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BE2022 - 6 - Aggressive Behaviour
BE2022 - 6 - Aggressive Behaviour
Why fight? And when to fight?
Learning outcomes:
1) Apply a cost and benefit analysis to aggressive
behaviour to determine when it pays off to fight
and when not.
2) Be able to distinguish between different
models that explain the evolution of fighting and
be able to provide examples.
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Fighting = resource or territory defense, defending young
Outcome depends on action of both involved:
1. fight (what will the opponent do?)
2. flee
Fitness of an individual:
Depends on its own behaviour + behaviour of others
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Costs of fighting:
1) lost opportunities
2) physical injury
Costs of not having the
resource/territory:
1) Access to food
2) Access to reproductive opportunities
Two opponents may value the resource differently. 1
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Willingness to fight depends on:
Relative size of animals
Who holds the territory
Physiological state
Value of the territory relative to other locations
Figure 1. Number of contests won (a) and initiated (b) by the resident or the
larger lizard across treatments.
Umbers KDL, Osborne L, Keogh JS
(2012) The Effects of Residency
and Body Size on Contest Initiation
and Outcome in the Territorial
Dragon, Ctenophorus decresii. PLoS
ONE 7(10): e47143.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047143
http://127.0.0.1:8081/plosone/arti
cle?id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.po
ne.0047143
1. HAWK‐ DOVE MODEL (GAME THEORY)
2. WAR OF ATTRITION MODEL
3. SEQUENTIAL ASSESSMENT MODEL
• Evolutionarily selected to increase access to
resources, without getting killed!
• Does result in winners and losers.
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1. ESS EXAMPLE – HAWK‐DOVE GAME
Hawk ‐ will always fight opponent,
may injure opponent or may be
injured. (Poker: the person who
will always rise the bet).
Dove ‐ will attempt to escalate but
retreats as soon as opponent
escalates i.e. never fight opponent.
(Poker: the person who is bluffing).
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
What behavior will persist in a population?
Natural Selection.
Game theory = study of how to
mathematically determine the best strategy
for given conditions in order to optimize the
outcome.
1. ESS EXAMPLE – HAWK‐DOVE GAME
• Behavious involve the interaction of multiple
organisms in a population.
• Success of one individual depends on how it interacts
with others and what the others do.
Analogous to game theory!
Strategy: behaviours
Payoff: fitness
Game matrix: Payoff for individual depends on
strategies of organisms with which it interacts
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EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY
Def:
A strategy is evolutionarily stable if
everyone uses it, and any small group of
invaders with a different strategy will die
off over multiple generations
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1. ESS EXAMPLE – HAWK‐DOVE GAME
Hawk Dove
b
(V(V– –C)/2
C)/2 c
V
Hawk 0
a (V – C)/2
a
d
V/2 d
0
Dove
V V/2
c
b
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1. ESS EXAMPLE – HAWK‐DOVE GAME
• Depends on relative value of V and C.
• If V > C, then being a hawk is the ESS.
• If V < C, then some combination of hawks and
doves becomes the ESS.
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1. ESS EXAMPLE – HAWK‐DOVE GAME
• Can interpret this in two ways:
– All participants in the population are mixing
over two possible pure strategies with given
probability.
– Population level: some animals hard‐wired
to play D and some are hard‐wired to
always play H.
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REAL ANIMALS?
If resource value is low, not worth fighting for,
better to be a dove.
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‐ Play Hawk if a territory holder
‐ Play Dove if not a territory holder
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Burgeois = respect for ownership: hawk‐like
and dove‐like strategies depending on
territory ownership
If an owner: flight like a hawk
If not an owner: act like a dove
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Resource: open
forest patch.
Pararge aegeria‐ speckled
Come across a wood butterfly
territory that is
occupied leave.
Only hawk if territory
holder.
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2. WAR OF ATTRITION
Displaying rather than fighting.
Attempt to wear down the opponent – as time
goes incremental costs for both – who will
resist for longer/give up first?
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2. WAR OF ATTRITION ‐ ASSUMPTIONS
1) Individuals can choose to display aggressively
for any duration of time.
2) Display behaviour is costly, the longer the
display, the more energy expended.
3) No clear cues such as size, territory, etc. that
contestants can use to settle a contest.
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2. WAR OF ATTRITION – LET THE GAME BEGIN
Basic standoff situation, the first one to blink
loses.
If V = value of resource and C is cost, what is the
length of a contest involving displays (x)?
How long do you remain engaged in this?
Depends on V because cost is equal between
the two.
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PROBABILITY OF LENGTH OF DISPLAY
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WHO IS BLINKING AND WHY
Prior experience, food resources for example, how
hungry you are!
Some support of this in the wild. Dungflies
How long should a male stay?
• Too long – fewer and fewer females
• Too short – lost of mating + cost of moving
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
‘Other game models not based on realistic
behavioural mechanisms’.
High behavioral diversity in fighting behaviour.
Combatants assess each other in a series of bouts.
Assessing fighting ability = statistical sample.
More samples = lower error rate
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
Start with least dangerous behaviour and progress.
e.g. Start with behaviour A
Sample each other with respect to A
Collect all information about A
Move to behaviour B
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
Ritualised behaviour in red deer:
1
1) Compare loudness of roars
2) Parallel walk to assess size
3) Antler locking
3 2
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
Dominance hierarchy
1. Change colour
2. Tail beating Increasing
3. Biting aggression
4. Mouth wrestle
Nannocara anomala
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
Not all combatants are equal
they use these differences to
settle fights
• Resource holding potential
• Resource value (i.e. hungry vs.
satiated animal)
• Territory ownership (familiar
with area reduced defense
costs)
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3. Sequential Assessment Model
Early stages of interaction
Fiddler crab
Later stages of interaction
Increasing ‘intensity’/aggressiveness
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