G.R. No.

93661 September 4, 1991

SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (14th Division), LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEOGRACIAS
VISTAN,respondents.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Office and Yap, Apostol, Bandon & Gumaro for petitioner.

Miguel M. Gonzales and Norberto L. Martinez for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This case involves the aborted sale of the Garchitorena estate to the Government in connection with the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. This opinion is not intended as a pre-judgment of the informations that
have been filed with the Sandiganbayan for alleged irregularities in the negotiation of the said transaction. We are
concerned here only with the demand of the petitioner that the private respondents sign the contract of sale and thus
give effect thereto as a perfected agreement. For this purpose, we shall determine only if the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals denying that demand should be affirmed or reversed.

The subject-matter of the proposed sale is a vast estate consisting of eight parcels of land situated in the municipality
of Garchitorena in Camarines Norte and with an area of 1,887.819 hectares. The record shows that on April 27, 1988,
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) entered into a Contract to Sell the property to Sharp International Marketing,
the agreement to be converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment by the latter of the full purchase price of
P3,183,333.33. On May 14, 1988, even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner, through its President Alex Lina,
offered to sell it to the Government for P56,000,000.00, (later increased to P65,000,000.00). Although the land was
still registered in the name of UCPB, the offer was processed by various government agencies during the months of
June to November, 1988, resulting in the recommendation by the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution in the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the acquisition of the property at a price of P35,532.70 per hectare, or roughly
P67,000,000.00. On December 1, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between UCPB and Sharp by virtue
of which the former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated consideration of P3,183,333.33. The property was
registered in the name of the petitioner on December 6, 1988. On December 27, 1988, DAR and the Land Bank of
the Philippines created a Compensation Clearing Committee (CCC) to expedite processing of the papers relating to
the acquisition of the land and the preparation of the necessary deed of transfer for signature by the DAR Secretary
and the LBP President. The following day, the CCC held its first meeting and decided to recommend the acquisition
of the property for P62,725,077.29. The next day, December 29, 1988, DAR Secretary Philip Ella Juico issued an
order directing the acquisition of the estate for the recommended amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to
Sharp, 30% in cash and the balance in government financial instruments negotiable within 30 days from issuance by
Sharp of the corresponding muniments of title.

On January 9, 1989, Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. On that same day, the
LBP received a copy of the order issued by Secretary Juico on December 29, 1988. On January 17, 1989, LBP
Executive Vice President Jesus Diaz signed the CCC evaluation worksheet but with indicated reservations. For his
part, LBP President Deogracias Vistan, taking into account these reservations and the discovery that Sharp had
acquired the property from UCPB for only P3.1 million, requested Secretary Juico to reconsider his December 29,
1988 order. Secretary Juico then sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as to whether the LBP could refuse to
pay the seller the compensation fixed by the DAR Secretary. Meantime, on February 3, 1989, Vistan informed Juico
that LBP would not pay the stipulated purchase price. The reply of the Justice Department on March 12, 1989, was
that the decision of the DAR Secretary fixing the compensation was not final if seasonably questioned in court by any
interested party (including the LBP); otherwise, it would become final after 15 days from notice and binding on all
parties concerned, including the LBP, which then could not refuse to pay the compensation fixed. Reacting to Sharp's
repeated demands for payment, Juico informed Lina on April 7,1989, that DAR and LBP had dispatched a team to
inspect the land for reassessment. Sharp then filed on April 18, 1989, a petition for mandamus with this court to
compel the DAR and LBP to comply with the contract, prompting Juico to issue the following order:

Since the whole property of 1,887 hectares was acquired by Claimant for a consideration of P3 M, the
buying price per hectare then was only about P1,589.83. It is incomprehensible how the value-of land per
hectare in this secluded Caramoan Peninsula can go so high after a short period of time. The increase is

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 difficult to understand since the land is neither fully cultivated nor has it been determined to possess special
and rich features or potentialities other than agricultural purposes.

We cannot fail to note that the value of land under CARP, particularly in the most highly developed sections
of Camarines Sur, ranges from P18,000.00 to P27,000 per hectare.

In view of the above findings of fact, the value of P62,725,077.29 is definitely too high as a price for the
property in question.

However, in order to be fair and just to the landowner, a reevaluation of the land in question by an impartial
and competent third party shall be undertaken. For this purpose, a well known private licensed appraiser
shall he commissioned by DAR.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued for the reappraisal and re-evaluation of the
subject property. For that purpose, DAR shall avail of the services of Cuervo and Associates to undertake
and complete the appraisal of the subject property within 60 days from date of this Order.

On April 26, 1989, this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it on October 31, 1989. In
an exhaustive and well-reasoned decision penned by Justice Josue M. Bellosillo,1 it held that mandamus did not he
because the LBP was not a mere rubber stamp of the DAR and its signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale was not a
merely ministerial act. It especially noted the failure of the DAR to take into account the prescribed guidelines in
ascertaining the just compensation that resulted in the assessment of the land for the unconscionable amount of P62
million notwithstanding its original acquisition cost of only P3 million. The decision also held that the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice applied only to compulsory acquisition of lands, not to voluntary agreements as in the case
before it. Moreover, the sale was null and void ab initio because it violated Section 6 of RA 6657, which was in force
at the time the transaction was entered into.

The petitioners are now back with this Court, this time to question the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
following grounds:

The Court of Appeals seriously erred in including in its Decision findings of facts which are not borne by
competent evidence.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the valuation made on the Garchitorena estate has not yet
become final.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not applicable to the
case at bar.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the sale of Garchitorena estate from UCPB in favor of the
petitioner is void.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the P62 million is not a just compensation.

We need not go into each of these grounds as the basic question that need only to be resolved is whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the LBP President Deogracias Vistan to sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989.

It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of
discretion but not the discretion itself. mandamus can require action only but not specific action where the act sought
to be performed involves the exercise of discretion.2

Section 18 of RA 6657 reads as follows:

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 Sec. 18. Valuation and mode of compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount
as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Secs. 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by
the court, as the just compensation for the land. ... (Emphasis supplied).

We agree with the respondent court that the act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a
high degree of discretion. The compensation to be approved was not trifling but amounted to as much as P62 million
of public funds, to be paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier for only P3 million.
The respondent court was quite correct when it observed:

As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is an essential part of the government sector with
regard to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instrumentality that is charged
with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable
cog, in the governmental machinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the landowner.
Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, function of establishing the compensable
amount, there would be no amount "to be established by the government" as required in Sec. 6, EO 229.
This is precisely why the law requires the DAS, even if already approved and signed by the DAR Secretary,
to be transmitted still to the LBP for its review, evaluation and approval.

It needs no exceptional intelligence to understand the implications of this transmittal. It simply means that if
LBP agrees on the amount stated in the DAS, after its review and evaluation, it becomes its duty to sign the
deed. But not until then. For, it is only in that event that the amount to be compensated shall have been
"established' according to law. Inversely, if the LBP, after review and evaluation, refuses to sign, it is
because as a party to the contract it does not give its consent thereto. This necessarily implies the exercise
of judgment on the part of LBP, which is not supposed to be a mere rubber stamp in the exercise. Obviously,
were it not so, LBP could not have been made a distinct member of PARC, the super body responsible for
the successful implementation of the CARP. Neither would it have been given the power to review and
evaluate the DAS already signed by the DAR Secretary. If the function of the LBP in this regard is merely to
sign the DAS without the concomitant power of review and evaluation, its duty to "review/evaluate'
mandated in Adm. Order No. 5 would have been a mere surplusage, meaningless, and a useless ceremony.

Thus, in the exercise of such power of review and evaluation, it results that the amount of P62,725,077.29
being claimed by petitioner is not the "amount to be established by the government." Consequently, it cannot
be the amount that LBP is by law bound to compensate petitioner.

Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. For, it is essential for the writ to issue that the
plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform
the act required. The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain.
The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and
specific (Enriquez v. Bidin, L-29620, October 12, 1972, 47 SCRA 183; Orencia v. Enrile, L-28997, February
22, 1974, 55 SCRA 580; Dionisio v. Paterno, 103 SCRA 342; Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203; Aquino v.
Mariano, 129 SCRA 532).

Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned. It is
established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-
ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a
particular way or to approve or disapprove a specific application (B.P. Homes, Inc. v. National Water
Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154 SCRA 88). mandamus win not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act (Mata v. San Diego, L-30447, March 21,
1975; 63 SCRA 170).

Even more explicit is R.A. 6657 with respect to the indispensable role of LBP in the determination of the
amount to be compensated to the landowner. Under Sec. 18 thereof, "the LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance
with the criteria provided in Secs. 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land."

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Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no contract between Sharp and the Government. The
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was incomplete and therefore had no binding effect at all.
Consequently, Sharp cannot claim any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition for mandamus.

In National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel,3 this Court held:

... the action for mandamus had no leg to stand on because the writ was sought to enforce alleged
contractual obligations under a disputed contract — disputed not only on the ground that it had failed of
perfection but on the further ground that it was illegal and against public interest and public policy ...

The petitioner argues that the LBP President was under obligation to sign the agreement because he had been
required to do so by Secretary Juico, who was acting by authority of the President in the exercise of the latter's
constitutional power of control. This argument may be dismissed with only a brief comment. If the law merely
intended LBP's automatic acquiescence to the DAR Secretary's decision, it would not have required
the separateapproval of the sale by that body and the DAR. It must also be noted that the President herself,
apparently disturbed by public suspicion of anomalies in the transaction, directed an inquiry into the matter by a
committee headed by former Justice Jose Y. Feria of this Court. Whatever presumed authority was given by her to
the DAR Secretary in connection with the sale was thereby impliedly withdrawn.

It is no argument either that the Government is bound by the official decisions of Secretary Juico and cannot now
renege on his commitment. The Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if
they are erroneous, let alone irregular.4

Given the circumstances attending the transaction which plainly show that it is not merely questionable but downright
dishonest, the Court can only wonder at the temerity of the petitioner in insisting on its alleged right to be paid the
questioned purchase price. The fact that criminal charges have been flied by the Ombudsman against the principal
protagonists of the sale has, inexplicably, not deterred or discomfited it. It does not appear that the petitioner is
affected by the revelation that it offered the property to the Government even if it was not yet the owner at the time;
acquired it for P3 million after it had been assured that the sale would materialize; and sold it a month later for the
bloated sum of P62 million, to earn a gross profit of P59 million in confabulation with some suspect officials in the
DAR. How the property appreciated that much during that brief period has not been explained. What is clear is the
public condemnation of the transaction as articulated in the mass media and affirmed in the results of the
investigations conducted by the Feria Fact-Finding Committee, the Senate House Joint Committee on Agrarian
Matters, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

It would seem to the Court that the decent tiling for the petitioner to do, if only in deference to a revolted public
opinion, was to voluntarily withdraw from the agreement. Instead, it is unabashedly demanding the exorbitant profit it
would derive from an illegal and unenforceable transaction that ranks as one of the most cynical attempts to plunder
the public treasury.

The above rulings render unnecessary discussion of the other points raised by the petitioner. The Court has given
this petition more attention than it deserves. We shall waste no more time in listening to the petitioner's impertinent
demands. LBP President Deogracias Vistan cannot be faulted for refusing to be a party to the shameful scheme to
defraud the Government and undermine the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program for the petitioner's private
profit. We see no reason at all to disturb his discretion. It merits in fact the nation's commendation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

Facts: Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, Filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. During the pendency of the case, Teodoro Abistado died and was substituted by his children - Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, who were all represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, ad litem ( act in which a lawsuit has a representative in behalf of children not capable of representation.)

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Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of initial public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Records show that applicants failed
to comply with P.D. No. 1529 Section 23 (1) requiring publication of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the application and ordered the registration of title to
Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of general Circulation is merely procedural, hence dispensable.
The Director of Land, represented by the Solicitor General, elevated this case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial hearing in a Land
Registration Case is mandatory.

Held: Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a publication once both in the Official Gazette and
newspaper of general circulation. The Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding, meaning the applicant must
prove his title over the land against all persons concerned, who might have interest to right in the property and should
effectively be invited in the court to prove why the title should not be granted.

Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or
equivocation, there is room only for application.

Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of Land Title to
the respondents.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to
set aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19,
1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision
reads:4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a
new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

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 The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want
of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over
648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G").
Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the
instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose;
the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same
paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion"10 in holding —

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

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Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette
is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply
with the notice requirement of due process."11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation
is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices
to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of
private respondents.

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We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due
process rationale behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the
land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be
barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner
seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not
only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action
for recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can
best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not
be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned
parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is
not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners
of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature
of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did
not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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