instance, addressing
different practices of unfair competition (e.g., unfair uses of state subsidies) or countering trade-distorting practices
(Grevi 2020). In the words of Grevi, strategic autonomy is about ‘strengthening Europe’s resilience against the
risks of interdependence, or its deliberate manipulation, and enhancing Europe’s clout to govern globalisation’
(2020: 7). Or, as emphasised in the 2020 EU industrial strategy, ‘Europe’s strategic autonomy is about reducing
dependence on others for things we need the most: critical materials and technologies, food, infrastructure, security
and other strategic areas (European Commission 2020: 13).

In regard to the Indo-Pacific region, the Council’s conclusions express concern regarding the current geopolitical
situation in the region and outline the increased tensions within the domains of trade, technology, politics and
security. The conclusions state that these dynamics ‘increasingly threaten the stability and security of the region
and beyond, directly impacting the EU’s interests’ (Council of the European Union 2021: 2). The September
strategy likewise emphasises the ever-increasing tensions and hotspots in the area and describes how the military
build-up in the region and the increased geopolitical dynamics could present a direct threat to Europe’s prosperity
and security. The strategy also underlines how human rights and democratic principles are under threat in parts of
the region (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 2). While the Council’s conclusions and the strategy itself
do not explicitly mention the Sino-US rivalry, it is clear that this great power competition will affect the EU’s
position and thinking in the coming years and decades (Simon 2021; Pajon and Pejsova 2021). However, according
to an ECFR study on the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the EU member states are somewhat divided on how to handle
this rivalry and the generally growing and assertive role of China (Grare and Reuter 2021). The member states are
also divided on the ambition to strive for European strategic autonomy (Franke and Varma 2019). That is, some
member states see the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy as an act towards European strategic autonomy, while others
view it as a way of aligning with Washington and hence keeping the United States engaged (Grare and Reuter
2021: 7).

The Covid-19 pandemic has nevertheless clearly strengthened the discussions on the concept of European strategic
autonomy. The fallout of the pandemic and the problems in global value chains have increased the EU’s
discussions on resilience and the diversification of supply and value chains. Thus, in regard to the pandemic, the
Council’s conclusions on the Indo-Pacific strategy emphasise the importance of ensuring industrial supply chains
for medicine and health products (Council of the European Union 2021: 6). This emphasis is echoed by the HR/VP
and the Commission in the outlined strategy (2021: 15). Similarly, in regard to the economic and industrial domain,
the council conclusions expressed that ‘diversification of supply chains should contribute to the resilience of the
European economy, especially for the most sensitive industrial ecosystems, and to the reduction of strategic
dependencies on critical raw materials’ (Council of the European Union 2021: 7). The strategy also discusses the
importance of the ‘further deepening and diversification of trade and investment ties’ and underlines the

5
importance of ‘securing the resilience of its supply chains’ (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 2). The
strategy goes on to address the importance of protecting the EU from unfair practices in the trade regime and
outlines problematic issues such as industrial subsidies, forced technology transfers, economic coercion and
intellectual property theft. Moreover, it discusses the importance of the Union both addressing strategic
dependencies and building more sustainable global value chains (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 6, 17).

4.2 Empowering
The dimension of empowering focuses in turn on how the Union could make full use of the EU’s various strengths
in world affairs. For instance, it focuses on how the Union can use its different regulatory powers or market powers
to conduct trade deals, ensure level playing fields, obtain market access and ensure fair competition (Grevi 2020).
As Helwig (2020: 9) puts it, ‘the power to shape global norms is not only due to the size of the single market, but
also rests on the EU’s strong regulatory capacity’. Likewise, the EU is becoming more serious within its security
and defence domain, which is part of this empowering process.

The Indo-Pacific strategy has a clear element of empowerment. Firstly, it addresses the need for the Union to
implement and finalise trade deals with partners in the region. The strategy also outlines the importance of working
with partners in the region to set global standards and regulatory priorities (European Commission and HR/VP
2021: 6). The digital sphere is especially outlined as an area of priority for the EU, including the importance of
building digital partnerships and working with partners to set standards within the field. The strategy argues for
‘enhancing cooperation on and interoperability of standards for emerging technologies, such as Artificial
Intelligence, based on democratic principles and fundamental rights’ (European Commission and HR/VP 2021:
10). Another strong priority for the EU – which will utilise its regulatory power and the ‘Brussels effect’ – is to
promote the convergence of data protection regimes (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 11).

The issue of connectivity has become deeply embedded in today’s geopolitical rivalry (Biscop 2020). One of the
core objectives in the Indo-Pacific strategy – which builds upon the 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity communication
– is to build and promote connectivity with the EU’s Indo-Pacific partners. In her 2021 State of the European
Union, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the Global Gateway initiative, which
has been seen as a way of countering and rivalling China’s Belt and Road initiative (Politico 2021a). Biscop argues
that the EU will seek to work with these connectivity approaches, especially in areas and countries where the EU
has a clear interest at stake, to counter China’s influence (Biscop 2020: 1018). The EU is now clearly seeking to
work more proactively on these issues and is moving beyond its 2018 EU-Asia connectivity strategy (Politico
2021b). The new Indo-Pacific strategy particularly outlines Japan and India as its first two connectivity partners;
it also outlines Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) as important partners (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 12). Since the EUGS, the EU has
especially tried to strengthen its connectivity approach towards both Asia and Africa (Schwerbrock 2020).

The EU has also expressed a stronger ambition to work in the traditional field of security and defence in the region.
The region hosts several very important and crucial waterways for European trade. Hence, the EU and its member
states are seeking to enhance their naval presence in the region in order to secure sea lines of communication. The
Indo-Pacific strategy also states that the EU is seeking to conduct more joint exercises and port calls with Indo-
Pacific partners in order to both protect the freedom of navigation and enhance the EU’s naval diplomacy in the

6
region (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 13). This aim is in line with the ambition revealed in the EUGS,
which underlined the importance of ‘ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes critical for trade and access
to natural resources’ (EEAS 2016: 41). The new Indo-Pacific strategy also discusses the possibility of establishing
a Maritime Area of Interest in the Indo-Pacific (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 13). This goal is clearly
echoed and outlined by the EU’s foreign policy body – the EEAS – draft of the EU’s new so-called Strategic
Compass in security and defence. The EEAS draft argues for strengthening the EU’s presence in the region and
expanding its Coordinated Maritime Presences concept to the Indo-Pacific by 2022. It also calls for more frequent
EU port calls, patrols and joint naval exercises, with the ambition to ‘conduct live maritime exercises with partners
in the Indo-Pacific’ by 2023 (EEAS 2021). However, this document is now under negotiation by the member states,
with the aim of formally accepting the EU Strategic Compass by the spring of 2022.

4.3 Engaging
Lastly, engaging involves the EU’s ability to work with other partners to both support and shape the international
system and the rules-based order. Hence, the EU experiences no conflict between partnership and autonomy. As
discussed by Grevi, ‘the opposite of autonomy is not partnership, but sheer dependence. It is not cooperation, but
the inability to shape cooperation’ (2020: 8). However, in order to be able to shape the international order, the EU
needs the ability to both brace itself against threats and challenges and empower itself to meet these challenges.
Hence, bracing and empowering are prerequisites for engaging in and shaping global politics (Grevi 2020: 22).

The very title of the EU strategy – that is, the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – emphasises a
strongly cooperative approach. This emphasis on cooperation is also strongly noted in the Council’s conclusions,
which underline the importance of reinforcing the EU’s role as a partner to the Indo-Pacific states (Council of the
European Union 2021: 2–3). The EU strategy argues for enhancing and reinforcing bilateral, regional and
multilateral relations in order to ‘promote the rules-based international order and access to open markets and ensure
a stable trading environment’ (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 2). The strategy goes on to argue for a
value- and principle-based cooperation to strengthen multilateralism, promote a level playing field in trade and
investment, and to meet the obligations of the Paris Climate agreement. Using a clear, normative approach, the
strategy emphasises that the EU will work with like-minded Indo-Pacific states in international fora to push back
against human rights violations (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 3).

The EU states that it will work with other partners that already possess an Indo-Pacific outlook. The strategy
specifically mentions the ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (commonly known as the ‘Quad’). It also
describes how the EU needs to cooperate with China while simultaneously working with other international
partners to push back against issues upon which the EU and China fundamentally disagree (European Commission
and HR/VP 2021: 4). This perspective echoes the EU’s approach of viewing China as a ‘partner, competitor and
rival’ at the same time (European Commission and HR/VP 2019).

The EU highlights the importance of partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan in regard to the
semiconductor supply chain. It also discusses how the EU seeks to work with its Indo-Pacific partners to set global
standards and ensure the workings of international trade regimes. Moreover, one of the EU’s key goals is to work
towards the green transition; the strategy refers to the importance of working with Indo-Pacific partners to fight,

7
mitigate and adapt to climate change. One of the ideas presented in the strategy is to build ‘green alliances’ with
like-minded partners, (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 6–9).

As mentioned in the discussion on the empowering dimension, the EU has a strong focus on the digital sphere.
For this reason, it seeks to build digital partnerships with states from the region and refers to Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Singapore and India as strong partners (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 10). The EU also wants
to strengthen its security and defence dialogue with its partners in the region and work with them to boost the Indo-
Pacific partners’ capacity to ensure maritime security (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 14, 17).

5. Conclusions and future outlook

This working paper discussed how and whether the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is consistent with its ambition to
achieve strategic autonomy. As discussed above, the EU aims to brace itself against the challenges stemming from
the current geopolitical situation, while empowering itself to meet these challenges and to work with partners to
steer and influence the direction of the multilateral system. However, what does this all mean for the EU’s relations
with different Asian partners?

The fallout from the pandemic, together with the increasingly challenging geopolitical environment, has increased
the EU’s discussions on diversifying supply chains and looking into various dependencies in strategic sectors.
Thus, as described in this paper, the EU aims to both brace itself from (over)dependencies and build new
partnerships. For instance, in the now critical area of semiconductors, the EU has clearly outlined its ambition to
build partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The EU also aims to work with important Indo-
Pacific partners, such as India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, to build global standards and digital governance.
Another interesting development is the EU’s stated ambition to work together with the Quad 2 . Increased
cooperation with the Quad on technology and security could be an important focal point for the EU in the years
ahead, especially as technology and economic issues become increasingly embedded in geopolitical rivalry. The
EU also wants to continue to improve its relationship with ASEAN (see also An and Kim 2020 for a discussion
on EU-ASEAN relations). Consequently, the EU may be slowly moving towards the US approach of building
partnerships as a ‘selective tool to realise desirable outcomes’ (Pan and Michalski 2019).

This tendency can also be seen in the EU’s connectivity approach, which – as discussed above – is shifting towards
a more interest-driven outlook. Connectivity has always been used by great powers; however, the Covid-19
pandemic has demonstrated both the vulnerabilities and the importance of connectivity (Biscop 2020: 1017). Thus,
the new Global Gateway initiative could be seen as an instance of a more mature European Union foreign policy,
in which the EU understands and uses investment in connectivity as a geopolitical tool. The European Commission
has clearly stated that the Global Gateway strategy should be closely coordinated with the Build Back Better World
G7 initiative, which can be seen as a way of countering and rivalling the Chinese Belt and Road initiative
(European Commission 2021a; Reuters 2021). In addition to the Global Gateway initiative and the ambition
outlined in the 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity strategy, the EU has now signed bilateral connectivity frameworks
with both Japan and India (EEAS 2019; European Commission 2021b).

2
The security format between Australia, India, Japan and the United States.

8
However, the EU Indo-Pacific strategy clearly outlines a normative approach (and thereby partly echoes the EU’s
more traditional functional approach to special partnerships; see Pan and Michalski 2019). It argues that the ‘EU
will remain a consistent defender of human rights and democracy and continue to use all tools at its disposal:
political, and human rights dialogues and consultations, trade preferences and the mainstreaming of human rights
considerations in all EU policies and programmes’ (European Commission and HR/VP 2021: 3). These normative
notions may be seen as underpinning the EU’s approach to strategic autonomy (see also Palm 2021 for a discussion
on normative power and EU strategic autonomy). Yet the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region follows the
‘principled pragmatism’ turn of the EUGS and indicates a more interest-based policy. Consequently, the EU’s
foreign policy can be seen as maturing and adapting to the new reality in world politics (Rieker and Riddervold
2021).

Nevertheless, the EU and its member states will be affected by the ever-increasing Sino-US rivalry. Hence, the
EU must consider how to handle rivalry, which is likely to shape world politics for a long time. Thus far, the EU
has attempted to mainly stay outside of rivalry; however, time will show whether this position is possible or even
desirable. The European Parliament has demanded a tougher stance on China, especially after China’s sanctions
against European researchers and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and has argued that the
ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) ‘cannot begin until China lifts sanctions against
MEPs and EU institutions’ (European Parliament 2021). Hence, the CAI is now put on hold, and both individual
member states and institutions are somewhat divided on how to handle relations with China going forward. Some
member states want to take a closer position to the United States, while others wish to achieve a balance between
the United States and China. As a result, some member states see the new Indo-Pacific strategy as a way of showing
support for the United States and thereby managing the transatlantic alliance, while others see it as a way of
affirming the EU’s goal of strategic autonomy (Grare and Reuter 2021). Nevertheless, it is possible that more joint
action can be expected between the United States and the EU on technological issues, such as the establishment
of the new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (European Commission 2021c). This is particularly likely as
technological innovation and trade issues have become increasingly entangled within the geopolitical rivalry
(Csernatoni 2021). Moreover, in the transatlantic discussions, the China issue has clearly become more pressing,
as demonstrated by the strong emphasis on this issue by the NATO leaders in the 2021 Brussels Summit
Communiqué (NATO 2021).

As the Indo-Pacific region is home to important technologies and production processes (e.g., semiconductors and
new technology in communication and artificial intelligence), as well as various important raw materials, the EU
needs to work more closely with partners in the region while making efforts to catch up in certain technological
areas. Hence, and to conclude, as the Indo-Pacific region becomes the epicentre of great power rivalry and the
home to important new technologies, the EU must interact more closely with the region. Therefore, we can now
expect a stronger EU footprint in the Indo-Pacific region going forward.

9
References
Alcaro R, Tocci N (2021) Navigating a Covid world: The European Union’s internal rebirth and external quest.
International Spect 56:1–18
An J-H, Kim G (2020) EU-ASEAN strategic partnership for connecting Europe and Asia. SPEAC Working
Paper #2
Anghel, S et al (2020) On the path to ‘strategic autonomy’: The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment.
European Parliamentary Research Service
Biscop S (2020) No peace from Corona: Defining EU strategy for the 2020s. Journal of European
Integration 42:1009–1023
Brattberg E, Le Corre P (2020) The EU and China in 2020: More competition ahead. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Caporaso J (2018) Europe’s triple crisis and the uneven role of institutions: The Euro, refugees and Brexit. J
Common Mark Stud 56:1345–1361
Christiansen T (2020) The EU’s new normal: Consolidating European integration in an era of populism and geo-
economics. JCMS: J Common Mark Stud 58:13–27
Council of the European Union (2021) EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – Council conclusions
(16 April 2021). Brussels, 16 April 2021 (OR. en) 7914/21
Csernatoni R (2021) The technology challenge in the transatlantic relationship. European View.
https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858211059251
EEAS (2016) Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s
foreign and security policy
EEAS (2019) The partnership on sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure between the European
Union and Japan. EEAS. https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/africa/68018/partnership-sustainable-
connectivity-and-quality-infrastructure-between-european-union-and_en. Accessed 06-12-
2021
EEAS (2021) A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens,
values and interests and contributes to international peace and security. EEAS(2021) 1169.
European Commission (2020) A New Industrial Strategy for Europe. Brussels, 10.3.2020. COM(2020) 102 final.
European Commission (2021a) Commission work programme 2022 Making Europe stronger together.
Strasbourg, 19.10.2021, COM(2021) 645 final.
European Commission (2021b) Principles, Partnership, Prosperity: EU and India launch collaboration on
sustainable connectivity. Press release, 8 May 2021: Brussels.
European Commission (2021c) EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Commission launches consultation
platform for stakeholder's involvement to shape transatlantic cooperation. Press release, 18
October 2021: Brussels.
European Commission and HR/VP (2019) EU-China – A strategic outlook. Strasbourg, 12.3.2019 JOIN(2019) 5
final.
European Commission and HR/VP (2021) The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Brussels,
16.9.2021 JOIN(2021) 24 final.
European Parliament (2021) Parliament sets out its vision for a new EU strategy on China.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/sv/press-room/20210910IPR11917/parliament-sets-out-
its-vision-for-a-new-eu-strategy-on-china. Accessed 06-12-2021
Ferrara F, Kriesi H (2021) Crisis pressures and European integration. J Eur Public Policy. DOI:
10.1080/13501763.2021.1966079
Fiott D (2018) Strategic autonomy: Towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence? European Union Institute for
Security Studies, Brief 12/1018.

10
Fiott D (ed.) (2021) European sovereignty: Strategy and interdependence. European Union Institute for Security
Studies.
Fjäder C, Helwig N, Wigell M (2021) Recognizing ‘geoeconomic risk’: Rethinking corporate risk management
for the era of great-power competition. FIIA Briefing Paper 314
Franke U, Varma T (2019) Independence play: Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. European Council on
Foreign Relations
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2021) Strategic autonomy, strategic choices. Council
of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49404/strategic-autonomy-
issues-paper-5-february-2021-web.pdf. Accessed 06-12-2021
Governments of the Netherlands and Spain (2020) Non-paper on strategic autonomy while preserving an open
economy. Kingdom of the Netherlands. https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-
representations/pr-eu-brussels/documents/publications/2021/03/24/non-paper-on-strategic-
autonomy. Accessed 06-12-2021
Grare F, Reuter M (2021) Moving closer: European views of the Indo-Pacific. European Council on Foreign
Relations
Grevi G (2019) Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power, Discussion
Paper, European Policy Centre.
Grevi G (2020) Fostering Europe’s strategic autonomy – a question of purpose and action. European Policy
Centre.
Helwig N (2020) EU strategic autonomy: A reality check for Europe’s global agenda. FIIA Working Paper 119
Helwig N (ed) (2021) Strategic autonomy and the transformation of the EU: New agendas for security,
diplomacy, trade and technology. FIIA Report 67
Howorth J (2018) Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: Threat or opportunity for transatlantic
defence relations? J Eur Integr 40:523–537
Lippert B, von Ondarza N, and Perthes V (2019) European strategic autonomy: Actors, issues, conflicts of
interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, research paper 4/19
Manners I (2002) Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? JCMS: J Common Mark Stud 40:235–258
Michel C (2020) ‘Strategic autonomy for Europe – the aim of our generation’ – speech by President Charles
Michel to the Bruegel think tank. European Council.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/28/l-autonomie-strategique-
europeenne-est-l-objectif-de-notre-generation-discours-du-president-charles-michel-au-
groupe-de-reflexion-bruegel/. Accessed 05-12-2021
NATO (2021) Brussels summit communiqué. Nato. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
Accessed 05-12-2021
C, Pejsova E (2021) A region of flashpoints? Security in the Indo-Pacific. CSDS policy brief
Palm T (2021) Normative power and EU strategic autonomy. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Pan Z, Michalski A (2019) Contending logics of strategic partnership in international politics. Asia Europe
Journal 17:265–280
Politico (2021a) EU launches ‘Global Gateway’ to counter China’s Belt and Road. September 15, 2021.
Available: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launches-global-gateway-to-counter-chinas-belt-
and-road/. Accessed 05-12-2021
Politico (2021b) EU starts work on rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Politico.
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-starts-work-on-rival-to-chinas-belt-and-road-project-
network/ Accessed 05-12-2021

11
Reuters (2021) G7 rivals China with grand infrastructure plan. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-
counter-chinas-belt-road-with-infrastructure-project-senior-us-official-2021-06-12/. Accessed
05-12-2021
Riddervold M, Rosén G (2018) Unified in response to rising powers? China, Russia and EU-US relations. J Eur
Integr 40:555–570
Rieker P, Riddervold M (2021) Not so unique after all? Urgency and norms in EU foreign and security policy. J
Eur Integr. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2021.1977293
Schimmelfennig F (2018) European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and
Schengen crises. J Eur Public Policy 25:969–989
Schwerbrock J (2020) Connecting Europe and Asia: The role of Africa. SPEAC Working Paper #6
Simon L (2021) The geopolitics of multilateralism: What role for the EU in the Indo-Pacific? CSDS policy brief
Tocci N (2021) European strategic autonomy: What it is, why we need it, how to achieve it. IAI - Istituto Affari
Internazionali
von der Leyen U (2019) The von der Leyen Commission: for a Union that strives for more. Press release, 10
September 2019: Brussels
von der Leyen U (2021) 2021 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen. 15 September 2021:
Strasbourg

12